if WANG MING(i)G)

WANG MIN G

MAO'sETRAYAL

'I'ran.slalerl

by Fie Schn eiereon

[EJiilpnOC;fiE SS P UBL1SUl!:l\S

MOSCOW

Ban Mila

nPE,lJ:ATEJIhCTBO 1I1A O U3 3-,lJ:YHA

110 aH 2.1UUC"O M .4 Jw x-t

CONTENTS

A Sh ort Fore uiord

I. FIFTY YEAHS OF TH E COMMUN IS T PARTY OFCH INA

I I. "CAI\II'AIG:\ FOH TIlE RECTIFI CATION OF STYLE"­IJRE SS REHEARSAL OF TH E "ClJ LTU HA /, REV OL U­1'101:\"

5

7

15

1. Th e Pr ep aratory First Period of the "Style Hectifrca-lion" Ca mpaign I f)

2. Th e Seco nd Peri od o f "Style Hectifi cati on' 54a Th e Third P(~ l'iod-"Enwl'f:iency Salvation " 11 8I,. Th e Fonr th Period - "Se lf-Refutation a nd Hnhahil ita -

tion " 148fl. The Fifth Period- "Surnming u p" 1[,2

III. THE "CULTT1HAL REVOLUTIO;\," AXD THE MAOISTilW FOR COO I'E RA T IOX \\'1'1'11 L\II) Enr.o\ LI S~1 164

L "Cult ura l Rev olution" in Na me :111(1 Cou ntor- Itevolu-tionnry Cou p in Substa nce 1131

2. Cooper at ion with Impe riali sm Is a Componen t ofMao's Cn un tcr- Hevo lu t ionurv Co up 170

:l The Reg-innin g of t he Pr esent j\laoi st Line of Co-op eration with Im pe ri al ism In

4. Th ", Basi c Reasons for Mao's Disg race 195

© n OJlIITII <J ll aT 1!l75

Engli!'h t rnns la ti on © Pr ogress I'ub l ishors 1979

Printed in the Union of So vi et S ociali st R epubl ies

IV. rue FATE OF THE " U):\,E MO NK" !I ;\,D TH E1ST 10TIl CO~GnESS

I. Why Mao Tse-l ung Became a " Lone Monk"2. TIll! Hom e and For ei gn Poli cy of the Maoist

Congre ssa. Mao 'I'se- tn ng and Chi n Sh ih lI uang

A fte rw ord

MA O-197

Hl710th

204224

277

A SHORT FOREWORD

The first and second partsof this book, " Fifty Years ofthe Communist Party of China" and "Campaign for th eRe ctification of Style-Dress Reh earsal of the 'Cu lturalRevolution ' " , are taken from an article I wrote in 1971on the 50th anniversary of th e CPC. Th e third par t,"'Cultural Revolution' and the Maoist Bid for Coopera­tion with Imperialism", was written in tho autumn ofHl71 to explain the " sudden reversal" in Mao's rela tionswith th e United States. Due to ill health I could notfini sh the manuscripts. Later, when health permitted, Icontinued my work. The fourth part, "The Fato of th e' Lone Monk ' and th e Maoist T enth Congress", wa s writ­ten in the heginning of Hl74.

Joining th ese four manuscripts under on e head followsthe logic of th e even ts . Certainly, it wa s not accidenta lthat Mao ':. betrayed Communism and th e Revolution . Hi sultimate treason cro wne d a lon g suc cess ion of cr im es . Adecisive part in the chain of even ts leadin g to h is ap ostasywas played by his rea ctionary " ca m paign for the rectifi ca ­tion of th e style of work" in th e ea rly half of th eforti es and by the " cul tural revolution" launch ed in thelatte r h al f of the sixties and contin u in g in altered formtoday. Du e to his cou nte r-re volu tion ary turnabout, Maowon favour with extre me rea cti onary imperialist groups,wh ile in th e eye s of th e tru e Chin ese Communists , in theeyes of l he wh nl« peopl e o f Ch ina, and in th e eyes of th ewor ld co m m uu ist a nd a u t i- im pet-ia l is t mov em en ts he isa despicable tr aitor. He knows that he is a lone , abandon ed

* Mao Tse-tung died at the age of 82 in Peking on 9 Sep­tember 1\176.

and r ej ect ed by even h is o nce closest Follow ers . It wa sthis th at ma ds him say to Ed gar S no w when seeing himoff in th e spr ing o f 1971 that 'h e .is " a lon e m onk walkingl.he world witll -a leak y urnbrclln ". .

The conc lu ding part of th is book deal s wi th th e lat estevents in China, I t tou ch es on th e follo wing qu esti on s :why h as Mao becom e a " lone m onk " : the ' hom e andfor eign poli cy d ecisi on s of the ~lao i s t l Oth cpe Con­gross: why does Mao gl orify Chin Shi h Huang, a ttackConfuciu s' a nd abu se tho name of Lu Hsun : Mao's secon d"c ultura l 'l'ovol u lion" under th e signboard of cri l.icisl ngLiI ; Pi ao and Confu cius.

I am quite sure that th e " lo ne m onk" is doom ed to"final, d ear and com plete" ':- def eat. ~his prcdictiou I~ e ed s

n o prooi . It is pr ed et ermin ed by hlstory. The Chi neseCorntnuuistsand the peopl e or China are s ure t,? throwoff Ma o' s rea ction ary rul e t o take comm and of th eir c?u,n"try's dcs tiuv a nd build their hl'~ ght and .hap py socla hS l,futur e. 'Iihi s condus ion foll ows fr om th e ine xora ble lawsof hi stor y.

23 Mar ch 1974

" Mao's 0 11'11 fav ou rite phrase.

FIFTY YEARSOF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

On 1 July L97 1 t he Communist. P arty of China wa s 50yea rs old.

It is a Marxi st-Leninist party, th e vanguard of theChinese working class, Und er guidance of the Commu­nist Internation al and with the a ll-round help and sup­port of th e Comm un is t Part.y of th e Sovie t Union it.headed the long,arduous, heroic , a rmed and unarmed,legal and under ground r evol u tionar y stru ggle of tho Chi­n ese people.

Many were the sple ndid lighter s a nd national h er oeswho grew up in t ile hitter contest for nation al and socialliberati on in condit ions of brutal white t error and ex ­ce erli n gly difficult revolutionary wa rs . Many have laiddown their lives for the ria use of the P'arty and revolu­tion. May their m em ory live for ever. ::'

Soon after th e foundi ng of th e Party, du ring tllllPeking-Hankow R ailwa y strike of 7 February !fl23 againstthe abuse s of the Peiyaug warlords, the strik ers andth eir lead er s di spla yed t,he aston ish ing fearlessness andmass h eroism typical of th e working class and it s van­guard . After the ene m y had chopped of[ hi s left hand, try­in g to com pe l him to orde r ,bh e worker s hack to work,Lin Hsian g-ehlen, ch a irm a n of the P cking-Hankow Rail­wa y Workers' U nion, said: " Yo u ca n ch op off my head,l will n ot orde r t.i1 e m en ha ck to work, " Lin di ed a hero'sdeath, foll ow ed to th e grave by lawyer S h ih Yang, whorepresent ed th e striking workers a nd chos e death to how­ing befor e hi s tormentors.

I' The list cf rilll( ~l1 comra des f.{ ivol1 here was drawn up Irummem or y and a vai lahlo material.

7

The following met a h er oic rleath in 1D25-Hl27 , duringtho memorable anti-im per ia l is t May Thirti eth Mov ement( 1925) " : Ku Chen-hung, who h ead ed th e str ike a tJapanese-ow ned textile mills in Shanghai; Ho P en g-i, orga­n isor of a dcmonstr ntion of Shangh ai University s tuden ts ;Li n Hua ch airman of th e General Trad e Uni on Conn ellof Shanghai , who head ed a gene ra l str ike of h alf a mil­Iiou Shanghai work ers.

And the foll ow ing laid down th eir liv es ligh ting na­ti oualnnd class ene mies: Chi S hu-fe ng, prom inent eco n­omis t and au th or of th e well -known book, China underthe H obnailed B aal of I m perialism , wh o orga nise d ananti-imper iali st dem unstration in Wanhsie~l; Chen T,sall ­hsien chairm an of the General T rade Union Council ofKiangsi pr ovince; Lo l -nung and Chao ~h ih-yen , leadersor th e th ird armed unri sing of Shang liui worker s ; W an gSho u-h u a chair m an of the General Trade Union Councilof Shangl'lai; Li Ta-chao, one of the P~rty ' s first th e0:istsof Marxi sm -Leninism and its outsta nding lead er : Chi angH sicn -vun , comm ander of a regimen t consisting mostlyof Communists , which heroically sto rme d and cap tu re rltho fortress of Ch engch ow h eld by a large force of Man­churian warlords; Kuo Liang, pr omin en t pea sa n t leaderin Hunan province; .l Isieu Chin-yu, popular l ead er of th ewomen 's movement, secr eta ry of th o P arty's Il ankow citycommittee and member of th e Central CommiLtee; HsiaoCh u-nn , popular youth leader ; Ma Chun, '~ l ead~~ of. theMay Fo ur th Movemen t (H1Hl) , rn nmhcr of the (, 1 C from1921 , work ed among th e Dungans, and later was secre taryof the Party's P eking city comm ittee ; the bro the rs Ch enYen-nicn and Chen Chiao-nien, both me m be rs of theParty's Po litbureau, arrested logell.l ~r and eX9~u tedtogothor; Chang Tai-lei , senior political and militaryload er of the Kwaugchow (C anto n) uprising an d hea d oftho Kwangchow Sovie t govcrnmell1.. me mber of t heParty' s Cen tral Committee, and man y other com rade s.

Many com ra des fell durin g the agrari an revoluti on andth e .a n li-J a pa uesu local war uf 1928- H137, am on g- th urnSu Chao-ch eng, leader uf the big Hl~5-192(j str ike inKwangtung provi nce and Ho ng-kong; he was el ected chair-

.. The names are given in chronological order according toth e dale of death.

man of the Kwangchow Soviet govcrnment " (during th eKwangchow upri sin g ) , was a member of th e l' artv 'sPolithureau. di ed from ove rs train ; Chang Kun-ti ( s{~c;'e­tary of the Panty's Kwangtung provincial committee) andhis wife W,ang Lan-ying (chief of the provincial commit­tee's wom en 's departm ent), who met th eir death s ideby s ide, showing gr eat courage ,

Treach er y oand betrayal re su lted in tho heroic de athof Pong Pai, prominent peasant l ead er , cha irman of th eHei.lnfong Soviet government and mem ber of th e Party 'sPolithureuu ; Yang Ying, organiser of the great Kw ang­chow-Hongkong strike, m ember of the Kw an gchow Sovie tgovern me n t, and alternate m ember of th e P ulithu rcuuin cha rge of com ba tt ing counter-revolu tiou: Ch an g Kuo­sh u, secretary of the Party's Ki angsi pr ovincial com mi t­teo and h is wife Yen Pi -fan g, head of th e oornrrrittcc'swomen's department. -

At the time of the Li Li -sen line hundr eds of th e Par­ty 's finest military and political ca dres wer e se nt to vari ­ous lar ge and medium cities to or gan ise uprisings, andthere m et a heroic death, Among the m were Wu Ch en ­pen, Ma o Chua-Ian, Liu Yun, Chen Chi -ko, H o Kun-jung,Wang Pu-wen, Qhen Te-ch en , Hu Ch in- ch ai , Tung J ih ­chang, W ang Tzu-ping, Lin Chen-lsiu , and Tang Yu-kun.Man y othe rs fell , too: Lo 'I'cng-hsicn, a pop ular work er s 'leader and m ember of the Party 's P olitbureau; Lin Yu­nan and Li Chiu-shih , lead er s of tho Chinese YCL; thowell -k nown writers Il l! Ych-piug and J ou Sh ih, active aspa rty cadres in literature and art; Yi ng FII , a yo ung but.already famous proletarian poet ; Tsa i H e-sen , m ember ofth e Party's Polithnreau: Yun Tai-yin g, promin en t org a­ni sor of the yo uth movement. and m ember of th o Pa rty'sCentral Committee; Huang Kung-lush , comm ander of tlH'3rd Hed Army; Lu 1, politi cal commi ss ar of th e 2ndRed Army; Mo Ping-Ian, ch ief of the wom en 's dcpartmoutof the Party's Kwangsi pr ovincial cornmit.tee, and Iearlcrof the women's m ovem en t among the Ch ua ng ethn ic'g ro up: Tung Chi ang-jung and Po Yang, secre taries of th eParty 's Manchurian pr ovincial committee; H o Ss u-rnei,Icadm of n nf.i-Jnpaneso g ucrr- illn g ro ll p;: in M n nrh ur-ia :Pu Wei-yu , comm ande r of \.lIe S ha ughn i work ers' volu n-

':. At that ti me Su Ch no-ch on g was in Shangha i and, since thoKwau gchow Soviet government survived for only th ree days,did not assume offi ce.

tner unit in the battl e for Shan ghai and W oosung agu lnstthe J a pan ese , and his deputy , Su n .H s ia o-pao; TongChung -hsia, a pioneer leader of the Chtnese tr ade ~In ~on

movement, organ ise r of th e F ebruary Seventl~ t: Strike(1923) a nd of the Kwangtung an d H on gkon g (.192,)- 1926)s tr ik es, m ember of th e P arty 's Central Comm~ttee ; ~~ p.nYun-tao, se cre ta ry of th e CC CPC Bureau for .North Cll1~aand chairman of the All-China ·~' ra d p. Un io n CO~lIlr:J1 ;H u a n g Li , ser,m t.ar y of th e Party s Klangsl~ provi ncialand Shanghai city com m ittees ; Shen. T se-mmg,. d eputysec reta r y of the IT up eh-Honan-Anhwei br anch of tho C~CPC Buren u for So v ie t ar ea s , secr et a ry of the Party sHupeh-Tlon an-Anhwei provincial com mittel> a l~ d m em b erof the Central Committee; Ho T su-shu. ac ti ve III com bat­Ling th e Li Li -sen line. a g i ft ed org n n is l~ r of the masse s;Ch llO P.o-sh en g, com m a nd er of t,he Herl Army' s 5 th ArmyCorps: Ch i Hung-ch ang . conu uander of th e 2nd Armyof the Chahar-Sui yuan Anti -J apanese U n io n Army, com ­mander of t,he Iatt er ' s north ern sec to r, a nd lead er of th eNorth China people' s anti-Japanese com m it tee for armedse lf -de fe n ce; Nie h Erh, Ch ina 's first pro leta ria n compos­er ' H si a H si , m ember of th e P a rty' s Ce n tra l Co m m it te ea n'd socr otarv of the CC CPC Bureau for Soviet ar easbrunch in th ~ western di stricts of Tlunan and Hu peh ; T syuiTsyu -po, promine nt P a r ty functionHry. wr it er . and minis­t er of edu cation in th e Chinese S oviet Rep u blic; H o S h u­heng, delegate to the f s t Congress of ~he crc and ?h iofo f th e cen t ra l worker-p easant ins pe c t ion of th o ChineseSovie t Hepu bli c: Chun g Yu , lead er of a s pec ia l (security)branch un it of th e ce CP C wh o di splayed co ura ge beyondcom pare in fight ing t raitors und enp;my agen ts :. Chi enChuang-f ei. wh o in filtrated the ~ncm :-' s sec r et p ol~e e a n dperform ed many important se r vices for th e P arty s , C~n­tral Committ ee: Fang Chih-min. founder of th e S ovietarea in the north-ea st of K iunzsi provi nce, comm a nd erof th e 10 th R ed Army: H s u n H u nt-ch ou . co m m an d er ofth e 7th Hed Army ; H o Ch ang. d epu ty ch ief of th e HedArmy's m a in pol iti ca l d epar tment : Lin Po-cl~i en , (~h ief o fthe polit ical depa rtment of th e R ed A r my' s Sth A rmyCorps : L in Chth-tan , com m a n de r of the Red Arm y' s 2GthArmv a nd fo u nde r of th e S ovie t a rea in th e north ofS h erisi pr ovi nre: Tung CIH'n-tan g, ac ting r OIllm ilTlll er ofth e w e ' tem sec tor of the Hed Arm y, co m m a nd er of llw5th Arm y Corps; Ying Ch ien , h ead of th e CC cre No rth

China Bureau's or ganisational d epartm ent , an d m anynth or comrades.

Tho foll ow in g- fell in the a n ti-Ja panese war of 1937 ­Hl4 5: T so Cliuan , d eputy ch ief of th e 8 th Army g enera lheadqu arters : H si ang Ying. pr omin en t workers ' l ead erand CPC Iunctionnry, d eputy co mm an d er or th e [ew 11t hArmy, m emb er o f th e Party' s Politbureau: Yuan Kuo­pin g'. chic] of ,t.he New !teth Army's po liticul d ep artme nt;Lo Ping liui and P eng H sn ch -Ien g. co nu n nnd ers uf New4th Arm y form ati ons : Chang W en -pin g, secretary of theParty's Kwang tu ng provin ci a l co m m ittee. a nd Red Armyveteran: Ch en T nn-ohiu, deleg at e to the l st Cn ngross o'ft he CPC, member of the Party 's Central Auditing Com­mi ssi on. an d m inister o f food in the Clli n ese ' S ovie tll epublic : Yang Chin-yu, couun an de r-i n-c h ie l of th e North ­cas t An ti -J apanese Un io n Arm y an d co u uu an rler of th eLst Army ; Cha o S hang-ch ih . dep u ty ccm m an rlor- in- chiefan d commander of th e 3rd Army; Tsni Shih-jung, com ­mandcr Ill' th e f.ith Arm y; Chao l -rn ang, r egimental co m­m issar and h er oin e o] ,th e a n t.i-Jn pa ncse war, nn rl man yothe r cum r ad cs.

Th e foll owing lli ed during th e cease- In-a an d t he libera­ti on war of Hl4fi-H149. Prominent P art y leader Ch i nP a ng-hs icn ( Po Ku ), T eng Fa, oh a irman of the S ta tpPoli tical D ep artm en L of t.he Chinese Soviet Hopnhl i (~ a lidme m ber of th e P ol.it.huroau , Ccul.rul Comruit.tec m emb er\ Van g J o-Ioi, a nd co m m a n de r of tho N ew 4th Army Yeh'I' i ng d ied on 8 April Hl4 6. Chu Jui , artillery comman d orof the P eop le's Liberati on Army, a nd m any other com ­rades di ed in H"11j7. Lo Sh ih -wen a nd Che Ya o-h si au ,loa ders of th e Par ty 's S zech uan provinci al eom m it,t ee.nct.ive in th e united national an ti -J apa nese fron t ofSznch uan, and man y oth ers, di ed ill uVt \) . .

This is an lucom pl et e li st of Communis ts, YCLers,r ev olutionarv workers a nd peasants, i ntelle{;tuals a nd s tu ­d en ts who gave their live~ for t he. lo[t~~ ide ~\ls of the ,re ,:o­Iu l. iou urv st r u ggle. Many In ler lla tlOuallst~ fr om thl' S OylCtUnion, too, d ied h or oi call y for t he Clunese revolution.M ay th eir memor y Live for ev er . .

l\'liUion s or revolutionary !"I gh ters in si de a wl ou t~HleI h e Part v t,ook part ,i11 the lierni c 28 -yeal' -long ravul ution ­a l'Y :-tr u; rg le. Th oll sHuds of lll on a ll(1 women wer e r eare dill ' the S l~'u g-glo In be eon){) til e Pnl',I,y ' s l Clnding 1IIldeus andha ckbone, As a resull. , the CPC ue{;am c a Ulass party,

~h !~h , fu rth e,rrnor e, built a stro ng revolutionary arm y.~h, s ena bled it to offer lead ersh ip to m an y hu ndreds of mil ­

l,lOlI S of people and: with all-ro und So vi et assis tance , t o~,~~s ummate .th~ Chinese r~v,olutio~ . No t only did it sue­cessfull,Y perform the unti -impcrl ulist a nd anti-f eud all' evolut~on , hut it al so put China on the path of social is t.r evolutionand the building of socialism .

rl'l~ose w er e gl oriou s chapters in scrib ed by th e Com ­munist Party o f China and the Chin es e people in th ocoun try 's 5,000-year histor y, and t h eir maznificent con tr i­bution to the world revolutionary moveme~t,

U n der gu idance of the Communist International andwi th the hel p of th e Com muni st P arty of th e SovietUnion, with Leninist internation alists in t.he vanguard,a rmed w ith the th eory and tactics of L en inism , the Com­muni s t Party of Chi na won vict ory afte r victory in dif­I ercnt periods of t he Chinese r evolution ove r variou s anti­Lenini st ideas an d lines, It overc ame diificulti es and ob ­s tacles, and con tin uo usly gre w st ronger ,

In the sum me r of H)27 Lhe Party gr appled with theri gh t-opportunism of Ch en Tu-hsiu ; in th e spring andsu mmer of 1928 it squashed the "lol t" putschi st line ofthe N ovember 1927 Central Committee Plenum; in theautum n of 1929 it put an en d to t he activi ty of the Trots­k yite-Ch en Tu-hsiu group of liquidator s (who aimed atdissolving the Party) , and in 1930-1931 it defeated th ese mi-Tro tsky ite Li Li-sen line and the counter-re volution­ary Lo Chang-lung gro up . And in all peri ods, especiallysince the th irties, it con ti nuo us ly ca me to gr ips in long,intricat e and difficul t s tr uggles wit h th o an ti -L eninist,anti-Gomintern, a n ti-P ar ty , anti-Sovi et , a nd a n ti- peoplepoliti cal " th ou gh ts" and lines of Mao T sc-tun g. This an don ly th is enable d th e Party to furth er th e Ch inese r evo­lution an d bring it t o vic to ry, as it al so enable d the Peo­pl e 's Hepub lic of China to m ak e con sider able progress inbuilding soc ialis m with the a id of the Soviet lJ n i~n ,

And yet, the victori es sco red by Lenini st id eas andtl~e Len inist political lin e over th e "tho ugh ts " and lineof Mao T se-tu ng in diff(!I'pn t peri ods of th e Ch inese rev­o lutio n a re on ly one side of t he pic tu re . T h... ot her s ideconsists in cr im es com m it ted by Mao in th e course of th eC h in(~ s(: revo lution , For exam p le. after usurping m ilita rypo ,~el' III ,th.e P a rty at the CC CPC Politbureau mee tingIII I's uu yi III J anu ary 1935, Mao did unprecedented

damage to th e ere a nd th e I'aray-l ed Chi nese Red Arm"In th e early half of 1I f t ' M' . oJ'

r " , ' ie ,o ~ res, ao launch ed a r eacti on -~:\. ca m patgn for th e rectifica tion of the s tyle of work"

11s was direct ed agains t Marxi sm-L enin isnl' the Co ' .tern a n I tl S ' U· " 1ll1I1­" ' . ~ 1:- oVle L, . mo n, a nd inflicted t errible ideo lo v-~~lal , CV~core tlca l , T! olrtJC.al a nd orgaulsati onal damage ; 11

e " ,~t th~ 2nd Pl enuur -oj t h e S eve nth CPC Ce n-tral Committee In H149 Mao repla ced Leninist ' I Ithe Leninist line wi th the id~a s< an d t he l\ne

Hefa~ , ane

dem ocr. , "Ill " ' , , c ' 0 1!e\V,~<lC~, ', n t.I ?, at~ Iirti es and early six ties his ad -

vc n tu r i st bi g leap po licy and th e in stitutio n of peo ple'scommm,les sot Ch ina ana cours e of political r eact ion a nde,cono nllc ban~rllptcy. The living standard and c ultu r alhfe , of . the Chi nes e people deteriorated . T hen, Irorn thebeginning of .the ~ ix~ies, Ma o's h om e and for eign policybased on anLI-Sovl et~sm and anti-commun ism finall y l edto a e~JUll te l'- rev()l u\.lOnary cou p, worked by Mao underthe guise of a "cul tural r evolution". This cou nter-r evolu­tionary putsch was an unh eard-of cal am ity for Pa rty andpeople, a nd did grave h arm to th e wo rld soci ali s t system,th e w orld com mu nis t movem ent , th e anti-im pe rialist st r ug­gle, and th e peace movem en t through out the world. '~

Following the " rectification of \lhe ·s tyl e of wo rk" cam­pai gn of t h e for ties and through out the pas t 30 years,Ma o twisted , di storted ami falsifi ed the hi story of theComm unist Party of China. An editoriul article publish ed0 11 1 July 1971 in Jenm inj ihpao, t h o journal Hungchi a n dbhe n ew spaper Ctuehio ngchiunpao, entitled "T h e 50th 1\11­

nivorsary of th e Communist Party of China", written onMao's express orders, wa s ia new collection of li es a ndslande rs , a n ow Ialsilica tlon of the h istory of the CPC,and a furth er step along th e CO Ul'SO of anti-Sovie tism andan t i-co m m u nism , "gl or ify ing" Mao T se-tung. Only a m ancom pl etel y devoid of shame could ins pire so fooli sh andsh abby all ar t ic le , Mao m ad e no ment ion of th e fall enh er oes of th e revolution, and bhis was no t accide ntal. Thetraitor to Party and revolution did not wan t-and indeedh ad no moral right-to honour the memo ry of our dead.

Th e Maoist Ialsifi catiou of th e hi st or y of the CPC wa sm eant to portray th e vict ory of L en in' s id eas and theLen ini st li ne in n h in a as a tr iumph for t he "tho ugh ts"

". To avoid repetition, I re fer th e reader to Len in , L en in ism,und the Ch in ese R evolution , where I deal with these questionsin conne ction with th e cen tenary of the great Lenin 's birth.

13

a orl , iin l' ~ ) f Mao '1' so- tu ng. Th c ar duo us st r ugO'les unrl

gl OI'l211:" vlr lOl' i()s of th e Communisj. Pm'l,y of CI~ i n fl and

th,o Chi nns« p() opl e und er g uidRllce of the Comintorn a nd

WII!l ,the aid of .Ih e So vio ]. Communist Part y and Soviet

lJ ~IJO ll, were deplet ed by :\lao a ' h is own, person al doin g.

l Iis fal.~ ac i ou s "t houg h ts":, line a nd policy were passed

off as absol utely con ed ' . Mno shifted 0 11 others t,he

blame for his own mist ak es a nd cr imes. and to mak e as­

sur ance doubly sure sys tematica lly fabricated "c ri mes"

allegedl y committ ed by hi s political opponents in the

Part y.By th ese mebhorls he sought to win credit Ior himself

and to discr edit a nd defam e othe rs. TI c Ialsifled the hi s­

tor y of the CP C ill every conc eivable manlier to depreciate

Lenini sm. th e Cominl ern, and th e Soviet Un ion, and to

replace rcv olu tiouu rv Marxism-L en inism with count er­

r evoluti onary Maoism , l3y so doin g he sought 10 deify

his own person and .lo usu rp sup rem o politica l pow er in

Par'l y ami coun try. Then , a t a "propiti ons mom ent" , he

wou Id usc this power to com m it ruuk treach ery aga inst

HaT'ty, state 'lind peopl e, and tak e a disgr-a ceful course

of ac tion on the iuterna tionul sc en e ag ain st th e Sovie t

Un ion, Ihe comm unis t parti es of othe r cOII Tltrip s,and th e

nati onal l ibera ti on movem ent. This earn ed hi m fav our

wi eh imporiali st s and othe r reactionarie '. In 1fl G6 and

lat er , beh ind the screen of a "cultural r evolut ion " , Maoper formed a counter-revolu t ionary coup. Thereafter , he

opon],v took th e roa d 0 f nationa I betra yal , se ck i ng I' ll p­

procliement a nd coopera t ion with impcrialist forces and

rcvoali ng h is tr-n o face, so carefully concealed for many

y ours, to th e wh ole world.To understand tdr e r eason for the lall a nd disgr ace of

Mao Tso-tu ug, we must ill additio n to what has already

been sa id exa mine more closelv th e hi storical roots of

his bet raya l, ( 0 1' th ey, and llIoi'e s peci fically his "e arn­

pai gn Ior th e rectifi cation of th e style of work" in th e

forti es, have R d irect and close boarin g on curre n t events.

As lat p:1' developm ents sho we d, this " re ctt fica tion of style"

cum par g u w as a d ress re hea rsa l of the " cu ltura l reyolu ­

tion ". So. to und erstand th e "cul tural r evoluti on" we

must have a «lea r idea of th is cam paign.

II "CAMPAIGN FOR THE RECTIFICATION

OF STYLE"-DRESS REHEARSAL OF

THE "CULTURAL REVOI..UTION"

At th e end of the summe r and th e beg in ni ng of th e a u­

tuum of H141 Mao T sc-t.un g look udvanta go of th e inter ­

national situation following OIl th e Nazi atta ck on th e

US SR and the t omporary setbacks of the Sovie t Army,

and of the relat ive major ity he b ad managed to build by

that tim e in th e CC CI'C, to m ount tlre " ca in pa ign 1'01'

the re ctifi cation of th e s tyle of work", se cre t pr eparation s

for whi ch he had begun in the au tumn of 19:)8, In so

doing. II I' re lied 0 11 th e CC CIJC g uard r'e~i Ille ll l whichwas subordinat e to him HS chairma n of the CPC military

council.Th e ca mpaign last ed for foul' year s-from the autum n

of 19<'11 until th e s limmer of 1945, with five distinct pe­

ri ods :1) the preparatory peri od (Sopterub er HM.1-February

194~);

~) th e period of th e "ructi ficnt ion of s ty le" cam pa ig n

pr opel' (February 19/12-July Ifl43) ;

3) the period of "em ergency sal vatio n" (Jul y 1943­

summe r of 1944);II) the peri od of "seli- rci utat ions an d re habilita tion"

(summer of 1944-sprin g of 1945) ;

5 ) the "sum m ing-u p per iod" (sp ring of 19/1;)-SUrnmer

of l H115) ,

I ~

l. TnE PR EP ARA TOR Y FIRST PERIODOF TH E "ST YLE RECTIFICATION"CAMPAIGN

Du ring thi s period l\1ao iuad e th e following provi sionalm oves :

1) By means of intrigues and compu ls ionhe suspended all Pa rt y periodical s in Yenan

Th ese in clud ed the CC CPC news pap er Hsinchunghuapuo(New China ) , th e CC CPC journals Chiehfang (Liber a­ti on) and Kungchuntangjen. (Communist), the journal ofthe CC CPC W om en's Com mittee Ch ungk uojunii (Chin eseWoman ) , tile journal of th e CC crc Youth Comm itteeChungkuochingnien (China Youth ) , and the li ter ary jour­na l of t he CC CPC Chungkuourenhua (Ch inese Cul tur e ):These periodi cal s wer e s us pe nde d becau se they were con­tr o lled hy Wan g Min g, 1.0 Fu (Cha ng Wen-Lien}. andKai F eng. On ly the journal of the 8th Houte Army, di ­r ect ly controlle d by Mao, con tin ue d to appea r, and a newda ily, Chieh j anr;jihpao (Liberati on) , was Iou nrled , al socom ple te ly und er h is con trol.

2) He closed down educational establishments

Mao rem oved the Anti-Japane se Milt tary-Polltlcal Schoo laIll) til e North Shen si Inst itu te to lh e S ha ns i-Chahar­H opeh Border Ar ea , while t he Yenan W om en 's Univer­sity and the Courses for Youth Cadres were dissolvedbecause Mao feared tha t t he revolution ary yo u th enrolledin th cm wou ld op pose I ~h e cam paign for th e " re ctifica t ionof the s tyle of work" . The Cen tral Party Sc hool and th el ns l.i l.u Le of Marxism -Leninism we re nomi na lly lef t intac t,bu t cadres wer e being concen trated th ere to '(;onu uct th e" style re ctificati on " cam paign .

3) He eounterposed Maoism to Leninism

III tite ea rl y half of l IH1, Mao ordere d th e pub lication of11 collec tion en titl ed, "Marx , Engels, Lenin and Stalin on~hi.na " (which in clud ed some Corni ntern documents}.I'his was followed by a seco nd collec t ion, " From th e

lith CPC Cungress to Our Day" , la ter re name d " T wo

IG

Lines" (which included doc uments of the Par ty's leadtnz~odi es and the works of some Parl.y lead ers · -Mao in th~til'S1 pl~ l: e ,. Wang Ming, P o Ku and Lo Fu) . Th e purposeof p.l~b lIs.lll ng these col le ctions in the COurs e of the "style~',e c t1ficatlO~l ca mpaign " was to br in g hom e th e idea that

only Mao s w~rks are correct , while all othe r do cumentsand works are incorroct" .

From S eptember Hl41 on, in private convers a liolls withm~illbers of the P olitbureau, Ma o ofto n referred to h isplan of creating Maoism. Here is the content of one ofMac 's c onvorsa tions wit h me:

"Comrade Wang Ming, I waut to crea te Maoism . W ha tIsyour op inion on this sc ore ?"

"For what purpose ?"."If a lead or has no 'ism' of his own, he can be over­

thrown during his lif et im e, and may even be attacked alterrleath, ·W ith an 'ism ' the situ ation is differ ent. Marx hasMarxi sm and though the Seco nd Interna tional split int omany groups, none dared to go aga ins t Marx and Ma rx ­.lsan. Lenin has Leninism and t hough th er e were many:!;~ l' O:1AP S an d currents in th e T hird Internat ional and the.Bolshevik Party, non e acted openly against Leni n andLen inism. Su n Yat-sen has Su n Yat-senism and thou gh

\tJl er e is t urmoil and a great number of groups in theKuomintan g, no ne dares to go against Su n Yat-sen andSu n Yat-seni sm. .If I do not create my ow n 'ism', I m aybe over thro wn even thou gh the 7th CPC Congress elect sme cha irm a n of the Central Com mittee."

I replied: . .li lt is not true that an ' ism' is f.I guarantee against ba in g

(Jvrn1Ju own. Indeed, if the 'ism ' is wrong, one. ca,T! fa~lvery .qu ickly . Trotsky and Ch en Tu-hsiu had their Isms ,but did n 't they both com e a cr opper? Like the communistparties of other countries, the Communist Party of Chinais guided by Mal'Xism -Leninism. W hy 'stoke a se parat efurn ace ' and cre a te an 'i sm'?" . " .

" By crea tin g Maoism 1 shall pr eserve Marxism, sal.dMa o T sc-tung. " Al l I r eject is L.eninism. .My approach IS

.th e followi ng : Le ninism is RUSSia n Marxism, a bl end .ofthe universa l truth of Marxi sm with the conc rete pr,a~tlCe.of tho Russian revolution; Maoism is Chinese or. S lUl~ed'M arxism, a bl end or the univer sa l truth of ~lar~lsm With.th e conc rete practi ce of t he Chinese r evolution .

I t r ied to exp lain:

,.,

"What yo u say is untenabl e theorotically and also in~ractl.c.e. To co~ tras t L.e~inism .to Marxi sm , to acceptMarxism a nd rej ect Leninism -i-th is was deliber a tely don eby leader s of the Seco nd Int ern ati onal and bourgeoisscholars, who in fa ct rej ect both Leninism and Marxism.We Communists cannot do this . For us Leninism is theMarxism of the epo ch of imperialism and proletar ianr ev olutions. In other wo rds, Leninism is Ma rxism as itco n tin ues to develop in th e new e poc h. T o Sinif y Marx­ism is wrong. T he very approach is uri-Marxist, Thereare no nationa l Marxisms, nor ca n there be. Marxism isand always w ill be an in ternational teachi ng . Sinc e youhave r aised this important top ic, l et m e sincere ly say:your approach is harmful Hot only for t he wor ld comm u­ni st movement and the Communist Party of China, hut willal so do no good to yo u personally. I beg you La think longand seri ous ly . Ther e is no need for any Maoism."

"How can th is be so'?" Mao said . " Haven't I quit e si n­cerely told you that if a man has no 'ism' of hi s own,he usu ally com es a cropper?"

" In that case, which of yo ur writings could be usedas tha bas is for Maoism'?" I ask ed.

"W hy -s-n ew dem ocracy is Maoism . My book On N ewDemocracy. is the first and basic theoretical produ ct ofMa oism, It was for this purpose that I wrote it in 1939.B ut at that time 1 could not say so op enly : now I cun."

Thereupon. I said :"You will sure ly r ecall that when yo u sho wed yo ur

rough copy of On Ne w Democracy to the Polithureaucomrades I spoko to you twice and critici sed both thetitle and the content. I sa id that On New Democracy iscontrary to Leninism in practically a ll the cardinal issuesof th e Chinese revoluti on (a ssessment of the charac ter ofthe revolution, it s s ta ge s, motive for ces, and pe rspect ive s,t he qu estion of hegemony, etc.) . Whatever you m ay wishit to be. 'new democracy' is in effeet an anti-Len inist an rlanti-socia list theory and platform; it is the theory andplatform of t he Chinese na tional bo urgeois ie as opposedto the non-capitalist, i.e . socialist, perspect ive of the Ch i­ne se r evolution. Apart from talking to you, I also wroteyou a letter say in g th at your book may be used by Trots ­ky and Chen T u-hsiu against the Sovi et Communists, theComin tern and the Communist P arty of China. I sug­gested that you give som e th ou ght to corre ctin g yo ur

book. But t hou gh yo u m ade a few corrections and addedsome passag es, the basi c principles r em ained th e sam e. SOIIOW I s incere ly say to you : if you up pose Len ini sm with'lle~' democracy', you will b e bound to fail. Thi s is why Iadvise you to abandon the idea of crea ting Maoism a ndto give serio us tho ug ht to revising you r book , On N ewDernucracy."

As far as I know, Ma o a lso s poko on this subject to.r en Pi -sh ih , who also cr iticised him . But Mao turned adea f ear to the well -m eaning advice of his comrades . Inthe course of the "s tyle rectification ca m paign" he open­ly pr oclaim ed Maoism and began a drive again st Leninism,

4) He falsified th e his tory of theTsunyi conlerence

Mao demanded th a t the Politburenu "corrr-ot" till' rasolu­lio n of the T sunyi confere nce (J anuary 1935) . II e wa ntedit to sa y that the 5 th P le num of th e Sixth Central Com­mi ttee of the CPC had committed not m er ely a fewtactical errors (as th e r esolution said) , but th at i t h adsot an incorrect political line. This wo uld ena ble h im todenounce the 5th P lenum r esolution as repr esen ting whathe term ed th e "l eft" -opportunist Po Ku line an d to J'e­doubl e his attacks OIl Po Ku and ot her com rades. More,it would ena ble him to claim that the Tsunyi confe renceha d been of cruc ia l importance . Furthermore, Mao al sointended to say th at th e poli ti cal line of the 4th Pl enumof t he Si xth CC CPC, whi ch nobody in Tsunyi had da redto reject because it wa s dir ected agains t the Li Li -sen li neand beca use it urged im pl em entati on of the r ecornmcnda­tions of t he Com intern, represented " W an g Mings ' left '­oppor tu ni st line". H e was al so going to say tha t the T Sl!­nyi confere nce had cr iticised it. The~~upon , h ~ wO~lld u eup th e line of th e 4 th Plenum as fal sified by h un wil.h t heso-call ed "left"-oppor tun ist line of the 5LIJ Pl enum, a.ndthere by establish hi s m yth of " four years of t he th ird' left'-opportu nist line in ~he ,Party"., T h is would set ~hestage for atl.Uck ing the Commtern .lme an,~ Wang ~'hngas its chief ex.ponent , and for asserting th~ crucial hlst?r ­ical role" of the 'I'su nyi cun fer ence and his ow n axcluaivcmer its during and after th at conference.

19

th e local warlords. This could have been eas ily avoided.A fairly good idea of Ma o's ex tr em e leftist political and

military line after the Tsunyi confere nc e is zleaned fromtho foll owin g tw o facts inad verten tl y p";.esentcd byCh en Yun " in h is ar ticle, "T he Heroic W esternMArch ". ,:.,:. Th e first was Ma o's already cited Kwe ichowslogan, "seize Kweiyang and capture Wang Chia-liehalive" , """ and the secon d was th e 11 nju stifiable exe cu­tion of more than 100 pe ople ord er ed by Mao in one ofthe coun ties of Yunnan pr ovince. The chief of this cou n­ty, Ohen Yun recalled, mi stook th e Red Army for Chi angKai-shek 's tro ops, ope n ed the city gates, and gave it arousing r eception, " ' Ve decid ed to keep up the game,"Chen Yun writes, "and made no m ove to expla in thatours was not a Nanking army. Af ter a short re st weas ke d: 'Have you pr epared food s upplies and mon ey forus ?' The reply was : 'Eve ry th ing has been arranged. ' Thenwe aske d for te n local peopl e as guid es. Thereupon, chiefsof various city institut ions ca me to pa y th eir r espects.Each gave his name and office : ' I am so-and-so, ch ie f ofthe guard detachment' , 'I am so-and-so, chi ef of theseclll'it.y department'. 'chief of th e county' , et c. They toldus everything about the mselves , a nd we naturally knewwhat to do with them.

" Mao Tse-tung sa id: ' If all our ene mies had been asstu pid as thi s Yun nan coun ty ch ief, the Chinese revolu­tion would h ave won long ag o'. And h e was certainlyri goh t." 'l-*l-*

-I t is pr oper to ex pl ain that at this tim e Chen Yunh eld that Ma o had ac ted correctly. This was why h e men­tione d the incid ent in hi s articl e. Before submitting thear t icle t o the editors of the journal , Ch en Yun sho we dit to me. And on reading it I suggeste d ch anges of tw okinds to pr ot ect th e goo d nam e of the Party and RedArmy. H e agreed. First, instead of the resounding phrase," seize Kweiyang and ca pt ure W ang Chi a-lieh alive" , otc .,h o put, "tak e W ang Ch ia-Ii eh pr isoner ". Second , threem ore changes were made : a ) dnstead of naming the coun­ty , he put "in a cer tain county"; b) instead of saying that

· In fact, however, the Politbureau conference in TsunylIII January 1935 wa s part of Mao's cons pira cy aga in st thec (!rre~t Comintern line. The political , military an d orga­ni sation al course set a t tho Tsunyi conference was in cor ­rect fr om sta rt to finish. Ma o had call ed the confe rence tousurp military power in the Party. And the political andmilitary line pursue d after th e con fere nce inflic ted heavylosses a nd tremendous da mage on the Pa rty an d th e Chi­ne se Red Army.

On e of Ma o's chi ef political and mili tary mistake s fol­lowing th e Tsunyi confe re nce wa s that he complete lyscrapped the Red Army's ba sic s tra teg ic slogan - "gonorth to resist J apanese aggr essi on " . T his slogan couldhave won the support of th e mass of the people an d, wh atis mo re, the sympathy of the troops of local power­h old ers and even of Chiang Kai-shek 's arm ies. Mao alsoscrapped the tactical sloga n, "resi st J ap an ese aggressionand light Chi ang Ka i-sh ek " , whi ch was di rect ed to form­ing all iances with various Iocal poli tico-military groupson tho ba si s of joint r esistance to J ap an ese imperialismand to Chiang Kai-shek who wa s eva ding a confrontationwith th o Jn pnnns« invnrl nrs and tryin g to rlestrnv th e Chi ­ne se Red Army and the armies of various pr ovincialpower-holders.

Ignoring the positive experi ence of th e Chinese RodArmy (at the end of 1933 and the beginning of Hl34 inFukienprovince Ohiang Kai-shek's 1Hth Army had join edth e Hed Army ito fight together against Japan and Chi angKai-shek; besid es , wh en in th e early part of the W es t­ern March ,~ the Red Army was crossing Kwangtung andKwangsi provinces th e local warlords refrained from a t­ta cking it, and evon invit ed it to r em ain) , Mao issuedth e slo gan, " seize Kwoi yang 'and capture Wang Chia-li shali ve" . ,~,~ As a result, the warlords of Kw eich ow, Yu n­nan and Szechuan provinces had no choice but to joinforces with Chiang Kai-shek's troops aga in st the Com­munists. This du al , political and military, mi stake of MaoTs e-tung, who had no idea of either strategy or tacticsand wh o followed an extreme "left"- opp ortunist plan offighting "all comers", expo sed the Ch inese Red Army toth e attacks of th e joint forces of Chi ang Kai-sh ek and

* Also kno wn as th o Long Mar ch.-Tr ."" \Vang Chia-lieh-warlord, mili tary and poli tica l chief of

Kwoicho w province.

'In

,;. At that time a member of,;.,;. Comm uni st l nt ernat ional

No. 1-2, 1936, p. 50.';"'" Ibid.

**** Ibid., pp. 5q-55.

the CC CPC Politbureau .(Chinese-language edition)

the gentry (shenshi) , representatives of th e merchants'association , oth er cit izens, sh ensh i elders and represent a­tives of neighbouring villages - all in all more than I00people- had come to pa y their res pects , Chell Yun wrote,"several people" ; c) in place of "Com rade Mao 'I'se-tu IIgnaturally knew what to do with them : he ordererl a ll ofth em to be cx ecu terl" , he pu t. as cited earl ior- , " we natu ­rally knew what to do with th em ,"

Chen Yun wrote that Mao was very plea sed with him­soiL Th is meant th at h e di d not reali se how fooli shlyh e h ad behaved , and. that h e wa s unawar e of the prob­a ble political and military consequences. The Hod Armyl eader s sho uld ob viously h ave used th e op port unity t oexplain to ~heof fIcials, th e gen try and th e people of th ecoun ty the true aim s of the Hed Arm y' s march acr osstho Southwestern proviuces to [orth China. They sh ouldhave explained that th e R ed. Army was h eading nort h t orepu lse the J apan ese aggress ion. and th at it was corn­polled to fight off Chiang Kai -sh cks troops hec rlllse in steadof resisting the Japanese invad orshe k ept a t tackin g thoHod Army and lo ca l armed forc es. Th ey should also ha veex pla in ed that tho Il ed Army h ad no intention of fall­ing ou t with th e local authorities and people. \ Ve co uldthus have l et th e leaders of th e pr ovinces know whorewe stoo d, i nfurrnerl the lo ca l population of t he R ed Army' :"poli cy, reduced possible re sistance, and persuaded th eloca l authorities not to r egard Ch iang Kai-shek as a pos­sibl e ally.

As a result of Mao 's tw o blunder s, the local authoritiesand the population of Kwoichow and Yunnan pr ovinces,and also of Szech uan and Sikang provinces, b ecam e d eep­ly s uspicious of the Ch inese Red Army. T his h el pedChia ng Kai-shek to win over the Inr::11 authnritics andto usc- th em against the Communists. F or t he R ed Army,on the other hand , it create d unfavourable conditi onsand l ed to l oss es tha t could have heen eas ily avoid ed.

At th at time, Ch en Yun was a suppor te r of Mao T se­tung. The m ain purpose of hi s .article was to present Ma oin a favourable li ght. So , some of his pa ssa ges co nta in edin evi table co n tradictions and ex aggera ti on s. All the sam e,co n tra ry to the a ut ho r's intenti ons, th e arti cle is a va lu­abl e hi sl.ori cnl docum en t. H we compa re t he fact s per ­tain in g to th l' s it ua tio n of the npd Arm y Irnm th e be gin­ning of the West ern March to its arrival in Tsunyi as

give n in Chen Yun's article with tho hi story of the Tsunyico nference as fabricated by Mao du rin g th e "style recti­fication ca m pa ig n" . we shall sec m an y fundamental d is­pa r ities . Ch en Yun 's article. which is based on histor­icnl fa cts, de scribes the actu al s ta t e of affairs, whil eMa o's version is a wholesale fabri cation . This is whyChen Yurr's arti cle can b e accepted as fairl y reli able evi­de nce di sprovin g Mao's version .

Another of Mao's po li tical and m ilitary mistak es wa sthat a ft er t he T S1111 y i conference h e nOl;t ed the correctComintern pl an of pr eser vin g t h e strength of the RedArmy of th e ce n tra l Soviet. area durfnz its W est ern Marcht o large, ri ch an d den sel y popul ated -Szechuan province.where it wa s to join for ces with the 4th Front of the RedArm y (already the re ) and crea te a ne w large base . The·IRt . ard and 5th army corp s of th e Reel 1\rmy of thecen tral Soviet ar ea , of which Mao had taken charze :'l fter­th e Tsu nvi conference, m ad e senseless marches one dayto Kweichow, another to Y unnan, seeking r eckless en­gagements with the en ernv. The r ight thi n g wouldhave b een to evade bat.tle and preserve manpower. Infact , preserving the nod Army's stre ngth was th e ch icfpurpose of th e march fr om Ki angsi to Szechuan. Inatelegram to the CC erc, the Comintern sp ecially em pha­sised tha t it w as m ost imncr tn nt to maintain the st rengthof th e Hed A rmv. This. the te legram said. was even mo reimpo rta nt th an maintaining bas~s, b~came by preservingt. hu R ed Army it would be possible III due course to setu r a new, l aI:ger Sovi et base on arrivin g in Szechuan. .

Before th e Tsunyi conference. p~ Ku , Ch ou ~n-ial.

and other comr ades who followed HIlS correct COilluI.ter npoli cy, nvoided linn ecessnr y .en gagcm en Is wi~~ C: ~ll an gKai -shek's troops. Th ey explained the slog an, resi st Jli ­

pan and fight Chiang Kat -sh ek",~o lucal gro t!ps and a~­van ced withou t com hat. Tile maxunum was rlon c to pI e­se ",:e th e lted Army. w h ich was exp ect ed to S:-l 11Jl a n ew,la rge Soviet, area in Szechn an . .and to prime for th~Sl l'lJ lY le against Japanese aggression. n ut ~t the Tsuny i~onf~~ence Maoatlacked the correct Co~mte:n ~~Hl,~~e,1 ihi it as a tactic of "ricrht-o!)pol'tunlst, Ilight". I fl-Cesc rr mg I < . < .. '- "' . " I t Iluc ta nce to fight", and the lik e, though lw"t?ry S lOWS l Ie

olitical and mili tar y li n e set by th e Com lUte;1l fo~ .1 I e\.v "tern 'Ma rc h to have b een correct , .an d l"l~o s pOlliJC~\and military line followin g th o T su n yi confer ence to la\ e

?q

be en incorrect. It caus..cd heavy , perfectly avoida ble, lossesto the I s~. 31'd and :)t h arm y cor ps of the llcd Army.

T he main Red Army for ces of the ce ntral So vie t areahad nearly 80,000 men when it set out on the WesternMarch on 16 Octo ber 1934. By th e beginning of J anuary1935 ( the time of th e Tsunyi confe re nce), th at is, twoand a half months la ter , th er e re mained approx ima te ly48 ,000 m en. Losses thus totalled some 32.000. Accord ingto Po Ku (Hankow, 19::18 ) . T eng Fa , \Vang Chiu- hs iung "(MORCOW, 1936) and oth er com rades at diff er ent tim es,the army had lo st men not as a re sult of fighting, hutm ainl y du e to the desertion of about 30 ,000 men re cruiteda fow mo nths before. There wore only a few en gagementsbefore the Tsunyi confere nce, and none at all duri ng theadvance al ong the borders of Kwangtung and Kwangsiprovinces. Chiang Kai-sh ek did not learn of the with­drawal of the main Red Army force unlil 2<'1 October .when he quickly se nt tro ops in pursuit. But since he didnot k now tho direction of the R ed Army 's march, andsince he could not enter Kwangtung and Kw an gsi prov­inces, hi s u nit s caught up with the Rod Army OIl only afew occa sions. The Red Army's logistical units had takenalong com para tivel y heavy and unwi eldy workshop equip­ment, printing presses, pr esses for prin tin g money, andthe li k e. On arriving in Tsunyi , the Re d Army st oppedfor a 12-day rest, because enemy activity was not es­pec ially serious.

But after' the T sunyi con fere nce, in a matte r of twoweeks foolh a rdy engagemen ts an d marches o rde re d byMao redu ced tho army fro m 1t 8,000 iucn to 22.000, lossestotallin g 26,000.

It was part of Mao's political and m ilitary treach er ythat on tw o occa sion s-in Ab a in Ju ne 1935 and in~laoerhkai in September 1935 -he tried to pro voke spli tsin the PUtty and Red Army, thus inflicting unprecedenteddamage.

The even ts that had all but pr ecipitated a spl it in Aha(Szechuan province), develop ed as foll ows.

The 4th Front s ta t ioned in th e Szechuan-Sh s ns i Sovietarea and the 1st , 3 rd a nd Gt.h army cor ps ma ki ng theW estern March m et in Ab a. The 4th Front had m or e

. ' A t the Tsun yi conference Teng Fa was neutral, Wan g Chia­hs~ ang supported Mao, and Po Ku was attacked by Mao. Theirevidence , there fore, merits attention.

~han 100,000 men, the 1st, 3rd and 5th cor ps only about~O,OOO . Tong Fa reports that Mao wanted to "swall ow"th e 4th Front. He persuaded Lo Fu to write an articlefor t.he wall newspaper, blaming th e 4th Front command ­~rs for righ.t-oppor~unist mi stakes. Th er e was a verystrong r eac tion , which a ll but ended in au outright split.Leaders and cadres on both sides con Ierred over theissue for nearly 10 days. As a result, Mao wa s com pell edto admit the error of hi s ways and hand ove r th e dut.iesof general commi ss ar of th e n ed Army to Ch ang Ku o-ta o.Chu 'I'oh , t oo, relinquished the post of com mande r-in-c hiefto Hsu Hsiang-chien and was m ade his deputy, wh ileW ang Ch ia-hs iang r elinquished the post of head of theMain Po litical Department to Ch en Chang-ha o, and be­came t he latter 's deputy. After r epeatedly con fess ing andrepenting his mi stakes, Lo Fu managed to retain the postof gen eral secre tary of the Central Com mittee. 1\ Polit­bureau m eeling eo-op ted Hsu H si ang- chien and ChonChang-hac as m embers. This wa s the pri ce for aver tin ga split . T he leaders of t he two sides decided that the n edArmy sho u ld con ti nu e t he march West in two columns .Th e first to set out were part of the .'J:th Front and theIst and 3rd army cor ps . They form ed an advance colu m nunder H su Hsiang-ehlen and Ch en Ch ang-h an, and wer efoll owed by anothe r part of the 4th Fron t and by the5th army cor ps, which form ed a second co lum n underChang Ku o-tao and Chu Tell. But ill Septem be r" on l"eacl~­ing Maoerhkai (Szechuan province) , and again off hisown hat, Mao suddenly began to move the troops, andonc e more brought matters to the brink of a spli t.

When the first colum n ca me to Maoerhkai, Mao defiedthe de cision of t he Politbureauand the Central Commit­te e's military council conc ernin g the joint ad vance northof the Lst (1st, 3rd und 5th army corps ) and 4th fronts,and one nighL ordered the 1st an~ 3rd ~rmy c.orps tostrike camp and advance al one, Without informing the4th Front, whi ch had marched with the m up to then.More, through Mao 's fau lt the march began in adverseco nrlit ions-c- lo z is ticnl arran ge m ents had not heen com­pl at ed ( ::nlppli~;; of food a nd winter oqllipJl1eI~t wer e sho~t)and requisite information had no t been ?~ t alIl?d cr~nc elll­ing we a tha r, and natural and other conditIOns III this areaof mountain glaciers and swam ps. As a result, the : stand 3rd cor ps suffered heavier losses than other u nits,

..."

In September 1. 935, when th ey se t out, they had som e17,000 to 18,000 men, but h eavy losse s saw th eir stre ng thsh rink to 5,000. And in October , after fightin g two minorengagements , and after they had m anaged to r ecruit somereinforcements, they had onl y 5,700 men.

The blam e for these two sp lits falls sq uarel y on MaoT se-tung, th ou gh th e fa ct th aI the spli t in Mao er hkai wasused to form a second CC P olitical Bureau with ChangKilo-lao at its head . whi ch only aggravated th e spl il intho Party and R od Army, was th e Iau lt of Chang Kuo­la o. Finally, in th e aut umn of Hl3G Mao deliberately hin­dered the w estern colum n of th e /ttll Front Irom geLtingmodern weapon s fr om th o Sovie t Union , 'wh ich were wait­ing for it in Sinkiang. Th e colu m n suffer ed very heavylosse s on this account, wiLh only 800 ou t of 25.000 menfinally reaching Sinkiang. Ma o had withheld ins truc t io n sfor th e western column to go to Sinkia n g to get the Sovi etequ ipmen t . If the co lu m n h ad been informed in goodtime (and th is was quite possible, for th e radi o trans­mittel'S of th e Central Committee's military council hadregul ar contact with it) , it wou ld cer ta inly .h a ve col lectedthe S oviet aid , and in the au tu m n of 1937 th e J apan esewou ld have h een fa ced by a well-equipped m od ern armywith hundreds of thousands of men in North a nd Centr a lChina ins tead of just the Sth Ilouto Arm y with 40,000m en and th e New ..Hoh with 20,000. Tn sh or t, n ot onlydid Ma o ex pos e the western co lum n to h ea vy losses, hu tIII~ . 11/",,-, caused trem en dous harm 10 t he Party a nd thoChi n ese revoln ti un -c-n m ost se r ious cr im e.

The T su nyi con ference and Mao's ac tivity durinz anda ft er th e co n fer ence givo no grounds whatever to ~peakof Ma ? 's re n der ing any "ser vices" to the Party and:;(' \,O!:JlI OII. On. the :oJltra ry . h e had commtu od ex tre m e

lof t -a dventu r is t mi stakes and a nti-Party crim es.T he fac t tha t Mao co n ti n ues to boa s t of Ih e "me rits

of .th !' T SI1.nYi con fere nce " and of hi s own "services" isa srgn of hIS truly un ash am cd im m odes ty.

.~ n ~ y e,1 th e Itr u e [acts ~how that even th e Mao-inspiredan ti- I a r tJ an d anll-C Omllltern reso lution of the Po lit­burea ~1 co u fer ence ill T sunyi criti ci sm! the 5 th Plenum ofthe .', lXth .Cen tr a!, Committee only for " com m it ti n g som et~c trc~l nll stakes and di d not say that its zeneral lin e'has "ll1c o.rrf'ct: Tt foll ow s. the refo re . that l\ r no '~ claim sincet e rectiflcation of s tyle campaign" tha t the 5th Plenum.'

?Ii

l in« wa s a " 'l eft'-opportunist P o Ku line" , is totall yg ro undloss.

As for the Comintern line of th e 41h Plenum, h ighlypopular and a ccepted by the entire Party, nobody inT sunyi spok e agai nst it. N OI' wOIII ,l an ybody have dare dspeuk agai ns t. it, In shor t, th e ve rs io n advanced during the" st yle r ectification cam paign " and propagated by Ma oto this da y th a t th e 4th Plenum line was "Wang Ming's'Ief t'<opportunist linen-is entirely co n tr ary t o the fact s.

Ma o's ver sion that the T sunyi confer ence oppose d" W ang Ming's ' Iof t.-op por tuulst lin e wh ich had reignedin th e Party for four y ears", that it " put an end t o ' Va ngMi ngs 'Jeff-opportun ist l eadersh i p" , th at it "establi shedMa o's corr ect leader shi p" , t hat. " by t ho time of the T suny iconlcrcnco ( i.e . by th e end of 1H:34) the Chinese rovolu­li on had been def eated due to the third 'le ft'-o ppor tu n is tl ine" , th at Mao " saved the Chin ese revolu ti on " , and th oli ke , all thi s , fr om boginning to end, is Ma o's fabri cation .Its pu rpo se is 10 m agnify hi s pe r so n. a nd to st rik e a l th eCominLern lea der sh ip 'a nd at those crc lead er s wh o fol­low ed t h e correct Com intern li n e during the Chineserevolu tio n .

No w. lei lIS look at t he st a te of th e Chin ese r evo lu ­l ion on th e eve of th e T snn vi conf er ence. This willsh ow us how abs urd and fal se ~'r a () ' s version is.

B ef or e th e beg in n ing of th e W cs tcru March (up toIG October I D;)4 ) the Ch inese Red A rm y had approxi ­m at ely 2RO,OOO-3 00.000 m en. Of thi s number about ~JO , OOO

men wer e in th e ce n tral Soviet area (mainly the [st Fro ruunder Lin Piao, the 3rd Front und er deputy commander­in -chief Pen g T ch -huni , and a few othe r ar mi es underTung Ch en - lang, HSTln Huai-ch ou , Lo P in g-hui, andother s); so me 150,000 m en in th e Szcch uan -S hcnsi S o­vi et area (4th F ro n t und er H su Hsi ang-ch ien and ChenChang-h a n} , an d n early 20 .000 m en in th e Sovie t a rea inwest ern Hunan and Hu peh provin ces (2nd Front underH() Lung. in cluding H sia o K o's 6th Army) . Th ere wereso me 10.000 m en in tho Sovie t area of northeast Kiangsi(LOth Army und er Fang Chili-min and Sha o Sh ih- ping },nearly 7.000 in th e Ilupeh-Hon an -Anhwci Sovic ] are a(witl: th e 25lh Army of 5,000 under Hs u Hal -tung m ov­ing La n or th ern Sh ens i}, abou t 5,000 m en (26th Arm yund er Lin Chill-la n and Ka o Ka ng ) in th e S ovie t area inno rthe r n S hens i, and b et ween 3 ,000 and 5,000 (under

Fen~ Pa i-chu) in the Soviet ar ea on Hainan , Kw angtungnrovmce.

In addi tio n t o the Il cd Army un its that ha d se t out onth e W est ern Mardi and lost 32,000 m en by the heg in­ning of Janual'y193.1, th e Lime of th e Tsu nyi conference,th e Red Army's guerrilla u nits tha t had s taye d behi ndin the former ce n tral Soviet area under the comm and ofH sian g Ying, Che n Yi, Ten g Tzu-hui , Chang T in g-ch en g,Tan Ch en -lin, Tseng She ng, Yeh Fei and ot he r com rades,numb er ed n early 10,000 m en. Besid es, sma ller gu errfll aun its operate d in o the r localiti es . Only two troop col ­umns were deployed on a Central Committee order fr omother ar eas to su ppor t the W estern March-the 2nd andnth army corps under Ho Lu n g and Hsiao Ko, th e10th Army under Fang Chih-min and the 7 th und er HsunHuai- chou-which together formed the "advance RedArmy colum n in th e northern cam pa ig n of resis ta nce toJapan" . All oth er Red Army units r em ained in thei r basesin So viet areas, and suffere d no losses.

In the Shanghai area, North China and othe r Kuomin­tang regions the Party ]IIHl Central Committee bureaus.Th nro wer e provincial P arty comm ittees in H opeh , Honan,Shen si , Kiangsu , Szech uan an d other provin ces, and lo calParty com m ittees in Shanghai , Soochow , Peking, T ientsin ,Tungsh an , Sian, Ch cn gtu , Chungking, an d oth ercit ies, aIHI also in m an y county towns. Al toget her. th eseaccounted for anothe r several t en s of thou sands of Partymember s (no t incl ud in g memb er-s of tho YCL ) . Theyplayed an impor tant pa r t in t he resi s tance to Japan and forn ational salvat ion, anrl w er e hi ghly ac tivo in the work ing-class , pea sant, s tude n t and in telJectu al m ovem ents. -

An An ti-J apanese Union Army of between 030,000 and40.000 men op era ted under the P arty 's leadership in areasheld hy J apan ese occ u pa tion forces an d th e IHl j)IHJt Man­clm k uo reg ime in Northea st China. Spec ial com m ittees\\:er~ active under the guidance of the Manchuri an pro­v i nc ia l P arLy com rni ttee in th e cast, north and so uth of~anehll~'ia , with Party anrl YCL organi sations op erating­III H arhju , Chan gclum a nd ot her large citi es .

In sh or t, the re wer e Party a nd YCL organ isa t ions inmany cit ies and villagos. Th ey fou gh t courageously inextre me ly di l ficult cond it ion s. con t.in uo usly ha rassed andb?~ c t by dan grl', leading th e Chin os« nati on in th o r n­sis tanc e to Japan and for n a tion al salva t ion .

28

Reports of various l ocal Par ty org anis atio ns concerningthe sit ua t ion in th e Comm u nist Par ty and the revolutio n­ary movem ent in 1933-193<'1 are a vailable in th e an -hivesof t he CC crc. Man y of t hem had be en pu blished a tI hat ti m e in Pal'ty and ouher revol utionary publications .J Iany wer e printed in the Communist In ternati onal ajournal pu t ou t in Hu ssran , Chines e, and othe r Ianz unzes/nfl"~co"", ::. publi sh ed by the Comin tern in 13rit fli~l , Bol~sheoik , organ of th e Communist P ar ty o f tlie Sovietl!nion, an d China T ribun e, 1111 Engl iRh-langllage puhl ica­LlOIl appcar lng in Shanghai. An article was co n tr ibu tedby m e, among others , in October 1934 about the R edArmy's s tr uggle agai ns t Chi ang Kai -shcks six th an ti ­comm un ist ca mpa ig n and its n ew uacti cs, It dealt withRe d Army ope rations in th e central Soviet area in H133­1931; the r easons for t he se tbacks during the eve n ts inFukien province that ce ntre d round th e Ku omintang 19thArmy's com ing out against Chiang Kai -sh ek and for r e­sis tance to Japan ; the reasons for t he Red Army's l ea v­ing ,th e central Soviet a re a, it s old base, after th e 19thArm y was defeated in Fukien, and set ti ng out on theWestern March in ord er to avoid a two-pro nged attackby Chiang Kai -shok (in th e east fr om Fukie n and th eno r th fr om Kiangsi) and due to other politica l, militaryand eco n om ic reason s. My ar ti cle ap peared in B olshevik(No. 22) and Communist I ntern ational (No. 32-33 ) inHussianvand the article, " T he Ne w Situation and NewTac tics" appeared in Inprecorr in En gli sh . Later, the twoarticles we re inco rpo rute d in a pamp hl et. "T he NewSituat ion and New T ac tics" , wh ich ap peared in Chi nese.

These hi stor ical fa d s, su ppor te d by documents, areincontes ta ble.

Wh a t basi s is t here th en for Mao's inventions aboutthe state of th e Chi nese r evolution on the eve of th eTsu nyi conference? According t o h is fabr ica tio ns, theChiuese revolu tion had come to a dead end : " losses in theSoviet are as amo un ted to 90 per cent", " losses in th ewhi te areas amounted to 100 per ce nt", "only 2f:i, 000 menre maine d in t he Hed Army througho u t the cou nt ry". Ma ocl aims that ill these cond itions ho " sa lvaged the Ch in eserevolu t ion"-an ou t-and-out li e that is not and ca nno tbe suppor t ed by any facts.

* Inprecorr-« International Press Correspondence.

Chen Yun's article already cited here contains nomenti on of any " def ea t of the Chiu oso r ovolu ti on " on theeve of'the T sunyi eon f'ar en co.

Indeed , Ch en Yun m ent ions a 12-day rest aft er captur­ing T sunyi, hut says nothing oI the Pol ithureuu con lur­ence. ':- I asked him at that time why he did not mention it.and he replied : "It wa s neither a Party con OTOSS nor aCentral Committee plenum-only on e of maI~y m eetingsof the Politbureau, nothing m ore. What special need wasth ere to write about rit?"_ Chen Yun related the following concerning the issuesdiscussed at that meeting:

"To begin with, there was crit icism of three past mis­takes. First, there was no explicative work in the Partyand Red Army, and amung the population, beIore the be ­ginning of the Western March ... because we had ap­preached the question of military secrets mechanicallyand consider ed it impermissible to let Party members, sol­diers and the population know tho objectives of the West­ern March. This was remedied by HIe slogan, 'CaptureWang Chia-lieh alive'. Second, we had taken along toomuch ammunition and too much heavy machinery andequipment. This matter wa s easily settled: all bulky itemswere abandoned.

"The third mistake was purely military: we hadmarched along a straight line mapped out beforehand. Thismi stake was remedied on reaching Liping, even beforearriving in Tsunyi.

"Besides, we changed men in two posts. This, in fa ct,was th e main purpose of the conference. Since Mao hadlong wanted to replace Chou En-lai as General PoliticalCommissar, he made a bargain with La Fu that the latterwould also replace Po Ku as General Secretary. This isnow a thing of the past. So, what need is thoro to writeabout it? After all, it was a very delicate thing.

"At the conference in Tsunyi Mao criticised Po Ku andChou En-Iai for their alleged reluctance to flght,and saidthe Western March was thus more like a 'resettlement'.On having assumed command a Iter the con fer ence, Maokept sending the troops incontinently into battle andforc ed marches, and provoked much dissati s laction." ':-':.

., See Communist International (Chin ese-language editi on)No. 1-2, 1936, p. 50.

*" Ibid., pp. 48-49, 50.

.A fow explanations seem to be in order in connection~~~~l,.Ghe? Yun ',s , account. J-:I e fail ed to mention that onarr ivmg III Ilueili couu ty of Ynl111 al1 province Lin P·.and other arm y commande rs pro tested aU'Cl i rlst'tlle ' raoless II III , . 1 f 1 OL se ns e-. , a u. LS a nr orcer 1ll 11l'cI leS ordered by M Tt~mg. After entering Szechuan province La Fu ~ho se­sldore d M t . '1' " w 0 con-

, _, 0.0 s nn ttary tactics in correct de cided t thwitli Chen Yun and La Mai to leave the R ed A age or

~'~f~g1'llhto ~halndghai for ~ndergroulld work. Mao d[r~v:rny~o cou to preval] on La Fu t t .

t o Support him in the " uoliti al o , ~ ~y and con tinu er 1 IC arena' If yo Ialto .

the politi c-al are na he said you will . t ~ a, or Inmilitary arena eith'er.' no s urvive III the

They reached a compromise: La Fu and La M . ld8, t l~y WIth th e Army, while Ch on Yun would 0'0 t~I S\lVl~Ullg_LUI and then t 1\ -1 1 ~ '-"

• < .t t : : 0 1~ uscow, to t ie Com in tern to ob i" . 1[or tl ' l 'l . R d A , - .a iu all, ie J ~lIles~ o rmy. This was th o objec t of ChonYUH s arrivul 111 Moscow in December H)~5. But we didno~ leiu:H of this until 1936, from T ong Fa and WanOlua-hslang. g

It follows that Chen Yun, too, was as sailed by doubtsabout Mao 's military tactics. Since Chen Yun left China~)efo~'e th~ Red Army had met the 4th Front, the version~n his article ab out a larger Soviet base in Szech uan prov­m ce was contrary to the facts. But 1'01' thi s he cannotbe blamed: he m er ely cited the plan of the WesternMarch as defined in a directive of the Comintern. None ofus coul d have foreseen then that after t h e two armiesmet, Mao would abandon the idea of a base in Szechuanprovoke a spli t on two successive occasio ns , and finallym arch off separately a cr oss mountains and swam ps tothe Nor th wes t, thus caus in g heavy l osses to the P arty andHed Army.

As concerned the political aspect, Chen Yun had earliera ssumed that Ma o's behaviour was correc t. It did notdawn on him that he was mistaken until after he hadseen the pro ceedings of the 7th Congress of the Comin­tern and r ead my pamphlet, "New Conditions and NewTactics", on the Rod Army's stand against Chiang Kai­shek's "sixth campaign" and the tactics of the WesternMarch, my speech at the 7th Comintern Congress on theunited national anti-Japanose front in China, and myarticle, "The Now Situation and New Policy", whichex pl ained th e th eoretical and practical asp ects of Comin-

:-\1

tern poli cy concerning a united front in China. Thiswa s how Chen Yun cam e to write in his ar ticle: " Ou rJ,)oliti cal COurs e in th e matter or a un ited ant i-i mperiali s t.fr on t. was not a correct one . If we had foll owed newtacti cs and had a new course at the ti me of the WesternMarch, we would have been h ighly s uccessful. But it isnot too late to make up for lost Lime. To da y, the unitedfront is ab solutely ne cessary ; it is the only possiblecor rect cours e." ,~

Chon Yunalso saw light in tho matter of using th e con­tradic tions between Chiang Kai-sh ek -and various lo calpower-holding groups. H e began to see that thi s wouldcreate more favourable conditi ons for the Red Army's"W estern March and com pel Chi ang to resist Japan. Hewrote: " T he offens ive of th e Japan ese imperialists inNorth China is exciting steadily growing anger amongthe mass of the people. A bitter hidden struggl e is goingon between different groups of warlord s, We must makeuse of their contradictions. " ':..*

Evidently, Ch en Yun had begun to reali se the error ofMao 's political line at the T sunyi conferenc e and in theyears t ha t followed. The erro r of Ma o's military line hadhe en clear t o him even before. This was why he hadnot mentioned the T sunyi con fer en ce in his article.

But that is not all. At the end of hi s article , ChenYun praised, and gave a relatively true estimate of theParty's work after the 4th Plenum of the Sixth CentralCommil.tee. H e wrote: "W hat assessm ent should onegive the work of the Party? After the 4 th Pl enum ourParty achieved truly significant success. Its prestige isvery high in the Soviet areas, for there it defends theinterests of Lens of millions of working people. Admitted­ly, th er e were als o some mistakes, but a ll of these wererem ed ied. No lon ger is the si tu ation anything lik e i t wasafter th e betrayal of Ch en Tu-hsiu or at the time of theLi Li-s en and Tsuyi T syu-po mistakes, Now , in the newsit uati on , our Party can se t new tasks. " *~:~

Anyone wishing to com pare the fact s as th ey are givenin Chen Yun's art icle with t he actual sta te of affa irs, andwith th e hi story of the T sunyi confere nce as fabricated

* Comm unist In ternat ional (Chinese-langu age edition)1'\0. 1-2, 1936, p, 67.

** Ih id ,".,>' Ib id .

br Ma.o during th e " s tyl e rectification cam pa ign" C~~~etJ;1I the " resolu tio n on so me points of his tory ' :;r Ll~:I I unum of t he Six th Contra l Cn/llilli ll et' ) will ,10" ,~ bs,ll rd, and ~isgra e efllJ l\1 a o ' ~ fa l sific a ti on ~ ;efl ll y a~.~~l

e can al so refer to Edga J' Snow's bonk V I ' /

QJo l~'t'n ey to the West, wh ich a ppeare d in Ch i I;e~eo i~ISl ~)1 7aIII e con trary to th e author 's in to Li . " .

reliabl e e~i dence dis pro ving Mao's f~br~~~~~d l \l i ~~ ' esenL~~,h e TS.llnYI co~ference,., Everybody k nows that ~1a~?h~':f

u nh ui dened .h is heart 10 hi s Arn erica f ' "I htr ut d ~ . II rren u . w om hel ed e as an old and trusted cu nlida nt. From ll im he did~ot co nce al eve~I hi s op in ion on ma tt ers perta ining to th e

ar ty, the Conu ntern, and th e Soviet Union. III th e sum­Iller and a lltum~ of 1936 in Paoya llg , Mao and S now hadm any confida n tm] talks. Before the notes Sno w m ad e ofthe.se talks w ere , publish ed , h e had t hem translated intoChin ese for Mao s personal perusal S f) il t he .. ·t L'fl . C ' ) ; ~ , sr ua IOna t ie omm u uist 1- arty and th e Clun ese revolu t ion onth e .eve of ~h e T sunyi confe r ence had rea lly been astragic .as ,~:la lme~ by Mao d.uring th e " s tyl e rectilicat ioncam paign , and .If th e Tsu nyi conference and Ma o him selfhad r eally been as " dec isive " as Mao claimed th is wouldcer ta iJl11 have been r eported by Snow to U{e pub li c inthe United S ta tes and th e r est of th e worl d. Snow hadgone on h is jo urney on ins tructio ns of the US au thori l..i eswith the in tenti on of m eeting Mao . H e wrote hi s " Notes ';to m a.ke Mao pop ula r. So, if Mao had give n h im such~latef1a l , he woul d have reported it with reli sh , Besides,Snow als o ta lked to Lo F u, Chu T eh , Chou En-Iar P o KuPe ng T eh-h uai , ami othe rs WIIO had pa rticipa t~l in Lh ~'I'sunyi conferenc e. A nd the notes h e look we r e also read~Y .?ach ,of th em persona lly, and we re even tual ly printedIII Sno w s Not es 0/ a Juurney to th e W est .

But read S now's book fr om co ver to cover . YOIl willfind no tr ace of th e versi on of the Tsunyi con fe re nce la terconc oct ed by Ma o.

Nei the r in th e archives of the cpe nor th e docum en tsof th e Comintern , the Communist Party of the S ovie tUni on or the Commun ist Party of Ch in a ,' no r in the pu h­l ica tio ns of tha t tim e, nor in Chen Yun's a rticl e, nor illthe book by Edgar Snow, Mao's close st A mor lcan fr ien dnowh ere will yo u find anything fact ual to su ppor t theh is tory of the T sunyi confer ence as fab r ica te d by Maodu ri ng th e "style rectificat lon ca m pa ign" . On th e contrary,

33

the fa cts of history arc com plete ly at va r ia nce with Mao;sfabri cation.

Mao's political and mi li ta ry m istak es and his in sid iousbeha viour to wards th e 4 th Fron t in th e course of twoy oars-fr om th e Tsu nyi confe re nce un til the Sianevents-caused th e main for ce of th e Hed Army to shrin kto slightly m or e than 40 ,000 by the time i t was concen­tra te d in Wayopao, On com ing to W ayopao, Mao wasreluctan t to stay in th e Nor th and wait for a favourableopportun ity to launch an ti- Japa nese operations . Motiva tedby hi s ri ght-opportunis t and pessimistic views, he unitedth e re m na nts of the W est ern March troops of 5,700 m enwith the 8 000-strong unit of Hsu H al-tung and Liu Chih­tan, and ~etout on th e adventuris t marc h to Shansiprovince.

Incontrovertlble historical fa ct s sho w th at th er e hadbeen no rectification of any "four-y ears-old Ileft '- oppoJ'­tun ist line by Mao Tsc-tung at th e T sunyi conf~, ' ence ,an d certainly n o "salvat ion of the Chinese revolution byMao Tse-tung". In fact, af t er it s 4th Plenum anduntil the Tsunyi confe r enc e, the Sixth Ce~tral C0I?-mitteehad foll owed the essentially correct Com m t ern line andafter the 18 SepLember events (1931) gradually d evelopedthe pol icy of a united national anti-J apanes ~ front. '1',0 this ,in fa ct , the Chinese revolu t ion owe d all its conspicuoussuccess in the Soviet areas, Knomintang-dominated area s,and regions in the Nor theast under the Japanese and the irMa nch urian pup pets. The- facts als o show that as a resultof Mao 's extreme " le H" -opportu nist li ne and in sidiou sbehaviour many of the achievem en ts of the worker-peasantned Army and the Soviet movement in China werequickly squandered, in a ma tter of two years . Ther e isnothing to su pport th e claim thaL thanks to Mao's cor rec tleadership "the further development of the Chinese revo­lution" after th e Tsunyi conference had been successful.On the contrary, there is ample evidence to show thatthrough Mao's fa ult the Party's CenLra l Com m it t ee andthe main Red Army force of more than 40,000 m en weredriven into a narrow strip of la nd in the north of Shens iprovince and found themselves in an extre mely difficultsituation. Only thanks to the u ni t ed national an ti­Jap anese front policy t he Central Committee and theRed Army managed to extricate themselves from th es esad straits.

::14

T hes e historical fa cts were admitted by Liu Shao-chi ina, I.cLl er to Ma o in 1936 on beh alf of the ce ere Nor thChina Bureau. Not t he vill age ha d saved the tow n hewr~J te, bu t vice versa . In other words, the success of' t heun ite d national ~nt i -Japanes e front policy in urba n areashad sa ve(~ th e ':l llage. (The complete text of Liu 's letterwas published ill th e earli er -mention ed collection T woLines; t h ere fore only it s m ain id ea is cited her e.) Beforethe "style rec tification campaig n" Mao ha d h imsclf ac­kno wledged these histori cal facts. lIe hal l said p uhliclyam?ng other !hings, that " Comrade W ang Ming's no,~poli cy of a u?-l ted ~ational anti-Japanese front is a groatdiscovery, Wi thou t It our Party and the Red Army wouldha r'dly have cope d wi th Lh e complica ted si tuation of tha tti me ; wit hout it the Chin ese people coul d n ot ha ve mount­ed Lhe anti- J apanese war on t he sca le of t he wh ole co un­tr y." More, alread y after launch ing the "style rectifica­tio n cam paign", he said to m e " in w ords that come fromt he bottom of the he ar t" in April 194/l , a nd in a talkwith m e on th e "style rectification cam paign" in Decem ­bel' 1948, that h e still recognised these facts. ,:.

