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CONVOY AND VIP ESCORT
Lessons Learned for SoldiersLessons Learned for Soldiers
The Army LessonsLearned Centre
The Army LessonsLearned Centre
National Défense
Defence nationale
VOL 13 NO 1
July 2007
ESCORTEDECONVOI
ETDEVIP
Défense
Defence
National
nationale
LeCentredesleçonsretenuesdel'ArméeLeCentredesleçonsretenuesdel'Armée
VOL13NO1
Juillet2007
DÉPÊCHES Leçonsretenuesapplicablesauxsoldats Leçonsretenuesapplicablesauxsoldats
The Army Lessons Learned Centre
CFB Kingston (613) 541-5010 Extension xxxx
CSN 271-xxxx
HOW TO CONTACT
Director
LCol R Matheson—4909
Assistant Director
Maj W.B. Pond—3291
SO Plans
Maj E.J.A. Lefrancois—4816
SO Operations
Maj E. Morin—5440
SO Reserve
Maj SR Rankin—5117
SO Coordination
Capt CI Clark—4813
Deputy Coordinator
MWO J.W. Hooyer—2890
Matheson LCol RH@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Pond Maj WB@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Lefrancois Maj EJA@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Morin Maj JGCE@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Rankin Maj SR1@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Clark Capt CI1@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Hooyer MWO JW@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
DIRECTOR'S NOTE
In November 1994, the Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC) produced aDispatches publication entitled "Convoy Operations." Now, twelve years later,the issues of convoy operations and very important person (VIP) escort haveresurfaced in light of the challenging counter-insurgency operations inAfghanistan. It is interesting to note that military themes remain constant, butmust be reviewed due to the ever-changing contemporary operatingenvironment (COE).
This "Convoy and VIP Escort" edition of Dispatches is a result of the work ofnumerous officers and non-commissioned members of the Combat TrainingCentre (CTC) who have contributed to the study of convoy and VIP escort "bestpractices." The ALLC is pleased to assist in promulgating this importantdocument.
The ALLC wishes to thank Colonel M.P. Jorgensen and his dedicated CTC stafffor their comprehensive work and commitment to training excellence.
R.H. MathesonLieutenant-ColonelDirector Army Lessons Learned Centre
FOREWORD
Canada has participated in the campaign in Afghanistn since 2002. Throughout ourinvolvement in this campaign, convoys have increasingly become the targets ofchoice for belligerents and insurgents.
The contents of this edition serve to provide a framework of tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTP) for the conduct of convoy and VIP escort. The material containedherein has been compiled from existing publications and TTP, as well as from recentoperational and training experiences of the field force. The Army Lessons LearnedCentre (ALLC) has representation in theatre and provides periodic lessons summariesin the form of Lesson Synopsis Reports and Consolidated Lessons Reports. Thesereports are distributed Army-wide and constitute an invaluable source of informationon emerging insurgent tactics and threats, while providing observations, findingsand relevant recommendations.
It was decided at a recent Army Individual Training Authority Strategic PlanningSession that the field force would benefit by publishing these TTP. Accordingly, thisedition is the first in a series of Dispatches covering the TTP that are pertinent to thecontemporary operating environment (COE). Future topics will include cordon andsearch, room clearing, and checkpoints, all of which will be published later this year.
As TTP for convoy and VIP escort will continually change to counter a fluid threat, Iwelcome your comments and suggestions for improvement. Your observationsshould be forwarded through approved communication channels to the applicablecentre of excellence-the Armour School-at the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown.
