Voter's Paradox and Logrolling: An Initial Framework for Committee Behavior on Appropriations and Ways and Means

Voter's Paradox and Logrolling: An Initial Framework for Committee Behavior onAppropriations and Ways and MeansAuthor(s): Terry SullivanSource: Public Choice, Vol. 25 (Spring, 1976), pp. 31-44Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30022856 .

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3 Articles

VOTER'S PARADOX

AND LOGROLLING: AN INITIAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMMITTEE

BEHAVIOR ON APPROPRIATIONS AND

WAYS AND MEANS

Terry Sullivan

Richard Blydenburgh has argued that the explanation for the "closed rule" in

Congressional decision-making stems from the fact that "... . members of the House are instinctively aware that Revenue bills introduced under an open rule may well meet all the conditions of what is called the paradox of voting (p. 58)." Recent theoretical works on logrolling support this conjecture and represent an important foundation for greater understanding of the wide range of activities of congressmen in the major committees. What follows is an explanation, based upon this new theoretical material, of congressional behavior as observed in two major committees.

To the casual observe, congressional politics appears to be a murky, complicated affair which rarely betrays any semblance of order. To be sure, this

murky affair has not often been clarified by analysts of the legislative process : one

congressman has complained, "I actually taught political science years ago, and I *I would like to thank Norm Frohlich for his criticism and encouragement in this

matter. Also, I appreciate the comments and assistance of Joe Oppenheimer and Samuel Popkin, as well as the editorial suggestions of Dianne Sullivan and Gordon Tullock. University of Texas at Austin.

1David Mayhew's book, Congress: the Electoral Connection, is an exception to this rule. In assuming that re-election is the primary goal of congressmen, Mayhew sees the institutional prestige of Congress as a collective good which congressmen whish to organize so as to supply themselves. In this context, Appropriations and Ways and Means are tools by which the



32 PUBLIC CHOICE

didn't know a thing about Congress until I came here. It seems like the whole idea of political science was to take the politics out of it. You sure get an inaccurate picture (Kingdon, p. 3)."

Whether the picture is inaccurate or just overly complex, one thing seems clear: the picture of legislative politics, at least with respect to the major committees, lacks any clearly defined foundation. In attempting to explain the workings of such powerful committees as The House Appropriations Committee or the Ways and Means Committee, political analysts have traditionally dealt with the committee as a subsystem of the congressional "system" (see Rieselbach). Using this these analysts have uncovered a wide variety of activities and "norms" of behavior common to the major committees.

While it is undeniable that such behavioral patterns exist on these committees, this method of analysis is incomplete and, therefore, unconvincing. There is, for example, no reasonable scenario for the development of these norms, e.g., if it is agreed that such patterns exist, where do they come from? Second, such explanations lack an overarching assumption set which could afford some insight into committee activity. Where such norms of behavior exist, it is not apparent what type of assumptions concerning the individual legislator is consistent with such behavior, nor is it clear what prompts committee members to accept them. As a result, it is not apparent when these norms will be violated by committee members.

This paper attempts to fill this gap by constructing an encompassing framework for the analysis of committee action in the House Appropriations Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means-the two most influential committees in the Congress. This framework assumes that members act rationally to achieve their own self-interested goals.

The House Appropriations Committee and the Committee on Ways and Means are the two strongest of the "big three" committees of the House2. These two deal primarily with finance, taxation, and appropriations-all issues with two important characteristics. First, every member of the House must deal with these committees at some time if he is to secure beneficial legislation for his constituency (Manley, 1965, pp. 96-97; and Mayhew, 1966, p. 146). As one member of the Appropriations Committee put it, "They've all got projects in over here and they know what we can do to them (Fenno, 1973, p. 3)." Second, the preferences and interests of committee members relating to such fluid matters as taxation and appropriations are more likely to be varied.3 There is, therefore, little consistency institution supplies itself. Mayhew does not deal, however, with the cause of those norms which guide the committees which would suggest a somewhat different reasoning behind the success of the two major committees-the voter's paradox.

2Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Rules.

3According to Fenno, Appropriations members seek to protect the power of the purse (the power of the committee), guard the Treasury, create individual influence and protect constituency interests. It is the fact that these goals are contradictory which causes the problems associated with logrolling.



VOTER'S PARADOX 33

or continuity among various members as to preferences across alternatives

(Blydenburgh, pp. 59-60). As a result of these conditions, Appropriations and Ways and Means are the

center of logrolling activities in the House. Each member of these committees endeavors to supply legislation that is favorable to his own constituency, whether it be farm, urban poor, or white Catholic, but since representation and committee

work, unlike that of the "policy" committees, is not concerned with any single sugject, each member's preferences on narrow constituency interests will not find broad support. For example, there will be little interest or support from the

congressman (or the people) of the 10th district of New York for appropriations for a project in the 1st district of Colorado. It is, therefore, the attitude of a

majority of members of the committee that any single alternative, excluding their

own, is not needed in the proposed committee report, i.e. on each issue no alternative is favored by a majority except the alternative of exclusion.

The majority of the committee in this case favors alternatives like

" .... guarding the Treasury or pruning the budget (Fenno, 1966, p. 3)...," forcing each member to secure wide support for his own particular legislation on the committee by promising support for other member's legislation, which is in similar straits. Thus, to secure enough support to get a favorable vote on the

committee, a member becomes what Howard Baker, Sr. called ". . . a horsetrader. Exports, imports, that sort of thing (Manley, 1970, p. 81)." He

logrolls. Though narrow constituency issues garner no support, members may be able to create a "package" of such horse trades with enough support to pass.

The building of these logrolling coalitions on major committees is

accomplished in two ways. First, members may simply exchange their votes on issue alternatives that are before the committee. These exchanges may be made with members of other committees for a favorable vote on legislation which is

important to one committee member but before the other congressman's committee; or, they may simply be a matter of accruing debts for the committee member to call in at some future date. The second method of logrolling is what is known as a "member's bill:" minor favors -" . ... which may be very big favors to individual congressmen (Ibid., p. 436). ... "-presented to the House for unanimous consent, once unanimous approval has been given by the committee. In both of these logrolls, committee members form a successful coalition of minorities across issues, a coalition which favors the minority alternative on each of the issues before the committee.

Two recent theoretical works4 on the question of logrolling have reached conclusions important to the study of committee decision-making. In both of these

studies, it was demonstrated that the preference orderings which allow logrolling are logically equivalent to the preferences which support a voter's paradox. The theorem states that

4Bernholz, and Oppenheimer, 1973.



34 PUBLIC CHOICE

If unrestricted vote trading is permitted with regard to a finite number of independent (ie. separable), m-sided issues with any simple or

special majority rule, precisely those preferences which allow for an effective logroll, lead to a voting cycle, or cyclic majority. Furthermore, if (in such situations) the individuals' preferences do not support a

cycle then such a logrolling coalition is not efficacious (Oppenheimer, 1975, p. 963).

Obivously, this conclusion is of paramount importance, not only for its role in

asserting the empirical significance of the voter's paradox, but also as it helps to

clarify committee and logrolling behavior.5 The logical connection between logrolling and the voter's paradox (or cyclical

majorities) implies several things for the legislative process in Appropriations and

Ways and Means. First, since logrolling is the product of a coalition of minorities, the majority position on each issue is not necessarily the alternative selected in the final outcome of the committee process. This is so because the majority of the committee would prefer the status quo (or the alternative of exclusion), rather than the particular legislative alternative which is an element of the logroll, in the absence of the logroll. One can argue, therefore, that the presence of the logrolling package and thus of cyclical majorities thwarts the "true" majority will of the committee.