Mao 's unlawful -organisational acts a t t he Tsunyi con­fer en ce were ch ie fly th ese:

I. H e formed a Mao-Lo bl oc and began a fa cti onalstruggle against the Party and its Centr al Commi tt ee, thecorrect line of the Com inte rn, and the Lop poli ti ca l andmilitary l ead ers of the Party's Cen tr al Committee whofoll owed this line. H is aim was to usurp th o posts ofGe neral Com missar of th e Hed Army for himself and ofGe neral Secre ta ry of the Cen t ral Commit tee Ior La Fu.

2. The Politbureau conference in Tsunyi was incom­petent to r epl ace th e General Secretary el ecterl by the5th Ple n um of the Si x th Cen tral Committee of the crc.

3. Tho Poli tbureau had 12 m embers at LhaL time. I nT sunyi Mao could count on no m or e than one-third ofth e vot es. Out of the 12 Poli tbureau members live we reab sent (H si ang Ying had r em ain ed in the former ce n tralSoviet area J en Pi- sh ih was wi th t he Red Army's 2ndFront ChUI~g Kuo-tao was in the S zec huan-S hcnsi Sov ietarea, 'and W ang Ming and Kan g S he ng we re ill t he Com­in te rn), Out of th e seven Politbureau m emb ers present

" For th e con tent of these two talks see "My three tal ks withMao on 'Rectificati un'" in this section.

at the T sunyi conference, P o Ku and Chou En-la i di d notsupport Mao. Later, T ong Fa sa id llnl~ if th er e had beena vot e, he, too, wo uld not have voted lor M no. Mao couldcount only on Lo Fu and Chen YUIl, for it wa s not ~l ea rwhich way Chu T oh would have turned. nut even I f ~lChad vot ed [or Mao this would only have made foul' forMao and if he h :llI vo te d against. the majority wouldhave' been wi th Po Ku and Ch ou E n-lai. Mao k new thispertectly well . So he evaded a vote. W hen th e army \~a ss ti ll on it s way to T surryi, he had resort ed to polly m­trigues and dem agogy to pr evail on th e army representa­tives wh o would attend th e confere nce tha t, If necessarr ,they sho uld back him up by shouting i~, his fav~u [' . ThISwas h ow the r esolution h e w an ted was adopted" : Po Kuwas forced to yield the post of General Secre tar~ to Lo.Fu, a nd Cho u E n- la i th e post of General Commissar 01the Iled Army to Mao.

I n yea rs to come Mao made no sec re t of th e fact th ath e had form ed a gro u p a ga inst the l in e. ~f the Ce.I~tr~1Com mi ttee and th e Comin tern to usurp mlh~ary. power ~nthe P arty , On t he contrary, he ref erred to It With undis-guised pride. . ,H ere . for exam ple, is what he sa id to m e even he to r ethe "style r ectification cam paign" : . '" Du ring th e con fel'ence in Tsunyi I was ::t111 co.nsl rl­ere d a rizh t' opportuni st ; I could not hope to W lII any influ ­once on '~n y own . [ was th er efore cornpell cd to use themethod of 'divid e and oppose'. A t firs t, I coaxed W an gCh ia -h siang and then La Fu in to opposing P o Ku. Atth e sa me time, I crea te d the Mao-Lo bloc and cam e t oterms with La Fu th at he would Iirs! sei ze the post ofGe ne ral Secre ta ry and th en ap point m e Ge nera l Com m is­sar in place of Ch ou E n- Ia i. Afte r the~ Ij, t l ~ Ple IlUI.n of th eSix th Central Committee ( Hl3 t) the Com in te rn lin e rlom ­iuatod, In th e struggle against t he Li Li-sen linn anrlfor th e Comin te rn course you wer e in first place, Po Kuin se co nd and (Wang) Chia-h siang in ,third. Thou gh LoF u had Il U part in this st ruggl e, he was educa ted in Mos­f~OW and wa s also a follower of the Com intern course. Thefou r of you h ad much influ en ce i n the P olitbureau andamong Party cadres. You wore at th e Cornintc rn, tlreot he r three were wiLh 11 5 . T wo out of the three - (Wang)Ch ia-h sia ng and La F u-i-upposed one, P o Ku , and su p­por ted me. My word gai ned weight , people began to li st en

36

to m o. " As a r esul t , I was ab le to ca pture m ilita r y pow­er - the post of General Commi ssar."W hat Mao sa id to m e agrees with the fact s. The sa me

was rel a ted t o m e by T eng Fa , P o KI1 , and others.Certa in ly, if Ma o had com e ou t against the tremendous­

ly popular Comintern li ne of the 4th Pl enum. he wouldhave been repulsed by Po Ku , Wang Ch ia-h siang. La Fu,a nd othe r Politburoau comrades, because t h e first twohad been prominent in th e s truggle against L i Li-sen andwer e com m itted to the Com intern lin e. As for La F u,th ou gh ho had returned from Moscow to Shanghai in thesummer of 1931 , t ha t is , six m onths after th o 4th Pl enumand had taken no part in the strugglo against the Li Li~se n lin e, he was com m itted to the Comintern lin e.At that time non e of t he Polithureau m embers co uld com oout against th e line of the 4th Plenum - th o T sunyi con­Iorence w ould not have t ak en place at all or , if it h ad ,would h av e ende d in Mao's tot al d efea t.

At tha t tim e, Mao had neith er the power nor the cour­age to como out into the oponagainst the Comintern l inea nd m e, Wang Ming, the m ain ex ponent of that line.

To make hi s Ial sifi cation of the T sunyi con ferencesou nd auth entic, Mao invented cou ntless l egend s and nbsor ins truc ted othe rs to in ven t them. H was alleged, forexample, th at W ang Ming h ad take n pa rt in th e LongMarch, and tha t it was n ot u ntil after hi s r emoval at theT sunyi conference in the begi nning of Hl35 tha t h e wassen t to the Comintern to represent th e Comm un ist Par tyof Ch ina. And even th is : W ang Ming attende d tho con­fer en ce of cadres in W ayo pao on 27 D ecember 1fl35 ,wher e he and Po Ku op posed Mao's repor t on th e unit ednational anti-Japane se fro nt. Mao's fal sifi cation s werepick ed u p by the Chinese press , and even by bourgeoispublicati ons abroad, eithe r becau se they were m is in formedor deliberately to make mi schief. All kinds of vers ionswere invented a bout m y whe reabouts. It is quite n eedl essto re fute each of Mao 's fab ri ca tion s or oth er fa lse reports.Bu t I think it is in orde r to cl ear u p the foll owi ng po int.I h av e n ever been in a ny of the Chi nese Soviet areas.In Ihe late tw en ti es and ea rly thirt lus I worked under­gro u nd .in Sha nghai. On 18 October t fl ;~l 1 left Shanghaifor Moscow . where I arrived on 7 November . As of 10

.. At the Tsunyi conference Mao spoke only in the debate.

November I was th e CPC representat ive in th e Com inter n

and perf onn od my d u ties in its top urgans . It was not

until 14 November J93 7 that I left Moscow, arri ving in

Yenan on 29 November.All other versions about my wh er eab outs a nd move­

m ent s :1 1. that tim e area de liberate Iabri ca tion.

5) The polsonlng of Wang Ming

which injured hi s health

This occ urred durin g th o pr eparation s for the " rec ti fication

of style ca mp aign". -Durin g the ni gh t of 3-4 October 1941 Mao brou gh t m e

a telegram from Comrade Geo rgi Dimitr?v. Th.e l e~ egra.m

con ta ine d 15 qu esti on s to the CC CPC, inc ludi ng mq ui r­

ies about the m easur es the CPC intend ed to take to step

up m ilitary ope rations agai nst J apa n on the Sino-Ja pan ese

front in order to den y J apan, an ally of Germany, the

oppo rtunity for openi ng a seco.nd .front a~ai n.st t.l~e Soviet

Uni on -in support of the continu ing NaZI offen~ : ve . M~o

aske d me ,to study th e telegra m , and ad ded: W e will

di scuss our answer tomorrow. "On I[ and 5 October we had an un usual ly sharp argu ­

m en t. I sa id anti-Ja panese mili tary oper at ions in Chi na

had ( 0 be s tepped up to den y J a pan any chance of h.p-Iping·

the Nazi offensive again st the Soviet Union. Mao obJect<;d,

bu t did not argue his case. My argume nts stumped hun

azain and acain. H e glared at me and was at a loss for

,: ords. Wh e~ I intimated tha]. his line was anti-S oviet and

grayitated towards allian ce with Japan. '~ h e began to

sh ou t and bang th e ta ble, though unable to say anything

coherent lo the contrary. On 6 and 7 October Mao invited

Jen Pi-sh ih an d Wang Chin-hs iang to take part in th e

discussion, and on 8 mid 9 October al so Kung Sheng and

Chen Yun, hoping that they would support h im. But all

four gave to un derstand by their complete si lence t~at

th ey agreed with Dimitrov's re commendations an d WIth

my view.Thi s frightened Ma o. To end the dis cussion, whi ch wa s

da nger ousl y go ing against him, he decid ed to eliminate

m e, his chief political opp on cnt-c-who opposed his an ti­

Soviet and pro -Japan ese policy of nati onal bet rayal , the

* See pp. 175-81.

00

"rectification of style" he wa s preparing at that time

and actions fal sifying th o Par ty 's hi st ory. On 14 October:

he Ior ced me to go to hospital. Th en (as we learn ed

later) through Li Fu-chun, ch ie f of th e CC CPC Chan­

collc ry, he orrlcrcrl a tte nding physician Ch in 1\1ao-yao to

gIve me m ercnr-y drugs and cause a slow poi soning. Itwa s onl y th e ~:a r e and h elp of man y Party comra desoand

doctors, c~pceIally ~f Li. Ting-min, deputy chairman of

the ShensI-Kansu -Nlnghsul Bord er Ar ea governme nt wh o

wa s a~ .expe~i enced speciali st in Chi nese medicine,' and

tJ~ e mlJll sl~·a[.; o ns of th o eon s('ientious and solicito us Dr .

LI Yun-shi h '.' that br ou gh t rne ba ck nruonz th e I' .M '. 0 ivmg.

y cons trtunn -, was badly ,affected. I wa s bedridden for

~our years, and gra vely ill later . My illn ess becam e chr on­

IC .and wa s accom panied by attacks whi ch caus ed terriblepain and snffering .

Si?cc Ma o has for man y yea rs sprea d all kinds of in ­

vcntions to CO ver up hi s cr ime , and sin ce he ha s mallei­

?us ly ac cu sed m e of " simul ating illn ess" to escape th e

' re ctifi cation of style " cam paign, I feel it is in ord er lo

refe~' to the matt er at l east bri efly.

First ab out th e poisoning, which in ju red my health.

As I have said, Ma o and I had a heaterl argument in

his house oyer Dimitrov's t elegram. It wen t on -from 4 t o

fI Octo ber 1941 . E ach day T had at least one m eal in hi s

h ous e. On 8 Octobe r I had a se rious st om ach di sord er with

pr ofu se bl eeding'. arcnmpa nicd by dizzy spell s and ca rdiac

weakn ess. Th e doc tor s wh o examined me sa id th e sym p­

LOllI S wer e th ose of poisoning. On a October my con­

di ti on deteri orated, hu [, Ma o' s personal aide, Yeh Tsu­

lung. pra cti cally dra gged me out of bed to a tte nd a m eet­

in g . OnlO October 1 could no lon ger ri se fro m my bed .

Meanwhil e, pleading urgen cy, Mao ordere d Li Fu -chun

to organis e th e cons truction of a co nfere nce hall and

office building for th e Cent ral Comrnilt ee. Withi n n few

dozen m etres of m y dw elling workm en lab oured day and

ni ght, bla sting s tone bl ocks ou t of th e m uunt ai usido. The

deaf ening exp los ions con tin ued r ound th e clock . I wa s

deprived of peace, and Illy condition gre w worse. I asked

Li Fu -ch un to stop th e blasting for a da y or two or to

get the bl ock s elsewhere. But h e repli ed: "Those are

':. SIIr. was a m ornbnr o] the CP C, had finis he d the m ed ical

school of Tokvo Imp erial University and headed the pediatric

department of 'the Norma n Bethune Peace Hospital in Yonan.

39

Chairman Mao's orders. W ork must n ot stop even for a

minute."On 14 October T was visi ted hv Li Fu-chun and Fu

Lie n-chang (deputy chie f of the C·C CPC Military Cou n­

cil's heal th depar tm en t and concur rently chief of l'he Cen­

tral Committee's h eal th bureau) , wh o took me in a car

to the Cen tral Ho sp ital , where Chin Ma o -y a o was ap­

pointed my tr eati ng phys ician.

Chin Mao-yao pre scribed tr eatm en t whi ch inj urer! m y

health. T could not lea ve the hospital. From March to May

1942, Chin Mao -yao adminis te re d mercury prepara tions

in la rge doses, caus ing a slow poisoning . At this time

Mao launched the "style r ectifi cati on" cam paign, direct ed

aga inst the Comintcrn and the Sov iet Union. tile Com­

munist Party of China, Wang Ming, and others whom

Ma o accu sed of belon ging to a " Moscow gro up". I wa s

often unconsciou s a nd escaped deat h only thanks to the

care and vigilance of my wif e, Men g Chin g-shu , wh o ('e­

mnined at my bedside in h ospital. Unfortu nat ely, she as

yet knew very little about m edicine and pha rmacology .

but on uoticing m y negative reac tions to the prescr ibed

drugs she did not let m e tak e them and, in fact , th rew

th en: away . Lat er , she began collecting th e doubt ful pre ­

scri ptions, stowed th em away, and tu rn ed to doctors prac­

tisi ng Chinese and European medicin e for ur gent ~ i d: ..

On 13 Au gu st 1942 I r eturned hom e to Y antsialin. :,'

Chi n Mao-y ao contin lied to "treat" me. He was espec ia lly

ac tive a lter a telcgrnm arr ived in my name fro m Dimitrov

1Il Febru ar y '19/[3. saying : "We'll have you flown to Mos­

cow for tr eatmen t."Her e I m us t explain th at. my one tel egr am to Moscow

had been sent a month earlier. Two Sovi et war correspo nd­

en ts had come to see me on R J anu ary 1\)43. J asked

th em if J could use the ir tra nsmitter to communica te with

Dim i tr ov, They said I could. My conrli t ion was very

se rious , T th ou ght this wa s my la st ch ance to per form my

internationalis t: duty, and asked the two Soviet comrades

to inform th e Comintern lead ersh ip that sinc e m y r eturn

to YCIIan a t the end of November 19B7 and througho ut

the follo win g five yea rs Mao had committ ed ruany gra ve

e, J had wanted to leav e the hospital before, bu t Mao disap­

prov ed on th e pret ext th at th e cons truction of the Cen tral Com­

mittee Chancell er y was not yet compl eted an d workers were

still blast ing stone blocks neal' my house.

I.n

political mi s tak es and cr imes ; specifica lly , for already

~lOr~ t han a. year he was cond ucting a "styl e I'ec tin c~­

tl o l~ campa~gn whi ch was in s ubstance an ti-Lenin ist.

an.t l-r,0:nmu.lll~t , a nti-S oviet a nd ant i-Pa r ty. In concl us ion,

r inquired If u was possible to send a plane [or me .a nd

l~.ave. me treated in Moscow, whe re r would also give th o

ComlD tern leadersh ip parti culars ab out Ma o's cr imes

. Comrade Dimitrov's reply and especially my proposed

flight to ~l oscow badly worri ed Mao. He imm edi ately

nrdored Chi n Mao-ya ~) to do away wi th m e. On hi s order s,

On 12 F ebruary Hl43 Chi.n J\'fao-yao prescr ibed a large

dose ..of an aq ueo us solut ion of. calom el (rnerc llry sub­

ch lori de ) along . WI t h sodi um bicarbon ate and m agnesi ­

11111 s ulf~ te . whi ch , as I learn ed la ter, could tUI'II th e

calornel Tnto co: ros ive chlor ide of m ercury. On 19 Feb­

rua ry h? prescr ibed enemas with a 10 per cent solu tion

of tannin. Both prescriptions wer e m ean t to eliminate

m e. But Meng Ch in g-shu, who had hecom o sus picio us .

as ke d othe r (,locto rs to stu.dy the pr escrip tion s. They sa id

the pr~para tlO n s wer e highly toxic and could not be

used . ? he lodged an officia l com pla int ag-ains t Cliin Mao­

yao WIth th e Party's Central Committee and th e m edica l

authorit ies . Fearin g public opi Ilion and on ou r finn in ­

s is tence, Mao was compelle d to ag ree for Li Fu -chun to

invit e cons ul tants fr om the Y eri a n Cen tral Hospi tal, the

Norman Bethune P ea ce Hospital, an d th e Yen an Medi cal

Institute.Th e cons ultants began their in vestiga tion on 30 Jun e

Ifl43 and did not end it until 30 July, 'Thev s tudie d Chin

Mao-yaos pr escripti on s and the di ar y o'f th e med ical

nurses, and h ear d th e evide nce of nu rses a nd che mis ts,

and drew up two documents, which th ey called " fi nding'S

con cer-n in g th e dia gn osis and trea tm ent of Comra de W an g­

Miug" , and " provis ional recommen dati ons for h is fur th er

tr ea tment" . H ere is wh at they found:

" Afte r ta ki ng the medicin e Com rnde \\Tang Ming vom­

itcd , had diz zy spells and acute pains in the liv er . Hi s

spleen was en larged, the re wer e pai ns in th e region of th e

heart, a nd hi s body temperature dr opp ed to sub-norm­

al. . . . I II fa ct , the total close of j list th e calome l, tak en

in ternall y, was 10 0 large and led to poiso ni ng (if th e pa..

tiont had cont inue d takin g it accordin g to th e ins truc-

41

tions of head doctor Chin , ':. the dose would have probablytotalled 20.4 grams ; so large a dose can po iso n or kills everal people), and to unfavourable effec ts on the h eart,liver, spleen, kidneys, intestines, stomach, oral cavity,the t eeth , n erves, and oth er or gan s."

The findings further said: " Cal omel is in soluble inwater, and yet head doctor Chin prescribed an aqueoussoluti on of it 10 Wang Ming. . . . Wh en calomel is mixedwith sodium bi carbonate, magnesium sulfa te, sodium sul­fate, bromine preparations,and the like, it can turn intocorrosive chloride of mercury or soluble mercuric salt,which is more readily assimilated and more toxic. Yethead doctor Chin pr escribed calomel with incompatiblecompon ent!'! to Wang Ming. Tn so me ca ses , though pre­scribing the incompatibl e preparations and calomel sop­arately, he advised Wang Ming to take the merliclnestog ether. After taking calomel , the pati ent sh owed sym p­toms of mercury poisoning. but head doctor Chin toldhim to contin ue taking it. .." , and so on. *".

J think it. is not n ece ssary here to go into the circum­st.a nccs of the poisoning and th o harm to my health in theprn-iod from Oct ob er 1!l41 to June 1D4:1. or into th e vari ­ely of m ethods used ior Ihi s purpose. It would take uptoo much space. But thoreis no harm in citing a fewdocuments J have kept that clinch th e m atter:

1. The written findings and ath ol' papers of th e COTl­

s u l ta nts , wh o had gath er ed in Yonan from 30 June to 30Julr 191.a (their findings were in two copies, one of\\'."I<:'h was g iven 10 m e and th e other forwarded throughLl Fu-chu n to th e Ccn t ra l Commiltee of the CPC) a t~f th o. If) r-o ~ls uIta n ts , the findings were sign ed b~ 1~IIlclwhn g- CIlIn Mllo-vao and DI' Ma Hat t j C· ,H' I ) . • . lY c 1- C I (Georgeb rg ll~m . an Amer~can doct or who took Chin 's Ride. Facedf y Witness es and Illcontroverlible evidence tlo~ed to a ffix their s igna lures to the documen t ICy were

n e of the four wh o did t sic C .cat od in fascist Germany an~o S lo~ wa s

fhu Chen, odu-

in ce. like Chiang China (Mao' a n~f Ire 0 d S~a.n tu ng prov­Dunng th e invesligali~n h d'~ w~ e an hill Ma o-yao.nnd when th e lillI e cameo t I .h lS UIIm ast t? clea r Chin,

* 0 sign t 10 findmgs he dis-The l'efe"'H1cc is to Ch· l\f

gync~olog ic 8 1 and surgica'l Ill) ao-yao, then head doctor of UHOSPItal. (epartmonts of the Yenan C t ,.ej** UF' d' e on In

III rngs...", pp. 7, 10-12.

42

al~peared.. Another wa s Hou Chien-tsun , who had s tudiedwlt.h Chl~ in . t h e. medical sc h ool of Amer ican-o pe rat edC!lJlll Univer sity In S h antung and had al so worked with111m at tho Ameri can-owned LIsl eh-ho H ospital in P eking.H e wa s godfather to Lina, th e dau ghter of Mao Tso-tunzand Chiang Ching, and wa s in charge of th o child ren' sdepartment at tho Central Hospital, where hi s wifo wa sse nior m edi cal nurse . Chiang Ching oIlen lef t her d.nurh­tel' in thclr ca re. The other two were Chu Ch ung-li andSoviet doctor A. Orlov, who could n ot at t end on the dayof the signing. .

Aft er tho findings had h een d rawn li p. th e s il;!"n inlr wa sdelayed for two days due to th e recalcitra nce of Ch inMno-yao and the attempts of Ma Hai-t eh and Chu Chento ab solve him of guilt. Most of t he con su lta nts, includ­ing Dr. Orlov, had th e pharmacy fill Chin Mao-yao's pre­scri pt ion of an aqueou s so lu t ion of ca lo me l and th o otherincompatible ingredi ents, and h ad off.ere d. 1\[a Hai~teh ,whu argued that it wa s harmless, t o drink It. Ma Hai-tehrefused. A few hours later , th o solution , which was ina glass phial , turned green. Then there wa s ~ suddenpop and the cork flew out of th e n eck of the phial up totho ceil ing. Ma Hai-teh paled, and spoke n ot a word moreiII Chin's defen ce. Fearing that he, to o, w ould be askedto swall ow the solut ion, Chu Chen fled. Chin Mao-yaoal on e cont inu ed to a rgu e. Then, my wif e Meng' Ching-shupassed round a prescripti on Ch in h ad issued on 12 F eb­ruary 1943. At thi s point Chin broke down. H e ran to her.fell to hi s knees, and said plaintively: "Comrade MengChing-shu, thank you for not having thi s prescriptionfilled and n ot letting Comrade 'Yang Ming take it. Youhave sa ved not only your husband ; yo u have al so savedme. " After thi s 11 out of the 12 doct ors present sign edthe document (except Hall Chien-t sun).

After the findings h ad be en si gned, Chi n Mao-yao ra nup to me, kneeled beside my bed and wailed with tearsrunning clown his ch eeks :

" Com ra de Wang Ming, it is tr ue. I have poisoned you .It wa s a torment for me to prescribe the poison. "

"W h y did yo u do it ?" 1 asked." L i Fu-chun told m e to. lIe sa id yo u were a dogmatist.

that y ou wer e against Chairman Mao , a nd that it hadbe en decid ed to elim ina te you. And I wa s to do it , b ecause1 wa s your treating physician. I told h im I was religious

43

and .lhat recently lhe Central Committee had decided toadmit m c as a sec re t m ember to the P arty - so how couldI do. su ch a thing? But Li Fu-chun repli ed: 'Thi s is as pecial ca se a nd si nce it has been decid ed thnt yoush ould (10 it , you have no choice. Y ou are C\ m ember ofthe Party and arc obliged to ob ey Party orders, ' "

The next moment two men in army uniforms chargedinto the room. One of th em shouted to Chin Mao-yao: '

"\Ve have looked for you everywhere, and h ere you are.Why arc you on y our knees, wailing and weeping? W ehave como to take you to Tsaoyuan. ':. You are a criminaland are forbidden to speak to anybody."

The two seized Chin by the collar and led him away.2. The prescriptions issued hy Chin Ma o-yao to poi so n

Wang Ming, including some found at that time in thepharmacy of the Central Hospital , and those k ept by us(other prescriptions " could not be found"). Be sid es, someof the toxic preparations were brought by Chi n Mao-yaodirectly from his house .

3. The written r osul ts of tests sho wing the mercurycon len t in the daily volume of urin e. The te sts were mad ein July 1943 in Yenan, during the period of the medicalinvestigation, and al so in D ecember 1950-0ctober 1952in a Moscow hospital , and in October 1954 in a Pe­king hospital; in addition there are other tests andfindin gs.

The consu lt an ts in Yonan establish ed that J was beingsystem at ic all y poi soned . After th eir in vestigation , Li Yun:"sh ih , a conscien tious and conside ra te pediatrist, was ap ­pointed my treating physician. She ba sed her treatm enton an entirely now diagnosis -mercury poisoning-s-anddid her best to help m e recover. Hope appeared of deliv­er ance from morl al danger, and th ere were signs of animprov ement in my h ealth.

Besides, there were athol' Important re asons that hadhelped me escape doa th, though many times r was on itsve ry brink :. I. De spite til e pain. th e dang-er and th e illnesses res ult­In~ fr om. r ep eated poi soning, and despite predicti on s ofa pproac h ing death by Chin Ma o-yao and othe rs, my wife

* 'I'saoyuajj was the headquarters of th e Social (Secur ity )Department of th o ec epc; lat er, Mao Tso-tun g and th e Polit­bureau moved th ere from Yantsialin.

and .r ~evnr lo~t heart: we turned Jar help and "(1"1',.,. tS jJl'C J' J I " ( 'J' ( " "" 0':, " . <1 IS S I~l . .> llIWS(' fl nd .E III'o lwil ll meuicin s, a nd nlso;;ludred medici ne () 11I 'S I''''( ~ S , '

" . 2'1Th oll~l~ :\1 ~ 0 nll,acke d a nd s lan dered m e du rin " t h es l.y (' rect tfi\"'l tl(»)1 '-' . " I '" '• '. : ' . : ( ( tl ~.lI, r U1 g 11 , was convinc ed tha t I~ts H~ eol ~ gl cally.' politi cally a nd orga nis a tio nall y right.1 ~ fal~h Ill, Lel1l111~IIl , the line of t.he 4th Plenum, andth e policy of~,the united national anli-J apan cse fr ont n ev­or fa l ~e red .. I' In n as eve r was my se nse of prol etarian in­I. crn~l.lOnahsm towards th e Comin tern and t he S ovi et Com­llll ~ n ls,~ Party. T ,,:a s su ro that th e "style rec tificatio n Cam­paign was r? a~IJoJl (II'Y a wl wron g, und ce r ta in, too, that.Mao was Ialsf fying th o h istory of tho C P C.

, :\' Despite Mao' s var io us a ttem p ts to isol at e me, 1110Stof lh u lr ad er's and Party cadres eithe r pu blicl y a pprove dm y s ta nd poin t or ex pressed th ei r sym pa thy and su ppor tedm e cove r tly . T had many vi sitors. 'I'h e a bsolu te rnaj ori tyof Party cad res was aga ins t Mao's "rect ificati on of styl e" ,as Ma o himself adm itted to m e in a ta lk in April In4.4.Thi s m ea nt, of course. that they were concerned 1'01' my[ate, and that they beli eved in Lcniru sm and the Coru ln­tern line.

T hou gh many P arty cadres feared per se cution or arres tand could n ot vi sit me, quite a few did com e regularlyto th e ho spital or vi s ited m e a t home, and this even dur­ing the two mo st turb ul en t peri od s -i-thut of " rect i fica t ionof ·s ty le" a nd that of "emergenc y salva tion" . Among themwere eight m ember s and two al ternat e m embers of theP ol itburcau (at that time it con s is ted of 10 m emb er s, in ­cluding mys elf , and [our alternate m ember s) .

I was also visited by som e ranking com rades wh o hadreturned to Yonan Irom liberated or Kuornintang areas.T o ke ep up appenr nu ces , Mao T se-tun g vis ite d 1111'. too. a tth e m ost critical period of my illness .

Comrad es from Party departments in my char ge camc[.0 se e m e many times. 1 had many fu nctions. 1 was inc ha rge of the United Front Depar tm ent of the CC CPC(handling m atters pertaining to the united national anti ­J ap anese fr ont), was chairm a n of the P arty Press Com­mission, Politburcau in structor-representative with th e CCCPC Northwest Bureau (including th e Shen si -Kansu­I Tillghs ia Border Area), chairm an of th e CC cpe Commis­s ia n 1'01' So u th China ( Hun a n, Ki angsi , Fuk ien, Kwan g­tung and Kwan gsi ) a nd So uth we st Ch in a (Szech ua n,

Kw eichow, Yunn an an d Sik ang ) , chairma n of thp. CC CPC

Commission for Northeast China, a nd sec re ta r y of the

CPC facti on in the National-Political Council. .

I was regu larly visited by Lin P o-chu, Hsieh Chueh ­

tsai , Chen Cheng-jen, Shen Tse-min and othe r comrades

of the CC cpe Bureau for Northwe s t China and t he

Shonsi-Kansu-Nin ghs ia Border Area , who were closely

associa ted wi th m e.Of course, Ko Ching-shih, de puty ch ief of the United

Front Department, visited m e m ore often than th e others,

and we exchanged opinions on th e " style rectification

ca m paign" ,True, ther e were al so other kinds of visi tors . Li Fu­

ch u n ca me fr equently. H e wa s Ma o's trusted ag en t in

poisoning m e. B ut as ch ief of the Central Committee's

Chancelle ry and thus in charge of m edi ca l inst ituti on s ,

he cou ld not deny m e various services, and cam e to di s­

cuss m atters pertaining to my comfort and treatme nt . It

s tands to r eason th at 1 n eith er wanted to nor could di s­

cuss with him t he "style rectification campaign" or o the r

Party or political matters.Hy this time my du ti es as chairman of the CC CPC

com m iss ion for work among women and as rector of

'Women's Univers i ty, whi ch I assumed in l n3 ~ , had

dropped away b y them selves. Th e m ain purpose ha d been

to buttress the P arty am on g women, laun ch th e journal Chi ­

nese Wo man, and es ta blish t he Yerian All -China Women'sUniver sity. But, as 1 h ave already mention ed , th e

Un iversity had b een closed down in S eptember 1941.T owards the end of th e forti es and in the fifti es Mao

con tin ue d h is attempts to elim inate me. Let m e mention

j us t a fe w.1. On 25 June 1948 a t th e Central H ospital in Chuhao ':.

my treating physician, Huang Shu-tse, ,:.,:. prescri be d lysol

. ,," Chuh~o, a . villnga in Fupi llg . county, Hopch provin ce,

seven an d u hall kIlometres from Hslpsipo, then the tcmpornry

headq uarte rs of the Central Committee. The Central Hospital wasthen In Chuhao.. ." * Fu Lit;n-chang app ointed Huang Shu-tss my treating phy­

siciun. Po Ku an d Fu Lien-chang told me tha t Huang Shu-tse

was suspected of belongIng to a Trotsky ite gro up. However

a fter .lhe "s tyle rec tificatio n campai gn" Fu Lien-chung speciall y

tran sferred Huang .Shu-tse from the Norman Bethune Hos ital

to th e Central Hospital and to the Central Committ ee's Durea~ of

Hea lt h hea ded by Fu Lien-cha ng himself.

ins tead of m edical soap for washing my intestines ' i tsu se could have been le th al. '

l owe it. to the vigilance of my wife tha t th is time

t(~O , a tl'a !:p c outcome was averted, This re ached the ear~

01 th e chlef of t he hospit al , Chou Tse-chao and ot herdoctors . '

H Ti~h7.,upon, on 7 ~uly, th~ Cen tra l Committee 's T3 ul'cau of

ea. I s~ued a Circ ular :'* cla im ing tha t a mi s take had

,?~en .com.mltted b y.a chem ist whe n fill ing the prescr ipt ion.

. y issuing Iysol Instead of medica l soa p he caused an

acute ,a ~gra va ~~ on of the di se ase; this is a serious case

of negligence, The above expla nation was, of cours e,

m eant to conceal a fresh attempt on my li fe m ade onorders from above.

r .2. On 25 Oct ober . 1!J50 at 11 o'clock in th e morni ng,

\ aug Shang-k un, c!l1 ef of th e CC C I-'C Chance llery, cameto my 'hou se and sa id:

" At 9. o'clock ~his m ornin g I was sum moned by Li n

Sha~-chl , who sa id that las t n igh t Chairman .\ l ao spoke

to .111m of Wang Ming''s depar tu r e for the Soviet Un ion

thi s aftern oon by the train go ing to Manchu ri a . Li u or­

dered. m e to perform all the formalities wit hout delay . It

wa s Sim ple : I telephon ed the Ministry of Foreign Affa irs

and told th em to iss ue passports to all you!' family a t

o~ce. H er e they are. You can lake along wh oever yo u

WIsh. ~l~ I need is .th eir photogra phs. I have alr eady told

th o !WlIlls tr y ~f RaIl~ays that you must ha ve a private

car m the t rain l eaving for Manchuri a at 6 p.m, today.

There is lit tl e time left. Will you manage to pack ?" .

I a ske d him:"The~e are rum ours that at midnight our volun teer

army will .cro ss the Yalukiang bridge into Korea to repulse

the American aggression, and that MncArth or has al ­

r eady issued orders for his air forc e to bomb the Shan­

haikuan-Manchuriu railway the mom en t Cliineso volun­

tee rs enter Kor ea in order to destroy the S\1!lply l i nos

fro m Peking and the Soviet Uni on . Is this tr ue ?'

"Yes, it is tr ue ," Yang Shang-kun rep lied.

"So, since we will be travell ing acr oss Mane11 uria to ­

morrow morni ng, we are s ure to be bombed . Am I right?"

* The Central Commit tee's Bureau of Health then had the

code na me, Fifth Department of the Workers ' School.

*,' I still have in my possession a copy of this cir cular and

Huang Shu -tso's notes.

47

"Yes, and it is up to you to doc ldo whether you IP,IIV A

tod ay or not ," h e a ns we re d. " If you d ecide to s tay, let

m e know: 1 must infor m th e Ministry of Rai lways. "

It was cl e a r to !\l eng Ch in g-shu and m e why Mao had

sudde nly dec ided that we s ho uld depart that day. Lon g

before Liu Shao-chi had given us permi ssio n to go to

th e Soviet Union, but for more th an six m onths we had

been waiting to b e told the date of our d eparture. W 0

wondered what to do, and finally decid ed La go despite

the ri sk, for on e cou ld never tell if there will be another

ch a nce. I was going to Moscow not only for medical

tr satmeut, but because I wanted to sec tho Soviet Uni on

again after its victory in tho Greal I' atrlotlc W ar. I had

not been th er e for 13 ye ars .At the r eception h eld on our depar tur e by live l eg al

and administrative institutions, som e com ra des advis ed us

not to risk ou r l ives. But a t 5 .30 p.m. we boarded th e

t ra in, a nd eventually set out for our des tination.

We r eached Manchuria with ou t m isha p, changed into

a So viet train , and arrived in Moscow safely. As th e train

approach ed th e So vie t ca pital, Men g Citing-s hu, who Was

ver y fond of musi c, began humming m y "Ode tu Mo s­

cow " ::' :

" The ly ri cs con sist of five stan zas, which Wang Ming wrote

in late October HJ41 , when in Yenar. Central Hospital. The Nazis

wers the n close to Moscow. Meanwhile, Mao not only refused to

s tep up m il itary operations to pr event th e Japanese from opening

a second fro n t against th e Sovie t Un ion, but a lso launched the

an ti -comm un is t and anti-Sovi et "s tyle r ectification campaign".

Wang Min !? dedicated this od e and other anti-Mao poems (e.g.

" Yantsialin" , "Wolves Howling in the Nig ht" , an d other s, which

were passed from hand to hand; Mao also rea d them) to tho

24.th au niversary of the Grea t Octob er Socialist Revolution and

to Moscow,Wan g Min g began wri t ing poetry at th e ag e of nine. He has

wri tten more than GOO poems and songs, and when gravely ill

and sufl urin g pain and anguish, did not for ego t he slightest

cha nce to write-s-to praise labour, to propagate Marxism-Leninism

and tho Soviet Union , to pa y trib ute to fall en heroes of th o rev o­

lut ion, to h on ou r un n lve rsru-Ies of th e f'P,vo lu tiona ry niove tn nnt,

to lig ht agains t imp eria lis m and Maot s rn , u ud fo l' pea ce an d th e

h appiness of ma nki n d. Hi s la st lines of ver se, and fr ag me n ts of

th is bouk , wer e written three day s beforo hi s passing . TIo of ton

sa id : " T o be a Communis t is to giv e all one's s treng th to the

last br eath." He had al ways followed this principle himsslt.c­

Note by Meng Ching-sh u.

48 49

Moscow,the Kremlin Palace

live -pointed crims on s tdr.TUlle of your chimes spread ing

acro ss th e Soviet LundThe s ta r lights Up .

, , tho five con tine n ts .1he rlllging ch imes

rea chiug all conn triesof th e world.

Moscow, triumphantOIl o)!e -s~x th of th e globe.

Sy m bol 01 things to COme.th e world of cu tu mun igmth e wurld of commu ub l~.

.. .. ..

Moscow ,Lenin 's Mnusoleurn .

Gra nde ill' of sp ir it,llea tltloss deed .

l.cniu ism has awakene dth e hum an race Irorn sleep.

The Sovie ts' vic torios. in spire an d deli ght.

Ilyi ch , Iorovnr, every whe re,. helmsm an of world revolu tion .

Il yi ch, for av nr livingin lh e h ea rt s uf m en .for ev er li vingin th e hearts uf men .

.. .. ..Moscow,

beacon of revolu tion.the working people's arden t lov e,

th e fasc ists' hat e an d fear.Tho man iac Hi tler h as a ttacke d,

and Sta lin ca lmly ordersPeopl e anJ ar my, th e Party

nt th eir head :Stand firm and win.

Peopl e and army, the Partyat th eir h ead ,crush the adversary.erush th e adversarv.

.. ,. ..Moscow,

the Commu n is tIntern ational.

Ail co nu nun ists 0[, theeg~~~~her .are hrothers 0 , Ol~ ,' . . J I . SovlelChin n IS ald .e1 );g~ in sl the JapaDe sl ~,C o rn. lll. \ l tl lE- S • ists

A n Chine se Conunulll~ .. - -11 1 \ the Soviet UmODrnust re p \. . \ .

'n~l the ascl ' ~ . [ .1ugal ". . ~ acroSS th e \VO " u ,CO Il I I' a des-lII- ar l~: ks [or victory.I se vour I an " .1

C ?-h .~hol11der to shoulue rFig t - . 1 J victory.for chens \e my friends.

. h Krcmlin palacc;~Io~co \\ , l he 1 ~nin ~I au soic ulll;~l osCO\\:- Ibe:C(;~ of revolul ion;7\lo scO\\ , .... .~1 () ~cOW . the C OllllIltCI n.

\IoSCOW , . I-\ ' Ol1'V C won ill () Uc-:;p~ t 1o f th" gloh.. .

S\' lIIbo l of things to c? mc .. world of l:omlllU ll1~lll.

world of com m unism.

In the winter of 1U52, during h is visit t o Moscow , T~ill" I ' I ' said to us " You were no l bo m be d hecause TIll -;-, iao-c 11 s I ~ . . 1 fbIman did not wan l a war wit h China ; he stric t Y 0 1' ac e~JacArthur 10 bomb Chinese to rritory." . '3 . I II Decem b er 1953 we returned 10 P eking. homApril 1!'l5!1 to January! ~56 I had seven ac u te ~LLl\cks .ofcho lecy-ti ti s and hepatitis . Th e first one was III April­:May 1954. Huang hu-t e, Fu Li en-chang a nd o t~erswere reluctant to acknowledge that I had a ba d Iiverand gall-bladder. because th is could revive t alk of t hepoisoning. I stayed a l horn e wi th th e atlack ~or five d~ys.On the six th. I was com pell ed to go to Po ki ng Hospital.T h e do ct ors diagno ed acute cho l ecyst itis , but HuangShu-ts e stuck t o his own versi on. H e sa id : "In additio n,tho patient has peritonitis. "

By th is ti me Hu a n g Shu-tse had been prOT1lotHrI deputych ief of the CC CPC Bureau of H ealth ; he nce, P okingH ospital was in hi s ch ar ge. The doctor s did not da re goagainst his opin ion . H e in si sted on at onc e re moving th ega ll-hlarlde r . On my fourth day of ho spital an d the ni nthafter th e nuack had begun, the situation be ca me c ritical.T h a t m or n ing Mcng Ching- hu summ on ed bot h our sonsto my bedside for fh p leav e-takin g. At the same time she

ircntcd m e with repeated ly t ested m ed icines. For th reedays she fought de spe ra te ly for m y lifr . Grad ua lly, Illyco ndition improve d, the pain subs ide d , the Lem pera turedropped. a.nd I was able 1.0 take ao rrt e (n od. nut rriy d octo rs cont inued to insi st on a n ope ra tion. IV e resist ed, forI h ad eaLen nothing in six days an d my weight was downfr om 58-nO kilograms to a m ere 40. 1 co uld n ot h ope t osu r vive a n opera lion. After re pea te d requests T w a s g ive ntwo bl ood transfu si on s - a m er e 500 mill ilitres. .r ~ secret,we c ot in t ou ch wit h specialis tiO in Chinese Ulcdll:.1ne , n n dI IO~k the ir drugs. t,- As a resu lt, my e ()J l d ~ L i on grad.ul\l.lyre tu rned to n ormal. But th e d ~ clors con~lIlued t o insiston an operation. An d when we firmly declined, t hey m ad eus s ig n a pap er 10 this effect. .1. In th e Slim mer of HISS, du e to an aggl'avatlOn, I wa sa ga in t aken Lo P eking H osp ital. S urgeon Shao made anin fus ion of n sodi u m chlo ride and g lucose so lu t ion a t th erate of (50 drops a min ute . He ad m itted this later, butsaid h e had been orde re d to do so by Dr. Wang, ch ie f ofthe surgica l d epartm en t. A few m inu te - a fter the infusi onb egan Dr. Shau went ou t of m y ward . I began sh ive r ingS? intensely tha t s ix hot-water bottles an d three q uillsdid not h elp. I was pal e, sweat ing profu sel y, a nd Illyh ea rt was beating furiou sl y. Thon a te rrible weakness s etin . Meng Ching-s hu asked the n urse to pull ou t then oodl e at on ce, hu t th e g irl r efused : " Dr . Shao sai d thein fusion must Dot be s lopped in hi s absence. I'll go andlook . for him. " W h en the nurse left, Meng Ching-shu irn ­~ned.Ia leIy s top ped the infusion a nd m ad e a ca m phor i n­joe l ion to stim ulate my h eart, Gradually, I r elaxed,tho ugh th e ca rdiac weakness l in gered. Aft er a lon g t imethe nurse brou gh t back Dr . Shao. When h e saw the in­fu sion had been stoppe d he s ho wed his di splea sure ands a i c~ we shou ld ha ve wailed for his re turn; he wo uld h avedec ide d wh a t 10 do .

P rofessor Y. ;\1. Voloshin , a Soviet specialist a ttachedto the surgic al dep a r tm ent of P ek in g H ospital , sa id wh enhe heu rd a bo ut th e case : " In Comrade W ang Min g's con-

". "L tho end of HJ4\l 1\Ino declar ed th a t Ch inese medicine wa s" ol d medi cin e" an d Eur opean m edi cin e "new medicine" ; he saidthat, "the old and dyin g must be thrown out and repl aced by thenew ". Thi s cause d r.ons tor nation in th e country and amo ng th eSUU,UUll doctors practi sin g Chi nese m edi cin e.

rlition the ra te sho u ld h ave hecn 20~ :)? dr ops H 1ll.iIlH1Po,;

!l uw could anyone pre cribe a rate o! (JO drop~ '\ :n l l~,u: \

If th ere is another inf us ion, yon must care ful J wa t.• I

the r a te ," , , " 1 M a C hi na-shu h ad a cted CO I'-

[n his 0pimou, C~mra\c) ~d e~~:e infu~ion , he s aid , \V i1l~grectly. Jf she hadn L sto: r'l d W owe Comrade V OI05111il

:'IIing's hear t may have fal ~ .: ~ t ru ~t \\' oJ't.hy counse llor,. 1 1 He \\, 'I S a true an r . , , SI Lt'si ncere t HUI cS. cv, • nediatc o pe r a tion as ' ~-

~I1 d strongly o pposed to)a~l<lm;thers, He sa id: " CholecJ:s,

crested by Hu an g Shu-.t ::\Cb~ . al l intel'Jlal org ans l,ll'l~ <d ]l itis isn't t.he only t~l~li~ ' is bar ely alive as It I S , a m

Icc ted Co m rade Wan", I g t ion.'1', . f tl e quos I , ,

'H I operation is out 0 , l "D lot azree to an operatIOlI 011

, He adyised us agum : 0, ICOIJ I'll,"'lion n sllrgical int cnen-\L 11' j)rC"PllL .. " A H

an v <lC count.. n yo 1 - . st of <:o n;;C'q uonces, J

'. I l y th e var v \VO l' . 1 S . "\li o n ran la ve all , , ' . itt cd me to go to tIC OV1\)

wh eu Liu Shao-clll aga in J~e~~~lo haste n our rl upar tu ro a nd

Uninn for u -cat mcnt , ~l e 'l·n e, 'ion" that m y heart w a sur sru ed . in defiance of at 1l~ 1 op m ":', . ,, '

:;tr':'Aon g et'l\fOrlol ng~ 1 t\~e s~b~~~~eu:»: ~~~~~~~; ' the a ut umn

par f 11)-1-' l' thor lWt'nl ~of I !H 1 anti th e be~i n Jl i n g 0 , ;) 1,. mar ~ t ~ , '.

and Iact s 10 indi cat e that M a o was after m y hfe.

6) Mao seizes the post of General Secre ta ry

of the Cen tral Committee

During his p re pa ra t ion s fOI' t110 " re ctifica tion of S L:y I (~

, " Mao Tse tung performed a palace revolutioncam paig n ! c ~ - • f tl P tv'sa nd seized the post of G ener-al Secr etary 0 io arr.y s

Central Com mit tee . TT ere is how things devel oped :

In September 1!J41 Mao often sa id half in jest to mem­hers of the P ol i tb ureau :

"La Fu is the Han Emperor Hsien Ti an d I am TsaoT s a o l.l u t 1 am not as n oLle a s T:<il O T::;ao , w ho was co n

to nt w ilh th e title of Pr ince \ Veiw ull g (i t was his so u

w h o l a ler usurped th e th rone) . 1'11 take u p lh e sword a nd(I SIJ ('p Ill e th ro ne m ys elf. "

Olle (Ja ~' in late Septemher, at the close of a P olit­

ImreillJ fII (!L~ l in g, he snddenly dC'JII:llldl'd Ihat Lo Pu shollld

at once "gi\'e him" thl' post of Genp l'al Sec r'pUn y, s inn' it

wa~ "incoJl\-e lliC'n l for hi m Lo wor"" wilho ili. it. .lenPi-shih instan tly retortC'd :

"Thi5' will be ill-con idcr erl, It is bes t to l eave the

maLl oI' to th e 7th Congress , w here a n official d eci s ionca n be taksn ."

T he ot.hOl's sa id n ot.h ing, and the me eting en ded .

Al ter thi s Ma o look it n pun himsclj. with out ;;0 mu ch

as a by your lcav o, to pre s ide at l'olitl)lll'(~ nll 1111' ('1 i n~' s in

pIneo or Lo F Il. au d ill November inado l ho lul tor g'o "o na tour of inSlJI!t;L[ oJl " In th e liberat ed nrcn ill no rt hwos t

Sha ns i. II was i n thi s mann er t hat .Ma o usurped th e postof G en era l Se cretary of l h e CC Cf'C.

7) 1\1:\0 form s a burly of m e n to conduc t

the "sty le redifltatioll cam pa ign"

Mao Tee-tun g had n o po l i ti ca l cadres of hi s own, So he

em ploye d a va riety of meth ods, Includlug threat s a n,rl

promises, t.o form a body of m en to ru n the " s tyl e recti ­fica l ion ca m pai gn" .

First h e turned h is a ttention to Lin Sha o-chi, then sec­

rotary of th e CPC Cent ra l China 1:l1lJ' l:'H lI , Accord in z to

Mao , he had often sough t clos er ti cs with Liu follo wing

the Tsun yi eOnfMe!lc:e, Duri ng the nth Plenum of th p

Sixt h Centra l COJll lllittee (October 1938) the two of th em

ca me to terms abou t a Mao-Lin bloc: after ' jointly :,pizillg

power in the Par ty th ey would ius tit utu [or ~r a n tho pos l

01' CC Ch ai rman (t he CPC h a d n ever had thi s post be­

fore), Mao would be in clJarge of military affairs, while

the post of Gcncrn l Se cretary woul d go to Liu. wh o wou ld

bc in charge of Par ty work. To amass III(~ "ca pi ta l"

pssPll t ia l 1'0 1' th is a p po in tm e n t , Liu [ollo wed Mao 's nrl\' i r:p

and wrote a book, On th e S elf-F:dllcation of a Communtst ,

in 1H:::H. '1' 11 e1'0,IIpon , Mao ofte n sl ressed at Pol ith IIrf'i1J1

meetings and in private conversa tions tha t Lin's role in

the Pait y shollid b e en hanced. Wh en 1Ie open ly pl'ol'laimer!

" Maoism", he oft vn sa irl : " Liu Sl rao-rl. i is th e first(' ()J If / lIC't ()J' anrl IH'o l11o lf'I' of l\fao i~Tll, "

Using the stick and the carrot, he WOn the hacking of

Kang Sheng, who was in r, harge of Central Committee

sec uri ty, Il nd Chen Yun , chie f of the Cenlrid Commillcc's

organis atio nal rlepClltll1l'nt. Lilte /', he SIlIllII IOIlC' r! PI' II l.("

Chell, the n Secretary of the Shilns i-Cha har-lInpelt brand ;

of Illn CC CPC North C h ina Fl U!'C'a ll, to Y('n all . Art er just

one falk w i th him, Mao d pd ared I lw( Plm g' CI1 ('J I wa:; a

" bOI'Il )\ l :J cds t" , ThC' :<a Ilw d l~ .'; tT i p t i o n o r " 1J f)~ n .\ l noi .;L" h('

also gH\'l~ to Kao Kan g, secretary o r the Party cO llJm i l -

t ee of the Shcus i-Kansu -Ninghsia Border Area and sccr c­tary of th e CPC No r th wes t Bureau. ::. Th ereup on h e set u pthe Chancellery of the Central Co m m ittee an d, as a signof s pecial trust, appointed the depu ty ch ief of tho CCorgani satiunal department, Li Fu-chuu (t hen alternatem ember of the CC CPC ), as its ch ief.

B es id es , h e recruited person al secreta r ies- Chell Po -tu( fro m the Centra l Comrnittecs p ropagand a depart­m ent) and Hu Chla o-mu (from the pr opa ga n d a dnpa r t­m ent of the YCL). Durin g t he "style rect.ifi cation cam ­paign" h e used them as a ssi stants in writing a r ticles a n dfalsif ying hi st orical Iacts.

Out of th ese eight people n ot more than th ree ha~es urvived , a n d they, too , keep di sappearin g from the pu lil­ic ul scene one day lin d reappearing t he next. The res twere done to d eath one a fter the other or sullered fr omMa o's per secutions.

2. TIlE SECOND PETUOD OF"STYLE RECTIFICATION"

During this peri od (February 1942-.fuly H143) Mao o pe n­ly "recti fied the style of w ork" .

On 1 F ebruary 1942 h e spoke a t th e Ce ntral PartvS chool (headquarter s for th e " rectifica tion of style"am on g Party cadres ). His s peech wa s en t itled , " Ilect ifytho Style of th o P arty " . It formall y ina ugura te d " the cam -

.. Previously. Kao Kan g had been well disposed toward s thoCornintern , th e Soviet Union and me. Between the aut umn of19:11l and th e summ er of 1()41 he brought top-ranking comradesfrom the Party committee of the Shcnsi-Kansu-Ning hsia BorderArea and the crc Northwest Bureau to my lecture s on thohis~ry of tbe. S~~'i et Communist Party. During the "sty le recti­Ilcation cnrnpmgn Mao wont out of his wav to win him. For :.1tim ~ . Kao Kang became Mao', follower. After tho Arrnv of th~S~vl et U!lioll en tered North east China he had frequent ' contactsWith SOViet comrades becau se at that tim e he was in the North­c~s t Bur~au . and. besides. ~: a rnc under the good influence of Kair eng. ch ie f of the Bureau s prop ngnn rln depar tment. Bcfri cndndby Mao. he had an opportunity to obsl'l've Mao's untruth lulnessan l~ perfulv. ~a n cl hecame criti en] of Mao 's " t hou ~l ' ts " , lin e andpo.hcy. In I!b4. MIl~ accuse d him of forming an •a n t.i-Par tv Ka o(Ka':l: )-Jao (Sh u-s l~l) h~.oc ". :md had him olim inntorl. (For' mor'l)d~talb see th e ;;~ctlOn. Th e Cu lt ur al Revolut ion' and the Mao is t

bBld for CooperatlOlI with I m pc rluiis ur". in the third part of tlthoak. pp. 190-96. ' .

p.aign for the rectifica tion of the sty le of P ar tv . oduca­l. inna] ?Il d li t era r~ work " . hut was ill fact the prelude to~ ,'ea cl.Hln al'y public ca mpa ign against Leninism. th e Com­111t:l'n . th e Sov iet U n io n. ann th e Com munist Part \' ofChi na . On 8 February h e m ade a no ther s pe ec h . " Aga ins t~ tl'l'l'otypes in th e Party". spe ll ing ou t add itional gu ide ­l in es for Lh e "rec ti fica tio n of t.lie s l.yl e o f lit erary ,~ork ",

On 7 F ebruary . Chie hta ngjih[J{/() puhli shcd a long a r ticle ."~n Maoism ". sig ne d by a certain Chang Ju -h sin (pre­v io u s lv known as Chang Shu -an } , n former fo llower ofW an g Clun g-wei and sus pe c te d of belonging to a Trotsky­ite gro u p th a t. h ad infilt rated th e P a r ty . '-'()~ Maoism" wastIll' overture t o u ndisguised cavill in g a t Lenin ism andlaud ing of Ma oism . Th er eupon, in MAy. Mao h eld three:con fer en ces "on liter a tur e and art", wh ere h e mane th eopenin g and closing speeches . Known as "talks at th eYennn forum OIl lit ornuirc a n d ar t", they prese nted th ebas ic gu ide li nes for th e " re cti fication of the sty l e of w orkill Iitcrutnre anrl art ", and w ere publish ed in 'newspapersO il 23 May.

H er e, I want to d eal with the follow ing four it em s :1. The Commissi on a n d s ubdivisions f OJ' t he " rec t tfica­

tion of th e style of work".2, Th e m eth ods a n d objectives of th o " recti fica t io n of

style".3. My thrne lalks with Mao conce rn ing the "rectification

of s tyle".4, Ma o' s " talks at th e Yc nun Ioruui on literature and

art" .

1) The Commission and su bdiv is ions for"the reelifieation of the st y le of work"

To conduct the " s ty le rect ification ca m pa ign" Mao for meda " cen tral com m iss ion" . th e members of w hi ch h e pickedp crs nnall v. Th e ch ie f m emb er s were Liu Shan-chi. K an gSheng. Chen Yun, P en g Chen. Kao Kang and Li F u ­chun-i- th c b od y of m en Mao h ad recruited during th eprepara tory per iod. Th ey followed h is bidding to the le t­tor . U n ti l J anu ary Hllj:3 th e com mission wa s cha ire d b yT\ :lllg Shen g. tlw;l Lin Shno-ch i re tur ned to Yeuan fromCentra l China and too k over.

In Y on a n. the "rectiflcation ca m pa ign" wa s co uc en- :tratcd in three la r ge s u bd ivis ions ,

The Iirst wa s th e Central Party School. In add ition toth~ studen ts of the Party School, worker s of Party COTll­

ffiItt el!s-frOffi county to te rri torial CC hureaus--wer esummoned her e from n il parts of til e countrv to underrro" rect ification", So wer e army commanders ~nd politi (; lofficers (regimental and high er ) , cadres of atlrniuisl rati vcorgans in areas (county and hi gh er ) held by the 8thHouto or New 4th armies, and Communists ac tive in thegoverning bodies of ma ss organi sations, The " rc cti fi ou­lion" in th e Party School wa s h eaded by Pe ng Chen.

Th o second subdivision, headed hy Kao Kang, concernedwork ers at all levels of Party bodies, adminis t.rati veor gan s and mass or gani sati on s in th e S hcnsi-Kaus u­Ning hsia Bord er Area,

TilC third subdivision was for workers of CC CPCbodies, and was h ead ed by Li FU- CltUIl,

Th e "sty le rectification campaign virtual lv convertedYonan into a huze concen tra tion cam p, The pr emi ses of

b I \' .schools , in stitutions an d olfices became p aces 0 IH'OVI-

sionnl det en tion , Nob ody was allowed to couunu nicatewith any body-to write or telephone, 01' do any th ing ,with out permi ssion of " rec tification canrpn igu ' olfic lals .

2) The method s and objectivesof the "reetification of s ty le"

Ma o Tso-tung in struct ed all th oso wh o wore subjected 10" re cti fica tion" to st udy th e d ncu rn ent s he had prescribe d,to write "confessions" , and to enga ge in " self-cr iticism" .Th e COlllmissio n for the Hectifica tion or S tvle announce dthat of all documents and writings only :\Ia(; 's work « wer ecorr ect and should therefore he dil igently read and rer eadas an important means of ideologi ca l re -educatiun. TheComm ission specia lly emphasised Maos pamphlet On Ne wDem.ocra cy because, it said, " Maois m equa ls New D Olll OC­

.racy' a~ cl becau se, tho hoo l~ !e t was th e " prim o and cap­ilal ~1<~ olsl thcoruti r-a] work, It foll owed that tho worksof Lenin, the document s of the Cominlern and the CPC,and those of othe r Pa rty Icadors, wer e wronz and thoseS'llO, read them were dog matists , Th e Marx-E ; gcls-LeJl ln _Etah.n ~M n o fo,rmula .wns nccordingly clHlngpd (0 Marx­" ngeb-~l a o. Som e oI th e ('adres (eveIl hi gh-ran king) Wer e_0 db~d l~ co\\' e~1 t h~~ they publ icly burned the li st ed wOl'ksan r llme n\:, or ~ 1Jl1 plr thr ew th em away. ~ o rne of Lholll

56

said, "Lu ckily I hav e never read them, for ot l10 r\\' i ~e Twoul d hav e become a dogmatist."" ' I:I~e , ClI llImi~ si on a lso na med th e nll' th od,;; :l n rl ObJ·P I·J ' o f

cr i ti ois m " . .. ~

1) ~riti ei se your acq uaint ancas. a~ well 3~ vourso lf.2) Sa y only dorogatorv things ahou! YOll ~ " elf a nd

othfl l'~ , .a n d all Ill.) 31:,eou Ilt ~ay an yth ing good ; bu t a bou tMa o ~:i H-tU Il g', Liu Shuo-chi a nd 3 fow oth er listed pe r­S Oll S speak W All only and on no ilCCou nt had lv.

3) The main objects of er itic,ism wcre pl'p"r, ; ihed - firslof a ~l the " dogma lic g[,o IIJ'" headed by 'Yang ~1i ll g an d1'0 1\11 for "s prea rlin g Rus sian ~ I il l'x i ;.. m ( Lf'ni~li"IIl ) ''; unrl,second, l.he group of " empiri eist ",' h ead ed h v Ch ou E n-I n iand Pen g Toh-huni for " tre ading in tlw fo'ot~t eps of th edogmatist s".

Those who had studiod in the Sovir t l l nion. the in te l­ligentsia, and those doin g th coretical or polit ica l w o rkwere told to confess to hring "dogmntists". while t hosoof working-clnss and peasan t background and those doi ngpracti cal work wer e told to con fcss to bein g "empiri cists".Th o overwhelm ing major it y of Par ty lead(>],::'. cad )'p;: nudrank-a nd-fi le members wer e thus accus ed of dozm ntism01' empiri cism. Th e label of "captives" or "helpers " of t he.logrna tis ts was attached to th e " em pir icis ts" in order toassocint o them with th e " dogtna tists ' an rl th us jus tifyst riki ng th e mai n blow at the latt er.

In fri el., th er e ha d never been any dogm at ic Ill' em piri r ­ist group in th e Communist Par ty of China . That i:, arn nk Maui s t invcnt lo n, a pretext for a n ark ing the maj or­ity of tho Party m em bership.

/1) All were obl iged to confess to the "rn is tukc" of pro ­metin g th e " 'Jeff -oppor tnnist line of W nng ~ling andP o Ku during the civil war " and the " r igh t-(,ppOl'lllu istlin e of Wang' Min g during t li e nnt i-Ju pau cse war" .

III Iact . th are had been no su ch lines. T hey wore lig­mnnts of Mao 's imagin at ion wh ich h e used duri ng the"recti hcnfi on" to hit ou t at W an g' ~l i n g . 1'0 E ll. aud themaj orily ol th e Party 111 embel'SIii p. .

S) Ev er yone was required to CO ll l t' :' :' that he had nolkn own Mnoisrn (con sider ed th o gra vest of all " m is takes.")arul had " Ii l i nd l y bulieverl in I\.u s:'inn ~I ar x i ;;m , Ihat isL t'n i n ism" . EY(~I'Y01 1I ' w aS \'p'!lIir l'd 1(1 p l 'Olni s(' " Il l '"]'('1\1:1\\' <1 .\ ' 111 0 illl'ologil'al \ynnpon of I1nssian :\Inrx is ill an l! 1;1]('up Chinesi' ,\ 1an .: i;;lII , lha l i". i\!a oi ;;l1l" .

.=.7

Mall sa id a t th e Y cn an Iorum on ar t and li ter ature th nt" ma ny m emb er s or Ih e P ar ty 'h ad organ is ationally joinedth e Party, but h ad n ul. en ti rely join ed or ev en not a t alljoined th e Par ty id eol ogically". Th is cha rge was direct edaga ins t Communists working in ar t a nd lit era ture, butal so aga ins t th e ove r wh elm ing m aj ority of th e P ar ty mem­ber ship. As a result the Central Commissi on for the R ec­tifi cati on of S tyle began demandin g " co n fess io ns" t o th iseffect from alm ost the whol e lot of Party leaders andmemb er s . They were required to admit that they hadjoined the Party only organisationally, but not ideolog­ically, which was meant to say that they had ideologi cal­ly joined the part.y of " R uss ian Marxi sm" and not th eparty of " Ch inese Marxi sm" . Til ey w er e re qu ired Lo re­nounce "Russian Marxism" a nd es pouse " Ch inese Marx­ism", and w ere t old th ey w ould n ot b e consid er ed mem­bers of the crc id eologi cally until they d id so .

6) Everyon e wa s also required to confess to t·he "grossmistake" of not appreciating "the greatness of Mao Tse­lung" find n ot kn owing that " Mao 'I' ae-t un g was the leaderof the CPC". Everyone was required to promise hence­forth to cons id er Mao "the sole leader " and to follow hisleadership. And so OIL

In accordance with these in structions. leaders andcadres conduc t ing the " r ect i fica t ion" in th e various officesca lled endless bi g and sm all meetings a t which everyonewas m ade to cr it icise himself and others , P eople werecont in uo us ly required to write a nd r ewrite the ir "conies ­sinns", au r] no mnl ter how mu ch one did so-orall y or inwl'itin g -il. wa s s l.i l l s aid that he had not " fu lly apprehend­ed his faults ", that he had not. " cr iticised a ll there wasto cr it ic ise" and must continue to en gage in sell-Il agella­tion. This con t in u ed until people were str ipped of theirinner co m m un is t and revolutionary esse nce. eve n thei rhuman essence. But even wh en they w er e reduced to thi ss ta te th ey were s till told that th ey had n ot cri t ic ised "d eep­ly enough ". They w er e in a sta te of stu po r and exh aus­ti on . and w ere played off o ne a gainst a no the r a nd for ced to" u n m as k" and s lande r one ano th er at meet ings and inw ritt en "con fes s ions ". T h is w as a deliberate t acti c tocrea te a n a t mo s phe re of mi strust, sus picion , hostili ty andIII 11111a1 sla ud er. E veryhod y wa s told to hel ievo onl y MaoT ao-tung, Liu S hao-c h i and a few othe rs. '

58

" Any n ew id eol og y a nd any n ew ' ism' ," Mao sa id atth e time, " is very di fficult to ussl rni late in the period ofits co nce pt ion , for people are acc ustomed to the old ' is m s 'a nd ideolo gies . W e must t.herefore fo llow the exam ple ofMoh amm ed , wh o converted people to the new fa ith bvfo rce, with th e swor d in one h and a nd the K oran in th '!)other . Wh en r ectifying bhc s ty le of work w e must r esortto for ce, making pe opl e ad opt Maoism." It became com­m on practice ir.l all su bdivisi ons to ar rest people, hangth em up by th eir arms. heat. th em, eve n kil l. Tn thi s delib­crate ly cr?a te d atm osph ere of stress and terror peoplew er e co n tinuo us ly made to ex press their "d eterm ina­t io n" to re si s t " Huss ia n Marxism", to war against t.hu lineof th e Comintcrn a nd aga ins t " do gma tic" a llil " empirici s t"lead ers , and h en ceforth to bel iev e on ly in " Maoism' a ndsu ppor t o nly th e Ma oist lead er ship.

Mao m ad e a s uccess ion of an t i-Soviet a nd pro-G ermanpronouncements, suc h as. "the Soviet Union is sure t ofall, G ermany is S11 re to win " , "twen ty-Iou r- yc ar-old so­ci a lism is no m a lch fOT' l!ighl.-y p. ar-olrl Iasc isrn" , " S t.a li nca n no t ov er come Hitler", and "Iluss ians arc no match[or Germans". AIlIl h ere is on e m or e: " Stalin 's str a t egic:plan of d ef endin g Mo scow , L eningrad and Stalin grad is ablunder. Th ese cities sho u ld he aba ndoned to t.ho German s .Soviet troops sh ould wi thdraw eas t. b ehind th e Ur a lsand wa it until Amer ica, Britai n and fra nce open the sec­ond fro nt. t hen begi n a join L cou u ter- olleus i vc. U ntil th a tt im e the Sovie ts sh ou ld depl oy on ly smul l forces andparti san deta chmcn ts to cond net guerrilla wa rfa re. U nlessthis is don e df'fpat is iuev itn hlc. " I l e trin d to d iscred itLeninism, invented fal se ve rsions of th e hi stor y of theSo viet Communist Pa rty a nd of Ru ssi n, expressed hi scontempt of. and slande red the Sov iet pe ople and th eSovi et Army. All thi s w as II gui de line for th e cam paignof ficials who, wi th Mao's "sword" in hand, made th es ubjects of " re cti fica t ion " re pea t Maos libel aga ins tLen in 's g reat party. t h e gl'pnl Sov ie t U nio n , the gr ea t So­vi e t people a nd lh o great Sovie t Army a t m eetin gs andin th ei r "coniess ious " .

Everv l im e Mao voiced hi s ab su rd " t hough ts" a t Pol it­bu rnaum cet tn gs in A ug ust a nd Septe rnher !!Vd, J en P i­sh ih , La F lI. and I n ever ra iled to r e tor t th nt we mustkeep OUI' fa it h ill Leni n ism, the lead er s of the So vie tCommunist Party , th e pot enti al of th e So vie t Uni on, the

59

Soviet peopl e, and the streng th of tlt e Sovie t Army ; th esethacks of the Sovie t Arm y wer e tem pnra rv and in thelong run th e soc ia lis t Sov iet Union was boun d to win IlIHI

Hitler 's fasc is t Germ an y was bound to lose. Sco wl i ngominously, Mao would reply with unrepr essed angel':" T im e will sho w. T'he n ear futu r e wi ll show who is co r­rect." Her e, a t least, he was ri ght - ver y soo n th e Iact sdid show.

3) My three ta lks with Mao on "reetifieatiou"

In Oclober 1\")41, April 1941 and December H)48 Mao a ndI met to discu ss th e campaign for " the ror-tifica tion of th es tv le of WO I'/;: " , Ma o mad e no hon es abo ut I'f' plying to alli n;p c)J' lant qu estion s related to th e campaign, sheddingligh t on its true motives.

. ln OU I' first co nversa tio n ;\fao in effect rep lied Lo t hequestion why he had pounced on m e (W ang Min g) , PoKu, 1,0 Fu, \Vang Clria-hsiang, Ka i Fong. Yang S ha ng­kun and Chu J 1Ii as th e "c hief ex pone nts of dogmatism"a nd a ll Cho u Eu-lni and P cnz 'I'oh-hu a i as the " eli iC' f e .\­ponents of em pir icism" . H ere · is h ow it happened.

In our talk on l.h e night 01' 4 Cktober l91 1, Mao sa id," tJwr e a te three peopl e popular a mong Party cadres. Thelu-s t is you, 'Vnng Ming, th e sec ond is Chou En-Iai, a ndthe thi rd is old muu Peng T ch -huai. You , Comra de Wan gl\l in g'. <luHl lg;; mate theory a11(1 pr actice. yo u hav e a pol it­ical mind a nd it se nse of realism, Cho u En -la i is H gooddiplomat, as well as a good orga niser and admi nis trato r.And old man P cn g is squally s tro ng in military thingsand politi cs, T o him we owe most of our big successesin NOJ·th China. Th ere ar c a few othe r very ca pa ble peo­ple among th ose who h ave st udied in Mosc:o \\-- ·110 Ku , LoPIl , W an g Chi a-h si ang, Kai F en g, Yang Sha ng-k uu andChu .lui."

Su bsequen tly, Mao denoun ced these peopl e as "dog-ma ­Lis ts" , " emp iricis ts" , " subjectivis ts", " sectari a ns" . a nd thelike. They wer e th e chief target of h is attacks , T hroug ht hem he a ttac k ed others, usin g thi s as <1 nll' <1 115 of glo r-i­fying hi s own person.

In U I I I' secur ul cuuvcrs ution J[au exp lai ned the purposeof the " recti flca tion of s t. vle " . a nd told me wliv it cncoun­ten-d strung resi stau r c am ong Part y (~a dl' f' s . i 'h is W:l S on1 A pril Hl44 a l 4 o'c lock in l he ult crnoon.

fiO

Sit ti ng a t my bedside. \I ao znnd-nnt ur edlv solid:" Com m rl« " -Hllg .\Iing, you fell ill bl.' fol'e t hc rect ifica

tion of s tyle hcgau of fH' ially. Th is is why [ had 110 op­por tuni ty to discn ss with you some questi ons of tho cam­paign. T oday, I ha vo Game to tllil you what is hiddendeep in m y soul.

"To b egin with, wh y I ne eded to r ectif'y style ',' Theprim e purpose is 10 rewrite the history of [h p. Comm unistI-'artv of China as lil y own hi story , Ilnw can th is I)( l dorw ',)It is' lIP!:(!SSal'Y to crea te Maoi sm', l low can on(~ wri to th ehistory of th e cre as the personal hist ory of Mao Ts c­tung if th er e is no Maoism?

"T he Communist Party of Chi nn was al ways gu ided byLenini sm , In the earl y per iod of the Ghillese revolution .Lenin and Stalin helped us to solve man y qu es tions ofthe ory and La work out our political line. From th o begi n­ni ng, th e CP C was guided by th e Coruin tcrn , T he Sovie tCommunist Party and Sov iet Governm ent helped th n CPCand th e Chinese r evolu tion in every poss ible way. Allth ese arc hi st ori cal facts ,

"At ori t.ioal times in the h istory of ti ll' cre wlieu , s nv,Ch en Tu-hsin commit ted hi s r ight-opportunist mista kein IH27 and th e Chinese revolution was in cri tica l s tra it s,CO/llrade Tsyui 'I 'sy u-po took Ihe lead in cOJllba u.ingChen Tu-hsiuism. The Centra l Com miu.oo ca lled its Au­gus t Seve nth Con feren ce on th e adv ice of tho Comi ntcrnin support of Tsyui Tsyu -po against Chen 'I' u-hs iu . T hiswas how we overca me Chen Tu-h siu 's mi st ak e.

" In 1~30 Li Li-sen committed hi s ' lefr -oppor tunist m is­tak e and cre ate d gra ve diffi culties I'OJ' th e Chinese revo­lution. At that tim e it wa s you, Comrade \ Van g Miu g,who took th e load in combul.l .lng th e Li Li-sen liue. Th eExecutive of th e Comintcrn sent a letter to th e CC CPCcriticisinz th e Li Li-sen lin e and advising lIS to call th e1th Plen~m to den ounce the Li Li-son lin e ,w d S Il PP ll l' t e~ 1your struggle ag ains t il. Thi s wa s how we overcame Li-Li-sen's tni take. _ .

"Alter the '18 Sept emb er eve nts of Hl3L ,.fc~ p a ll G OI~lInJ.t ­led one aggression after ano ther agai nst Ch ina, \;11110.1nCh in a itse lf th ere was a civil war hetw ee u the I\.l~o lll ~n­tau c 'HId th e Comm unist Pa rty. Su ppor ted hy the Corn in­t~rI7 ~nd th e Commun ist P arty of the. Soviet ~ J niori, 'youIormul atcd anr] developed t he policy 01 th e uni ted nat IOn:OIl unLi-Japa llcsc lr-o nt , which r-na hled 11S to j)1 01lUL ,

1\1

na ti onwide a nti -.Tapancse war for the salva tio n of ourcoun try .

" T h is, too, is a hi stor ical fa cL." B l~ t if this is acknowled ged, h ow wi ll it be possibl e

to \~'I'll e, l ite h i :;~~ rx of tho CPC as tl ~ c pers~na l hi storyof Ma o I's c- tu ug i So wha t was I to do? 1 decid ed 10 con ­du et a ca mp aig n I'())' the r ectification of th e s ty le 01' workto di savow Leninism a nd to di savow th e rol e of L enin 'S talin, the Comin tcrn, and th e So vie t Uni on in t he historyof the CPC and th e Chin ese revolution . W e say th a tLenini sm is inapplicable to th e Ch inese revolution , thateveryth ing L enin a nd Stali n sa id abo u t th e Ohinese revo­lution wa s wrong, tha t th e recomm endation s of th e Com ­intern were wron g, a nd th at th e Soviet U n ion ne ve rhelped th e CPC , a nd that if som et imes it did h elp, itshelp was usel ess a nd harmful. 'rYe do not r ecognise TsyuiTsy u-pos se rvices in com ba tt ing- Chen 'I'n-hsiu and say,on th e con trary, that. h e had been wron g. We do notrecogn ise yo ur serv ices in com ba t ting Li Li-sen and sa y,on the contrary, that yo ur li n e was st ill m or e left tha nLi Li -sen 's . W e do n ot r ecognise yo ur ser vices in devi s­ing the poli cy of th e united n ation al an t i-Japan es e Iront,and say that yo urs was an incor r ect ri g ht-oppor tunist line.\V e al so say th a t on th e id eolog ical plane th e Comrnu­ni st Party of China was always gu ide d by Maoism , thatth e CPC and th e Chinese revolution owe all their achi ev e­m ents of the past tw enty-four year s to Mao' s leader ship,a nd th a t th e m an y mis takes com m it t ed by cer t a in leadersof tho r,PC Ill. differ en t tim es wore re cti fied by Ma o.

" Alas , though th e rect ifica t io n has now been goi ngon for a long time, m y opinions are s t ill encouutoriugve ry s tro ng r esi st ance.

" ' Vha t am ] to do ?" 1 h an g iven it a lot o f tho ught, hut ha ve found no

so lu ti on, T o be s u re, things arc a bit s im pler' w ith Len in ­ism , th e Cornintorn , an d the Soviet Uni on because th eComin lern h as been di ssol ved and nob ody can nowfor ce us to r eco gnise th em. Things arc als o sim ple withT syui T syu-p o, for h e is dead. H e com m itted a putschistmistake after the 7 August confer ence, a nd the 9thPlenum of th e Cornin te rn Executive h as cr i ticis ed himfor' i t. S o did th e 6th Congress of the cpe. In Inct ,thi s was th e reason w hy it d id not el ect h im Ge nern l Se cre­tary . Th e 3 l'd Plenum of our Centr al Com mi ttee ( '19~O )

~a.w h im co m mi t anoth er mistake - th'l t I' ' i"With the Li L' I' ~ L U cu nei ta t ion'1" 11 ( . li 'll-lson m e, :) 0 , h is in fluen ce in Lhl' P arty'" lW n eg Igl ) e. .' .

" it i s muct: h arder to deal w ith yO I Y I . ,ten a Look again st th e 1 i L ' '. J. " uu lave \\"I'\t­an d th e CPC 11 . : . . ", l -s e~1 line. lit e Comin tor n'" l' ) a vo pa ss ed lC ,';ol utlOns agains t th L 'L'M. l~ me. I eapl e remember tl' Y , . e I 1-art.icles , r eports and other doc

ll S. , o,u also wrote m any

tional an ti-Jap anese fron t Y lJ,nJ(Jnt:~ . on th e un ited na -policy of th e it d '. O U I part III work ing out the

Ulll e na tional an ti Ja fkn.Own not on lv 1. 0 th e C . t ( . -. .pa n ese ront is. , . ' Olllll l ern a nd tlie Iratcr , 1 "ti es but eve n tr tl K ' . (u na pa l -gro~lpS, Our Par~y ' ~ e fu~rll1talng .and ~J l h er parti es andf , . ' . IUS . 0 owe c this policy for a number

o year s , IS follo wmg It now , and wili follow it u n tiltl~~ ~Dd of . th e anti-Ja paneso war. This is why it is vel'~~fi cult. Ior Party ca d re s to accept my ve rs ion th at 'Van~. Ill g did not fight ag:Jinst Li Li -sen 01' th 'lt JI I' ':: ( I) .

ti on t tl L ' L ' " , ( ~ ) P OSl ­il d a 10 I. i-sen .ll1l e was wrong, th a t W ang MiJlg-a. no part III wo rk ing ou t th e poli cy of the uni ted

natlOna! antI-Japan ese fr ont, and tha t ,,'Tan g Min g s toodfor an in correct policy.

" 0 ' I 1 . . ,11 ~I e o~ 1e1' hllJl ~l , d .1 were to recognise tlt e line

~) f th e l t.h Ce n Lra l Com m Ittee Plenum as correct , a ndIf 1 were to ack n owle dge th a t it was yo u wh o fnrm u lat­ed th e united n~'1 t ional H1I t.i -J a l,anese fr on t poli cy, yo uwould ~,cc u py 1:J yea rs ill t he 24-ye a l' hi stor y of ourParty. Cou ld there be a ny Maoi sm in th at case ? Howwould it. be poss ible th en to write th e h is tory of ourParty as the per son al hi stor y of Ma o T se-t u ng?