M.P. JorgensenColonelCommander CTC / AITA
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REFERENCES
A. B-GL-394-005/FT-000 Convoy and VIP Escort TTP
B. B-GL-005-000/FP 001 Convoy Operations TTP
C. B-GJ-005-316/FP-004 CF Counter-IED TTP Handbook
D. B-GL-394-001/FP-002 Reconnaissance in Battle
E. B-GL-392-009/FP-000 Military Training Volume 1 Fieldcraft
F. B-GL-361-021/FP-001 Mobility Support: Route and Area Clearance
G. Mounted Reconnaissance TTP (Draft) May 2005
H. Combined Arms Team TTP (Draft) Jan 2005
I. ALLC Dispatches Vol. 1 No. 1 — Convoy Operations Nov 1994
J. US Army FM 17-98 Scout Platoon
K. US Army Convoy Leader Training Handbook, Kuwait Oct 2003
L. US Army Lessons Learned, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DISPATCHES 3
CONVOY AND VIP ESCORT
REFERENCES 2
PART 1 INTRODUCTION 4
PART 2 PLANNING FOR CONVOY ESCORT TASKS? 8
PART 3 INTRODUCTION TO "ACTION ON" DRILLS 16
PART 4 RECENT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN 19AFGHANISTAN
PART 5 CONCLUSION 20
ANNEX A LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY 21
PART 1—INTRODUCTION
General
Historically, convoy escort and the mounted escort of VIPs was primarily the doctrinaldomain of the armoured reconnaissance squadron as a function of rear area security(RAS). However, in the contemporary operating environment (COE) there are no rearareas, and mounted escort tasks are far more common and can be assigned to mostfield units. Recent operational experience in Afghanistan, coupled with the lessonsbeing learned by the US Army in Iraq, illustrate the importance of updating andformalizing convoy escort doctrine and TTP for the Canadian Land Force.
This edition of Dispatches provides a summary of the types of escorts, the keyplanning considerations, and select "Action On" drills. It is not intended to replace,but to introduce, reference A.
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...all CSS activities are a deliberate combat operation.
—Theatre Lessons Report 06-032, TFA Roto 1 CSS Support, 01 August 06
In the first three months of this mission, the 12 RBC Battle Group carried outmore than 600 patrols, escorted 90 humanitarian aid convoys, which delivered6000 tons of cargo and 100,000 litres of fuel.
—Interim Operations Report, OP CAVALIER ROTO 2
Key Definitions
A clear understanding of the following definitions is important when planningfor this task:
� Escort Commander. A military officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO) incharge of the military forces assigned to conduct the escort task.
� Escort. The combat force detailed to accompany and protect a column ofvehicles from being scattered, destroyed or captured. Its commander is theescort commander.
� Vehicle Column. A vehicle or groups of vehicles to be escorted. Thesevehicles could carry personnel, arms, ammunition, petroleum, oils andlubricants (POL), supplies, or a very important person (VIP).
� Vehicle Column Commander. The senior military or civilian person incharge of the column to be escorted.
� Convoy Commander. The military officer or NCO overall responsible for theescort force and vehicle column once link-up is complete. For reasons ofunity of command and control, the escort commander is normally appointedas the convoy commander. The convoy commander is, regardless of anyother senior ranking personnel within the convoy, responsible for theconduct of the operation and the safe conduct of the column to itsdestination.
� Convoy. A group of two or more vehicles organized for the purpose ofcontrol and orderly movement. A convoy may be composed of a vehiclecolumn or an escort, and it may also include both civilian and militaryvehicles.
� VIP. Consists of one or more persons of designated special status whosestatus or value requires special protection.
Aim of Escorts. The aim of any escort is to provide protection to an assignedorganization or individual. The two types of escorts most commonly employedare:
� Convoy Escort. The aim is to protect a convoy from being scattered,destroyed or captured. Such vehicles can range from military combat servicesupport (CSS) or command and control (C2) vehicles, to civilian trucks orbuses.
� VIP Escort. The mission is to protect the VIP from being killed or captured.For the purposes of this document, it is concerned with the mountedmovement of the VIP and not their close protection.
Contemporary Operating Environment
Recent experience has shown that escort operations must be treated as carefullyplanned military operations rather than scheduled as routine military road traffic.This point is valid throughout full-spectrum of operations (FSO) and conflict in the
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COE, and re-emphasizes force protection. More than ever, convoys and escort forcesface an increased threat posed by asymmetric forces operating throughout the entirebattlespace. Attacks against static and moving CSS elements will increase as theenemy chooses to attack perceived weaknesses rather than confront the superiorfirepower of the combat forces.
PART 2—PLANNING FOR CONVOY ESCORT TASKS?
Types and Tasks of Escorts
Mechanized forces are well suited to perform escort tasks during all phases of wardue to their firepower and armour protection against direct fire, indirect fire, andmines / improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Additionally, escort forces are furtheroptimized if they are reinforced with aviation or other aerial reconnaissance (recce)support such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). An escort task may be assigned atthe squadron/company level. A troop/platoon should be considered the lowesttactical organization capable of effectively performing an escort task. The elementassigned the escort task is dependent on what is being escorted, its importance, thedistance to travel, and the threat level. This may include the coordination of multipleescorts on different routes.