Since the preferences which support the logrolling coalition also support a voter's paradox, the final outcome of the committee decision process is an arbitrary solution. The crux of the voter's paradox is that rationally acting individuals with transitive preference orderings can and do reach intransitive preferences as a group. Thus, members may prefer a sales tax to income tax; and prefer an income tax to an excise tax; yet the preferences of the group are such that the excise tax is also

preferred to the sales tax.6 Because of the cycle of majorities, the social choice is not dependent solely

upon the individual preferences involved but rather is a function of who controls the decision process itself. As a result, those who control the process of

5Schwartz has shown that the appearance of vote trades does not imply that the underlying preferences need support a voter's paradox, that there can be vote trades where there is a Condorcet winner. This is so as long as cooperation costs are arranged so that some decisive coalitions are unable to form. What "logrolling" implies is a coalition of minorities in the sense first employed by Downs, pp. 54-57. That is, logrolling is concerned with coalitions and vote trades where a decisive coalition favors the vote trading outcome over the outcome attained in the absence of vote trading. It is unlikely that such vote trading as Schwartz mentioned is an empirical possibility, since it is unlikely that the decision process would discriminate against the interests of the decisive coalition in any meaningful way. For example, a decision process which is sequential, i.e involves several steps, would guarantee that some vote trade could not thwart the will of the decisive coalition. On the other hand, it is quite likely that logrolling, vote trading outcomes which are favored by a decisive coalition, is a reasonable description of empirical reality.

As in the 1932 Revenue Act of the Appropriations Committee, reported in Blydenburgh, as well as the 1938 Revenue Act.



VOTER'S PARADOX 35

decision-making are inordinately influential. Since issue alternatives obviously have a better chance of winning the later in the process they are proposed, control of the debate and control of amendments is crucial to the final outcome.

These implications of the voter's paradox and of logrolling are central to

understanding the two major problems facing Appropriations and Ways and Means. First, members of the committee are faced with the problems which concern the securing of logrolls. Since the coalitions formed are arbitrarily decided upon by the decision process to favor a particular set of minority alternatives, several committee norms need to be established to promote the ease of securing coalitions and commitments which are binding over time. Second, since the group preferences in the committee are intransitive, newly-proposed amendments threaten the existence of the particular coalition of alternatives, once formed. Therefore, the amending process needs to be limited wherever possible and limited in such a way as to protect the arbitrary decision already reached and, thus, protect the power of those who control the process. This arbitrainess of the outcome is the source of power, for those who set the agenda and rules decide to a great extent what the outcome will be. The norms set up to provent amendments are guarantees that the logrolling coalition will not be challenged successfully once it has been created. As these norms reaffirm the power of the senior members who control the committee decision process, committee members (and, later, House members) make their contribution to the successful supply of the collective good forming the bill passing, reelection nexus (see Mayhew, 1974, pp. 8,150-58 and Riker, 1958). Obviously, the committee members and other legislators have a great deal at stake in these rules since they assure that any logroll, once decided upon, will be successfully passed through the committee and House even though a maj ority would prefer some other alternative outcome.

Since the preferences of the House are important once a bill passes out of committee, amendments in that stage of the process also need to be controlled; committee and House norms (Froman, p. 128) to protect the coalition of alternatives formed in the committee are necessary. These two major problems, securing and then protecting an arbitrary coalition, are derived from the conditions of the voter's paradox and as such supply a consistent explanation for the appearance of the committee "norms" cited in the literature on committee behavior.

To secure logrolls, committee members must be allowed the widest possible latitude in combining preferences; they must be able to combine with others in any possible arrangement, with the decision process overcoming the restrictions placed on committee members by constituents, party, and ideology. To limit the constraint of constituents, the "mark-up"7 must be held in "executive session," that is in secret. These informal, closed-door affairs protect the members from

being seen as "selling out" their constituency interests (say in guarding the Treasury) and protect the members from giving such campaign issues to would-be

opponents. 7"Mark-up" is held after the committee hearings on the bill are completed in order to

determine the exact content of the bill.