" W ha t am 1 to do?" 1 have th ou ght of H solut ion : I am goin g to as k you

to co uc erle yn ur se rvices to tu e. \Vill yo u agree ?"I re pli ed: -" My vie ws on thi s SCOre diff er fro m yo u rs . H e wh o

reject s Leninism and tho rol e of the Comin te r n a nd th eSovi et Unio n in the Chinese revolu tion cann ot be nCommunist. No Communist, no matter h ow big or sm allhi s con tr ibu tion is to the Par ty and revolution , sho uldregard it a s hi s own cre dit, for it is th e cr ed it of th eParty, the Comintern, a nd Marxism -Leninism. 'W h enDimitrov, Th or ez and other comrades sa id to m e a t the7th Congress of the Comintern: your con tr ibu t ion to theunit ed n ational a nt i- J a pa ne se Iront is a cre d it 10 you ,Ior yon h av e cl on e H great se rvice to th e P arty , th e people

0 1' Chin» , th e who le Ch inese nati on," I repli ed : it is notIlly pers onal cr edit, but a cre dit to the Party, the Com­in ter n , aud Ma rxi sui-I .e niui siu ,

" A s you kIl UW, ~O O Jl uIlcr t he 7 th Cougrus» Di m itro vof' Iic ially informed me tha t Comrade A. A. Zhda nov hadreported OIl the resul ts of the 7th Com in te ru Congressto th e I' oli tburcau of t he Soviet Comm unis t Party, andtha t Zlllla!lov and Lite Politbureuu ha d com me nded m yspeeche s at th e Congre ss, and in pa r tic ula r th e ne wI'olky of a un i ted national anti-Japanese front present­ed on behalf of the CPC; Zhdanov sa il! that m y arrowhad hi t the ta rge t. ::.::. To th ese words of pra ise, too , Igave my previo us re ply . . . , .

" Y OIl will pr obably rec a ll that bef or e sty le recti fica tio nyou yourself rep eatedly said a t m ee tin gs and to m e:>r he new policy of the u n it ed national an li-Japalle~:

[rou t is a great dis covery; it woul d have been very di i­hcult I'm our Party and th e Chinese Hed 1\ [, 11I y to oy er­COIllP t he ir di lhcultios wit hou t th is po licy ; the Ch in es epeop le would u ot have been ab le to wage Lite an ti­J ap un usc W 8 1' 0 11 lh e sc ale of l~ I~: whol e coun try wi t ~ \()u ~,thi s poli cy ; it is a great cre dit, for Comrade Wang MIJlg.And m y r e ply was again the same. . .

" Hu t iI' yo u th i uk those a re lil y cre dits an d If yo uwuu l me to 'con ced e' them to yOIl, let m e as k you thi s :10 'c oncede in what wayr '

Mao sa id :"Til l' fact that you h eaded t he struggl e against th e

Li Li -sen l ine will not be mentioned. We will cons id erIha t 1 headed the st r uggle aga ins t the Li Li-sen li ne.Let us say that the Hed Arm y of the b'ukie n-Kian gsiSo viet a rea, of which I wa s th en poli tica l com m issar,did not su pport th e Li Li-sen li n e and that, th er efore. lwa s the one who head ed th e st ruggle aga ins t I h e Li Li ­se n li ne. What do you sav to tha t?'

1 risked h im :

':. Comra de Dirnitrov repeated those words in a conve rsati onwi th me ill t ho pr es en ce of Kaug S he ng awl Wa ng Ch iu-hslang;: h n r t l ~' heforo m y retu rn to Chi na in Nove m ber Hl:n.

':"f A t t he ti ms of th e "style r ectifica tiun cam paign " Maooften del ibern tel y sa id: " We di schargo Marxi st -Leninist 'nrr ows'a t the targets o f the Chinese revol u tion, Doguiutists di sch ar geurruws without any target." Th ese wor ds were aimed agai ns tCorurndu Zlidanov's rerum k.

c.1.

T~'Do you think this version will convince Party cadres?o ~led Army of the Fukien-Kiangsi Soviet area

of WI~ICh you were com m iss ar , attacked Ch ang I l'the cklty was almost defencele ss and m ounted s ia w Ie~attac wh en it was pack ed with a seco~cr esulted in heavy losses for the n enem~ troops. ThIS

J4 th Pl~nll111, follOWing their arr-ival i ~dctI,~~. Aefter th e

en Pi-shih and Wang CI ' I ' nu S I ll , omradesP < lJa - rsi ane ca lled a ' 1a~ty con ference of the Fuki -J(' '" " . SpOC13.

which the second a ttac k on CieIn laIngsJ So viet area, ata '1 It. ' I . ( . ianzs ia was describ d 'e -ac vc n t .ur is t m ist ake. Til '" I ' " 1 e asresolution on th is sco re. So wil o con er c.ne e ad opted apresent version ?" . , 1 th o cadr os a ccept yuur

" Quit e true," he mumbl ed " b ut Ichoico." , t icr e is no ot her

Again I asked him:"~nd in wl~at manner am I to 'concede' tf tl

credit for creating th e united nation al anti-Japan~seYfl~nt~~He replied : ."Vie will simply take no notice of th e fact that it

was y~u wh o worked ou t the poli cy of the united nation­al antI-Japanese fro~t. Let us consider that I did it.From n?~v on we Will say that the united fr ont policyof tho CPC :vas launched on 27 December 1935, tho daywhen 1 delivered a report on the united front at theconfere nce of Party cadres in W ayopao."

1 replied:"Do YOH t.hink you can convin ce the cadres? Con sider

the following fa cts :"~irst, th~ Party had been working on the united

national anti-Japanese front policy for a number ofyears befor e you delivered this r eport. On the day alterthe 18 September events (1931), tho Central Committeeset the sigh ts on a national-revolutionary war of thearmed people against Japanese imperialism. It said soclearly in it s appe a l 10 the people of Ch ina in connec­ti on with th e Slicny ang (Mukden) even ts . Puttinz tosham e th e non -r esi stance poli cy of Chiang Kai-shel~ Infurt.h erance Jor this course duri ng th e Shanghai battleag ains t th e . ap anese, t he Central Committee issu ed theslogan, 'Worke rs , peasants, sold iers , stu dents and mer­chants, unite to r esi st Japan and save th e Motherland! 'This slog an was con sonant with th e unit ed fr ont policy.Accordingly our P arty or ganised an an ti-Japanese vol-

65

untccr army of Shanghai workers and called on the peo­pic of Sha ng hai to h elp th e Hlth n.~u te Army.

" In 1\):):2 wh en tho Japan ese occupied th e three northeas ter n pr ovinces and set up the Mauchukuo puppets ta te th e Contrn l Com mi ttee sen t a le tte r dat ed 2;) J?e­ceml;er to the Man churian provincial committee, ca llingon it to create a unit ed an ti-Japanese and an ti -Mancl.lUkuoIr out, In J93 '1, the Cl' C delegation lo the Comiutornse nt Comrad e Yang S ung to th e northeastern prov­in ces to supervise the activation of the anti-JapaneseUnion Army of Northeast China.

" In January 1933, the central Sov ie t government ofChina and tho high command of th e Chinese Ited Armyan no unce d th at they werc ready to conclude an, agr eementon three s im ple conditions with any othe r Chinese armyon joint armed resistance to th~ Japanese i~vaders. ,~he~Chen g, supre me commander of the Kuomintang liqui­dation of com munists' fron t, and generals of other regu­lar ar mies sent a tclozram to Ch ian g Kai -shek, asking, t:> •

him to end hi s 'liquidation of comm unists' campaignand launch joint re sistance to Japan. The command ofth e 10th Route Army and the peopl e's government . ofFukien province official ly concluded an agreement Withthe Chinese Red Army and th e Sovie t government ofChina on joint resistance to Japan and struggle agains tChiang Kai -shek, T he an ti-Japa nese Union Army ofChahar-Suiyuan, headed by Feng Yu-h~iang, Chi Hung­chang and others, al so collaborate d WIth our Party onthe basis of th ese three sim ple conditions . The threecondit ions were also acclaime d by the groups holdingpower in Kwangtung, Kwangsi , Shensi, Szechuan, andoth er provinces.

"]n the beginning of 1 93~ , a s ix-poin t pro gramme ofthe pr eparatory committee for armed self-defence wasiss ued over the signatures of Soong Chi ng-ling ':. and3,000 oth er pr ominent personalities. W elcoming this ap­peal, peopl e in all our big cities and many overseasChines e began org anising local pr epar atory self -defenc ecommittees , which pr oved highly effecti ve in unitingthe mass of th e peopl e to r esist Japan and sa ve th ecoun try .

" Tho wid ow of Dr. Sun Ya t-se n; al so known as MadameSUIl,-Tr.

" in August 1935, our Cent ral Com mi tt ee and the (~h l ­nese Sov iet government issu ed a join t ap peal \0 a ll com­patriots conce rning anti-J apanese resi st an ce and nationalsalva tion, setting out concreto organisational measuresa~l d a progra mme of ten principles for uniting the effortsof all parties , governme n ts and armies in China. Thisappea l wa s ent lll~si a~ tica ll y received by all parties, groupsand mass or gan isations, in cludino a majority in theKuo min tang. l:>

"~ ll these political documents on the nn iLed nationalanti-Japanese front adopted and issued by th e CPC, weredrawn up by m e. And as you h av e just sa id this isknown n~t ~lllly inside but also outsid e the P~l'ty, andno,~ onl.y lll sI~ e but also outside the country.

Besid es, III my speech on behalf of our Cen tra lCommiLLee at th e 7th Congress of th e Comintern I setout. Lhe content of the August First Appeal, and gaven otice of tIl.e . change that had begu n in all Our P ar tywork to facili tate and further the united nationa l anti­Japan ese front policy. In Novem ber of th e same yearI publish ed an ar ticle, 'Th e New Si tuation a nd th e NewP olicy', about the theory and ta ctics of the united nation ­a l anl.i-Jupuuuse Irorit, Tho idea of joining hands withChiang Kai-shek to ruaist Japan for nationa l sa lva tionwas first presented in this articl e. In the beginning ofDecemb er t his pr ompted Chiang Kai-sh ek to send TongW en-i, mili tar y attache of the Kuomi ntang Em bass y inth e USSH, as hi s own and the Kuomintang CentralExecu tive's representative to the Government of theUSSH and to th e Comi ntorn leadership with a requestto facil it ate n ego tiation s between him and me as rep­rcscnta tivo of th e CPC in tho Cornirucrn on questions ofcoopera tion between the Kuo min tan g an d the CommunistPar ty ill the anti-J apanes e s tr ugg le for n ationa l salv a­t ion . Though no specific agr eement was readied for obj ec­tive and subjec t ive reasons, a s ta rt was m ade in Kuo min­ta ng-Communist Party contac ts, an exchungo of opinionshad taken place, and certain common viewp oints we reestablis he d.

" Second (1 continued), everybody knows that 'two da ysbefore your r epor t, the Politbureau h ad adopte d a resolu­ti on on th e curren t sit ua tion and the tasks of the Par ty,in wh ich it announced its decision to foll ow a unitedIr ont policy and imp lement a corresponding programme .

ifhough the Politbureau was not ruily informed of the

new internal and in teruational situation and it s resolu­

Lion contained several serious mistakes, it had thereby

officially adopted the united national anti-Japanese front

policy. Everybody knows that the resolution was based on

a factual report of Chang Hao ' and Liu Chang-shcn, ,:.,:.

who had been sent on my request and through the good

offices of the Soviet Communist Party's Politbureau to

Wayopao. Their report consiste~ of 1) the report .and

concluding remarks I had mad~ 1ll.June 1935. at m~etlllgs

of the CPC Comintern delegation m connection with the

drafting of the appeal to all com pa tr iots 011 anti-Japan~s.e

resistance and national salvation, 1.0. the August Fi rst

Appeal, and 2) that part o~ my speech at the 7th qon­

gress of tho Comintern which co~cerne~ the rev~lutlOn­

ary movement in colonial and ~ellll-colo.lllal coun tr ies ~nd

tha Lactics of communist parties, specificall y the united

national anti-J apanose fruut policy in. China. .

"Third though It is now nearly nme years since your

report to' the conference of Party cadr es in Wayopao, its

text has never been published. Who knows what you

reported at that time? ,:.,:-,:.

.. Chang Hao (a lia s Li Fu-sheng, real name Lin Chuu-tnnj e-­

a worker member of the Sixth CPC Central Committee. In the

early thi~ties he represented the Chinese trade unions in the

Hed I'rofiutern. IIe died in Yenan in 1942, soon after the official

lallnchin~ of the "style rectilication campaign.",'* Liu Cha ng-shea (a li as Lo Ying, real name Wang Hsiang­

pao) - former Vladivostok docker, member of th e Soviet Com­

munist Part y since 1923, twice elected memb er of tho Chinese

Communist Party's Central Committee, After liberation, he was

deputy chairman of the All-China Council of Trade Unions. In

Hl67, during th e "cultura l revolution", he was mobb ed and killed

by "red guards" (hung w eipings) on Mao's ord ers.*** Thi s so-called re por t was includ ed in th e first volume of

Mao's Selected Works 1G years later, in 1951, after considerable

doctoring. entitle d. "On th e Tacti cs of Fighting Jap an ese Im­

peri ali sm". The report was not in suppor t, but rather against,

th e united national anti-Japanese front poli cy. If we are to

believe this repor t, th o Communis t Party of China lacked re­

source s to build a united national anti-Jap anese front with the

Kuomln tang an d the local power-hold ing' groups. The report said:

"The big local bu llies find bad ge ntry, th e big warl ords, tho big

bureaucrats and the bIg comp radores have long mad e up th eir

minds. . : Th ey have formed a camp of traitors : for th em such

a questi on as whe the r or not th ey ar e to become slaves of a

f?r eign nati ?n does not ~xist. becau~e ,they have already ob­

Iit erat ad nati onal demar cations and th ei r In teres ts are inseparable

"It is n ot.. lik ely, th er efore, th at th e cadres will heli evo

what you Will now say on this sco re "Mao replied: .

"Quite true. H ow eve t h ' .

make thnm believ e it. rthi se~~ ~~h~'o tihe~ chOIce hut to

yo,~ what is. hidden deep in my so ul. iav e come to te ll

But I will gi\'e it some m or e th ought. And I be vo u

to h ~lp me find a way out. Let us say no m or e tod a/ ) '

nrc Ill, too much talk tires "On nut Jet mo t" " {IUo . oJ • '" cau 1011 \'o u·. n no ac count mus t yo u tell anyone else ab o I t th . ' 'of ou r co n ve rsauo-, today." I e co n ten t

:~l ere i; ~fly one c ~nclu.s i on that ca n he drawn from

this: ~ao s s tyle r ectification campaign" was mot iva to rl

~lxcluslvely by selfish a ims; .Mao acted as a rank ca reer­

1St and narrow nationalist.

. D~scribing Mao's behaviour during- th e "style rect ifica­

t ion . some ~arty cadres sa id : " Ma o is a poli t ica l swi n­

dler. Everyth mg he says anrl rl OPS d uri ng the 'rectifica t ion '

c~mpa lgn. IS a sheer s Win nl:", or : " Mao is w ith ou t prIn­

ciplos, WIthout scruples, WIth ou t m oral s, and wi th out

shame. What really n eed s mercil ess r ect ification is hi s

s tyle of theso four withouts."

As I learned later, Mao had come to tell m e wh at wa s

" h idden docp in Ihis so ul" not only because Party ca dres

were strongly opposed to the "style rectificati on ca m­

paign", but al so because sho r tly befor e our conversat ion

?eorgi I?i.mitrov had se nt m e a lett er supporting my polit­

ICIl J positions. It had be en int erc ep led and concea led by

Mao. i\ nd Mao knew, of co urse, th at Dimitrov was then

in charge of the Sovi et Communist Party 's departm en t of

international information. Dimitrov's letter worried Ma o,

He was embarrassed by the "style re ctifi cation campaign" .

So , soon after this talk with m e, he anno u nced the end

of "emergen cy salvation " , and launch ed a peri od of "self­

relutation" and "rehabilitation " .

In our t h ird t.alk Mao ad mitted tha t h e ha d bocn wron g

to oppose L eninism and pro mo te Maoism.

Al so , he admitted tha t he had b een wr ong to fabricat e

Wang l\fing's two " oppor tunis tic mi stakes".

from tho se of imp eri ali sm; th eir ch ief of chi efs is non e othe r

than Chiang Kni-shek." Referring to th e national bourgeoisie,

Mao held that only its "left wing" was likely "to take part in the

s truggle" against Japanese aggression .

an

The talk was in hi s H sipeipo hom~ on 18 Dece l~~er1948 I t was the fifLh t ime wo talked since October 1..1.18,and ,t h e conte n t of our conversation attra cted the .atten t lOfof the 2nd Plenum of th e Seve nt h CC CPC I.n Marc 1

1949. H er e are the main points of our conversa tio n .

Mao sa id: 1 f Li 1"C d Wanz MinO' w o h av e spo {en , our imes ant

omra e ' ''' '" T d I t u tooxchnn ed o pinio ns four times. 0 ay, . wan yo. I ~our min d OIl certain impor tan t Issu es con necte d~~i~~ \he style re ctifi cation campaign, ~ Iwh as 1l.lC. qu cs.­t.i on of Leninism, the political ~m o durin g the Civil war,the political lin e during the an ti- J apanese :v ar, and so oniI f on hcarinz your opinion, I find myself III th e wrong,, 0. ."will r ectify my mistak es.

I said : ,"You have alre ady spoken on th ese m atters dun ng our

talk in Ap ril 19H . As th e pr overb sa):s, .you have hunga cow b ell r ound the tiger' s n eck an d It IS. up to you totake it. off. 1£ you want to r ectify y?ur mi stakes, .do ~~ .' Vh y ask the op in io n of o!.her~? ,Hesld es, yo u a~e l.mp~.I ~vious to th e opin io n of others If It does not fit ~ OUi 0 \\ n ,n ot only d o you lose yo ur tem per , but yo u also persecutepeopl e."

Mao answered:" Comrade W ang Ming, l et m e assure yo u that I h av o

made great progress in that respect. I sho w n o rancour,and am roady to re ctify my mistakes."

" Fine." I sa id. " Let's di scu ss th e questio ns you haveraised . T h e firs t ques tion - i- on Lenin ism and 'Mao'sthou ghts ' . Y ou will r ecall th a t eve n in th e preparatoryperiod of the style r ectifi ca tion cam paign I advised youagainst crea ti ng any Maoism , and I told you not to goaga inst L enini sm. I said that this would do no good .toth e Communist Party of China , to th e world communis tmovem ent, a nd eve n to you person ally. What is yourpre sent v iew on this score?"

" I am no w try in g to decid e wh at to do ne x t. Mind you,I h ave taken n o d ecisi on s . I must give it a little morethou ght. " Mao replied ,

"The seco nd ques tion ," T con tinued. " concer ns th e polit­ical lin e of th e 4th Plen um , At th e 7th Pl en um yousaid th e line of the Itth was more lef t than th e Li Li-sellline, becau se in m y bouk ab out the s truggle agai ns t tho

70

L i Li -scn li n e ::. I wrote that th e 3rd Plenum had failedto criticise som e of Li Li-s el1's rizhtist theol'etica l v iewsY,ou sai.d: ' ~ i nc? W~ng .~Hng says"'there wer e rightist p. l e~m ont s .In .L I LI-sen s hne, he mus t b e still farther lef tthan LI LI-sen '.

. , "Now, I ?Rk rou:, d.id not til 0 Leui n is ts criticise Trot 'ky­lSI!1, for bein g lef t In .form a nd right in con tent? Doesthis warra nt the deductIOn that th ey wer e m or e 'l eft ' thTrotsky? a n

"Li rLi-s ~n ' s id e~ s about th e Chi nese r ovolut io n and~h,e ,re \ o l~l t lOna rr slt.ua~lOn in Chin a wer e of th e extr em e~ef~, , ~·nl'l ety. Dnt, ~l1S Ideas about the force and poten-

tIa li tIes of the Chinass r ev ol uti on were of the -t. I t · . ex remer~g I v.anety. TIllS is wh y th e lett er of the Comint~t' xeCli!.I\'e described I.l le Li Li-sen lin e as se rn i-Trots~~~LO ,

" Vll IY ~l1a~ one po int out Li Li -~ e n ' s 'left' mi s takesand not his l'l/{ht th eol'f~li ca l l11i st ak n s ~ '\ ft" I' all L ' LiI . , c , • •'"'- ~ , , 1 ~ I-se ll

I?d ~~ t only order ed th e Chinese TI ed Arm y to at tackb~g cl.t~es, had not only ill spired armed pu tsches in m a nyIJig ci lle s, and I.tad not on,lY call ed Oil th e Soviet Unio na nd th e Mon goli an P eopl e s TIepublic to se nd troops and!lelp th o i~surre? Li?n , but had al so u rged the proletariat~ n a: l, 'lilt? .1mper,lahs t co untr ies to ri se in su pport of thellpI"lRmg. II~ Ch ina . Did not I in m y book a nd th e .'J. thPle~um In ItS resolution se verely cri ticise these ex tre melefti s t, adventurist mistakes of Li L i-sen ? Did 1 Or th e4 th Pl enum ev er suggest th at troops sh ou ld al so comef roI!1' t he Mo~n or Mars to h elp th e Ch in e e rev olu t ion ?I did no t. Nelt~lOr did the 4th Pl en um , So how ca n any­I~odr say th e Iin a of t he 4th Plenum was ' Wa ng M in g 'sl in o and m ore 'left'than the Li Li-sen lin e?"

" T h e mi st akes attributed to th e 4th P lenum are not mvinvention ," Mao said. " They are t he in ven tinn of LinShao-chi. But I accepted hi s opini on , uud 1I0W T admit'that I was wrong."

"T he third question, " 1: continued, "is that of th e Pa r tyli n e duri ng, the anti-Jnp anoso war. On arr iving in Yen a ~ ,fro m Moscow OIl : 29 Novemb er 19:17, T sa id a mong otherthings in my report to a Politburua n m eeti ng ea rly inDecem ber that Comrade DimiLrov recommended us to

". The ref ere nce is to Wang Ming's Struggle for th e Further.Bolsh euisat uni of th e Commun ist Party of China.

study th e French Communist Party's popul ar £ront ex­

peri ence. He als o sugges ted Ih e foll owi ng slo gans : 's ub­

ordinate everything to the united nation al anti-Japanese

front' and ' everything through the united n ational anti­

Japanese fr ont' . I said that I agr eed with th ese r ecom­

mend ati on s."But J never mentioned these two slogans again. Not

because I con sid er ed th em wron g. hut 'sim ply because

there wa g no occas ion to mention them. I h eard nothing

about th ese slo gans either fr om you or fr om Lin aft er

the December 1937 meeting of th e Polithureau until the

6th Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1938.

After speak ing at th e 6th Pl enum I wa s in Slru ~ted by the

P olitbureau to dr aft th e 6th Plenum resolution . There­

upon, I left for Chungking before th e Pl enum ended to

attend the second session of th e join t National Political

Council. It was a time of national crisis and a cr it ical

point in the anti-Japanese war, for the city of Wuhan

had just fallen, and I wa s to explain to the people our

Party's view of th e current sit uation. and it s standpoint

on closer coo peration b etween the Kuomintang and the

Communist Party, na t ional unity, and on fighting the anti­

Japanese war until final victory, supporti ng tho se in the

Kuornintang who were for continuing th e resi stance to

Japan and hitting th e group of 'Yan g Ching-wei , the na­

tional trait or who had gone over openly to Japan's side,

Comrade Liu took advantage of my departure and said

at the Plenum: the slogan 'subordinate everything to the

united national anti-J apanese fr ont' is a good slogan, but

the slogan 'everything through th e united national anti­

Japan ese fr ont' is a bad slogan, becau se it signifies , ' every­

thing through Chiang Kui -sh ek and Yen Hsi-shan'.

"Now, let me ask you: according to Liu the slogan

'everything through the united national anti-Japanese

fron t' is equivalen t to 'everyth ing through Chiang Kai­

shok and Y en Hsi-shan', and is therefore incorrect. Also

according to Liu, the slogan 'subordinate everything to

the united national anti-Japanese front' is corr ect, though

by hi s own logic it should be equivalent to 'subordinate

everyth ing to Chi an g Kai -sh ck a nd Y en Hsi-shan'. What

kind of juggling is t his ?

. "'Vhnt.is the united national anti-J apanese front? It

IS the .polIcy of our .Par ty in a definite hi storical period

of antI-Japanese resistance and national salvation; it is

72

the Pat'ly 's gen eral line during th is peri od. What was the

Tcon ten~ and purpose of our Par ty 's unit ed fron t policy?

o UnIte, on definite ter 11 I . .

political . ms, a c asses, all pa rties and

th . ( groups, all armed forces, all government s II

e rue gr oup s, and all mass or . . . - , a

Japon eso clem ents ill I g amsah ons, excl udmg pr o-

tionary war of rC'~;i stan~er( er ~ o twaJge a nati onal-r evolu_

I' If " " . agilln s . apane -e ' . l'anr In ee ence of China 's nau I ' I "; Imporla Ism

sho vereignty and t errit()ri~l'- inte~~~~~ ~; el~endencc, :tate

t. o Party sees thi s .h istor ical er iod ' o .sa!ne time,

rlO (~ opening th e W ElY to the J/ctory ~; th6r~~I?1 l narh pe ­

ge ols-d em ocra tic r evoluti on on th e sc I I mht'se our-

cou ntry, - a e 0 t e wh ole

"TI" I~1~ite(~I~l~~i~~~K ;I~~i~i~g:~e~seu~~~~ ~~~~~a~~sert~t~~i~~ ~o the

!Illtfl IllstoncaI period tIle Party s ubordin ates ~ I I its dt~f­

Jtv t thi Ii T , . n . ... .. " ac IV­

u~ited n~;ioPo IlCY. ti Jh e slogan 'everything throug h tho

, ' . ' .na an 1- apanese fron t' mean s that in th e

given 11lstorICal peri od th e P a rty clischa rges it s mi .

Lh I Ihi I' Th . . ission

r oug 1 u s po ICY. is is how I und erstood and nov

und erstand, t,he meaning of these two sloza ns . Th ey \ e v

su¥.g~sted ~y G~or?,i Di:~:nitrov and I agreeO

with th em. v re

.\, IlY. (h d Lm Iden~lfy our Poarty poli cy with Chiang

Kai -sh ek and Yen lIsl-shan? Lin interpret ed 'everythinjr

,through.th e united nat i.onal anti-Japa nese fr ont' to mea~

eVCl:ythlllg through Chia ng Kai-sh ok and Yen Hsi-shan'

pre~lsely he~aus e he ide nt ified th e policy of th e united

natIOnal. antI-J apanese front with Chiang Kai -shok and

YenJlsl-sl~aIJ . To follow Liu 's logic. the unit ed front pol ­

ICy 18 cquivalcn I. to the pol icy of Chianp Kai -sh ok and

Yen Hsi-shuu, Can th er e be anything more absur d?

"As for Lin's conte n tion that th ere was no orzanisa­

tion in China similar to the popular fr on t committee in

France through whi ch th e pa r ties concern ed could settle

all affairs by negotiation -this was untru e. Th ough th ere

was no united nation al anti-Japanese fr ont committee in

China, there wa s the bipartisan commission of the Kuomin­

tang and Communist Party, whi ch wer e tho basis of, and

the biggest forces in , th e united front. Ther e was no

other political party as massive and stron g as eith er the

Kuomintang or th e Communist Party. There wer e several

small parties and gr oup s, out of which the left followed

the Communist Party and th e right foll owed th e Ku omin­

tang. In other words , when the Kuomintang and the

73

Communist Party ca me to term s on some issue, this wastantam ount to an agreeme nt among all parti es and groupsin the cou ntry. This is a r ecognised fact.

"As yLJ U know, ul th.C\ t ti=e tho b~purtiC:An (~nmml~~non

cons is ted of the foll owmg: Wang Mlng, Ch ou En-lal, PoKu and Y eh Chien-ying for the Communist" Party andCh en Li-Iu, Chang Chun, K ang T se and Liu C~ien-r,hunfor th e Kuomintang. with major issues hein g directly n e-go ti ate d wi th Chian g Kai-shek . . ..

" I n addi tion, the re was the Joint National Pohb~alCounc il (Kuomintsanchenghuai) , on whi ch the ~uomlJl­t ang th e Com mu n ist Party, and the oth er par~lCs andO'rou:ps were r cprescnted. Up to a point, in fa ct, ~hls Coun',~il se rved as a n ation al comm itlne of th e antl-Japan~scunited fr on t, as a place of direct contacts an(~ ne10tIa­ti on s between th e Kuomintan g, the Commumst 1 arty,a n d ot he r par-ti es a nd organ isations.( " T h is is why Liu Sh ao- chi's conte)~tion ~hat th er e ":as110 m ech anism in China throu gh which diilcr cnt patti esco uld se ttle issu es by negotiation , was cont rar y to the

fa ct s. . 1" After HIe anli-J ap anese war began and followmg the

emergence of th e u nit ed na tioT.l al an ti-Japanese fr ont ona cou n try w ide sca le, all qu esti on s concerm ng the C~m­muni st P arty, th e 8th Boute and the New 4th armres,and all ot he r qu esti ons of inter es t to our Party, were ne­gotiated by our P arty with th e Kuominlang. ,1 n fa ct, noneof these issu es could he set tl ed without the CommunistParty. This Chia ng Kai -sh ek knew perfectly well. As forY en Hsi-sh an and othe r local power-h oldcts, they wereeven m or e strong ly consc ious of the fact that cer tainthings could not he se t tle d without the Comm un is t Party.

" T h is is wh y Liu's con te nti on that Ch ia ng Kai-shek anclYen Hs i-sh ar; would not negotia te with the Com ­munist Party was al so co n trary to the fncts.

" If Liu had mad e these contentions before I l eft thenth Pl enum to go to Chu ng ki n g, I would have explainedat once th a t h is und orstand iug of th e Party's united na­li on al anti-Japanese fr ont poli cy is out of line with boththe Len inist theory on th e united nationa l anti- im pe rialis tfron t and the present s ta te of the united national anti­Japanese front in China .

" A t the end of 1938 , after I retu rned fro m Chu ngk ingto Yerian, you said to me: ' 1 have pu t Li u Shao-ch i right.

74

in my concl uding remarks at the Bth Central Com mi ttee!~lennm' .. Y ou also said, 'Those w ho think that the slozan~vel}t.l llng through the united na t ional anti -Japa;ese

fron t 1>: tho sam o a s "ovorything through Ch ia er 1""­shok a~d. Y en Hsi- shan" , are in error . EverYbod;bkn~~sth~,\ thi s IS farth est from Comrade W ang Ming's th ou zhts '. t old yo~ then that yo u r sta t em ent was vague

Oa~d

1.n~oIllP.l et e. First, yo u arc tryin g to te ll me no w that vousa id thi s was .farthest from W ang Mi ngo 's thoughts, but i nyo u r r,o ne ludmg remarks at the 6th Plenum YOU saidn othing of th~ so.r t. Second, you did not expla in wh oexac tly h eld this VIew. \ Vho was i t? It was Liu Shao-ch i.I laving mi st ak enl y id entified the united naliunal an ti ­Japanese front policy with the poli cy of Ch ia ng Kal -sh ekand Yen Ilsi-shan, h e said that ' every thing th rough theuni ted national anti-Japanese front' meant the same as'everyth ing through Chiang Kai-sh sk and Y en Hsi-shan' .It is unfortunate that you did not point out Com rad eLiu's mistake a t that time. Third, you did not expla inthe conte nt and purp ose of the P arty's u nit ed nationalanti-J apanese fron t poli cy. Nor did yo u ex plain what itmeant to subordinate everything to the united nationalanti -J apanese Iront and do eve ryth ing through th e fro nt.As a result, Liu's speech and your ow n remarks on theunited front created ideological and poli tical confusionand lack of clarity. Now yo u m ust decide how this ca nbe remedied.

"At that time you replied to m e: 'Aft er our excha ngeof opinions today there are no longer any differences be­tween u s on thi s sc ore. At the first opport un ity I willagain explain everything to our comrades in accordancewith our con versa tion today'. But during the 'sty le recti­Iica tion cam paign' you s udde nly declared th ese two slo­gan s to he 'W an g Min gs l'ight-opporlunist l in e of theanti-Japanese wa r period' . I had been poi soned and wasgravely ill at that time, and had no opportu nity eithe r toexpla in or to di scuss an ything. \Vh nt is your presentopi nion on this score?"

" It was not Liu's invention," sa id Mao. " I t was all m yinvention. Liu made his speech at the 6th P lenum on myin stru ctions. And it was un my in il.iative th at du rin g thesty le r ectification ca m pai gn th e two slogans we re decl are~to he W anz Mtnzs l'iO'ht-opportunist line. I was w ron g.

"Chairm~n ?I'l a~!" 1 ~~id to him, "you h ave just, li stened

75

, " and have flxpr 8ssed sclf- cr it i-to anoth er man s OPl~ll Oln , 1 nrofTrpsS and 1 s incerelyci!'U1 . YO Il 111\\' 0 cer l m ll y 111M e \' ,., ,

"welcome it.." d 1 1 hi fa ceH p. was sl lerrt for n t im e. T'h on , S 11 (en y, 11 ;; ,

turn ed li vid and he pounded h is fist on th e table, shou t-

in g: . \ '1 1"1.4'")" Haven't I explained my idea to you 111 .' pr i ~n .~

Didn' t 1 tell you then what is hidd en deep 111 m y soul :If Leninism is recognised. as th e gui ding ide a of th e Com ­muni st Party of China, if the line of yO':ll' 4th C~C Plen1ll~1is r ecogn ised as correct, and if your united nati onal an l i ­Japane se fr ont poli cy is al so rec ogn~sed as . cor l'ec ~, t,hollth ere can be no Ma oism and it WIll be ImP?SSlble towrite the history of the Communist P arty of Chma as theper son al h ist ory of Mao 'I'ss-tung. Everything you hav,osaid today sho ws that yon still do no t recogrnso Mao sthoughts as th e only gu iding th ou ?hts of th e ,crc andthat you still want Russian Marxi sm to dominate theepc. Th is won ' t do! It says so clear ly in th fl GeneralPrinciples of th e Party Rul es ado pted hy th e 7th Con ­gr ess . It is impermissible for yon not to accept them, Asfor the content of our conversation today , see that youfoll ow the exam ple of th e gil ded ido l in the T emple ofRoyal An cestors and se w u p yo ur li ps. If you sa y an y­thing to anybody about it, I want you to know that I willstop at nothing."

J rebuffed th ese abs urdi lies. \V e argu ed. for another twohours, but in va in. I tri ed again and again to prevail Ollhim that it is best to follow th e approach we had followedin the beginning of our conversa tion-what is right isright, wha t is wrong is wr ong. I will say yo u are rightwher e you had be en right , and yo u will admit you arewrong wher e you had been wron g. Our principle shouldbe: su bordinate everythin g to th e tru th , su bordina teever ything to the inter ests of the Party and the worldcommunist movem ent. That is th e pusi tion of a COIlUllU­ni st, es pec iall y a Part y leader . And h p. ex pla ine d again andagain th at he did not den y hi s erro rs in th e matter ofoppos ing Leni n ism and of asc ri bing "opportu nis t lin es " toWang Min g, b~.It that he was determined to cre a te Mao­Is.m, and to Write the hi st or y of the Party as hi s personalhi st or y .

,We were de~ply immersed in our argument wh en myWIfe, Meng Ching-shu, en tered the room an d sa id to m e:

lI1 have looked for you everywhere, a nd here you arequarrelling again. Let's bettor go hom e a nd have din­Del'."

Chiang Ching, who sat in a corner li stenin g to ourargument, rose hastil y and said :

"How fOl'tuIl~te .thaL you have come, Comrade Meng.The tw~ old fighting cocks are impossible: th ey star tquarre~hIlg the mom ent th ey meet an d th ere is no end~o th~lr argument, T ake your fight ing cock Lo have dinner,and J ll, do . th e same with mine, Then the y will haveto stop fighting. "~hat was ho w our argument ended.Cle~rly, Mao had admitted tha t his " style recLifica tiun

campaign" ?i.recte~ a~~inst Leninism and ascribing " er­roneous ~ohtlcal lines to others, wa s in correct. H e had~Iso admitted that h e committed these abomina ti ons de­liberately.

It al~o .follows ~rom tho con ten t of our talk that beingan . egoistic ca reeris t and narrow nationalist Mao is in ­?a1lahle ~)f pl acin g the interests of the Party ~nd th e worldcomm unis t m ovement above all other interes ts. H e hasal,,:a~s given priority to the inter ests of hi s own person.This IS WIl Y he has nev er been able to re cognise an d cor­rect hi s mist akes. On the contrary, he has a lways a 1717ra­vated th em . This is wh y h e com mitted mistake baf termistake on an ever greater scale and of an ever moreser ious character. And the more so as time wen t onuntil his mistakes became irreparable and he himselfdegenerated into a traitor to commu nism and an acc om­pli ce of imperialism,

4) Mao's talks at the art and literatureforum in Yenan

Mao and hi s few followers con tin ue to exto l h is Talks atthe Art and Literature Forum in Y enan, thus decei vingthem selves and others. They de scribe the Talks as a clas­sic exposition of " Mao's r evolutionary tho ughts and linein art and literature" , passing him off as the sale author­ity on the subject. Mor e, during the "style rectification"period and until th e "cultural r evolution" Mao consid er edit the greatest of crimes for anyone to ignore his literary" though ts " and "line". This was th e angle of h is attackon revolutionary writer s and artis ts of th e fifties ands ixties, wh om he subseq ueurly sub jec te d to repression s.

77

Let us take a closer look at the Talks-not th e originaltex t printed in th e Yenan newspaper Chiehjangjih pao inMay 1942, which was full of mist ak es, but th e repeatedlytouched up text published in 1953 in th e third volum e ofMao 's S elect ed W orks. This will deny him th e opportu­nity to say we are criticising something that was put outin ha ste and had not been properly revised.

1) Mao's Insinuations

Spurning the facts of the. revolutionar~ development ofChinese art and literature III the preceding 20 years, Maolevelled a whole set of accusations at China's revolution­ary writers and artists. To begin with, he placed all ofthem " under one cap" by saying they had not yet solvedor found a correct solution for the main question-whomart and literature must serve. Thereupon he said they hadnot yet found the right answer ~o the qu.estion " how toserve" - whether to raise the quality of their work (refine­ment) or to make their work more simple (popular).He also accused them of not understanding " the questionof th e united front in art and literaturo" and the problemof "li tera ry and art criti cism". To top thi s, he chargedthem with " ideological mistakes" and "mistakes. of s.tyl?" .

Mao also faulted revolutionary writers and artists .1llSI?eand outside the epc in various other w ays. He said, forexample, that many Party memb ers "~~d joined the Par­ty organisationally but had not yet J o~ned th.e PaI:~y orhad not yet entirely joined the Party ' :ideologically . Hesaid writers and artists in side and outside th e .Party werenot able to di stinguish between the p:oletanat and thepetty bourgeoisie, that they were divorced from thema sses and had no sympathy for workers, pea~ants andsoldiers, and were th erefore incap~bl e o~ producin g worksabout workers, peasants and soldiers, Ev~n ~;hen th~ytry to portray workers, peasants and soldiers , he said,"all they manazo is to paint the outer shell of a work­ing man, wher~as the essence th ey produce is the o~desse nce of a petty bourgeois intell ectual , since deep inth eir souls th ere is still a kingdom of the petty bour­geois intell ectual." 1\10.0 'yen t on to say that. they did notunderstand tha t art and li terature served politics an d th atthey did not kn ow whom they mu st praise and who~ i!WYmu st crtticisc. Th cv did not even understand th e distinc-

t!on between " the fa r rear , whi ch is und er the domi na­tiou of th e Ku omlntang, and the libera ted ar eas, when'tAw leading force is the Comm uni st Party" , On all thesegrounds Mao .drew the conclusion that an "effective an dscn ous camptu.gn to I'ectify th e style of work " was neededamong revoluttonm-y writers a nd ar tists.

¥ao pretended that he was refe rring to just some of thewntors and ar tists in Yenan. But the onsulng even tsshowed that he was a ttacking literar y and art workersmSlde. and outside th e. Party ev.erywhere in the coun try.He did not confine his campaign to just the lib erat eda:eas, In ~9'}3 he spe cially sent Hu Chiao-me to Chun g­king, ~vh~l e tho latter invited Party writers and artists tothe mISSIOn of the 8th Routo Army and told them theymu st conduc t an "effectiv e and serious rectifIcati on of~tyle campaign" in line with Mao's Talks in orde r 10transform th emselves and th e content of their works".

2) The True Facts of History

Ma.o's groundless acc~satiolls do not stand up to th e his­torical ~acts. Take Ius ch arge that revolu tionary writersand art is ts had not yet solved or found th e right solu tioufor the main questi on -whom art an d li terature mu stserve. This was tantamount to saying that they did notunderst and th at art and li terature mu st serve the workinzpeopl e. Which is contra ry to the fa cts. '"

The Chinese revolutionary literary movement, whi chcam e into being during the May Fourth Movement(1919), resulted from the influence OIl China's progr essiveintolligentsia and you th of the Great October Socia lis tRevolution, of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and Ilussiau revo­lutionary literature. With th e support of Len in and th ehelp of the Comintern , the Communist Pa rty of China wasorganised in th e summer of Hl2J. The pioucers of revo lu­tionary Chinese art :an d lit eratu re, wh o espouse d th eideas of communism, joined the Party onc after an oth er.This wa s how th e revolutionary literary movement, ofwhi ch Communists wer e the leading and workin g nu cleus,became part of th e anti-imperialis t revolution, th e an ti­feudal revolution, and the str uggle for ~he non-cap italis t,i.e. socialist, perspe ctiv e. Its memb ers fough t on the frontof revolutionary art and literature und er the guidance ofthe Communist Party. And the revolutionary movement

'71\

in art and literature th at had arisen and developed in thi s

manner nat?rall y could have no oth er aim but to serve

the prolctartat and all working people.

Alre~dy in th e t wen ties th e for em ost mem bers of the

~'evolutlOnary movem ent in literature unders tood th eor et ­

ically and adop ted in practice the basi c principl e of se rv­

ing th~ proletariat a nd all the working people, and of

prom oting the revolution. Her e are a few ex am ples.

1. In th e early twenties, soo n after th e Communist

P arty of China was founded, prom ine nt Party leaders,

among them T ang Chung-h sia, Yun Tai-ni, and Hsiao

Chui-nu wr ote in th eir articles t-hat " li te ra ture must devel­

op as a revolutionary w eapon". They came to gr ips with

the " art for art' s sake " theor y, and ca lled on writers and

poets to " engage in practi cal revolutionary activity" and

"show more of the true life of society".

2. Chiang Kuang-tzu raised the same to pic in his es ­

says, Th e Proletariat and Culture, On Revolutionary

Literature. Ru ssian Literature, and oth er s. In On R evolu­

tionary L iterature he wrote th at "revolutionary li terature

is a liter a ture that reflect s the inter ests of th e oppressed

masses", "exposes th e cri mes and evils of th e old socie ty",

and "helps the development of the new forces" .

Chiang Kuang-tzu not only propagated the theory of

revolutionary art and literature, but a lso follo wed revolu­

tionary th eory in hi s cr ea tive writing, portraying the

revolutionary movement of the m asses in different pe­

riods.3. In an early article, Our Ne w Literary Movement,

Kuo Mo-j o urged "resis tance to th e ferocious dragon of

capital ism". He called on the writer s to sho w the "spirit

01 th e pr oletariat". In th e article, Th e R evolution and

Literature, he wrote, "\Ve ne ed a li terature that would

express sy m path y for the proletariat , a literature of soc ial­

ist re alism"; h e in vited young writers " to go to the people,

to the fa ct ori es, to the army barracks, to plunge into the

whirlpool of the r evolution".4. Mao Tun sai d in the article Naturalism and Modern

Chinese Prose that literature " m us t pay a tte n tion to social

problem s a nd show sympathy wi th th e oppressed and

downtrudden" .5. Chen Fang-wu al so wrote in th e article, From a

Literary R evolution to a R evolu tionary Literature, that

"the worker-peasant masses should be our subject" and

" we must use a langu ag f "l"masses ". e ami WI' to th e worker -p easant

Til ese calls for a "li ter ary r ev I . " ,ary literature" a nd a "PI'ol' t ' 0

1,uti on , a 'r evolution-

J ' e anan Itera ture " 11 t d Is ta IlCpOlTl t not only of th b 1'0 ec e t 10

the basic directioIl of th eer~v °tet~named au thors, but al so

of th a t peri od. 0 u iona ry art and liter ature

Th e spread of Marxi st-L eninist .d .of th e movem ent [or a new c It I euls1?nd the lllflu en ce

d 'IJ uro anr rterat .C many revolution ary in tell eclt J . ' UI O, prompt-

gage in educa tional work. They' ~~rd an~' ~t u~ler~ts t o ~n ­

working peopl e in towns and villaO'es e ;)~:g{t~l~dass es 101'

~,~oks a~ld a r t re prod uctio ns, held p~lblic lec tures tfo°.rul;~,~ISIn g SCie nce, and organise d concer ts and othe r If'an ies TI' , . I per orm­, ,L : u,s se t In m,otlOIl th e now hi storical process ofwerldJllg art and lIterature with th o 1Jllasses. wo r cer-poas an t

DU~ing tit ? grea t r evoluti on o[ 1925-1927, th e drive to

p.ut aI t and htoraturo III th e se rvice of the working m asses

"as a cons plCu,oUS par t of th e ge ne ra l revolutionary

my vem ent. And III th e la te twen ties, followine th o def eat

0 1 th e great revolution, amid hardsh ips and a ~hiLe terror

the re,volulionary \~riters and artists worked harder th ar;

eve r for art an d lIterature to Jacilitate tho struggle of

the worker s find peasants.

The Leagu e of Left-Wing 'W riters was organised in

March 1930 on th e initiative and under the directi on of

the Communist Party. Its nucleu s consis ted of Com m u­

ni sts, whil e Lu II sun wa s m ad e its chairman. :;. The th eoret­

ica l programme adopted at the Le ague's inaug ura l con.

gross sa id : "W e must be in th e for ofr ont of the liber ation

s tr ugg le of the proletariat". It also sa id: " The con ten t

of our art are th e as pira tions and fee lings of the prol etar­

iat in this di sm al and m edi eval class society" . The League

also had an ac tion programme a nd princ iples, which were

a ttached to th e th eor etical pr ogramm e. The k ey provi­

sion in th e acti on programme said, " Tho purpose of our

literary m ovem ent is to work for the li berati on of th e

new , dev eloping cl ass".The principles of th e League wer e:

" Tsyui Tsyu-pu was closely involved in directing the League

from th e latt er half of Hl31 until th e end of 1933, when he wassen t to work ill th e Sovie t arcus of China.

81

"f) To borrow the ex perience of the new , progressivefor eign liter ature, to expa nd our movem ent, a nd set upvar iou s research Ladies.

"2) To help young writers, leach thorn the art of writ­in g, and assis t the development of worker-peasant writers.

"3 ) To acce pt as final the Marxist theory of art andIi toraturo, and of l iterary cr iticism.

" 4) To pu t out journal s and va rio us 's er ies' and 'libra­ri es ', and the li ke.

"5 ) To pr oduce works of literature for the new, devel­oping class." (See Menyah monthly, Vol. 1, No, 4.)

Faithful to its programme and principles, u. c Lea guepublish ed a jo urnal throug hout th e six y~ar~ in wh ich itexiste d (M arch 1930-s pr ing of 1936) , pr inting works ofdifferent genres, League members wr ot e novels and s to­ri es abou t th e life and s trug gle of worker s and pea sants,and m any easily u nd er standable poem s and m iniatures inve rse dedicated to th e working class. So me of these wer eput to musi c b y Chi n a's ru st workin g-class har~,. thegi fte d young co m poser Nieh Erh, and other mUSICIanSand became revolutionary songs well known at horne andabroad. Stage-plays were written, too, to be perfor~nedin working-class districts, wh ere th e Leagu e organisedworkers ' circles and mobile th eatrical tea ms.

In respo nse to th e Party's united nati.onal anli-Ja~anesefront .policy, a ime d a t launchin g a natlO?a~-revolutlOnarywar agains t th e Japanese invaders, a sim ilar front wasforme d in the field of art and l it erature. .In May-August1936 a de eply m otivated discu ssion began among Lea,?,l;lem embers and o ther writers and art is ts of the slog ans Iit­erature of national def en ce" and " mass literature of na­t ional -r evolutionary war" . Ther e wer e divergent opinions,but taking guidance in the Party 's correc t united frontpolicy, writers and art is ts of dWere':t vi ews ft?ally \~orkedout a common standpoin t. Following tho di ssolution oft he Leagu e of Left-vVin g Writer s, an All-China ~edora­t ion of Literary a nd Art Workers was formed, WIth thenucleu s consisting of left writer s. This F ed eration visiblycontri buted to the anti-Japanese resistance and nationalsalvation m oveuicn t , awl to the cause of the workingpeople .

I n Ma rch 1938, during the period of KMT-CPC coopera­t ion in the anti- Japanese war, when fri endship flourishedbetween Ch ina and th e Sovie t Uni on, the All-China As-

~oc i a ~jon of Anl. i-Jupaneso Art and Literature W k~\: as fou;nded in H ankow.. wh er eupon stage workers, o~ues~=c.la ns , film workers, artists, etc. formed sim il ar associanons. " -

,T he Asso ciation Issu ed the slogan, " Literature for theVillage, Li tera ture for the Army" . It Iormod "res ' t-Llenemy theatrical groups" " resis t- tho-en em y l IS Ide­-' C ads" " I 1" I ropagan as j u a s.' runt- lIlO he lpers ' groups" " . t thnr t I I ' e reSIS - e-enem yat anc it er a lura working groups" and so on 1'1wor . t t J I ,. 10 g roups

, 'e se n 0 rau 0 areas and rural di stricts where tlhel pod \'0 mobilise the mass of th e people' a zainst ~~~Ja pan}esc, and popularised literature among'" workin gpeop e.

,Mea n time, tho main politica l departm ent of the Kuo­I~ lln lang ar~ed fo rces s e t up the 3rd Department, whichc:~nduc ~.ed 'plOpaga~lda and explained the aims and purpose01,the antl-Japanese war to en emy troops.

T!le leading nucle us of tlt e All -China Association ofAn tI-Japanese Art and Litera ture ' Yorkers and of the 3rdDepar tm ent cons is ted of member s of th e crc or non­Part~ re vulu l.iuna ry a rti sts and write r's , Before the fortiesdo fYlllg bans ~nd barri ers rai sed by r eact ionaries, the~rna do ,t~lC ma~lInum use of the legal opportunities fororgamsmg wr iters and artists who wrote and publishedpopular poetry, songs, plays, reports , and shor t s tor iesprod uced tradition al Chinese drawinzs and pa int ings and

I . J ""mac 0 an ti- apunese war film s. Various youth organisa-t ions wer e founded during th is period to conduct li teraryand arti st ic propaganda umong workers, pea sants, soldi ers,studen ts and other sec tions of the people in the far real'and th e baulo areas. This made it gre a t impact, awakenedan ti- im per ialis t national conscious ness, and raised t he na­tion 's m or al e. They popularised the work of the CPCand the ope rations of the 8th Ro u te and New 4th armiesa nd bho Anti-Japanese Nor theas t Union Army, ca llingfor un ity of all patrioti c forces to com bat the Japaneseaggressi on and exposing the manoeuvres of pro-Japanesegro u JlS and Kuom intang reactionaries who so ught to d is­rupt th e an ti-J apanese front. All thi s heightened the classconsc ious nes s of the worker a nd peasant masses,

In th e former Soviet areas of China, where the Com­munist Par ty wa s dom inan t, and la t er in all the li beratedareas, art and literature workers inside and outside theParty, working join tly with the propaganda appa ratus of

Lhe Par ty, governmenta l educational bo dies and th e army'spolitica l department s, conducted va der! ednentio unl activ­iti es and organised li ter ary and ar t groups. As a result,workers , peasants an d sold iers took an ever more activepart in th e revo lut ionary art an (1 litera ture movement.

D urin g the op erations of th e Sth Houte Army on theanti-Japanese fro nt in Nor th China, from the au tum n of1937 and unt il th e "s tyle roctlfication campaign" beganin 1942, many professional theatrica l compan ies wereactive in the No rth Ch ina l iberat ed areas, including thoTaihcngsha n th eatrical oornpnny, th e T heatrica l Society,and ot he rs, The Na t ional Hcv oluti un ary Arts Institute, th eLu Hsun AI'tS I nst itut e, and IJIC ] ns t.itute of ArL andLiterature trained a la rge group of art worker s, who werehi ghl y active ill rural areas and he lped the peasants 01' ­

z ani so their ow n the a trical circ le s a nd li terary a nd art~oUI·ses . Th ey also formed theatrical circles in the battl eareas, no ta bly the theatrical society New ElJOC!l . Jn .1940th er e were som e 100 highly active rural tlioa tr icnl circle sin the Tai heng area, as many as 1,700 in the een),ralpa r t of H op eh province by ea rly 1942, and. some 1,100r ural thea trical and song-and-dance groups ~n tho HeI~gMoun ta ins. Anti-Japanese so ngs were su ng In every \' 1.1­lage. M<I~s thea tri cal groups were formed not only 1ll

libera ted areas , but also in guerrilla zones, where th eyconducted anti-lmpcr ial lst and an ti-war agitnt ion amo ngenomy troops. .

The officers and politicul workers of the Anti-JapaneseNortheast Union Army used every possi ble opportu nityin an exceeding ly difJi cul t si tuation to promote liter atureand art in th e army and among the people i,n ~r~ler ~obuttress the soldiers' morale and the people s Iaith In

vict ory, and al so to tighten the link between army an.dpeople. I n areas control le d by lh~ J,apan ese nn(~ th eirpuppet s, in te llectuals and stude nts insid e and. olltsl~e. theParty ri sked their li ves to stimulate the fighting spi r i t ofthe mass o f the people, in flicting cons ide rnble moral dam ­age on the enemy. They wrote and dissem~nated at.t t i­Japanese and al1ti-;\lanch uk llo novels and stories, sho w ingthe bleak and bl ood-st ained back grou nd of Jnpanese-Man­chuk uo rule, and de scribed the h eroic exploits of th e peo­ple and the anti-Japanese armed for ces in Northeast Ch i­na fighting the enemy under th e guidance of the Com­mun is t P a rl Y.

.nlCse are fa c~s of history. A11 this wa s don e before191 _, before tho Talks of Mao Tse-tunz Even LI 1.1' •of ' tai I' . . ' 0 ' Ie au TOl'S. eel' a m. iistori as o! mo dern Chinese literature written~~a~h'~tl;~t.~er~tOI1Ilal~fIaof st,orders Ito .propagate l\Iao 's legend

o IC revo utionary art d li tmovement in China" I d I r 1 < . an 1 orature" Maois t" I " ia ueve oped under Lu dlsun th e

• < • "ane expone n t of Mao 's tho ughts on -art ' dliteraturo , wh ile tho "second h alf" tllat' f 11 ~nM ' T lks I <, IS, 0 owing

ao sal>, developed under Mao himself- ove tlauthors could not avoid Citin g these historical iac~ l ese

In IJ~e li gh t of th ese fa cts Mao 's claim tha t revol~Ition-nry . wri ters and artists di d not know "whom to "untd he told them in Ids Talks ar e ent i I servo1less. . ' , < . 11'e y grounn-

.i\I~o mainta in ed th a t 'wr i ters and a rtists in Ku om illtan O'­donu na te d a re as wer e unable, ev en re luctant, to co~eclose to !'he workers, peasa n ts and soldiers, that they hadno sy.m pa thy for them, and could not therefore writeanything about them. This accus a tion coll aps es in fa ceof the facts.. The fa cts sho w that m any works w ere written about the

llf.o and stru?gle of worke rs, peasan t" an d soldiers, andth is al ready III the twenties and thirties. Let us name afew (in the order in which they ap peared) .

W orks de picting the life and struggle ot the workers ,Lu Ilsun ex tols the higl: m or al cod e of a P ek in z

ri ck sh aw i n a short story, A Small Happening (Hl20tT'ien Han in B e/ore Dinner (abo known as S ist ers,

1921) , a one-a ct play, portrays the Ii fe and s tru ggl e ofthe three Cha ng sisters, working in a ma tch fact or y. I nano the r of h is well -k nown plays, T h e Death 0/ Kii Chen­hung (1 925) , he dopi cts (he heroic anti-imperiali st s tr ug­gle o f the Shanghai working class a nd the death of KuChon-hu ng, a workers ' lead er in a Japanese-owned textileIuc tory, a t th e time of the M ay Thir ti eth Movement,

Yu Ta-Iu in a story, T he Euenlng of the I ntox icati ngSpring lVind, portraying girl-workers in a tobacco fa ctory,and in anothe r s tory, Bodian, about ri ck shaws (c. 1fl23) ,portrays the h igh-m inded behaviour of workers and work-ing .peopla. .

Chiang Kuang-tz u in a short novel, Sansculottes, whi chappeared short ly before the April Twelfth Events (1927)portrays the uprising uf Shanghai worker s in support oflh e North ern March of th e r evolutionary army.

SF;

Kuo Mo-jo in a poem, Tramcars are Back at TV orle(1928) , prai ses th e heroic spir it and iron will of the Shan g­h ai workers, a rrjvin g at th p conc lus ion th at in t he endthe workin g class is i)Qund to triumph.

T'ien Han in a play, The Fir e Dan ce (1928) , dw ells onclass r elations and tho class s truggl e between workers andcapit ali sts .

Yin Fu, who wrot o the poems 1 May 1929, Dedicatedto th e Girl of a New Ep och, and others . w as a you n g pro­l et.a ri an poet who took part in the workers' youth move­m en t and portrayed th e greatness of the working classand its bright, future.

Tien Han in Autumn Rain (1931 ) , a on e-act play, de­picted the hard life and stau nch strnggle of spinning-m illand other worker s and unemployed in Shanghai 's poorquarters. H is pl ay, Moon light Sonata (19 32) , is thestory of a strike in a for eign -own ed Sha nghai bus com ­pany.

Y eh Lin relates the s tory of an anti-Japanese volunteerarmy forme d by Shang hai's u nem ployed in a sho rt novel ,Discovery .

Shu Chin-chun (Lao She ) in a sho rt novel , RickshawB oy (i!J35 ) , portru ys nn is-y eur-oId yo ung m an who, h av­ing' lost hi s parents, goes to th e city to earn hi s liv ing.Ile becom es a ri cksh aw hoy and runs m any miles bathedin swe at befor e he ca n buy his own rickshaw; duringan internecine war betweon lo cal warl ords, h e and hi sri ck shaw are se ized by soldie rs.

Hsia Y en in a play, Slave-Girls (1936) , gives a lively,u ninhibit ed and au then tic portrayal of the t ra gic fat e ofgirls fr om poor peasant families tri ck ed into work ing ina textile fa ct or y. The author ex poses the wanton oppres­sion and inhuman explo itat ion of these girls by Japaneseimperi ali st factory-owner s abe tted by feu dal lords.

Ko Chu n g-ping wrot e a po em in prose, Demolition T eamon th e Pek ing-W uh an Rail way (1938), based on storie sof m embers of the tRam. It portrays t he heroism of team­leader and Com munist Li A-ken and hi s com rades .

Chang Ti en-I in a shor t story, A fte r MOVing, expressesdee p compassion for the children of the oppressed workers.

Jn th e twenties and thi r ti es many pop ular so ngs worewritten ab out. th e work ing class. Tsyui T sy u- po wro te th eS ong of th e R ed Break ers in the twent ies , ex Lolling fr eelab our and the f uturo worldwid e commu nist society.

The a utho rs of some songs, suc h as the Song of th ePeasants and W orkers , Song of the Y oung W orker, So ngof th e Ironsmith , and many other s, are unknown . ChonYu's. S ong of t~e L?nF R oad, Pu Feng' s Song of PortCool.~ es and. Shih Lin s S ong A bout the B rick (put tom USIC by Ni eh Erh ), were popular in Ch ina and abroad .Wri~ten in the .early thirties , they are su n g to this day.During the anti-Japanese war, Chinese writers producodm any songs about the resistance and national salvat ionm ovem ent, k nown in eve ry ho m e and liked by worke rsand pea sants all over the country. Furth ermore in thotwenties a~d thir~ies many oxcellen t So vie t SOI~gS woretranslated m to Chinese, contributing visibly to the revolu ­ti on ary education of the worker-peasnnt mass es andChina 's student you th .

In th e twen ties and thirt ies, more was written aboutthe life and struggle of peasants than about workers andsoldiers . This is du e not only to tho ·peasant s ' com pr isin gthe majority in China , but al so to tho fa ct that m anyautho rs had them selves come from villages. Below, ,I li s tonly some of t he works as an ex ample.

Kuo Mo-j o in L and, Oh, Mothe r Mine (1919) , portrayedpeasan ts, and also coalm ine rs .

Lu Hsun in a short story, My Old Hom e (1921) , r elatedthe sad story of peasant Jun- tu , whom "many chil dr en ,fa m ines, taxes, soldiers, bandits, officials and landedgentry, all had squeezed . .. as dry as a mummy". T hewrit er hopes that the r isin g generation will have "a newlife- th e k in d of life we had n ever known " .

Kuo Mo-jo in a poem, R esurrect ion of th e Goddesses(1921) , por trayed an old pea sant and a shephe rd wh oabhor war for sowing death and d est ructi on ,

The h eroin e of Lu JTsun 's sho rt story , ;1 Pray er forITappiness (1921t), is a pl ain -h earted, hard-w orkin g, kindand poor pea sa nt wom an , Ilsi en-l in. wh o fel l prey to fam­ine and Ieud al morals ,

In the early twenties the jou rnal Ilsiaos huo uue hpaopublished a uthors wh o described the situation in the Chi ­nese coun tryside -e-Hsu Yu -n o portrayed the ca rnageloosed by bandits and so ldiers in Hon an v illages in TomS hoe ; T ien Y en d epi ct ed the hard life on th e la nd inR aindrops ; Wang Jen -shu described peasant life in eas t­ern Che k iang in Exhaust ed , a shor t s tory , a nd W ang Szc­t ion r elated how a destitute pea san t sold hi s chil dren to

escape death from starvat ion in Wiltin{{, also a shor tstory.

Kuo Mo-jo in I R em embered Chen She and Wu Kuang ,"(1928) , expressed the belief that new Chen Shes andWu Kuangs would come to lead the pea sants. He wrote:"A peasant uprising' l ed by worker s-this, my friend, isour salvation, a for ce that will transform the wholeworld" .

Chiang Kuang-Izu in Fi eld Wind (1930) portrays epi­sodes or the acute class struggle in the countryside in1927 and relates how peasants led hy Communists organ ­is ed peasant unions and took up arms against counter­revolutionary for ces.

Hung Sheng in hi s plays Wu Kui Bridge and Sweet ­Smelling Rice-, written in 1930 and 1\:)31, describes thewrong-doings and perfidy of the gentry and local despots,and the stam ina and hon esty of th e pea sants who roseto end the cruel oppr ession and exploitation, and to winthe right 10 a de cent life.

Chiu Tung-ping, who had taken part in the Heilufengpeasant ri sing, described it vividly and portrayed thechanges wrought in the pea sant mentality by the agrarianrevolution in Messenger (1931).

Ting Ling in Wat er (1931) portrays a natural calam­ity-a flood that spread to 16 provinces, famin e, andcou ntless other trials fa ced hy peasants in old China;the peasants fight against their exploiters to gain controlover the fruits of their labour.

Sha Ting won th e reputation of a peasant writer. Mostof his works are about the village and it s people-Pancake,Murderer, Beastly Nature (written in the early thirties)and Back Home, Animal Ilunt, and others (written duringthe anti-Japanese war). All hi s stories portray the con­tradictions hetwp-en peasants and th e re action ary forces(the landed gentry and local bullies). Ho al so sho ws thounity of th e peasants, their in creasing s tr en gth and grow­ing soli dar ity .

Mao Tun in Spring Silkworms . Autumn Hnro est andLate Winter (19:12-Hl33) sh ows that und er tho boot of

., Chen She (also known as Chen Sheng) and Wu Kunngwere pea sants who headed lin upri sing agains t th e tyranny ofChin Shih Huang, th e first Chine se emperor, in the 3rd centuryD. C.

th e gentry and local bulli es th e peasan ts in old C,hinago hungry whether they till the soi l or raise sil kworms,regardless ol the ha rvest. T he author al so describes howthe yo u ng ge n erat ion of peasa nts awa kens and se ts outt~ end the m an y cen turies of oppressio n and lack ofrights.

VV'll Ch u-hsiang writes about the greed and cy nicism oftho landed ge n try and local d espots, and abo ut th e ruin edand hungry pea sants ri sing to resist them in hi s On eThn.usand Ei{{ht Hu ndred Tr ibutes , A ll Qu iet in th e Ce­lestial Empire and T he Fall Fa mily S hop , written in '1933and 1934.

Ting Ling in On . the Run (1933) tell s the story ofpeasants who, escaprng fr om th e ex ploit at ion of th e zen­try, go to Shanghai in se arch of work ; they find no work~ut loam to, figh t for their rights. Th e workers t ell them:When you rc hungr-y yo u must dema nd food from your

masters. When we looso our jo bs wo demand work fromca pitalists."

Y eh Tsu devot ed four of the six s tories in Ids collec­tion A Rich Har vest ("A Rich Harvest", " F i re ", " Beh indCharged Barb eel Wire" and " T he GUide", 1933-Hl34) , tothe people of hi s native village. He had seen hi s fath erand elde r siste r, hath Communist s, do r evolutionary workam on g the pea sants and pa y for it with the ir lives. andhim self to ok part in the peasants' st l'uggl e for a liveli­hood. He wrot e in a comba tive spirit, giv ing the impres­sion that h e is amo ng the charac ters of h is novels, figh t­ing at their side. In " Be hi nd Charged Bnrb cd Wlro" oldman Wang's two so ns join the Chi nese R ed Arm y, an dtho old man, too , se ts ou t to look for it a ft er he has afew hard knock s. In " T he Guid e" Moth er Lin and h erth ree sons join the R ed Army. H er sons di e in battle,and old Mother Liu, too, di es for th e revolution, but notbefore she aven ges her sons and comrade s by agreeing10 sh ow the way to ene m y troops and leadin g them intoan ambush.

Tn I935-H)3G Ye h Tsu wrot e another six sto ries, pub­lish ed in th o coll ection Night in a Mountain Village, anda sho rt novel, Th e Star . All of th em w er e devot edto th e life an rl s truggles of the peop le of his nutivcvillage.

Llsiao Hun g in Fi eld of Li]« and Death ( In:H) , descrihcstho ca rnage, arson, nn rl plunder in the village s of Nort h-

east Chin~ following the 18 September events of 1931.Japanese invad er s levell ed whole villages with the ground.T he peasa nts look up arms anrl joined the revolu ti ona rypeople's army.

In the thirties Yang Han-sheng wrote a pl ay TheDeath of Li lIsu-chen, portraying tho former field workerwh o became the gifted l oader and hero of the T aipln gR ebellion. The author himself played the part of Li Hsu­chen in productions of hi s play during th e anti-Japanesew ar. H is Deepening sho ws the reasons for the intensifica ­tion of th e peasant struggle in the countryside after1928.

Tien H an in his play Th e Great Flood (1935)de scribes the life and struggle of peasants in floode dareas.

On the eve of the anti-Japanese war Tien Kian wro tea trilogy in ve rse, Stor ies of the Chinese Village (" F am­ine", "The Yangtse" and "There"), depicting the hard lo tand de sp erate struggle of th e peasants.

In th e thirti es th ere w ere also many works devoted tosoldiers. In Th e General R etreat, for exam ple, Kuo Chingdepict ed ep isodes from th e battle of 28 January 1932 inShanghai , when Kuomintang sold iers went over to thes ide of those who re sisted Ja pa nese aggression .

Yeh Tsu in Night Patrol (1!J33) painted a stark pictureof how Kuornintang troops terrorised the people du r in gtheir " anti-communis t campaigns", wreaking havoc, arson,car nage and plunder. This caus ed the honest ones amongthem 10 pr otest. Squad leader 'Yang Chili-ping, his dep­uty Li H ai-s nn , private Chao Tc-sheng, ann. ot he rs revolt­ed, liberated imprison ed Red Army soldie rs and otherprisoners and joined them in an attack on tho enemycam p.

H si ao ChUD in th e novel The V illage in August (1934)sh ows how a heroic unit of the com m u nis t- led NortheastPeople's R evolut ionary Army cons ist in g of workers, peas­a nts, sold ie rs and stu dents, fought against the Japanesein adver se circ u mstances. The novel sho ws the revo lu­tionary army fighting a people's war against the Ja paneseimpe r ialis t. aggression.

Chiu Tung-ping began writing in 1931. As a youngman , he had taken part in th o H eilufen g pea sant ri sing,and later in th e an ti-J a pan ese battle of 28 January Hl32in Shanghai. He was with the New 4th Army and d ied

in battle in 1941. An ex perienced soldiar hportl b t h ' , e wrote ex­d . ~ a ou t e war. H IS Defence of Red Flowe P' ldt:I~~~~e1s85a ~~~lolutionary unit . of three detachme~ts , l~~~Flow:r Field . Th~ol~~ft~~at~~de;ntl~ deennes~ fores t nc ar R edsmashss two regim ents, There is a th ,'W y l~naw~re.s andSIX men dofending a stone b .d I J mg ( escn pu on ofand a soldier, and th e o th~r t~~r:: ~~d;~~kei a peasant,coll ego. They f'ouzhi bravel 1 '11' 30 s o . a tea ch ers 'H' '" ( y, {j mg. ene m ies

IS story . BattaliOn Com mander in th e U ": ' A

(D ecember f 940) i 1 . ' man .'J rmyt I· . s .11e tragic tal e of a Kuomintan o bat-a IOn ~ommand (!r WIth ' . '"

!Ie Succeeded in ' brcach i~gC~~emJJanpI:~~~CeV(IJI'nl1 teisonaanr(Yl Iundit.mg f wo com na ni ~ ,, ' ea ­b . , ompan les to sa fety. For this he was reward edbY th e comm ande r of the comm un is t- le d New -ith Armyo~t w~s cxecUI,~d on reac~ing the headquarters of hi~b~~~IJ~~'~y for not dofe n/h ng hi s position s to th o last

A H~ppening on the Road (June 1%1) is tho s tory ofa ~ow It.h Arm y sta ff officer who save d a regimen t of theUnion Army ( l~l e ant i-Japa nese part of th e Kuomin tangarmy) . It describes tho corrup tion ram pant in lhe Ku o­mintang forces which , thou gh some times com pelled toen gage th e Japanese, were of ten hostile to th eir ownpeople.

~iell Han in the shor t novel Lu k ouchiao (Hl37) de ­scnbes how th e m en of th e Kuomintang 29th Army ralliedto resi st Japanese aggress io n. This m arked th e beginningof the f 937 July Se venth eve n ts -Lhe beginning of thenationwide anti-Japan ese war. H e also describes th ehelp of s tudents and working people to an Ii-Japan esetroops.

Chang Tien -i in Twenty-One , a shor t story , portrayssoldie rs of a Kuominta ng u n it who r efu sed to fight in theuutl-communlst civil war. H is L ast T ra in ami Th e R oadare al so abo ut soldie rs wh o, wis hi ng to fight the Japanese,came to gr ips wit h th eir officers, who were traitor s. Inhis s tory, llatred, Cha ng T ien -i portrays the abominationsperpetrated hy th e old army, whi ch ea rned it the hatredof the peasants.

Chou W en in Season of Opium Poppies ('1936) showswarlord s imm ersed in co rr uption sc ram blin g for poweranrl privil eges , and tr eatin g sold iers with inhumancruelty.

Ai Ching's poem , IIe Died a S econd Time, is the storyof a wound ed soldie r' who had gro wn up in a village.

Hoi Yan's T he Front describes the Northe rn March ,and Yeh Lin's In the Vi llage sho ws Kuomintang tro opsbombarding villages and ex term ina ti ng peasants duringthe " t hird campaign" agains t the Chi nese Red Army.

Apart Irom s tories and novels sp ecificall y devoted toworker s, pea sants or sold iers, m any of the works writtenin l.he twenties and thirties si multaneously depi cted work­ers, pea sants, soldiers, and other wo rking people.

Many were devoted to the Oct ober Revolution and th ocivil war in Russia, portraying the building of so cialismin the So viet land.

In A Journey Across Ne w Russia and in Th e Hi story ofthe R ed Capital (end of 1920-enrl of HJ22) Tsyui T syu-potells th e s tory of th e workers, pea sants and sold iers ofRussi a who, l ed by th e Bolsh eviks, overcome difficultiesand defeat imperiali st interventionists and lo cal white­g uard gan gs. This warm-h earted hook ac quain ted theChinese, es pecia lly th e yo uth, with th e pa r t pl ayed by theCommunist Party n nd Sov ie t pow er in liber ating thepeopl e and defendin g its gains .

T sou T ao-f en g produ ced a four-volume travelog ueLetters of a Tra vell er (summer of 1fl33-surnm er of 19R5),a first-cl ass .pioco of repor tage in content and form. Thefirst and second vol umns, which describe the condit ionof the m asses in th e Europ ea n capita lis t co u n tr ies, andthe Iourth volume, abou t conditions in th e North Amer­ican dollar empire, are a merciless in dic tment of thecapitalist sys tem . Th e th ird volu me , devoted to th o So­viet Union building social ism und er th e leadership ofthe Party of Lenin, is an ode to sociali sm . These fourbook s are s ti ll useful reading for th e Ch inese of today.

Tao H sing-chih 's poetry ab out th e life and str uggl eof working people has earned him the r eputation of apeopl e's poet and teache r. Unfor tunately, Mao consiznodthe liter ary Iegu cy of T syu i Tsyu-po, 'I'sou Tao-I eng"'andTao Hsing-chih to th e flames, and it is unknown to th eChinese people a m! yo ut h uf today.

Other revolu t ion ary Chiuoso writ er s, too, produ cedhook s about th e great Lenin , the Octobe r Il cvolutlon , andL~l e Sovie t l anr~ , con trib uti ng to the revolutiona ry erluc n­tlO~ of the Clunese people and th e sprea d of Sovie t ex­pcrroncc ,

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1300ks and s tor ies ab out workers, peasants and sold ie rswero well received lly rea ders at hom e. Som e wnre tr an s­lated, and counn cndod by for eign read ers. Prozr essi veliterary cr itics and histori ans, bo th Chinese a nd [orei ctIlpraised them h ighly. '" ,

M.ost of these wor ks belong to the sc hool of sociali stre alism, and Some La cr it ical reali sm 0[' re volutionaryromanticism.

It stands l.o ~' e ason .that they differed ill depth andbreadth, a~~ III ideologica l and ar tistic va lue. T he sameauthor .wntJllg. on related s ubjects wo uld prorlucr, worksof varying merit, Everything dep end ed on the time placea nd general condi ti ons. ' ",

I ha~'o li sted only som e of the works of the revolu tio n­ary writer s of the twenties and thirti es-just a littJe over70 ,; orks by 30 au tho rs. But this is enough to show th atMao s ~landerou s cha rge is groundless. It i s not true thatthe writers and ar tists of the tw en ti es and thirties wereunable, much less re luc tant, to wr ite about the life andstr uggle of work ers, pe asants and soldi er s.

T? back h is eharge, Mao declar ed that only works por­traying worker s, pea sants and soldiers cou ld serve andbe nccept abl o lo workers, peasa nts and soldiers,

This is false. I t only sho ws th at Mao does not k nowwhat kind of liter ature is neede d hy th e working class asthe hegem on of revo lution, by the peasants as it s clo sesta llies, an.d by th e s ~ld ~ers . Book~ showing the parasiticalnature 01 th e im pe r ia lists, showing th e enslaveme nt andexploitati on of colonies und se mi-co lonies, hooks abou tthe rea ction ary Manchu Ching dyn as ty, abou t tho war­lords and th e Chiang Kai-shek clique, book s s tig rna tis ingthe land ed ge n try and th e bourgeoisi e, showing the brut­al oppression , ex plo itatio n a nd torment in flic te d on theChinese peo ple by J ap anese invad er s and their puppets - ­a re n' t th ese hook s also neede d by the worker s, pea santsand soldier's? Don ' t they, too, serve the in terests of theworkm-s, peasants and soldiers? It can ' t be tru e, as Ma owould have us beli eve, that wo rkers, peasa nts and so l­di ors wa nt to read on ly abo ut themsel ves and do not. wantto read abou t th eir ene mies. Isn 't th e pr incip le, " knowthy encuiy us th yself " , for mulated by the gifte d militaryleader Su n Wu more than 2,000 years ago in h is tr ea ti seOn th e Art of W ar , st ill va li d for the workers, peasantsa nd soldiers of th e pr esent-d ay revol utionary m ovement?

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And for the same valid reasons we can also ask : aren' tbook s ab out th e life and struggle of the re volutionaryintelligentsia and revolutionary st udents also a source ofknowledge for workers, peasan ts and soldie rs ?

In his nove l, Before the LJawn, Mao Tun showed th eeconomic impasse of the Chinese na tiona l bour geoisie; hetore to shreds th e Tr otsk yite in vention that capitalismcan thrive peacefully in China for a long time, and atonce described the st ruggle of the workers, peas ants andsoldiers. Tsao Yu demonstrated the economic bankruptcyof th e bourgeoisie and sho wed th e decay of th e bourgeoisfamily in hi s plays, The Dawn and Hurricane; he arriveda t th e conclusio n tha t only the working class can opennew horizons for China .

Pa Chin in h is novel, The Family, depicted the degen­era tion of the feu dal-hureaucra tic fami ly and its destruc­tive effect on th e you th, showing tha t if th o foremostyouth wants to br eak out of the vicious circl e, it mu stfi rst break with the old family. Many other books couldbe listed. Aren' t they acceptabl e to workers, peasants andsoldiers? Can' t they, too, ser ve work ers, peasants andsoldiers'? Jt is quite clear th at apart frum books aboutthe life and st ruggle of the workers, peasa nts aTHI sol­diers, there ar e ma uy others that they will acce pt andth at ca n serve their intere st s.

Take thi s example , wh ich was also witnessed by MaoTse-tuu g. In 1940 comrades of the Lu Hsun Art In stitutein Yenau produced Tsao Yu 's plays, The Dawn ~ud Hur­ricane, on th e stage of th e Central Party School s c?~fer­ence hall. They were applauded by Party and militarycadres, many of whom were of working class or peasantbackground. I rememb er th eir delight and enthusiasmvery clea rl y, and Mao, too, must r ememb er it.

In short , Mao's charge is qu ite groundless.One of Mao 's gravest accusations was that tho revolu­

tionary writers of the twenties and thirties wrote too muchabout th e lif e and strugg le of the intelligentsia and thest ude n t youth. But thi s should be considered a meritrather than a fault. That they chose this subject is dueto specific subjective and objective hi storical circum­stances. Th e su bject ive factors are that most of the revolu­t ionary wri ters came from the intelli gentsia and had beenst ude nts themselves ; when they bega n writing, th ey couldwrite mainly of tho se whom the y knew well. And th e

94

obje ctive factor was that the working people in China tlthe extent of 8~-9.0 per cent, were either completely ;lll~e ll~~e~ or semI-lI ter~te . And so, withou t cul tura l and

edu cational . work, WIthout promoting litera ture amonz:vorln.ng pp;ople, all the decluratiolls of the prog['essiv~I?-telhgentsla and s tudent youth about putting art an dIiteraturo a t the serv ice of the workillg people wouldnever be more th an em pty talk. For inte llectua ls and stu­dents to h~cor~e propagators of revolutionar y cult ure it:vas es~en~Ia I lirst to \~ i n them and to help th em u cc~ptre volutionary art and lit erature for theins olvos, aud thento t,e,~~h . ~h ~m , to unders.tand th e. in terests of the workin gmas ses. I'his accords WIth Marx s pr inciple, "The educa­tor must him self ?e. educa ted", in the third of his Th ese.':on Feuerbach. TIllS IS why revolutionary writers pro ducedworks that educated young intell octuals and studen ts 'otherwisc ther might have be en generals without a~army, and ~nht for comb at. In due course, taking par t inthe revolutlOnar .y movemen t, they gra dually lea rned moreabout th e worki ug masses and Legan Lo produ ce morebooks about the circums tances of th e work muu 's Ijfe uudstru ggle.