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The crew commanders, air sentries, and co-drivers need to be particularly alertfor people and vehicles approaching or following their convoy. On numerousoccasions soldiers have spotted individuals (sometimes locals, sometimesforeigners), following, videotaping, or noting what convoys were doing. Therehas been a distinct correlation with regard to observation followed by a higherthreat posture against ISAF [International Security Assistance Force], mainly atthe start and end of rotations.
—Observation, OP ATHENA ROTO 2
Escort Methods. There are two methods to perform escorting tasks:
� standard method; and
� tunnel method.
Standard Method
In the standard method of escort, all elements directly involved in the task areintegral to the convoy or VIP under escort as illustrated in Figure 1. This method ismore reactive in nature. It is used when the route is in good condition, passable toall vehicles, and the threat of enemy action is relatively low.
An escorting force employing the standard method will, as a minimum, consist ofthree tactical groups:
� Advance Group. This group is the leading element of the escort. It moves tacticallyand proves the route, acting as early warning for the follow-on elements. Its task mayalso include the recce of detours and the establishment of pickets.
� Close Protection Group. This group consists of combat escort vehicles dispersedthroughout the main body of the convoy. Its task is to provide the immediateclose protection to the vehicle column.
� Reserve Group. This group provides a rear guard/reserve to react quickly to theconvoy commander's direction and to assist the close protection group if acontact is encountered. It is also where the medical and recovery resources arelocated if attached.
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a. Advance Group. This group is the leadingelement of the escort. It proves the safety ofthe route and provides early warning prior tothe arrival of the vehicle column. As aminimum, it consists of two vehicles formutual support.
b. Close Protection Group. This group providesthe immediate close protection of the vehiclecolumn. The escort commander is locatedwithin this group.
c. Reserve Group. This element provides a rearguard/reserve and also medical and recoveryresources of the convoy (if attached). Twoarmoured vehicles with medical and recoveryassets.
Two escort vehicles withadditional assets (i.e. LiaisonOfficer, or Engineer SupportParty with vehicle mountedblade or Surface MunitionsClearance Device [SMCD]).
Distance depends on taskand situation (e.g. 2 km /5 min interval).
Main body of the convoyincluding the closeprotection group, theescorted vehicles, andadditional assets asrequired (e.g. ForwardObservation officer [FOO]).
Distance depends on taskand situation (e.g. 2 km /5 min interval).
Figure 1: Standard Method of Convoy Escort
LO
ENGR
Tunnel Method
The tunnel method is similar to the standard method; however, additional resourcesare allocated to provide security, early warning, and reaction along the route, asillustrated in Figure 2. This method is more proactive. It is used to escort anythingthat warrants higher protection than what is provided through employment of thestandard method.
During the tunnel method, there are typically two tactical groups used to provideadditional security, early warning, and reaction. They are:
� Security Group. This group creates the imaginary tunnel for the escort to travelthrough along the planned route as illustrated in Figure 2. It deploys prior to theescort's departure, and is tasked with observation over watch in order to reporten route status, provide early warning, and protect the route through the use ofprecision direct or indirect fire.
� Rapid Reaction Group (RRG). This group is a dedicated reserve force whosemission is to provide immediate assistance. It is normally located in a staticposition (hide/waiting area); however, it may move independently from locationto location depending on the length of the "tunnel" and threat level.
The tunnel method may also require additional assets to effectively conduct the task,such as snipers, engineers, direct fire vehicles, UAVs, helicopters and/or militarypolice (MP).
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Figure 2: This is an example of tunnel method with tactical groups deployed along aconvoy route. Once the "tunnel" is in place, the convoy and escort proceed down the"tunnel" using the same groupings and movement as in the standard method.Abbreviations: SP—start point; TCP—traffic control point; RRG—rapid reaction group;UAV—unmanned aerial vehicle; and RP—release point.
Tactical Movement
Regardless of whether an escorting force uses the standard or the tunnel method,the advance group normally moves tactically with mutual support. They will notnormally conduct drills, however, they will investigate anomalies along the route thatcould affect the main body. Conversely, the close protection and reserve groupsmove at a constant speed and spacing to avoid bunching and straggling.
Stages of an Escort
The following are suggested stagesfor conducting an escort task:
� Stage 1—Preparation and Planning.
� Stage 2—Conduct of the Escort.
� Stage 3—Redeployment, AfterAction Review (AAR) / Debrief ofthe Escort Force.