36 PUBLIC CHOICE

Even though shielded from their constituency by this secrecy, committee members still may be constrained by partisan or ideological considerations. To avoid such constraints, it is important for the committee members to act as if the issues before the committee were non-ideological in content. Thus, in the eyes of the committee, matters of finance, taxation, etc. are issues which concern "money" rather than "policy," which is to say "..... a disagreement on money isn't like a legislative program (see Fenno, 1973, p. 3)... ." This is not to say that issues which involve finance and expenditures are devoid of some ideological content, but it does say that committee members will not limit their freedom to logroll because of ideology. To reduce further the constraints upon the committee, members abide by the norm of non-partisanship.

The ability to logroll depends, to a great extent, upon this ability to be flexible in the decision-making progress, but this latitude is tenuous; such wide-ranging flexibility requires a very controlled environment. Hence, enforcement and cooperation are major factors influencing an atmosphere conducive to logrolling. To achieve and protect such an atmosphere every individual member must adhere to the norm of reciprocity; a trade implies debts. In this fashion, every member's responsibilities concerning logrolling are obvious and enforcement arrangements are facilitated. As a result, any member who does not abide by the norm demonstrates an unwillingness to hold to his bargains and soon becomes a pariah on the committee.

In securing participation in coalitions, the committee norms favor the "expertise" of the senior members and especially the "expertise" of the chairman. Since any combination of alternatives is potentially successful (or also potentially unsuccessful), choice of the alternatives available to committee vote is limited by this deference to the wishes of the committee seniority on either side.8 More importantly, these members are also the members who can decide the bill's shape through dominance of the committee's procedural apparatus, when they are faced by the non-compliance with committee norms of some members. For the individual legislator, caught in this process, it becomes easier to allow the committee leadership to control the logrolling process and to concentrate upon receiving an even hand from the seniority, than to challenge the arbitrary control of the seniority. To challenge such arbitrary authority, because of the cyclic nature of the preferences involved, is to court disastorous chaos.

On the floor, in postpartum debate, the norm of expertise is again heeded as protection of the control of the decision process. House members are expected to defer to the judgement of the committee, and thus to the coalition of alternatives decided on by the senior leadership. At this point, control of the process is partially in the hands of the party floor leaders and thus their views must also be taken into account during the control of the process in committee sessions. This "expertise" controls the process of decision and debate and, hence, amendment and the

8Mayhew, 1974, adds the reasoning of institutional maintenance to this reasoning as the explanation for difference to the hard working chairman.



VOTER'S PARADOX 37

creation of new successful coalitions. Since members on the floor are hesitant to upset the balance of the

committee coalition (Kingdon, p. 134), these floor norms keep the debate and amendment process in the hands of the committee (Ibid., pp. 266-67). This is, of

course, important, since any alternative can possibly be beaten by some other alternative and so on ad infinitum. This would disrupt the floor activity, "roll" the committee (with accompanying effects on committee prestige), and, of course, disrupt the coalitions set up in the original report, i.e., those of the senior members in the "policy" committee (where relevant) and the "money" committees, the committee chairman, and the various party leaders involved. Each of these

members, therefore, has an interest in preventing amendments on the floor. The

pressures they can control are exerted toward attaining compliance with the

"expertise" norm on the floor in order to protect the original coalition of minority positions.

In addition to these norms placed on House members, committee members themselves have norms which limit floor debate and amendment. Fear of being "rolled" on the floor prompts members to seek the strongest bill possible, i.e. the coalition with the most committee support. Once on the floor, this norm of

avoiding committee defeat helps promote the solidarity of the committee, especially with regard to preventing amendments. As long as there is no minority report (and there usually is not9) and no defection from the committee, the floor norm of "expertise" exerts even greater pressure to thwart amendment.