As a result, part of the inLelli geutsi a and studentsWere drawn into th e revolutionary movemen t, in to thePu.rty and th e YCL, join in g the worker-peasant ma sses;a forc e was thus developed that put revolutionary art andliterature in th e service of the work ing people. .

Th e facts of history show tha t mak ing h is cha rge Maowas driv en by subjectivis t moti ves, whereas the revolu­tionary artists an d wri te rs were mo tivated by the concre teobj ective and subjective circums ta nces.

For Mao the chief "argumen t" was tha t the revolu­tionary movem ent in art and lltoraturo had, as he sawit, followed a petty-bour geois rat her than proletarianlin e, and was th erefore at variance with Mao's " worker­peasant-soldier line in art and litera ture". By puttingthings in this way, Mao was tryi ng to re place socialis trealism with his own line, so called, in art andliterature.

Now, let us see wha t Mao's "worker-peasant-soldierline in art and literature" amounts to from th e point ofview of its cla ss orientation:

The workers are th e prol etariat, the peasants are thepetty-bourgeoisie, while Chinese soldiers, at least th evast majority of them, come from the peasant class.

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Hence , the " worker- pe as an t-s old ier line in art and liter­ature" can he nothing hut a mixed prole ta r ian a nd pe tty­bou rgcois Jine, and certainly no t a prole tarian line. Ye tfrom the Marxis t s tandpoiut, the class li ne in ar t ancl lit er ­ature is determined not by the social origin of t he authorsor th eir charac ters , but by what world ou tlook, the out­look of what class, they espouse in depicting li fe and thesurrounding world.

This is the cri ter ion to use in classifying art and l iter­ature as proletarian, petty-bourgeois , bourgeois, feudal,etc. What, then, is the class position Mao wants revolu­t ionary w riters a nd artis ts to take? In h is Tal~~ he sa id :" T he ques tion or position, Wo sta nd on the POSl tlO11 of th eproletariat and th e broad mass of the people". But wha tdocs he mean by " broa d mass of th e people"? In the firs tpart of hi s Concluding Remarks he sa id : " 1?u t who areth e mass of th e peop le? T he broad m ass of the people ,constituting more than 90 per cent of our popu lation, ismade up of workers , peasants, soldiers, and the urbanpetty-bourgeoisie." It follows, th erefore, th at Ma~ .wantsrovol utionary wri ters and artists to take the pOSItIOn ofth e pro le ta riat and at the sa llie time th e position of thepc uy-hourgeoi s ic. l n more spec ific terms thi s means t ha tin their cr ea t ive process rev oluti onary art and Iiteratu roworkers are expected to adhere sim ul tan eous ly to theproletari an ou tlook and the pe tty-bourgeois ou tlook. Interms of theory thi s is entirely in compatible wi th th eMarxist principle s of art and literature, and in terms ofpractice it is s imply impossible. This is why hi s conceptwas not adopted by the revolutionary writers anda rtis ts .

In Mao's article On N ew Democracy wh ich appearedearly in 1910, and in On th e Dem ocrati c Dictatorship 0/th e People, whi ch appeared ill June 194U, he expanded theconcept " m ass of tho peopl e" to include the national bo u r­geoisie. And after the es ta bli shment uf th e People's R e­public of China he took advantage of th e suprem e ,powerhe had usurped in Party , government and army to Im pos ethe vi ews contained in h is Talk s at th e Art and Li ter­ature Forum in Yenan on revolutionary art and literatureworkers. Tiley were expected to adhere sim ultane ously tothe outlook s of th e prolet ar ia t, pctty-h ou rgcoisie, and bour­geoisi e. It is easy to see , th erefore, why a now overt now

covert s t.ruggle ensued in a rt and litoratura he twoen ]\[no'",app roach, on. the one hand, and the app roach of th e revo­lutionn ry writo rs and ar tis ts, on t he other.. l\I~o adva nced. th e . s lo*au of a " wOl'k er-pea:;an t-s old i01'

Itn,e"JI1 a,rt. and I, t er~ t.ure and wanted re\'o lutionary writ­ers , to take th e POS ~ !lOn s of th e pro le tariat and th e broadmass of th e peopl e bee:ause hi s views on such basi cmatters ~s th e qu estion of classes -not. only in the liel ;l ' 01:art and literature, but a lso in o ther field s - were con fusedand r,omple tel~ e~'roneous . H is fundamental mis ta ke ca nb~ t raced to hi s lIIcomprehellsion of the Marxis t crit eriao~ classes and soc ial suata, and of th e place or rol e ~fdiff er ent classes a nd socia l s tr a ta in tho Iifn .I . I.d ' I ' 0 SOCIC Y~n In re: o nt ionary movements. Striking evidence of thi'sI~ found In tl,l e w?rks he sp ecially devot ed to the quos ­Lion of class identity, An Analysis of the Classes Of th.C:hin~se So ciety" (lH2()), How to Determine Class lden~tlly . i n th e Coun tryside (1933) an d the section on " thomotive for~ es of the Chinese revolution" whi ch he wro tefO,r th e a rticle , Th e Chinese Re volution tuul the Com mu­nist Party of China (19::l 9) .

Mao's thoughts on class id entity, as pr esen te d in th e~rsL . two of the above articl es, coupled with the errorsIII his R eport on the Investigation 0/ the Peasant Move­ment in H unan. Province (1927) and R eport on the La ndll~distribution Can:paign (Hl:3:3), ex pla in the polit ica lmIstakes m ad e du ring the agrarian r evoluti on in th e So­vie t ~reas of China and, on a still greater scale, during th eagra rian reform in the wh ole co un try la ter . In determin­ing th e class and soc ia l id en tity of th e r eal land ed gentrya nd th e small landowners he pu t both unde r th e samehead, thou gh th e latter wore no t of the ge n try, whil ekulaks and well-to-d o m iddle peasants, and even simplymiddle peasan ts, we re also lumped toge ther. As a result,t here Wa S indiscriminate con fisca tion of land OWJJ(H! bvmiddle pea sants along with that owne d by th e gentryand kul aks. Th e distribu tio n of land, on the other hand ,was egali tarian, and su bsequen tl y the land had to bere dis tr ibu te d over a nd over again wi th deplorable co n­se que nces for th e productivity of pe asant, lab our. La st.but not lea st, thi s er ro neous a pproach led to in di sc r im­inato repression s, even executions .

ln th eory and practice, gui de d hy hi s ideas of " ne wde m ocracy", Mao gave priori ty to th e Tute rusts 01' th e

nati on al bonrgeoisi o, while the in te rests of the proletariatwer e g ive n seco nrln ry, or su bo rdina te , considera ti o n. Hebeli eved that on ly a " revolu tion of new democracy" waspossible in Ch ina, while a soci ul ist r ev olut ion and soci al­ist cons tr uct ion wore impo ssibl e. This was a direct. resulto f th e basi c mi st ak es in th e first and third of th e above­m ent io ned art icle s o n th e questi on of classes, and alsoin hi s oth er ar tic les (e.g. "T Ill! P eking COIlP a nd th eMerch ants" in th o jou ru al Il siunglao in lm:\, etc. ) .Mao's no t io n of classes and his th eoreti cal mi stakes cl~n­

ccrn ing " ne w democracy" w:re tl~e i ~eo l ogica l . 1I1a lll­spr ings that led to hi s tran sformation Into a traitor toco III Ul u n ism.

,T he above muy he illu strated with t he followin gexam ples fr om M ao 's Ilra cLic:I ~ S: h e s ys Lem at ica llyIor ce s Conu n u n ists a nd m embers of th e YeL, a nd Lh(~for em ost worker s, intell ectuals and stude nts with aMarxi st-L eni ni st ed uc a tio n , Lo go to the vill age for" re-od uca t io u b y poor peasants and lower' mldd lopeasants",

Mao regards the soc ia l ist com m u nity , th e world COIll ­

mu n istjnnvem en t, th e an t.i-i ru peria Ii s!. uu tiona1 libnmLionmovement, a nd the peace movemen t a s hi s e ne m ies, andtreats extrumc rea ctionary imperia list ele men ts, the Ius­c is ; sta te s, and ruu cti on of all hu es, as fri end s. Anti ­S ovie tis m a m i u ntl-co m m u nlsm have become th e pi vot ofMao's horn e an d ' fOl' ci gupolicy.

Mao forced his elde r so n, Mao An-ying, who had go neto a Sov ie t sc hoo l a nd had fini sh ed th e Milluuy P olitica!Aca de my in th e So viet Union, "IHI who rutur uod to Yeu n»in the winter of 1\145, to live with th e fa m ily of h is c losefr.i end a bi g Yonan kulak, \Vu Mung-yu, fo r " re- ed uca ­Li on" ~nd " ideolo gic a l renr-iental.ion ". Mao An-ying object­ed. H e com pla ine d th at th e socia l a nd id eologi cal r ootsof h is fath er' s deci si on cou ld be t raced to Mao 's or ig in(M a o's Iath or was a hi g kulak and m oneylender). UnLMa o u se d hi s pow er to make hi s so n spend several monthswith the Wn Mang-yu family . Foll owing this, Mao An­y ing to ld h is [ath er and other co m ra des : " I refu se to' learn' fr om a k u lak; T am d eeply revolted hy the wayo f life of thi s hi g kulak family. I will alwa ys he 11 Marx­is t-Len in is t, a gradua te of Soviet ed uca tio nal establish­m ents .' N ev er will I cons id er th isn di sgra ce, Ou th e con­trnry, I am proud of it. " In thi s cla sh between fath er

and son th e truth was cer ta inly on tho son 's s id e. Br can s('of this I will always res pect Comrade Ma o An-yi ng.

Let m e al so call a ttenti on to the foll owin g. III t he" Couc lud iug l lcnuu-ks of his Talks Mao sa id : " My re ­marks o r toda y Covel' on ly SOllW of t he Iuudumenta l proh­lems of ou r c ultu ra l movement. .. . I bel invo th at nil of~:Oll , "p,ornradcs, arc determin?d to advan ce a long th os!'lin es. As wo soc, Mao adm its tha t hi s d iscu ss ion wasnot co nfined 1.0 "som e basi c qu es tions of or ien tation",I~ut that h e wa s advanc ing his own n ew line in art an dl~ temtl~re. Y e t, i~ hi s .Talks he did not touch on the ques­l~ on of the classification of Ii teraLure by artistic or crca ­LIVl! method. Maxim Gorky, a wri ter of world renown anda pion eer of prol et a r ian litoratnrc, sa id on this sc ore :

" T he re a rc two ma in 'c urrents' or tren ds in Ii torature :romanticism and r eali sm. " H e pointed ou t th at, " in rom an­ti.c.i sn~ w e must al so d istinguish betw een two di s tin ctl ydiflering t.rend::; - 'pa ss iv e romanticisrn' and 'active romnu­ti cisll1 '-al1d in reali sm betw een cr it ical rea lism a ndsoc ia lis t realism."

Spenking-of trends in art and literaLure (a ctuall y hereferred only to th c question of tr en ds in Il ternturc) ,Mao wholly ov erlook ed the classifica t ion o f ar t and liter ­ature by arti sti c or crea tive method , whi ch shows thatho did not und ersta nd w ha t a li ter a ry or artist ic tr endreally is.

What wa s the trend followed by r ovol utl on.n-y wr-itersand artists in China befo re Mao's Tulks ]

First a do pted in the twenties , and dorninnn t in thethi rf.ins, wa s the t rend of socia list r eal ism. T Ill"! lond i Il ~id eas of thi s trend - a nd t hat is it s esse nce -c-w crn th ose ofMarxism-Lenini sm . It wa s a n ew , r evo lu tionary tre ndco nce ive d by Max im Gorky in the begi n n in g of th'u tw en­ti eth ce n tury. I n the n ew hi stori cal setti ng Iollowing t.heOctober Il evolu tion it becam e th e lea d ing trend ill Sovie tliterature, th en grad nall y spread among revolutionary nndprogressi ve writer s of other' cou n tr ie s , incl u d ing Ch ina,

li enee the fa ilure of Ma o's attempt at s ubs ti tu tin g hisown trend for the tr end fo llowed by Ch ina's rovolu tio nru -yw r-iters and ar t.ists , I t. is not. su rprising, t,hr.ro fOl'o , t.hnta long and hitter s trugg!c ensue d .

Tho limits o f Ill y pr esent work pr even t m e from g- ivi nga detailed exp lication of Ma o's ot.her a ccu sati on s . Butsurel y ther e is no need .Ior one, b ecause they are so

""

Ail COIllml\ni sl~ of the globeare broth ers of o~e ano ther.

China is aided by Soviet ,Commun ists agu iu sl the Japanese,And Chineso COll1mu11l~t s ..

IUIISt help the 8.0V101 l 'nlon'lg 'linst the Iascists .

Com~' lI des- in.a l'lns across lI!C world,dose your ranks for \,l CLOI:Y .Figh t sh.oulrler ..to ~~\() ul de lfor che r ished \ ICt Ol) , . • .1my fl'1enuS.

Mo~coW Lhe Kremlin Palace;~Io~ co\\" the Lenin Mausol~u~ ;\\oscow: he ac~n ~f revolutton,i\losr.ow, th e COIllm ter ll.Moscow, . tlYou've wall ill oue ·SIX I

of the globe,sy mbol of things to C? llle,

. " 'orld of cOIUmuu~ s lIl.world of communism,

. I . . , t t o Moseow Liu. f 19<:2 dunng u s VI S1 . . " ,In th~ wl,uter 0 .. ,, ' ) , ' I W CI'C not bomb ed beeall se Tru -S hao-chl said to us. \0\ itl CIl'lna ' he s tric tly forbad c'. 1 t t a war WI 1 ,man diu no wan , it "MacArthur t o bom.b ~h~;ese te::~u~,~'d to P eking. Fron.3.. In Decem?eJ . .' :1 9~~\ had se ven acute ~ilacks ..ofApril Hlfi4 to January. '. '£1 first on e was HI April­chol ecys t it is and hee,atl t1s: ~e Li en -ch ang and othe rsMay 195/1. Huang ~hu -tsle 'd u that I h ad a bad liverwere reluctant to acknow ~l ~~'ouhl reviv e talk of theand gull-bladder , lJecaus p, 1' ~tl(; tIl e attack for five UllYS.. I t yed at home Will . 1poisolllllg: s a., H d to go to P eking 1I0SPltli .On the sixth, I wus com po 0 cho l cc stit.is hnl HuangTho doct or s diagnosed acute . ' H / said ' ' '' I n addition ,Shu-tse stuck to h~s o:v? ~erslOn . ,.the patient has l1enlonwr tse had be en pr om oted deputy~Y this t.ime,C ,~a~8 'B~~~~u olf H ealth : hence, Peking

c.Jllef of th e ~ I' I The doctor s did not dare goH ospital :vas l.n. us c la~~:i st ed on ~t once r em oving th eagains t. hiS o l~nlOn . ~ e -t\ 'fl :1Y of hospital and th c ninthgall-bl add r.r., 'kn lillY] 101ll I tllC situation be(:ame critical.Her th e attac inc ) CgUIl , I ' .~, ' ., Monz Chiner-shu sum mo ne d bot. lou r so nsI hat l\1ut!lmg . '" e 1 . At the "arne tim e sheto my 1>efl sidp lor I lll' l eav c-ta cm g. . .

treated m e with r ep eatedly tested rn edicines. For threedays she fou ght desp erately for Ill y life. Gradua lly , mycondition improved , tho pain s ubs ide d, the temp eraturedropp ed . a nd J was able to take sorn e food . But m y doc­tors continue d to insis t on an opera tion . \V e resi sted, forI had ea ten nuthiug in six days ami m y weight wa s downfro m 58-60 kilograms to a m ere 40. T co uld not hope tosurvive an opera tio n. After rep eated requests I wa s gi veilt wo blood transfusi on s - a w er e 500 millil i tr es, 1n secre t,we got in touch with specialist s in Chin ese medi cin e, andI took th eir drugs . ,;. As a result, m y condit ion graduallyreturned to normal. But th e doctor s con tin ued to insiston an operat ion . And wh en we firmly declin ed, they madeus sign a paper to this effec t.

4. In the sum me r of lDS5, du e to an agg ravation, I wasaga i n taken to Poking Ho spital. S urgeon Sha n m ad e aninfusion of n so dium chlorid e an d glucose solu tion at thera te of GO drops a minute. li e admitted this la ter, butsaid he had been orde re d to do so b y Dr. Wang, ch ief ofth e su rgical department, A few minutes aft er the infusionbegan Dr. Shao went ou t of my ward. ] began sh iveringso In touscly that six hot-water bottles and three quillsdid n ot hell). I wa s pale, s wea ting profusely, and myh ear t was beating furi ou sly. Then a terrible weakness setin. Meng Ching-shu asked the nurse to pull out theneedl e at once, hut the gi rl refused : " Dr. Shao sa id theinfusi on must not be s topped in his absence. I 'll go andlook for him." When the nurse left, Mong Ching-shu im ­m ediately s toppe d th e infusion and made a camphor In ­ject ion to st im ula te my heart. Gradually, I relaxed,th ough th e ca rdiac weakness linger ed. After a long timoth e nurse brought back Dr. Shao. When he saw the in­fu sion had been s topped he showe d hi s displeasure andsaid we should h ave waited for hi s re turn: he would havedecided what to do.

Profe ssor Y . M. Voloshin, a So vie t sp ecialist a ttac h edto th e surg ica l department of Peking Hospital, said whenhe heard about the case : " In Comrade Wang Ming's COJl -

':. AL the end of l U4U Mao declared that. Chinese medicine was"old mcdi cino" and E uroponn medicine "Dew medicine"; he saidthat "the old and dying mu st be thrown out and replaced by thenew". Thi s caused cons terna tion in th o country and among the800,OUlI doctors practi sing Chinese medi cine.

The first wa s th e Cen tra l P ar ty School. Tn ad dit ion to

th e s tu de nts of th e P a r ty School, work er s of P arty com­

mittees- --from county to territorial CC burea us -- woro

summo ned her o lr orn all parts of the country to undergo

" rectificat ion" . So wer e army commanders fi nd political

officers (r egimental and hi gh er) , cadres of ndmiu isua tive

org ans in areas (county and h igher) held by the 8th

Routo 0 1' Ne w 4th armies, awl Communi st s ac tive in the

go ve rn ing b odi es o f ma ss organblltiollS. The "rccti fica­

lio n" in th e Party School was- h ead ed by Pong Chen,

Th e second subdiv is ion, head ed hy K ao Kang, co nc erned

work ers at a 11 levels 0 r P ar ty bod ies, ad min istra t.i\' 0

organs and mass organ isati ons in the Shcn st-Kansu­

[in gh sia Bord er Area.T he lhird s ubdivision was for workers of CC epc

bodi es, and w as h ead ed by Li Fu-chu n,Th e "style rectificat ion campa ign" virtually conver ted

Yen an into a huge conce nt ration ca mp . The premises of

schools, Ins titutions an d offices becam e pla ces of p~'ov i ­

siona l detenti on. Nobody was all owe d to conu uunicato

with anyborly- -tu wri te or telcpho uc, or do an ything,

without permi ssion o r " rec ti ficuti on ca m pa ign " ol'Iiciu.ls .

2) The methods and objectives

of tho "rcetifi catiuu 01' s ty le"

Mao T se-t uu g in struct ed all th ose who were suhjcct erl lo

" rectifica tion" to st udy the docu m ents he had prescr ibed,

to write "confess ions" , an d to engag-e in "sel l-criticism " ,

Th e Commission fur the Hoctifica tion of Stvlo annouuccd

th at of all do cum ents and wri tings on ly ~I a~ ' s works wer e

correct arul sho uld th er efore be diligeu tlv I'l'Fld and reread

as a n im por ta nt means of ideo logical r e-education. Th e

Commission specially em phas ise d Mao's pa mphlet On Ne wDem ocracy becau se, it said, " Mao ism eq ua ls Now Dsmoc­

racy" and because the book let was th e " pr ime aTIll cap­

ital Maoist th eoreti cal work" . It foll owed that the works

of Len in , the rlocuman ts of the Comi ntern a nd the cre,and th ose of other Par ty learlors, were wro ng a nd tho se

wh o read them were dogm at is ts, The Marx-Engcls-Leuin ­

Stalin-Mao form lila wa s accoJ'flingly eha nged to 1\1arx­

Engels-Mao, Some of t ho cadres (even high -l'ankin g- ) were

so badl y eowed tilal th ey pubJiely hurned the ]islnd wor k

a nd documents or' sim ply thr'nw lh em awa y. SOllte of th em

"Rid, "Lu ckl lv T hav e never read them, for n lh orwisc I

woul d have hocoruo a dogm atist ."Th o Comm issio n also named th e methods and Obj CI :l :; or

" cri I ic is m ":1) Crtti cis e your acquain tances, as well as vo urse lf'.

2) Say only derogatory th ings ahout vourscl ! and

o thel'~ ' and on no acco un t say an ything goorl: hut abo ut

Mao [ so-tung, Liu Shao -c hi and 11 few other lis ted per­

sons spea k well only aTIll on no accou nt ha dlv.

8) The ma in objects of cr itic is m were prescl~ib e(l- jirs l

of all the " dog ma tic group" head ed hv Wa nz MillO' and

Po 1\.11 for " s pr ea d in g 'R u s.~ j H n l\Iarxbn; (Ll'ui~tifo;rn) ,7 a nd.

secon d, t.lic g ro up o f " cm pii-i cisl.s " headed h y Chon En-lu i

nnrl Peng Tch-huai Ior " tre nding in th e foots teps or th e

dogmatis ts'' .Th ose who had stu died in th e S ovie t Union, t he intol ­

ligentsia, FI nd those doin g the oreti cal or pollt leal work

wer e told 10 confes s 10 bein g " dog ma tists ", whi le Iho:«:

of working-cla ss and peasant backgr ound and th ose doing

pra ctical work were told to conf'css to bein g "emplrh -ists".

Th e ove r whelm ing maj ori ty of Party leaders, ca dres aud

rn nk-a nd- Iilo members wor e thu s acc used of dczmatis m

or empiric ism, Th e lab el of " ca pti ves " OJ' "he lpers ' of th e

rlugrnat. is ts was atta ched 10 th u "cm pir tt.ists ' in orde r 10

assuci al o them w i th th e " dogmatis ts ' and t hus jus tify

s lr ik ing the main blow at the la tt er .

In Iact. there had never' been Hny dog matic Il l' ellipirit: ­

ist grou p in the Comm unis t Par ty of Ch ina. T hat is a

ra nk Mao is t. inv enti on, a pretext Ior llLl al:k ing tho major­

ily of tIle Party muuibership.1) A ll were obliged to con fess 10 the " mis ta ke" of p l'O­

mol.ing' the " 'left'-o ppor tllnist lin e of Wan g Ming' and

Po Ku d uring the civil war " and the " righ t-opport uuis t

li ne of W an g 1\Iing durin g th e an ti- Japanese war" ,

In fact. the re had been no such lines , T h e ~' were Iig­

m enl s of ;\!a o's imagi nati on which he used dur ing tho

"rcctifi catl on" to hit ou t at W an g Ming, Po Ku, a nd tho

major ity of thr. Par ty memb ersh ip.:"i) Ev er yon e was required to CfHlfes;; tha t li p ha d nul

kn own Ma oism (r onsirle rcd t ho grnvost of a ll " m is ta k es" )

and lind " bli ndly believcrl in I111 Ssi:1n Xlarxism. t hnl is,

L p l l i ll iSIl1 " . EH' l'ylll1l' WilS I'f'i! " il'l'd 10 J! l'o ll l i :<1' "10 I iiI'll \\'

awa.\· I he idl'O!og'jcn! \YP,i1 pon or nll .~ s i ; 1I 1 l\ l n l' _\ i ~1 1I and l ;i/{('

np Cliim·.-(' l\lnl'xisIII, l liil l is, l\1:wi."lIl",

:17

;)hviou~ly anrl .so r.omJ.1l~toly groundless. L et 11S tuko just

<l few fa cts, with a brief explanation for ea ch.

. Ther? m e no gro un ds wlwLsoe ver for Ma o's chargo that

rovoluuonary writers and artists had no idea of "how to

serve", that is, had no answer for tho question: " to en­

h :~nce com prehensibili ty or raise th e quality?" To hngin

with, he should not have con fus ed the qu estion of "how

to serve" with the qu estion of " enhancina com prehens i­

hility or raising the quality". Because here"'a part is taken

for the whole, Certainly, the problem of "enhancing com­

prehen sibility or raising tho quality" is an important part

of the qu estion of "how to servo". But the qu estion is

hronder. Mao 's vulgar and limited approach Lo th o ques­

tion of "en hanci ng co mpre hens ihili ty or raisin g the qua l­

ity" (popularity or refinement) shows that he ha s no

idea of the subject, As everybody can see clearly , in the

mattorarulsed by Mao th e revolutionary writers and art­

ists stood head and shoulders above him in both thought

and deed, They were aware that from 80 to 90 per cent

of the working people could not read, For this reason

they directed their efforts to winning th e intelligentsia

and s tuden t youth to their side in order to make them

Lhe "conductors" of revolutionary art and literature ill

th e m as se s,Mao's charge that revolutionary writers and artists did

not appr eciate the importance of th e united front in art

is al so contrar y to the facts. As we know, members of

the ea rly r evolutionary literary and art soc ieties of the

tw enti es, suc h as th e Creative So ciety, Society for the

S tudy uf Literature, and So ciety of th e S un had, under

Communist Party leadership, begun their activity in the

heat of theoretical di scu ssions, hammering ou t, a common

viewpoint. Later, in the early thirties, by a de cision of the

Par-l.y, ea ch of these socie t ies di ssolved itself. Left writ­

ers and a rt is ts in side and outside the Party formed th e

League of Left-Wing Writers. Subsequently, in 193(j,

su iti ng th e new situa tion in th e revolutionary movement

a 1\(1 th e Party's now policy, Com munist-Ied rcvulu tionary

writers and artists joined hands with other left writers

to es ta blis h the All-China F ederation of Literary and Art

W orkers , and later , in 1938, the All-China Association of

Anti -J ap anese Art and Literature Workers,

l\-fao's cha rge that r evolutionary writers and artists

did not understand the problem of " li terary and art crit-

AIV\

ici sm is also en ti rel y a t variance with the facts It .

~~mIll (Jn ~{~lo~vledge th a t .Lhey warred long a nd sysiema~~

icully agains t th e r ea ctIOnary curr en ts r epresented b

th e Cont emporary Review group the Ne M y

t,he KM~-inspired "n a tiu na l lit~ra t\lre " ';ro l1~)~n t~~O~~~

called third tr end, and others. This undermined th e r e­

;lCt~OIl~~'y Cl~ ~' l'en ts , and destroyed th eir influence. Revo -

Il~I?I~<lIY writers and a rtis ts al so engaged extc ns i , I .cr rttc ism and se lf -cr it icis m in their own mid t l\ e y. III

this a . I IS, seeing.' s ~n ImpO!' an t means of promoting th o revolution-

dr y m,o\ em oJ.1 t III ar t and literature as a whole and of

tho progressive dev elopm en t of each member of the '.

orgalllsu tlOn (th ou gh, uf COurse so me of th o , ,' t ' , ' . II

wa s e1'1'( II' d I ' . err I I-I S111) eons an t ioro were faults ill cl r.. f I.

g ll' IOe) It ' I lUICL ° an-o ( 0' w.as precise y to continuou s cri tic ism that tI .

~lteW't J'evlolutlOnary movement in art and literature owel(~

its s eal y progress.

In s hort , th e thrco accu su tf ons made by Mao are

U(j1 I~lly groundless and unjustified.

. !~ Mao s cI,I,a rges of " ideologica l mistakes" and " m is­

tuk es of s tyle had heel! a(ldressed to just a few indi vid ­

uals, not to all the revolutionary writer s and ar tis ts in

tho country, and if h e had been motivated by th o wi sh

,tl~ h?lp ~nd t o war~, not La crea te a pretext for hi s

Joctification of s ty le campai gn , there would hav o boon

no nee~l to pay any attention to all ih ls. Bu t these

accu satI.ons and in sults, P?rtraying r evolutionnry writers

and artists as peopl e lacking elementary political social

and cultural knowledge, wer e el evated by Mao' to th e

rank of "supr em o comm ands" or " be hests of Ch airman

Mao ". They required every revolutionary writer and a;·t­

ist to u.ccupy himself month after month nnd y ear a fte r

year WIth endless self-flagellation , wri ting "con fessio ns "

a ~Hl "rep entances". Certainly, this wa s bound t o, and

did, angel' r evolutionary writer s and ar tis ts and all

those wh o s till r etained th eir se nse of jus tico' and the

ca pacity to di stinguish between truth and untruth. III

this sel~se, Mao is much like t he reaction ary judge of

old en times wh o foll ow ed th is sim ple sc he me: on de­

ciding to co nde mn a guiltless cit izen , he chose th e pun­

ishment he would m et e ou t, th en inven ted th e charges,

listing the impu ted "crimes", and then wres ted " con fes­

s ions" from the accused by crue l torture,

101

3) !\fao's Theoretical Mistakes, Utilitarianismand Praglll:ltislII

In conclus io n, it is proper Lo note th at in Ids Talks

Mao di splayed his "particular" understanding and frag­

m entary knowled ge of th e basi c Marxist-Leninist prin­

ciplcs concerning art a nd literature. In so doing, 110 hc­

traycrl hi s utilitarian and pragmatic approach to soci a l

ph enomena .To su ppor t my con ten tion , let me cite Mao' s \~i ows

on the hi s torical periods and th e class essence ul a r t

and liter ature. In th e Talks, and likewise in a tho l' works ,

suc h as On New Democracu, Mao directly or indirectly

id entifi ed til e period s in th e hi stor y or art a nd literature

wi th th o period s in t he his tory of social formations.

Besides , he maintained that the art ~1I l(1 literature of . an

antagoni st ic socie ty co uld se rvo nou e but th e ruling

class, and that th ere could be no art and liter­

ature th ere se r ving the interests of the oppressed

classes.This pr ov es th a t h e did not understand the Iullowiug

ba si c pr op osition : though, like o th er form s of social

conscious n ess, art an d literature can no t be isola led in

th eir hi storical development Irom th e sp ecifi c develop­

mont o f soc ie ty and from the soc ia l or ig ins, th e Iacts of

hi stor y sho w th at peri ods in th e history of art and

Iiteraturn do not co incide with those of th e develop­

meut of so cie ty. lI er e is what Marx wrote all this

sco re:" It is well -known in respect o f art that dnlinite pe ­

riods of it s d ev el opm ent hy no m ean s corres pond 10 the

ge ne ra l d ev elopment of s ociety, and , con sequ en tl y , to

th e d evel opm en t of socie ty 's material has is which, in a

wa y, cons ti tu tes th e ske le ton of it s organlsation. Tnko

I ho Greeks as com pared with the m od ern n ations 01'

a lso S hakes pea re . It is eve n ac cepted in r esp ect of s~ lll e

form s of a rt, e .g. th e !) P OS , that in UHlir cl assical fo l'Ill ,

whi ch is a n epo ch in w orld hist ory, th ey could not he

r.[·ca tr.f! th o momen t. al' t is l ir. prorluofinn as such hog-all"

~ hc l' pfnn" f:o!'la in signlllcnnt forms in Ihe Ii elel or ar t

i ts r-l f \~- l'rc p~ssib le on ly a t. a low JeYeI in th o develop­

~nPllt . o[ a rt. II thi s is so within a rt in th e rula t ion between

Its different typ es, it is uot surprising at all that thi s

circ umsta nce. al so prevails in th e r elati on o f tI I t I I

ar a s a\V 10 e a S OCIa · ( ev eloplll ent as a wh ol e."

In s hort, Mao 's vie ws on period s in Ii teral.ure

are contrary both to th e hi storical fa cts nnd t 1"'1Ma rx. 0 \.<11

..Mau's "C ~ ) JlCC Jl ti o Jls" . a lso s how th at he do cs nnt IInd er­

~t<lIHJ th at III cac h national c ult ur« t.her e a rc two natiOll­

al cultures -the art and literatul'(, of th e oppressor

c1 ~IS~ and t.h.o ar t a? d literature of tho op pressed classes.

'",UIIU nxplllln ed , lI~I S very dearly. In hi s a r ticle, Crit ical

1\oles O~l lh e 1\atio nal Qu estion , lie wr ote: " T he ro a re

~wo nati onal cultures in eve ry nati onnl cul turo. 'I'h er e

r~: th o Great-Hl~ssian c ul tu re of th o I'urishkevl ch as,

Cruch.kovs and St l'll \'eti-- b ut l.lu-r« is al so th e Gr out ­

HussI~n cul turo typified in th e nam es of Chcrn ysh evsk y

and Plckhanov, There are th e same two cu l tu r es in the

Ukr ain e as ther e a re in Germany, in Franco, in En gl and ,

umnng th e J ews, a nd so for th. " ':. -

Why is th er e in ea ch n ati onal cu ltu re in a dd itio n In

th e cul ture of the oppressor cl ass a cul tu r e repros entiu g

lIro opp ressed classes ? Lenin an swered thi s qu estion ai>

w ell. I 10 wrot e in the sa me article : "The ele m ents of

doruocratic and socia lis t cul tu re are pr es en t, if only in

rudimentary Iorm , ill every national cu lt u re , since ill

every nation ther e are toiling and ex plo i te d masses,

whose conditions o f life inevitably givo r ise to th e ide­

ology of democracy and soc ia lism ." ':. ,:~

Certai nly, L enin 's th es is on tw o c ultures applies a lso

10 ar t nnd Iitorature. Mao 's vi ew th a t ill a socie ty of

antagonistic classes th ere can he only an art and liter­

ature se rving capita lis ts and Ianrlownors and 110 art nnrl

lit erature serving work ers and pe a sants , is co n trn r y hath

10 th e hist ori cal fa wts and to Lenin's vi ews.

Mao 's " co nce pt" on ly shows that h e did not, under­

s ta nd th at t herc a re two differ ent lil o/'atn l'Ps nurl two

IlifJer ent, ar ts in n sudety of nn lngo n isl ic classes, awl

that apart Irom the art aud litcr aturu serv ing th e class

of landown er s o r ca pita li s ts th er e is a lso an ar t and

literature serving th e exploit ed a nd o ppre ssed classes.

Thi s is due not only to tho fa ct th at [rom th e rnnks of th e

~:. V. T. Lenin , Collected lFor/t'S, "01. 20, p. 32.:;.:;. lhid ., p. 21.

oppressed and ex ploited t.ll.llr e can e!I.lCcge ~nte.l1 ectllalswh o ca n depict in artis tic Iurm th e life, IlSIHra tIO Ils andstruggles of th o cl as ses from whi ch they come, but a lsoto the fact that th ere m ay be people of the oppressorclass who br eak with th eir cl ass a nd portra y l!le hard­ships and as pirations of the oppresse d ~n lhCl ~ wor ksof art. Thi s ca n be illus tr ated by m any m ter ostmg a wlinstruct ive examples fr om th e h istor y of diff er ent cou 11­

tri os, including th at of Chin a . The whole world, knOW5the m asterpi ece s of Count L eo T olst.oy, tho g1t\I1~ ofllussi an literature, who for 40 years reflected as a nurrortlHl peculi ar features of a n entire hi st orical ep och (£r~)\nthe liber ation of tho se r fs in 18li1 to the first HUSSHl[)

revolution of 1905) . .Lenin wr ot e in hi s a r ticl e, L eo Tolst oy as the AIirror

of the Russian R evolution: ."Tols toy is gr eat as the s pokesm an . o~ th e JdlJas . ~nd

se n tim en ts th at em erged amo ng the millions of BURRJ anpeasants at th e tim e r ~h e bourgeoi s reyolu li Ol: was , ap ­pr oaching in Hn ssi a . 1 olstoy I S nr ig in al , b e~al~ se tl:c. S I ~ ~l~~total of hi s views , t ak en as a whl~l e , ,l,l ~pp ens to ex pt essth e specific features of ou r J'evoluliOn,

H ow could a nobl em an like Coun t T ols toy become uwriter of the Ru ssia n peasa n t revo lut ion ? Lenin an ­s we re d this qu es t ion , too, in hi s ar tic le, L. N . To ls to y lindthe Modern. Labour Movement:

" By birth and ed uca tio n T olstoy bel onged to the high ­es t landed nohi l ity in Hu ssi n-he broke with all thecus tomary vi ews uf th is envirunm ent." »» .

Tha t is the Marxi st vie w point on the nature uf a rtan d literature in a society of antagoni stic class es. Hutn ow back to Mao's anti -M arxist a nd an ti-L enin is t vi ewson a rt a nd literature. As we know, th ey led up to a finalneg-a tion of cult u ral l eg-acy , wheth er for eign or n ation al ,c u lm iua ting during th e "cultu ra l r evolu tion " in brutalcrimes that ecli pse d in sca le a nd dep th the barbarou s" bu I'll i Il g" of books and burying of sch ola rs" hy Em [J er urChi ll Sh"ih Huang.

H sh ou ld b e not ed in r elation to th e secon d of th oabove-mention ed points th at Mao refer!' 10 Lenin 's works

,:.: v ,. I. Lenin , Coll r.r;t ed W orks, V9l. 15, p. ~O~..Illld.• Vol. W, p. 3:.31.

Itl4

sole ly to pr om ot e hi s s el fish u til it arian aims, whil e infact o pen ly advoc at ing utili tar ian islll.

III hi s T al k s h e cite d Lenin twi ce, Th e firs t timewhen h e aske~ in th e Con cludin g lt emarks; " W ho m m us tour' Ilrt and Itt~ra t UJ'e se rve?" H er e h e qu ot es an incour -pl cte se n te nce fr om Leni n : " II. will se rve t hc u '11' .I " . ' . . . llli lOll s1~IH ten s of mi llions of workin g peopl e." The secondt~ll1e h e. appe als to Le nin in the third par t of the~onc.l /ldln~ R emark s when t.acklin g t he q ue st ion of " t hel elal lon slu!) between the work of the Par't y illa r t and literatu re an d th e work of the P arty as .whole". u

h~ hi s ar ticle, Part y Organisation an d Parly L iteratureLe,I,1111 r~ferred to , the .ohject of Party Iiteratu re: '

It will be a free liter ature, b ecause it will serve,Il O!. som? s at ia,led h er oine, n ot the bor ed 'u pper leul~1011SaJld suffenng from fa t ly degen er a tion but th e rnil ­1101113 and tens of mi ll ions of working peop le-thefl ow er of th e country, it s strength and it s future," ,;.Le~in describes the sei vices li t er a lure r en de rs to the

~v :ll'l~l~g pe ople as , se r vices ~~ "the f1 owe: uf th e co u n tr- y ,Its s trength a nd its fu tu r e , By s o doing, h e eleva testh e role of P ar ty litera ture, li nk in g it s tasks w ith th eParty's tasks of gui ding th e worki ng people ill th e rev­olu ti on ary transf ormation of their coun try . But this ism erel y one se n te nce ill a passage that ex pla ins whyParty liter ature is a free Ii teratu re. In th is sc u lc ncoLenin refers only to th e obje ct a nd sizniflcance of thoservices of P a r ty liter ature, In the sall1~ pa ssage, Leniuals o says : .

" It will be a free li tera tur e, becau se th e id ea of soci al­ism and sym pa thy w ith th e working p eopl e, and no tgreed 0 1' ca r ee rism, will bri n g ever 1Iew for ces to it sranks ." ,:.,:.

1L foll ows that Party litera ture has it s root s in theid ea of so ci alism and r eflects the inter est s of th e wor k­ing peopl e. Con tin uously, it a bso rbs ne w, li fe-g-iving rev­olution ary fo rces, a nd t hi s not only provides it withunlimited resourc es for developm ent, hut also helps toex pa nd th e P a rty' s r anks.

Holerrin g to tho m ergin g of sc ie n ti fic soc ia l ism wit h

>, Ibid., Vol. 10, pp. 1,8-10,"'" 1Mcl. , Vol. 10, p. tiS.

the m od ern working-class movement, Lenin giv es a highrating to the rol e of Party literature. H e wri tes :

"It will he a Iree literature, e nr ich i ng th e lust wordin the revolutionary thought of m aukind with the ex plJ­

ricnce and living work of the socia list pr ol etari at, brin g­ing about permanent inter-action h etween the ex.perienceof th e past (sci entific so ci al is m , th e com pl etio n of thedevelopment of soci a lism fr om its primi tiv e utopianforms) and the' experience of the present (th o pr esents ll'u ggle of the worker com rades ) ." ::'

As we see, L enin gives an ex h aus ti ve principled ap­preciation of th e chnracl.er. role a nd s ign ifIca nce of Partyliterature. H e wants a hi gh sense of r esponsibility tomark the work of Party writerR, At the same ti llw , h ein stils en th u s iasm and Iaith in them , which, of cou rs e,furth ers th e development of P ar ty literature. Lenin 'sideas are o] tr elll emlou s cd uca tiolla l val ue a nd a sourceuf great inspiration for tho revolulionary III nvum ell t inChinese art and litera ture, [or ev ery r evolutioll<ll'y writ-

cr and artist.Y et, Mao, in fa ct, throw out Lnnin' i':l appreeiation of

Party literature. H e m erel y cited a few in coJllpletephra ses from it, and , worse st ill, Ir om the way he llilllll\edth em ev en these incompl ete phrases lost their truemeaning. H e u sed them to " s uus tan tiate" the char gethat revolutionary literary and art workers ill Chinn didnut understand " w ho art and literature must se rv o" .Here, ill Ia ct, is what h e sa id in hi s Talk s:

"As far hack us 1\)05 Lenin s t resse d th at our litera­Lure and our a r t mu st, se rve 'th e milliolls a nd lens ofmtlllons of workin g people '. A mo ng 0 11 1' cOlllm dcs en ­gaged in lito field of art nud literature on lit e territoryof an ti- J a pa n es e resistance bases this question, it wouldReem , has already been so lve d an d th ere is nO n oed toraise it again. In fact, however, this is n ot RO ."

Mao aecllsel! rcvolutionary writ c rs and arti sls of thefollowill g: " Man y com r aucR h av e by n o m oans so lved ,01' have n ot found a correct s,ol u ti oll to, this question ."H e al so sa id that thi s is " a hasi c qu estion, a questionIII' I'rindpl e". This h e nscd as Ih o ch ief OXCllS C for at­tackin g revolutionary writers and ar tis ts . Mao sw ungth is h eavy cu dg el a t th em , a cudgel h e hart hims elf

':. v, I. Lenin, C"llcct"d W ork s, Vol. 10, p. 4\),

manufactured , hu ·t whic .atel y O' a v T ., h, to da cel ve pe I I.? ' e .ern n s name. It is II . . up C, Ie dcli har.,hy .ci tin g th e a bo ve -men tio n ' . lUI e lllll H oh viow; thaIdollheralely used the gre t ~d ~n~omplele phras es, J\laoOWlU purely ~Itililarian enJs . em u S nmuo Lo further hi s

n th e article Part O· ' .Lenin de ll ' y 1ganisaiion. and P ·t J'on> ca with tIlfl qu estion a/ y ;tteratlU'c

e hand, h e s u hs lan ll"l tecl II fon two pl an es: on tIll'II P'II'l f I" , , .ue ac t II I' '

I:J or arty work and OIL tl I ' ru t Il lJl'atllJ'e was

el LIP f ··I J . , 1e 0 I l(l r I I ' ,f , d C I tat P arty lit er I ' .. , Ie SII JSlantiat-e ~,l u.res . H e wro te: a llIC had its o wn, spec i fic

Litera ture mu L b«r IIIp , s ecumo part of l/. 11I'ol elllr wl 'a ClIO' an d io couu uon (; '111" ""I'e 'll S ' 1 ' ., lU I( a " ' ~'-''" : ., (Jew -D em ocr a tic 'I . . ' scre w of one s illg l 'on ti ro pol ili cally-con scj()l:~ ec ,w IIIS1l1 .se t in Illation by Ih ~lllg. class . Literalure must vrnguard of the entire W()J"'~g nn ised, pl a n n ed anrl ' I JeCOlll e a cOlllpone n t o r "work" :' c m te gruted Soc ia l-De moc ra tic )1a:'):;

~1,1(1 110 am plified:.1 h eru is no quesl ion that r

s u hJec t to lIIecliauic 'li adjust ( It eralu.re is l ea st of allof II " ,( . S m ont Of ' I , ' II'. LC maj orrty ove r th e '.. ev e lng, to til!! rule

e ithe r, that ill this lil "]l.' gr~mt°l! IY . Th ero is n o qu estionI 11 '-' l oa ur scope 're a owed for personal initi : " ".1 list undou ht edlythought and fa ntasy for a t~ve, individun] inclinationd cniahl e ; bul ali t11i~ Sil~ll~I ~ f1 ~ C;J.n lc n L All thi s is un ~of the proletari an Inrt ' ) S IO \\S th at th e literary s ideidellt.i~lCd with it s l) t1 I~ f ' ; i d~,: ~ I,~~,::. can no t he me chauicully

Lenin d ealt d ial ectically with 1 Itel', which are organicall tied JO,1 J . as pects of th e mat-ca n he nezlectcd Nel' l l y. , o~}(J ll~ th e other. N either

eo • Ior can ne ITIvon Iy ou concen tr a te oxcl us ivoly r I 1:0 prccer enco. Iftho ,par ticu la r , you will ine ~.1: rlegeneral an.d overl ookParly literature ' witll ge Jlef/;I J:a))'ry ~rrl~? Ct

Hlentifyin.gy ou c:on c:en t l'a te excl usive ly 0 1 II ~or ~ ', ,on ve rsel

y,If

look the general \ ' OU \\,11 ' 1 , 10IIPartll:,ul<\!' and oveI'-(' . 1 ' - I llIevlta) y 'lITl ve I .lCta separat io n of P IHty r I ' " t " [ .' - a , lin artt-work. Neither of these a ) Jl'(:, ~1 <l ~lI,e . 101Il I?en e l'a l Partyc: nUSe of the p , 'I . I' II ~ches (;a u heue!rL th e gon oml

). . '.' 'll 'y 0.1 arty lIlerature." ( J l~i'3 en~,lT1 g th o I,hm] of I.he iSRllf>S misl'd ill hi s Talk s

1Il . Ie lul crconnf>(:tion bct\YcC'n Party \Yor! ' '11'1 ' I ' --I, ' al , alH

:;. Ih!d., Vul. 10, p. o1G."" lind" p. 46,

1117

a wholc" - Mao again referredliterature and Party work as L in 's word s on th e pecu -to L en in, th ou gh omit\. i J ~f ' . e ~r o 'field or' liter ature. AndJiar features of Party WOl. \.1 Ill

tII F or Irom Mao's pOiI.lt uf

. . , S not aCCICe n a . , . I fthi s omissi on wa ", li ted 'IS th e leas t su itab e orvi ew th e m ethods Lenin IS e « the contra r y th o

, I' literature wer e, on ,the Party s wor {Ill IL . . 1 that "zrca te r scope must.: bl WI ere en in salc ( . '" c ,most s ui ta e. I " f at:Livity Mao was eagOlundoubtedly be . al1owec~ tOt ~?On' Leni ;l:s ideas wer e a ll1.0 ins t il arm ~-l~l~ e reglln~~bfi~~i~ g per sonal con tJ:ol ,o~e l'obs tacle 10 hi s ai m of es f u e " s tyle rectlfl(~,ltlOll

I lit -at I' U by m eans 0 I . I ' '1.art anr I CIa 11 v • -cvol u t i iary wrtters a nr .II -ca mpa lgn" and making the ~evo u tl~1

c 0 . , nal In ter es s. . flsts serve Iu s own, person : I hi nd h is "t'ectiflca tlOlI 0

' f 1.1 Hlrp ose ic I ..., CMao spoke 0 ,Ie I t Kai F en g head of th e en -

s tyle" in art a nd liter ature I? de p ' l rtm~nl. H e sa id: "InLI';11 Committee's propugaur a hI >s~me people , a nd th osege ne ral , in te llect ua ls ar e dt ro~IYetroublesome. They haveI' ll art and literature are au I are th e m ost ill clin ed to, . . . )(15 'l nc a . 11th e most sen,s l tl\'~. ~1l ' U'~ss i and chit-cha t , a~lll to adr eams an d f a Il ta~les, to \loeir s~Yle must be su bJecte? tokinds of convol utIOns. T , k e them more cOlllplwJlt ,' . . . orde r to 111 a ~e . .,se vere recu fica tJOn III • darl nu to think , wI'ILe 01

J Ir III over it (Tarn, ° I t fluto prc vcu t tn eui 1 0 ," , 1° , nd to teach t ieru as pea k as th e mood s t.nl~~::; t.l(~Ill , a

onl y wha t tho? ar? IJ)l(L I ' Mao's t rue a Lti tu de to ~vllrdsTh e Iollowiug 11 ustratos 0'« day durinz the I s tyl e

" rks nu , 0, I hlLeu ill a nd L onin s wo I' ' 1 1 1'0 Ku to Iinr urn. . .. . . . ign" f\. ao as (ef II l :

l'cd l flCHlloll ca mpa l . , ., I II·tera tl1 r e. H e ac c ec ,. Ir L I III on at t anc ' f ' rr

quot ati on s lorn e, I 1 , intelligen tsia when recti y~no" ll is h ard to a tllltess L10 I t e want is sO]lle tlu llg

I . ., told that w ra W I . .sty le. If t ley ale, if we tell th em that J.\> a~) sa ysMao T se-tung has ~)l(lden , d such a way this Will not

1 I n s lIch a n " , I 'they must Je.lave I , tc fl~) not beli eve in rv aois m,h a ve the dosired effec t. 'II Y th e s tage What w e must. . I . s t COllie OIl ( . .because It h as .on y ]U ' com modity wit.h all old trade-do there fo re, IS pull out:1 . id this aru] this you mu st, I I I eUIll s a t c , •mark. For eXUl np e,' , ' This they will beh ev ebeh a ve in such un fl s u~h ,:1\u y.

a nd will Dot dare to~rl: ~. -L enin is m as the th eor y andMao did, no~ S~?li c ca~~\~~~ n is ll1 , !lor as a guide in so lv i~g

method oj scten I .11 ' dl'lPI'minin 'T it C011l'se ufP PbteJno lOg i~a I I IP I' (! ) e ll1115

"( ~es \~'h en h e In scl'tod in onel clio n. Practlca y III a e.t.. , . . f M 'x-~ i his works scpa l'at e phrnses from th e cl aSSICS 0 ar

ism-Le n ini sm (u su ally Iound for h im at hi s request b yo,thel's) , it w~s m e rely La give grea te r we igh t and attrac.tivenuss to Ius own word s, utiing tho nam e or anoth er' fo rhi s uwn demagogic cu ds . .

~?nSideri~l,~ th e ra bi? ,ant~-S ?,vi e ti sm Mao had im plan tedcllu lllg the s ty le rectificatIOn ca mpa ig n, Ids call to usethe m ethod and ex per ie nce of Soviet art an d liLfH'atlu'H,~as clearly prompted hy purel y lltililar ian cons ido -a­t ions .

Th e s ame m ay be said of Mao's occasi on a l " de n u ncla ­tio ns" of Trotsky during the "recti fi ca tio n ca m pa lg n ' 'whe n he was op en ly subs t i tu ti ng "Maoism" fo r LODi I~ sm'and expoundin g nn a nt i-Le nin ist and a nti-soc ialist "newdemocracy" . l lere, too, h is m otives boiled dow n toth e usu al tri ck which, like th at of a thi ef s hou t ing" hold, thi ef'! " , wa s m eant to divert attention fro mhimself.

The facts of h istor y show t ha t Mao has a lways beena utiIiLarianis t . P ersonal gaiu was the point of departuroin everything he did. 11e used Marx ism-Len inis m exc lu­s ively to di sguise hi s true a ims . T ru e, be for e th e "stylere ctification" cam paign, before h e m oun te d his ope n of­fensive on Ma rxism-Leninism , he went out of hi s wa y toconceal his aims. It was n ot until t he "rectifica ti on" earn­paign , when he cam e ou t into the open against Marxi sm­Leninism, t hat his ut.ilila ri an ism he carno in creas inglyapparent.

It was n o accident that in the Concluding R em arks ofhi s Talk s Mao adv oca te d utili tar ianism. H e said , " no per­son on earth s ta nds above utilitarianism" , H e said, "wea re proletartan, r evolutionary utilitnrianis ts ," a nd m ad ejust on e reser vation, " we arc utili ta ri nnists who are COII­corned not with per so nal gain, but with the pu bli c inter­ests". E vidently, h e thought that t h is hon eyed phrasewould ad or n hi s views and that h e wo uld be r eceived asa new "r evolu t ionary" , utilitarianist. But peopl e havelong sinc e lea rned t o ju dge a man not by hi s words butby hi s de ed s. More, people ha:,~ learn~l to probe de~p toth e ideological and SOCIal ?ngms . of Ideas a~H~ a?tl o.IIS.When Mao publicl y pro clauned lumself a u tlhta.na nl s.t,many Communists w eighing hi s words an d actIO.ns 1I1

th e "rectification cam pa ig n" turn ed for a n explan a tIOn toth o old eig lttcfln Lh-cen tury ut ilital'ianism of J eremy Be n­tham, the su bjective idealist e th ical doctri ne, or to tho

new llt ilit nriani sm that re Oectr,d \.he needs of t.l1l' U~hourgeoisi e - th e subjecti ve ideali st. philosoph ica l schoolcrea ted in th e eigh teen-s eve nties by Cha rles Sa ndersPi erce a!IC1 developed ill th e ea rly t.wuu l. ict h cen tury b yWilliam James uud J ohn Dewey und er th e nam e ofpra gm at ism. Many Communists com pnre rl Mao's word sa nd deeds wit.h tho pr incipl r,s of th o old and th o newutilitariani sm , arrivin g a t. th e cOllc lm;iou that Mao 's util ­i tari anism , wh ich had nssimilated th e pri uci pies of theold utilitarianism, was a new American-type utilitarian-

ism or pragmali sm,And the clear est evidence of this wa s that, contrary to

th e int er est s of the Communist Party of Ch ina , the Ch i­nese revolutioll, and th o wOl'lll conun unis! movement, Muohall lalln ch ed a "cam paig n Ior th e recti I'lcation of sLyle"to fllrl.her hi s own, ex tr eme indiv iduali st inter es ls , Therecould be no clearer manifesta tion of tho principle o~ hoi hth e old and new utilitarianism (pragma tism ) , accordlllg towhi ch narrowl y egoistic ~esi gns and llI1disgt~fs ed , og~i~lllare tho main motives hehind all mor al aets - th,o lIldl

Vll,I,­

nat's truth is th at whi ch sat is fws his pel'sollal 1I1tlll'IlS!,S, 'Mao 's falsilka t.ion of th o h istor y of t.h e CPC and th e Chi ­nose I'evolution , of th o history of th e 1ll011ern revol utio n­ary 1ll0\'O Illellt iu Chinese ar t an d l i t e l'~turc , o ~ th e clHIl' I~e­IeI' a nd role of Lenini sm , an d of the lu stor y of th e Comin­tCI'Jl and th e Soviet Union, is a spee ific man ifes t.ati on ofprn grnali slll wh ich spurns t he, ohj~c ~i ve tr ut h and l:~ ns i d ­el's as th e truth only th aI. wIu ch IS In th e personal Inter ­cs ts of the ind ividual. In the course of t lte " roctiflca tionca mpa iern" !\lao sought to huild a cuIt, of his pe rso

llaliI.y,

extolled Lho bour geois dem ocracy of the Unite d S tatesand revilell th e di ct at orship of th e pr olet ari at in theSoviet Union, pr edi ct ed "c er ta in victor y" for fa sci st Ger­man y and "cer tain defeat " for th e soc h lis t lall ll, til eSovi et Union, All th is. loo, wa s a concr ete manil' cstationof va rious pragm at ic conce pts in socio log y- frolll tllc Cll ! tof " gl:ea t person ali ties" (Ja mes ) ancl the apologia ofbour geois democracy (Dewey) to ou tright su pport of ra(:­ist and fascist id eas. In th e course of th e "recti flca tio llealllpaign", Mao seas one d his extreme individualis t. ideaswith an ti- Ma l'xist, an ti-Lenini st aIIII an ti -Sov iet PI'O ­

Ilouncem enLs, T his was a disti nct m a ni festatio n or tllP lIeo­pra gmatic approach , whi dl a ppea red on th o s(~ e ne in t.h egarb of " exper imenta l natul'Ulism " and whi ch blends sub-

je:-.tivl' idonl isrn with . T t-M , .'(SldlleyI-look) , nnl.i nrxism and ant.i-comml1 nism

I 'I', .JI co th e old vari crv I I 'LI SIII " . ' Ie nl' \\' u t Iitar ,, . . ' ,I S II bO'"'g-I ~l) i s idea list s J I an aru s ru, or pragm a,Jlldl vJ(llI ali slll . Hoth Ihe old ~ chloo ~ that reposes Oil extreme~n un: compatihl» with M' , .' :lflr t ie new variet ins a rc no'~ s WIt.11 wate r, I t is e l; l tl~I(:"\1 IST)ll ll,nrJ com m u n is m than firelilli' Ih " " ' . y orri cal II fL~l " ' ? l'ec:l.Jf,enl;oll GH /Il / ;a i ( rr ~ ' '~1' .uore .(we, that dur-" IILJST~I" persecu ted I\Ja l'X " "', ,n? rovil or! Mill'S ism ­

,~: ~:d' fiu,:J1 ~ tari a n ism , and c a 'IlI~~~sl~I:'Il1 7;Sts• .p'ubli cly advo­" ,octl cau on cam paign" was se a utdltal'ianist. The

c ul tur a l r ev olution" ,a dress r ehearsa l Io tl', ' I pre cisely b l' iecam pa lg ll a nd up 10 thi s da eca uso over sinco that!IOll lWOIlJellt.S nlld a ct.io~l s ':, a ll of Mao's ren ct.iona ry pr;l-is rn. ' , I e snllll'nt. ml with 1 t' I' , .. . I I I ,al'la ll-

One ma y Iezit hna tol "1tl'?dicted the 11ctS 'of ' I~ ;~~T: \~~~~Il\In o 's Talk.~, wh ich eOI1-rnistukos, wer e not t l Y.I ' ahoundod 111 th eoreti cal" . , lOre a nI the b' ' ,lllg cl'ltic ism at the " n rt J t s u jec tod to u nn i lu lnt-a ll, tile " for um" was ~ L te [l

jI1( 1 It O l'HtU T'I~ lu ru m " ? Afl(:/,

' I ' . ,.. nr er 1I 0t 0 1 I b ·l 'a nr IU'!. IS !,S rosid iu cr ill Y ) h 1 Y Y th e wri tersI

itt ' 1 '" ' cnan ut nls 1 t » ,.nu lW en de rs , hy re spon sil 1 . ' p, " , so ly Central COIl1-rcsc nta tives of a d lll i n l' s t l : : llt~ L .t1,t~ workers, aIHI hy 1'(1)-. " 'L . ' " Ive m il itn ry and I 'InHLI ULJOII S, an d muss () I'g 'l ' 't ' ' " a ru ()( ucatlon al, ' " , _' IIl sa lO llS ,

, I'o beg in with, a t th o verv 0 ' , . "t iflcatiou CHII IIJai

l111" J~ I " r I ' I) ut Sl:t of tho . style rec-

) I' < '" n .. I lal ('sl'l blls ) I " . .

J(' IHvlollr", nnnlPly ' s (Je'l l- I" le( a pl'm clpl e of

CI' , " '" , OilY "ood " I I I, 11I 1J'11l Hn M'w '\Ilfl ) I I ' 0 . " H nevel' Ja r! of. ' . , ' O il Y lal and 1 ' l '

s lIhJcete d 10 "s tyle l'el'l iik rt L'o ~, S leV~! goor o [ thosepor! al1t., he rcl ied IIot ':m · ~ r ; I./~ " ~conl , and morc illl­weapons as "cl'i\.i e is ll1 " Du t . I S;I~ <t.~ u 'yaupon hut 011could affOl'r! 10 heh ave ~ ::; I e J?IIllSl ma gIC shield" Mao~Jid, wit.h facl.s, at'g '~ Ill C I ; I 'S ~~ HII ( I/"~l,\ , ~l s e, tho I~l ethods lll~Jug com ple lcly ,'edund HIII H is

oJo;'t3 !e nSOl1l ng b l1colll­

he (~ ha l'il e l el'i s ed as 'W ex'[ , ' UlfOt 10. S may, th e.!'ef(H'e,

I I. " . Icm e 0 self-glor ' fj I' JI'

ll1. lltV10 1I 1' I'l'sem bles t hat of 1,11 11 ':' I ea LOn. IS

g lts llJllun townl'lls Ilis Chines I "S,',ISI? s IJon gk ollg" En-W I'O _, . e s a \ e , ,l nCe I say V ( "

. n g , yo u lIlu :st be W f O Jl r,. " IL" , .. , ' J lU a leIOUI' and louic of ever d "'. I.S, USSL IIL lid ly, th e IJl!h av-jects, So L h~r (' is not h1n ' e:~o l. ?1. I.ym nt townI'ds h is suh­Jll eallS, lt Jlll r t. '[ !'O1ll sur:hg l ' Irpr.ls lllg a bou t. it. \Vh a t othe r

1\1 I' . W IIlVl our and s ue ll "1 ." I'

ao w ve 10 conduc t th e '" . . , ogle , ( leiof s tyle"? " campaIgn for th e rccli fi ea tio n

Tn any analysis of the con ten t of Mao 's Talks , as alsoin th e cas e of iuany of Mao 's other works, it might be aptto say : "T hey seem to sound ri ght, but they aren 't"."They seem lo sound right" is the impression of peoplewho do not understand wh at Mao is talking abo u t, and" but they aren't" is the judgement of those who do un ­derstand. Mao belongs to th e sam e breed as Proudhon , ofwhom Marx sa id in Th e Poverty of Philosophy that helooks like a speciali st only to those who do not under­s ta nd the topic.

Only for those who have but a faint id ea of Marxist-Leninist policy 1'1'Iao looks like a " poli t ical expert". Andfor th ose who do not unllersland art and literature fromth e Marxist-L oninis t s ta ndpoint, h e may look like an"ex per t on art and literature" , . . ' .

The a bove is doubly true of h is philosophical VIews.Each of Mao's "four philosophical works" , thrown ~o­gether with other people's h?lp and, w.ith res~rt to plag~a ­ri sm (Un Practice and On COlltradu;llOll , wille.h appe~l cdin the early fifti es, ':. a nd On the Correct Hatuillng of Con,­tradictions Among the People, 1957 , and Where Do C?,­rect Ideas Come From? which appeared in the early S!X­Lies), con ta in ser ious an ti-male rial,ist , extr~me subjec tivoid ealist and voluntarist mi st akes 1II qu estions of the?ry,and an Li-d ia le ctical and so ph is tical mi stakes in questlOn sof method. Hi s approach and hi s cho ice of exam ples ares trongly tainted with exLrem? in.dividualisT~1 .and prag­matism , and arc con trar y to h lsl orl cal materialism;, Tl~ese" ph ilosoph ic al works" e na ble hi m to pa rade as a. philos­opher" befor e people who are not conve rs ant WIth ques­tions of Marxist-L en in ist philosophy. Ru t for convers an tpeople h e is nothing but a half-l earned dabbler. , Hi sLectures on Dialectical Materialism, whieh wore publ.ishedin t he late thirties conta in so m any m is ta kes and so man ypuerile pronounC~Jl1 ents that an yo ne co nve rs an t withMaI'xi st-L eninist philosophy m ay, as th e saying goes, " 1050hi s teeth from laughing" when read in g th is opus . In Ia ct.,Mao T se-tung belongs to th o sam e breed as Diihring,wh om Engels descr ibed as a man who likes say ing andwriting thin gs he does not u LHlerstand.

» Man Tao-tung in cluded th ese two articl es in the first volumeof h is Sel ected lI'or1.'s, claiming th at th ey wer e writt en in1937.

Mao's talks se t the st age f , tl " , ,among revolutionary ,' t , 01 ie ro~tlh cntion of s tyle"Iying the hi story of t~V~l ~~sC a~1 artis ts and for falsi ­(Jus part in the "st 1 ' . '. h~y played a conspicu,help of his Talks M:oes~~~~~~at~o~:. cam pa ign . With the~y s trong blow to revolutionar? e IV?r an .u nprecedented ­I~ ordor to twi st their ide I .y rt d~J(~ Iiterary workersuonal .pri nclplss to breal

o tlg lCa , political and organ isa­and to provoke 'the mas <rm morally nnrl physi call y,diers into joining !)"ttl e' s o . workers , pea sants and sol-

• u , , azamst revoluti ,artists Fo 1\1 l b . ronnry writci-s and, . r. ao t ie purpose of the Talk s wasleach two highly important ai ms 0 tl to tr y a ndsought to discredit revolution ·Cl !l . ie l?n e hand, heart d t . . ary lIn eSe iterntura and;lIe~l~nin °a;~nte ;)f~ .t~h e s uccess of th e revolution ary JlI ~ve-

a IH 1 cr a turo th at hogan in th o twont.iosand developed so hrillianLlyin the th ir ties Tt wa s \'~emPt to, ~eny the hisl~rieal fa ct t ha t ~I;c ia li s t " r~1 i~IU~ s~ruGk ? eep I'O?t, flowered , a nd was yield in g r ichIruit, m Cilln e~e soil, It wa s also an attempt to den ythat th o reVOllll l?nary m ov em en t i II Chinese a rt unci l it er­aturo wa s conce ived und er th o immedi a te id eol ogi cal in ­f1uen~e of tho Octo~)er Revolution and th e pr ogressiveHussian and revolutionary Soviet a r t and Ii teraturo andthat it was th e result of th e rapid s pread of Mar~ ism­Leninism amon g the foremost Chinese intell ectu al s follow­ing the May Fourth Movement ( t 9 J0) , and that it s success­ful growth was due solely to the guidance and all-r oundassi stance of the Communist Party of China over a lon zperiod of time. b

On the other hand, Mao wan Led to show that hi s Talkswore nshering in a "correct line in the Chinese r ovolu­tionnry m ovem ent in art, and literature" . He wan te d toparade as the "Ioundor" of Chinese revolutionary art andliterature. All this was to have justified his demand thatrovolutionary wr it ers and artists should tu rn their ha ck sOIL the literary and arti sti c id ea s of " R ussian Marxism"and " re -or ient" their minds on the literary a nd ar t.is l.i«ideas of " Ch inese Marxism", that is, " Mao ism" .

He thought that he would thereby s ucceed in forcingrevolutionary writers and artists to declare them selvesfollow ers of " Ma o's literary and arti stic thou ghts" andhcncelorth to extol Mao in th eir works as tho solo cre a torof the correct line in th e revolutionary mo vem ent in Chi ­ne se art and lit er ature, and al so ex tol h im to th o s k ies lor

cvc ryt.hiug dlllt hu ascri/)ed to irimsclf Iu ti' e fa lsiiied his­lory of th e CPC and Chinese revolution he had hl msol!produced in the cou rse of the " style rectifi cation ca m­pai gn" . In ol1HW wo rds, h e tried to convert th e Chineserevoluti on ar y wr ite rs into court scribes s in gin g t hepr ai ses of " M aoism" and Mao's person , into trum pete rsa nd drum m ers who wo uld create a c u lt of h is per son al it y .

In hi s Talks, Ma o descri bed h imself as a "prof'essiuun lrevol utionary politician wh o has assimilated r ovolutio uarvpoli t ica l sc ience or, in other words, mastered L1H! art 1;1'revolutionary poli ti cs". All others he descri bed as ,;pol i­ticin ns with all a r istocratic tw is t" sche m ing ill th e scc lu­sion of their studie s, th inki ng the mselves vnry clover, a ndcont inuous ly arlvorti siug' the ir OW Il sel ves : "we are thebest or the best, so do not confuse us with an yho dy olse"."T his, in fad ," he even sai d , " is t he fu ndur uentul dif­Ier eu ce het ween a proletaria n a nd I he curr u pt hourg uui«politi cian". H e see ms to ha ve thou ght in ea rnes t that itwa s enough to praise him self and rl cf'arne others for thl'Chin ese revol lltionary writers and arti sts, s pellhound hyhi s Talks, at once to hocoure h is pruselytes a ud obudieuttools. T his is wh y he said ill his Conclutluu; R emu rks :" I ru n su re that comra des will lind th e resolve 10 foll" wthis di rect.iou . .1 alii sure that ill th e process of I'eelifyi ngs ty le a nd ill th eir s ubse q ue n t IOlIg s t udi os a nd WO I''', cOIIl­rad es wi ll doubtless SUl:ceed in a lte r l ug their OWIl illJagrand t hnt uf th eir wor ks."

(j ilt his ex pec ta tions wore dashed. Hi s Tol k s s howedclea rly that he had not "ass imi la ted rovo lut inua ry politi ­ca l sc ienc e", t hat he had nut "mustered thf' a rt o f rcvolut iuunry pulitics" , th at he was nll " prolotrui uu politi calleader", a w l th at, on th e con t ra ry, he was " a corru ptpoliti cian " with a u " a ris toc ra tic twi st" . His '1'111 Irs pro­yoke d cont.em pl nnd loathin g amon g th e co u nt ry 's revo­lu tionary 1itt~raI'y a nd a r t W OI'k e l's . T hey ahonIlded i llillcUllgruities, contrad ictiolls and t hco ,'e't ica l I11i sta kesan d hnv e l:l'eated au unh l'idgeabl c gu lf betweell'Mao and t he revolutio lllll'Y wl'ite l's an d ar t is ts o f th ecn ti l'e to UIltl'y , jlrecipitating a IOll g nnd hard s ll'lJ g ftl ehl'twl'ell Ihpse \\'!'it el'S aIHl al 'list s, wh om he I~ e l's f' c ll t e s ,

and Mao Tse-tuug, wh om they r es is t.

114

1) Briefly about M IlO Tse-tung's Poetry

:-\I' ter .tl le " styl e ruc ti licul ion ca m paign " had oudcd dur­".' g, his lIo.gotiations with the United S ta le s nnd c'hi anu'I~ :lI -:'5lt ek, III Chll~lgkin~.. ill Sc pteruhur Hl~ ;j , ]\lao [l lIh~lI ~hed hi s Invuu r it e t SI '" poem , entitled "S i n Y Il1I1 \( ~ 1J u lI "

(Sno~v ) in Hsinluuii ihpuo. ll e h oped his poem would heal:el al!!1Cd a nws\cl' pie cc . H e ex pec ted the lnurol wrcnt II0.1 a great po~t'. He a lso hoped to heigh ten Ids I1I'('s ­

Il ge among writers, which would "pip Ilim impose " iscontrol oy er th e revolution ary movem ent in art, a nd li ter­nt ur o and, convinc e r evolutionary writ ers a nd ar tis ts illt!l e need. 101' ex toll ing hi s " grea tness" and his "ser vices" ,':.ut ,aga l ll tho res II It s cou foumled Mao 's nxpcct nt.iou s .Outs id« those organs of the pr ess whi ch were , in [tu .I. ,CO!I ~ I' ~ ) lI l' d hy him and co ul d ut ter 110 word ofrr itic isrn , . th e poem had a critical r eception a nd~va s descr ibed a s s tee ped in the felldal uu d m ounrr .h istld eo~ ogy. Many revolut ionary wri ters and ar t is ts insid e ando ulsid« th e Part y h eld th nt th e poelll wus sa tnrnt od withfolltla l unrl mounrch is t irlen ls a nd s hould HOt have curnerl' l ~1lI tho pen of a Com munist. T hoy hold t ha t, Iar fl'Ollibolng a work of socialist rea lism, it cou ld 1101, eve n he('ollsi dol'('(! a \\'OI'k of cr i t.icnl rcn lisru. Th e publ icn tiou ofIh e poem only widen ed lh l' g ul f botweon l\[:lll a nd th erevnlu t.i o nary write rs a nd al'li st.s o r rho wh ol e ('O II/ i1J',' .

In 1% 7 Mao publish ed 18 or h is P OCIII S ill Ilill I ) e l~ i n ~[o ur na l Shih kau ( Poetry) , a nd on tI Junu rn- y 1 ! 1 (j ~ a llll l h'~01' 10 POOIll S in l enminjih pn o and t he jou rnul ll n ugclii.Jr \\'C' add a ll th e othe r of his p ublis he d IH.H' Ill S, \\'0 w illgil t a to ta l or ::\7, o ut. 01' w h icl: '12 worn POOIII~ null 25were l s i. Every lim n he had his poem s published he «nlvwidened and deepen ed th e gul f hotwccu him self nnd th 'e'ruvolutlonn rv w rit ers a nd a rl isl.s . Thi s wa s nul urn l andiuc \' ita blc, I; p.eullse IIwn y of hi s PO CJJ1fi and t si \\'PI'C ~i m ­pl y wre tc hl'd in eonleu t. SOllie were s tpcped in feudal andnlon al'ch ist ideolo g y as " S i ny ua ue h lln" (Sn ow ), a l si , th ePOOI1l "'The Pnnpl l" s Li lH'l'a t.ion Al'luy I l as Ca pl. nl'e d Na n­king" , li nd " Pohta ilro" (Lal/ R/II OS /III) , a /.~i, Othn l'S preac lwd

.. Tsi (lil el'lllly te,rl) - a :-peciflc form of ve l' ~i fl c, lIlion whereth e poet pt'danlicnl ly roll o\\"~ Ih t· Ill rllSlIl' (' a n ti l'ltyUlP. of one ofIlw nn cil'lIL songs, m ainly dating 10 tllP. S n ng u yn llsl y (960-1276) ,th e LUIllJS of nearly all of whi ch are lon g fOl'gollen,

my sti ci sm and su pe rs titi on, as the po em s " Seein g Outth e God of Epidemics" , " Dedica tio n to a Ph ot ograph ofComrade Li Ch in", " T he Ca ve of Cele stial Bciugs inLu sh an g" , dep icting the a scension to par ad ise of souls ofth e dead, "A Butterfl y Lea ves Not th e Fl ow er" (A Giflto Li Shu-tv , and other s, And in the poem " Re ply 10 aFri end" , wh ich re lates h ow the souls of Emper or S hu n 'sconcubines descend to earth, cle m en ts of the fe udal andm on arch ist id eol ogy bl end with mysti ci sm and supers ti­tion . Some tried to interpret Mao's ver se as a work ofrevolution ary romanticism. But it is obviou s th at none ofit ca n be r eferred to as belonging to revolu ti on a ry, wheth­er active or " harmless", romanticism, On th e con tra ry,l\[ao's poetry clea rly belon gs to, r?a r, tio ~a ry , . pa ssive Hn.dharmful roma n ticism . So me of It IS anti-Soviet and anti­communist, such as Mangtsian ghun g, a tsi (Jan u ary 196~),the poem s " Aft er Seeing th e Film 'Su n Wu-kun g Thri ceKills th e W erewolf White Bon es ' " (Novembet' . 1961)""W inter Clou ds" (Dec ember 19(2) , and othe rs . Some atth e verso betra ys it s a u th or' s ignorance of h i stor~, (~,s f~rexam ple hi s ve rs ion of the le gend of Puc'~ol1shan l.n ,yUl­tsno' (A gainst th e Fir st March ) , a tsi, and I!IS" 1 ~1l0­

ranee of natura l sc ie nce, as for example th e isi , NI3Jl­nu tsn o" (Ku nlun), So m e of the poe m s ar e a ime d at. but­tr essing th e cu lt. of Mao's personality and winn!n!J', th ?yo u th for hi s n ef ariou s sc h em es , s uch as th o tst , Shui­t iaok otou. (Sw imming) . Artisti cally Mao's poetry if'cl um sy, a wk ward, sha ll ow, s ti ff, di vor ced fr om reality ,and la cking beauty.

Out of tho 37 poems and ls i produced hy Ma o in 1,0years (Hl20 to HIGO ) not a single on e is ded ica ted toMa rx ism -L en inism , t he Communist Party, or th e workingc lass, and not a s in gle one dep icts th e lire of workers,pea sants a nd so ldie rs or th e lif e and s truggle of th e revolu ­ti onary intelligentsia and s tude n ts . Th ere is not a singleone, of course, in praise of th e socialis t com m u nity, th eworld comm un is t m ovem ent, th c anti-imperialist or nn ­tion al libera tion movement, or th e peace movement. Noris th er e a s ingle one dedi ca ted to th e memo ry of thethousan ds upon th ou sands of fall en revolu tio nar ies orna tio na l h eroes ins ide a nd outs ide the P a rty. Even th epoem "T he Lon g Ma rch " does not hl'in g out the political ,m ilit ary or his torical s igniflca uco of th e march , and do esnot ment.ion the ba si c fact th at the Chinese Hed Army,

wl~i ch fOll ght. 50 heroicall y and overcam e coun tl ess h ard ­~h l PS ~~ r ~ th e march , WaS an a nuy of work ers nnrl " I'~ ~a s (: n ts:\Ild \\ (~s .Ied . by th e Com m unis t Pa rty arm ed wit h Marx­l st-~\enll~ l s t ,Ide as . If e , d~picts . the Lung March as litt:J cI~ol e than ,til entcrt nlning lu ke acro ss mount ain s andnVOt'S. ( ,

.:1. is l~l .is. t yp,C .of poet ry t hat Mao, Inki ng advan la ge ofIll S power III 1 at ty a nd 'Ia lo, ord ers Lo he pllbli sh er! inhllJ~drcd s of tho usands, III illions, eve n tuns 0 f million s ofl:°PlOS nul only in Chinese and the lan g uages of th euon-H an ~eo pl e~ , but abo transla ted in to Iore ign Jan ­g ilages, USlllg d ip lom a ti c, commerc ia l and c ult ura l ch an­l~ eJ s Ior t,~lf!il' ,r1! ssP,Jll!n ali on . He h as ove n p ut 0 111, a ph oto ­1J~hog'l'nphl c 0(111101 1 of th e man uscri pts of his poems awl1St . No words can describe thi s other th a n as s hamelessand mad.

In his Talks at the .1 rt and L it erature Forum in Y ena uhe demanded of revol utiona ry a rtists a nrl wri te r'S thnt th ocon ten t of their works sho uld re flect th e life of wo rkerspea san ts a nd so ld ie rs, and that th eir la nguage should b ~com prehens ible to the workin g masses. But hi s ow n poem sand lsi ar e, both in conten t a nd form , th e ve r y op positoto wh at he dem and ed of oth ers . In fa ct., th ey m ay be de ­scr ibed as a bst ru se. lIe turns a fton to m ythulogy (111< 1 tovarious lon g-si nce-f or gotten " ins tr uctive tal es or para­hlos". As a result h is poem s aIHI lsi arc in comprehensiblenot only to workers, peasants a nd soldiers, but even 10in lellectu a ls and s tuden ts . In fa ct, Ite has had to askpoets 10 writ e st iff, wordy, and Iar-I e tch cd comm en tar iesto hi s poet ry. Yet, du e to hi s mi suse of proverbs and oldparabl os, a nd also to phraseologi cal incong rui ties, someof hi s poom s and lsi arc incom pre hen sible n ot only topoets or to au thors of literature textbook s Ior se niorforms, hut often also to hi mself . At leas t, he find s it dif­licul t to explain th em. T hi s is why in the eyes of ru volu­tionar y writers and artis ts Mao is a swindle r wh ose pro­nouuccrnents are a t. varia nce wi th hi s intentions, whosewords a re in con flict with his deed s, wh o reli sh es dofnm­i ll " othe rs, but is in ca pable of bein g cr itical of hi msel f.In'" shor t, th e failu re of " Mao's th ou gh t s and l ine in a r ta nd Iiterntnre" is no t accide n tal . As it says in I Ching,th o a ncient B ook of Cha nges, " fro m thin r ime Lo thic kice th er e is a distan ce of m or e th an one day, and th eor ig in of t h is is in in ex orable gradual ness" .