Stage —Preparation and Planning
General. Upon receipt of an escort task, the escort commander conducts normalbattle procedure. The paragraphs contained in this section outline a few of the keydeductions that are specific to this type of task.
Detailed Time Appreciation. The detailed time appreciation must be conducted inconjunction with the detailed map recce. This will assist commanders indetermining:
� when liaison with the vehicle column commander / VIP will be conducted;
� how much time is available to make a recce plan, conduct the recce, prepare andissue orders; and
� how much time is available for subordinate commanders to conduct their battleprocedure.
Detailed Map Reconnaissance. Conducting a detailed map recce will permit theescort commander to understand what effect and influence the terrain will haveupon the execution of the mission. It includes primary and alternative routes, theenemy, and the terrain along the route(s). Specific attention must be paid to thestart point, release point, and other points along a route where interference withmovement may occur, or where timing is critical.
Prepare a Reconnaissance Plan. The planning and recce of the probable route(s)that the escort will follow and any possible alternative or bypass routes are critical tothe escort task. The route recce should be conducted covertly to avoid alerting theenemy of the possible operation and route(s) to be used. Aerial recce assets can beused to overfly the route(s). Engineer assets, if available, should be used to assist inthe recce.
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Conduct the Reconnaissance. The recce is conducted to confirm the condition andsuitability of the route(s), and to ensure that it is clear of obstacles and hostilethreats. It also serves to confirm the information gathered from the detailed mapappreciation and assist the escort commander in determining which escort methodwill be used, as well as thelevel of surveillancerequired. The requirementfor a liaison officer orinterpreter may be identifiedat this time to help with thepassage of lines through otherfriendly units' areas ofresponsibility (AORs), dealwith the affected localpopulation, etc. It must bekept in mind that recceinformation acquired severaldays in advance may need tobe updated immediately priorto the operation.
Combat Estimate—Key Factors. The key factors for consideration in the combatestimate are as follows:
� Enemy
� Type/size / order of battle (ORBAT).
� Locations (possible and confirmed).
� Equipment, vehicle and weapons.
� Intent, and recent actions.
� Capabilities and weaknesses.
� Standing operating procedures (SOP)/tactics for attacks/roadblocks, snipers,ambush, minefields, IEDs, etc.
� Confrontation lines on the route, location, and check points.
� Likelihood of direct or indirect fire attack.
� How they would react to friendly actions.
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Timely, accurate intelligence is a two-way street, as the convoys both collects andbenefits from the final product. As they are a daily presence on the road,transportation assets became an integral part of the intelligence collection process.
—Observation, OP ATHENA ROTO 2
� Ground (Route and Influencing Terrain)
� Terrain type (e.g. open, closed, urban, rural).
� Type of main route (e.g. paved, single/multi lane, conditions and classification).
� Defiles/canalizing ground.
� Obstacles (natural and man-made).
� Bridges (class and condition).
� Built-up areas (BUAs)—size/location/bypasses.
� Alternative routes/detours / return route.
� Halt/resting areas.
� Emergency hides, friendly bases, possible landing zones (LZs).
� Dominating positions (e.g. hills, buildings, towers).
� Overpasses/ambush sites along the route.
� Communications dead zones? Location / radio rebroadcast (RRB) sites available?
� Operational or factional boundaries? Liaison required?
� Weather
� Effect on the road conditions, now/during.
� Effect on visibility/surveillance sensors and optics.
� Effect on aerial support.
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� Own Troops
� Escort—resources available. Are they sufficient or are additionaltroops/attachments required?
� Own rules of engagement (ROE).
� Deception plan—if so, what is it? Where/when?
� Do we have electronic warfare assets?
� Does the convoy have compatible radios or not?
� Is there a requirement for a LO(s) and/or translator(s)?
� What are the locations of other friendly forces that can assist if required?
� Convoy organization to include chain of command.
� Where is the controlling HQ?
� Number of vehicles to be escorted.
� Type of vehicles to be escorted (e.g. mobility, speed, armoured protectionrequired?) Are they armed?
� National origin of the column and their ROE.
� Their national ROE.
� If civilian vehicles are being escorted, are they easily distinguished from regularcivilian traffic?
� Vulnerability/importance of what is being escorted.
� Combat service support:
� casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)/medical arrangements en route;
� recovery requests/vehicle breakdown procedure;
� alternative communications procedures if radios do not work within theconvoy; and
� replenishment of combat supplies if required.
� Time and Space
� Time of day the convoy will travel.