Some bills may be so important that out-coalition members feel it worthwhile to resist "norms" and pressure to conform, and seek to amend the bill. This is

especially dangerous, as late-proposed alternatives have a better chance of passage in a cycle of majorities (Black, p. 40). Such bills as taxation, a chief product of Ways and Means (Rieselbach, p. 120), thus require further protection. This is supplied by a vote of the Rules Committee to consider the bill under a "closed rule," even

though a bill from Ways and Means is privledged and may be brought to the floor without passing through the Rules Committee first. Known as the "gag-rule" the closed rule prevents any amendments to the bill which have not obtained the

approval of the committee. As a result, amendments which could upset the present coalition of alternatives are excluded, and the cycle of successful coalitions is

prevented from moving continuously on. For Appropriations, rules preventing points of order likewise protect the committee report (Fenno, 1966, pp. 423-25). Virtually every piece of legislation from these two committees goes to the floor

protected from new attempts to reorder the coalition, which undoubtedly accounts for their strong showing on the floor.

Throughout all of these maneuvers in committee and on the floor, members can manipulate the decision process without any formal knowledge of the paradox of voting. All they need understand is that the situation is open to manipulation

9jewell and Patterson, pp. 467-68, report that in an 11-year period only 9 of 141 reports of the Appropriations committee had a minority report.



38 PUBLIC CHOICE

which is favorable to the manipulators, and, when one arbitrary solution is imposed upon the process, the ability to impose the solution is the prime source of prestige and influence. Finally, to allow others to set the agenda for consideration of possible alternatives limits the authority of those involved in the original deal and threatens the success of the original logroll (Blydenburgh, p. 58). Thus, members need only understand the results of the paradox to cope with it. Members see the "closed rule" as a means of preventing " ..... logrolling on the floor of the House (Froman, p. 51) .... ;" they report that without the closed rule, the House was trapped "... . after 7 days' debate.., .and adjourned (Earl Michener, R-Mich., Manley, 1970, p. 225) .... ;" or ". .. a very important part of the bill was stricken out, carrying... some few billions of dollars, ... and members were picking out this tax, that tax, or the other tax and coming into the House and proposing it (John McCormick, D-Mass., Ibid.) .... ;" or ".... things got into such a state of

confusion.., .that it went back to committee (Howard Smith, D-Va., Ibid., p. 226) ....;".or there " .... were so many amendments... offered by so many members that finally, after 2 weeks of futile debate (Richard Bollins, D-Mo., Ibid.)... " the committee got a closed rule. In all, "..... on the few occasions when Ways and Means bills have been considered under open rules, one veteran Democrat claimed, 'you had chaos' (Manley, 1965, p. 88)."

It is apparent that committee norms, as well as the norms of floor behavior, are the outgrowth of committee problems in dealing with legislation in which the preferences allow cyclical majorities to exist. The existence of the voter's paradox not only supplies a focus for committee norms, but also gives us a clearer understanding as to why the members comply with these norms. It has already been shown that any decision reached is the arbitrary product of control of the decision process. It is clear, then, that this arbitrariness is important in terms of an assymetrical concentration of power in the committee and on the floor, and is of central importance when considering the desires of congressmen to gain reelection and influence.

Not only does this logical link between logrolling and the voter's paradox represent a foundation from which it is possible to reinterpret committee activity, but such a relationship can aid in analyzing the activity of individual congressmen in relation to committee legislation. Junior congressmen, for example, are more preoccupied with reelection, since, without influence, their ability to benefit constituencies is tenuous. Having few tools with which to bargain, they must be content in serving the wishes of those who do have influence. As important as this lack of influence is, the fact is that junior congressmen cannot accumulate enough credits to protect their constituents' interests well. They are, therefore, more than willing to logroll with senior members when the deals made do not directly threaten narrow constituents' interest. Also, a junior member will spend much of his resources seeking to influence bills dealing with home district concerns. This he can best accomplish, given the meager resources available to him, by working on the most relevant committees. Thus, first and early terms are spent trying to get on and