5) The Outcome is Total Failure

By his pron ou n com onts a nd a ctions dur ing th e no torio us" cu ltu ral rovolut ion" , i n suhs la ucu a counte r-revolu tion­1\I'Y coup, Mao ad mitted the tota l fa ilure of his literarya lid ar tis l.i c " thoughts" and li ne, He was com pelled 10 ad­m il., on t h o one h and , t ha t h is many " i ns t ruc t ions" per­tain ill g 10 a rt a nd l it erature pu blished in th e forties,lifti ns alld s ix f.ies h ad not reall y been obeyed by u nyruv uluti oua ry writer 01' artist ::. ( uxcludin g hi s wife, Chian gChing ) , On th o other hand , he consigned to th o f1 alll es allIIIIl \\'ol'ks o f [he revolution ar y writers of th e pl'ec:mling50 y ea rs a nd brutall y p ers ecuted the wr iters th um solvos -»­llIa ny of whom were physica lly eliminated, wh ile some,in des perat ion, committod s u icide , T h e r est. are oit hor i llpri snn , wh ere they a re m o rall y and physica lly tor tured ,(11' in Ma y Se venth Schoo l', whi ch nrc ill ra e\. forcedlabuur l'a;n ps in whic h people arc " re-ed uc a te d throughlab ou r" and co ut iuuo us l y torm ented . Man y hn ve alread yIourul t he ir dllath in th es e "schools" . China 's re volution­arv arti sts a iul writ e rs ,11'0 ill so r r y slrn its, nud th e r evo­Illtionary m ovem ent ill art a nd U'terature is in a s ha m­bl es .

Dus pitu the ig uorn i nious fail ll l'e of Muo's " li tera ry antinrt.ist ic though ts and line" , Ill) s till orders th e Chiu csoUO\\ 'Sj l1lpOrS 10 r epri nt hi s Tal ks at the Jl rt and Lit eratureForum i ll Y enu n eac h yea r Oil 2 :~ Ma y ami rai se a c la m­o ru us propa ganda uproar. I t is hard [0 luul suitable wordsto desc ri be th is lola l la ck or s luun o and sc ru ple s . As Ireca ll , th o lil nrarv community in Yona n compos ed th eInllowi ng dilly sao II a fter th o publica tion of Mao's Talks.

His fal'e is thicker than 11 bri ck ill thu (j ruaL Wall ,And his heart blacker th an a chunk of coal,

S u bseq ue n t ev ent s s ho we d Iha L th ose worrls wore s u i t­a ble a lid COl'J'Oc t.

a. rns THIIII) PEJUO»­" EM ERGE;\,CY SA LVATION"

~lI e .l lIin ( jlll l'io t! , of ll,l ~ , "s tyle I'ed ifica t io ll r a m pnig n ",kIl O~\ Jl H~. [he penod of .eJll er geli cy s a h·a (.j o n" . heg an inJ u l j 194,-) a nd la s lnd lIntJi th e S UIll IIW I' o r H)~~.

,. Se( ~ lI 11 fl g c lt i No, !J, 11)07.

11 ~

1) Fabricating the pretext for"Emergency sa lva t ion"

MHO wns awa re tha t d espi te 18 months of "sty le r ccl ifica ­tion" , the curlres conti nue d 10 rr-sis ]. a ll h is words aw l nc­tio ns whi ch Iloutod I .h (~ truth fi nd th o Incts. H e fp, ll. l1wlif Illi s we nt Oil he wo ulrl Il O\. bo a h lIJ 10 a l \.a i n t.ho fir sto f the d esired aim s or th e " s ty le rcc l.i fi cnf.iou" ca illpaig n .':'"I I) crua lo Maoi sm n nd wl'j\.e I.!IC hi st.ory or t!I O C P C a shi spel'sonal hi sto ry. And if 11 0 did II ~\. n u ui n th e firs]a im, (.llerp would hc no hop e at a ll o f a ll a in i llg' th o sec­o ud ·- 10 "s u hs t.itu tu" Mao ism 1'01' Le n in is m , USUI' P su pr eru opo we r in the Pa rt y, crea te a c ul t of M HO' S pe rson ali ty ,a nd es ta bl is h his per son al mi litary d icta torshi p ill th eParty. Yet he held that since the Com inte rn had h~HJlldi ssol ved lh er« was not.hing to h ind er h is a c tio ns: t heti mo was favo ura ble 1'01' he had " Iroorlom of act ion " a nda cOlll ple l l'Jy " f ree l uu rd " . So he decid ed 10 reso rt 10 s l.i l lni oru r euct.louary n nrl viol ent a nt.i- Pm-ty ICI'l'o ri Sll\ - -a

ca m pa ig n of "em ergenc y sa lva t ion" 10 fur th er hi s ow nox trcmo e go is t ic, national ist a im s .

T o laun ch th e reaction ary tl ~ITOI' c a uipa lg u or "e l llll r ­g f~ n c y s a lva t ion" , Mao I'I/'s[, Iuhri cated a (.I J' flt.ext , acco rd in g[ 0 wh icl: Ih e uecd Ior l.ho cnm puig u wa s impos ed by botht he " oh jec tive s i l.ua l inn " a n d the "su hj ect.ive si t u a­ti (J 11 " .

Tu o "object.ivo s itua l. iun", he cla imed, WH S tha t Chia n gKn i-sh ok h a d decided 10 mount an offensive o n Ye na n.Mnrf.ial law wa s enforced i n Yonan nnrl the nut.ire S lrcusi­Kun su-N iu gh sia Border Area . An ntmo sp hcru of extrememilitary dan ger wa s artificially cre ated.

In Fact, h owever, neither th e i nlornnt.iunal s il.unl.lounor th e internal conditions of that Limo pOl'lllilt.ed Chia llg1\a i-81IOk ove n La think o f an a ssault Oil Y CIl 'l1l.

Th e interual .iunal s i tu a ti on w as g l' OR tt y illnu oucurl h.\'th e hist oric; victory of th e Soviet Army at Sta lin gm d, fol­lowin g' wh ich IJiil cr' s tr oops su ffe re d ouo d e l'ea [. u Itor,II 10th CI'. T herefore, Ch ia ng Ka i-shek w as bo und I(l ba voheon ap preh ensive of making any undi sguis ed Hn t.i-clllll­IHIlBi st 1l\ove, Besid es , foll owing t lH! o utbrea k of tl lH Jap­a ncsl:-Alll erican war in the P acific, t.he Un ite d S t. a toshnd a s t.ak e in I\.J\IT-CPC co operat ion in the a u[i -Japan esewal' Iheat re in China, A nd to th e opinion of the UnitedSta les Ch iang al ways lent a r espectful ca l',

I ,H I

Th e internal condi tions of that t im e were m ainlyr hnra ct criscd by the continuing Japanese occupation ofexte ns ive areas in Nor theast , North , Cen tral and So u thChina , and, as be for e, Chiang was not able to fight a nanti -J ap anese and an anti-communist war sim ult ane ous ly ,

Th e stridently predi cted "third a n ti-c ommu n is t wave"and " Ch ia ng's imminent offensive on Yenan" were, i llfact, nothi n g but ano the r of Mao's frauds, invented tojustify the "emergency salv a t ion" ca m paign.

Using th e atmosphere of tension he had himself ar t i­ficially crea te d, Mao announced that all leaders and mostca dres and rank-and-file members of the Party -with theexception of Liu Sh ao-chi and a few othe rs - were "S11S­

pectcd of cou n ter-re volu tion" , He speciall y declared thatleaders, cadres and rank-and-lile member s wh o had at anyti me in the pas t worked in Ku om in tang-controlled ar ea swere pseudo-Communists smuggled in by th e Kuomintnngto carry ou t the " policy of red banners" , ':. This, h e sa id ,applied especiall y to t he pr esent m ernb ers of P arty or gan­isations of all levels in T< 11 0m intan g-controll ed ar ea s.They were all denounced as "organisations of the Kuo­rnintang red banners policy" , In reality this was mali­cio us slander which Mao needed purely as a pr etext. Iorlaunchi ng hi s "emergency salv at ion" cam paign .

2) "Emergency salva tion" in name andrepression of leaders, cadres and Partymembers in fact

On Ma o's orde rs Kang Shen g, cha irm an of the CentralC0r,nmissioll for the Hectifica tion of S tyle, publishe d anarticle, " On the Em ergency Salva tion of Those WhoSlipped Up" , in .th e 1 Ju-Iy1!)4;) issue of Chiehlang ithpo» ,This wa s tho Signal for the cam pa ign to begin. KanzSheng said tha t its purpose was to " save" all those wh ;" 1 ' I' d .. 1 'raving s ip po up , lad bocomo "national traitors": ',enc my ~pi?,S", "counter-revolutionari es", a nd the lil{():I'hcreu pon , mass meetings" were called in all the sub­d ivision s .conducting th e " styl e r ectification campa ign"where, !althf~ll to l\'1a? 'S ins tructions , officials deliverellreports III which. pleading tho exigencies of th e " obj ecti ve

.. In othe r words "to carry 11 red ban ner 'the rod banner". ' In ardor to fight

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situation" an d " s ubjective s ituat ion", they " subst an t iat edth e need" for an immediate cam paign of "eme rge ncy sa l­va tio n" . It was announced in a ll s ubdivis ions th a t. thesecond period of "style rectificat ion" wa s ove r and thothird period, "emergency salvation" , had begun.

In fact , th in gs wer e th e other way round. T he pur­poso of "emer gency sal vat ion" was not to save th ose whohad "slippe d up" , but to slande ro usly accuse th e m aj orityof lead er s and cadres and many rank-and-file P arty mom­])()I ' S , and the r ovolutiouury youth, of having "slipped u p",a nd th en to use brute for ce and ma ss terror to for ce eon­Iessiuns of having "s lipped up" from faithful revolut ion­a ries . Th e so -ca lled Soc ia l Department of the CC CP C,he ad ed by Kang She ng , spec ial lsed in arrests , beatings,tOI'l.1I1'eS, and exec ut ions, Officials of su bdiv isio ns conduc t­ing " style r uctifi cation" were also authorised to arres t ,beat, a nd k ill.

111 pr act ice, " emergency salvation" consis ted of variousme tho ds of com pulsion and rleceit to for ce thousands ofcadres and members of th e Party and th e Yo uth L eagu e,and al so em inent per son al it ies outside the Par ty , to wr ite"con fess ions" admittin g that they w ore " cou n ter-revolu­ti on aries" , "enemy spies", " nat ional traitors" , "agents ofthe Soviet Union" , and the like.

Noth ing was too low for t hi s end. People were arre steda nd cruell y tortured or beaten up to wrest a " confession"[ro m th em . Th ey were bl ackm ail ed, bribed, and slanderedat " mass rallies" or "persuad ed " at sm aller m eetin gs, andreduced to a sta te of total pr ostration by means of m or aland physi cal terror. From some "confessions" w ere wrest­ed in " turning wh eel " inte rroga tions. '~ Especially bru taltortures were reserved for cadres of pr ovincial and cou ntyParty committees from Kuominta ng-controlled areas s pe­cially sum mo ned to under go " styl e rectifICat ion".

Those w ho admitted to bei ng "ele me n ts" referredto above w er e im m ediately re leased, given th e "red flow erof glory ", and ot he rwise re warded, T hose who denim!comm it ti n u any " cri mes". were hca teu u p aJIll tortu red.Many (Heel as a resu lt, Othe rs , u n;~b le to heal' t~ \C insult,c.o ll1 l1li llcd suicide (C hou F cn g-pi ng, a guerril la lead -

,~ With soveral interrogators alternating clay and night thedotnine c lost cOllsd ous ness, was revived, whereupon tho in ter roga­tion continued . Sometimes , reduced to semi-consciousness, th edetainee would "confess" the "crimes" ascribed to him.

er and secreta ry of the Szechu an provincial P ar ty com­mittea , whu had cnrl icr survived inhumuu tor t ure in anene my prison; 'I'scug 'I'a n-ju , head of th e wnmons de pa rt­mont of th o Szechuan provincial Pa rty com mittee, whohall al so previou sl y displayed cou rage a lid for ti \.11(1 c inall ene my pri son ; Han Chuu, vete ra n Party cadre who hadled th e New Sha ns] Arm y Lo sa fely, eva d ing wnrl ordYan ll si-sh an , a nd jo ine d up with th e 8t h HOULe Ar my;Hu , chairman or the All -Ch ina Students' Ass.u.inliouwhose full nuruu, rogrctta bly, 1 ca n not re call , and rua nyothers) , i\ sti ll greater number or peo ple Were red uced toco rnploto mnntal pr ostra ti on or s ullored other ser-ious dis­ord ers (Wei Kun g-chih , huar] or th e organ isa tio ua l dupcllt ­ment of l.I w Honan provin cial Party enmmitl co, [Iu an gChin, who h eaded Par ty work among 1.110 yOUL! I, a utlIIIit II Y others ) .

lu'descl'ihabl y savag e methods were uSerl someti mes.For example the " accused" would Iw brought 10 a "massra lly " and seated before it ta ble on which lay a ha yo nu l.,a via l of poison an d a length of rope , T he a udience wasth en mad o to cha ut, "Eit he r imill ed iat ely .ulmit th at youam a coun tc r-r c vulu tion a ry or com m it su icid o hero uudnow" , " Choose a ny of the three ways".

But there were many stout, unbending people whoproudl y rep lie d : " T' m a Con uu unist and no cou nter­revu lutionary . 1 refuse to ta ke my own lif,!" . T hey wouldin dignan t ly swee p the linyou et, poison uud "op P. oil u.«tab le. Th ese sta uuch one s us ua lly became targots ofes pecially refilled tortures uurl hrul a l ki lliugs.

3) Leninist lnt ernutlunall st s weres till the main target

' Vh pn th u atmosph er e or repression and tiliTor reachedits apogee, t he spearhead was turned against Ll w chidmem bers of tho so-called Moscow group - Wang Ming(mornbel' of th o Poli tburea u a nd secretary of Lhe C(~

C PC), Po Ku (member of the Po!itbu reau a nd secretaryof th e ec CPC) , Lo Fu (member of the Polithurcau nn~lGeneral Secretary of th e ec CPC) , Waug Chia-h siang(alt ernat e member of th e Politbureau and head of the~Iai II Political Departmen t of the 8t.h Houle Army) , KaiFcng (all?rI~nle member of the Po!itbureau , chief of t.h eCC COlllIll IS SlOn for work with th e yo uth and concul'!'oJl tly

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chief of th e P ropaganda Department of the CC epc fol­lowing Lo Fu 's depart nrc Ironi Yen an) , Yang Shang-k un(u ltur uate member of t.hc CC CI'C an d sec reta ry of theCC CPC North China Burp.au ) , Ch n .lui (alternate iu em ­I.HH' or Ihe CC crc and secretary of the Shan tung branchii I" th e CC CPC North China Burea u ), and others .

As ill the "style rec tifi cation " ca mpa ig n, the ch ief tar ­get was ' Va ng Miug, whom Mao so m ut.im cs tenlpm,,,t ely;; n ll l~ d "t he chief member of the Moscow gro up" a nd some ­times uhusivelv descri hed as "t he biggesl headman of thepro-Sovi et grn~l p " . Why rl irl Mao aiili his a tlae:kiS cl ricfl vaga inst Wa ng Min g? This question is best an swered by1\1 ao h imselI. l lo an swered it oflic.ially in p u hl ic o u l1l HU y

1Il',('as iol1s: " T he s tr ugg le hotweeu mo a nd ' Vall g Mingis 1I0\. a pers onal s truggle, hu t a struggle or priuciplc,Wa ng Ming is 1ho chief repr oscn ta tivo of Hussi nn Murx ­ism ill th o CPC, .uul I am th e ch ief repro sentativ e ofC hiueso Marx ism . Tho s t ruggle betweell us is thcrcln roa s l ru gg !o 01" two ideologi es, two th eories, two li nes a ndt wo ways of the Ch inc se rcvolul.iun. The prctlom iruuu -o orHussian Mar xism i u our Pa rty will uot en d wit h ou t as t ruggle ag a ins t Wang Miug. And wi tho ut eliding th eprudom ina uco of l1. lIssia u Mar xism it is hupossihl u toestablish the produminanco or Chi nese Marxism ."

l lere it is necessary to give an appropriate expla uu-t i 0 II.

T o boulu with, th ere has Bever been nuy t hi ng like H

" Mosco\~ group" 01' n " pro-Soviet gro up" in th e CO Ul IllU­

nist Party of China, But in th e Party's hist ory, eve n lon ghefore Mao's "s tyle l'oe:t.iflcalion " cam pa ign, t hm'c wer etwo occa sions when opportunis ts brand ish ed I he sloga nor com hatt ing tho "Moscow g l'oup" ()[' " P l'o- ~ov i e l /.{l"C" l\~ " ,a ttacking noL onl y those who opposed their opportunis tlin es, hut also Leninism , th e Comintern , and th e COJl1 Il1 I1­

uis t Party of t he .. oviet Union,First , ~l l1ring th e Wuh a n period in H127, wh?n r ig h t

opp or tunism was ri fe in the Party: Chon Tu-hs iu, Pen gShu-ch ih an d ot her righ t Op portU lll stS O P POSC l~ th e CO I1 I­int er n rpr,olllnwu(la tio ll Lo expand the workers an d pea s­an ts' movement , to arm workers an d pea~ants , c l' el, a t ~l i\

lIeW revolutionary al'Iny , laullch all ag,l'al'lan rcvo. t~(,IO Il ,and Daht for th e lion-cap itali st PC J'sp l~ c lwe of the L1llneserevol lliion . They cou nlered this .with their so-r all eel COIl ­

cept of t.wo-phased revoluL.ion.

This " concept", it m ay be recallcrl, was sot out in anar ticle, "Tho Hourgeois Revolution a nd the HevolutionaryBonrgcoisio" , in the [our nal H siangiao. But the dearestand mo st th or ou gh exposition wa s given by Che n Tu-h siuin u tal k wi th Cornrndo Miff and me lit the CC CPCpromises in Hankow on 1G Ju ne Hl27. W I! wore th en d is­cuss in g why a Com m unist must not accept th e office ofcou nty ch ief. H er e is wh at Che n Tu -h siu sa id abou t the"concept of two - pha sed revolution":

"The Chinese revolution has only two phases. T he firstph ase is a civil revolu t ion , that is, a bou rgeois r evolu­lion , a nd the second is a so cialist revolution, tha t is , 11

pro le tarian revolution . Th e Communi st Par ty ca nnot directth o first phase of the revolution. Only tho bourgeoisi e ca ndirect it. Tho governmen t lind th o a rmed for ces must hein t he hands of the bourgeoisi e. If a Communist w ere 10head tho army in this ph ase, h e would become a warlord,and if h e wer e to h ead the governme n t, ,;. he would becom ea bureaucrat. Mass movements must not be all owed toim peril t he bourgeoisi e. Th e vic tory of the revolutionmust belon g completely to the bourgeoi si e, wh ich m ustbe permitted to develop ca pit alism for a lon g period. TheCom muni st Party must not begin the sec ond re vol utio nun til ca pital ism develops to a degree where a proletar­ian re volution will be possibl e. Only the n will the Com­m u ni st Par ty be able to dire ct the r evolu tion, and the na Communis t will be able to head th e army a nd not lwII warlord , and to head t he govern me n t and not be abureaucrat. Only in these condi tions will it be possibl eto arm th e workers and pea sants, to carry out anagra rian revolu tion, and to begin buildi n g socia lis m.Our sys te m of t heory and m ethod di ffers from thatad hered to by Moscow, hut we think that our sys tem iscorrect. ", . Ch? n 'I' u-h siu, Pon g Shu-ch ih a nd th eir foll ow er s call edl SYyl T syu -po , who had written a pam phlet (Third I nt er­nati onal 0 1' Z ero Ln tern ul ion al'[v in s up port of th o Comin­torn lin e, the chief rnombor of It " Mosco w gro up" . All~hos o wh o ranged thel1lse~vos wi th the Comi n torn liuo'l~d sh~.rL'd 1.syul Tsyu -po s views, wer e call ed m embersnl the TSYUl T syu -pn gro u p" or "Tsyui T syu -po'S Mos .

as ~0J'11&.I'C fOl'c nce is to bodies of power in tho centre as well

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cow grou p" . 1 s uppor ted th e Comintern lin e and appr ove dof Tsyui Tsyu -po's views. Among m y dut ies wa s tha t ofedito r uud editorial hoard member of Hsuingtao, of wh ichT syui Tsyu-po wa s edi tor-ill-chief. Besid es, in No . 198 ofHsiangtao 1 publish ed an ar ticle, " Con cerning the Out­look of th e Ch inese Il evolu t ion and H egem ony in the Hov­e lu t io n" , and wa s a lso imm ed iately named a m e mbe r of" Tsyu i Tsyu-po's Moscow gro up".

The se cond cam paign occurre d in 1930, wh en Li Li­sen's " left't -a dvcn t uris t li ne became dominant in the Par­ty. At th a t time, Li Li-sen descri bed Ch en Shao-yu, ;:.C, hin Pang-h sicn , :;-:;- \Van j:{ Chia -hs iang a nd Ho T~Hl ­

s hu ::.::-:;. (they spoke th eir m ind La Li Li-sen and mem he rsof th e Politburenu , and suppor ted the Com i ntern Ii/II!ngainst the Li Li-sen line at a m eeting of Centra l Commit­tee cadr es ) as m embers of a "right oppor tu n ist grou p"or " Chen Shao-yu's Moscow group". T hey cam e u nd erfire politically and organisa t ionally. For oppos ing Li Li ­son' s articl e, " Ques tions of the Eve of a HevolutionaryUps wing ", in a double issu e (N o. 4-5) or th e CC crcjournal Bolsh evik, and al so tho P olitburca u decision of11 Ju ne, Ch en Shao-yu was given a " la st se r ious warn­in g" on 28 June, wh ile Ch in P an g-h s ien , \Vang Ch in­hsiang and Ho Tsu-shu w er e giv en a " se rious warning" .For opposing th e Chinese Red Arrny tacti c of atta ckin glarge cit ies and the adventurist uprisings in large cit iesth e " last se r ious warning" given to Chen Shao-yu wasch anged on 7 August to a str ict er formula , " te mporarys ix-mont hs' st ay in the P arty for observation " , ::.::.::.::. whi lethe "ser ious warn ing" given to Chin Pang-hsien, W an gChla-hsiung a nd H o Tsu-shu wa s chan ged to " last ser iouswarning" . Not until 25 October, wh en thc Com in ter nExecutive's letter to th e CC CP C concerni ng th e L i Li ­sen line reach ed Shangh ai, the di sciplinary acti ons takenagainst the four of us were repeal ed in a P olil,lm re.auresolution of 10 Decem ber, and th e wh ole Party wa s m ­Iormed of th is.

:, Wan g Ming."-" Po Ku , .

,:.",:. 1-1 0 Tsu-sh u was s tri cl1y re primanded 0 11 7 Aug ust 1 0~O .

Li Li-sen sent him to Poking for tra do union work. Th ere hewas arr ested and died in a Peking m ilitary pr ison in 1\)32.

",,'>:, Thi s' could be followed by ex puls ion from th e Par ty.

Besides, in Au gus t Cheu Yuan-Ino (Li F u}, ::. whohe ad ed th o Honan provincial Par ty cununitt ee mujuri l.ywhi ch o pposed the deci si on of the sec re tar y uf the pro viu ­cial comm ittee and th e CC CPC Nort h Ch inn Tluronuconcerning armed uprisings in Chcngcho w, Kallen z .Loyang and othe r ci t ie s , w as give n a " l a st. s e r- io us wa ru ­iu g" by the North Chi n a Bureau ,

Aft er th e ~rd Cen tral Co m mittee Pl enum he ask ed rorhi s ca se to he r evie wed , hu t th e Pol ithu renu look sti lls tri cter act ion, leav ing him " i n th e P ar ty tern por nri ly 1'0 1'

observ atlou for three months", Th ere is a special Pol it ­bureau resolution of 29 January H1J I and a circularconce rning tlw ruponl of th e diseiplinnry ncl.in u agnill fltLi FII. Wh en word ul' Ch eu Yuan -lao's oppos il. io u to theLi Li -sen lin e reached th e Central Committeu, Li Ll-sunnew in to 11 rage, and said : " T hose who ca me had , [romMoscow obstru ct m y ev ery s tep. Chen Yua n-l ao is al so am emho» u[ th e Cheu Shao-y u gro up " .

Th o th ird ca m paign aga in st. \V an g l\lill ~ was 1ll01l1l1C'r!at tho t.i me of M ao's nnt.i-L eni nls t, nut i-Cumintc ru , nul.i­Soviet a nd a uti-P nrty "rec t.ifiontio n of s ty le" . Mao se nthi s uieu 10 rallies and muctings, wh er e l.hny hocklod tho" Mosco w ~ I'U U JI" 01' " pro -Sov ie t g"O llp" , Wa ng Mill g, tIle"2f1, 112 Bolsh evik s of th e 1\1 OSCOW groun", th e -wa ugMiu g gro up", etc. \Vh e n Mao w a s s how u th e fmrl ings ofth o g r o u p of doct ors in An gu s]. Hilt:), he wa s l'o ll l pPl Il'd tovis it me, and I ex plaine d th aI Ihl'l'e had I1 OYl'l' been unv" Mo:; l'OW gro up of vVallg Miu g" 0 1' " \ Va n g \I ing gro llp".I sa id 10 hiJII:

"T he so-called Che ll Shau-yu g'I'ou ll was i nvouted hyth e Trotskyit es a nd Chon T u-hs iuists ill th o winter 01'H127. I had alwa ys ta ken parI ill Ihe s l l'lIgg le a gni ns tTrotsk yism, aud th e T rotsky ites pas led a ll kind s of lalwl sto Illy lIam e. On r etlll'll iu g f,'olll \Vnhnn to Moscow inA lIgu stHl2i , 1 IHad e a lIulllb el' or repor l.s a lld f'x pla illcdth e lIeed for com ha tl.ing Ch() 11 Tn -h sin 's r ight. opp ortlln­i SIIl. T he l'ullowol's o f Che ll Tu-h sill alll on g th e Chinesestudellts ill ]l,losco\V call1'd II I() a Ts yui T SYlJ- poi sl. To ··gelher with th e Easlern Sr<:reln r'ia t of lite CO lllinlm'1l am!t he CPC repres enlative in lIle COJllinlcl'll 1 lo ok a u M:ti vC's la lld against lhe so-ca lled l\i ali gsi -CIIPk ian g Na t i \' l ~ s ' So-

" Ch ell T Y \l i~ll - tau was arres le d in Shangllai in 1!l32, tr ans­ferred to "ankmg, an d exec uted by firin g squad.

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ciety run by Trotsk yites and Chen Tu-hsiu is ts , At th e GlhCong ress of lhc CP C, hy d ecision of it s Prcs idhuu, I madea report 011 th e qu es tion of th e Kiaugs i-Cheki an g Na­t.ivcs ' Sor,ie ty, This was why th e T r-ot sky i tes an d -Che nTu -Iisini s ts began calling most of th e teach ers and s tu­dents of th e Couunu nist Unive rs ity of th e Toil ers of Chi­lin (CUTC) the 'Ch e n S huo-yu gro up' , T heir pu rpose, inofloct, was to sllo \V th a t since th ere is n Chon Shao-vu'g rou p', t h ey had a right to ha ve th ei r own I\i an g'si ­Chekiang Nativ es' Soc ie ty.

" T ile ' l a lt~ of ' t hr. 2Hi/2 Bols h ev iks' find the 'C hr-nShao-y n gro u p' was a lso luuulied a huu] by 'I'ro tsk yita sa nd Chen Tu-h s iu is ts in t he a u t.u mn of Hl2 Q d uring th o11at'ty purge ill ti ll! CUTC. I had loft. Moscow for 1I0011 e intlll~ beginnin g of Febr uary . But. rot' selfish purposes, theTrots kyites nud Ch uu 'I'u -h siui sts a t tac ke d so vcrul hnn ­dred com ra des, th e nhso lnt r; ma jo l'ity of t he C T C whos u pp orl .ed t he Comiutorn a nd th e Con t ral Couuni ttee ofth o Conuu uni st Pa r ty o f th e Sovie t Uuion anrl oppo se dth o Trotsk y it es a nd Che ll T u-hsi uists , 1'0 1' hnin g momh urso [ n 'C he ll Shao -YII g roup ' , T hey pr etend ed that only aminol'it y- 2H' /2 Bolsh eviks h ead ed h y C he n S hao -y n ­opposed them. Look a t th e nrch -re ncti onnry l\u omiTllllllg'w eekl y, Th e Anti-Japanese W ar ant! Cul tu re, a ppea r ingin Sian. I ts chid e d i to r, Yuh Ching, is n trn itor, a s py,ami a T r ot sk yit e Cl u-u T u-hsi u is t. I':ach ixsu o cn utu i us IIla­l ic.ious a rti c les a1\(1 reports Yilifyi ng the "2'K 'h Bolsh eviks '- Clw il S h ao-yu, Po Ku , Lo Fu , \ Vau g C hia -h s ia n g andothers. ' I' h is al on e should s how yo n how l.h is s lory ul'i gi­na ted. "

Mao ' l' so - t.u ug l'cpl ic rl :" I do nol. kllo w what olhe l's sa y, \Vh at. I do kn ow is

lh al yo u sLndit'd ill Mosco\\' an d that you \Vol'k ed il. ~ . th ehi gh est COllliJlt l'l'll hod ies fO l' ns l,ou g as ~ i x yea l's , S l lIe l'lh e lith CPC Cong ress a lld the hl h Conllll lern COlIg rC'ssin Hl28 yo u l1 a v l~ 1"1 0\\'11 lo p-!'Hlll,in g eOlllradcs o f ~h eCOll1muni'st ['al'Ly o f th e Silviel Ull io ll, Y01~ Wlll't~ asso r,lflt ­ed lind h nd fri endl y rf:lati oll s with th elll 101' , m~ II Y ~e:Hs

wll cn yo u work ed ill th e COll1inlel'n in th o 111,,'1 lOS. 1.11 el :eis no 'oth el' s \1eh person i ll our Party exposed lo lhl' ll'i 'nnu~ ll l' l' . In m y s peed ! Oil the recti l'lcaL!on (~ f s tylr II'ef erl'ed to peopl e w ho ' ne ve r ra il 10 m ent IO n (, l'l'pce t.he1ll0n1ent I.hey o p e ll th eir IllUuth '. ~:vel'ybod y k 1I0 WS lh atwe have u o such people in th e Purly, and tha t th er e are

only people liko you, who 'novel' fail \0 mention Leninand St ali n the m oment th ey op en their mou th ' , who 'ne v­er fail to mention th e Com interu th e moment th ey op enth eir mouth ' , alii I who ' ne ve r fail to m ention th e SovietU nion th e mom en t the y open their m ou th '. H en ce, what­over yo u may say to th e contrary, you a re in effect. thech inf m ernhe r of th e Moscow g rou p or th o pro-Sovietg rou p. Thi s is undeniable. As for th e Wang Min g group,it is just another name for the Moscow gro u p. nut it.s ta nds /'01' more than just the Moscow group. Ever sinceth e victory over the Li Li -sen line and the 4th Plenumof the Six th Central Committee you hav e been suppor tedand follow ed only by those wh o had studied or workedi n Moscow. So, w heth er ther e is suc h a n organisa tio n isone th ing, and th e fa ct that m a ny people foll ow you ,foll ow the Moscow li ne or th e Com i ntern lin e, is another.Now , we have begun to rect ify s tyle pre cise ly to endthis sort of th ing."

In th e beginning of January 1943 1 hrul a talk withLiao Lu-yen, wh o was then my poli ti cal secre ta ry, aboutth e three pa st ca m paigns against the " Moscow grou p" . Hemado notes of our con versa tion and look th em to Mao'I's e-tung . Learning abou t this, Ko Ching-sh ih warned m ethat Mao Tso-tuug would probahly be an noyed. But Maodid not dare to say anythin g publicly abou t th e inform­er 's not es.

This shows that Mao mounted hi s attack on the " Mos­cow gro u p" or "Wang Ming grou p" as a pretext for doin gaway wit h W ang Ming a n d ce rt a in others . From time I;)Lime, in fa ct, he deliberately "spread the word " that. so­~nd-so b ~longed t o the " W ang Min g gro u p", and Saw toIt th a t th is should be r ep orted in the Iorci gn pr ess. Th er e­upo~~ he IISed th e " re port" spread by himself as th e " 1' (1a­SO!l for per secutin g peopl e 1'01' Iwlon ging' to the " W an jrMing gro up " . .

.I t .IlIus L be point ed out h er e that ther e ha s been a 1111st ill ~ s a s truggh, between two ideologi es, two th eori es,tw o 1.IIl ~s and tw o roads in 1,lw Cumm u nis t P arty or Chinn.~ut It. IS no t ,~ha~ Mao descr ibes as a st ruggle between

Russum Marxism" and " Ch in es c ~l a l' xi sll1 " II is 'Iand irrecon cil ab le s t.rug~ le betw e·cn 'J\ill r x i'sm~ I' ~ t.eaand allti - ~ r · . ' t ' . L " ( . "en llll sm

n arx rst, an u- en ruis t I'O""tl' (')11Ilt'" M .t l " I " U c, ' (,y IV a OI SrTl Of'ie t iou ghts of Mao Tsc-lung". T h is str uggle I '"

tw o theories . t I I. • , c' h:LWee ns IS a s rugg C uctwecu th o l\lal'xi sl:-Lcll il{isL

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th eory of the Chinese revolution and tho l\Iaoist theory ofthe Chinese r evolution. '

The s ubs tauce of the Maois t theory is that " the Chineserevolutio,n is H revolu tio n in a colon ial, se m i-colon ialand seml- fe~dal c,o~n try" and that, formally, its devol­° IH!len t consists of two stages : th e new-dem ocratic r evo ­lu tion a.nd the soc i alis~ revolution " ( th e an ti-imperia lis ta nd a nti -f eu dal revo lu t ion COIIICS un der tho head of new­democra tic. - Wang Ming). In fa ct, however, the Maoistth eor y of the development of China does not go beyondtl~ e st ago of the new -dem ocral ic, r evolution . Af ter th e~l~ ~ or'y of the ne,w-d erno,c~ati (:. r e:'ol ut ion , accomplishe d. w l~h. th o pr~l cta l'lat. parucipaung 111 th e leade rship ( t hatI S , JOI ntl y w! th the bou rgeoisie - Wan g Mil/g) or und erth~ Ica dorsh ip of the proleta riat" , it will be possible tobu dd a " new-democratic r epu bl ic" , tha t is , "a r epubli cbased on new Three People's Princip le s, th ree ne w basicpoli t!cal gUi~elin es " ( i.e . a left-Kuomintnng type of re­public Iol lowing three basi c politi ca l guidelines: " alliancewith Russia , alli au ce with the Com muni st Pa rty, and s u p­port of pe asants and worker s"; in ot her wo rds, not a~' ep ublic .in ,~hi ch lea.dership would belong [ 0 th e proletar­ra t and ItS Communist Party, hut a r ep ub li c l ed by t hebourgcoisie and it s politi cal party- W ang Ming) . It goeswithout saying that a "new-d emocratic r evo lution ' of thissor t ca n not grow over into a socialist revolution , Ma o,ther efor e, se t th e soc ia l ist revolution in the distant future.T o a ll intents and purpose s, Mao's work, On New Dem oc­racy , is therefore basically an ada pt a tion of Che n Tu­hsiu 's "concept o] two- phased revolution " to a new si t­u a ti on . Th e w ord s give n ah ova in inverted commas arefro m th e sec t ion, " T he Poli cy of New Dem ocracy", inOn N ew Democracij, which ap pe ared in Mac' s on e-vo lum eSelected W ork s (T ungpet shui ien , 1948 ).

The esse n tial differ en ce between the Ma rx ist-Le n inis tand Mao ist theor y of th o Chinese r evol ut ion consis ts int he foll owing : Marxism -L en in ism stan ds with th e pro­let ariat , whi le Maoism stands with the bourgeoisie. Thisis expressed, first of all, in the diff erent under standingof the characte r of the anti-imper ialist revolution andthe struggle aga inst the remnants of feu dalism . In theMarxist-L en inist view the anti-imperialist revolution isnot merely a step objec tive ly favouring the developme ntof nati on al capital ism , but al so and chiefly a par t of so-

cialism's struggle ag ainst world cap ita lism, ~ preparat~rystep and preliminary condit ion for ~ socialist revolutIOnin China. Similarly, the struggle against the remnants offeudalism is not merely a s tep clearing tl~e way for thedevelopment of capitalis m, but al so and chiefly ~ prepara­tory step and preliminary condition for ~ socialist re v?lu­tion in China. This is why, in th.e Marx:st-Lemmst View,the bourgeois-democratic revolutIOn begins ~o gr.ow overinto a socialist revolution at the moment of It.S. vlcto~Yi ' t

For Maoism on the other hand, the antt-impena IS

revolution and'the anti-feudal revolution. ~re confinedbio

crea ting favourable conditions and prov.ldll~.g f~vour~ 0

opportunities for the dev elopment of capltalI~~hlllhChpi~~~This is why in his On New Demo cracy, w IC .e .lished in th~ early forties, Mao denied that aft~r its VIC­

tor the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolutIOn ~ouldr!w over into a socialist revolu tion. In l:is ~tM Chinese~evolution and the Communist Party oj China, . Chapter 2("The Chinese Revolution"), poi~t ,?, referrmg ~o the" prospects of the Chinese revolutIOn , Mao. wr?te.

"After the victory of the revolution, a capitalist .econ?­my will have enough opportunities. for. d~velopmg ill

Chinese society for the revolution WIll ehml? ate the ob­s tacles to its development. This is eas ily pIctured, andthere is nothing sur prising about it." He hel~, at the sametime that after the victory of the revolution there canmer~ly be a "development ?f so.clalist eleme~ts".

The difference al so consists III the following. In theMarxist-Leninist view, the decisiv e conditions for thegrowth of the Chi nese bourgeois-d emocratic into a social­is t revolution are ins ide the country, hegemony of theproletariat in the ~evolution through ~he Communist P~r­ty and, on the international scene, assistance of the S?v.letUnion . At no time did Mao accept these decisiveconditions . Why? Let us briefly recapitulate Mao 's perti­nent pronouncements and actions of the past few decades.This will help us to see why.

.. T he Ch inese R evolution and the Communist Party of Chinawas pr epared in 1939 by a worker of tho Propaganda Departmentof the ee epe by name of Yang Sung (Wu Shao-yi) and othercomrades. Lo Fu and then I edited it, and correct ed its mistakes.Then, it was shown to all the Politbureau comrades for theiropinion . When it reached Mao, he did not return it. ShortlyYang Sung "fell ill" and died in Yenan. A few years later Ma~included it in his Se lected W orks. '

i30

In an article, Th e Coup in Peking and th e Merchants(July 1923) , Mao described the bourgeoisie as th o "load­or" of ~h e revolution.

In hi s R eport on an Investigation of the Peasant Move­ment in H unan Province (March 1927) , he denied th one~d. for an alliance between tho peasants and the prole­taria t and for the hegemony of the proletariat in thisalliance , while exaggerating the revolut ionar y role of thepeasants.

In 1931 he maintain ed that "the Soviet movement inChina is a purely peasan t movement" an d did not ac­knowledge th o leading role of the pro letariat and its van­guard, the Communist Party. For this reason, he deniedtho non -capitali st, tha t is, socialis t perspective of theChinese revolution, and call ed for a "peasan t cap italis m".

In his On N ew Demo cracy (January 1940), he rejectedthe non -capitali st perspective of the Chinese r evolu tion.As I have already sa id, he called for a bourgeois-demo crat­ic republic with a "new-democratic" policy , econo my andcultur e.

In October 1940 he publicly urged an alli ance withGermany, Italy and Japan, and, insid e the country, analli ance wit h the Japanese Invaders, that is, a policy ofna tional t reason (q .v . Part III ).

From the autumn of 1941 until the summer of 1945 hoconducted the anti -communist and anti-Soviet "campaignfor the rectificati on of s tyle" and su bstituted Maoi sm forLeninism.

In Au gu st Hl44, speaking to John Service, second sec­retary of th e US Em bassy in China, Mao sai d: "Wo donot exp ect Russian help . . . Chinese and America n inter­es ts ar e corre la ted an d similar . . . We should coopera te ."To Harri son Forman, a US journ ali st, ho said : "W e ar enot stri ving for the soci al an d political Communis m ofSoviet Ru ssia. Ra ther , we prefer to think of wha t we aredoi ng as something that Lin coln fought for in your CivilWar: the Iib ora ti on of slaves."

In April Hl45 at the 7th CPC Congress, in h is report,On Coalitio n Government, Mao said : "We have loo littleca pitalis m", an d "the str uggle for new democracy willst ill be long". lI e added : "W ithout the deve lopment ofpri vate capitali st and other economy th o building of so­ciali sm is impossib le". He came out against the correctpoint uf view that at th e moment of victory the hour-

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geoi s-d emoeratic revolution grows into u soGi ai is l, revol u-

Uon, 1 CIII March 1940, at the 2n d Plenum ,o ~ the Sevent I en-

tral Committee, Mao voiced the opiruon .tha ~ afte~ tl~cvictory of the bourgeoi s-d em ocratic re~olutlOn in Chl ~,a Itwould still be necessary, for a lon g tune, to f?llow thopoli cy of four sides and eight dire~ lio ~l s ", includin g "equalobservance of the inter ests of cap ItalI st s, as well as :~ork­ers ", and to build "the society uf ,ne,w dem ?Cl:acy . Herejected socialist revolution and bll~~dmg soc~ ahsm: Con­cerning foreign relations, h e s~id New Ohina \~lll notneed to be recognised, at least In th e first few ye,\~s "either by Britain or th e United Slates, or by the US?~, .Mao did not want China to en ter the soclalist

car:'the article, On the Democratic Di?tatorsh ip of th ePeople (June 1949), Mao said that no dict atorship of t;1leproletariat can be established ,in China, and t~? alterr:,~ tI.vewas a " dem ocr at ic dictalorsillp of th e people as a jointdictatorship of the working class, peasantry, petty bour-geoisie, and national bourgeoisie". . , '

In the fifties Mao set out to subver t th e socialis t gainsby the extreme " leftist" policy uf " three r.ed bann ers" .And followin cr the failure of his adventul'lst und ert.ak­ings-the "big leap", "everybody smelts steel" , and thepeople's commu nes - he said again: " I ll a ,h ackw~r~ coun­try Iike China it will be impossible to build socialism Iortens, even hundreds, of years" .

. In the sixties Mao embarked on the treacherous courseof anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, of st ru ggle againstth e world communis t movement, of a coun ter- rev ol ut ion­ary coup, and of coll us ion with im periali sm and otherr eactionary for ces. Concealing hi s coun ter-revolu tiona rydeeds behind such terms as " Marxism-Leninism" , " soc ial­ism", "dictatorsh ip of the pr oletaria t" , and th e like, h ebegan cha nging China's political image, clinging, as be­fore, to hi s r eactionary Maoist th eory of " n ew demo c­racy".

The real struggle of tw o lin es is a strugg le betweenth e line of the Marxists-Lcn ini sts and th e line of MaoT's u-tung in differ ent pori ods of th e Chinese r ev oluti on. Ihave already wr itten ab out th e main content of th ese twoIl ues in L enin, Leninism, and th e Chin ese R evolutionpubli shed in 1970 on th e ce nte nary of Lenin's birth:

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Below is a comparison of the two different a pproache s tothe qu esLion of periods in th e Chinese revolution.

Mao Tse-tung di vided th e Ch inese revolution into twostages and four per iods. Accord in g to hi m , th e firs t stageis a "new-d em ocrati c revolution", which consis ts of fourper iods , namely: 1) the period of th e first civil war (HI25­Hl27); 2) th e per iod of th e second civil war (19 27-HI J7) ;3) the period of the anti-J apanese war (Hl 37-1945) ;q ) the period of the third civil war (1945-Hl49). Thesecond stage consis ts of the socialis t re volution, whoseadvent is in determ inate (see HIl Chiao-mu 's pamphlet,Thirty Y ears 01 the Commu nist Party of China , writtenon Mao 's direct in structions) . It was not until after LiuShao-chi, wh o returned from Moscow to P eking in theheginning of Hl53, passed on th e opin ion of the Cl'SUleadership th a t "the establi shme nt of th e P eople 's Repub­lic of China marked th e And of the stag e of th e bourgeois­democratic r evolution and the be ginning of the sociali st.revolution ", a nd after a resolu tion on this score wa sadopted by th e 4 th Ple num of the Seventh Central Com­mittee in February 1954, that Mao was compell ed torecognise th at the sociali st stage of the Chinese r evolu­tion had begun.

This shows that Mao knows neither the criteria for di ­viding the Chinese revolution into s tages , nor th e criteriafor setti ng per iods. F or him the form of revolutionarystrug gle , i.e. war , is the criterion for per iods . He doe snot under stand tha t the national or social con ten t of "herevolutionary struggle is the real cr iter ion. I wr ote aboutthis in L enin, L eninism, and the Chin ese R evolution,showing that th e Chinese r evolution cons is ts of five pe­riods-first, the period of the r evolution of the unitednational anti-imperialist front and preparations for tileagrarian revoluti on (19 24-1927); second, th e period ofthe agrarian re volution and prepa ra tions for the unitednational anti-Japanese front (1927-1937) ; third, the pe­riod of the united nation al anti-Japane se front, the an ti­Japanese national -r evolu tionary wa r , and pr eparations forwinning th o bou rgeois-dem ocratic revolution (Hl37-H)·'t5) ;fourth, th e period of th e victory of tho bourgeois-demo­crat ic revolution and its gr owth into socialist revolution(1945-1949) ; flft.h, the peri od of socialis t r evolution andthe build in g of soci alis m, wh ich began with th e establi sh­ment of the People's Hepuhlic of China in October 1949.

133

I t needs a s pecial work to look into the periods ofthe Chinese revolution in greate r det ail.

Due to the fundam ental differen ces between Maoi sm(or " tho ughts of Mao T se-tung") and Leninism, the thi~d

period of th e "styl e rectifica tion " ca m pa ig n ~a:v th~ mainblow being direct ed, as be fore, at the Lenini sts m theCPC, firs t of all W ang Ming.

"Emergency salvati on r allies" wer e called in the con­fer ence hall of th e CC CP C in Yantsi alin (at tended byall Cen tral Committee cadres, m embers and alternatemembers of the Politbureau, including Mao, member s andalternate mem be rs of the Central CommltL ee, del egates tothe 7th CPC Con gr ess present in Yonan, and others­all in all mor e than a th ou sand peopl e). Belore a m eotingwould begin , people sp ecia lly ap po in ted by the "commis­sion for th e rec tification of sty le " made deprecatory re­marks ag ains t Wang Ming, calli ng him "dogm atist" , " run­ning dog of the R ussians", " traitor" , and "count.er-re v~l ll '

tionary". This, Mao hoped, would cow the aud ience . 1Il~O

su bmission, and nobody would dare take Wang ]vIln?" ssi de. H e was especially anxious that nobody sh ould raisethe subject of W ang Ming's poi soning, a fa ct that hadbeen proved by th o group of cons ult ants . There wasmuch talk about this at the time, and many peo pleguessed that the poi soning wa s Ma o's handiwork, whichfact caused him cons ide rable worry.

When Meng Ohing-shu (member of th e standing burea uof the Central Comm ittee com mi ssion for work amongwomon and a del ega te to tho 7th C PC Congress ) , rebuffedthe sla~derers at one of these ra llies an d sa id that WangMinz had been poiso ne d an d hi s life wa s in danger,Mao'i's per son al secretary Hu Chiao-mu got up andsho u ted :

"W hy did you tell people tha t Wang Ming was poi -so ned by Chai rman Mao?"

" W ho did I t ell this to ?" Men g Ching-shu asked.Li Kuo-hua * jum ped up and cr ie d;" You sa id it to m e.""Wher e and wh en did I say i t to yo u? " Mong Ching­

sh u asked.

,. Li Kuo-hun was a Red Army soldier . In th e thlrtlos 11estudied in Moscow. At th e tim e of "style rectification" and"em ergency salva tion" he was slandered. W hat he said at th orally was obviously said under compulsion.

134

" Last March , wh en Comrade ' Yang Ming wa s in a O'ravecondition . I visited h im a t th e Central Hospit al, That waswhen yon said it to me," Li Kuo-hua answered.

Meng Ching-shn said:"At that time, * m any people carne to se e Wang Ming

every day. \Vh en you came Wang Ming wa s in a cr it ica lcondit ion . T he guards did not let you into the ward.Neither I nor Wang Mlng could have seen yo u there.This can be con firmed by the guards. Now, I must askyou : how could yo u ha ve known last March th at WaneMing wa s poi soned , let alone who had don e it? The fa ctthat W ang Ming wa s poiso ne d wa s establis he d this sum­Ill?r by th e group of cons ult a nts. Who poiso ned WangMI~g? I am SU fO it wa s done by imper ialists, nationaltraito r's, Ku omi rit an g spies, Trotskyites, or sim ila r S CO U ll­drels ."

Mao sat with lowered head and crimson fa ce in thecentr e of the front row. Po Ku, who wa s in tho centreof th e th ird row, s ta red at Meng Ching-shu with wide­open eyes, dr eading that with her usu al s traigh tforward­ness she might say every th ing she kn ew.

My guards wrote a note to the chairman of the meeting,confirming the fact that thoy had not allowed Li K uo­hua to enter tho ward and that he had not seen eith erW a ng Ming or Meng Ching-shu.

Mao tried to pr evail on peopl e that. W ang Ming wassim ula ting illness. Th is att ra cte d still more atten ti on tomy poisonin g and to th e qu estion of wh o wag the culprit .

A t the samo meeting, Meng Ching-shu sa id:" I t was said at tho meeting today that th e Au gu st

First Appeal wa s written by Kang Shang. Th e Appealhas long since become a hi storical Party document andone would think that th ere is no need for di scussing whowrote it. But since it is being claimed th a t Kang Shengwrote it, I want to ask him-has he th e ner ve to ac­k nowledge that h e wr ote it?"

Kang Sheng lowered hi s head, and did not repl y.Menz Ching-shu cont inue d:" T a~k all of yon: must a Communist obey h is consc i­

ence?"Nobody dared r eply, and sh e answered her own ques­

t ion :

* In 1942.

"I think he must. The August Fi" st Appf'al was writtenby \Vang Min g. In the beg inn iu g of June. H135, on. theday h e ret urned to Moscow a fte r' a \,a(:a l lll ll and tr e a t­m ent in Ki sl ovodsk , h e said to th e com rades who h allcome to see him: 'T he Japa ne se aggression in NorthChin a is ex pandin g. T h e s ituation is tense. At tho san a­torium in Kislovodsk 1 ca me to the conc l usion tha t ther,emust be a new docum ent in t he name of th e. CC Cl'C,in order to prom ote the united nation al an tl-! ~paIlesefront poli cy.' On the foll owin g da~ he be~an wn urur theAppeal to All Com pat ri ot s Concol'Jl ln~ Resistunce to Ja panand Salvation of the Hom el and , which lat er came to ~e

known as the Au gu st F irst Ap peal. For th ree days. Insuccession h e worked OIl it until t hree in the rnorrung,and on the fourt h d av added fur ishing tou ches. On th efifth day, a m eet ing ~ f tho CPC Co~inte~'n deleg.atio,J)w as ca lled to discu ss the draft. T he dISCUSSIOn con ti nuedfor several da ys, wi th 'W ang Ming ~llaking a report onthe dra ft, and th en al so th e concluding re m arks . .A:- fp;;vcom ra des pr esent in this h all took part in th o meetm~.

Now, th e " cl aq ue " led by Li Fu-ch un began howling.But Kao Tzu-li ':. got up and sa id :

"I took pa r t in that m eetin g, and I al so attended th e7th Congress of th e Comintcrn. I h eard Comrade WangMing' s r ep ort a nd hi s concluding r em al'k s,,, and clearlyre call the discussiun of th e dr a it, I ca n tell. ...

Ther e w er e ho wl s and s hr ieks . Kao 'I'zu-li was shou teddown . But Mao's attempt to pa ss Kang Sheng off asthe ini tiator of tho united national a nti-J apan ese frontpoli cy fell th rou gh.

Thereu pon , on Mao's in structi on s, a few speak ersh eaped in sults on m e and Meng Ching-shu, Sh e r~llUffed

them. A few u pr igh t com rad es wante d to speak 1Il ourdefen ce, hu t none was given th e fl oor.

Mao was worried . Th o m om en t Li Fu-chun closed th orally, he began upbraidin g him: " T he m eeting was fullof lowl y in te re sts. There was no thing ins truc tive." In

" A lias Chou He-sh eri, head of th e building administration inth e government of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningh sia Border Area. In1933 he was sent to Moscow as a CPC delegate to the 7th Con­g('ess o f th e Corru n te rn. Her r. he w ns elected momber of thoInternational Contr ol Commission. Was at one time Minist er ofAgriculture of tho Chin ese Soviet Republic.

130

o t~ l e r words, he cons idered the ant i-W a ng Ming "all y aIailure . H o had himself been in a deli ca te spot on som epoin ts , and was now for ced to pl an new steps againstWa ng Ming,

Soo n, a seco nd anti-W ang Ming rall y wa s call ed.This t im e. Ma o in stru ct ed Lu Ti uO'-i ::. 10 say from tho

ro strU.lll that :' thc (!esorter m ust be S}1Ot" . Lu Ting-i sa idtha t in war tim e, II] all ages, in all arm ies , deserterswere shot ; now, while the "sty le rect ification" ca m paig-nWaS at it s heig-ht , the re were people who ha d [110 terncritvto ask the Centr a l Commltton of th e Soviet Comrnuni~tParty and tho Comin tern to se nd a pla ne for th em a ndlake th em to the Sovie t Unio n for tr ea tm en t; th is w asan att ornpt to esca pe "st yIe recti fica tion" -slwel' dese r­lion, and deser te rs mu s t be shot. Th en, Lu Ting-i wro tea n . ed i tori~.l , which a J~p ea red on t he foll owi n g' da y inCh ieh ja ngiih.pno, Lu Tin g- i d id not m ention \ Va n g- Mirr gby name eit.he r a t ths rall y or in the od itor inl, hu t th o" talc" was quickly spre ad t ha t \ Ya ng Ming was m eant;the a tm osphe re thu s created was on e of Inar a11(1 terror.

At another rally, Li Fu-chun suddenly go t up andan nounced that K o Cli ing-sh ih ?" was a counl.or- rn vnl u .,t iona ry. Ko was inst antly .soized , ti ed lip , put under housearrest, and ord er ed to wr ite a " co n fession". On th e fol­lowing day , on Mao's orde rs, Liu Shao-c h i su rn moncdKo , and told h im : " \Ye have ac te d ag ainst you becauseyou knew \Y a ng Min g in the twen ti es, look par t in th es truggle against th e Li L i-sen line under hi s di rectionin 1930, and han been W an g Miug 's depu ty in the unit­I'd fr ont d ep art.m en t of t he Cen tral Committee s inc« 1D3U.The style rectification Campaig n has been goi ng on aloner time but you ha ve said nothing yet agains t WangMiJ~g. Ev~rybod'y k nows tha t you are an old Y CLer andCom mu nis t, and W an g Ming's dep uty. S ince you havebeen hran ded a coun ter -re volutiona ry , peo ple will be ledto conclu de that W an g Min g, too, is probably n ot asreliable as th ey th ou ght."

* A Litt er opponent of th o Comintern , th e Sovie t Union andthe "Moscow group" who had been closely connected with th eTrotskyites in "tho tw enti es and thirties.

,',' t ater, Ko Ching-sh ih was member of LIte l'oli Lbur ca,u, Secre.­tary of th e CC Cl'C Sha nghai Bureau, and ma yor of Shanghal.In 1965 he died "suddenl y" in Chengtu, where he had beensummoned to accomp any Mao all his vacati on.

This is a vivid exam ple of the cynicism of these people,and of how far th ey departed from the principles andstyle of behaviour adopted in Communist par ties intryin g to incite pe ople against W an g Ming.

It was in th is oppressive atmosphere of fear and ter­ror that Mao se nt Li Fu-chun, Peng Chen , Kao Kangand Lin Piao " to see Po Ku in Chinliangshan, whereChiehfangjihpao h ad it s editorial offices (from the autumnof 1941 to the day of hi s death in 1946 Po Ku wased itor-in-ch ief of Chiehjangj ihpao). Heferring to in struc­t ions they had received from Mao Tse-tung, they toldPo Ku th at he h ad to write "a confess ion revil ing throe" ,mean ing, as Mao conceived the formul a, "reviling him self ,revilinz \VaIl O' Ming and revili n g the Russians," whe re

'=' ....' C ." reviling the - Ru ssi an s" m eant reviling the onuuternand the Soviet Uni on. If Po Ku had refu sed , he wouldhav e been arrested and sho t, and the pr ess would reportthat he h ad been a counter-revolutionary. Later , Maotold me that Po KI1 had lon g resisted th e order to writea "confession" . He we pt all throu gh the night, and didnot zive hi s consent until h e wa s about to be tied upand led away. Ma o admi tted to m e that he us ed thesame m ethod with Lo Fu and Yang Shang-kun to forcethem to write similar "confessions reviling three". WangChia-hsiang and Kai F eng wer e gravely ill in the latterhalf of the "styl e r ectification" period, which pr eventedMao from for cing "confessions" from them.

Mao als o used strong-arm tactics against the chiefmembers of the " group of empir icists"-Chou En-lai andP ong Teh -huai , Bu t it was only after nearl y two y ears ofpreparing and conduc ting the "style rectifica tion" ca m­pai gn , which was also directed against this pair, that Maore called Chou En-lai fr om Chungking in July 1943, whileP en g Teh-huai wa s r ecalled fr om the battle zon e inNorth China eve n lat er - November 1943. In othe rwords, the hysterical ni ghtmare of "emergency salvation"had already begun when they returned to Yenan. Theywere completely unpr epared, eithe r poli tica lly or morally ,for tho abuse heap ed on the m at va r ious rallies in thesituat ion of " accomp lis he d fa cts" that Mao had cr eated.

As I have already sa id , Mao admit ted to m e on 18December 1948 that he h ad boon in th e wr ong at that time.

* Then commander of tho 8th Rout e Army's 115th Division.

1 :\~

Speaking at the 2nd Pl enum of the Seventh CentralCommittee in March 1.94.rl, I compared Mao 's pamphl~tOn New D.emocracy , wi th how Len ini sm and the Comin­t ern cO~lceIved the fundamental qu estions of the Chinesere volu tion. I. ~laintained that Mao's con cept differed from~ha~ . of Le~lllism and th e Comintern over its character,~ta,..,es, mot\vo forces, and the hegemon of th e revoluti on ,i ts perspectives, and th e like. I dem onstr at ed in factthat ~ao 's "though ts" we re con tr ary to Marxism-Lenini sm'up settmg th e ~Jaim th at they wer e "the sole gu ide';o.f th e Comm unist Party of China. I called special atton­tJO!I to the two main conditions for 1I1 e z rowth of the? hmes? bourge ois-d em ocratic r evolu tion il~to a soc ialis t}evolution (h~gemonf' of the pr oletar ia t and assis ta ncerom t~,e SOVlCt Umo;r) , and showed that Ma o's "four

r?as ons why th e C.hmese bourgeois-democratic rovo lu­t ion coul.d notgr ow into a sociali st revolution ( the exis t­ence of irnper iall sm, th e contin uinc- azrarian re volu t ionundevelopad c~~it~li sm, and the in;ol~ement of the na~tional bourgeoIs.Ie III the revolution) were groundle ss.~lso, I ex~lall~ ed ~hat in m y article, "The Soviets in

China as a .Special Farm of 'pemocrat ic Dictatorsh ip ofthe Prolet arrat and P easantry (Commnnist I nternational1934) , I h ad exami ne d th e Leni ni st propositions of th~Com m tern that the Chinese bourgeois-d emo cratic rev­olution could gro w in to a soc ialist revolution . I stressedthat this would occur the moment the bourzcots-derno­crat ic revolution won a decisivo vic tory in China. I toldthe Pl enum that the basic concepts presented in this ar­t iclo had been approved by the Comintern .

Mao did no t dare, at that ti me and for many ye arslater, to publish hi s report " to the 2nd Plenum of th eSeventh Centr al Committee. Neit h er did h e clare to de­mand that a resolu ti on be ado pte d on hi s report.

Naturally, the talk h e had with me in December 1948and my speech at the 2nd Pl enum had an gered Mao. Inhi s concluding remarks at the 2n d Plenum h e re bukedme for continuing to oppose the "thoughts of Mao Tse­tung" , and sa id my sp eech was "full of poisons". ',':'

,. Mao's repor t, considerably altere d, was first published in1960, in th e four th volume of his Selected W orks.

''' ' When tIle Plenum closed, Mao stayed behind . I asked him :"What did you mean by my speech being full of poisons?" Hesaid: "Th ere were at least eight or ten poisonous points. First,

Tlte " theses " of hi s concluding remarks wer e Int er cir­cula tod among P url y m embers. One of them wa s: "H owto help Comrade ' Yang Min go re ct ify hi s m ist nk cs". Thiswas a sig na l for It new nnti -Wang Ming campaig n .

On Hi March t 949 a t 5 p.m. , Mao visited m e. (W elived then in the villa ge of l l si pei po, Pi ngsl iau coun ty ,H opch provi nco.) II e sh owed me the " con lessions" of PoKu, Lo Fu and Yang Sh ang -ku n , and said I 111I1St al sowrite a "confess ion revili ng three", that is , revi ling my­se lf , r e\'iling them (Po Ku, Lo Fu, Y ang Shang-ku n andoth er s), and r evili n g the Russians. Th er eupon, with ob­vious pride, Mao told m e h ow h e had forced Po K u andthe oth er s to writ e their "con fessions" . Sudd enl y , herai sed hi s voi ce: "If you don' t write it , I'll treat you asI treat ed P o 1\:11 ." I ca tego ri ca lly refll sl' d to do th o absurdand im proper thing he ask ed. I said it wou ld be cr im inal ,and warned him: " If you dare stain your h ands wit h' Yan g Mings bl ood , you wi ll earn th e re puta tion ofcou nte r-r ev olu tioJlary and t raitor to commu ni sm , wh lch yonwill never be abl e to wash off." I also sa id : " Not onlydo I refuse to write, ImL also to r ead anyth i ng of theki nd." I asked h im to take the " confessi on s" away.

Crimson to hi s cal'S, Mao said : "Whether or not vouwrite a confession is up to you Lo decid e. T will l ea ve

in m y report th er e was no mention of Marxism-Leninism , Lenin.Stalin and the Comintern. Your speech, on th e other h and, hadso J!iHny ql!otlltions an n references to Mnrxl sm-Leninism, and toLenin, Sta lin and the Comintern about th e Chinese revolutionth at th e comrades will th ink you are th e only one who recognisesthem , and . I do not recogn ise them. After your spee ch, duringth c ~lmch int erv al . I or.der~d portraits of Marx, En gels, Lenin andStalin to he hung up III th e h all. In my concluding remarks, tomak e up Ior Illy omiss ion, I suggest ed 'thn t all comrades shouldst~tdy t \\'I']:-'e books of Marx. Enge ls, Lenin and Stalin, But thi s\\ ' 111 not ~\'Ip e out th e imp ression crea ted by your speec h, Is th isnot. II, poison? S~eond . my repor t to th e Plenum gnvn 110 sys ­tematic .eXP,ll1ll at lOll uf th~ question s of th e Chinese revolu tion .~ll I said. \I as that the Chinese revolution had urb an period s and}ural per iods. and th at the rovolu t ionarv war would continu e

OT' an oth er three 10 five yeflr~ : I ~po lcc about th e cu rren t sta prf t~; rev1.lutlon and th e polit lca l line. questions of hom e a~dorergn P? I Cy. and so Oil . In you r speech, on the oth er ha nd

th e que stions of th e Chin ese revolution ar a present ed ns ~ s stordand are ~~) c ~~mprehensivel.v ~et out that it looked like ' L~ SU;l~li~up 0If histor tcal resu lts. I'his creat ed tho im pression th at you

g

not . were milk i ngo th » report to tl 1'1 ' V < • •puisnn ?" \11 ' . II I r'· . ie cnum. \ as th is no t. . • III ,. 10 Ist !!d " t 1 ' 0 ." I "t ions for each uf th~II1, . ell iorsons'. pro vlrlod expluua-

t he se three for you to read " I ' 1t I

· ' . r llmam ce [r ue to I ·t tm en nne (lJd not r ead t hem . 1\ICIl" (,1' . __ I n y :; .a ()-tl I tl . ,'r , r:"t ~ ll n g-~ Ill, w h o g l n n c tHII~O.ug \ . 101;1, s,ald :. ' 1 he ha sic content of these 'con­

fe~ s l~ ns (.f I 0 Ku, 1.0 F u and Yang S ha ng -ku n WII K Ull ­

qu ostionahly Iabricntcd by Mao T se-tung."~r.lel' I had so firmly ref used to write a " con fes sion

reY I ~l ~)g. three", Mao de vised n ew in trigues aga ins t me .On _b Octob er H14~), Ior exam ple , l .o lold the I'ol ithureaut~) include " Poin l N o. !r' (on W an g- l\ling) in it s r e~'iOiu­t~u n , and OIl 9 Jun e 1n:J0 ti ,e 3rd PJ e lll J1I1 of the Se ven thCen~r~l Committee, al so. on his in si sten ce, adop ted aDeCI SIOn 011 COl I1 l'H do \ Vilng Miug. The two decisions~moun Led to a demand that I sho uld ackn owl edge the' m is t akes of 'Yang Ming's political lines during the civi lwar an d the anti-J apane sc war" Iabricated by Mao dur­i~g the "style rectiflcation " cam paign . Though the dcci­SIOn . of the 3rd P lenum said t.hat " Comrade ' Vang Ming­conti nues to r efuse to repen t h is pa st mistakes" I wascertain th at my position was correct: the Ili storic~l t ruthwas on my side. T he decision read : " The 3rd Pl enum of theCentral Committee has decided that Comrade Wang Mingmust at long last ful fil tho de cision of the 2nd CC Plenumand de eply rep ent the com miss ion of fundam ental mi stakesin his variou s articles, pamphlets and other documentswrit ten during the civil war and the war of resistanceto Japan". Y et , th er e had been no decision of the 2ndCC Plenum dem andin g such a s ta tement fr om me. Thefirst J h eard of suc h a demand was on 23 Octo be r 1949from Liu Shao-chi , whom Mao had sent to me,

The tal k with Liu Sh an-ch i she ds light on the situ at ionin which .Mao Iabricated tho "two li nes of W ang Min g"an d explain s why he wanted m e to wr ite such a stateme n t.

"Why did you write so prolifically durinz the civil warand the anti -Japan ese war -e-several million words ina ll?" Li n asked me. "You wrote arti cles, rep orts andd~cn~ents ,. and even a book on th e s truggle against th eLi Li-sen line. Look aro und you , has an yone else in ourParty. writ ten as much as you have? Nobody has. Andsince you wrote so much, Chairman Mao was able tot ake tw o phrases at random durin g th e s tyle r ect ificat ion ,and turn th em into two oppor tunist li nes. Is this a lot?On e co uld take more phrases, and easily produce 20, 200and 2,000 lines. That Chairman Ma o asks you to wr itea s tatemen t is noth ing but a point of organisational

procedure. He knows you will not write it. Mind. you,even if you wrote it, it would be of no use. ChUl~manMao can then say tha t everything you wrote IS atvariance with the tho ughts of Mao Tse -tung, so yourwriting the statement will be in vain." .

Most of the comrades in the Central Committee knewthat in the civil war and the anti-Japanese war W an gMing represented the correct, Comintorn line, and thatit was Mao Tse-tu ng who, in both these periods, followe dan incorrect political line and com~itted many fun~an~en­tal mistakes. This is why , despite the donunciatio nsand threats contained in the decisio ns of th e Politbureauan d the 3rd Central Committee Plenum, I was able(knowing that these decisions had been taken underMao's pressure and were contrary to th e facts and thetruth of history) to continue defending the truth anddenouncing the untruth, and not wr iting the statement:

Here is the text of the Decision on Comrade W ang Mingof the 3rd Plenum of the Seventh CC, taken on 9 June

1950: . d b C d W" In view of th e mistakes commItte y omr~ e angMing during the civil war an d, the war of r.esIst~nc~ toJapan, the 2nd Plenum of th e Central Co~nllttee m.Feb­ru ary 1~)!10 instructed Comrade Wan? Mmg to write astatement to the Politbureau. At that time .C.omrade WangMing said that he would honour this deCISJOIl. B.ut he IScontinuously deferring his promise though the ~ohtburca~has issued reminders. On 23 Octobe r 1949, Liu Shao-chiwas sent to ta lk to Comrade Wang Ming on behalf ofthe Politbureau. He told Comrade Wang Ming th at hemu st respect the decision of the 2nd CC Plenum andthat it is a misdemeanour on his part to delay mattersand not write the statement. He said that Comrade WangMing must promptly produce th e s~atement. ?,n 26 Oc­tob er 1949, having heard Comrade Liu Shao-chi s accountof his talk with Comrade Wang Ming, the Politbureauinformed Comrade Wang Ming of the following: 'Com­rade Wang Ming is obliged to obey th e decision of the2nd CC Plenum and, abiding by the general trend of thecriticism expressed against him by comr ades at the 2ndCC Plenum, and also by virtue of the ora l consent givenby him at tho Plenum, must wr ite the statement morepromptly and submit it for study to the Politburcau.'On 6 November 1049, in a letter to the Cha irman, Com-

i 42

rade Wang Ming said that he had written a letter con­cerning mistakes at the tim e of th e civil war to th e 7thPlenum of the Sixth Central Committee on 20 April1945, e:<pressin~ his rea.diness completely to accept theResolution on Some POInts of History adopted by the7th CC Plen~m on 20 April 1945. Though he subsequentlytold the Chairm an that he disagreed with this resolutionlie refused to make any additional statements on thegroun ds that he had initially expressed his readiness toaccept th e Resolution. As for mistakes committed duringthe ,~ar of resi stance to Japan, he declared his readinessto abide by the conclusions of the Central Committee butre~~sed to make any statement on this scor e. '

Th e 3rd CC Plenum has the impression that ComradeWang Ming is still refusing to r epent his past mistakestha t he is insincere towards the Central Committeo andholds th at his fail ure to fulfil the decision of th~ 2n dPle~um and his re luctance to write a sta tement to thePo!,tLbure au constitute un disciplined behaviour.

For this r eason, the 3rd CC Plenum has decidedthat:

"Comrade W ang Ming mus t ful fil the decision of th e2nd CC Pl enu m. He must express his deep repentance of thefundamental mistakes conta ine d in various articlespamphle ts and other documents which he wrote in th~periods of the civil war and the war of resi stance toJapan, proving thereby that he has deeply understood andadm its his mistakes, and that he ha s truly corrected th emin th eory and in practice. As soon as he writes the state­ment, it must be immediately submitted for study to thePolitbureau of the CC. If necessary, the Polithureau willforw ard it for discussion to the next CC Pl enum."

The following explanations are in order.1. It is not t rue that the 2nd CC Plenum, held in

March 1949, took any decisio n instructing me "to writea statement to the Politbureau". It was in a one-pageste ncill ed circular, "Theses of the Concluding Remarksat the 2nd Pl enu m of the CC (13 March 1949)", thatMao Tse-tu ug put down the following words underPoint 6: "How to help Comrade Wang Min C7 rectify hismistakes ." t>

2. The 3rd Plenu m's Decision on Comrade WangMing of 9 June 1950 was forwarded to me through theCC Chancellery as late as 30 July. I had ju st retu rned

143

"" UIIl Ti ents in , wher e i was on a to ur of in sp ecti on , findth en 1 fell ill. Furth ermore, I w as inv olved. in thepl'epal'ULions for the firs t all-Ch ina juridical con fere T~ce ,1'01' whi ch I was hurriedly wr iting a r eport and dr awln?up (hafts conce rni ng a criminal code, .So, it was not until17 Auuust tha t I found time to wrr tc a letter to MaoTse-tu~g , in which I aske d him the foll owing :

1) IT ow much time am I given? I need LIme to lookt hru ugh all my articles, pamphlets and other doc,~mentswri tte n durinz the civil war and the war of resistance

I> •

to Jap an and to draw conc lus ions.. 2) I need the notes for my r eport to the Decem~er

1\):-1 7 1' ulitbureau m eeting, and al so m y notebook, whichwere taken fro m me, as they were from other~ , by W angShall-tao ch ief of the CC secretariat, on Mao s orders atthe mill ~ f th e P olitbureau mooting, and which have notbeen retu rned. . " (

:)) Defore the evacuation of Yenan III U1. 7, my vVu-han files of H sinhu.ajih pao and files of th e Yonan news­paper Hsinchunghuapao, and much other material had,on Mao's orders, be en sent to Wayopao. All trace ofthem was lost. In roy letter to Mao I demanded thatthey be returned to m e or L~la t a n ew set, be given..

Thou gh very busy at that tune, and also III ~nd phYSI­ca lly weak, I wanted \,0 look through eve rythi n g I l~aclwrit ten before produ cin g fo r the Party an hon est SU1~lmmg

up of it s activity based on the tr;l e fac.ts o~ hi story,whi ch bore no r esemblance t o Mao s fal slfrcaLlOlls. ButMao did n ot r epl y to my letter . And on 25 October h esud den ly arran ged for my imm edi a te departure to theSov iet Union.

3. The 3rd Ple num's Decisi on on Comrade WangMing says that I h ad wri tt en a l etter to the ?lh Pl enumof the Sixth Cen tral Com mi ttee on :W April Hl45, ex­pressing my readi ness "comple tely to accept th e Ileso­lu tion on Some Points of History" adopte d by th e 7thPlenum.

As I have said before, I had been r epeatedly poi sonedbetween th e beginning of Octo ber 1 9~1 and tho summ erof H)4::3 , This was don e on Mao's orders. At th at time,hi s "style re ctifi cat ion campaign" wa s at i ts h eigh t.W h en I was in a cr it ical condition, Mao di d not expec tme to survive . But thanks (0 my stu bbo rn r osi stanoo, t othe support of m any of my Par ty comrades and of Com-

144

f ade Georgi D imitrov, thanks to th e good news from theSoviet Union (h aving r ecover ed fr om its ini tial se tbacks,th e Sovi et Red Army was on the countor-ollcns ivc},and thanks to the n ew treatment foll owing th o doctors'consultation in the summer of 1913, m y h ealth hadbegun to improve, though I was still bedridd en and hadfr equ ent pai n ful a ttacks ,

Mao was pl anning Lo convene the 7th Cong ress of th oere in April I945 . 'f his was wh y Lhe 7th Pl enum ofthe Six th Central Committee was called on 20 Ap ril ,Rut in th e beginnin g of the m onth he had se n t me th edraft of th e Hesolu ~ i on on Some Points of His tory, andaske d m e to study It. T hen , twice h e se u t Liu Shun-ch iChou En-Jai, Jen P i-sh ih and Chu Teh to speak to m e:and onc e he ca me him self. I was urged to wr it e a sta te­ment acknowledgin g th e resoluti on and " repent ing mymi stakes". I r efu sed. '=>

Friend s ca me to m e, ann we discussed m y cours e ofac tion. The day of the Soviet Union's fina l victory ove rIascist Germany was swiftly approach in g. It was cl ear'that eve n if I refused to recognise the resolution, Maowould hardly dar e to expel m o Ir om th e Party. But mycomra des argued that , Iirst, th e Com intern had beendissolved and th er e was n o longer an orga nisa Lion beforewhich I could plead my case. Accord ing to the Par tyRules tho minori ty was obliged to submit to the m aj or ­ity. The coming 7th Con gr ess was being pre pare d underMao 's complet e con trol. At presen t , I h ad neither oppor­tunity nor physica l strength to put my views to theCong ress . Besides, th e Congress would not be able toalter th e re solu tion of th e 7th CC Ple num. Se cond, mycomra des said, peopl e in the country an d abroa d h adnot yet fully unders tood th e r eacti on ary essenc e of Mao 's"style rectilicat ion cam pa ign ".

A long s truggle agains t Mao lay ahea d, the y sa id, andby preserving m e th ey would pr eserve the truth of th eParty and th e leader (If th e anti-Ma o struggle . If Iwere' to refu se to ackno wled ge the 7Lh Pl enum rcsolu­Lion, the 7th Cong ress would pro bably " adopt" an id en ­ti cal r esoluti on , and if I wer e aga in to refuse, I couldbe expelled fr om th e P arty , making tho str ugg le ag ains tMao still m ore dif ficul t.

Th ese were the r easons wh y I told th e 7th CC Plenumthat I submit te d to th e Con Ira1 Committee decision.

11<5

On 2:1 December HJ<i5 I made a report;, "On th e C~Ir­rent Situation and the Tasks of the Party , at a meeungof cadres of the ce ere Party committee, ~he N?rthwestBureau, and the Party committee of the Shensl-Kansu­Ning haia Bord er Ar ea. It was attended by ~ore than1,000 people. This report, which presented my, Idea ~f theriaht political course was in content dIanwtrlCallyo l~pos i te to ~lao ' s repo'rt to the 7th CPC Congress, " OnCoalition Go\,el'llment". »

AIter I had Imished my report, a few comrades cameup to me and said: " As lon g as there are trees on ~hehill there will be wo od for th e fire." And later , afterIlly 'two-hour speech at the 2nd Plenum in March H)~9,when I sho wed tha t Mao was in effect . r.onouncm g

sociali st revolulion and the building of socialism, thereI , ' I t e: "Did you notice thatwere comr ades w 10 saH 0 m . .

everybody li st en ed to yo u in com plete SIl ence f.o~ twohours? It is a lon g time since we h eard yo~ spe~l\ . , ill

This was the Iirst and als~ the last tunc since y. ' tl I I tool' part In a CC pl enum. Later,poi soning Ill. . \ U • CC

during my stay in Peking, I could n?l take part. l~ .pl enums or the all-China P arty Conf erence for raasons

of health. , 20 A '1 1(\45 IIn view of th e fad that foll oWlIl,g . pn ~

(lid n oL write a s tatemen t and con u nue d ll~e an ti-Maostr ugg le , Mao made th e Politbu~ eau and the drd Pl?nu~nof the Seven th Central Committee adopt the aloresaid

dec is ions . I • IFrom Nove mbe r 1950 to Novemb er 1953 I was 1I1 t re

Soviet Union.Then , from \J December 19;;;), when I returned to

Peking, until 30 Janu ar y 19SG, when 1 again left Pekingfor Moscow, th ere were m any other episodes in Mao'spersecution of \V aug Ming and \Vaug Ming's s tru ggleag ai nst Mao 'I'se-tung . Le t me descr ibe som e of them.

Aftnr Mao 's mis takes - his rejection of socialist rev­olutio n and the building of social ism-we re cri ticisedat th e end of 1952, m any people began to understandth at the line I had ba cked at the 2nd Plenum of theSe ve n th Central Committee (th e bourgeois-democraticruvoln lio n g rows in to a soc ia list revoluti on the momentit w ins through out th e country) was correct, while th e

t t " ~ee Wang Ming, Len in , Len in ism and the Chinese R evolu-10 11, Moscow, 1970.

14G

line imposed by Mao at the sa m e Plenum (after victorythe revolution will for a long Lime foll ow the road of" ne w demo cracy", that is, th e r oad of capitalist develop­ment) was incorrect. This was why, for a time Maohad stopped asking me for my sta temen t. But ~t theall-China Party Conference in March 1955 he read outa letter from a certain Fu Chen-shenc addressed to Maoand the presidium of th e confe rence.

oThe au tho r of the

letter heaped slander on me." I was bedridden at thet~rne. No~ llJ,ltil 30 ,J an uary '195G, through the interven­t~on, of Liu Shao-chi an d athol' comrades, includin g a fewSo v!e t . comrades, was 1 tak en fr om Peking H ospital toa SOViet plane, and on 1 February again arrived inMoscow, so dear to all of us.