� Time by which column must arrive at its destination.
� Estimated travel time.
� Earliest time column can arrive at check points / destination.
� Requirements for halts en route.
� Allowance for delays or unforeseen circumstances.
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� First/last light.
� Time for subordinates to conduct battle procedure.
� Time for the escort to return to its parent unit location.
� Rehearsal time prior to conducting the operation.
� Time available air support can be on station and its duration.
� Other Considerations
� Civilian attitude? (e.g. friendly, neutral, hostile).
� Civilian traffic patterns? (e.g. vehicle spacing of the convoy, avoidance of rushhour traffic).
� Refugee issues—are there any; are they friendly; how to deal with them?
� Non-governmental organization (NGOs)—is there a need for interaction?
� Media—embedded, freelance?
� Local hospitals we could use in an emergency? Security plan if used?
� Local, national, or religious holidays? Could movement cause unrest orescalate issues?
� Are any additional control measures required.
� VIP escort considerations:
� How to identify the VIP.
� Composition and actions of the VIP's personal close protection group.
� Will the VIP travel in an armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) or a decoy vehicle?
� When does the escort commander become responsible for the VIP?
� Additional control measures required:
� assign nicknames to routes and waiting/safe areas;
� use of grid intersection points (GIP); and
� identify prominent locations or points along the route.
Courses of Action. Any escort task has three possible courses of action: tunnelmethod; standard method; or a combination of both. Once all of the factors and keydeductions have been considered, courses of action are then developed.
Plan. Once the plan has been determined, "Action On" drills must be established orconfirmed for all foreseeable eventualities (See Part Three). The escort commanderwill normally back-brief higher command on the escort plan, emphasizing anyadditional control measures or additional assets required. The escort commander willcommunicate this plan to the escort force using the standard orders format (Seereference A for suggested orders format).
Stage 2—Conduct of the Escort
The following list outlines the chronological steps taken to conduct an escort task:
� Orders are issued to the escorting force.
� The escort force moves to the link-up location.
� Based on the level of threat, all-round security is established.
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ROE. As a normal activity, early discussion of ROE is a must and should beconducted as a routine activity / marrying-up drill even in training. Differences orlimitations in regard ROE need not be an obstacle to effective operations if all partiesclearly understand the differences
—CFLO USMC 14 Jul 05 Report TRUEX
� The escort commander liaises with the senior person of the force to be escortedand establishes the chain of command.
� Marry-up drills are conducted to include:
� exchange frequencies and call signs;
� number of personnel and their primary language;
� number and type of vehicles including confirmation of the cargo;
� types of weapons carried and their nation's ROE; and
� any other pertinent information that may affect the plan.
� Convoy inspection (in the case of VIP escort, confirm the identity of the person(s)being escorted).
� Crew/driver briefings to include issuing of maps/route cards. Sample briefingformat included in reference A.
� Convoy marshalling.
� Conduct of "Action On" rehearsals.
� Establishment of over watch and check points (tunnel method).
� Departure of the Advance Group.
� Departure of the Close-Protection Group.
� Departure of the Reserve Group.
� Conduct arrival drills and vehicle inspections at the destination.
� Tactical re-deployment of theEscort Force.
During the conduct of an escort task,all members of the convoy must bealert and maintain situationalawareness against possible threats.The escort force should notice anychanges from previous recce, and thecommander must be prepared toimplement contingency plans for anychanges to the tactical situation.However, all participants must be alertfor the following:
� Suspicious movement near and on overpasses (as they provide excellent areas forIEDs and/or ambush sites).
� Abandoned vehicles along the route (possible vehicle-borne IED).
� Foreign objects en route (possible IED).
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� Sudden activity as the convoyapproaches.
� Local population dispersing ordisappearing.
� Fresh road repairs (possibleIED/mines).
� Signs of tampering, exposedwires, or items attached to thebackside of guard rails.
� Movement on rooftops and inwindows of buildings.
Stage 3—Redeployment and After Action Review / Debrief of theEscort Force
Once released from the escort task, the escort force may return to their point oforigin via an alternative route if possible, or receive a subsequent task. If the securityforce is still in place securing the tunnel, this route should be used for the return trip.
Once redeployed to a safe area, an after action review (AAR)/debrief of the missionshould be conducted to analyze the task and capture lessons learned. A reportshould be submitted upon completion of the mission including information on theroad conditions, enemy/belligerent disposition, conditions of the local populace, andother details. This is an important method in updating the intelligence situation andcan assist in the planning and conduct of future operations.