VOTER'S PARADOX 39

then working on "policy" committees relevant to home interests, like Agriculture, Interior, etc. At the same time, junior members will have to deal with their interests as they go under the jurisdiction of the major committees-those to which all

legislation is referred. Once on a major committee, such as Ways and Means, the junior member as

well as the whole policy committee must deal with new coalitions and demands. Here, again, deals are made to get the legislation through, and, again, the deals are

arbitrarily made by swapping favorable support where required, or by swapping debts. In any event, the arbitrary resting point for the cycle is determined by exchange of favors and debts, both of which are assymetrically distributed among those members with enough "expertise" to control the committee process. These senior members, too, are concerned with their reelection chances and thus seek to influence committee decisions. Their ability to control the committee decision by control of the coalition-forming process gives them the added ability to protect their home interests and keep their seat "safe."

Having survived these initially expensive but helpful coalitions of his first terms, a member begins to secure his won "expertise" and his constituents' interests are not as precarious; he may be able to defend them without being a member of the policy committee.10 If his credits are with the proper people, i.e., the seniority and party leadership, the aspiring member may be able to fill a vacancy on one of the major committees. Once there, he may still betable to defend his own home interests since everyone has something in these two committees. Credits secured on the major committee can then be called in from members on the "policy" committee (Manley, 1970, pp. 96-7). This system of committee legislation tends to concentrate power and influence in the hands of the members of the two "money" committees, regardless of the member's standing on the committee. Therefore, all committee members share in the prestige and influence of a successful committee.

Likewise, a non-member representative has a great deal at stake in the prestige and influence of the money committee, for he must be able to count on the ability of these committees to supply him with the constituency legislation he needs to retain his seat. If a congressman's views are not totally represented in the committee report, he must consider the utility of defeating the committee on this issue in the light of the reduced effectiveness and prestige that a defeat means for the committee in the future. In the long run, the congressman will many times need the aid of the committee in securing some favorable legislation, but this can be assured only if, in the short run, the committee is able to guarantee the passage of its legislation. The committee's short run strength, therefore, becomes a type of collective good over time for each individual, and each individual can only assure the long term supply by voting his contribution for the committee's bill.

Several consequences stem from all of this. It is apparent that if a

10According to Fenno, 1966, p. 21, the average new member of Appropriations has 3.7 years experience prior to selection. On Ways and Means, Fenno 1973, p. 19, the average number of years before appointment is 6.6 years.



40 PUBLIC CHOICE

solution-any coalition of minorities-can be imposed upon the group either in committee or on the floor, it is, for the House as a whole, extremely important as to who is involved in the original logrolling situation. Thus, the determination of committee assignments is clearly a critical issue where logrolling is the prime means of securing legislation. If the preferences of the members on these committees are not amenable to the logrolling process, because of some strong, current policy preferences, the scope of possible solutions is diminished. With a truncated set of possible solutions, the ability of committeemen to make successful deals over a wide range of issues is likewise hampered and the whole committee may lose as a result. Likewise, the whole House has a great deal at stake in terms of individual

constituency efficacy in the continued success of working relationships within the committee and between the House and the committee. Therefore, a great deal of the prominence of the House Appropriations Committee and the Committee on

Ways and Means, as well as a great deal of the power relationships in Congress, is a result of the varied preference of individuals in the House-preferences which

support the empirical importance of the voter's paradox. From this, it is clear why those who control committee assignments are

important and would seek to protect these privileges. In a very real sense those who sit on the committees decide the outcomes of the legislative future. These men are, therefore, likely to choose those who would further bolster their own power. Thus, only those are chosen who can "..... work with the leadership (Masters, p. 353)," i.e., those who are able to conform to the preferences of the leadership. As a

consequence of this co-optation by the leadership, legislation will tend to favor strongly the preferences of the leadership-even though many alternatives represent the choice set. As long as party leadership and committee leadership cooperate in not opposing each other, their ability to control the decision process will carry the day. As a result, certain legislative groups may be perpetually left out of the legislative process as long as they are unable to obtain pressure for entrance to the committee. This is an additional factor pointing up the importance of a strong regional organization within the party apparatus.