4) Most Party leaders were declared"counter-revolutionary suspects"

Those leading m embers of the Central Committee, suchas Chou En-lai (member of th e P olitbureau and CentralCommittee Se cretary) , Chu T eh (m ember of th e Politbu­reau and command er of th e 8th Route Army ) , J en Pi-shih(member of the Politbureau), Teng Fa (member of thePoliLhureau), and Pong Teh-huai (alternate m ember ofth e Politbureau and deputy commander of the 8 th R outeArmy) ,':":' who had been acc used of "em pir icis m" and"dogmatism" during Mao 's " style rectification " cam­paign, were charged with " counter -revolu tion ary activity"during the "emergency salvation" peri od. At variousmeetings people were prompted to cast slander at them.Even a renegade like Kang Sheng (member of thePolitbureau) , who capitalised on anything he could andfor whom no misdeed was too vile, and a wily operaturlike Ch en Yun (member of th e Poli tbureau and altern atemember of the CC Secre tar ia t) , wh o always held hisnose to th e wind, had admitted to being " wicke d em­piricists" during the pr ep ara tory peri od of "style rec­tification ". It was only after they had don e so that Maoincluded them among the campaign officials. Out of thewhol e Politbureau and Central Committee Secre t ar iato nly two men remained above cr iticism-Mao Tse-tung

. * Th e Iou or was given to me to read and I have a copyof It. '

,'" Here and further we give only their chief duties.

\ 0* 14'i

(m ember of th e Pol itbureau and ee Sncrc tnry} , wh ohim self asserted hi s absolute " purity and infa ll ib ility"and took it up on him se l[ to per secute and repress ot he rs,and Liu Shao-chi (alternate m ember of ~he P olithureauand Seeretary of th e CC Cf' C Ce ntral Ch in a Bur eau),whom Mao em ploye d ex te ns ivel y for his own ends, Every­body was ordered and expected to speak of th ese twoonly in pr ai se. . .

Th e unlawful acts commi tted by Mao dunng. th ~ , r ec­tilicati on of s ty le " and the " emergenc~~ sa lva l lo.n w? renot - and, of COU I'se, could not be-;- sub]eet ~() , c1JSCUSSlOll

0[' approval a t Pol i tbUl'eal~, Ill e etI n g~. 01' . C(~: p leuUl.ns .From the heginnlng of the s tyle rectJ.hcaho~ cam pa ig nMao bad con~pJetely ignor ed th e Party's leading .10d1Os­the P olitbureau , Se cre t ari at, and Central Committ ee !Ieformed and personally con tro lled a cen tra l cor~rn ISSlOnf;)r the conduc t of the style J' ~cti?cation CamIJ al~n , ~J:~Iissued order s a nd in struction s 1ll Its n ame and fas c1hull-

" , f 1,1 e CC cpe Military Coun cil. Belying or irutcm an 0 1 , . 1 . J ' Ii I,fo rce on the guard r egim ent that was direct y S,ll ~OT( 111a .-ed to him , he committed all sor ts of lawles~ and evilacts. This continued in ylC subsequont , pe~~lO d. , U ponlnunchinz th e notoriou s cultural r evoluti on , he corn­pl etely ignored all the leading bodi es. of P a rt y and sta~o ,and form ed a "group for the aii airs of t he ~u l tl~r aJrevolution", which o perated under his pers oI~al (hrect,Jon.As before, he issu ed commands and Or dl11'S 1ll th e .l~ameof this group and as ch airm an of the CC CP.C MilitaryCouncil. Backed by a section of the ~,rmy which he hadmisguided, an d on the " red guards , h~, thus ac?om­pli shed a co unter-re volutionary co.u p. The styl,e rcc~I~ ca­tion" campaign was, ther efor e, III everybo dy ~ 0RI man,Mao 's dr ess rehea rsal of th e "cultura l revolu tion . Andthis descripti on of it is , of course , cor rec t.

Ii. THE FOURTH PEnIOD-"SELF-REFUTATIONAND HEHABILITATTON"

1) The reasons for the "self-refutationand rehabilitation" cam paign

In this period (summer of 19H-spring of 1945) Ma oT se-tung was compelled to proclaim a ca m pa ig n of"self-refutation and rehabilita ti on ". And h er e is why.

148

The continuo us ly advancing Soviet t roops w er e abou tto clinch the final vic tory ove r nazi Germany. Y et theva st m aj ority of Purty cadres and P arty an d YCL mem­bers had been branded "counter-r evoluti onaries" It wasimp ossible to distinguish between real and false ~nmnies .Out of th e th ousand CC CPC cadres m or e than 900 hadbeen declared. "counter-rev,olutionaries". Even pupils of~he Yenan Primary School, the children of high-rank­lllg' cadre s, w er e among their number. In Yenan ando,the)' . liberated areas, ofIlcia Is in charge of "style rec­tification am ong t he m asses" used to sum mon th e peas­ants of a village, to line them up and order them to

f t bei "con ess 0 emg counter-revolu t ionarh~s", "ene my spies"or " national tr aitors", Those who " conf essed" wereall owed to go home; those who refused were subjectedto processing-hun g up by th eir arms, beaten , and putun der guard, So, t he vast m a jori ty of the loc al popula­t ion, irresp ective of sex and age, had "owne d up" tobeing "counter -r evoluti onaries" or " en emy spies" or"national traitors". And, naturally, m ost of th e leadingcadr es and rank-and-file Party and YCL members, andal so people ou ts ide th e Party, were shocke d and dis­gus ted.

Th e campai gn of "self -r efutati on an d rehabilitation"was or ganised 'on th e following lines.

AL a m eetin g of the Central Com mission for the Rec­tification of S ty le. Mao said th at W ang Ming and someoth er l ead er s of th e Central Committee, and many top­ranking cadres of th e Party, government and army, hadcommitt ed dogmatic or em piric is t mistakes and followed"left" or right lines. These mi stakes, he said, could notbe refuted, and the people who had com mitted themcould not be rehabilitated, Y et , h e adde r! : "There arcnow n o poli ti cally unclear questi ons concern ing thesepeo ple, that is, ther e is no suspicion of coun te r-revolu­tion, betrayal, or any other type of political unreliabil­ity. All charges of this kind m ade agains t them maynow be self -refu ted. "

He then said that those who had been declared "conn­ter-re volutionaries", "enemy spies" or " national tra ito rs "were entit led to " self-refute" the ir previ ous "confess ions "and wo u ld the reupon he "rehahilitater!".

Those who wer e in ch arge of " style r ectifica tion " and"emergency salva t ion " w er e orde red to " sum m on " and

persu ade all those wh o had undergone "rectificati on"and persecution to refu te the ir confess ions, so that th eycould be relieved of the labels of "counter-r evolutionary"," en emy spy", "national traitor", and the like. Theywou ld thus reg ain th eir freedom an d win the opportu­nity for being- reh abilitated. As a result, all tho se whohad confesse d " crim es" wr ote "self-refutations" , wh ere­upon th e "style rectification commission" immediatelyabs olved th em of "counter-revolutionary" and other"o ffenses" . Mao maintained th at all th e in jus tices of th ecampaign stemmed from tho poli cy of "compulsion,confession, and confidence":~ followed by Kang She ng,wh o had fail ed to obse rve the "nine instructions" issu edto him by Mao, and, in particu lar, tho principle of"execu te no one, arres t only a few". (Kang Sheng latercom plained that he had never heard of any nine inst ruc ­tions.) Thus Mao un consciously admitte d !ha.t verymany people had been killed and that the majority hadbeen imprisoned.

It has been estimated in various quarters that ami nimu m of 50,000-60,000 people were kill ed in the"style rectification" campaign , while tho nu mb er of peo­ple arrested defies calcula tion. And here is another,bitter and appalling faet . Obey ing Mao's order of "e mer­gency sa lvation", Jao Sh u-shi (acting ~e.cretary of, th oCC CPC Central China Bureau and political commiss arof th e New 4th Army) declared the several tens of thou­sa nds of young men and women who had come fro,mvarious par ts of the country to the lib erated areas III

Centr al China to take part in the anti-Japanese war andgai n revolu tionary knowledge, to be "enemy spies","na tiona l tra itors" and "coun ter-r evolutionari es", th oughmany of them wer e Party or yeL membe rs of lon gstanding. Ex pelled from the liberated areas, these youn gpeople fell int o th e hands of th e Japan ese occupa tionforces or the ir puppets, and were executed.

In the Shensi-Kansu-Ni nghsia Bord er Area Mao in ­eiled local cad res again st cadres wh o had come fromelse wh ere. As a result, ma ny of the la tt er wer e killed,ma imed or beat en. Later , when the dust had settled,

" " "Com~,ll l~ ion" to con fess, "confession" under pressure, andconfidenco ID that the evidence obta ined by compulsion was

true.

~)~th th e local cadres and the comrades from other local­ities were equa lly bitter about th e whole thin g .ndequally sorry. ' a

2) The so-called poli cy or magnanimity

~t t?,e heigh t of the "self-refutations" and "rehabiIita­t I O~,S , .Mao ordered hi s secur ity agencies to carrv ou ta pnlicy of ma gnanimity", ur gin g" the inmates ofY~n :lTl . pfl son :-murrler.ers, robbers, rna l counter-revol­u ti onar ies. national traitors enemy sp ies an d tl 1'1t "f " , ' , < re 1 {e -~ . re ute their earlier te:timony. Following this, they

\\ P r e nil r.eleased. Dr. Chill Mao-yao , '~ too, wh o hadbeen nomlnallv serving his sen tonce (for poisoningWang Ming) in the Social Department of th e ec epclost no tim e to "refute" his pr evious evidence . In short 'a man wh o was supposed to "atone for his guilt bylabour" became a man of ."merit". He was allowe d to gofree and was at once appointerl trf'ali ng physician to MaoTee-tung and members of the CC CPC Polithureau,After the lib eration of Peking, Chin W ::IS made deputychief of Peking Hospital , whi ch had been se t aside forlead ers of th e Party, government and army, and forother top- echelon cadres . Th ough in 1952 the healthdepartmen t of the ec CPC Military Canneil was com­pell ed, du e to nu merous protests, to dismiss Chin fromhis office in P eking Hospital , he was at once appointedch ief of the 2nd Central Hospi tal , an d according toJenminjihpao reports (12 , 16 and 18 February 1973) ,is now a high-ranking official of the Heal th Mini s try.

* As menti oned earlier, Chin MaO-F lO had con fessed to methat Li Fu -chun had on Mao's instru ctl ons or dere d h im to poisonme. Neithe r I nor he could at that ti me reveal th is sec re t. Aspeci ally organised "Chi n Mao-yno tribunal" . ch aired by Li nShao-chi and in cluding Kang Shong and Li Fn-chun. ru led: "ChinMao-yao has confesse d that he poisoned Wang Ming on th ein structi on s of the cha irman of tho Kn omi n tnnz Reel - Cross. aperson named Chu . who belongs to th e Chen- Li-fu group",Thereupon, tho tr ibunal provisionall y sentenced him to five warsimpri son ment. But the rul ing also said: "In pursua nce of Cha ir­man Mao's poli cy of mngnanimitv, Chin Mao-van shall he allowedto con tinuo his nractl co as physician during the period of im­pr isonment in or der to aton e for hi s gui lt by labour." During th o"self-refu tation an d rehabilitation" campa ign Chin Mao-yao"refut ed" hi s earlier testimony. saving that "he h ad not de­Iihl!ratcly poisone d Wang Ming" and th at th is had happ ened byan oversight.

ri. TITE FIFTH PEnIOD-"SUl\lMING UP"

Durin g lh is period (spring and sum m er of 1945) Mao

Tse-tung summed u p the r esult s of . t he f.our-year

campai gn of "rec tify ing s tyle " in the ide olog ic al , po­

litical , and orga n isat iona l sphe res .

1) The ideologleal and politi ca l re sults

Th e ideologi cal and political results wer e sumn~ ed up

first. Th ey - w er e defin ed ch iefly in th e R esolution on

So me Points of Hi st or y wr itt en by Mao ~nd adopt~d by

th e 7 th Plenum of th e S ix th Con trn l Comm ittee, an d 1Il th~

instruction s concer n ing' th e " tho ugh ts of Ma o T ao-tun g

in the Gener al P r incipl es of th e P arty Rules ad opted

by the 7th CPC Con gress. Th e no to r ious 7th PI.en um

Hesolution w as the firs t docu men t in which. th o lll sto~:y

of the P arty was open ly Ialsi ficd. Billow IS tho basi c

content of th is Il esolu tion:1. Tt proclaimed the " great r ole" playe~, ~ y' Mao T~e­

tung and th e " though ts of Mao T ao-tun g " 111 th.e hi s­

tory of th o Cl'C. Th e CPC, it said, had al ways rr,h e,~1 on

" Mao's thoughts" a nd th er e had always b een the cor-

rect line of Mao Tao-tung" in the Party . .

2. It sa id that th e CPC owed all its a: h ievemen ts . III

24 years to M ao's l eadership and the Impl emCI:.tatmn

of hi s "thoughts", wher eas all th e faults and mistakes

were ascribed to others . . r.:

3. It sa id th a t th e pnlit.ical li n es of th e ,H h and ,)t.h pl e­

nums of tb e Six th Cen tr al Committee (Ja nu ary 1931 and

January Hl::M ) were" 'Icf t --op portun lst " li n es. .

4 . It said th at the T sunyi co ufcr ence had rectified

the "left" -oppor tu ni st lin e of th e above two plenum s "m~d

established "the correct l eadership of Mao Tso-tung III

the epe. li . thr5. It said that Mao r epresented Lhe correc t m e III rc

Sovi et a reas, a nd Lin S hao-ch i rep resented the correct

iine in the whit e areas, a nd th e l ik e.

'f Durin g th e "styl e rcct lficat lon" cnm'p;~ign Mn~ uS,e.ll ~rn rxjsm

as a cover: ac tually . he oppose d, .L~~Ill1fl:n, '.!'hl s IS why th e

original dr af t of tllll Hesol ution sa id: Maoism 15 a blend 0/ ~re

gener al t ru th s of Mar- xism with the concrete pr actice 10 . 10

Chinese rovolut lon" Th o se con d dra ft WRS produ ced at L io LImo

\~hcn tIl() ' Soviet A'rm y hall :~ll'el,\u.y reached .Lhe apPI;?~cJ~~~ t~Berlin and the word " Marxism was replaced by ,?IXlsm

Lenini'sm", and "Maoism" by "thoughts of Mao Tso-tung .

The Resolu ti on was never pu blish ed in the pres s.

And it is in orde r to note that th e R esolu ti on of tho

7t h Plenum of th e S ixth Cen tral Com mittee publ ished

in the fifti es in l\Iao's Se lected rVarks, though da ted

20 April '1945, was in fac t an en ti re ly ne w t ex t. It was

fa lsified for th e b en efit of Joseph S ta lin an d members ofthe CC CPSU.

For exam ple :

1. Through ou t th e "st.yl e rec tificati on " campa igon 1\L10

indulged in all ki nds of an t i-Soviet slander, comp l etely

n ega ti ng the z reat contribu tion of Leni nism and the Com­

intern to th e Commu ni sl Party of China and th e Chinese

revolution. B ut s ince the Sovi et Army h ad bv th en

already def ea ted Hi t.J er Germ an y. Mao did n ot. dare t.o

write his s la nders agains t th e Cornin tern int o the Heso­

Iu ti on . H e s imply did not. m en tion Leni nism and the

Comintern in the 1~45 Resolution . The Resolu tio n pub­

lislled in the fift ies Jllentions Lenin and th e Comin tern,

and even gives th e Comintern con cept pr ecedence in

relation to th e basic issu es of the Ch inese revolu ti on .

adding th at. Mao's opinion coincided wi th it. It m ain tains.

quite gro un dl es sly, t h at Mao "d evel op ed the teac h in g

of Lenin a nd Stalin on the questions of colon ies a nd

semi-colon ies . a nd th e teachin g- of Stali n On the ques­

ti ons of the Chinese r evoluti on".

2, Th e or iginal Res olu t.ion of th e f orties claimed th at.

th e " t.hough ts of Mao Tse-tun g" were th e sole guid e of

th e Cmn mll n is t ParIv of Chi n a an d of th e Ch inese r ev­

olution, Th e Rf'so ITll.ion published in th e fift.ies does

not. eve n Irnve th e ter rn "thouzhts of J\lao Tse-tung" , It

says: "The id eas of Marx ism -L en inism as represent.ed

by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.".

3. The so-ca lled " tI l ird 'l e f t. '-oPDort n nist, line" and

its com pariso n w ith t he line of Ma'o 'I'se-tunz. an d t he

"impor tance" and " 1'011::" of th e Tsunvi conference-all

il lis ,was ment ioned in so many word s i1; t he or ig in al Res­

elu tion. whereas the Resolu t.ion of t he fifties con t.ai n ed

a more th oro u gh faJsi ficat icn , T here are also ot he r differ­ences in th e two texts .

LM't. but. not least, tlwse two resoluti ons. though dif­

fer ing fr om nne a not.h er in con ten t hava one iden t ical

Ienture, nam ely : not n word is saili in them abou t th e

all-roun d s u pport a nd a id render ed to the Commun is t.

P arty of China and t ho Ch illcse n~\"O I Ij I . i(l1l h v lh e CPS Uanrl IIIC Sov ie t Un ion. " -

In sum, th e R esolution con cocted by Mao in the fortieswith the purpose of falsifying the hi story of the CPC,was itself subjected to fal si fication in the fifti es. Inyears to com e, in other times and other circumstances,Mao will not balk at n ew fal sificati ons of this R esolu­t ion for th e sake of some personal a im . Ever since the" style rectification " campa ig n he has "distinguish edhim self" -for se lf-aggran di zement and to attack othflrs­in falsifications : he fal si fied history , fa bricated " facts" ,cou nterfe ited documents and writings. F or th is h eresorted to " cover t intri gu es" and " overt intri gues";"In short, Mao T so-tu ng is an adro it and experiencedm an ag cr of th e fi rm - Mao and Co. sp ecialising inall sorts of fal sificati on s. But past experience sho wsth at truth is always truth , and untruth always un truth.The truth ca nnot becom e an u u lruth any mo ro tha n anuntruth can becom e the truth . On e ca n d eceive people,but this only for a time. The truth is immutable. And nom atter h ow ' much ink and energy Mao expends, he willn ever succeed in changing the facts of th e h istory of theCPC. His exe r tions only em phasise his di sgrace .

Wi th a " sword" in one h and and "Mao's tho ughts" inthe other. Mao com pell ed th e 7 th Plen um of the Six thCentral Committee t o adopt his wholly false Re solutionon S ome P oin ts of Hi story ; then , with a " sword" in onehand and this R esolution in the other , he com pelled the7th Conzrcss of the CPC to wri te in th e Gen eral Princi­ples of the P artv Ru les that the CPC "is guide d in all itswork bv th e thoughts of Mao T ee-tun g" .

Mao ·h oped that wi th a " sword" in one h and and theGen er al Princi pl es of th e P arty Rules in th o other, h ew ould then substitute the " th ou gh ts of Mao T ee-tung"for Marxism-Leninism. and that nobody wo uld everal!a in da re to go against Mao's "thoughts", lin e and pol -

* At th e 2nd Pl enum of th e Ssventh Cantrnl Cornrnittea. Maosa id : "According to W ang- Ming the stvlo rectification campaignwas an int rign ». T SIlY thllt it. was not a cove r t int rlr-no. but anOVAI'I i nlri l7 ~I l" . T s aid pub llclv th at I want to rlismi ss W lln g Min gn n ~ t nk o hJ~ nlace. an d therefore WTot A th " n e~ ollllilln Oil SOIl[p'Poml ~ of R iston ' . I sha ll still writ » h :st orv. R ow rn n thi s h <>dp's(,J'I !Jp. r),,"s a ro',"er t intI'ig'Ilr.? T See it onl v I'lS nn overt in f,riiUR,"I askl'd : What d id you msn n wh en vo u snid VOIl ", nntl'd tn tak nm~ pl nce? I WIlS not th e concrnl soc re ta rv ." Ma o renl lod: "Po J<1I

~h Lo Fu wore gcn~ra I sp.crr;> tnr ies only no mina llv. Afte r t h p.t Pl enum of the SIxth Centra l CornmItloe, Wantr Min z \VIIS

to all Intents and purposes, th o Par ty's commander-i n-ch ief." « c ,

~cy. The Iact s have up set hi s plans. T holl lTh condit ionscca .me {nore . in tol erable, th e true l\[ arxist~-LcniIli st~

contJIJUC( their s tr uggle , against Ma o after the 7th~~CP C~n?ress'k I n assessmg the political sit ua tion and. n.r y s tas s after vict ory in the anti-Japanese war'~n se t.t lll¥ th e course of the agrari an refor m ' in estimat'~ Ilg tl~c SItuation during th e war against Chia~lg K;i- I 1'­dnd . in the. que:'5tion of tho bourgeoiS-democratic s I~~;~o lfu ~lton ~rOWIng Into 11. social ist revolu ti on at th e momento I s vIctory-on all t l . 11 .'. i eso pOInts nino committed

rrous mista k es, and invariahly encoun tered firm res~~=tan~e On th e part of Mal'xists-L eni nist s . T han ks t tlas slstanco of the CC CPSU and the f 0 10I d ' COurse u even ts ats~~ne an ?n Lh e. in!erna ti on~l scene, the P arty fina lly" ·lc eo~ ed . lIn r ectIfym g Mao s erroneous poli ti ca l li nea nc prmctp es .

Th e 4th Plenum of the Seventh Central Comm it tee{.Fe bnw l'y 195ti ) criticised and correc te d th e poli tical

1110 th a t had r en ounced the socialist way.MilO had followed hi s in correct lin e for five '

( aft~r the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central c'o~~~~~tee Il1 19~9). His mistake concerning the ba sic qu estionof the Ch1TI~,SO revo luti on wa s shown to rep eat Trotsky'sconcept of permanent r evo lution" and Ch en Tu-hsiu'sconcept of "two-phased" revolution. The "thou ghts ofMao Tse-tu ng" suffere d a defeat.. Furtherm ore, th e fight against the per sonality cult andIts consequen ces begun hy the 20th Congress of theCPSU had a fav ourabl e effect on th e climate in th e CPC.Mao was compell ed to consent Lo expun ging th e princi­pl e concerning the "though ts of Mao T se-tunc" from th eGelleral P r inciples of th e Party Ilules. Th e Ilules adopt­ed by the 8th epc Con gress (September 19GB ) had th efol~owin.g' ~ormul~: . " The Communist Party of China isguid ed In Its activity by Marxism-L eninism" ,

.Ru t Mao , that ext reme in dividualist, careeris t and in ­trIgu er . wo uld not abandon h is desi gn s ,

Hi s " cultural r evolu tion" , in substance a militarycounter-revolutionary cou p, complete ly wrecked the Par­ty, its Rul es, and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress,Th e Hul es adopted at the Mao-inspired 9th Con zressextol th e "thoughts of Mao Tsc-tung " even more perv~rs e­ly than bef ore. H e uses these Rules to com bat Marxism­Leninism.

We ure deeply convinced that this s ta te of affairs istornpornry. Soon, th e Communis t Party of Ch in a an d theChinese people will throw out the Itul es of the 9th and'1Oth congresses to gether wi th all the "though ts ofMao Tse-tu ng". AIl-conquer in g Marxi sm-Leninism willtrium ph on Chinese so il for goo d.

2) The "organisational con clu s ions"

III th o wak « of the ide ological " sum m ing up" came 01'­

zanisatlonal decisions. Though no m embers or alternate~lcmbers of tho Politbu rc au , CC Secre tariat or CentralCommittee w ere expelled from these l eading bodies rim­ing the "s ty le re ctification" campai gn, it w as cle ar fromthe eJeclion R at th e 7th Con gress and the Lst Ple­num of the Seventh Central Committee what " orga nisa­tional con clusions" Mao would now put in to effect . Tobefuddle th e Congress del ega tes and P arty rank-and-f le,Mao repeatedly declare d hefo1',e th e ,?lJening of, the. 7t~~Con O'I'CSS that the purpose of th e s ty le recti ficatlonhad "'been "to achieve unity OIl a new h asi s flowin g fromthe wi sh for unity after pa ssing throu gh struggle".

To crea te the impressi on t hat th e whole P arl.y was"united" Mao resorted to all kinds of stra ta gem s. Forexample,' about half an hour bef ore th e offi cial openingof the Congress, he cam e to me, approached my b ed, ands aid with all marks of cou r tesy :

"Comrade Wang Ming, on behalf of all the delegates,the Central Committee, the P oli tb ureuu an d m e person­ally, I be g yo u to attend the 7th National Congr ess ofour Party,' which will ope n p resently ."

"1 am ill. As you see, I canno t gel up from m y bed,"I replied. "How can I attend the Congr ess?"

"Two of the b est porters h av e com e with me. Let meask Comrade Moug Clung-shu to h elp you dress and youwill be taken ther e in a se dan-chair ," Mao said withthe same polite mien.

"I can be taken th ere, but I can't s tay a long time,"T said.

" Can you stay for ab out 15 minutes?" Mao ask ed ."Just for the ope n in g ce re mo ny, an d hetter s till if youstay a bit l onger to h ear part of m y rep ort. ComradeWang Ming, 1 b eg y ou to come. Ou r 7th Con gr ess isa co n gre ss of un ity. Y O II I' prese nce will m nkc th is cle ar .1 hav e a lso i u v it.cd Comrade \Van g Chiu- hsinng and se n t

f!it:

H, se dan -c h air to h is hou se, H e will han ,,' . 1 1 1Ilme yo ueome L et ( .all l\e< JYtlfll'olithur ean and the ~ne~ e~~ t :~d 'Il~;la\~h e. m~~lll~~S of theWang Minz an d Wan e e Chis I " c e lllV~ ee omrades

o . ' '" la- isiang TIll S m akecongress truly a congress of un it ' I ' I ll ' ~ s ,t:urCon gr ess expect s h ath of yo t y . sna ~o n ow. I'heuntil yo u com e." . u o com e. It will n ot open

Wh en Wang Chia-h sianO' and I . .hall, Mao m ounted th e s t;' ( , 1 w er e ca rried into thespoocl I ~ ps o L ie s tage macle " I " f. " , 1, ant opened t. he CO il r S ' A " , '. H H1ecd , an d tho azcnda a . g c'. sl' lHesldll llll was e lec t-1_ . < '" « nn oun co. All thi s 1:) mmut es. When Liu Sh ao cl : lIS too { ab out

would b egin hi s politi cal e' ( -,t II anl~ounced that Mnnof the hall. r p J I , as ..ed to h e taken out

. ~l,lt e~eIl in th ese 15 minut es I saw that thg l oss bore no roscmhlan- ., t . C 7th Con-

, . c J 0 a congress of I 't 1'1 'wa s el ear fr om ho w m ember s of 1 . .' . . un y. I~Ssea ts when the J' I f 'I Pi 110 presldtum took t heiron th e ' IS , 0 '. .n am es was read . .Mao was alone

.. ' sla.ge anl.l w~ved Jll S. at ins vigor ously, invi tin ,T themto JOIIl 111 Ill. L I1I Sh ao-ch l. Chou ]. "11- 10.1' Cll l' gl ·.1J Pi hi] . . J , J II e I aUI

en I-S lJ 1 ascende d the stage and s tood helJinrl thelonf~'. ~ahl e . Mean\~hiJe , the oth er ten ~ell1 h ers of tllOpr eaidiurn k ept th ei r scats in the llall (CI Y .I(Sl P , ( len IJ n anc•. ll!~lg, 1 en g Teh-huai .and Ch ang vVen-tien, who ~ve]'e t~b e I e-el ect ed to th e P ohLbureau; Kao K ung and P eng Chenwho were t~ be electe d m emb ers of th e Ce n tr al Commi~te e and .Pohtbureau for the first time; Lin Po ehu andTUl~g PI -WU, who w er e t o be elect ed m embers of thePol1l!.llll'eaU fo r t he firs t tim e' and rl T .1II H " ,( 0 .JlIIlg aIH

,su s,lang-clllen , who wer e to he elected membersof Y1: (~entral Com mi ttee .fo~ . th e first time). Now, gcs ­~,~llI Ilg vehem ently, Mao invited them to th e platform.I hey cam e on e by one, seem ingly ern bar rnssed, walkings J c.)\~ l y to the corner on th e ri ght and sea t ing themselvesbeside the wall at a di stance from the presidiu m table.They were thu s hidden fro m v iew even to delegatess ea ted in th e fr ont rows.

Meanwh il e, at th e fro n t of t he s tage, wh ere the above­mentioned five stood beside the presidium table , MaoTse-tung wand ered fr om on e to the other, while the rest,th ei r faces red fro m embarrassmen t, shu filed about andprodded each other like children at a party. Th ey did notknow yet wh ere each w as expecte d to sit.

Before the " s ty le rectification" campaign, Liu Shao-

chi had occupied a more modest placo in the Party thanth e oth er three and he was embarras sed to tako the sca tnext to Mao 's. ClIOIl En-lai , Chu Teh and Jen Pi-shih (es­pecially Chou En-lai) h,~d been va~ious~y ,~nsulted ~ndpersecuted during the style rectification campaignand, of course, did not know what seats they were as-

signed. L' siAt long last Mao seated them as follows: LU la?-

chi in second 'place, Chou ~n-lai in third, Chu :l'eh u~fourth , and Jen Pi-shih in filth. All five took their seatssimultane ously. . 1

The vast majority of the delegates showed no speciaemotions. Watching these unseemly s~atmg arrange­m erits, ea ch delegate naturally formed his own opimon,observing the proceedings with a sense of estrange-ment.

Suc h strange goings-on had no~ been see~ at anypr evi ous congress of o~r. Party. This small episode wasa reflection of the prevailing disarray.. .

During the "election" to the leading bodies, Mao againre sorted to double-dealing. He said to . the delegates:"C omrade Wang Ming was not only gU1~ty of big , mIS­takes, but h as al so performed gr eat services. It Will bea good thing to elect him to the Seventh Central Com­mitte e of Lhe Party."

Li Fu-chun followina Mao 's in structions, manipulat­ed the electi~ns. Amo;g other things, ho said to thedelegates : "In the case of people like Wang Ming, wemu st follow the policy of 'shaving the bamboo'. This timelet's 'shave off' his m embership in the Polithuroauand CC Secr etariat, and leave him in the CC. Otherwisepeople in side and ou tside the Party, at home and abroad,will be confused. "

The "organisati on al conclusions" flowing from the"style rectification" campaign mainly affected "elec­tions" to the Party's leading bodies at the 7th CPC Con­gress and the 1st CC Plenum, both of which were riggedby Ma o Tse-tung. Out of the seven chief members of the" Moscow dogmatic group", as Mao called it, Wang Mingand P o Ku were not re-elected either to the Politbureauor the CC Secretariat; Lo Fu (Chang W cn-uen), thoughnot re -elected to th e Secretariat, was re- elected to thoP olitbureau thanks to his "services" in the "Mao-Lobloc' a t th o Tsunyi conference; Wang Chia-hsiang and

158

Ifai. Feng were not r e-el ected alt erna te m embers of theloht?ureau; th e form er was elec ted alternate m em ber ofthe CC .and the latter not even that, Yang S hang-k un andCh~ JUI were not re-~lecled alternate m emb ers of th e CC.~I~c. only m ember of th e PoJitbureau of working-class~lglll,. Teng Fa, was not even elected to th e Cen tral

, omml ~ te e . Mao explained: "T on g Fa did not want tos,a.~ a Slll~l~ bad :\'ord against Wang Ming and Chou En­l~,l, . tl~erelO1 e, ,he IS a dogm ati st .and empiricist", But therewas a deeper reason l or Mao s a t ti tude tow a rd s Ten vFa: he was always disdainfu l and h ost il o t:llva l'ds leaters and cadres of working-class background Fe~ample, he was an~oyed by even the menti on of JfSia;;Y,Jllg, also. of worklllg-das::; origin, who was a member~f the Pohtbure~u and deputy commander of the NewIth Army. He SImply could not hear Hsiang Ying InJanuary 1941 , Hsiang Yin g di ed trag ica ll y during' theeven ts pr ovok ed by Mao in th e sout h of Anhwei. As forthe other ex-me mbers and alternate m embers of the Polit­bur,~au, .a~I. o ~, t~~em though re -el ected bore th e stigmaof empmcist', dogmatist", and the like.

A "exoanti I". . n oxcop lOn~ person appeared in th e Party 's lead -mg bodlC~, usurping the post of Central Committee ch air­man. TIns was Mao Tao-tung th e in comp arable whoth ought himself th e r esurrect ed Yanwanz (g od ofdeath). Wi th a "sword" in on e hand and tl~o " though ts?f Mao Tso-tung" in the other, he strutted ab out, perfectIII all resp ects, th e "su pr em o ruler of mortal s".

,!,hel'e al~o ~ppeared an "especially influential" person.TIns was Liu Shao-chi, made a member of the Politburcanand CC Secretariat. With a trumpet in hi s left h andami a ,~riling-brush in his right, he assiduously soundedtho pral~es .of Mao and Ma o's "thoughts".

By this tim e the ab solute majority of cadres and Par­ty members had been branded "dozmatists" " empir i­cists", and the like, Their forced "conf;ss ions " t~ "counte r­revolutionary activity" were filed away in the socialor organisational departments of the Central Committeeand could be dug up at a moment's notice with enough" evidence" for seizing anyone of them "by the pigtails".

This was how Mao undermined the Marxist-L eninistpillars of the Communist Party of China.

t50

3 ) Th e results in questions of "style"

In concl usion, a "su mming up " was also marle in qu es­ti on s of "style of work". Though no resolutions w.erewritten on this sc or e, stride nt calls resounded ~1,url1lg

the "style rectification" campaig!,l for l?eopl e to l~:~rnthe correct style of Mao Tse-tung and fight th~ old ll~:correc t styl e", Now every10 dy knows th at l\la? s s tyle ISnothin g bu t a bl end of th e d~spotic s tyle of ernp~l'orsand m artinets aIHI th e style o[ a dec~a~s e ~allg Cl11ef--:­. sl ·t the s tyle of an ex treme [ndividunlist and na r­In s lUI, ' . ., . . I' t 1'1 ' stylerow "gre at II an Celest ial Empire nati ona IS '. Ie.

Mao oppo sed, the style that had a.lways prev~Iled III theCPC, was the s tyle of Com mu nIsts and exponents ofprolctanan interna tian al ism. .

If we n ow look at th e fate of the m ain representatIves

f " d ti sm" and " empiri cism " , those who h ad beeno ogm a IS . , . " 1 11 seeper secuted during the "style I'ectlhcatlOn , we rch. . 1'I " 1 th at " s tyle rectification" was a dress r c rearsa

L ca l y . "of th e " cu lt ural revolutiOn . ., . . .

P Ku (China Pang-hsien) and T eng l'adred 11l a p~anecras~l ~Ying fl';m Chungking to YenaJl in an Am er icant ransport a ll 8 April 1\)46 . f 1

CI J i who had been artillery commamler 0 t 10

P l~ ,S ~iberation Army at the hcgi n n irig of t ile sec~nclC~O~)_K~1T revolutionary civil. war, ~vas kille~ . in a nll:l~explosion during a tour. of mSp?~tlOn ?f g l:ll emplace _mcnts ncar Changch un In 'H)l17 . J he mille had been deli berately planted.

In 'HJ55, sh or tly before the CPC Nation al C~nIere nce,Ka i F eng di ed sudd enly afte r a . meal o.n. having cOJ~chorne fr om the Institute of Marxism-L eninism . l\'~ao W d ~known [·0 h ave feared th at he would speak III d cl en ce ofKao Kang at the confer enc e.

In J uno 1966, at the very beginning of th e s.o-calledc ult ura l revolution, Yang Shang-k un was se ize d by"red guards" on Mao's order. A dun~e cap was pl aced .onhis head Ids fa ce was sm eare d WIth soot, and an in­scription ' was hung round hi s nec~ , saying : ~'!o'-ge.nt of theSovie t revi si onists , co unter -r evolution ary re visionist blackbandit, traitor" , and the lik e . He was beaten to deathduring a "re d gu ard " rally.

In '1958, La Fu (Chang Wen-tion ) was persec uted forhaving joined Peng Teh-huai and oth ers in cr it icis ing

160

~Ino 's specious "l~ olicy of th ree red bann er s". D uring thel;ultur:al r evolution " the " re d gu ards" t ormented and

~e~t. j~~:n brutally. His la ter fate is unknown. "Redgua rd s a!so t ormented Wang Chia-hsiang. As for me(v~ang l\l lllg ) , ever since th e "sty]c r ectifien tion" cam­pa ign Mao has been slandering me in the press and at~cetI~gS as the c1~ ief exponent of what he call ed leftand ri gh t ?PIHlrtUllJsm. In the early six ties, when Maocam e out lJ1 t~ th e open against the S oviet Union an dsought to spl~t th e world comm unist m ovement I wasaccused of brlIl g' a " pro-Sovie t revisioni st", Th o ' attachIII t he pres~, and a t ralli es did not s top Ior a minllt~ .W hen th ~ cu lt.ural r evolution " er up ted, huge posters,~ppeared . ~ n Pekmg and. olhe r , l arge ci ti es, saying:Down \\ ith t ~l e agent of tho Soviet revisio n ts ts, t he

co.un~~r-revolu tlOnary bl ack bandit, the big tra i tor W angMllIg ." .! was often the cllief target of a ttacks in theJennHnl~hpao , .Ch iehfangc!~ i,!npao , and th e journal!{unl[ch~ . My :vlf e, i\leng Cillng-shu, wh o had studied in••10 SOVIe t .UnlOll a nd IH\s Ior rriany years actively com­batted Maoism, was also a target of attack On Mao's or­der s "red guards" dese crated the remains of my fath erCh en Pi n-chil i, ,;. b uried ill the Papaoshan Cemetery ofr evolutionari es in Peking, ransa cked my h ouse, and bea tm y ~?re than SO-year-old s tepm othe r, Huang Lien­fang, ..···almost to death. " Re d guards" threw h er in lothe street, and burned or otherwise de stroyed dozens ofmy m anuscr ipts , and my library.

As for the ch ief " em pir icis ts" , Peng Teh-huai earn edMao's hostility for urging the armed forces to l earn fro mthe Sovie t Union and wanting to build the People 's Lib­erat ion Army into a modern force of national defencewi th So vie t coopera tion and aid. In 1958 he spoke outa ga inst Mao's re ck less " three red banners" policy, andwas bru tally assai led. In 'l!:J59 h e wa s officially dis­missed from the post of Defence Ministor, an d , in effect ,put un der h ouse arrest. In De cember 1967 Mao sent a

" He had lived a hard life full of privations. For his participa­tion and the participation of his sons and daug hter in the revolu­tionary movement, he served live terms in Kuomintang prisons,where' he was tortured. The last lime he h ad t ome out of prisonshor tly before the lib eration of his native Tsin chai county inAnhwei province.

** She was a hou sewife and came from a hum ble peasantfamily,

planoful of ,"r ed gu ards" to Chengtu to se ize Peng Teh­

huai and ~nl1g him to P.~king. According to SOUle sources

he was kill ed by th e red guards", and accordinz to

others he was impri soned. In any case, his fat e is"'un­

known.The only one t o sur vive was Chou En-Iai. When the

"cultural rovolution" broke out, " r ed guards" heaped in­

sults on him and threa tene d to "burn him alive". Then,

Mao changed his mind and kept him on as premier of

the State Council to use him as the all-enduring,

obedient and hard-working official that he was

(even in the thirties, Mao had ni cknamed Chou En-lal

"hard-working donkey ").Though the 7th Congress was sa id to have been a

summing up of th e results of the "sty le rectification

campaig n", th e camp aign continued, Mao kept cadres

summoned from different parts of the country in the Par­

ty School pr emises in Yenan, saying, "Th ere is nothing

for th em t o do a t home. Let's wait until next summer,

when US forces land in North China and assist the 8th

Haute Army. Then they will havo th eir hands full at

home". His t rue purpose, however, was to con ti nue

their "brainwashing". Not until af ter 9 August 1945,

when the Soviet Union declar ed war on Jap an, did Mao

hastily despatch cadres to various regions. At that time,

many of th em said: " Our Sovie t elder brothe rs have killed

two birds with one s tone : not only havo their troops

lib erated our five prov inces (the three northe as t prov­

inces, Jehol, and Chahal' ) and tens of millions of our

compa triots , but have also saved us from concentra­

tion camp and from 'styl e rectificat ion'." These words,

th ough spoken in jest, were true.The "style rectifica tion " campa ign had continued for

four years and its consequences were immediately felt;

th e harm it caus ed the Communist Party of China and

th e Chinese revolutionary movement in ideology and

politics, organisational matters, and style, was truly in ­

ca lculable. It creat ed very gra ve difficulties for the CPC

in the succeeding revolutionary pr ocess.

Tt is now clear that the "rect ificat ion of style" cam­

paign launche~ and directed personally by Mao in the

fort ies, a reactionary, in essence anti-Leninist a nti-com­

munist, anti-Soviet and anti-people campaign,' set a dan­

gerous precedent, foll owed by a succession of other cam-

paigns-"struggle against r igh t elem t ." " "Idc? l? gica l education ", "four " ,~n s ', socl~hst

reVISIOni sm " " lear Ir 1 pu~ges, st ruggle against, arn l orn th e Llherati on A . " "

ca to s uccess ors ", find th e like lb ' LIlly , edu-were the sa me. FUl'th ermore' n SU" s tance all. of them

was a dr ess reh earsal f ' th e" s tyle rectification"

launched OIl Mao's perso~r I t~l~ . cultu ral revolution "

perso na l command in the si~t' lllItl~t-ve" and un der his

tion " was, in effect a counter res, 1 ~I S cultural rovolu -

N h ' -revo utIOnary co ook, however Iar I oup .

.scr iption of th e viol en~eg=~dw~~~~~ l'suffice for a. fU!l do­

t~lC ,~ uffel'ing and anguish of th o victi plot; "and lll trr ¥,ues,tion , and of th e fortitude a d ms 0 style re ctific a-

s isted it during four years. ~hec~~r~geI°t thoso. who re­a re no m ore tha n a hare l' c s I~ve CI ted here

I hope it will give th e re~d:/~~ ~~le~ tr:~jc picture But

and criminal nature of Mao's "style °rect ,lfie rte.actlOnary

P · " d '. 1 ca IOn cam­, aign an convince him tha t it was a drelo r th e coun ter-revolutionary military coup ofSSt}reh~at~sal

L t1 't' . ie SIX lOS.

, .a~ y! 1 " IS in orde r t o stress that during the "st IeI e~trfi,ca tlOn , Mao falsi fied the hi story of the CPC. ~o

th is , m fact , .he ~ ttached as much im por tance as h o did

to the ca~palgn Itself . It was only in th e conditions of

the c~mpalgn. that he coul d fa lsi fy the history of the

FPC, Just as It was .only by fal sifying CPC history that

,10 could launch such a campaign. These two factors were

lllte rdependent and mut ually conditioned ' one " hel d"

the oth er, a.nd each ,~as tho cause and effect o/~he

other . In this way, using two "poisoned a rr ows " Ma o

la~nc~?d. out on hi s career of usurper of Party l~ader­

shIp; 1!lIS.boo~ presents only the ma in facts concerni ng

Mao 5 fal sification of CPC history. Much ad dit ional re ­

s.earch IS needed to pinpoint th e m any othe r Ials ifica­hans .

m THE " CU LTURAL RE VOLu tION" ANDTHE MAOIST mn FOR COOPERAT IO NWITH IMPERIALISM

1. "CULTURAL REVOLU'l'IO N" I N NAMEAND COUNTER-REVOLUTIO NARY COUPIN SUBSTANCE

In the summer of 1966, under the nag of a "culturalre volut ion" , Mao launched a counter-revolu tio n.ary co updirected against t he CPC and the people of Ch ina, al:dagainst th e Soviet Union and the world communistmovement. .

The ch ie f objecti ve of this coup w as to su bsti tu te th ecou nter-revolutionary "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" forrevolutionary Marxism-L enini sm and to make then~ .thesole basis for the country's in ternal and ex ternal pol it ica lgu ide lines and poli cies. . . '

I n hom e policy, Mao used military force to. smash thegreat and gl ori ous Communis t Party of China a.nd tosu pp r ess the tale nt ed, hard-w orking, and r evolutlOIcptpaopl e of China. Most of the m emb ers of tho CCPolitburcau were m aliciou sly slande re d a nd r epresse(~(Liu Sh ao-chi Pen g T eh -hua i, T a o Chu, H o Lung, LICh in-chuan, P eng Chen, T a.n ~hen-lin, Ul~nfu , Ch angW en-ti en alias Lo Fu, Lu Tmg-I, a~d Po ~I-pO) or h~r­asscd (Chu Teh, Chen vr, IIsu Hs iang-ehlen, Hnc~ Nl e llJ un g-ch en) . Ma o Tse-tung also?e~1t r,uthless~.y WIth al ­most all the members of the Cr:c Secre Lallat --:- W~Il~Ch la-h si ang, T an Ch ien, II uang K o-ch ong, ~o ~Ill -clu ng,Hsi Ch ung-hsun, W ang J en-ch un.g, Liu N mg-I.' . . YangShang-kun, Hu Chiao-mu, and Liu Lan-tao. H arr owi ngtorment was the lot of some 140, or nearly four-fi,fth s,of the 174 member s of t he CPC Central Comm ittee .Par ty organ isations of all levels - prov~~cial, city, coun­ty district, rural , P. tc: ,-wcr e sm as he d. I here was who le­sal e lIl a S Sil C1' 11 and pers ecution of cad res an d rank-an d­file Party m embers. Army com m ande rs and poli t­ica l officers. too, were attacked. Government bodies, t he

~C~, t rade union bodies of all levels and .elations of cre at ive a nd scienuf 'k varIOUS assn.up . 'rh e in tell ec tual s who w k c .wor ers , were broke nHS well a s in sid o the Pa t or ed III th em, those ou tsido

. r y, w ore cruelly tr eat" I 1\1 -were phYSIcall y elim ina ted. M'U' v ~ . 1 a llYw orkers, peasants, in t ell ect 1 I Ions of th e for emos tYou th were ma ssacred ;1' j ,a i i~~ s , an d the 1'0\"01utionary

The losses su ffere d by th c' .Mid the Chin ese people w: omrumlst ,P ar ty of Ch inagrea ter . f t I " re co ossa. r iley wore far

' , Ill act , t Ian t he losses in flictod 0 Ppe~pl e bJ: ,internation al imperialists P ei , n -ar~'t~ ~ n~1Chiang h al-slick and Wan C1' ' . ya ng warl crds,cOllu ter- r ovolut iona r ies c0Il1 b1n ed lIn g-woI, ant! :llJ oLl lel'

May th e m em or y of all t h ' . .Jive fOl' ever, e victims of Mao's crim es

At th e Dth crc Congress (Apri l HJ69) M ' . 'ed a pseudo p .... l·ty if I . I' I - ao s ubs t! tu t -

- , - U ( lIS OW11 or Lie ro 1 CI ' - Cmunist P ar I. ' JI . . a , lUleSe 0 1U-, ,~ . 0 IS 1I0W tl'YlIlg to lise it to prom ote Ids

pers~n al antI-communist and an ti-Soviet ends. The Com~~m~n~st Party and tho peop le of China are submerged ina vortex of unheard of ca lami ties ., Ma o's .extre me crimes h ave made h im a traiLor to the

Com m un is t P arty of Ch ina and to the Chinese r ovolu­ttonvand an ene my of the whol e Chinese peopl e._ In t ho fi el ~1 of foreig n policy, Mao bega n an in san e

::; t ruggle against the Soviet U nion and th e ot her so­cia~is ~ cou ntries, H is fr en zy is dir ect ed to suhvert ing andsplit ting t ha world socialis t sys tem . H e has gone to thelen g th of m akin g te rritorial cla ims on th e Soviet Union,has Ill.ounted a rme d a ttacks on the Soviet fr on ti er , and!IIlStri ed to an nex th e Mongolian P oople 's Repu bli c. H eIS a Ltaeking' th e Mar'xi st-Len ini st communist and workers 'parties of all countries, and has publicly proelaim edIds inten ti on of " putting an end" to them . He I' IJ ­

gages in subversive and -divisive activ ity in th o w orldcom m un is t m ovem en t, a nd a lso in the anti-imperia lis tnational liber a tion movement of t he Asian, African a n dLatin American countries. H e is doing h is worst [,0 im­pair t he ir frie nds hip and soli da rity with the social is t s ta tesand the world communist movement. T hi s is helping'imperi alist a ttempts at re-estahlishing control ove r thesecoun tries and at conu n itt inp ag gressions against the mwh ere possibl e. Mao is hatching intrigues [0- provoke rmAmerica n-So viet arme d conflic t, which would gro w into

a world war. He hopes that flam es of war will en gulfand destroy the sucialist cou n tr iee, as well as the Impe­riali st states and their allies. He hopes that a therm~­nuclear war will further his maniacal dream o~ undi­vided world supremacy. He has. broken econ~mlC rel~­tions with the socialist commumty and has hItched hIScountr y to the capit alis t ch ar iot , s ett in g the stage for therestoration of ca pitalism in China. , 'Mao's extremely serious cr im es on the lllternatlO~alscene have made him a traitor to the wor~d commumstmovement and the anti-imperialist revolutIOnary mo~e­ment and have turned him into an ene my of progressiveand ; eace-Ioving peop le throughout the world. .Mao's crimes, committed in hi s counter-r.evolutl~n -ary coup confirm the fact that home and foreIgn pol~cy. . di . "ble' home policy being the source of foreIgnIS in IVISI . ~. . f 1policy, and foreign policy being the con tmu~tlOn 0 l~mepolicy. Inside the country Mao uses anll-communlsmto clear the way for anti-Sovi~t stru~~le . ~t the sam~time, h e tries to consolidate nts pO.SItlO~s .m th p. anti ­communist s tru gg le by JUeans of antI-Sovlel:lsm " ,

. On the international scene, h e uses antl-S ovlCt a~danti-communist acts as a means of r approchement withim periali sts and reactionaries abroad. ,I have given a fairly detailed account of. Mao s. var-iou s crim es inside the country and on the mternatIOnalscene durin g the early period of the "cultu ral revoh~­tion" in my article, "What Mao T se-tung H as Star.t ed ISNot a 'Cultural TI evollltion' But a Counter-TIevolutlOnaryCoup" , published in 1969. So, it is needless to r epeatthe story here. .In the foll owing y ears th e counte~'-revol~ltlOnar~coup cont inu ed. Its main conte~t cons l.st ed in anti­com m unism, anti-Sovietism, and cr imes against tho people.Mao ac te d under suc h sl ogans as "for deep criticism ofr evi sionism and for r ect ificati on of s tyl e" , "for a fur.therde ep ening of struggle , cri ticis m, aud reform", "oontlUuethe one 'd ow n' and three 'againsts' ", '~ and "preparo for

* The one "down" was the anti-communist and anti-Sovietcampaign inside the country under the sl ogan~; "DO\;,n w~th t~ nhandful of p ow er-holders and ca pita h st roaders and DOVin Withthe counter-revolutionary revisionists". Out of the three "against s"only one slogan was in actual use-"Against modern revisionism,at the heart of which are tho revisionists of the USSR". Th\5

sudde n attack fr om the North" ; h e pr om ot ed h is line~hrough suc h cam paig ns as the " educati on al ca m paignin th e fleln. of ideology .and politics" and "boycott thefa lse Marxi sts Wang Ming and Liu Sh ao-chi".

Th ese slogans and cam paigns h elped Mao to seek out,P?rsecute and exterminate the cou ntry's leading Commu­nists , YCLer s, revolutio~ary worke rs , peasants, in t ell ec­~uals: and the YO~lt.h. Disse.n t ers w er e so ugh t and foundIll. e\ ery offi?e, military UTIlt, or ganisation, school, enter­pr ise, pe ople s comm un e, and family. Mao's sl ogan "re­~ovo t~e . {lIn , a bsorb the n ew", m eans t ha t h e wiIi eon­tm ue wipmg out his ene mies-and n ot only h is own hutalso those of hi s h eiress, Chiang Ching, and h is son-in­law. ~ao We~-yua n. Hi s main target are the Marxists­Len ~ll1 sts and Internationalists, those in fa vour of Chinese­SO'",Iet. fr iendship, and al so all opponents of US im­per~n~lsm •. In this way he expects to r ea ch h is extremeindividualist ann selfish aim: "Not to be over thro wn dur­ing my li feti m e, and n ot to be denounced after mydeath".. Th eso slogans and cam paigns h elped Mao in his fre n­

z~e rl. attempts at subverting and disrupting the world so­cial is t sys tem, the wo rld communist and anti-imperialist~ov{)ments, a~d at es tah.1is h in g closer ti es with im pe r ial­tst elements in th e United S la tes and other countries .

As b efore, Mao aims his attack s agains t the CPSU andthe Sovi et Union. This is natural, b ecause:

- T he CP SU and the Sovie t U n ion are th e livinzem bodiment of sci enti fic: comm u nism; they are Marxism~Len in ism in action.

- The CPSU is the mo st advanced, th e mo s t expe r i-enced, the most prestigious, and the mo st powerfu l com­munist party, a recognised vanguard of th e world co m­m unis t movement, while th e Soviet Union has tho gr eat­est experience , th e gr eatest ac:h ic ve me nts , the greatestpower nnfl greatest prestige in the socia l is t. community.Mno used as nn excuse for hi s nnti-Sovi et an d anti-rommunistacts on the Int nrn ati onal scene. The othe r two "agalnsts" were"Fight against the imperialist ~roup headed by th e USA" (nul­lirll~(l hy the development of Chinese-American re lations ) . and"Figh t against reactionaries of all countr ies" wh ich Mao heliedwhen. hand in hand with US imperiali sts he supported thereactionary Pakistan militarist , Yahya Khan, who exterminatedthree million Bengalis fightin g for nation al liberation . and Iqrdemocracy and freedom.

.".,

- T1H' CPSU and th o Soviet U Ilion arc tho impreg ­nable s tronghold of tlle peoples ' s t ruggle agai ns t imperial­ism and reaction, and for peace, dem ocr acy , national in­de pend en ce, social progress, and socialism , while th e So­viet Communists and Soviet people ar e the most dep en­dable fri ends an d comr-ades of the Chinese Communi stsand th e Chinese peopl e in th e re volutionary s truggleand th e b uildin g of soc ia l is m.

- U nder lh r. ' leadersh ip of the CP SU , fulfill ing thehi storic decisions of th o 24th crsu Congress , the Sovietpeople nre putting into effec t th e grand plan s of buildingcomm u nism and th e magnificent pro gramme of worldpeace. . .,

It wa s for th ese reasons th at Mao mad e an tl-SOVll"l t lsmhis motto and laun ched out agai nst l\~ a rxism-Lenin ism:the soc ialist countries. the CU lll lll\llllst a1H1 workersparti es (in cludin g th e Communist P arty of China ) , theanti-imperialist movement, and world p eace. He ~ls? usesanti-Sovi eti sm to ear n the approval and nppreciation ofthe imperialist pow ers, not~bly tho YSimperialists, andreactionaries in all countries. He is eager to cooperatewith th em on an anti -Soviet and anti-communist ba sis,

Anti -Sovieti sm is a concen tra te d expression of anti­comm u nism and pr o-imperialism. Comrade Janos Kadar,First Secretary of tho Hungarian Socialist Workers' Par­ty , wa s ab solutely r igh t wh en h e sa id that there neverwas and nev er will be an anti-Soviet communism; itfoll ows that th er e never wa s and never will he an anti ­Soviet Communist.

It is precisely becau se Mao' s anti-Sovietism is na­ti on alist in form an d an t i-communist in conten t th at itbecam e th e foun dati on of h is r ea ctionary for eign poli cyand th e core of hi s r ea cti on ary horne policy .

From th e people of Ch ina Ma o conc ealed all word ofth e joint fes tivities held by th e CC CPSU, the USSHSuprem e So viet and th e RSFsn Suprem o Soviet on the50th a nni ve rsary of th o Uni on of S ovie t So cialist Hepub­lie s, held in December Hl72 in Moscow , in which represent­a tives of Irutorrial Marxi st-L eninist parties, national­democrati c parties, and national liberation movem ents par­ticipated. lIe al so conce aled from hi s people the historicreport of the CC CPSU General Secretary, Comrade Brczh­nev, a t Ihos.e fes~ivit~es , which. h,rilliantIy summed upthe outstanding victori es of Lenin s ':.a lional policy and

168

~~le ,great, achi evem ents of the mu ltinational Sovie t social­1st ~t~le 1Il t he 50 years of th e Un ion , and elu cida ted theL,emnust hom e and for eign poli cy of th e CPS U and So­",lOt G:overnTnOnL in mod er n cond itions. T her efore I con ­sidsr lt useful to qu ot e that part of Comrad e nr~zhnev 'srOI~olt wh er e he re.fened .to the presen t r elations betweenCIll.na. and th e SOVIot Union, as well as most of the oth erSOC 1~llS t st~tes , an d alsu exatni nad the s ubs tame of th eMaoi s], f~relgn policy , I do so in or der to gi ve the ChineseCommunists and. the people of China a cl ear idea and adear ullder st a.nd ln g of the h y pocr itical a nd incendiar ynature ~f Mao s howls about a "Soviet th reat" .

I~ Jere IS what Comrudn L. I. Brezhnov said :. Now: Comr~d es , H few words ab out our pr esent r ela­

tions With China or, r ather , ab out Ch ina's attitude to ­ward s mo st of th o soci al ist s ta tes .

",It. :s more l:han t.en. ye a rs sinee th o lend er s of thePeople s HepublIc of Chll1a .too k the Iiuo o[ opposing theUSSR an~, III effect, th e en ti re socia lis t comm uni ty, whichthey continue to regard as the main obstac le to theirgreat-power designs.

"Speaking b~unLly , what is P eking 's for eign policytoday? l.t. consists of ab surd claims to Soviet territoryand mah(:~ous slander of the Soviet social and politioalsyst?ll1, of our peaceable foreign poli cy, It consi sts ofoutright sabotage or the efforts to limit the arms raceof the efforts to bring abou t disarmam ent a nd a relaxa­tion of interna tional ten si on. It consists of constan t at­tempts to spli t th e socia li s t cam p and th e communis t~lOVeIl1er::t, to .s Li r up di scord among th e fighters for na­tional liberati on, to range the developing coun triesagainst th e So vie t Union and th o other soc ialist sta tes .Lastly, it cons is ts of unprincipled ali gnments on anti­Soviet grounds wi th any , be they even th e most r eac­tionary forces - the most rab id hater s of the Soviet UnionIrom among th e Briti sh Tories or th e re ve nge-seek ingclements in th e FHG, the Por tu gu ese colon ialis ts or thera cists of South Africa.

"Tn subs lance, tho purpose of doing th e greatest pos­sibl e harm to the USSR, of impairing the interests of thesociali st community, is now the sole cr ite r ion determin­ing the Chinese load er s' approach to any maj or interna­tional problem.

"What can one say about this policy ?

169

"We hold that it is unnatural for relations betweensociali st countries, that it runs counter to the interestsnot only of th e Sovi et, but al so of tho Chinese people,that it run s coun te r to th e interests of world socia lism ,tho liberation and antl-Irnporialist struggle, peace and in ­ternational secur ity.

"It is therefore understandable why we ca tegoricall yrej ect this policy. (Prolonged applause.)

"The Chinese leaders cla im to be disturbed about som ethreat emanating from the Soviet Union. If th ese s ta te­m ents are not hypocritical, it is impossible to under standwhy China has not replied to our proposal, repeatedlyrna do since 1969 , to assume clear, firm and permanentcomm itme n ts ruling out an attack by one coun try ortho othe r. If Peking is r eally concerned about China'ssecurity, why has not the PRC leadership agreed to con­clude a special treaty renouncing th e usc. of for~e, th edr aft of whi ch was subm it ted to the Chinese SIde onJanu ary 15, 1971 ? The draft of this ~reaty sta tes un eql.liv­ocall y that the sides- and I quote- sh all not usc againsteach other arme d forces employ ing any type of arms, In­cluding: (a) conventional, (~) mi ssile, or (c) n~lcle~r '. ~o,th e Chinese leaders ' com plain ts ab out a mythical SOVietthreat' quite obviously do not stand up to sc ru tiny ." ::.

2. COOPERATION WITII IMPERIALISMIS A COMPONENT OF MAO'S

COUNTEn·nEVOLUTIONAny COUP

\\1e have already pointed out that Mao T se-tung is usingh is anti-Sovie t and an ti-communist counter-r evolutionarycoup as a m eans to win the appreciation of, and es ta b­lish cooperation wi th t he imperia lis ts . The course ofeven ts has fully confirmed this . Mao's ca llrse, set all aco un ter-revolu tio nary coup, wa s applauded by imper ial ­i sts and reacti onar ies , and first of all by the imperialistsor th e United States. Comrad e GII S Hall , Gen eral Score­tary of th e CP US A, spe aking at the festivities on the50th anniversary of th e USSH., said r ig htl y that th e Maogro up follows a counter- revolutionary policy, and that it

" L. 1. Brozhnov , Follouiin g L en in 's Co urs e Progress Puhllsh-ers, 1!l75, pp. 84-85. '

is therefor e natural for the capitalist press to sound thepraises of Ma o's "cultura l revolu tion". Diplomatic repre ­sen tatives of capitalist countries flock to Peking to shakeMa o's hand and ex press their friendly sen time n ts. And,certainly, th e gr eatest atten tion is drawn to the "sudde nchange" in Chinese-Am eri can rel ations. After EdgarSnow, Mao's bosom fri end, had sp ent many months inPeking and h ad had many secret conversa ti ons withMao , a US ping-pong team visited Chi na , where upon,on 16 July 1971 , the official Chin ese and American presssimultaneo us ly publ ished a communique confirming r u­mours that H enr y Kissinger , then a national secur ity ad ­viser to the US President, had secretly vis ited P ekingand held 20 hours of confidential talks wi th Premi er ChouEn-lai. Also confirmod were rumours that US Presid entRichard Nixon had accepted the Chinese gov ernment'sinvitation to visit. China. Th ereupon , hoth sides reportedKissinger's second trip to Peking to prepare Ni xon'svisit to China, and announced Nixon 's arriva l in P ekingon 21 February 1972.

In short, Nixon 's China visit was no t a fortuitous thing,but a far-reaching step by Mao and cer tain US ele­monts.

It is comm on knowledge that ever since the ina ugura­tion of the People's Republic of Ch in a, the Soviet Uni?n,oth er socialist coun tr ies , and some of th e Afro-ASianstates have systematically, at all sessions of the UNGeneral As sembly, demanded the ous t ing of the ChiangKai-shok representativo and the recognition of tho legit­imate rights of the PRC in the United Nations. Due tothe stubborn opposi tion of th e USA and its allies, anddue to US insistence that tho ultimate decision neededtho approval of two-thirds of the UN membership, thisis sue was dragged ou t for many years . At the 26th UNGeneral Assembly, however , the United Sta te s and .itsallies "suddenly" voted for letting th e PRC r eprosentativetake th e place of tho Taiwan emissary in th e UN. Ohv i­ously, this change of heart followed a preliminary agree­ment reach ed in confiden tia l Ameri can-Chinese n egotia­tion s.

News ag en cies report that P eking is crowded with US"visi tors " an d that Ameri can guests are received in P e­king with courtesy an d ca re. I t is qu ite cer tain that thecooperation of MaQ and th e US is ex panding eac h day .

17i

Mao's delegates use the 20th UN Genoral Assemblya nd the UN Se curi ty Cou ncil for an ti-Soviet cam paigns ,Th ey heap m ali cious insinuati ons and slands rs all theUSS R, and sta nd before th e world as Fait.hful help er s ofthe US imperiali s ts and oth er reacti on aries. They vot edagainst the Soviet proposa l for a world di sarmam ent con­fere nce . Yet, the UN session ad opted a resolution on thisscore by a majorit y vote. And Mao stoo d u nv eiled befor ethe world as an enem y of peace and a h en chman of thefor ce of war . In the Se curity Con neil , Mao's spok esmanjoined th e U S s pok esman to back the reacti ona ry Pakis ­tani mili taris t, Yahya Khan, and opposed th e libera tionmovem en t fightin g for th e na tion al self-de termina tion,dem ocracy and fre edom of th e 75 million peop le of Ban­glades h . i3y s o doing, th ey opposed th e USSR and Jndin ,which su ppor ted the liber a tion str uggle in Bangladesh .The Maoist stan d on th e Mid dl e E ast favoured Isra el a ndUS re actionaries . The Ma oists deni ed su ppor t to th o ju sts truggle of th e Arab cou ntr ies and th e Arab peopl e ofPalesti ne against th e US-back ed Is raeli aggre ssion, a neldid not back the UN Se curi ty Cou n cil r esolution r ef]uiring Isr ael to withdraw h er troops fr om overrun Arnhlands. At th e sa me time, furth eri n g their nefarious de­s igns, th e Maoi sts t r ied t o und orrni no the fri end shi p andcoopera tio n between the Arab peopl es and th e Sovie t.Union.

In th e United Nat ions Maoist spokesmen act hand inha nd with im peri al ist forces, and this mor e and m or efr equently. Comrade Gu s Hall , s peak ing on USSR Cen­tral T elevision on 29 April 1973 , sa id it is almo st im­possible to di stinguish Maoist poli cy fr om imperialistpolicy . Maois ts and imperialist s tend to act in concer t.Tiher c is practi ca lly no difference, for exam ple, betweentho .Maoist utter ances in the UN and the UN speechesof reacti onary imperialis t spok esm en. P erhaps the onlydiffer ence, Hall ad ded, is th at the Maoists are mor e givento the us e of coarse and abusive langu age.

All th is is natura l. It is th e effect of th e anti-Sovietand anti -communist policy aimed at ra ppr och ement withimperi ali st. for ces in th e Un it ed States, foll ow ed hy Maosince th o " s tyle r ectification ca m pa ign" for more th an3.0 years cover tly or overtly, with or wi th ou t interrup­u on s,

~ . ~HE ll EGINNIl\'G OF TH E PR ESEN'r !\IAOiS't'LINE OF COOPERATIO N WITH DII'ERIALISM

To und~rst an~ t~e pr~se.nt-day Maoist polic y aimed a t~tooPJ e"~ tlU:l With imper ial is t for ces, we must look h'ICI- atI s JegllllllJlgS. ( ~ L

1. I.n the .a utum n of 1936 Edgar Snow had lana con­;;~~~~~oen)s :~~th l\-{aOWin PJaoyang (nor tharn part of Sh.ellSi

. ioug I ley :lad met for th o firs t ti Ma nd Snow behaved li ke old fr iends. Th ei r con~:~~t~~~~:ve re fI'ay k an~ th orough, irresp ecti ve of wh etlHJl: theyconcerne public or personal matters, Par ty and s taten~atters .0 1' matters related to the Cumin tern and th e' So­VIet Union, etc . This is why i t did not take them verylon g to becom e bosom fri ends.

Refe~:ing to th e twenties, Mao Tao-tung sai d to E dgarSno w, I .was th an a s trong suppor ter of America 's Mon ­roe Doctrine a~d the Open Door. " ,:. This sen tenc e m eansat l east two things: firs t, Mao wanted to pa rade as a con­s~an~ follower of th e USA ; second, h e wanted to exp r ess!l1S hrm suppo: t of th e im perialist and ex pansionist pol­~cy of the, United S ta tes in China and othe r countries .The experien ced US bourgeois [ournal ist Edzar Sno w' ''' ,was sure to dr aw th e ri ght conclusio ns .

It is not surpr ising th at the not es of Sno w's ta lkswith Mao, w hen publi shed, alerted Georgi Dimitrov. InNovember '1937, sho r tl y before my r eturn from Moscowto Yonan, Dimitrov instructed me to explain to th e CCCP C and to Mao personally that he had departed fr ompositions exp ected of a Communist in talks with a USbourgeois jour nalis t,

Snow's impression is said to have been that Mao wasat most an agrarian reformer, and certainly no Com mu ­ni st; if Mao were to hecorue top leader of th e CommunistParty and, in addition, some da y hold pow er in China, h ewould not bu i Id socialism , wo uld he an oppone n t of th eSo vie t Union, and an ally of imperiali sm.

2. At the end of 1937 , after my return to Yen an, Il earned that Mao had negotiated with Lo Hang, a rep­resentative of Ch on T u-h siu, an d had permitted the en­ti ro Trotskyit e-Chon Tu-hsi ui st group to r ej oin the Par ty(thanks to m y ret urn this wns prevented). This showed

':. Edgar Snow, Red Star oller China, New York, 1061, PI 154.

17 ;}

even at that early date that Mao was prepared to [olnhands with Trotskyites, tho se active abettors of imperial-is t reaction.

3. In the summer of 1938 Mao published ,his article,On a War o] Attrition, in which he divided t~lC Sino-!~p­anc so war into three stages: Japanese offunsiv e-cqmhb­rium - Chinese counter-offensive. In the first stage Ja panattacked while China re treated. In the second stage ne i­ther of th e warring sides was able to ~ttack an d th?rewas a state of equilibrium. .In the thud stage Chinawould wait for Japan to attack the Soviet Union, andthen mount a counter-offensive .

These views, and especially the idea of waiting fo.r aJapanese attack on the Soviet Union, w~r.e at that umeconsonant with the designs of the US, I3rit~sh and ~ronchimperialists, and also with those. of C~lang ..~a~-s~ek .They were waiting for th e same thing. 1 hen, sitttng onthe mountain and watchi ng the tigers light", they hoped !to reap the maximum advantage. In short, ~n a yvar .oj,,­Attrition let the im peria lists know of Mao s anti- Soviet-designs. ., M .'

After the article was published III Yonan, 0.0 sent itto Wuhan and asked for it to bo r~prin~ed in t~e Hsin­huaiih.pao " (which was under my direction) . Ohm Pang­hsien (Po Ku), Hsiang Ying, Kai Feng, .other co~radosand I were against the article, because It was orientedon pass ive resi stance and on waiting for J~pan t? attackthe USSR. This would work against the national mt?restsof the Chinese people and contradicted t~e internatlOna~­ist duty of the Communist Party of China. The Party spolicy was to further the nation's active re.sista~ce to theJapanese aggression in order to defend C111na's indepcnd­ence and territorial in tegri ty , an d to prevent the Jap­ane se militarists from starting a war against the USSR.So we decided not to pub lish On a War of Attrition inth~ Hsinhuajihpao. '~* I asked a Soviet comrade who wasthen in Wuhan to let Stalin and Dimitrov know of ouropinion. Dimitrov saw to it th~t th e artic~e should notappear in the journal Communist International. (Wan g

* At that time it was the daily newspaper of tho ee epe.** Later reluctant to betray to tho onemy tho existence of

fundamentai differences in the epe leadership at so critical apoint in the war, it was decidod to publish the article as 11pamphlet and distribute it as a supplement to the Hstnhua;ihpao.

Chia-hsiang inf orm ed Mao of Dimitrov's decision andalso tol~ me about it when he return ed from l\Josc~w toYenan III the autumn of Hl38.)

4. In October 1938 Mao publish ed his r eport On theN:w S tage, to the 6th Plenum of the Sixth Cent~al Com­rnittee. Here he said the second of the three stages oft~le war-~hat. of ~quilibrium-had begun . This was de­SIgned to Justi fy Iu s passiveness in the war of resistanceMao's concept was instan tly approved by th e Japanes~invaders and br Chian g Kai-shsk. For the Japanese Chi­na .was a staging area for an attack southward on theUn ited ?tates or northward on th e Soviet Union. Theycould W1S~ ~~r nothl~g better than a standstill in Sino-Japa­neso hostilities, Chiang Kai-shek, too, aft er the fall ofWuhan, was eager to avoid engagements with the Japa­nose army an d to preserve his armed forces for a futurewar against th? Communist Party. He was banking ona JapaJ.l0se-SovlCt or Japanese-Amorican war.

In h~s r~por~: Mao also advocated "Sinifying" Marxismand rejecting overseas stereotypes". I3y this demagogicslogan I:e was, ~n. fact, trying to fold up tho propag~tionof . Marx1sm-~elll lllsm and the use of Soviet experience,:oJe.ct tho guidance of the Comintorn, and crush Lenin­ist intcmationaltsts in the Party. The report On th e NewS tage also let the imperialists see that Mao made freewith ~le. nati~nal interests of th e Chinese peopl e andthat hIS mtentions were anti-Marxist anti-Leninist anti-S · d "oviet, an anti-communist.

My sp eech at the 6th Plenum, "On the War Situationafter th~ .Loss ?f .Wuha~", was based on Lenin 's preceptthat anti-imperial ist national re volutionary wars are pro­gressive wars and are always victorious. I showed th atth e many millions of Chinese were bound to defeat Jap­anese imperialism with th e aid of the socialis t Sovi etUnion, provided they fought staunchly an d strove forvictory. This ran counter to Mao's erroneous line, as setforth in his On the War of Attrition and On the NewStage.

5. In the beginning of 1940 Mao published his OnNew Democracy. Here he openly contradicted Lenin'sview of the non-capitalist (i.e, socialist) perspective ofthe Chinese revolution. In so doing, he defe ndod the in­te res ts of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, opposedChina's ta king th e socialist roa d, and advocated a "new-

dem ocruuc' wa y implying a long period of ca pit al ist de­velopment. On New Democracy enabled im per ialist id ool ­ogues to see Mao's ulti mate in tentions : de fe nce of th ebourgeoisie and h ostility towards the proletariat; d efenceof ca pitalism a nd hostility towards so cia l ism .

6. In Oct ob er 1040 Mao publicly came ou t in fa vourof an all ia nc e between nazi Germany, fascist Italy, mil­itarist J apan and th e Soviet Union, and i nsid e th e coun­try an alliance with th e J apancss ag gressors, whichamounted to national treason. Here is how it happened.

One October ni ght a comrade from the Sinchu nghioa­pao (the Yen an newspa per of th o CC CPC, which ap­peared eve ry three days) ca me to show m e th e conten tof th e fo llowing cl ay 's issue ( I was th en chairman of th eCC CP C press commis sion and wa s in charge of theSinchunglu oapaov, 1Jy att en ti on was dr awn to the titleof the leading article- "On Alliance Between Germany,Italy, Japan, and th e Soviet Uni on " .

"W h ere did you go t thi s article?" I aske d." I t wa s se nt in by Comrade Mao T ao-tung," th e corn­

rade r eplied. "This afternoon h e held a confe rence withour editors and com rades from th e Cen tral Committeepr opaganda depar tm ent. H e said tha t we must se t thesi gh ts all a n alliance be tween Germany, Italy, J ap an an dthe Sov ie t Union in in ternational r elation s, and on aunited {,runt with the Japanese and W ang Ching-we i in­side th e cou n try . He said he had .prepared an editor ialand told us to publish it in our next issu e. The questionis a se rious one . H asn't h e di scu ssed i t with the othermembers of th e P olitbureau?"

I said h i go and talk to h im.Mao ad mitted th at h e h ad held th e confere nce, and

added:"Stalin an d Di mit.rov suggeste d an an ti- fasc is t alliance

of Bri ta in , th e Uni ted States, France and the SovietUn ion agains t Germany, Italy and Japan . Even ts haveproved th is to be a mistake. What we want is no t analliance between Britain , the United S tate s, France andthe Soviet Union , but between Germany, Italy, Japanand th e Soviet Union ."

" W hy?" I asked." Germany, Italy a nd Japan are poor," Mao r eplied.

" W o will gain nothi ng fro m figh ting th em . In caso wewin , we ca rl take nothing fr om them. Britain, tho United

1if)

, ta les am) F rance are rich es cciall R' .COIO!l ic'" If sl ' I I' P , y , fl la l1l . Look at her

-vs , ie IS (TUS l Ot g l'C ' t fit ' IIj us t L' 'L ' I . . , <I pr o S \\"1 accr ue from- e IVl Cing rer colonies. Yon Ill .fasc ist line bu t 1 d ' ay , accus o m e of a pro-f. . ' 0 no t car e, In Chin a we want a u ' t )['O!li with the J apanese and Wanz CI ' c . c n~ ecph,,~ng II{a i-hshek" not th e aIlLi-Ja;)a~ese l~~g~~e~uga~~~sJJy J OIL n s art, yo u arc wronz " b

" \Vhcrc am I wron z ?" I asl'ebe)'" \V ° . < , •

I j~) lca n not o\' erpowcl' the Japan ese " 1\1 '10 suid "So\\' !y !crl t lh ' ~ \\T ' ' -' . •I" ' '" . ern : o would do be tter to f\C1!l t CI'xai-shek with tho hell) of Tapa n and \\ ' °CI ' lla n?r J. I 1 ' l lang n ng-wm

.Ala , ,a t ti e argo territori cs Chi ang Kai -sh ok con trol ;In the southwest and northwest If II " ' - I .t . ::. . " I ::. re a te n, W e callge a pIe eo of the north west. T his would he ' . Iknr . 'II tl a gam.

, ~,,; YOu. WI" say la t I am pro- Japa nese and g uil ty ofna ti ona ] tl r;a::.o n, but 1 do Hot ca re. I nm not afra id ofbe ing a nationa l traitor ."

" Y I . I" . ou rave .no 1'Jg It , to decide anything of su ch inter -na tio na l and in ternal Imparlance on you r o wn " 1 . I"Ot . . . '. I ' sa lt .

, II ,:1 g UlIle? t IS point ess . I pr op ose normal procedure,I~:lJII Cl j,' , s?lldmg a. tele gram with your opinio n to Com ­lad e~ Stalin and D.nm trov, an ti discussin g the m atter a t am eet in g of th e I' ol it bur eau. "

"No suc h telegram ca n he se n t now," -'l ao r epli ed . " T hetwo vencrablo old 1I1cn may fly in to a ragc. That wou ldbe n? joking ma tter. Neith er do 1 want a Politburcau dis­( ~ USS.IOn at the present moment."

"\Vhyi'"

" The s i tuati o~ is n ot yet ripe," he replied. " In sixmonths events will show that I am r ight. Then I will se nda t el o~l:am sayin~ th~t I had !ong si nce m ade thcse 1'1'0­posals HI an art ic le 111 t he Slnchunghwapao, And Com­r ad es Stali n and Dimitrov wi II rep ly : 'Com rade Ma o T se­tung, yo u wore right, and we were wrong' . You too Com­rad e Wang Ming, will then have to admit yo~l' mista keand say : 'C,oillratlc l\Iao T sc-tu ri g, you were right, a nd iwa s wr on g. At th e next Poli tbureau meeting I will as knot to send a ny tel egram to Stali n and Dimitrov andnot to d iscu ss the m atter a t any P ol itb uruan 'meet­ing." ':-

* MO~ l of the Pol itb uren u members in Yon an did indeed,~~I:ec '~' I t h , Ma~'s proposal because, after the nth Plenu~ of t.h ~SIxth Central Commi tte e, th oy were afraid to cross him.

17i

"O ut what if th e next SI X months pro ve you wrong ?What then?" I ask ed.

" How can I be wrong ? I am certain to be ri ght," Maoreplied blandly.

"That yon are certain of it is one thing, ,and ho.w evonts,develop is another. '~'e ll me what you will do ~f eventsprove you wrong? WIll you sen d a telegram to Co~radesStalin and Dimi tr ov admitting your mistak e? WIll youab o admit your mistak e to me?"

Mao did not answer.The course of events , as we kn ow, has pr~ved ,the folly

of Mao's pro-fa scist id ea of an alliance '.vlth (' crJ~any ,Italy and Japan, and of hi s lre~c1~ero~s line of, ~lhan~ewith Ja pan and \Vang Chin g-weI. I-ar fro~r ~dIlllttI,n g Iuserr or to anyone after Hitler a tta~kod the SO~le~ , Um o,n, .he1 nched th e "style recti fI cati on cam pargn, makingLau

. . th e Coml'ntem the Soviet Union, and the COJ11-enlllIsm, , .munist Party of China its chief targets.