PART 3—INTRODUCTION TO "ACTION ON" DRILLS
General
The paragraphs contained in this section outline four major "Action On" drills forsniper, ambush, IEDs, and halts. For a more complete list of "Action On" drills seereference A.
Action On Sniper
The following list provides the actions on for a sniper contact:
� The convoy should NOT stop.
� The escort commander must develop a course of action (COA), considering the
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One of the most prominent methods of attacking convoys has been attackingfrom overpasses with small arms, RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and IEDs.This allows an attacking force good observation and fields of fire, good coverand concealment (often), and quick escape routes.
—Maj Eric O. Estep, Support Ops Plans, 3rd COSCOM, LSA Anaconda, IRAQ on 16 Oct 03
relevant factors as to what the sniper is trying to achieve:
� To harass the convoy/target a specific individual; or
� To force the convoy to:
� stop and deploy (possible baited ambush);
� continue at a greater speed (possible baited ambush);
� turn around;
� take alternative route;
� canalize into a kill zone; and
� commit its quick reaction force (QRF) / rapid reaction group (RRG).
� All personnel in armoured vehicles should go hatches down.
� The escort force may, on order, use direct fire to suppress the sniper, althoughtime should not be wasted attempting to locate and isolate the threat.
Action On Ambush
Regardless of the ambush scenario, the convoy commander's response must includethe following:
� Immediate offensive action within ROE.
� Arrangements for halting and protecting that part of the convoy not caught inthe ambush.
� Action to extricate that part of the convoy caught in the ambush.
� Instructions for all vehicle column drivers to, if applicable, clear the road to permitthe escort to manoeuvre.
Action On Improvised Explosive Devices
While the CF Counter-IED TTP Handbook at reference C should be consulted fordetails, the following key activities should be taken upon an IED detonation:
� Quick, lethal and aggressiveresponse in accordance withROE.
� Establish all-round security ofdisabled vehicles fortreatment/evacuation of casualties.
� Mobile vehicles move out ofthe kill zone to establish a RVwith all-round security.
� Report situation.
� Re-establish the order of march and continue the task.
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Action On Halts
If the halt is for any reason other than an obstacle, these actions should be taken:
� The convoy commander signals the halt and transmits the order by radio. He willalso inform his higher commander of his action.
� Escort vehicles take up protective positions forward, to the rear, and to the flanks.They orient their weapon systems outward and may, dependent on the escortcommander's plan and the mine threat, establish dismounted local security.
� Escorted vehicles with weapons systems must also cover arcs outwards aroundthe halt area. Drivers should remain mounted and be prepared to move onimmediate notice.
� When the order is given to move, escorted vehicles re-establish the columnformation, leaving space for the escort vehicles. The escort vehicles then moveinto their positions, leaving local security dismounted.
� Once all elements are in column, local security personnel mount, and the convoycontinues its movement.
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Figure 4: Action on Halt (showing sample arcs of fire). When required, dismounted personnelshould be interspersed among the escort vehicles to provide additional protection.
If traveling in soft skin vehicles, one Soldier wears earplugs the entire time.Then, if an IED/RPG is detonated or fired, that Soldier can continue tocommunicate effectively on the radio.
—U.S. CALL SBCT Monthly Bulletin, Volume 22,December 2003
PART 4—RECENT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN
Recent operational experience in southern Afghanistan since early 2006 hasseen less traditional convoy escorts, yet innumerable "convoy operations."All convoys in theatre have integral combat power provided by a number oforganizations. A typical convoy could consist of five to ten CSS vehiclesand three or more several fighting vehicles such as Coyotes, light armouredvehicles (LAVs), RG-31 Nyala mine protected vehicles, and light utilityvehicles wheeled command and recce (LUVW C&R) variants. Theseintegrated CSS convoys usually move as a single entity without an advancegroup or reserve group. The fighting vehicles (escorts—close protectiongroup) can come from the battle group (BG) or from the National SupportElement (NSE) integral defence and security (D&S) platoon trained andconfigured to conduct convoy operations.
Nevertheless, convoy escorts still occur in the current COE where a fighting
echelon sub-sub unit or sub-unit is given the task of escorting a convoy
from another organization. In addition, the TTP
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PART 5—CONCLUSION
Convoy escort TTP and amplifying doctrine are not meant to limit theresponse of escort commanders, but serve to outline the guiding principlesand provide all personnel involved with the tools necessary to effectivelyplan for and respond to any threat. During operations, escort tasks willcontinue to play a vital role to ensure force protection in the COE as ourlines of supply and communication are increasingly vulnerable to anasymmetric and evolving threat.