The whole system of logrolling and committee prestige discussed above leads toward well-ordered channels of mutual accomodation which support the influence of tested, senior congressmen, i.e., those with high seniority, strong geographic ties, heavy credit accumulation, and/or leadership in party matters. Legislation need not always reflect the views of all these four groups,. since the goals of party and committee seniority are not necessarily compatible, but this would seem rare since, within the parameters of the seniority's "gut"'issues, any ideological coalition can be victorious.11 Above, it was apparent that committee members did not often allow political ideology to play a blocking role in coalition formation-though political ideology and party affiliation play some role in legislation. It is equally clear that the narrow constituency interests of those who control the committee

11Those few issues which the senior member must deliver on to keep his local support and thus his safe seat. Thanks to Norm Frohlich for pointing out this implication.



VOTER'S PARADOX 41

process set the parameters within which ideological (or party) coalitions across issues may form and win. This is the case since these members control the process crucial in the arbitrary selection of the final outcome.

For representatives with strong ideological desires for particular policy legislation, the road to success may be very difficult and/or costly. The cost may be

extremely high since, in a bargaining situation, they will have a very low tolerance to risk (Zeuthen, pp. 10-18). They, therefore, must pay dearly for their logrolling in order to provide constituency legislation. Too, because of this ideological "stiffness," they are less likely to be successful in obtaining assignment to one of the two major committees. In the words of one veteran Democrat, ". . . . everyone's a moderate . . . we don't want any screwballs .... These men are pretty carefully selected, so you don't get any radicals (Manley, 1965, p. 95)." As a result, these seats will be highly unstable as long as the representatives are unable to logroll with the leadership, and, since any attempt on their part to arrange new channels of accommodation might be as effective as the old affair, those who control the decision process will not be very willing to allow their members much latitude for action.

Past evaluations of the voter's paradox have been critical of its empirical content, but the establishment of a logical link between logrolling and the voter's

paradox argues that the paradox must be considered as relevant, not only to a normative theory, but to an empirical theory of democratic government as well.1 2 The voter's paradox is a problem fundamental to each committee involved in

logrolling and one with which each must deal. The presence of cyclical social choice is, therefore, a central structural reality of the legislative process, and to ignore its implications is to overlook an essential aspect of public decision-making.

Since the voter's paradox is a fundamental structural reality for at least the two major committees of the House, it might be useful to make some brief comments about the reforms of the legislative process in the last (and present) session. A more democratic, i.e., open, selection of the chairman and members of committees does not threaten the core of the chairman's power, because the chairman's essential power comes from his control of the agenda and procedural machinery. Any reforms which do not affect these prerogatives of the chair cannot

seriously affect the decision process. Reforms in the committee assignment process 12There is, however, some concern over the empirical content of the assumptions

employed in the derivation of the link between the voter's paradox and logrolling- in particular the assumption of separability is questionable (see Schwartz). Where a committee, such as Appropriations, must deal with a legislative program within the constraints of a budget ceiling there is reason to suspect that the issues involved in the program are inseparable from the issue of the overall budget, which is to say that members preferences for the issues involved are not separable. On the other hand, no investigation into the realim of separability in terms of such committees has ever been undertaken; moreover on issues which Appropriations logrolls over, it is likely that what is involved is the creation of a program separate from any budget constraint. This debate over the acceptability of the separability assumption indicates that a considerable amount of investigation is needed into the subject matter of legislative committees.



42 PUBLIC CHOICE

which is removed from the monopoly of leadership, will radically affect the policy production of the legislation. Though the final choice is still an arbitrary one, the

"widening" of the selection process offers the opportunity to introduce new issues and alternatives into the policy domain.

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44 PUBLIC CHOICE

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Documents

Voter's Paradox and Logrolling: An Initial Framework for Committee Behavior on Appropriations and Ways and Means