Our conversation continued. . bd " t le must not be pu -"In short," I said, your ar IC

liS~~~~.'~ust, ,, he said. " I havehcld a C~ Ilr el' en,ce, .andhave sen t in th e manuscri pt. if we. don t publrsh ~t, Iwill lose face. I want the ar ticle published, and I de~la{ehere and now, an d will also declar e to all ~e~?ers a ~ l~Politbureau that I alone ,bear th e ,responslbllr ty for ~\Half ple~ding and half demanding, h e had the artie 0mblish ed in th e Sinchunghwapao. .I To be sure, Mao could only prattle about. the pollcyof the world communist movement and SOVIet fOreIgn.Iicy. Alter them he could not. All th e same, events~~owed th at this unprincipled p.olitical, a~venturer ~ndintriguer had a defin ite pur pose III publishing an articleadvo cating alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan.His aim was to cover up his treasonable. pro-Japanesooutlook , and to justify the order ho. had I ssue~ to t.hotroops to halt anti-Japanese operations a~d mte~sIfyarmed conflicts inside th o country. On the internationalplane, he me ant to undermine Sovi et prestige among anti­fas cist forcos ill other countries.

Secre tly , without th e kn owled g..,e of the .~olitbureau,usinz the ra dio-t ransmitt er of th o CC CPC Military Coun­cil, ~lao orde red Jao Shu-shih, Political Commissar of theNew 4th Army, to send a spokesman to negotiate cooper-

178

uticn against Chiang Kai-shek with rapr eseutativos oft.h e . Japanese arm y and Wang Chin g-wei. Operationsagainst the enemy were suspended. Gut at that timeneither the Japanese nor Wang Ching-wei would believetha t Mao was capable of trea son . They sus pected a tra p.As a resul t , no concr ete accords wore rea ched.

KMT propaganda, however , made the most of Mao'sdea ling with the enemy . Luckil y, tho CPC enjoyed tr c­:ll~ I~ r1 ouS revolutionary prest ige among the people as th ein itiator of th e anti-Japanese national revolutionary war11,nd th e unit ed national anti-Japanese front. [obody be­lieved tha t th ere could be nati onal tra itors li ke Ch inKual ':. and W ang Ching-wei among the CPC leaders.Chiang Kai- sh ek's attempts to use th e above-me ntionedIac ts in his an ti-communist propagan da proved fruitless.

l n 1955, on th e pretext of combat ting a " Kao (Kan g)­l ao (Shu-sh ih ) bloc", Mao arrested Jao Sh u-shih and hadhim killed. He also took advantage of the campaign toarres t and execute Pan Han-nien (form er chief of theNew -ith Army's reconnaissance) whom Jao Shu-shih hadsen t to negoti ate with th e Japane se and W an g Ching­wei, and Hu Ohun-ho, who ha d r epresent ed the Japanesean d \Vang Ching-we i at the negotiations. (In the pas t,Hu Chun-ho had betrayed the Communist Party, butduring th e negotiati ons Pan Ilun-ni en pers ua ded him toservo our Party again.) Mao wanted all witnesses of hi snational betrayal ou t of the way .

Since Hu Chun-ho was a triple agent (for ChiangKai-shek, for the Japanese an d W ang Ching-wei, andfinally, thanks to Pan Han-ni en's efforts, also a coun ter­intelli gence agen t of the New 4th Army in th e Japa nes eand Wang Ching-wei camp, and in Chiang Kai-sh ok'scamp) , the content of his negotiations with Pan Ran­nicn was promptly r elayed to the US and British secretage nts in China through Chiang Kai-shok's spy agencies .In shor t, th e American and British imperialists wereg-iven to understand that even tho ugh the Japanese hadinva ded China and the nation h ad risen to resist theaggresso r, Mao was prepared to deal with Ja pan andbecome a national tr aitor ; thi s meant that in a differentsitua tion he would seek alliance with imperiali sm.

" A nati ona l traitor a t the time of th e Sun g dynast y.

Since many people in side and outs ide th e Pnrt.y have11 0 kn owl ed ge of th o tr ue im plica l.i on s of th e "an ti-Pa r tyKao Ka ng -Ja o Shu-s liih hloc" , i t, will he upp rn pri nt« togive a brief account of it here.

The " anti- P ar ty Kao-J 0.0 bloc" case (19 54) Iabricatedby intriguer Mao pursued three aims.

First, h e wanted T eng Il siao-ping and n ot Liu Shao­ch i to be elec ted General Secre ta ry of the Central Com ­mittee, ren eging on hi s "sole m n promise " (tha t LinShan-ch i would get the post of Gen er al Secre ta ry ) m ad ewh en th e " Mao-Li n bl oc" was Iormed . At the I s L Ple­num of th e Se ven th Central Committee he had objectedto having a General Secre tary in ch a rge of all organisa ­tional work and sugges ted retaining thu post of ch ief ofth e CC SecI:etaria t, who would m an age the affairs of var­iou s CC organs and ce rtain current CC bu siness. In1953, however, Mao began arguing in favour of havin g aGen eral Secre tary . He required his cl osest ellto urage ­Lo Jung-huau, Lo Jui-ching, and othe rs -v-to ha ck KaoKang's open campaign against elec tin g Liu Shao -chi. Ap.a result, Liu Shao-chi was compelled to agree that T engH siao-ping, one of Mao's trusted li eutenants, should beelected Gen eral S ecr etary .

Se cond, Mao wanted all power in the P arty and gov­ern ment agen cies and the army in Nor th east Chin a, U

m aj or administrative region, to pass from Kao Kang toLo Jung-huan, This is why he s udde nly stabbed KaoKung in the back, de claring that Kao Kang's cam­paign ag ainst Liu Shao-ch i was directed against " theem pero r 's cl osest associates" or , m or e plainly, "nominal­ly against Liu Shao-chi but in fact aga inst Ma o 'I'se­tung". Kao Kang was seized (after his ex ecution h e wasr eviled as a "suic ide" and " expell ed" fr om the ParLy) ,and hi s pos ts in Northeast China pa~sed, t o ~-'o. Ju~g­

huan. I3ut t he r eal r eason for Ka~ Ka~g s el lmlI~a lI~nwas his poli cy of sin ce re cou pcru t iou With th e So vie tUnion in defiance of Ma o's orders ,

Third Mao wante d La use tho "anti-P ar ty Ka o-Jaobl oc" c~se t o d estroy J ao Shu-sh ih, Pan Ilun-ni en, R.llCh un- ho , and a few ot he rs, th at is , all wi tn esses of Iustreasonable line of "alliance with J ap an and W angChing-w ei against Chiang Kai- sh ck " , dating to Hl1.0.

7 From th e au Lum n of 1941 to tho summer of 1945i\la~ conduc ted hi s " s tyle rcctl fica tlon cam paign" against

MarXism-Len inism, th e Comi nt ern th e SO " .the . C~JJnmll nis t Par Ly of Ch ina 1'f ' " J.et Union, ~ndperwhsLs that anti-S ovi etis . d liS. con vlllced th e un­ingrained in l\Ja o's outlook. m an anti -com m unism wore

In 1948 Mao said to me' "AI hPacific war betwoen Ja a~ tel' t e o~ tbreak of theRoosevelt has repeated1 P and Amel'lca, Presidentso n officer in Yenan th~t st gr es te d through th e US liai­r.1J:1l':lct er of th e COlllmll~' st ~) 10~Jld chf nge the nnmo andwill, Moscow. This was ~o bcartli'~ an~ break off reJ.a~ion sand t echnical aid to tho 8th n o tpr~e for US ~lhtal'Ydid not agree. vVe would now b .u e rmY·fiL~lcl(lI.Y, we

But though formall ~I d.ed lll a prctty x,' If We had ."y Iv ao I n ot a O'r ee to alt tJ

namo and character of tho CPC and d·l t b k erff

ielations with M. hi . ' ( . I n o r ea a re-"style' re cti fi cat~~~o~~m l~ i ~n ~~ -S~VlC ~ and an ti-c ommunis tof readin ess to ful fil th ~s e eoUnS '1,as, 11l, su bs ta nce, 11 tok en

D ' , (eman( s.nrmc th e "st ,] t ifica t :II . ,'"' , ' ) 0 .rcc 1 c:atlO n ca m paig n" the vVhite

' ow'.: sen.t a ~n~ccesslOn . of h igh-ranki ng dipl om at s andge"nel 'l ls (lIl clucllJ1 g P atl'I ck lIllrle" a person 1 fL1 l)S P . ' .," ( '. a envoy 0 '

Ie, , . restdent) I.? Yeri an. MHO spoke to th em in ananll-SovlOt and antl -c,ommunist vein seeking US a' Iand US-l\fao coop eration. On 23 Au O'dst, 194,1, . '. IC, , ti . h J } 0, 1, In a con­

\ or sa IOn Wit 0 III S~rvic e , political advisor to th e UScom m ande r of the Ch ma-13nrma- I ndia war theatre andse,con? sp.c~et,a ry of the US Embassy in Chungking, Maoexplaino d m r epl y to a questi on why he was so anxiou sto g~t ~~ , a id and su p port and Why' h e sa id nothing o'f!;llS SHl. '~e do n ot ex pec t Hussian h elp," Ma o said.~he RUSSlU~ S h av e suffere d gr eatl y in th e war and

:vl11,,1lave th.en' h ands full with their OWn job of rebuild­mg. .H e ~l'l ed to convinco Service th at " Ch inese andAm encan in t eres ts arc cu rr elatorl and si m ilar . They fittogether, econom ica lly and politicall y... This is wlry itis so Import ant to us Communist s to k now what yo nAm eri cans ar e thinking and pl anning. W e cannot ~iskcrossin g you - cannot ri sk any conflict with you,"

To get, US ai d and cooperntion Mao did not shrin kfr om sla ndering th e poli cy and programme of th e Corn­muni st P ar ty of China, d escribing th em as purely hour ­gco is or purely anti-f eud al. lIe told Servic .-. for ('.\ 11 111 ­

pll' . t.l urt " t he poll cir-s of the r,hin f' ~f' Com ru u n is t P urty:11' (' II I I-'l' l'h' l ihorn!". a n ti that " e \'l! 11 t he mo st N II I Sl' l'VH ­

tivo Am o'ricHIl hu si nessm an can lind noth ing· · in our

program to take exce pti on to"., :~ At abo u t the S~~H~ t.imeMao told Harrison F orman : Vve are not striving forth e soc ia l and politicul Communism of Sovi et Russia .Rather , we prefer to think of wh at we are (~o~ng as some­thing that Lincoln fou gh t for in your CIvil War : t~leliber a tion of slaves. In China today w e h av e many m il ­lions of slaves , shackled by feudalism." '~"

Need 1 say that th e policy and. programme ~f theCom munist Party of Ch ina was neither bourgeois norliber al. and n ot exclusively anti-feudal. Mao spokc forhimself , r eflecting h is own ideas , his own pol l?y ~ndpr ogram m e. What h e wanted was that the ~meflcan Im­per ia lists should k now him as a mere agra.n~n r ef orm er ,n ot a Communist, and more ho stile to socialis m than to

capitali sm. . h ' " t ITh er e arc facts to prove that dur ing IS s .y 0 rec-

tificat.lon cam paign" of th e forti es Mao con tlll~lOll slyhegged th e USA -for ~id. and .look ed fo~ t.he sli ghtestch ance to establi sh MaOlst-AmerJcan cooper ation.

H ow obsessed h e was hy this idea may he seen fr omthe foll owi ng episode. On e sunny day in tl~ e l at ter halfof Novemhe r 1944, as I l ay on a couch out side my h ousewrapped in a WMm quilt, 1 was suddenly approached bya smiling Mao T se-tu n g:

"Comrade Wang Ming," he sa id, "I have brought good

"news. d 11 dI asked h im to be seated. H e sat down an pu e apiece of paper out of th e pock et of his overcoat. ITe gaveit to m e.

" Here, r ead this". .T h e paper was about 1;) cen tim etre s. l ong and}O WIde.

with three lines in English. Th e first lin e read: Mr. MaoTse-tung," th e second. "thanks for your congrntula­tlons" . and the thi rd . "Roosevelt ." . I n the lcf,~ cornerwere four boldly pen cilled Chinese ch arac ters : Destroyat. once after r eading".

"Now that we have this telegram," Mao said, " our re ­l a ti on s with Am erica will he much sm onth er ."

". S<'e John S. Service, T he Am eras ia Papers: S om e Proble m sin th e Hlstor u of US-Chin a Il ela t ions, a nubll catl on of the Uni­vcrsi tv of California Center for Chin ese Studies. Berkeley, Cali­fornia, n. 173.

** Harrison Forman , Report from Red Ch in a, N. Y., 1!l4fi,p. 178.

" \Vhy?"" In the past we dealt with R oosevel t' s su bordinates."

Mao replied. "This tim e h e answer ed personally. No~vw? can exc hange telegrams and letter s directly, main ­tam personal contact s, and negoti at e man to man. Thismakes it easier to settle th ings."

"Judgin~ by thi s telegram," I said doubtfully, "it doesnot look like Roosevelt wants any direct exchanges oftelegrams or letter s with you . let alon e any settlin sr ofth ings." '"

::W~y do you think so?" Mao asked pe evishly.TIm; does not look l ike an official t elegram. If h e

had wan ted to exchange te legrams directly, hi s replyshould at Ieast have been ty ped on officia l stationory ofthe US army observers in Yonan. if not on an of ficia lUS Embassy letterhead . What you re ceived is a scrapof paper wi th a few pencilled Engli sh words. Can yo uprove that this is really a tel egram fr om P resident Roose­ve lt? If some day th e Am eri cans sho uld say that Roose­velt had never se n t you any tel egram, you will no tbe abl e to prove that h e did."

He stared at me. Th en h e said :" How can this be possibl e? A m ember of th e US army

group of obser ver s hand ed it to m e per sonally.""And what do you th in k of the four Ch in ese charac ters

in the 1p,ft corner?" I asked." Roosevelt is probably afraid that Chiang Kai-shek

may learn about this te legram, and wants us to burn itafter r eadi ng," Ma o r eplied.

"If Roosevelt is afraid of Chiang Kai-sli ek learni ngabout a telegram like this, how can you expect h im toexc hange telegrams or to se tt le thin gs with you direct­ly?"

Mao's fac e dark ened. The sm ile va nish ed from hi slips. After a mom ent's sile nce , with a forced grin, hesa id :

"All the same, I think that after this direct exchangeof telegrams things will go mo re smoothly."

H e to ok back th e note and went away.T re called that hi s first talk with m e th at year was

on 1 April. He had com e with a defin it e purpose: tospeak hi s "words from th e hottom of th e heart.". 'VItal.han been th e purpose of his visit this time? W hy had h ecomo to show m e the t el egram? Before this, for several

years he had s topped briefing me on hi s con tacts withthe Americans. So, I assumed tha t Ma o had wanted todemon strate his s trength : " Look , I h ave direct t elegraph­ic con tac t with US - P resi dent Roosevelt. That is nojoking m atter. "

Since then Iacts have come to li ght to bear out m yassum ption . In Sep tember of tha t ye~r (1 944 ) Di.mit­rov, wh o was about lo r et urn to Bulgnrla aft er h er lib er­ation by th e Soviet Army, had wr itt en one more lat terto me. I .ike th e previous one, it had been inter cepted byMa o Tso-tuug. lI o was a fr aid that I mi ght learn abo~ tit. Th a t was wlry he had cnmc to show me Hoosevclt stel egram : " Look , y01l m ay hav e Dimitrov, but I haveRoosevelt. "

8: I n th e au t.u m n of 1\145, a fte r the Sovie t Ar-my en­te re d North east Chin a and militari st J apan was crushed,the situation in Asia chang ed r ud ica Ily . Mao was com­pelled to demonstrat e fri endship for th o Sovie t Union sothat th e Sih Ilouto Army could enter Nor theas t Ch in naud cullucl, the tremendous Sovie t military aid . At th esame tim e, h e con tinue d to nurse hopes of Americanh elp i n uniting and building postwar Chi na. T hi s iswhy, in tho autumn of 1945, on the invitation of Patr ickHurley . th e US A Amb assad or to China, Mao went toChungking to negotiate with Ch ia ng Kai-shek, trustingtho US Am bassador to he the arbiter. As a r esult, theconc ilia tory ri ghtward-leaning Oc tobe r T enth Agreementw as con clud ed by th o Kuomintang and crc, which lookedlike a concess io n to th e ri g-ht forces .

Und er this a~reementthc Sth Rou te and New 1tha rm ies and all ant i-Japanese guerri ll a units under th ei rcommand-nearly 900 ,000 m on in all -wore to he re con­s titu ted in to no t more tha n nine di vi sio ns. And ant ofthese nine, the Communists could in dep en de n tly formonly th re e. The r em ainin g s ix wer e to contain Ku omin­t ang units. Upsides, w e were to r olin quish all liberated~reas so uth of. th e Yangtse. Fur th ermore , acco rd ing toan und er st anding between the USA, Chia n g Kat-slickand Mao. th e US Army would ope n mili tary schools in",:onan aIHI Ch an gkiakow (Kal gan) Jar 8th Hou to andNew .'Jth Arm y personnel. ':.

• <. pueJ

to i he ~13 sty prcpara tions for Ill! anti-comm unist civil\ltrJ .ly t 10 morrcans and Chiang Kai-sh ek non o of tho pointso t u s agreement was put into effect. '

184

I wan t to describe th e circum st ances in which Maosigne d th is agreem ent. S ince it s t erms wore harsh andhumiliatin g Mao was afraid that the P arty and our r ev­olut ionary arm ies wou ld object to thorn. So . a t. first. hewas rel uctan t to a ffix h is signature. Then, Ch ia ng Kai­shek r esor ted to the old m ethod of " de mo nstr a tin g theexecu tion of a hen to the ape": to in timidate Mao hearrested Lung Yun, military ch ief of Yu nnan provinc e.And Hurl ey kept saying : " T hese are the fina l terms. Ifyou don 't s ign, th er e will be no othe r chance." Mao ga vei ll , anti s ig ned, An ex t reme ind iv id uali st. he was con­cor ned solel y wi th his selfish in t er ests, a nd was neg lec tfulof th e interes ts of Party and revolut ion. Bad ly in timi­dated , h e all hut los t hi s head. On returnin g to Y en an,he com plained to com rades from the Cen tral Commit­te e: " I n Chungkin g- m y n erves wore s tra ine d to thelimit. Now, 1 feel unwell and ofte n have heartpalpitati ons , dizzy spells. aud insom n ia. " H e su llereda ner vous breakd own , which lasted for ma rc than sixmonths.

Until th e da y war hroke ou t between th e K uom inl angand CPC on a n atiuual sc ale , Mao he lievcd tha t th eUn ited Sta tes wou ld force Chian g Kai-shck to ag ree to acoalit ion governm ent h eaded by th e KMT and includingthe CPC and othe r pa rti es and gro ups (as Mao had en­vi sioned in hi s r eport, On Coalition Government, to theith CPC Congress ).

Mao expect ed the United S ta tes to h el p Ch ina to unifypeaceful ly, T hough after th e surrend er of J ap an th eUS A was r eacti va tin g and arm ing Ch iang Kai -sh ek 'str oops for an an ti-comm uni s t civil war , and thou ghKl\IT tr oops had been attacking CPC troops (the 8thRoute and New 4th armies) a t differen t points in Northand Cen tral China since the latter half of 1946 Maolaboured under the illusio n that the "ccasofire teams"with U S army arbiters would he lp to en d the KMT-C PCciv il war.

Tn the autumn of 1946, Mao invited Gene ral GeorgeC. ]\ la r'sh~ll. ~resid ent Truman's special envoy, to Yo­nan , ~ eeklllg hIS good offices in n egotia tin g a pea ce wi thth e l'.-MT, In the winter of 1946, he was st ill nursingth~ .ill ll.sion th a t th o US wo uld assist China' s pea ce l'niuuili cution CVP l) th ough VI' I I l.Isi-shau's urruv Ilad beuunlarge-scal e m ilita ry op erations azaiust tI lU· su, ItO~lt~

Army in Shansi and Chiang Kai-shck's troops mountedseven successive offensives against the New 4th Army innorthern Kiangsu. The futility of Mao's hopes was ob­vious. In tho beginning of 1947 Fu Tso-yi's cavalry cap­tured Changkiakow (Kalgan) in a sur pr ise raid andChiang Kai-shek, hearten ed by this success, officially or­dered an "anti-communist oxtermination campaign" on14 March, thus precipitating a civil war on the scalo oftho whole country. Yet, it wa s not until 1 May 1947 thatMao finally said, "Down with Chiang Kai-shek", in oneof the Mayday slogans .

9. In 191.7-HI49, durin~ the KMT-CPC civil war.Mao 's r elations with the USA were marked by mutualhostility, though a search continu ed on. both ~ ides fo.rways and means of cooperation . Meanwhile, Chiang KaJ­shek concluded a Sino-American treaty which, in effect ,turned China into a US semi-colony . At that time theKMT st ill con troll ed the larger part of China wi th anarmy of more than two million m en , which th e TrumanAdrnini sl.rntion was priming for an anti -communist civilwar, for th e US imperialists did not b eli eve Mao wouldsucceed in putting th e Communist Party of China and th eCommunist-led P eopl e's Lib er ation Army on the path ofanti -S ovieti sm and rapproch em ent with th e United States .They knew that a victorious Chinese revolution und er CPClead er ship and with Soviet aid would radically alterthe r el ation of forces in the Far East and. th e re stof As ia in favour of soc ia lism and against imperial­ism.

But this did not mean a total break with Mao. Tn thelatter half of 1948, in the final stage of the war, theWhite House again stretched a hand out to Mao. ChiangKai-shak had lost the support of hi s army, the peoplehad turned against him, and he was facing imminent de ­feat. The White House , on the other hand, did not wantUS t.r0ops to be involved against the CPC, fearing ther eaction of th e Sovi et Union. Besid es, it had 10nO" sin ceund erstood f ao's anti-sociali st and anti-Sovi et (~<; 15 ence,~nrl was re l ucta nt to ali enate him. Its cours e of bchav­JOnI' wa~ clea r from th e followin g- fact s. Til North andE as t Chma th ere were then more than 600 000 UStroops g d ' f 'h . - roun , all' orce, and navy-which withdrewast~ly wherever the P eopl e' s Liberation Army hove in ­

to SIgh t In orde r to avoid a direct engageme nt. US Am -

HU;

h~ssador Stuart in Nanking let Mao know th rou ghdifferent channels th at th o United Sta tes was pre pare dto loan a new Chi nese governme nt two billion dollars forfive ~) r t en .years , pro,".ided it did not es ta blish diplomatic.r el a tions WIth the Sovie t Union .

Mao was r eady to m oet tho United States half-way.He ordered the P eople' s Liberation Army not to fire onU S troops. P oli ticall y , he foll owed a "wide-open door"poli cy in anticipation of cooperating with th e USA .

The ab ove is borne ou t by th e general poli t ical lineset hy Ma o in h is report to the 2n d Pl enum of th e Se v­e n t h Central Committee in March 194n. This genera lline and the conco mitant home and for eign policy were,of course , above all a proj ection of hi s anti-L eninis t andanti -socialtst "new-democratic" li ne and policy.

M ilO ' S lin e wa s at cro ss purposes wi th th e Len ini st line,according to whi ch the Chi nese bourgeois-dem ocraticrevolution would grow into a socia list revolu tion a t th emoment of it s victory on the scale of the whole counlry,leading to th e building of socialism . Mao m aintainedthat after the victory of the bourgeois-d emo cratic r evo­lution the sights should be set on a no n-socialist "new­dem ocr ati c" society. H is argume nts against a sociali strevolution an d the building of soc ia lism in Chin a wer efour: -

1) "Imperiali sm conti nues to exi st" ,2) "the agrarian r evolution has not been com ple ted",3) " capitalism in China is undeveloped", and4) "the national bourgeoisie is still involved in tho

revolution".Only ono out of th ese four arguments-"the agra r ian

revolution has not be en com plete d" - had no immediaterelation to im peri alism. The first argumen t meant tha t solon g as " imperiali sm ex is te d" Mao -was not goin~ to se t,the course on soci alist revolution and. th e huildin z ofsocia l ism . And the th ird an d Iourth sho wed that h e (~rav­itated towar ds capital ism and dirl not want to come togrips with th e bourgeoisi e.

In home policy , he favoured a "policy of four sidesand c!,ght directions", which included these four points:

;) "equ al concern for public and priva te in tere sts",... ) ~qual concern for the inter es ts of workers and

capitalis ts",3) " mutu al aid of town and vill a zo"b ,

4) "commerce between th e internal a nd exte rnal mar ­kot s".

The first two point.s are cle arly non -socialist. The othertwo do not look objectionable. nut if w e recall one morepa ssage from Mao 's co nversation w ith Jo hn Servicein 1944. it. will be clear th at these two points wer e al sochiefly aim ed at furthering Maoi st-Ameri can econom iccoop er ation. Mao said to Se rv ice th at " A merica andChina com plem ent each other economically: they willnot compete. China does not have th e requirem ents of ah eavy industry of major size.., China need s to build uplight industries to s upply her own market and raise theliving s tandar ds of h er own people... America is not onlyth e most suit able country to assist LIti s econom ic devel­opm ent of Chi na: she is also the on ly cou ntry full y ableto participate." W e ma y al so re ca ll th at Mao had mad ecle ar hi s wish for US man u fac t ured goods Lo he su p­plied to China, whi ch would pay th e USA with farmproduce, and the like, This sho ws th at th e latter twopoints apply not only to home poli cy , but als o to foreignpolicy, Surely, White House officials and American s tu­dents of China who foll owed Mao's eve ry movo wer epleased with this trend in Ma oist poli cy .

In for eign poli cy . Mao s uggf'st ed th e foll owing course :" At lea st ill th e first few ye ars new Chin a do cs not11 ?l;'r! lo he recogn lserl hy th e three great powcrs-c-Brit­a Ill , th e USA and USSH-so that they sho uld not inter­fere in our internal affairs. " H er e h e deliber ately placodth e socialist Soviet Union on one pl ane with imperiali stBritain and tho im peri alist USA. The purpose was thesame as the one Mao pursues today with hi s dcmagogi ­cal talk of " two su perpowers- the USA and USSR'-': °tomislead the pu blic and slande r the Sovi et Union , and todisguise hi s hostili ty towards th e Soviet Union whil eseek ing ra pproch em en t with the USA and Britain.

But at t ha t t ime t he in te rna tional situation and th econdi tions at hom e d id not permit Mao to foll ow an U11­di sguised anti-Soviet and pr o-imperialist poli cy . The CCCPSU and t he Soviet Governme n t foll owed a Lenini stinternationalist policy towards China. Th e So vie t UniOl~announced it s r ecogn ition of t he P eople's Il cpubllc ofChina as SO~111 as i t was in augu ratod. It ga ve new Ch in anll-round ll ll! au~l ;; l1 P I ~ n l' t . ill th (· pu l it icn l. diplomati c.economic, rillauc iuI, SCIon tific, technical , cul tu ral , and

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educational fields , and in publi c health. Fo r a tim e, thistorpedoed Mao's pr o-imper ialist and ant i-Soviet cons pira ­cy .

10. From the autumn of 1950 to the su mm er of 1953China helped the people of Kor ea to repulse the US ag­gressor. During thi s per iod , too, Mao did not aba ndonhope or fri endl y r elation s with th e im pe rial is ts . Thi sis supported by fa cts wh ich Liu Shao-chi reveal ed to meat that tim e.

At 8 p.m . on J0 Nove m ber 19.52 Li u Shao-chi (whohad come to th e 19l h Con gr ess of tho CPSU and wa ss till ill Moscow ) in vit ed m e (in l\Ioscow for m edicaltreatment) for a talk. "W hen t he Anglo-Amer ican troopslanded in In chon," he said, " the situa t ion in North Koreabe~ame cri tica l. But Chairman Ma o hesitated to sendChinese volunteers to r epulse the US aggres sion andhelp Kor ea. The Polithurcau was in ses sion round thec~o~k for f,ourteen days, but co uld not come to a de ­?I SlO~ . ~h ::\lI'Il1 an M~o. sa id : :T1Ie mom ent ou r a rm y goesI~tO acti on , the tradit ion al Sma-American fr iends h ip will(he. 'Who ca,n tell how long it will take to r estore it?A:~Hl, supposing w e act, what are we going to do if weIail L~ halt. the Ameri cans?' In sho r t, he cou ld not makeup. 111.5 mind. It w as not until :::; troo ps capturedSIUUgIShu and ther e w as only the bridge across the Yalubetween them aurl China that Cha irman Mao was forcedto come Lo a dec ision, H e said : 'Now we mus t act.If our, troops begin now, wo ca n still coun t on gloryand gam-the glory of proletar ia n in tern a ti on alists n ndthe gain of flghting not on Chines e but on Korean soil.If we wait until tho Am eri cans cross the Yalu we willlo se both glory and gain.' When later, a fter our troop shad already gon e into ac tion, Ch airman Mao learnedthat Trum an h ad forbi dden MncArthur to bo m b th e Shun­yang-Manchuria railway, he said ru efully: 'H ave wedone right to engage our troops?' And still later, whenMacArthur insisted on extending the war to Manchuriaand s take d his job on this (either h e docs what hewants, or he resi gn s ) , and Truman di smissed MncArthur,Chairman Mao wa s deeply upset. He sa id : 'If we hadknown bef or eh and tha t th e USA docs not want to fightagainst u s, We sh ould not have involved ourselvesa~a inst th? Ameri cans by aiding Korea and injuringSino-American r elations. Now, we must see how we

18S

can put an end to the matter qu ickly. Until we do, it isno use seeking a gradual r estoration of Sino-Americanfrie ndsh ip.' "

This "frie nds hip" , as we see, was m ore important forMao th an aiding a fraternal socialist coun try and herpeople aga ins t a US imperialist aggression. E ven at thetime of the Korean war h e was stro ngly affect ed byAmerica-m ania, as well as Am erica-phobia. .

H. The period fr om 1951 to Hl57 was one uf contin­lI OIlS nezotia tions between China and th e United States,laying tl lC ground for Maoist-American cooperat ion.The 1954 Geneva Conferen ce on Indochina cleared theway for regula r Amo rica-Maois t contacts. The Kor eanwar and the American tr eaty with Chiang Kai-shel~ onjoin t "de fence" of Taiwan had strained Maoist-Americanre lations for a time. But at the Gen eva Confer ence theChinese and American representatives cons igne d th eses trains to oblivion . The two sides defined methods andstages for subs equ en t regular con tacts. The ~egoLiations

between the Chinese and US ambassadors m Warsawwere part of this pattern. F earing exposure of his unsa­voury deals, Mao tri ed to ke ep the conten t of the nego:tiu tions from the Chinese peopl e and th e world. The USState Department, too, conflI~ed itself to .saying . thatthou gh Washington and P eking had no dlploma~lC. r e­la tions, t he progress m ade in the W ars aw negotlatl~ns

was fa r greater than that of Britain and other countr ieswhich did h ave diplomatic relations with Chi na. 'fh.emore than a hundr ed m eetings of the Chinese and Ameri­ca n spo kesmen in W ars aw did, indeed, pave the way toclose r con tacts between the Maoi sts and certain quar­ters in the United Sta tes.

12. In the per iod from 1957 to 1965 Mao was busypr eparing the anti-communist and anti-Soviet "cultu ralr evolution". . . , "

The 1957 "campaign against rightist elements .waspersonally stage-managed by Mao. At first he proclaimedthe specious slogan, " m ay a hundred flower s bl oomand may a hundr ed schoo ls compe to" . He urged peopleto "say everyth ing that is on your mind, sa y everyth ingfr ankl y. T hose wh o talk commit no cr im e and those wholisten get a va lua ble wa rning" . On his order s people wereencouraged at meetings and throug h th e pr ess tospeak up without fear. First, Mao wanted to identify

HIO

those who were still critical of th e mi stakes he had madeI~l On New Democracy and in hi s report to th e 2nd\le?u~ of th~ Seve.nth C.e~tral CommitLee, tha t is, spe­cdicall )., of h is hasic poliuca l s tand agains t a socia lis trevolution and th e building of socia lism in China afte rtlte victory of the bou rgeois-d emo crati c revo lution' sec­ond, ]I ~ \~' anted to identify those who approved ~f th edenuncration of th e personali ty cult at the 20 th Conaresso~ the Sovi et . Communi~t Party, th osn who, in one formor another, directly of m dir ecLly, opposed the deificationof . l\J~ o Tse-tu ng .and h is dictatorship. To engineer a pre­te.xt for persecu ting peopl e cr it ica l of his mi stakes, heordered his agents to persuade, even forcibly compel cer­Lam r eal coun te r-r evolu tionaries a nd pr o-KMT el eI~en t~to slarI~er th e Com~unist Party of China and th e Ch ineserevolution at meetmgs and in the press Lat. .LI "f "I . er, usmg

resa act~, ie .pounced on th oso wh o cr it icised himfrom Mar~lst-LeIllnist positions, br anding th em "c oun­ter-revolutIOnary r igh tis t elements " .. Mao admitted th at 800,000 people were nailed downin th e "cam pa ign against ri ghtis t ele me nts" . Bu t then umber of i ts vic tims wa s much gr eater. Among themwere Party cadres , writers and art wor kers, and m ostof tll? leaders and m embers of dem ocr atic parties andaSSOCIatIOns.

From HJ58 to 1960 Mao conducted his rec kless " threered .banners" policy und er th e slo~an of outs tr ip ping th eSoviet economy in a few years. 1:hi s scheme failed di s­n~ally.' wh er eupon, in April 1960, Mao th rew off alldisguises and began an ide ological and poli t ica l battleagainst the CPSU and the world comm un is t m ovement,and char ged the Marxist-Leninist parti es wi th "revi­sionism" . At th e International Meeting of Communis tand W orkers ' P ar ties hi s slanders wer e conde mne d byth e vast maj ori ty of fraternal parties.

Tn HH:i2 Mao launch ed an officia l campaign against" r evis ion is ts" in sid e the country. At first, h e struckag ainst part of the leadership, no tably Liu Shao-ch i, andthen banish ed a number of writer s and artists knowns i n~c. th e ~wen t~,e s .an d thirties to remote vil lages, de­scnblllg this as going to th e m asses" .

In 1963 Mao launched hi s no tori ou s 25-point pro ­gramme, aimed . at splitting th e soc ia list community, th eworld comm umst movem ent, an d th e an ti -imperiali st

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/lation al libenltion movemen t. J\ t th p. same time, us inghri bery and deceit, h e b egan em a ti ng an anti -Sovie t, anti­Comm unis t and pro-Maoi st fift h col umn in othe r coun­t ries.

I II H161. and t(lG5 h e co nduc ted a " learn from theLib erati on Army" and an " educating successors " cam­pai gn, pl acing th e arm y ab ove Party and peopl e. IIe alsolaunched othe r cam paig ns directed to deifying h isperso n , befu ddlin g the youth and drawing it " in to t hes torm an d turmoil together with Chairman Mao" . T hisse t the s tage for depl oying th e youth and P eople 'sLib eration Army units ill a counter-revolutionary militarycoup.

These an ti-So viet and anti-communist divi sive moveswere meant to win sympathy and favour in im pe rialis tqu arters. In 1964 and HlG5 the White H ouse di spatchedEdgar Snow, and then Li Tsung-jcn, to con tac t Mao Tse­tung.

13. The period from i nGS toH170 saw unprecedenteddevelopments in Maoist-Am eri can relation s. At the he­gin ning of 19(j5 Mao publi~~ly. refused t? join tl.le. Sovie~Union and the other socialis t coun tries in a~dlllg th epeople of Vi etnam in th eir just w~lr against ~S aggres­sion and even obs tructe d their ald . At the tuue whenth e 'US was esc ala ti ng its aggressi on in Vi~tIl~m , andMao was prepar-ing for his " c ult ural revol ution .Snowand Li Ts ung-jen came to Pek ing. Snow repor~ed 1Il theBritish Sunday Times in May t97 t that referr ing t? thowar in Vi etnam Ma o had sa id to him, " T h e Clunes.ewill n ot fight, unless t he Ampricans a t tack th em. Is thisnot clear? The Chinese h ave their hands full at h om e."In this w ay Mao let th e While Hou se know w her~ Chi nareally stoo d in the Vi etnam war, thus com for ting an dencoura zinz th e aggressor . R eferring to Sino-Soviet r ela­tion s, S~ll)\~ r eported th at Liu Shao -c hi .,had w anted tose nd a Chi n ese delegation to the 23rd Congress of theCl'SU in Inus with the aim of revivin g t he Chiuese-soviet all ia nce. But Mao h ad put hi s foot do wn. He was

in fav our of a peo ple 's war against bo th the U nit edS ta tes and th e Soviet Un ion .

I t is com mon kn owle dge th at Mao has always beenhostil e to t he So vie t Union, but only pr etended ho sti litytowards til e US A. By m entioning war aga inst. 1111>. UnitedSta tes he was m erely cre a tin g a smokes creen fo r hi s

H12

[.r ep ar at ions f.o~ a war against the So vie t U nion. S urely ,th e tw o old fnends-~lao T ee-tu ng and E d(1ar S IlOW ­

must als"~ hav e di scu ssed the "cul tural revol ~tion" , eve nthOl~gl~ ~ 1l0\~ d~es not mention it in hi s re port.

Ll 1 sung-l.cn l ~ all old lackey of US illllJedalislJl. Afterth e collapse 111 1v1.H of the anu-communm war in whichhe had,pl ayed ~ prominent part as the so-c alled \Tice -Presi­deut of,tlw Ch iness Repu bli c, Li Tsung-j r n emigra te d tothe United S ta tes. Th ere h e s layed for 17 yea rs, th ensudde nly retur n ed to China. I n P eki ng Mao re ceived himas an. h Ol~~ured guest. Ban qu ets and re ceptions were heldfor him . I hereupon, he toured the big cities. During hi stravels h e propaga ted the slogan , " to figh t against im­perial ism it is essentia l to figh t against re vis ionis m"contr ibu ting th ereby to th e preparation s for th e "cultu r~a l "evolution" . Hi s ca ll for lIghting against im pe rta lismwas a m ere pl oy, whil e hi s call for fighting against " re­vis ionis m" con form ed in s ubs tance with Mao 's ownplans , Oil the in terna ti onal plane, th is mean t str ug gleagainst the Soviet Union , the oth er socia l ist cou n tr ies,and the world com ui un is t m oveaent. Insid e the coun tr y,it m eant strugg le agains t t he Communist Party ofChina, th e for emost work ers , peasants, in tell ect ual s a ndyou th , an d the poli ticall y conscious revolu tion ary se ctionof th e P eopl e's Lib eration Arm y.

It w as an open secre t that Sno w and Li Tsung- jenrepresented th e White House and exp r essed th e opinionof officia l US quar ters. T hey had a common ob ject ive:to learn more about th e prepara ti on s for th e "cult ura lrevolution' and to express th eir approval 0 11 be half ofthe White H ou se.

In the summor of 1966, while waving th e nag or acultura l revolut ion , Mao performed a counte r- revo lu t ion­ary cou p. Agai n , he was seeking to win t he con fidenceof imperialist r eac tion a nd to begin coopera tin g wit h iton an an ti-Soviet and anti-communist basis. H is de sig nshorn Iruit, U S P residen t Lyn don John son , State Secrn­tary Dean Ru sk, Defen ce Secretary Rob ert McNam ara ,a nd others, stated that th ey w anted to improve ~m eri ­

cnn-Chiuese r elati ons, to coo perate wit h Ch ina III theFar East, and acted acco rdingly. A conference of U S ex­ports declared that the White House looked with favourupon M ao T se-tuug in th e bcli el th at " Mao's vic tory intho 'c ult ural revolution ' is in the inter ests of the USA".

t o?

Mor e d ocla r ntions followed from influ ential US qu art er s,say ing th at they wanted b etter relations ~\lld coopcr~\ t:ionwith the Maoists . Commercial, diplomatic a nti politicalact io ns wer e taken to "stim u late mutual und er standing".

In sh or t, in the period from J~(j ;j to 1970 both sides ­Mao Tso-tun g anti th e US qu arters concerned - took therequi sit e s te ps to arra nge 1'01' ('oop er alion., e ~ -

'14, In th e period Irom th e sunu uc r o l U/O , In t.hes pr in g nf J9 7 1 !'Ilao a nd S now h eld lon g cn l d. ' d en~ ip !ta lks on these issues. It will be r ecall ed th at 111 ~Ll.3 (jMao and S no w h ad b ecome bo som fri ends at first Sig h t.Th er e is evide nce th at Snow was the Iirs t middl emanthrou gh wh om Mao arranged sec ret con tacts with impe­ri al ist US q ua r te rs . This was wh y Mao ofte n rdcl'I'cdgra tefully to S no w sa yin g : " l owe it mainl y to S nowfllilt I hav e bnl~ olll e' k nown all over the wo rl d , es pcr,inll yin the USA , and t ha t I am unrlcrst ood by th e Auu-r­lea ns ." In Fcbru nry 1!)71 , as S no w w as leavin g Pek ingafter m an y se cre t conve rs atio ns with Mao concer n ingMaoist-Auiericau coopera ti on, th ey parted dose frie ndswho had com e to a n undcrstandiug and whose I'olati ollsW(~ L'e cord ial and fra nk. Thi s is horne out by a va rie tyor sources mll1 by Sno w's own rep ort in Lije ill April"l!17 1. Th ey had di scu ssed a visi t 10 Chin a by th e USPresident, Mao's co ntin u ing s tr ugg le aga ins t th ose ofh is countr ymen w ho favoured Iricndsuip with thn Sov ie tUn ion a ud o pposed a rupproch eui en t wi til US im perin 1­ism, and ma ny other subj ccts. Th ere is th is roveaIiIlgpassage ill . now' s re port in Lif e, ref errin g to Mao: " Ashe co urteously escorted m e to th e door, h e said 110 wasnot a com pl icate d man, bu t rea lly very s im ple. H n was,h e said , on ly a lone mon k wal k ing the world with Hleaky umbre lla."

T h e sense of Mao's sad words was th at al ter th e ou t­break of th e "cu lt ura l rovol u t io n " h e h ad h eeu nbundon ud0 1' betrayed by his clo se st assoc ia tes; a " pu rge " wasin th e offing of hi s m ost trusted fri end s (includin g hi sappointed " succ ess or ' Lin Pi ao and intimate Ch en Po­ta). H e was con scious o r hi s a loneness and hi s ra il ings tr ength , a nd wa s in desperate n eed of h elp fr om theUnited States .

Cer ta inly, the above docs not cover all th e asp ects ofMaoist poli cy, d ir ected to coo pe ra tion with imperiali stforc es. But it is CIlOUb:h to s h ow th at Mau's rupproch e-

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mont with im per ialism is neither sudden no r Iortultous.a ud th at it is a deliherately planned aim of Mao' s cou n­ter- re volu tiona ry activity.

It. TIlE BASIC REASONS FUn MAO'S DISGllACE

IL is bey ond qu esti on th at Mao' s di sg rucclul fall, hi sbetrayal of the revolution , has ideological, th eor etical ,hi storical and socia l roots.

The ideologi cal roots are in h is counter-revolutionaryideas of feudal monarchism, anarchism, Trotskyism, m il­i tnri sm, and reaction a ry pragm atism . This is why,thou gh Mao did join the revolu tionary m ovement, hi sideology drove him ultimately to the ranks of cou n te r­revolutionaries.

The th eoretical ro ot s : in philosophy, poli tica l ccoun­my, and in th e question o f revolution and socialis t con­s tructi on, Mao was n ot s imply a fa lse "Marxi st who con­ce aled hi s tru e identi ty behind a " Ma rxist" mask, but anoutright oppon ent of Marxism. This is why, though h edid penetrate the ranks of th e Com mu n is t P arty b y pre ­tending to b e a follower of Marxism-Leninism, he ulti­mately subs t it u te d hi s unsci entifi c and cou utcr-ruvolution ­ary Maoism for th e profoundly scie nt ific and revolut ion ­ary tea chin g of Marxi sm-L enini sm, and be ca me a traitorto Marxi sm-Len ini sm.

The hi storical roots: Mao's lifesl ory is not only a longhi story of a nti -Par ty, an ti-Marxist and an t i- Len in is t,anti -Comintern and an ti -Sovi et ac tiv ity, not on ly a hi storyof right- and " le ft"-o ppor tu n is t mi stakes in question s ofpoli cy in all the periods of th e Chi nese revolution, a n rlin many cases a hi story of grave crirnus , but also a lun ghistory of id eological kowtowing to imperiali sm. This iswhy from a pseudo-Communist. carrying the Com mu n is tbanner ho ultim ately turned into an outrig h t an ti ­commu nist using the Comm unist P arty n ag as camo uflugu .

The soc ia l root s : in the anti- im perialis t, an ti- fe uda land socialist. r evolution Mao mainl y represented th e in ­t er ests of th e n ation al bourgeoi si e (as most clearly ax ­pressed in hi s On New Democracy ). Hi s style and methodsm ac k of th e way s an d m or al s of decl asse pe tty propric­tors and lumpenprolctari ans , and in some cases eve n ofr ank Ieudal landl ordism. Th cso arc the com pl ex so cialorigins of the anti-proletarian character of hi s ideas and

actions . It wns inevitable th at he should ultim at ely be­tr ay th e in teres ts of th e prolet aria t.

The limits of th is book pr event m e from going intoth e sources of Mao's disgra ce in gre ater detail.

But to (Je t a better idea of th e reasons why Mao t urned'" .into a class traitor and nat iona l renegade we mu st,if only bri efly, exa mine on e or th e important i.rleologicalsources that influen ced hi s thinking and hohavlour-e-Iou­dal monarchi sm . Th e old Chinese feudal m onarchi smaffected him chiefly in two ways: he wa s drawI~ ,to ~h eegoce ntric "son of h ouveu" no tio n, that. is, the deificationof one's self in the man ner of the Ch in ese em perors asson of heaven (go d, supreme being), a superman whoconsirlers no other men his equals an d cannot trea t themas equals; all other m en (foreign ers as well as compa­triots) are ordained from hirth to be hi s sub jects alll islaves . Th is is the ideological source of Mao's di sgrace­fu l and ridiculous individuali sm. He dei fied h imself,called himself " the red sun", th e "magic ape Sun WlI ­Kung" , " the firs t in th e Celestial Empire", "the onlygreat man with no equals eithe r amo ng the ancients . OJ'

am ong contemporaries" , an d th e "ne\~ ~mp~ror" . ~ewa s al so dr awn to th e feudal monarch istic S inocc n t r icnot ion s of the Celestia l Empire - the autocrat's rleificn­lion of his dynasty as th e emhodiment of th o divin ewill and cause, rejecti ng equa l r elations with other coun­tri es, which are ordained to bo it s tributaries and vas­sals . This is th e ideological source of Mao's presumptuousand extreme nationalism, yuar-u lug day and night for th esu premacy of his Maoi st dynasty in Asia, Afri ca andLatin America, and for world hegemony.

1t should be remembered, however, th at th ese noti onsapply exclusively to periods of prosperity. Ther e worealso many feudal dynasties in Chinese hi st ory whi ch attim es of decline paid tribute to st ronger foreign dynas­ti es, gave t.heir duughtor s in wedlock to alie n rul ers, andswore allegiance to them as faithful vassals. The kinghumbl ed himself and called himself "son-emperor" toW'(! s er~' e his tenuous hold on power. At such ti m es , th e

sun c t i t y of th e son of heav en" an d th e " im pregna hi lityof the Celestial Empire" were forgo tten. And t-his to~

affected l\f~o's thinki.ng, for did he not advocate a' PI'O~Ja panese Iine of na t ional tr eason and does he not nowfollow a pro-imperialist line of national tr eason?

IV TIlE FATE OF THE "LONE MONK"AND TUE MAO! T 10TH CONGHESS

I. WilY MAO TSE-T UNG ll ECA1\fE A " LO 'E l\IONK"

1) The inevitable result of ideologicaland political mi stakes.

Mao T se-t uu g became a "lone mall k " . 'I' h is was riots ur pr isin g. It was, first of all, a logi cal result of th o evo­lu tion and development of his ideological mistak es a ndl'!TOneOUS politi cal lines. Of late, Mao has been saying"everything d epen ds on wh ether the ideological an d po~litical line is correct" , And this is essentially tr ue, If aCommunis t mHkes one ideo logi ca l mistake after another,if h? continuously foll ows an erroneous political line,turning a deaf ear to the criti cal remarks of leading Par­ty () I'g(~ns ~nd eorn rad e~, and if he con tinues to aggra­v.uo .llls 1ll I S~ a~(esl he IS hound to ond up a traitor to~! al:xrsIll-LOIll ru s ru , proletarian in ternationali sm , th e so­l' l1d l ~ l revolution and socin list cons tr uction, to th o COIU­ruunist Party, the pr oletariat, and the toilers. This wasL!le p~t,h of .traitor Trotsky . This was tho path of trai torChon I'n -hsiu. And this is also Mao Tso-tung's path totreason .

In 28 years -from tho founding of the CPC in 192110 th e victory of the Chinese revolution in 19ItH- l\laomade oue s~rious ideological and political mis tak e altera Jl ( ~ ~h er , ta k in g eithe r " left " or r igh t opp ortunist li nes.. SUH:~ the victory of the Chine se revo lution, with Mao 's~ d eologlc a l a~l(l polit~ C'a l rnist,akes developing i ll scaleand .d e r~ h, his evolut ion C' lllmlIlllted in hetraval of com­1ll 11l11St ld ea~ and coll usion with imncn a lts m . De testedh{ COn~ Jll lllll s t s an d working peop le , he bccam n what heh UllseH d csci-ibed as a " lune mou k " ,

2) The inevitahle result of persecutingand exlel'lllinaUng all " close associales"

Th a t Mao has becom e a " lone monk" was also theun avoid able resul t of hi s own intr ig lles and plots, and oftho brutal r epression of hi s closes t and. most faitbfulassociates, The inhuman brutali ty Mao loosen ed agains this revolu tionar y comrades and Communists is commo nkn owl edge, Her e I will cite only a few exam ples of howperfidioUSly and savagely he treate d people whom h e hallused a t different ti mes and wh o were cou nted aJllonghis "i nt ima tes" an d "all ies ", These few examples a reonough 10 show why he becam e a " lone monk" deserledby hi s dosest cou federates,In th e autumn of 1927 , ou ord er s of the Cen tra l CUJl\ -mittec, Mao ca ine to the mountains of Cb;ngkllngsl1an lit,th e h ead of a troop of armed poasan ts. At th at tim e peas ­aut troops had no comhat ex perienco, and Mao coulddepend on ly on th e unils of W an g Tso and Yu an Wen­lsai , whi ch consisted of peasant rcbe ls who had long sinceFound refuge in Ch ingkangs han. It was tha n ks to mil ­itary coopera tio n with the se units th at Mao man aged tosurvive an d build a su pport base. In the spring of 19 28Chu Teh arrived th ere with revolutionar y unit s, and inthe autumn Pong Teh-huai and Huang Kung-lueh withth eir units. Thereupon , resor ti ng to the old warl ordtr iek , " a plot and a banquet" , Mao execu ted Wang T souud Yuau W ou- ts ai , and di sarmed th eir troops. At th eend of tile thirti es, in one of hi s talks with me, Mao ad­milled : " Aft er all th ese years I hav e realised th al WangTso an d Yu an W cn-tsai sho uld hav e been spared, T he yand t heir troops had b een fairl y slIccess flllly ru-ed uca ted. "

It. was not until Chu Tell , Pong Teh-hu ai, Huan gKun g-Iu eh , and othe l's ca llie to Chi-nglwngshan th at (tbecame a revoll1Liollal' y hase ca pah le of i lld\qwnde llt mi l­it ary operllt ions. Mao had 11 0 kn owledge of wa rcm ft.Uu[ul'llT na l.cly, Hn an g Kun g-lueh wa s I(ill ed du l'iug aKuolllinl nng air ra id in I!"):H, Fo r man y yea rs, Mao re­li ed ehil~ f1y nn Clm T eh and Pen g Teh-hn ni. Th en , soutoyears nIt!'r seizing mili tnr'y lr ad l>T'ship in th e Party atth e T SlT nyi confp, renc e (J allllUl'y Hl:i :'i ) , he did not hesi­tnle to hlT miliat e th em, Dmin g the "style reeti ficati on"call1 paign in the cllr ly forti es th cy were cllCIl'getl with

grave p~)lili c lli an d orgnu isatloun l mist ak A .perse cu l.ion (:011 t iuuod during th o « , it' ,~s , nd .th elrPung' Teh-hua l os iecia ll . cu ur n revolution" .rv hrutoli t y. ' , I " y, was tr eated with extraordi na-J l was chi efly the " Mao-Lo bloc" tilTse -tu ng lo U SUJ']I lh e I. ' I' " a t enabled MaoT ,~ ., . op 1111 Ilary IJOst in til P l. sunv i I U Janu ar v HP5 1 I ' e ar ,y atthe hel p of Lo F'~l ('eh' n \~ 101' .words , he did it with

h ~ i ang', Dut. in the fort~llesg 1 O~! - tlC ll) and Wang' Chia -l' " J ' '" nu rrn g t he "st I ti fmn , L iev were both at t: 'I' I I . Y e roc 1 rca-" I' < ac , ee 'y hun ' I I .e ll tural revolution" LI \ I l ' 'I ' anr e unn g th eMao launched his " sltoYla,IC<t'fjwas. renewed.

lI 1 1,. , o rccu H: a t IOn ('~ 1 . ' " 'le. 10 p, among other thinvs < , ",ul 'l Hl lp l WIthwhich he had hezun to " gs, ~)f I.he J\ lao-LILI bloc"

(ith Pl enum of Ih'e'" S J' X I 11SCla lllD IIICI October Hl38 at. th ~I " ' ' .' .en 1"1 om' tl YI ie cult ura l rev olution " I "11 . " 111 1, ee. , et duri ng"1 ' ['1 I 10 pI OlJPd I I II SI I .; I) , S n <e- irc aker , traitor ' ,.. ' . . ' .J , , 1<IO-C; 11 as

III g ca pila l ist -r ondeI', and \11

0 \ ;~;,O,IIl ~ t , ch io] pow.er-twlll­cruelly, . 10 I ce, ,I1HI dealt WIth IiiIIIAs rot, Lill Piao Mao I ' I I . f .At that tim e Lin jJi'I( )' (1l' tll,le t)l'lI'IIP 1Hl\ll'rd him s ince 1\1:3;).I' " ,110 'I - 0 '1' IT f,li S successo r" se r iously, li e told' P , (~ ~ 0 or 0 , beingIII II ny episode . . 0 Ku abou t It as aAfter the Tsunyi con tc ro MIds post of Gen eT'~ 1 C()mmi~~lLe , / fOto~k advan tage of

a l! d, later, Chairman of tl;~'3a~ (\ I, 1Cl\CI )l ~ nese Hed A.I' IIlYWill OYCI' Lin Piao T .: ,I , . 3 1 Ys 11I Iary Coun cil InTh o f ' \\ ICC io s po ke '11)0111 L ' PirIP. lu-st t.iuir- was i ll t he s " (J' " 'f f '( III lHO . tO ni e."Comrnde \Van O' M' . ~)( I1l ", 0 LlB.J. Mao said:Lin Pia o') H I' is It'l' y mg, \\ IllY are yon mak ing lip toI

. . , ma ll ,lil t 1 don 't ,- t ..durmlnud." ' \\ ,111 Illy wa ll I1n-"What do you me . ~l " I I . - ." \VI ' d' ) , ~ n , asked In surpr ise ., I y H you prUlse Lin Pi ao ' L II . , ,intern ati onal you th delegati , H

ali e mco ting wlth HII"All Ts aid ' " tl I G TOn III an <ow la st summer?", ' \\ as la , .relleral LiIl Piao -I • 'l1I illld III th e lJaLtle at 1" . ' I " 1- ' ' \\ 10 \\ as III CO Ill -nlall . fl ow ca ll Ihis bl' ( ' ( : : : ~i ~i~:'~' ;lu 'l ll , wals. also H young0 " ' I , - '.' '. ~ asmai: lllg llIllohin. 1 <IS IlllC erIllJnln g' YOUl' \\"lIP " I .1' I I," B . . - " rep JC(Y JH'alslllg Lin Pi ao you \\' > ' i . .waJl," Mao sa iel "N ' 1' " tI (1 lIJ1t l'r lllllllng mywork for wpl! o~'e r 0 \\ 1, ~t e ,I~ , I hav e been doi,ng lIlilitar ywon is L' 1" H t e~l ) Cal s, ami the only fn elld I have. II Ill. lao, e IS my man. His is t1w only arm ' rcan ca m1l1 e, tllr onl\' army I can (lel)t·· llel . 'TI Y1('r .t f' I " . ' , 0 n, Je 0 t I -. llll! s o l ie 8111 Houte and Ncw 4th " )'11·1" " 5 ' , l" ~" .I I e 110

I \j ~ 1

mi ne. So, be ca ref ul. I'll 110 1. let. an yon e u nd ermine Illywa ll. "

Th e second time we tal ked a ll this su bjec t wa s af te rthe closing of tha 2nd Pl enum of the Sev enth CentralComm ittee in March H149. Mao had said that m y speechat the Plenum con tained " ten poison s". T wo of th emconcerned Lin Piao.

Mao sa id to m e:"Wh~ did yo u prai se Lin Piao at. the Pl enum'? Why

did yOl~ say hi s descripti on of tho military s itua tion hadbeen c]ear and 10 th e point? Didn't I tell you te n yea rsago th at to praise Lin PI ao was to Und () I' ~ll iIl O. m y ~am)Now you have praised h im aga in. Isn' t this porso n­Oil S? "

"And didn't T toll Y OU ten ye ars a go, " I l'l-'plied , " tha t,a s I 1'1 0 0 i t, all Par ty cadres , ' includin g you and m e, he­long to the Par ty and that it is abs urd to say that somem e mi nc UI' you rs, or nuyb od y 's . I did no t m ea n to mak eup to Li n Pi ao O!' to m ak e him 'm y' mall. You Hayth at yo u a nd he have boon close for a lo ng time. If thatis th ~ ease, ca n a few word s of pr ai se Will him aw ayfrom yo n'?"

Th ese t wo tal ks show how much Mno depended onLi n Pi ao, how much he need ed him and how un sure h ewa s of him . Hi s relationshi p wit h Lin P iao was no t th atof tw o close associates wi th co mmon aim s an d ide als .Thou gh by abu s ing hi s post of Cha irman of th e Mil ituryCouncil an d that of Central Com mittee Cha irrnnn, Maoused press ure Hnel prom ises to befri end Lin Pi ao a ndmake him his suppor ter in th e army, th e la tt er did notwant to be involve d in Ma o's dirty tr ick s . During th e"s ty le rec ti fica tio n ", for exa mple , Mao did not tell LinPia o of hi s plan of fal sifying the hi story of tho Party orof hi s other in trigues , for th e latter would h av e disap ­proved. J can also cite a few other cases in which I waspe rsonally involv ed and w hich show that th er e were dis ­agreem en ts between Li n Pi ao a nd MHO Tse-tun g.

1. In Decem bet' 'I9~7 at th e firs t Politbureau m eetingth at. I fI lte nd r d a Iter my return to Yonan from tho Com­intern , two di fferent as sessmen ts were made of th e'battl e at, Pingh si nkuan and of our st ra tegy in th e anti ­J ap anese wa r .

Mao sa id that th e battl e a t Pln gh sinku nn hnd brok enth e rules of gue rri ll a warfar e, that it hu rl been n halllu

200

of manoeuvre, and tha t no such battles sho uld be fou ghtill future because w e were not capable of anythin g fJU tguerrill a operations against the Jap auese. This, he sa id,was our strategy.

Chu Tch, comm ande r- in-chief of the Sth Houte Army,Pong T ch-hua i, hi s ~ep ltty, Hsi ang Ying, formally dopu­ty commander but TIl fact th e com ma nder of the Ne w,1th Army, Chou En-Iai, dep uty chairman of th e CC Cf'CMilitary Cou ncil , and others, maintained th at the bat tlea t Pi ngh si nk uan had shown that given appropria teprcpuratious a l~d fav ourable conditions we wer e clearlyc ll. jJ a~ l e of t aking on tho Japanese in s im ila r butl.los ;cer tal,nly , so lon g as our arm y lacked mo dern w eaponsg ue rri lla warfare s ho uld be our main stra tegic course bn lwh en condit ions w er e fa vourabl e we should not sh unbattles of manoeuvre.

~Ve als ? di scussed tho pro posals of Stali n and Voro­sh ilov which I had brought from Moscow: the 8th Ho utoan(.1Ne~ 4th armi es sho uld m uster avail ab le moans to Iormunits With modern arm s. These arms cou ld como 1'1'0 111

the on e-fift h or on e-fourth shar e of Sovie t arms su ppl iedto th e Chinese armed for ces under the accord reach edsom e years bef ore wi th Chiang Kai -sh ek . S talin had alsoaske d m e to say to the Politburcau of t he ec cre ·

" A rt illery is th e god of modern warfare. T he ' Rth,~ou t~ a~ld Te,y 4th armies should form artill ery uni ts..' he So\"~ et U IIT?n CUll hel,~ with a workshop for repair­IJI g g ll n~, mach in e-guns , rifl es, nnd othur w capous , andf~r. making s he lls and ca rt f'i dg cs . Equipm ent and tec h­nrctan s could al so be su pp lie d. " All co mrades of th eP~litbu realf welcomed Stali n's and Vorosh ilov 's pro posa ls,WI th th e sa le ex ception o f Mao T se-t ung.. Mao sa id: "Agai ns t t he Ja pan ese we m ust fight a g uer­

n~l fl WIlJ'. \V~ ne ed ,1,10 gu ns. w, need no work sho p. T heyWill be a nur sance. Of COIlI'se, he wa s wrong-not onlymi li ta r ily, but al so politicall y. -

A t th a t lime, Lin P iao wa s not H m ember of th ePol ithu rea u. He did not at te nd the meeting, where hecould have expressed hi s opinion. But as fa r as I knowIrom olh er Pol it burcan com rad es, ho opposorl Mao's yipw­poin t.

2, One Novomhor day in HI4.8, ontormg Ma o's s tudy,found h im in a sta te of ex tr em e ir ritation ," W hat is th e tro uble, Cha irman Mao?" 1 aske d,

:J0 1

" I t's L in Pi no," h e r eplied ." Wha t lias 110 dOllor"" Lin fliao is di sobeyin g order s," Mao sa id. " I ha ve

issu ed se veral orders for hi m to a ttack a nd tak e Cha ng ­chuu . l l o wo n ' t do i t. Il o wants lo s tarve th e dty andw ake its ga rr is o n surru nrlu r."

3. T he Ioll owiug month I a gain Iouud Mao i ll th o sames ta te of irr itation .

r asked :"Chairman Mao, wh at is it 1h is tiuic ?'" It 's Li n Piau a gain ," he said ," \V ha L has he ({OIl C'? "

Mn« replied: ," He is still di sob ey ing or ders . I drew u p an IIl tl ~n a-

uun for F u Tso-yi . L in Pi ao was to have furwarded It toh im . I dcmnudcd inunudi ato s urre nde r . If Fu 'I's o-yi WCI'Oto re jec t it, we would m ou nt a gene ra l ollcnsive a m i w~pchim out. Lin P iao has di sobeyed my orders on the adv l~cof T on Pao-shuang a nd other mid dl em en . Th ey say I'llTso-y i is a stuhh oru northern er aIHI is SUI'C 10 re fuse tosur re nder: they claim, on the othe r hand , Lhu l h e muybe pursu adcd to joi n lI S as a 'I'ebol' . , If we yl'l'sc ul tIleultim atum , h e may ellgage h is :100 ,000 mun In a desp er­ato assa u lt. If dulcated , he would esca pe by plane toNanking, whil e P oki ng and it s e nviro ns would be rav­agod -something we want lo a void, So, Lin Piao is s ti llw'aiting for 1"11 ' Tso-y i to ' re bel ', and is ign orin g lilyorders."

Yes, Li n P iao o fte n had IIis ow n viewpoint. Ilc refu sedto he Mao's blind tool.

Y et , in mi litary matters Mao was com pe lled to dep endo n Li n Piao. In 1959, wh en h e di smissed l'cn~ Teh-huuifr om th e post of Mini st er of Defence, h e a ppo int ed LinP iao to replace him and le t h im h an dle all the currentaffairs of the Central Com m i t tee 's M il itary Co un cil. Also,ft c orde re d Lin Plao to laun ch tho " lea rn Irorn Lei Feng "ca m puigu in t he a rm ed Ior cvs . To all in te n ts anti pur­poses , thi s mean t prop aga ting ti le SJOgU ll, " re ad trw hookso f Chairman Mao, obey C,hHil'lllan Man, fo llow tho be­hest s of Ch airman Mao" , awl inc ulca tin g a sp ir i t of blindobe dienc e to Mao. Th ereupon , Mao launched t he " lear nfrom the Liberation Army" and "ed uc a te successors "ca m pa igns to fnr t her the persona li ty cu lt a nd to set thes Lage for offlcially naming Lin Pi ao his success or.

'W hen tir e "cultura l revol ution" beg-un, Lin Pi ao ex ­I.oll l!r/ Mao 's pe rson and " tho ug hts ", and th o Mao is t. prop ,ugan da m achin e k ept how ling' da y a JU I ni gh t : " Lin Piauis Chu irm an Mao 's clos es t asso ciate", " Li n P ian is tl wmost fa ithfu l asso ciate of Chai rman Mao a nd th e mostFaithful expon ent of the thoughts of Mao Tse-uin g" , and" Lin Piao is th e fin est success or of Chairman M~lJ " . A tth e li m e of the so-call ed Btl, Congress it w as officia ll ywritten into th e Party Constitution that L in P iao wa sMao's " su ccessor ",

In loss th an two and a h alf years, however, th ere oc­cu rre d th e so-c a lled Sc pteru hor ev ents. Lin Piuo van ishedIro m the scene togeth er w i th hi s wifc Yeh Chu n,deputy mini st er of def ence and ch ief -of-s ta ff HuauzYu ng-s he ng , co m ma nde r of lh e ail' fo rc e W u Fa -h siCI~,poli tica l co m m issa r of Lh e uuvy Li T so-p eng , anrl c:li il-d'of army ordnance Chu Il ui -tso , At th e 9th Congress alluf the m h ad, On Ma o's specia l in stru ctions, been electedm em bers of the P olitburcau .

Th e Septem be r eve n ts occ urred d uring' tho "s uddenimprovem en t" in Ma ois t-A merican relatio ns Iollowinzth e two vi sits Lo P eking' o f Hen ry Kissinzer s pecia l e n~

" '" ,\'oy of th e US President, a nd short ly befor e Nixon 's vis-it. Th e forei gn press deduced a ca usc- und-e llect con­nect ion between th e Muoist -Arn eri can rapprochement a ndMao's br eak with Lin P iao.

Now, a few words abo u t Chen Po -la, In Se p te mbe r1% 1 Mao mad e hi m Iris perso na l secre ta ry awl a id e inth e "s ty le rect.ilicution en rJI paig n " . Mao hefri ended hima nd Iurth cred hi s Cn rNJI'. On M nu's ad vice Che u Po-tawro te oonunentnri es and a r ticles OIl cruc ia l iss ues ofhom e and for ei gn policy. T hi s w as to gi ve him " we ig ilt "and in flu euc e. Mao gra du a lly prom ot ed h im fro m a lte r­nate m ember of the Central Committoo to m em b er o f theS ta nding Committee of Lh e Politburc a u , and made himon e of hi s most trus te d li eu ten ants . H e decla re d 011 eve rypossib le occ asio n lIlat Chen Po- tu wa s t lte prin cipal in ­terpre ter of the " tho ugh ts of Mao T so-tuug" , a nd sa w toit that th is sho u ld be univer sally ack now ledged. D u ringthe " cu l tu ra l re volu t io n IIH put Chen P o-La a t t ho headof the g ro u p su perv is ing th e "cu ltu ral r evo lution ",th ough Chia ng Chin g , Mao's wife, was its ac tua l chief.All th o same, tho appo intm ent, a lbeit on ly nomin al , w asa tok en of spec ia l trust. Yet in A ugust 1\:)70 , SOon a ltcr

E dgm' S now's arrival in Pek ing, Che ll Po-~, a s topped . ap­

pearin g on the politica l scene , and accof'(!l! lg to . vafl~u s

q ua rters vanishe d com ple tely. to gether wit h L in P IUO

d uri ng th e September events of 1971.

Mao h ad afton sa id that h e h ad fo ur "old close ,a:;­

socia tcs" da tin g to th e Chingkaugshan peri od: La Jun g­

hua ng, T an Chien, 1,0 Ju i-ch ing and .lIo Ch ang.-kung .

Fo llowiu z the " s tyle rectificati on ca m pa ign " h e sa id th a t

h e also h atl several "new close assoc iates": Liu Shao ­

ch i, Che n Po- ta , U u Chiao-mu, Pe~g Che n, Kao I~ang.

Lu Ti ng-i and Chou Yang. Kao Kaug w as physically

e limi na ted by Mao in H154, Lo Jung-hua ng died of a ll

illness in L!lU3, and none of hi s othe r n ow and old "close

associates" survived th e repression s of the " cu ltu ra l r ev­

olutio n " pe riod.

:~) Th e inevitabl e re sult of "style rcctlficatlun"and " cultural revolution"

Mao beca me a " lone monk" as a res u lt of th e >t~,le I'CC­

tifioution " campaign and th e "cultura l revo lu t ion", "bo th

of wh ich he had organi sed himself'. He becam e . a lone

mon k" du o to h is u n di sguised t reach ery and .1m ; coll ,~­

s ion with imperi alism an d reaction on the baSIS of a nti­

Sovietism a nd anti-communism.

T he " Lin Piao ca se" a nd its extreme ly grave co nscq­

uunces s ig nified a major defeat for Mao 's ! l t~ 1 ~ongross

lin o. As II. r es ult , r ent by s tr ife an d c()ntra~!J c tlOns , th e

Maoi st group is in sad s tra its and m us t con tin uo u s ly ox­

pect "sto r ms a!ld ! ,ncl~ment we.athel:" . M.ao's ,c al~ at" tl ~~n th Congress fo r unity to gam s till g loa tel. :l.cto lles

was in vain. Th ere followed s till greater dlVISIOTl a nd

still greater defea ts . Thi s is why . Mao admits to being.

a " lo ne m onk " who h as los t prestige and the s uppor t of

h is followers. At the lOll I Congress h e was n o more th an

"an id ol in th e temple of royal a nces to rs wi th t hrice

seale d lips" .

2. TH E HOME AND FOREIGN POLI CY

OF TIlE MAOIST 10TH CONGRESS

Accord ing to the ClJin ese press , th e '10 th Congress of the

CPC ope ne d on 2/1 Au gu st and clo sed on 28 August

1973 . But th ere are rel iabl e reports th at it opened ear-

204

li or , in mid -Augnst. Fo llowing con t f'O vcws ies a nd d isagree­

l1l eJl t~ , t l!e lead ership finall y jJubli sh ed two reports ,' the

COlJStltutlOlI, a e0I11111lJ lli que, and se ve ra l lists o f membersof cen tral org ans.

Th e p eopl e of ClJilJll a nd tho world have not hCJOn to ld

how. ,1l1~ny of the 1,~49 de lega tes, a ll appointed by Mao,

spo l\c In th e dehate, a nd what th ey said . Noith or does

a nyhody k now whet.her Mao, who "direct ed tho Congress",

I11 ad ~ any speech Illmself. B u t w heLller llC di d n ot spea k

or' ~I , d (and d.oes not dare puhlisll hi s speech) h e wa s

Ob,:,lOus ly lJ,1 dlffi .cullies, JUdging fr om the published rna­lOIl HI , Ma~ s policy endorsar] by the Wth Cong-l'ess Jl ll S

hecom s s til l more rea ctIOnary and iLs aims s t ill more

m approlJl'jale. This is why t he 10th Congress line is

l~eading for s t ill g re a te r se tba cks tha n tha t of th o 9thCon gr'ess .

1) The lllain objective of home policy

"ye ca n. se~ from thl' , puhlished material that Llw prin­

~ I pa l obJc~tlv.e of Mao s home policy and th e conespond­

m g orglllllsa tIOna l measures is lo maintain Mao 's on e-mnn

!'el\.ction al'Y ru le nnri prepare tho g round for tJ'llnsfel'1'inl.!'pow er to Chiang Ching.

F irst , th is is confimlCd hy th e cen t ra] item dea lt with

h~ th e 10th Congr~ss -th.e so-c alJod Lin Piao case, W hy

dJ(1 Mao tum ag amst Lin Piao, hi s offi ci al successor'?

Wh a t is beh ind the Lin Piao case? T he Mao ist po litir.a l

r eport to th o 10th Congress delivererl by Cho u En-Ini

sa id: " Prior to t he Con gress , Lin Piao had produced 11

? ra ft political r eport in coll abora tion with Ch on Po -tn .

Th ey woro opposed to co n tin u ing t/IO revo lution undor

tho. di ctatorsh ip of the pl'o letarint, contenrling that the

m um task af te r th e !:It/I Cong I'eSS was to develop produc ­

ti on . Th is was a r efurbished version under n ew con di ­

tions of th o same revi sionis t trash th at Liu ShaD -chi and

Chen P o-ta h ad s mugg lod into the resolu t ion of the 8 th

CongTOSS, which a lleged t ha t the major contradiction in

0111' co u n t r'y wa s not the contradiction be/ween th e PI'O­

let ar int an d the hourgeois ie, hut that between th e advanced

socia lis t systern and th e backward prorlueti vo for cesof socioty."

Ma o rej ec ted th e draft an d drew up a n ew rep or t, which

Lin Piao was to have delivered to the Dth Congress .

. , 1 ions from thr puhli sh ed\Vc ca n draw certa In cone l1S1 '

ex tracts of th e M aoi sl repor~, ,, t ' uiug the r ev ol u tion, , , f . r r 01 con III ,.\ Mao was 111 avau 1 t ' ri at" w hi ch mean s, I ' £ the pro 0 cl w v ,under the dict ators u p 0 , " the cOlln te r - I'evolu -. r " . or co n t lll\ l1l1g '1that he was 111 (1\ our , " hi tting the prol etanat ur«tlona r y "cultu r a l revolutIOn , 't ll 'ar ty 0 11 th e pretext ofits van<Ju a rd, the COJl1m,ll ~ l ~ A~ [~~' t h e na tional bour-o , \ !)OUl'rteol sl e , - 1 t1 r sa fel y"com hatt lHg tie n , flClel Mao gua l'an t? e,( 1: : th ogeoisic , in the ccon~n~ltC and trusl and pnvileges In. ital and \HOI1 s, .of Its ca pl . , ' ns l con tin m n gpolitical fwI,d, I Chen po-ta w ere alg a: : " de vel op in g') Li n Plao anc ," awl call oe or , ' . ofM....~' s " cu}tu r a l r evOl\ltlO1

n" 1Icr th e " pl,'n(\nctlVe r o~ c~~ or,J ,'" order t o III ;, ialisl syStEll1 ,produ ctIOn ~n 'u " the nd va nced soc. ' 1 r on " andsocie t y" in line WI I I the "cu ltura l rc vo u I, I' , . words , to Oll( , I111 ot l L-l " , f soc ia11sn l. . Slu -ch! amhegln the nuild ing 0 \' 8th Congr es s LlU • 1,\0 1 " fell') A t the t li1\e or tie l ' ru] M ao, on th e ot lU I ,, , tl one h ant , <l •Chell 1'o- ta , on \(~ o ] bui\din g so cia lJsJll , . ,' , of Mno­ou t ovel' the ques liOn hi t ile "st an d an l- bea lo l 1 1\ "'\. 1 Li Sh ao-e 11, . , } 1 ' f w iom "vVll v dll JIt!· it " tl1pol'is t, iotn 0 L' n 'aoJ CI P o-to. I S ' f 't ' s an d In 11< ,ism , and • len " e the earl y or re , ' ',-\0 y ears, d M ao' S t rust SIUC 1 for 1110re th an , - ICll lOY1

e, I I)cen enltival ed b y 1\ 111

0 un e IIis 0VP01len ts :lJIewhu \,1( ' 1 ccessor )eCOl. l ' offl Clll SU " , ~a,Hll \~ <1 S . 1Is } f ft ies all d Six tIes? , , t act w ith MaoHeS III t 1e I 'd'n ly con \.en en " " t il they w ere I II " 1 l ' I the-scmH~s a -T o b egll1 \\ 1 , • ew a ll Iu s )e nnr - . , f the[01' t ens or years , a nd k llhad ' flI's t-han e\ l\llowl ed ge 0 , r'Ol' ~f;lir s , Fnrth ermo~e , It~le\h~u rtlllS" and his h om e :111 '\' \l ennl an v m istakes III lIs\ " el l'~ls tl'OU S cOllsequences ' l It ', -, • 'r 1<\ of t l ell ' " , , 'S iet an ' l\lelgll POLIC)}, 'dl1 l1is an ti-comnUIl1lst" <1

1n t1- ,.(:v ohv iolls\y aM ao }aUIlC1e . .. w Ille 1 \\ ,\ " "

1 " I\tu ral re vo lntlOn , l ' " :;l nnd ar<l -h ea l'lll','IWoP c CI on p even W i , 'l lhl5(' ~n n tel'_ revo1nli ona I'Y c ,.' ou ld not hut ri se a gmn s .,; , ,' '' . nd " succcssor c ,th collst a , . and t l'altor, J . Piaocou nter-revol l1 tlOn ~I\Y ,' t ILe same r ep ort that Jln 1()7ll, I ' " 'u e In ' , . A cru s tChou En- a l -< , , b cea llse In tI ,., ' ', ,'i , -. IOr la l oneill ) I ' "t at whle 1b ~ ('. ll lll C N ao ~ 1I r evolutionary coup ( e " ,li e s tar te d " a conn ter- p\ ' Session of the N 1I1t h~ tl 'Second ellary ., - Iw as ab orted , a t )(J. 'M 'Cll '1\17 1 h e dr(!W lip ti e(' ' t t ee lhen III nl' "Central ,01)\1111, Iltl' ()llary con I) (\ etat cn -. \ con n lflr-I'(WO \ , \pInn [or a n 1I1 111 el " . ' t' ~ I' ancl on Sc pt (! mher H w' I l OtI' c of ProJcc l ,J I , • "tIt ec II ll\ ' , ,·Id a ttcJl1I)t t o as sass lllate OUIlaun ched th e cou p III a \\ I ,

n{'\.O

great leader Cha ir ma n Mao and set lip a ri va l cen t ralcouuuiu eo."A la ug h ably crud e versi on , Even hefore the IOth C OIl ­

g res~: :dl e I~ , 0 11 l\r~ o ' s or ders, C ho n En-l ui ex pla in cdLit e 1,111 P IIW case' to S and Briti sh co r res pon rlun ts ,th e latter co m me n te d in th eir' ro p o rt.s t.ho t t.he t al u didnot sou n d tru e . Mao fabri ca ted th e circu ms tn n ces o f th ecase us Il pretext for pl im ina ting Lin Pin o. But. eve nit' we w ere \0 accep t t h e s tory as t rue . it is q u ite f1 p ­p a rent th a t Li n P iaos m ot.Ivnt.Ion s s te mmed lrom Maosco m ple te id eol ogical. pol it icul, and urgan isat iona l ba n k­ru pt cy , Th is w as why Mao's intention to con t in u e the"cu ll.u ral r ev olution" e nc ou ntere d ca tegorical ob ject ion seven 0 11 the pa rt o] hi s "s uccessor a nd on the part 01'th o chief of t he "group SIIpervlsing the ClJltural revolu­ti nn ",

Th o m a in I'l'aSOJl why Mao destroy ed Lin Pi an wasth a t he had never I'l'a lly mean t to make Lin h is s ne ce s - .S a l' , H e h ad eleva te d Lin Pi ao in word, but was reall yse tti llg th e s ta ge fo r Ch ia ng Chin g , I m en ti on ed thi sin an art ic le. " Mao 'I'se -tung P erf or ms a Coun ter- Hevo lu­t ion ary Coup , Not a 'Cultural H(!Volntion ' " (Marc h10G\J ) , " Mao's nu t. l-com m un is t a nd an t i-peop le g r'ou p ,"T w rote, "cons is ts of a ha nd ful of person s, Out of th esehi s wi fe Chia ng Ching is Mao's closes t an d most trustedassocia te, T his is why he has co n trived to put her int h ird place in his hi erarchy, afte r L in P iuo." Accordingto th e conuuun iqu c of L1 1!! l Oth Congress, Mao brand edL in Pi ao a bourg eois careu ris t, co ns p irato r, COll llte l'-revo­luLionary douhl o-d cal er , reneg ad e a nd Lraito r, an d h adh im expe lled from th e Par ty "once and for all " , C he nPo- La was descr ih ed as " the principal m r m hel' of theLin P iao cliqu e" , llra nr!e<! an "an l i-co m m u nis t Kuolllin ­l.ang cle Jll (~ ll t " , Trol sk yit r, r r negad e. eIWl1l Y age ut a ndr evis ionis t, expelled froll1 th e P a l't y and di sm issed frollla ll pos ts illSid fl and ou ts idc the Parly . T he Co ngress del ­e~a tes, lh e cOllllll l1 lli q lle a lso said , "su p por te d th e d(~ ­c. is ions made o n all t he conespo nd ing m ea s u res takenhy, the ~eI)tral Committee of tIle Com m unis t Party ofC lu na, wI~h reg~l'fl to tlt e o tho r principal m embers ofthe Llll Plan an t l-P a r ly cliqu e",

Who WCI'l' t lw se "otho r prin ci pa l nH1mhm's" ? Mao lack edth e cou l'age Lo n a nw lh em publi cl y, T he w hole worldk nows tha t WIl('Il Lin Pi ao di sappeared , hi s wife , II

m omher of the P olithureau , di sappear ed as well ; so didfoul' other members of th e I' olithu rc uu , th ree ?f.:vho mw er e al so com manders-in-ch ief of three serv lcef-t~ l~

. d for ces th e air force, and the navy ; the om tlgrolln l ief of :lrmy ordnance. But what has hapPoulc,dl·ttOwas c II ( ber f tho 0 1 -Li Hsueh -feng, fonner alternate mern or 0 '

bureau ? 11 Hl71 eve nts Mao purged th e so-Aft er th e Se pte m er. ' . 1 P, t aOVOl'l1 me n t ,

ca lled Lin P ino gro up men~h e{\~~ ntti\~ll ~~.J;y~ WllO wer eand especial ~y rthr. l~ eoy:~l'~ ~~ tl~e com mun ique of tl~ethese people ? rh~d autt l Iug OIl this score. Thi s , too , IS10th Con gr ess sal no II

part of th e ~.ao T se-t;l.ng.:t~l'\1aO h as been con Li nuouslvSince tho ~epLemb~l ,~~~: ll :~. se Marxi sm, and not ruv t­

repeating the slogan. . J at\\:. h e open and abovcboard ,s ton ism ; unite , and don t sp I.' " T hese three " m us ts"a nd don't intrig~e " and COl1SPrl·ltrtee~ int; the new Party

1 " lon 'ts wer e w .. f ' .a nd t.Ire? c. u " [u nda mHntal principl es 0 mn er-Co ns tl tuuou as ieParty struggle. '11 ' b hind honeyed w ords is another

To conceal evt (Olll gs e , .. .' k f Mao T se-tu n g s . . 1 tifav ounte t ric O. . I .' t anti-SovlCt anr an I -

I his anti - -,enlIllS, < "For examp e, . ' lie ,le ;;c1'ihe d as n cam-, cam pa lg ll " .. 'comm unist reacl\<mary 1 " and his coun te r-J'c)\'o-pa ign for rect if ying il~II~~~lt~l~;tSr~v~lu tion" and a ca,m­lution ary .coup as t 1£ I f c'lpilal isi -l'oa llees holdingpaign " agal nst a iauc l l~ P' < and Chen I'o-ta he alsopow er". His assault on ~JIl , Jao <} I' 1 I

. lib t Iy dl:-lortec 19 h.presents 1Il a de I era e i juggle r of truths an dl~ Iact, Mao has a lways} ll~en l,a

T\ order to deceive the

. ' facts ant les tuntr uth s, mn~mg . I h~ rest of th e wor1<1 and pr ovenpeople of China am l :- 1" cations of the even ts.them fr om seeing tl~? k~rue ~:~x~ensiv~ly used by Ch i an~

All these are old tnc s onc.. f 12 Ap ril "n2 1H " ti ommulllst cou p 0 . 1

Kai -sh ek . IS a~ I-i of th e n ational l'lWOlutlOll a.llehe described as de ene

le ts " While coll uding With

f ti nary e e111en. . l' ,. hepurge 0 reac 10 . 1 ' un tr y down t \e ri ver. 'imperialism and se llIng ~ I.~ . cl~national tr aitor s". H e waskept calli ng the Comm\:ll~s~S lu ti on ary , ye t he shou te l1an ou t-and-out co un te r- leC~liana Kai-shek, was and l ~ al lfrom th e r OO [top s tha~ he" r " If ~YOll eve r cateh m e d.?lng

a lways be en a revolu~llll~l ~n'al'Y" h e used to say , yoUanytldng counter-re\ 0 U 10 t '" Kuomintang veterun Bumay shoot me on the spo.