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CSS Veh
Cbt Veh
Cbt Veh
CSS Veh
Cbt Veh
� The convoy will usually have combat vehicles atthe front, middle and rear of the convoy, with anRG-31, LAV or Coyote in the lead. CSS vehicles(vehs) may be BISON, heavy lift vehicle wheeled(HLVW), etc.
� The convoy escort concept without the AdvanceGroup and the Reserve Group (due to resources intheatre).
� The convoy may have additional vehs, such ascombat vehs and CSS vehs according to thesituation and re-supply tasks.
� Concept when attacked: Push through a threatand never leave anybody behind. If a veh is battle-damaged and cannot move, the middle and rearFP vehs will stay behind to destroy the enemy. Ifnot, it will bring all personnel to the next boundand deny any equipment prior leaving the enemykill zone (KZ).
Figure 5. Example of a CSS Convoy during JTF-Afghanistan Roto 1 , Feb to August 2006(variations occurred throughout the deployment, and this should be taken as a guide).
..Convoy TTP will continue to be followed and all vehicle movement "outside thewire" will be treated as a combat patrol.
—Incident Lessons Report 06-054, SVBIED Attack on16 Oct 06, JTF, Afg Roto 2
ANNEX A—LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY� There are no "rear areas," and no one in a convoy is just a passenger. Remain alert
(watch for potential threats). If it looks out of place, IT PROBABLY IS!
� The AAR process should be used to establish sound convoy escort SOP.
� At the link-up, time should be allocated to ensure that "Action On" drills could berehearsed with all involved.
� Clearly establish the convoy chain of command.
� When doing his inspection, the convoy commander should ensure that convoyloads are properly secured. Loads that shift or fall off of the truck create hazardsand could possibly force the vehicles to stop creating an easy target.
� Avoid routines for standing escort tasks.
� Take the quickest lane, and if the road quality is equal, travel down the middle ofthe road, avoiding the vulnerable shoulders.
� External assets, in the forms of fire support, UAVs, helicopter recce, fast air andgunships, can be essential to mission success. Ensure that if these assets aredesignated to support a convoy escort that someone in the convoy is trained andcapable of directing their effects.
� Build up as much protection on each vehicle as possible IAW theatre SOP. Allconvoy vehicles should be equipped with tow bars or tow straps for quickrecovery.
� Every vehicle should have radio communications. Redundant communicationmethods should be considered.
� Breakdowns will occur; a plan must be in place.
� When the mine threat is high, road inspection and mine clearing should beperformed daily. In these areas, drivers should drive in the tracks of precedingvehicles.
� Be alert for people (including local media) observing or videotaping convoyactivities. If people appear to be counting the number of vehicles in your convoy,or seem overly interested, stay alert (especially if they are speaking on a cellphone)! They may be gathering info on TTP, or may be a scout or a recce assetfor a potential ambush force farther down the road, and may signal yourapproach. There has been a direct correlation between observation and attacks.
� Watch for lights flashing or going on/off, or listen for horns honking. These couldbe signals for an ambush force nearby. Other signalling methods include non-aimed gunfire. Recognizing the signals can help you anticipate an attack andavoid an engagement altogether.
� In built-up areas, watch for the absence of children where there are normallymany. If the locals avoid it, so should you.
� Be cautious when approaching overpasses or embankments.
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� Know your ROE! More importantly, ensure all members of the convoy are clearon the Open Fire Policy.
� Maintain convoy speed at all times. Do not stop for any longer than absolutelynecessary.
� Smaller non-armoured vehicles should use evasive movement in ambushes.
� If you encounter human obstacles (civilian or protestor), it is not your job to meettheir demands, and they may be linked to enemy activity. They want you to stop!
� One of the biggest keys to success in convoy escort tasks is live fire training.Include it whenever possible.
� Ensure that all soldiers involved in convoy escort operations are intimately familiarwith friendly force recognition SOP.
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Remember that the enemy is not the only threat to a convoy.
Apart from enemy action, most accidents during convoys are due to driverfatigue. Speeding, and following too close are the second and third mostcommon causes of convoy accidents.
—Observation—British Army Convoy Operations
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