Ha n-m in said on this score: " Chiang Kai -shek has pro­noun ced a ll th e fine words th a t exis t , and ha s cornm i tte da ll th e ab om inations imaginable." Ch ia ng Kai-shek is~ue of the " three teachers" th a t Ma o OHOll sai d had in ­UU UllCOU him (th e o the r two ar c " t he im pe ria lis t" and" the beggar") . In fa ct, Mao surpasses Chi an g at spoutinghon.eyed words to cover up iniquiti es . As the Chinese~~r lIlg goes , " having orig ina te d fr om bl ue, blue r ou tdoesIt ; a~lOther saying runs, "came lat er-wen t hi gher" .

. It IS now apparent that the Lin P iao ca se lias ha dlyfrightened Mao. Despite the violent reaction to the Se p­tember 1971 eve n ts a t hom e and abroad, Mao did not clareto uch on th e s ubject for a long tim e. F in ally, he launchedse cret purges of military and political ca dres, whil eofficially he m er ely publish ed th e slogan of com ba tti n g"swindlers li~e Liu, Sh no-c h i" . Two ye ars of m ass purgesand rep ressi ons loll owed. Sti ll, th e comm unique ofth e I Oth Congress sa id: "At present we should continueto put th e task of critic is ing Lin Piao and rec tif yings tyle of work above all else." T he politi cal rep ort predict­ed that " Lin Piaos will appe a l' aga in " and that eve ntslike t he Lin Piao case will keep recurrin g.

Th is sho ws th at it wa s Mao's con tinuous purges andrepressions during the "cu ltural revol ut ion " direct edagainst Party , govern me n t and mi li tary ca dres th a t hadled to th e Lin P iao case, and tha t t he Li n Pi ao case isbo und to lead to n ew purges and repressions. Mao isca ught in a vicious ci rcle of u nsolvabl e con tradic tions inhi s re lation s with Party, go vernme nt and militarycadre s, m arked by eve r in crea sin g m utua l di s trus t andhostility.

Seco nd, at th e 10 th Congress Mao publicly declared hi sintention to con tinuo m ali gnin g a nd persecuting Comm u­ni sts and th l' working people. T he Maoist poli tica l rep ortde liv er ed by Chou l i~ n - l a i sai d: "Lin P inos wi ll ap pe aragain and so will per son s li ke ' Van g Mi ng, Li u S hao ­chi, P eng T oh-huai and Ka o Kang. This is som eth in gin de pendent of m an 's will. " Thi s is th o reason wh y Maointends to renew hi s attack s on P arty, govern me nt andmilitary load ers , and also on tens of thousands of ca dresem ployed in P arty , governmen t, m ili ta ry , mass and ot he rorganisation s " ten, twe n ty, and thirty t im es", as he haddon o in th e cas e of Lin Piao, \V an g Min g, Lin Shao-c hi ,Pen g T ch -huai and Kao K un g .

These words and deeds of Mao 's have their origm inhis " theory" of " re m oving th e o ld and ab sorbing thenew" . What this concept means is that per secution ofrevolutionary cadres and working people must be ascontinuous as the blood circulat ion is in a hUllHUI body ,His target s are cadres and Party m ember s of all l.hp.periods lis led in th e com mun ique of th e IOt h Congr ess ­not only the "older generation, which outlived th e !ound­ing of th e Party and the tirst and secon.d revolutiouarycivil wars" , not only "cadres who surv ived th e ordea lof the anti-Japanese war", not only " t hose wh o took partin aiding the Korean people to repulse American ~ggres­

sion", and not only cadres who had grown up III the,period between China's liberation and th e outbreak 01the "cultura l rev olution", but al so th ose young lead er sand ca dre s who had mad e th eir CiUCCI'S during th e "cu l­tural revoluti on " , and the youth that join ed th e Partyduring this period.

In the beginning, the "cultural revo lution g l'Oupcons is ted of 17 members. Out of these only Ch ia.ngChing, Yao W en-yuan and Ch ang Chun-chiao h a ve re­ma.in ed in th e public ey e. Its mo st zealou s m embers havelong since vanished from th e scene. In shor t , Mao'sintention to persecute and purge leaders, cadres andParty m embers is not a chali ce stratagem.

Though, in contrast to th e earlier period of th e "cu l­tural revolution ", Mao docs not send " red gUill'ds" withunfurled banners and rolling drums into th e streets tobeat up Communists and working people 0 1' make th emmarch in processions with dunce caps 011 their heads andyokes round th eir n eck s , ex pose d to insults and blows,his spies sc our factories, min es, transport en te rpr ises , of ­fices , orgarrisations, schools and h 0111 es , arrosting, purg­ing and exterminating cadres and intellectu al s . This con­tinuous persecution and ex te r m in a t ion of wh ole g rou psof people with revolutionary ex pe r ie nce, polit.i cally ed u­cated anrl ab le to see through hi s cou nter-revolutionnryesse n ce , is for Mao th e chief m eans of buttressing hi sreactionary rule and preparing th e ground for hi s heirs.

Th e "style rectification" and th e "cult ura l revolution ",the brutal persecuti on of "old asso ciates" and " tr ulytrusted persons" such as Lin Piao and Chen Po -La, andes peciall y the intention announced in th e docum ents ofthe 10th Congress of continuing repressi on s, has finally

210

iet peopl e see Ma o's perfidious and cruei nature. Theyhave underst ood th at Mao's tr eatm ent of any person de­pend ed ex cl usively on hi s usefuln ess to Mao 's extremeegoisti c interests, So long as a person was useful to him,Mao literall y showe re d him with blessings, bu t th e 1110­

m ont h e was no longer need ed he was "k ick (!d out andtreated as prescrib ed in a m em orable " cu ltura l revolu­tion " dlrective -i- " th row to th e grou nd un d trample wit.hthe hoot". Ma o's morbid su spi ciousness ("be tte r>mi streatthe guilt less than be deceiv ed " ), hi s desp otism and vio­len ce, h av e s urpassed th ose o f Tsao Tsao, known andhated by most people down the ages for hi s perfidy andcup idity , hut deeply rev ered by Mao Tse-tung.

Mao no lon ger beli ev es an yone, exce pt perhaps ChiangChing. But n either' doe s anybody beli ev e Mao, Th e bl amefor th is rel ation ship of mi strust and suspic ion betwe enhirn and millions of Comm uni sts a nd working peopl e Iallsen t ire ly Oil Mao. And this tenuou s s tate of in compatibil­ity is bound , soo ne r or later , t o precip ita te grea t di s­meier, which will doubtless resu lt in vi ctory for th e ma ssof the people a nd in defea t for the " lone m onk" .

Third , take th e li st of deputy ch airm en of the CentralCommittee and th e li st of m ember s of th e Standi ng Com­mittee of the Politbureau handpick ed by Mao aIt er th el Oth Con gress. 1n th e past, th ere were a lWHyS it fewParty ve te ra ns in th e top lead er ship. Mao was afra id toinstal " II H\\' arrival s " mud e by the " cultural revolution" inhigh posts, lest this sh ou ld ca use out rage in th e coun try.This tim e, how ever , hH mad e W ang' Hung-w en and LiTeh-sh en deputy c ha irmen of the Cent ra l Co u unlttee, findtho same W an g /lung-w en and Li T eh -shen , al on g withChang Chun-chi ao, members of the Standing Committeeof th e CC CPC Polithurcau .

S ince Mao has of late toned down th e viru len t cult ofhi s person, and include d neither Ch ia ng Ch in g nor Ya oW en -yuan in th e list of depu ty cha irme n of th e CentralCommittee and member s of th e I'olf tbureuu S La ntlillgCommittee , some obser vers concl u de d that he had s uf­fered a se tbac k a t th e 10th Congress 01' w as COlli poll edto draw back,

This is true. Mao and hi s " closes t trusted person s"Chiang Ching and Yao 'Veil-yu an found th em selv es inan atmosph er e of di saffect ion crea ted by th e " cult ura lrevolution " or, more preci sel y, by th e bl oody ev en ts of

211

the arm ed co un te r-re vol u t ion , So, th ey rleemerl it wi serto with draw in to the sha de, But th e ' move was purelyIormul.

Mao is s till the di ct ator , He h as g iven up none of h ispow er. AJI(I Ch illng Ching, who h ad m oved up into seco ndplace - after Mao- at th e time of t he "cu lL l~ral rcvo l ~ l ­ti on " and was, in effect, ge nera l sec ret ary 01 th e Polit­bureau St anrli ng Com m ittee in cha rg e of the Ma oist par­ty , cou t.in.ucs to 1'1111 tho party's a linirs regal'd le~s o~ herformal offi ce, Th e so-c a l led Hin gle pa r ty leade rs hfp sovigorously em ph asise d by Mao these days, is designedto'"subordina te everybody to hi m and to h is w ife.

'1. By m aking W ang Hung-wen an d Li Teh-sh en dep­uty chairm en of th e Centra l Comm ittee, and the sametw o plus Chan g Chun-cliiao m embers ~ f the l:olithll~' eauS tand ing Committee, Mao se t th e s tage for nuttin g ChiangChin e anrl Yao W on-yuan in th e game high office . Whathe W~ll ts to sh ow is that s ince 'Yang Hu ng-wcn , Li 'I'eh­s hell and Chang Chu n-c h ia o can occupy to-ech elon posts,so can Ch ian g Ching and Yao W en -yuan . At any mo ­ment, lie is liabl e to - raise Chiang Ching and Ya u Wen-yu a n t o th e sarno sum m its. , "

2. The sym bo l ic effec t of Ma o s m oves IS still moreimportant. H e ga ve th e cou n t ry a mi the world \0 und er­stand th a t Ch in a is en te r ing a period when top partyand gove n lllwllt posts will be held by peopl e wh o m ad eth eir ca reers durmz the "cu lt ural r evolu ti on ". Everybodyknow s th at W an g tlung-w en was pushed up hy the " cu l­tu ral revolu tion " ; it is -k nown OIl good au thority, in fact,t.hat h e played a leading part i,~1 t~le crimes .~ f . th e, is ao­[ans. tho t rouhl a-makers , w ho se ized pow er III S h_a ng ­hai and ran sn ck erl th o lo cal or ganisation s of L1w Com ­mu II ist Pa rl.y, th e t ra de uniun s , and th e local gove r n­men L. H e [oi ned th o MHoist party a nd was ]11'0111ptlym ad e de puty ch a irm an o l th e Sh a ugha i " re volu ti on ar ycomm it te e" . Then , Ma o tran sf erred h im to Pekin g tog ive h im po l itica l prestige, for he was bei ng g roomed 1'01'a loadi ng rol e at t he 10th Congress. Mao put W an gTlmig-wen in secon d place a f' te r hi m self ch ie fly . to brin ghom e to the people th at 1'1'0111 now on to p-ran k ing lead ­ers would como froUl a mong th ose marIo by the "cu ltu r alI'evolution " , Al so, this mo ve w as to pave the Wfl Y 1'01'

o rrteia ll y appointin g Chian g Ching hi s s llceesROI:. In sho~',t,

to usc the classi c phrase , Wang Huug-wen IS now a

ty pical personage in a t~p i r. al s itu a t ion" or , in the polit­ical J ar~un , the most. ty p ica l rPIJI'cSonl ative of those madeby th e cultur a l r evo lution " .

, , ~~ ao 's pul!t ica l slra ta?eIll is desi gned to ma ke people~:~ep t th e Idea , th at s l.nce W an g H ung-wen can takeSLc? Jld pla ce, Ch ia ng Ching ca n too, for s he has a g rea tercla 1111.

, M,~u I.'egards. th e cO,\IIl t.e ~·- re \'o l u ti on ar y "cul t ural rovolu­Lion as til e biggest nclu ovem cnt" of 111' S lif ' .1 I 11tl t Cl . ' NT '- 1 e , ant 10 ( S. H~ , ' , , " l ~lll· , u: I SllO lIld, there fore, Iorovor he hi s , Awlgh 'lfl~ o~ t I ~ ,~g l v,e n ;\:h ere i t is d ue" , who sh ou ld occupy

c u. _. Lin I la o, wh o was hi s appoin ted heir i's1I0 more . Chen P o-t u chief of Ihe " c 11 . I I '"7 ' " I ' u .ui a revo uti on~ I ,O IJ P , I.as. al so I~ ;e n eli mi n a ted. Conseq uon tly t hel epu ty chie l 01 tl~ e gro up " , Ch ia ng Chin g , is a " na t,lIra l"C() l ~ te lldo r . Is this not clear? Mao is p lanuinz t t~ ~ I.l~lJ l.g ~hing . in Chair No. 2 a nd apPo i ~t ho/ ' lti~ s~~ ~~cesser. Pur ,th iS he need s only to pu sh W an g lI UlW-WOllout. But th is does not m ea n th a t Ma o \\' 1'1 1 11(") 1 '"\V, II , , ' ougur lis ev ang lin g-wen III hi s lllllle l'iland dua lin gs . On the CO Il-

tr~r~: :Vang Hun g-wen was prom ot ed by h im for thi sex press purpose. W ang has a lrea dy IJC ()n used to d ulivo rt.h o. Heport OIl th o Hevisi on of the Pur ty Con sf.it utio nwhl~h says that " re volut ions li ke th is wi ll h a ve tu b~carrie d out many lim os in th e Iu tu ra ". And there is nodo?ht th at}Iao a lso intends to u se W ang Hung-won asch ie f of a second cultu ra l revolu tion " .,FOll ~·tlt , ta ke th e l!s t of m embers of the T enth Central

COlllllll lt ee. It con ta ins s till fewer old members and 11, 1­I.el'll ate !lWIII])ors da t.ing to bef ore LlIU fllll Congre ss, wh ile!'!l e number of t l.IOS ~ w ho . mad e th ei r earners - during ll w

cul t ura l r evoluti on has in cr eased . Besid es, th ere are IrOwOllH:n amo,n~ th em , This is l!npreced ented , conside ri ng'that 111 add iti on there we re 32 women a mong the '148m embers of th e T en th Con gress presi dium . T h is Iuet CU Il ­

not hy itself evoke adverse com me n t, hu t in t he case ofl.he Maoi s t cli que it h as a defi ni te purpose-to gi veg rea le r weig h t to t ile person of Ch ian g Ching a III I i" 'e­pur e cadres t o su ppor t her ascension to t he th rone.

Now about th e re habili tation of th e score or old m um­hers and al te rn a te m embers of th e Cen lra l Commi ttee.H el'll, la o, ]\[a o WfiS g u ide d hy se l fish ends , On t ho O l le

hand, he wan ted to soo the feHlings i ll co ndi ti ons of agra ve crisi s and , 0 11 the oth er , he h ad H definite lise for

th e a rme d counte r- rcwo]u t ion. So, th ey deem ed it wisert.o withdraw into th e sh ade. But th e ' move was purelyfor ma l. ,

Mao is s t ill the dict ator. H e has give n up n on e ol hi spow er. And Ch ia ng Ching, \~ho h al,' lll o\'~ ~ l up i~~to ~ :l(:on dplace-afler Mao- at th e tun e of the cu ltu ra l l e\ol~l­ti on " a nd WH S, in effec t, gelllH'a l sec retl~ l'Y of th p: Poht­bureau Standing Committee in charge 01 the Maoist par­ty, co nti n u es to run th e party's a ffai rs regardl ess o~ herform al ofIk e. The so-cal led sing le par ty ImHler slllp sovig orous ly em ph asised by Ma o t hese day~ , is . design edto subo rdinate everybody to him and to hi s Wife.

t. By m aking Wang , Hung-w en a l ~ l l Li 'I'oh-shen dep ­u ty chairm en of th e Centra l Committee, a nd tl~e sametwo plus Chang Chun-chiao memher s ~ [ th e ~olIthu ~'eauSta nd ing Committee, Mao se t th e s tage for pu tt ing Chian gChing anrl Yao Wen-y uan in th o same hi gh offlce..W hathe wants to sh ow is that s ince Wan g Hun g-w on, LI Teh ­shcn and Chang Chu n-chiao can occupy to -ech e lon posts,so can Ch iang - Chi n g and Yao W en-yu an. At an y mo­men t, h e is liab le to ra ise Ch ian g Ch in g a nd Yao W en-y uan to th e sam e s umm its . , . '

2, The sy mbolic effect of Mao s m oves IS still mo reimportnnt. He gave th e count ry and th e wo r ld to 111Hler­st a nd th at Ch in a is enter ing a peri od when top partyand gov ernmen t posts will be held by people wh o m ad eth eir caree rs durin g the "cu ltural r evolut ion ". Every bod ykno ws t hat \ Van g Hung-well wa s pu sh ed up by t he " cul­tural revolut ion "; it is kn ow n on goo d authority , in fact,th at h e pl ayed a leading p al'l in the crimes of the i sao­fans , t he t. rou hln-m ak crs, who "seized pow er in Sh a ng­h ni nn rl r ansacked th e local orga ni sation s of th e Com­mun is t Pa rty , t ile tr ad e un ion s , and th e loca l gover n­m ent. He joined the Ma oist party and was promptlym ad e deputy ch airm an of th e S h anghai " revo lntion ar ycomm it tee". Th en , Mao transf erred h im to Poking tog ive him political presti ge, for h e was bein g groomp,d I'm'a lead ing role at .t h e 10th Congress , Mao put Wan gHun g-wen in se con d pla ce afte r lrlmsol] ch ie fly to br ingh om e to th e peopl e that I rorn n ow on top -rank in g lead ­er s wou ld come from among th ose made by th e "c ulturalr evolu t ion " . A lso, t his move was to pave th e way forofficia lly appointin g Chian g Ching his successor. In s hort ,to lise t he c lass ic p hrase, W an g H un g-wen is now " a

'Ji'J

typ ical per sonage in a ty pical s itua t ion" or, in the polit­ical jar gon , th o must typica l represent a ti ve of th ose madeby t.he " cultn ra l r evolution " ,

Mao 's pol!t ical s t ra tagem is desig ned to ma ke peopleaccept th e Idea that s ince Wang Hung-wen can ta kese cond pl ace, Chiang Chi llg can too, for she has a g re a tercla i Ill.

, Mao rega rd s th e counter -r c\' olu tionary "cult u ral revol u­t.ion" as ~l le bigges t "ach ievemen t" of hi s li fe, an d hold s~11l~~ C II ~lr, TO: I shou ld, t herefore, for ever he h is , An dIf , ~~ ~ 'ed: t I; .)gn'.en ~\:h ere it is d ue' '., who s hou ld Occ upyCha n No . _ : . l. in I la o, who was h is appointed heir, isuo l1l~ ~l'e . Chou PO-L a, ch ie f of th e "cul l II I'llI revolu tiong l~oup , h,as, a.lso !~ ~en e,~ i lll,i n.a te ll. Couscqu on tly , t hedEpll ty cliiel of th e gro up , Cluang Chi n g, is a "natura l"(~,o l~~onde~ . . l ::l ~hi s n O,t clmll'; Mao is plannin g to putChia n g Clung III Cha i r No, 2 and appoin t. h er h is sue ­cesse r. F or , thi s he needs on ly to pu sh W ang Hu ng-wollOl;,t.. ~ut 1I1l s does , n ot . m ea n th a t Mao will lI O louger lise\\ a ng Hun g-wen III Ins underh and dea lings , On t ho CUll ­

tru ry, W ang l lu ng-wun was promoted hy him for th isex press purpose. W ang has a lr eady been used to deli verthe, Ii eport ou the Hovisi on of the Par ty Con sti tution,which says tha t " re volut ions li ke th is will h a ve to heca rried out m a ny t im es in the futu re". And there is noll o ~ b.t that}oIao also intend s to u se \Vang H un g-wen asch IOf of a second cuItura I revolution ", FO ll ~·t lt , take t he li st of m ember s of ' th e T enth Centra l

Comm itt ce. It CO Il tains s till fewe r old III em bel'S and a l­tornato me1llh~ rs da ti ng to befor e the Ilth Con gress, while!}IC n umber of t1.IOS ~ who . made their ca reers during the

cultu ra l r evol u tion hns incrcnsed . Besid es, thuro are 40WOll1 f:n amo,lI~ t he m. Th is is IJ nprcced en ted , cons ide r! ngthat III add iti on t here we re 32 wom en am ong th o '11 8m ombors of the T en th Congress pres idium, T hi s Iuct ca n­not hy it self evuke adverse com me n t, hut in th o elise oft he Maoi s ~ cli que it has a defini te purpose ·- to g iveg re a te r weight to th e pe rson of Chiang Ch ing a nd pre­pare ca d res to suppor t her ascension to th o thron e.

Now about th e reha hilita tio n of th e score of old ni em ­bel'S and alte rn ate member s of t he Con 1./'(\ I Co uunitt ee,U N e, too, Mao was gl1 idnd hy s elfish ends , On t he onehand , he wan ted to soothe fee lings in co nd it ions of agra ve cr isis and, OIl th e othe r, he h ad a defini te lise for

each of the rehabilitated: so me were to win over cer­tain military units , oth er s to win sy mpa t h.y. amollg . 11011­

Han peupl es, and st ill oth er s w~rc ruha bi li ta te d S l1l~,I~lyfor th e sake of a ppe a ra nces. As Ior th e bulk , o! the re ­habilitated " , we cun s till r ight fu lly use the Chi nese say­in g: " T ho ug h we hear th e s taircase ~~'eak , the a, nes wh oare descendin g it are not to be seen . A l'e. these. peoplest ill alive'? Are th ey s till in pris on, and ~tJ11 bein g tor­tured ? Ar e th ey doing forced lab our in May Sev~n th ca d ressc ho ols ? Are th ey und er h ou se arres~ and s t~ll ex pos edto insults '? Or have th ey r eally regai n ed th eir fr~edumand are really being treated as m embers of the Cen tralCommittee?

Let us assume th at th ov a rc s t ill a li ve, a nd th a t th ?yhave nominally been r einst a t ed on th e Ce n tr al Comm~t­tee. Let us eve n assume that a st ill grea te r l~Um~)er . Will

return lo the Central Committee and other institutions.Bill, a rc th ey sa fe from b eing perse cuted and represscd

. '~a ga lll . . .-Fifth , lak e Mao's Lrnatment of th e yo u th and won.len S

movcm eut.s. Prior to th e l Oth Con gress , Mao hunicdlyformcd a false Komsomol. Th e n ew Maoist Party Con­s t it n t io n ad opted b y th e 10th Co ng ress says that th ohunguieipi ngs (r ed g uards ) and hungsiaopings (li ttle I' ~d

g ua rds) a re lcgitimatc organi sati on s of yo uth a nd c hi l­dren . T he fa lse Komsomol is m eant to deceive th e pub­li e and to m a k e th e nn m e o [ tho K om s om ol nvailn blofor Mao's u nd erhand desi gn s, Tho hu ngweipings a ndhungsiaopings h a ve been pr eserv ed for use in th e s ucces­s ive "cult ura l revolu tions" of t ho future as a blind toolfor k ill ing, manhandli ng, a nd torm en ti ng ca dres andwork ing people,

As for wom en's organisa tions, Mao had always tr eatedthem with di sd ain. In the initial peri od of t he "cul tu ra lr evolutio n" he is kn own to ha vo sa id: "T here is nothin gmore usel ess than women 's organi sations". W om en 's 01 '­

gn uisa tio ns W CI' C crushe d, and th eir ~ad ro~, a rres ted . ~uts ince 8 March -1 972 he has been saying : Due uttout.tonmust he devoted to work among wom en " and " a llthings m en ca n do, women ca n do as well ", S ince theLOth Congress th e women's movement is being r evived,Wom en 's con fere nces are being h eld in all proviur .iulce n tres. New wom en's org unis a tions arc being Iorm cd,And th e aim is obvious : to have mass orga nis a tions that

214

would so u nd th e pra ises of Mao T se-tnng and ChiangCh ing, a nd se rve as pillars of su ppor t for Chia ng Ching,

Th o a hovu examples show tha t Mao is hurrying tobuttress his reac tionary ru le a nd to se t t he stage forr, hia ng Ching 's inheri ting h is "throne", Bu t in th e in ­tur na l a nd international" condit io ns of th e seven t ies,Mao' s attem pts at making th e P eopl e 's Hepublic of Chinaa famil y COIIC Cl'Il can , of course, have bil l. one ou tco me­total bankru ptcy.

The Maoi st politica l re por t, to the 10 th Co ngress like~h a t to t he !lth. con tain s no conc rete men tio n of eCI;uom­I,C or c: ~Jlt l~I'a l "achievements" , T here is not o ne eonc rc tehglll:e In I t. The Maois t clique chan nels a considera bleportion of t.he nation al incom e, th e co ntri but io ns ofov cr sc.as Chinese, and th e lion 's share of th e r evenuefrom lornign trad e into war industri es, ()specially nu clearwea]Jol~s a nd ballistic mi ssiles, Con siderable re source sa l'e , b?lllg . a ll{)ca~ed for su bvers ive acti vity agains t th esoc ~a ,lJs t c(!Ill ~nuIlIty, th e world comm unisj, m ovem ent, th ea n l1-l111 pcnahst national liber ation movemen t, a nd thopea ce rnovcJl~ cnt. ~f uch money is spent on finan cin g afifth ~:ol u mn .111 VIlI'lO US coun tries to promote Mao's a bo ve­menllOncd Hu ns. Only H sm all porti on of the na t ional in­c.orne goes to industry and agrieu l ture, sus ta in ing lh elife of the mass o f th e peopl e at a mini ma l le ve l. So,wh at could Mao ha vc said a bout economic "ach ieve­m en ts " .

, ~f he had really wanted to name fig ures sho wing th eli ving s tan dard of the people, h e would have had to ad­m i l Lha.t duri ~g . t he past 20 years th ere was a uste r-itya nd str-ict rn ttoni ng of necessaries as in wartime. Takefuo d. All th a t a person ca n buy on a mo nth's rationca rds is from n ilie to 20 kilograms of bread (01' ro otcro ps a t. a ratio of 4:1) a nd fr OID 125 to 225 grams ofvsgetubl o oi l. As for ot her' commod it ies, spec ifica l ly clo th,fr om five to nine ~l()tr?s a re allotted pe r person a nnua lly.All th e same, Mao s cliq ue kee ps nrging people " 10 di videth e rood of three alllong fi ve" , " to cat a mouthfu l lessa t every m eal " and " to pr ep are for W ill' a nd natural ca­lamiti es " - all in order " to s to re mure gra in". Speakingof housin g , practi call y no n ew constructi nn ha s been see ns ince th e lim e of the " big leap" (1958) .

Ou tsid c th e bigg l!s t cities - w hew a mod est nu mberof hi gh er educa tio nal es tablishm ents is s till fu nctioning

with a shor ter training period, a curtailed curr iculum,and a reduced number of s tude n ts -s-scc oudnry and pri­mary education, whi ch has be en com pletel y denied sta tesubs idies Ioll owing its " trans fer to th e charge of thepeop le 's commu nes " , is in a truly wretched state. ~'h el'eare shortages of specialist s in various fields of scienceand production. Many wer e repressed, m any were exiledto vill a gcs . So, wh at co uld MH O h nvo said abou t " ach ie ve­ments ' tIn the cultu ra l Held?

I t would have been soli-chas t iseme n t for the Maoclique tu l'cf cl' to th ese economic and cl,l1tu l',al fact~. Thisis why th e matter wa s glossed over In silence HI t heMaoi st rep or ts to th e nt h and !Oth cong resses .

The sp ending of tremendous sums for the upkeep ufthe Maoist em pire and for war pr ep arations, on th~ o.nehand , and the policy of cons igning the vast m aj orityof the nation to wretched pover ty, suffering and prema­ture death on th o other, h avo crea ted in soluble and in­crcus iugly 'sharp centrad ictions between th e Mao ist cliq ueaIHI th e people of China.

2) The central link in th e for ei gn policyof th e 10Ul Cong ress

Tu judge fr om the documents of the 10th Congress andth e accom pau yiug diplomatic ac tivi ty, Ma o's aim s i llfor eign affairs are focu ssed on inten sive pr eparati ons .forwar against th e Sovie t Union aI1l1 attempts a t provokinga world war.

First, this is made evident by the communique of the10th Congress. It say s : "Be un guard ... particularlyagainst sur prise attack s by social-im perialism and beread y to wipe out resolulct y, th orou ghly, wholly andcom ple te ly any cnomy that dare in vad e us!" Whatclearer evide nce can th er e be that Mao is in fact himse lfpr eparing an an ti -Sovie t war?

As far ba ck as 1 96~, addressing guests from Japan,Mao laid cla im Lo large areas in th e Soviet Union an d(,0 th e territory of the Mon golian P eople's Hcp uh lic .Fo llowing th e outbreak of the " cultural revol ution" in1\:)66, the hungioeipings, encouraged by Mao, screamedto t ho accompaniment of rolling drums th a t th ey want"to go (,0 war against Moscow an d hois t the re d han nerof the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung Over the Kr emlin" .

~ 11i

Troops wer e con cen tra ted in area s bord ering on th eSuvieL Union , and large numbers of " red guards " woresettl ed in areas adjoin ing th e Chinesa-Soviot and Chinese­Mon go lian borders,

IJ.1 ~1arch 1969, on ,M <~o 's ord er s , Chinese tr oops twiceperfidiou sl y attack ed Soviet horde!' gua rd s, ca usi ng blood ­she d 01.' th~ Chinese-S~Yiet l!order. Tn 1I1is extre me lygrave !'n~u.ahon, ,tho . Sovie t Umon was co m p elled to takeall requisite defensive measur es, on the one h and andin September HW9 to offer th o Chinese si de imme;liate­ly to begin negotiations On border issu es on the othe rThese negot ia tions have been dragging o~ for a ntuuhe;of years, but hav e so far yie lded n u r esults du e to th eintransigence of th e Maoist s.

Addressing th e jubilee meeting On the 50 UI anniver­sary of th e Union of Soviet Soci al ist Il epuhlics, Comra deL. 1. Brczhncv noted that in!f.l71 th e Sov iet Govern­iueut had offered th e Chine se Governmen t lo concl ude atreaty on th e non-u se of force. The Chineso s ide took non ot ice o~. this pr oposal. Speaking in Tashkent in Septem­ber 1\)7,'\, Drczhllev ruvealed that in Ju ne th e So vie tUuion had again offere d to concl ude a Sino-S ovie t non­aggre ssion tr eaty, and again tb e Chinese side saw Iit toignore the offer .

Despite th,is, in th e past few years th e Maoist pro pa­ganda m achine has been howling about "Soviet int en ­tio.ns" L.o ~ttack Ch!?a". A~ld on . the pre text of coun teringthis SOViet t hreat, Mao IS ca lling on th e peo ple of China" to pr ep are fOI' war, " " to pr epare Ior war and for hun­ger" , and th e like. This is meant to justify th e inten ­sive gro wth of war industries, the man ufact ure of nu cl eararms and m issiles of va ry ing rang e, t he muste ri ngof ten s of m ill ions of people for digging bomb-shel te rs ,and th e mili tary tra in in g of mili ti amen in town s andvillages . All ex tre m ely t ense atmosphe re of im m ine ntwar is thu s being created to make people subm it to mil­ita ry co ntro ls an d to reconci le them selves to poverty .

Hcca ut.ly, Mao ad vanced t his sloga n: " Dig tunnelsdeep, s tore grain everywhe re , and n ever seek hegem on y" ,T he first two phrases are aimed at furth erin g war proparn­tious, whil e th e third ost en sibly explains th e a im of aneve ntua l Wil l' , Hut Mao's douhlc-rlcnli ng is we]! known.By saying- " neve r seek hcgernouy" , lie 1I ;"eHlIs thut hegem­ony is to be so ug h t.

')17

Prcpal"in g for a n anti-Soviet w~r and attempting toprovok e a world war -these two nuns , th e s ubs ta nce ofMao's foreign poli cy, also underl ie hi s h om e (l ~li ~y . H eis hostil e to evcry th ing as socia te d wi th th e Leuini st for ­eig n poli cy o[ peace o[ th e CPSU and the Sovie tGo vernm en t , a nd pu ts himself out to defamc the gra ndP eace Programm e of th e 24 th Congre ss of the CPSUwh ich h as al rea dy helped ch an ge th e wo rld clim a te. As aresult, Mao's loathsom e im age of warmonger is st ill bet ­t er seu n by the whole world.

Second , Mao is eager to t hrow in h is lot wi th t heex tre me react io na ry imperiali s t gro ups. H e h as gone ou tof h is way to cs t .a hlie h co ntacts wi th NA TO, a nd isscck iug closer r el ations with th e Comm on Ma r ket, H e iswouing tho U S military-ind ustrial com plex, th e reven ge­seeking forces in W est Germa n y, the an ti -Soviet antianti-communi st British T ories a nd Japan ese militari stgrollps. H e advises a ga ins t rorlu cin g arme d for ces a nda rm a me nts in Europ e, pleads for th o US 7th Fl eet todrag Oil t i ts presence in Asi a, tri es \'0 tor ped o th e Con ­Ierence on Security and Coop eration in E uro pe, a nd isrl aarl s r,l ngain st collec tive secu rity in Asia.

Th ird, Mao is s n pporting , a nd sho wing fr iendly feel ingluwards the fasci s t cou p in Ch ile. lI e expelled the am ­bassad or' of the Popular Un ity government an d wel­comer! an ambassado r appo in tor! by t he fa sci st jun ta .Sid ing wi th th e Iuscist rlictatorsh ip , he tr ea ts as ene m iesthe Comm u ni s t P arty of Chile an d its Gen era l Se creta ry,Lui s Corvala n, the So cia list P ar ty of Chi lo b u ilt by P res­id en t Salvadore Allende, and the working pe op le of ChileIig hting cou rageo usly aga in st fascis m .

This is n o accident. The targets of Mao 's coun ter- r evo­lution ary cou p and th e cou u ter- rovolu tiona ry coup of theCh ilean mi li ta rists we re the sa me-c- Marx ism-Lcnin ism ,the wor ki n g class and it s par ties , t he working poasantry ,th e progr essi ve iutclll gun tsia , uud r c volutiounry yo ut h .On th e interna t iona l pl ane Loth co u ps wer e directeda gainst th e Soviet Union and the soci alist conu u uu ityas a whole, th e wo rld couun unist and work in g-class mov e­m ent, th e a nt i-im per ia lis t nati on al liber ati on move­m ent, a nd t he peace mo vem ent, In both cases th e m eth­od s were th o same as well -Lerror , brutality, ph ysi calel im ina tion, and burning of book s .

'l HI

By siding wi th the fa sci st military d ict atorship inChi le, Mao dem on strates su ppor t of "co n lcde rates" a ndjo int action with US imperiali st forces. T his is why th eChil ean m ilitarists noL on ly express their grat itude toMao, hut also, as r ep orted, arc aiming to se nd a del ega­t io n to P ekin g " to s tudy the expe r ie nce " of Mao's co u nt-er­re volution ary coup. And this, too, Ma o an d his ch um sprob ably co ns ide r a " g re a t victory" for th e " though ts ofMao T se -tun g and the " g re a t cultura l revo lution".

Ur'ot h erl y treatment of the Ch ilean junta is in tendedto will Chil e as an all y in Mao 's an ti -S ovie t and a n t i­co m munist drive, and, ~vi th oth er Impurinli st ageu ts , to(Teal e l~l~e ulO~· e . ba se III La ti n Am eri ca Ior disr uptingthe a n ti -imperla lt s t, democratic, p rogressi ve, a nd peaceJlI overnonts.

" '1'1'o lII~gs ~ r? gro ~ , ped by qu ality , and people hy spir-itual kin shi p - - t IllS aphoris m ex pla ins th e Iriundshipand s ym pa thy . s ho wn by Mao, who has performed aeOllnter- l· e vol.lI tll~ na r~ COII Jl in hi s own country, for' a lla nd su ndry Iascist dic tatorsh ips a broa d.

.F.()urth, Ma(~ is t rying to foment confl ic ts in As ia and;\ I r·Jr..a . H e JS . a.nIloycd ~t the re storation of peaceIII VIetnam. He IS sabotaging a peacefu l solu tion in th eJ\ Ii ddle Eas!.. lT e is doi l.lg his utm os t lo prevent a ne go ­tiate d solu tion of th e di sputes b etw een India and Ba ng­lad osh , on th e on e ha nd , and P aki s ta n , on the ot he r .A nd he does 11 11 this to further hi s criminal plan s ofturni ng' local wars into a world war,

Mao is ho stil e lo the Sovie t- Ind ia n Treaty of P ea ce ,Fri endsh ip and Coop eration , which is tremendously im­portan t for peace in Asia and the rest of the worlrl. H ehas s et ou t lo di srupt th e historica l fr iendship betw eenth e p eopl es o f three great powers in Asia -China, India .and the Soviet Union. H e is con t in uously s toking up t en­s ions in Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-Indian relations,Hull persi sts in h is attempts at di srupting cuopcru t ioubet ween India a nd th e Sov iet Union.

1\Iao is lr yin g to di vide a nd weaken tho mov eme n tfor Afri can u nity di rected agains t imper ialism andagainst old anti n ew coloniali sm , an d also eon nives withth e r cacti nnnry raci st r egim e 01 th o Hepublic of Sou thA Iri ca.

Everywh er o in As ia a nd A lrica h e is s preading dema­gogic propaga nd a tal es abo u t th e " two s uper powers"-

the ussn and USA-with th e one objective of anti:Sovi et subvers ion. Using appea ls for "stru ggl e against USimperialism" as a cover, Mao is in fact doing h is utm.ostto injure the Soviet Union and. to w~n ~ome of tho ASl~~land African cou ntr ies for the Imperialist cam p, to enli stthem as partner s to his pro-imperialist, anti- Soviet al~danti-communist policy of inciting armed con flicts m ASIaand Africa as a fu se for setting off a world war, .

Fifth, the essence of Maoist pol.icy is revealed In thefollowing pa ssage of the commul1lq~e of the. iou. ~o.n­gress : "We must unite with all genuine Marxist-L eninistparties and organisations tl~e. w?rld ov er and ( ~arL'Y, t h~struggle against modern reVISlOI1lS~ thro~g~l to th~ end.

What Ma o call s " ge nuine Marxist-L enlnist parties HlIl I

orlJanisations" (a s Trotsky had on ce called hi s cou n te r­re~olulional'Y or ganisations "Leninist") are. handf.uls o~renegades financed by him and serving his en~~. ~heappeal to "curry the struggle against mode~n revls lo l~l~m

th rough to the ?n~" means tl~at Mao considers h.o.stIlI tytowards tho sociulist community and all comm unis t andworkers' parties to be his main aim. The lrailors to c.om ­mu nism, hourgcoi s agon I ~S , still .surviving Trotsk'yl~CS,"left" and right opportunist s , revisionists, a nd the h.ke,whom he has srath erod Lo his Iold ill vari ou s coun tr ies,a re dolnz Ids l~iddiI'" and s trideut ly ex tolling hi s name,and splitting their tlllgS in th e anti-So.viet. a l~d anti ­com m u nis t chu rus . T oday, this chorus IS SlII g 11lg theprai se s of th e rea ctionary "thou ghts of Ma o Tse-tuug"and th e cou nter- re volu tio nary "c ultural revolution", 011

the on e hand, and of Mao 's aucmpts to unrl ormine wor ldpea ce , inten sify war preparation s, and provoke u worldwar, on the other .

The IOth Congress communique says : " T h e Congresspointed out: th e present international situation is charac­t eris ed by great di sorder on the ea r th ." What doc s thismean? From Mao's point of view it means imminence ofn world war.

Mao's attempts at turning local wars (su ch as the warill Vietnam, t. he war on the l nd iun s ubc ou tlncn t, theWill' in th e Middl e Ea st, etc . ) inlo a world war have Iai led.Th e armed conflic ts he had hi mself provoked on t heChin ese -Indian border d id not d evelop i nto a lull -scal ewar. Mao's armed provocations against the Soviot Uniondi d )JoLgrow into a la rge-scal e conflict because the Sov iet

220

U nion . whil e' ropul sin u th e ag gre'sso r, foll owed 11 linn pol ­icy of peace.

Now Mao is resortin g to othe r m eth ods. H e is tryingto brlng China into th e imperialist cam p, to make heran ally of imperialis t gro u ps in orde r one day to tr y andignite a third world war. Ho hop es a new world war willti g hten hi s pr ecariou s hold on power and, a t onc e, securehi s he gemon y in th e " third world " and . later', th e wholeworld, But this mad drsam will not come true. Th e im­perialists will hardly want to be victims of a worldwideth ermonuclea r holocaust in Ma o's com pa ny. But onethi ng compels vigil an ce : Mao is in a desp er ate plight;t here is nothing he ca n co un t on . If he 1I18 1l1l 1{CS to a m ussa quantity of nuclear weapons and mi ssiles and succeedsin obtaining m odern weapons in sufficien t qu antity fr omreactionary imperiali st sources, he may decide to plun gei nto a m ilitary adventure.

Th e peopl e of China and all other nations must beco nstantly vi gilant against imperialist attempts at br eac h­ing the peace in co ncert with Mao Tse-tun g. T heymust firmly repulse all suc h attempts.

:1) Mao in th e g rip of ins olublecuntradie tlons

Mao's efforts to reach th e above-mcu tio no rl a ims inho me and for eign poli cy ha ve su bmerged him in a quag­mire of con tradic tions . From these ther e is no esc ape .And all the mor e de sperate arc hi s at tem pts a t m akingthe People's Hepuhlic of China a reactionary family COIl ­

ce rn for him self and hi s wife, and th e gre ater is theanger and r esi st ance of th e true Ch in ese Communistsand th e peopl e of China. But the mor e dearly he feelsth e ge ne ra l indign ation and th e wi sh of hundred s ofmillions of working peo ple to be rid of h im, the moreactive he will be in forg ing a reacti on ary " fam ily s ta te"as hi s only r ecourse. And th e m or o r eckless are his at­tem pts at provoking a n an ti-Sovie t a nd a new worldwa r , the mor e swe eping will be the conde mnation andres is tance of the Communists of all coun tr ies and ofall peace-loving; mankind, and th e greater the loa thin ghe w ill ear'lI or th e Counnun ist s and peopl e of Chiu» .And the knowl edge that th e Chinese peopl e and th e re stof th e world re gard him as an l~llemy wil l make him seck

salvation n11 th e more dosp ern tely in intensifying rene­Li on at home and in provok i ng war s between . lI ati on ~ . Be­sides for hi m coll us ion with extre m e reacti on ar y nnpe­ri ali s't groups is a sts pping-s tonc ~o hi s aims i.n . hom oand for eign poli cy, for th ey are hi s closest al.h es b~thin inciting wa rs on th e internation al sce ne and 111 r~la,lIl ­in g hi s gr ip in side th e coun try. !his adds .to th e ex ist inginte r na l a nd extern al con tr adlotious and lIl e~' eases thehostili ty betw een Mao an d the vas t revolu tIOnar y a ndprogressi ve forces a t hom e and a broad . An d th e mo redearly he sees that he canno t ove l'com e .the se forces, th emore desperately will h e .seek con tac t WIth extre me reac­tionary imperi alist g l'ou IH~lgS . , , " 'r

The con tradictions, which ar c of Mao s o,: n 111 ,11~~ll g ,. . d " I' lley arc lik e a gIallta re conu nuo usly groWing eepel. " c , . "

n et in which Mao , thi s " magic ape Sun \V~l-kung , hasentangled himself without hope of redeml~tlO,I~, , . "

Since th e tim e of the " cultural r ev.01l.ltlOn Mao hcl ~cr ea ted a variety of in soluble con tradictions . And thes el~ew contradi ctio'n s make th e old on es, the on es h e cre a t-ed before, still sha rper. . .

lI e has substi tuted COli nt er-r evolution ary M~olsrn l ~ ,'th e revoluti on ar y teaching of Mal'xisln-Lenill.lsm . -:r: lllshas crea ted an il'l'econ cil ahl e politi cal and ideologirnleou tra d ict ion between Mao and th e Mar xists-Lenini sls InChina and the rest of th e world.

He h as subs titu ted a pseudo-communist party for th ernaI Marxist-L eninist Communist Party of China, wh oseorgnn lsa tion s were ransack ed aJ~d whose acti.vis ts W?I'Crepressed. Besides, he has been in s trum ental I ~l lormin gant.i-com m un ist, Maoist pseuc!o-comm uIllst parties In o~h ­HI' lands. T hi s has create d an i rr cconoiluhlc con tr ad ic­tion between Mao and th e Communists of China and th eres t of th e world .

He follows a blatan tly r eacti on ar y hom e and fore ig npolic:y tota lly in com patibl o wi th the intere~t~ of th e CI.li­nose na tion . This has cr ea ted an antagonistic con tr ad ic­tion between Mao and th e wo rki ng class, th e workin g"peasantry, th o intelligentsia, and the studen t yo u th ofChina. He a nd th ey hav e diam etricall y opposi te in te rests.

He follows a tw o-fa ced policy toward s th e P eopl e' sLib er ati on Army, usin g it in hi s rea ct iona ry a nti­conu uunist, anti -p eop le a nd a nti-S ov iet cr imes, on the onehand, and subjec ting its commande rs , political officers ,

and soldiers to continuous purges and repressi ons, on thoothe r. This has c rea ted a con trudic t. iun between Mao andthe PLA, ma king th eir coexis tence im possi ble.

H e follows an ex tre me chauvinist grea t-Han policy to­wa rds th e non- Han peop les of China. Thi s poli cy is bru t­a l to th e point of harbnri sru, marked by disori uuna uo n,op~ression, forcible as simila tio n, a nd mass repression s.This has created a n insoluble contrarl ictin n between Maoand th e nnn-Hnn peoples of Chi na .

Il e f? llows an ex treme reacti on ary for eign pol icy basedon allian ce with imperialism and reacti on an d onanti -Sovi et ism an d ant i-com munism. Th is ha~ crea ted 11

~lInd all1 ent~1 con tradictio n stemm ing fr om the opposit elilt cres ts of the tw o sides between him and the wo rldsocialis t community, th e worl d communis t a nd working­class movem en t, and th e an ti- imper ial ist , dem ocrati c,a nd pI'ogl'essive movements.

I1e foll ows a policy of divisio n an d subvers ion towardsth e. nati onal . lib era tion movem ent in As ia n, Afti cun andLatin Am eri can cou nt ries, t rying to dri ve H wedge be­tw een th em .an d tl,l ei r true fri ends an d all ies in the .strug­gle for nat ion al Ind ependen ce, and against colonia lismand nco-coloni alism. rucia l oppres sion uud racial discrim­inati on - th e Sov iet Unio n, th e soc ia lis t cu tup as a wholeand Lll(!. world cOlllm." l1 is l movem ent. lI e is tr ying t~drag . th is m~)Ve~l1 e Ilt Into th e cam p of imper ialis m a ndI' ea c:~ lOn. Tlll~ IS. crea ti ng II con trad iction flowing Iromth e incom pntibln in ter est s of the Maois ts and th e " th irdworl d" coun tries .

l Ie rejects all proposals and measures di rected tofur thel'ing the pea cefu l coex is teuco of state-s with differ ­en t socia l-ec onom ic S YSt l~ lII S , to casing int ernati onaltension , to establishing reg iona l co llec tive security sys­tem s, and to sa fegua rding world pea ce. He mak es nosecre t of his war prepara tions an d is tr'y ing to provoke an ew world war . Th is has cr ea ted a sharp con tradictionbetween Mao an d all peo ple of peaee- a con trndict ions lnmming from th e cho ice betw een li fe and death , he­tween re gress ion and prog ress .

The r ela ti on of forces is d ear : Mao Tse-tung and hi sgl'llllP 011 one side, ami the revoluti onary, pl'og"l'cssiv cand ponce-loving forces of China and the wh ole worldon the other. T fle two sides are lock ed in a con tinuousand irrccon cil ahl a s truggle . And th er e is 11 0 doubt about

Its outcome: Mao Tse-tung a nd hi s group will nol escapedefeat. I

Th e contrndict ions with in th e Maoist grou p are L~ soa siunilicant element sa pping th o streng th of the Maoist sand ""br ing ing cl oser the downfall of th e Mao d:ynas~y.

In short, th e lin e of th e 10th CUJl gre~s, wlll,eh IS theline of Mao Tse-tuug, is bound to result III a ~ t J1 1 grea te rnumber of m ajor se tbac ks than those whi c!l , Ill' su ffe redaft e r the \ll h Con gress, Thi s is the wr lllll g on L1lC'wall. The march of hi story is not subjec t to the will ofth e "lon e monk" .

3. MAO 'I'SE-T UNG AND CIIlN SH m H UANG ..

Followi ng L1lC' 10th Cong ress , th p Chin ese pr ess beg~lla campaign in prnise of Chin Sh ih Huang. To land ChillSh ih 11 uang it ca lle d down C~II'SOS on tho head of Con­fuciu s and ahusod the name 01 Lu l Isun.

1) Why and how Mao T se -tun g praisesChin Shih Huang

Mao begun his c aIn pa i ~ n by p~' ai sing t!lO even t~ th?tdi slinuu ish cd Chin Sh ih H liang' s despotic rule, ."n(m nas fel~Ks}1/l kengj iii (burning of books ~ n~~ htll' Ylll,~ of" 1 I s) On 28 Scptembor '1D73 Jennurutll.pao printed

51, 10 ar. . I .. ", (In Doan a rt icle entit le d, " Fe ngsh u , cng,llll plCn -Ience of Burnin g Books and Buryin g Sc lt,(l l a r~). Its auth­or , who /-{aye his name as S h ih Tt ng: writes I n th e 0 )l I ' II -

ina passag es of th e ar ticle : ,'i" BurIl i l~g hooks and burying scho lars ,wa~ ~n ImpOl:-

t l li ti cal event during th e ru le of Chin Sin h Hu ang,a n , po I " . I ' t Thou gh

Man y com ments were wr itt en about I. li S eve n . ,not nll opin ions coinc ide, most peopl e regard th e hurnin gof b'ooks a nd bur ying of sch olnrs h~ Chin Sh ih Hu an gas a despotic and cru el aC,t , ,a rea etlOn~ry measure th atled to th e downfall of the Chin llynasly. f

Furt h er O il h e quote s Chin 1, a well-known man (! .letter s a Tl II poli tical figure of th o ,H :ll1 dynasty. ,In h ~~Tra vels i ll Chill, Chia I describes ' the burnin g of book s

>, TI ll' fir s t l'm p N OI' of L1w Chin rlyn as ty -> Yin g Cho ng (25(1­210 B. C,) ,

~Ild burj:in g of schola rs" as a " rej er- tion of th e cours e oftne p!'eVlOUS ru ler " , and " th e cons ignme n t to fire of th eteac1ungs of a hundred sc hools" as an act " to he f tlpeople" "B k b og ie

• 00 s were urned, and punishmen ts becam emoro sover~ ", Chin I wri tes, and adds: " T his is wh ,Lth e~'lrl y downfal ! of the d~n~~ ty wa s only to be expe~ted '",.he author ?f th e Jen m llll lhpao ar ticle adm its tha t " the

\ ~ews of Chla I had a s trong inll uence all hi st ory" andCItes th e full text of a poem by Chang Chic h a :r a gdynast y poet, en t-it led " The Pits for Burning B~oks ": Il

T,hc bamboo and silk " wero swall owod by Burnes'1he might of th e empire va nished, too, 'Ip va in did mou ntain ranges and turlml ent streams~lan u guard over th e dr agon 's lai r. .,*'I he as h of th e pyres had not gro wn cold,~e f ore turmoil hr?ke out in Sh antung,l'hough neither Liu Pang nor Hsiang 'I'llHad read many books,

The author expla ins th at th e poet " wan ts us to beli ev ethat as a result of th e burning of books aIHI buryingof scholars by Chin Shi h Huang, th e Chi n empire lostvigour and fell und er th e assault of Liu Pan g andl lsinng Yu ". He express es empha tic disa greem ent withChia I, Ch an g Chi eh , and others. He descr ibes th e burn­ing of books and burying of scholars as a " progressivemeasure". " Books wer e burned for the sake of ideologi­ca l unity," he writes, " and th ere wa s no connec tion be­tw een th e co llapse of th e Chin dyn asty and t he b ur ningof books and burying of scholars" . Migh t we ask, then,why th e Chin dynasty collaps ed? The au th or cannot s ide­s tep th e conclusion accepte d by everybody since an­ci ent .t im es . " T he Chin dynasty fell ," he writes, " becausebrutal execu ti ons and pu ni shments had led to univer sa ldisorder". S evere law s, tortures and executions " alarm edyoung and old th roughou t th e Celes tial Empire". ::.:;.:;. T hen

.h e goes on to say : " Th e Chin dynas ty Iel l du e to an ag-gravation of con tradic tions between the feudal rulersand tho br oad mass of th o peopl e, The u pri sing of Che nSh e.ng and Wu Ku an g wa s a revolution ary st ruggle

".; .} Bamboo an d silk- he re book s. wh ich wer e writ ten 0 11 st ri psof bamboo or on silk in those remote times.

'. '. -. •,., ' Dragon 's lair-lito ca plta l of th o Chin ompcror." >'>'>' See ' Ssu -m n Chinn. Shih Ch i (Hi st ori cal Record ) .

agf!in s t the Iuud al ex ploite rs a nd h asten ed th e eo l lupseof tho Chin dynasty , In sh or t , the Chin em pir e w as ov er ­thrown by a peasant r evo l ut ion ,"

All art icles C.\ toll in g Chin Shili Tluuu g were dclib cr ­ately written to rel ate th e pr a ise heap ed on Chin to M aoT se-tun g, Th ey make Ch in re se m ble Mao a nd Mao r e­se m ble Chill.

Some for ei gn ob ser ver s n ote ri ghtlv th at th ese arti cl eswere eit her w rt t te n by Mao him sell' or were a t lea s t p J'O­d ucerl on hi s or d ers and with h is a pproval. No body wo ulddare to compare Mao with th e m ost n otorio us d espot illChi nese lrist or y w itho u t h is ex press co ns en t,

Now, let us see w hy Mao pruises Chill ~ h i h Hu an g a ndI i ken s himsel] 10 tha t a ho m i nabl o tyrnu t.?

Mao pruiscs Ch in Sh ih Hu au g chi efly because he ishim self sa tu ra te d w i th feud al iuou archi s t id ea s . T hi s isconfi rmed by th e Ioll owiug exam p les.

1. Th e poe m , "S inyunnchuu" , which Mao wrote ill1~l ;--\ S , is nomin all y a description o f a snow-covered la nrl ­sc a pe: ill it h e co mpa res th e peopl e' s re vnlul. ion und erth e lead er ship of th e Conuuunist Party o r Ch in a withth o power s tr ugg le betw een em per or s and prl uces , andli imscl l with th e ancient em perors Chi ll Sh ih l luau g,Hall \VII T i, THng Tai Tsung, S ung T ui- tsu a nd GeughisKh an ,

2, In a Chi ne se -la ngua ge edit io n of no te s o n hi s trav­el s in West Chill a, which a ppeared in l U::I7, U S jour­na lis t E dgar Snow quotes Mao as h a vi ng sa id th at s inc ehi s yout h ho h ad admired Ch ill Sh ih Huan g', Han Wll Ti,a nd uth er a ncie ut CIll !)()l' OI'S,

:1 , Mao T sc-tun g is in th o habit of ca ll ing t he Par ty' stop l eader em peror, a nd the other l end ers -e-h igh ol ficialsof hi s m a jesty. Be fo r e th o I s t Pl enum of th e S even thCe nt ral Committee, in HJ45, whe n h e was ch a irm a n ofthe Mil itnrv Cou nc il a nd n ot ye t ch a ir m nn o f the P}\]'ty,Ma o, Imi ta tin g th e feud al m on archs , dill no t a llow peo­ple 10 call h im b y his n am e. H e wi sh ed to be addr essedas ('h a inll all,

-1. , 111 the wi nter o f Hl48 and in early 1!J4!J, wh en Ih ePeopl e's L ih er a ti on Arm y w as po iRed to en te l' Pekill g,Mao sa id t o m ember s of th e Ce n tral Conu n ittee: " W henT was a young man, I ofte n th oll gh t - ·-h ow good to hean em pe ror , But I d id not know how to becom e Hll e m­peror. No w 1 know. Soon , w e sh all en ter P eking: The

r:n~~ent. WE' cnt.er flokin g i will he empero r . I sn 't th is~o . W hen ,P~k ll)g was t~k,en, he began cnlli n g himself

, ~n ,emp.er,Ol 111, new .coIHh tlOllS" an d ordere d th e puliti­(, \1 dd,lllllll strallUll of th e Ce n tral Couuu it teo's MilitaryCou ncil to orga ni se lcct , ', f" •"e l . . , " L , lll e~ or se rVicemen, saying

-nam u a n Ma o IS II new em peror " . -S. In. 1D()4 in a talk with a French Natio na l Ass ' ' I I

d ulegnuon Mao d ecl ared h im sal ] "au 'l(1111'I'r~ ' f ' eN,Ill ) Yleon". ( « d n a po-

L .6. He punished w riters 'I'icn H an , Wu H an 'I'cnsr Tiao Mo-sha, and o thers for r idiculing . "' t .' " '" 0,

perors in th eir b k H' 01 e l l i c i s ing em -Il 00 s. e sa id to attacl .

Ia.ntrunoun j, to attacking M ao T~e-tuIlg ac { em pe rors ISMao ex tolled Ch in Sh ih lIn b'

mu ch in com mon . a ng ecauso tho two have

1. Ch in S h ih Hu a ng v Iftri o caree l'is t, and a d d ic~as II se -conc,oitod ,an d egocon-d escr ibed h i r If I e~1 to th e pel sona lt ty cu lt . He, mso as t re first grea tlcsti nl E m pire. M ao too . ' I I' ( empero r of t he Co­cul t, ' , IS ar ( Ic ted to t he persona lity

or j2t y' ,~ h i n S II1Ii h HI y aIlg co nside re d himself th e "sole auth-on a t ling'S. A t iicaI . . . . (

d espoti sm he "made tho J y~ . ( exponent o f one-manI " ( r eCI SIOns on all 'jffn" f,1O t.h IHg and small, by himself" (8 ' , ~lS or ~ ta le,icai Hecord ch " P " . I NT • su-ma Ch ie n . H is tor:HUlin 0''' " • . I lIlc lpaolos about Chin S h ih

;-J . CI)' ~<l~ , to o" IS an nutho rilaria n despo t." lI.n ._hih ~ll~ng was an extre me indiv idua lis t of

ex tra ordlIla ry cupidity. H e ca lled himself S11'/ l·r T '( I' ' t . • I I u unc I

u s e~l I'eror ) a nd wanted hi s "fam ily dynn sty" 1('"' heeverlnst.ing throu gh the se con d t hird etc ' ' . t ~ · '.. 'I I I " " " ge ne ra , J( " I ~Il g I , u p to t. IC te ll th o usand th d escendant, Mao Lonw~n ls t~ turn ~h inu into a " fam il y eonce rn" lo~ethOl:'I Vl ~,lt Chian g Ching, and lo h and it dow n fro m llOil' 10ieir.

0' 4. Chi ~l .S h ih J,I ua.~g . was a , d espot. for whom, as E n­gels put It 1T1 A ~ I~ ~-Duhnng, peopl e w ere "a ll equa l, n am e ­ly , equal to n i l , b ec~lI se h? .d id not co ns ider peopl e~() ho peopl e. From prrme mllllst.er dow n to plain su b­l eel; all w er e wo r th n ot n;rore to h im th an hens , dogs ,cows or shee p; a ll w er e IllS shives wh o m he co uld eXB­cu te , im pr iso n, 01 ' exi le . Mao, too , is that k ind 0 1' ty ran t..

S. Ch in Sh ih Huang was a vOl ~iferollS advo(:a le of a" Gre a l. Ch in Ce les t ia l EIllpi re". Towards s la tes and tribesn ei ghb ouring on t he Chin Empire h e followed a pol-

icy of arme d conquest, rOl'cibl c ass imilation . forced reset ­

tl cm ont, and brutal repr ession. Mao, too, is an ex tre me

grea t-Ha n nationalist; hi s treatment of ethn ic min orities

inhabiting differ ent parts of China is th e same as Chin

Shih Huang's.6. In th e ninth year after the founding of the united

Chin Empire (213 B. C.), Chin Shih Huang ordered all

books to be burned. Among th ese were Shih Ching (The

Book of Songs ), 81m Ching ('fhe Book of History) , th e

works of Confucius and of exponents of all other schools,

books on the hi story of th e Chou dynasty and the hi sto ­

ri es of six non-Chin s ta tes. Onl y a few books on medi ­

cine , fo rtun e-t ellin g and agricu lture wer e spared. T here

was nothing for peopl e to read. Then , in the tenth year

(21 2 H. C.) , he orde red all scholars to he buri ed alive

(mor e than 460 Confucia n schola rs were buried alive

together, in cluding G2 of th e 70 "doctors" a t Chin's own

cour t ) . This made him the first fero cious despot in hi sto­

ry to burn books barbarously and massacr e schola rs.

But in quantity and range of subjects, the books burned

by Ma o during th e "cultural r evolution" far sur passed

t110 S 0 burned by Chin Shih Huang, and in numbers the

intellectuals physically eliminated by Mao far sur pass ed

Chin Shih Huang's burying of scholars ,Thi s is wh y Mao Tse-tung mak es no bon es about prais­

in g Chi n Shih Huang and defend s hi s desp oti c " hurn ing

of hooks and burying of scholars" .Worse still, Ma o extols Chill Shih Hu ang with a dull­

nile secre t poli tica l aim. Take th ese rnw exam ples .

1. Mao praises Chin Shih Hu an g for havin g been "a

politician wh o s topped th e attempts at restorin g th e s lave

syste m" (see th e article in l enminiih .pao of :)1 October

Hl73, signe d by th e "group of authors of th e Shens l

Tench er-Trai nin g Institute").This betrays Mao's la ck of eleme ntary knowl edg e of

th e histor y of ancient Chinese socie ty. Historians who

s tudied China 's an cient histor y have demon strated that

uudor the Sha ng Yin dynasty (18th-12th cen tur ies R. C.)

China saw th e eme rgenc e, bloom, and downfall of th e

slave-owning syste m. In th ose days, OIl a ruler 's or noble­

man's death, from several dozen to 2,OOO-:-{,OOO people

were sacrificed for "co-burial with the deceased". In th e

Lime of W estern Chou ('12th-8t.h ce n tu r ios R. C.) this

sucri fice wa s prohibited ; human bein gs wer e replaced by

clay or wooden dolls . This shows th \V

Ilu IOll~er a sla ve-owning ~ oci e ty H~s tol~'s,~y~. ~:lOll,waslhat Wesl ern Cho u which last ci f rca ~c s snow

l~ r th e Shang dYIJasty b ' Cho' e ro~ the elimination

Ilsllinent of the capit al J · I~,.u WI'.1 \V'lIlg and tJlO cstah-1 . ' In vaoc lin a to til) t f f

t ie capi ta l east by Cho u Pi n a \V "'IT '); ra TIS er 0

WIIS essen tia lly an em of fen~dali~~>:> FL_-n1 R. C.) ,

Chou , whi ch began wi th th e' tl'an~ f ' ~ early E.as tel'll

Loy au g hy Chou Ping Wa f er of the ca pita l to

LlIO followin g abo ut ')00 ,~g (7111 n o D. C.) and for

se rf dom lihe-' t ' f- ,Je drs, t lore was a decline of, 1a IOII 0 serf s and a 0" I 1

landlord s, a now class of 1:1 d d ;,I UC.ua emergence of

disp ar al u ccon oll1/'c and , nl 't~ IPIOIIJrJetors. Du e to th e. 'po I rca ecv I .

s ta tes, wh icl: WOre in depcndent tlli ,e ~ r~ Ill~ ~ll oJ . llie.s ta te to state ' t ' d ' s process dIffere d from

., III Imo an tempo At} .{londed OIl th e size of th e Ian '. ax w.lOse size de-

th e Lu sta te before 594 R Cdhol~lll~ wa~ Illt roduced ill

Chin, rem ote, isolated and 'ec " w l .e~. ~~ s III tI.l e s tato of

ward , a harvest renL was ~~.OtmlCdf ~,rela tlvely hack­I,OHR C Yt I as I S ellO/ ced as la te as

lh ~ S ; ~l t~s w: s ~l:~ s;~~:.ral trend of dovelopm ent in all

Accordin a to the A n I its d I .tI >:> a ec s an Ol ler litera ry classics

io foudal sys tem no longer oxisted in II li f tin .f'Confuciu s (55 1-47!J B C )' h . . re J e l~n e 0

others. Ser fs had be~Il 'Iible~a~e~ s~~~s aOfnIe',lvl , 'eVel, a l~dsys t \ f f I I 1 ' conomrcTI . om a euc a andlord s had already come in to hein g. re now cla ss of lunellords controlled) . \ I . .Contending- S ta tcs ( 10'~- ') ') 1 B C ) I.:OWOl . j n.c III th eI . . -- . J . soclO ty co nt iu uer] to

develop, stim ula ted hy th e introduction of imB im plo-

~ll e:lt s. Th er e was unprecedented prosperity . Eco nomy

ell.le .cll lturo grew, an d it variety of philosoph ica I a nd oth­

elschools emerged and engaged in fr ee discussion s.

Yet there. was conte n tion uud riv al ry among th e seve n

s ta ~es, with .continuous fra tr icida l Wil l'S, becau se eac h

as pir ed to elimina ting tho othe rs and creating a unitedelll lHre.

Th e llO \~' Ieur la l landowning' economic sys torn took

deep foot. In the Ch.in sta te follo wing Shang Ya ng's r e­

Iorm, w}lI~:11 hegan ~~ 3,5(J . B. C., cur tailing th e ri ghts uf

th e hel'e(lIlaJ'y nobility, nn pr oving the condition of

peasants and warriors, ending coroee, and elim ina ting

hounds (b etween fields of th e ge nt ry a nd pea sant s ) . Th e

~lave-o'~'llJ n,g . sys tem had cea sed to exist aoo yea rs be­

for e Chill SIn h Hu ang es tablishe d his united feuda l OUl -

pire (22 1 B. C.) . More, in the Chin s ta te eve n se rf-owninghad gOlw out some 200 years previou sly. ::. In otherwords', the question of " res toring the slave sys te m " couldnot arise at th e timo of Chin Shih H ua ng 's ru le. T ho d isputebe tween che f/siang (pri me min is ter) Wang Kuang andiingioei (j udge of tho s uprem e cou r t ) Li Ssu over reta in­ing th e sys te m of s ta te s or introdu cing' a system of pre­Iccl.ures and coun ties, a nd the di sputes on th e same s u b­ject be tween a group of Confucian ists h eaded by Sh UIlYu-y u and anoth er headed by Chou Ching-chen con­ce r ned th e type of administration to be introduced i ll theCh in empire, and h ad no relation at all to "rcs toratiou0 1' anti-restoration of th e sla ve system".

Ignora n t of tho soci al sys tem at the lime of Chou amiChill, Ma o mistakenly consid er s Ch inese socie ty priorto th e Chill dynasty a "sla ve sys te m" (an erroue ousterm' in th e Marxist teaching on th e hi story of so ci etythe r e is no room [or a "slave system", only for a slave­ow n ing s ys te m , for "slave sys tem " s uggests a soc ia l s ys­tem in which slaves a re do minant ; the re was no s uc l:so ci ety in hi st ory ) . H e descr ib es t ho con tr ove rs y overtil e " system of feudal s ta tes" and tho " system of prefec­Lur es ~nd coun ties" as a co n troversy over " res tor a tion"and "an ti-res torutiou" of th e "slave sys te m" .

As w e sec, Mao's portrayal of Chin Sh ih Huang as" a pofit.iciun who prevented the res tora tion of sla ve­owners " lias no subs tance in hi sto ry .

Hy defyi ng h is to ry a nd ex to ll ing Chin S h ih Hunug,Mau seeks Io portray himself as "a pol it.icia u w ho r eso ­lu t el y pr ev en ted the rostoration or cn pi tu l is ru" . In th eearly period of the "c ul tura l r ev olution" h e issued thes loga n of com bat t i ng th e " han df u l o f power-holding ca p­ita Hst-roudcrs" in ord er to attack Lin S hun-c h i nnrl th eca dres of tho Party, and in the past two years has bran­d is hed the s logan of com ba tting "cons pira tors and double­deal ers who are restori n g ca pita lism" in order to di s­credit awl attack Lin P ia o a nd the Party 's m ilitary an dpolitical ca d r es" This exposes Mao a s an intriguer whois him elf a ca pila lis t-r ond cr and cer ta inly no " pul i ti­cla n r esolut el y pr eventing the ru storn l.iun of ca pita lis Ill".

" It is impossibl e to dnal in grealer detail with the natureor th o socia l system at th e tim e of Chou and Chin in thi shook.

Fa cts datin g to the " cu l tu ra l r ev oluti on " and la ter ,ha ve a1~lpl'y confirme d thi s . Nut only h as Ma o destroyedth o socia list s u pors tr uc l uro of Chin ese socie ty; h e hasa lso a llcred the soc ialis t cha rnc ler o f China 's natio na leconomy" H e ha.s crushed th e s ta tu npparntus directedh~ th e . COflllllUnIsl Par~y of Chin a and ha s r ep lac ed itw I,lh his on e-man reacti onary military-terrorist di ctator-~ 11I 1I At pr esent CI' , t '. . .'- .' una s s ate eco nomy se rves not maxi-m um sa tls fadwn of th e malerial and eulturni need s ofth e lJ'P~op l e , .but l~1C l'e.aelional'Y d ic ta torsh ip of Mao Ts~­I ,~" I ", and hi s anl.I -? ov! et a nd anti-communist mili tarism.LJem enl s o~ a ca pita lis t econ omy with g ua ra n te ed r.a pi­,tal a nd ~I~'o h t for ca p ita l is t~ and wi th ca pita lis ts lWRd illg,\. n \lIll I~~ 1 of s ta te ~Il te r pr ls:-s .on th c pre te x t of beingel,;O IlOIll IC f1/l~1 t cc h n icn] s pe c1iil ls ls, co n l inu o to nourishunder th e Sig n board of mixed Slate-privat e en te r pr ise,Th ese Iu c ls , too, sho w I hc truc na turo of Ch ina 's s la teCC O 11o III Y .

, The 1:lIra I peopl e 's com 111 un es, th ou gh s t.i/I coupera t. iVI !S

In n? m e, have been s tr ip pe d of th e rig ht to settlequ estions of prod uct ion and dislri bu Iion on t.h oil' ow na nd ~re g~ared 10 th e n eed s o f Ma o's r ea c lionary d i <:t a ~tl!rshl p , W It h ug ri cul turo cu t off fr om industr ia l a nd ftnan ­cial aid on tI.1C part <.If. the socia list s ta te, th ey a re d eniedt he opportunity of rai sing til e materi al and cu ltu ra l s ta nd­~ rds of th eir m embers, who are s t ill a t th e level o f

poor a nd lower middl e pea sants" . In effec t, the COIll ­

IIl11IW~ h 11V ~ beco me regimented s u pp lie rs of food and rawrnater ial s 101: Mao's rea ctiona ry d ic tnt ors hlp, a nd havethus lost. thair former chnract ur.

In ~ hor t, the two co m po ne n ts of C hina's national econ­o my, !IH)u.stry and agricu lture , ret a in only a fPW soc ia li st~ I em ents I II form of properly , but 11I\\'u los L l.huir soc ia l­ist na ture as regards the obj ect th ey se rve . Mao makesI~O . se cret of this . He loses no oppo r tu n ity lo d ed ar e thatCh ina bel on gs among the dcve lo ping coun tr ies o f th o" third wo rl d" . Actually, cons ide r ing eo Mao's ruuotionurvrul e, Ch ina d oes not belon g even among th em. I l e c aus~d.ev~lop i ng ~o ll n t r ies. a re essen t ia lly opposed to impe­r ia lism a nd its co lo n ia l ami neo-col oni al poli cy, with th eleadin g on es dirceting their e ffOlts to the lion-capita list.perspective, th at is , th e r oad to soc ia l ism. Ma o, on theothe r ha nd , is co n nivin g will , extreme r eactionary im­pe l'i:J lists a nrl rl i-ivi ug C hina i nto t.hn im pnri nlis t ~', a Jll p.

:!31

2. Mao says that Chin S hih Huang was th e founder ofth e Iirst feud al dynasty in Chin a 's history and " a pow er ­ful feudal r ul er who unified all China" (see " Stru gglebetween B estor atlon a nd Anti -H cs tor ation During thoEmer gence of the Ch in Dynasty" , s ign ed Lo Ils i-iingin : Hun gclit TO. It , t!)73) . I n fact, Mao h ea ps all th ecredit for the establishment of the sin gle feudal Chi ndynas ty on Ch in S hih Huang alo ne. This , too, is co ntra ­ry to t he fa cts of hi stor y .. Th e s ubs tance of the phrase, " Iouudor of the firs t feu­

dal dynasty in Ch ina's history" , may be re duced to twofact s : Iirs t , conq ue s t of the six s ta tes; se cond, introduc­li on of th e system of pr efectures and coun t ies.

Let us take the Iirst fact first. Histor y sho ws th at ChinS h ih H u ang was able to eli m inate th e six ot her sta tesbecause he h al! in he ri te d a so und " concer n" fou nd­ed by Ch in Hsiao Kung, whi ch was consoli datedby s i~ ge n era lion s of Chin Sh ih Huang's a ncest ors inth e course of so meth in g like a hundred years . Ry ea r­rying out Sh a ng Yang's r eform, Chin H si ao Kung laidthe eco no m ic Ioundation s for enr ich ing hi s s tate and mak­ing it mi li ta rily pow erful; m or e, h e began ce nt ralis iugpolitical pow er by di vid ing his. coun trr into 31 cou n t ies .Fan Tsun es ta blis he d tho for ei gn poli cy of th e s ta te ofChin : "friendsh ip with di stant coun tr ies in order to at­t ack nuar co un tr ies" , and wooing of eve ry s ta te se pa ra te ­ly in order to pr even t th e s ix ~ ta les fr om jo.in ing Iorcesagain s t Chin, I n hom e poli cy h e con t inue d wha tShang Yan g had begun. Chin S hi.h Huang inh erit:d thethron e at '1 3 years of age. All a ffairs of state w er e In t l~chands of chensiang Lu Pu-wei. No t u ntil h e was 22 didCh in Sh ih Huang assume cont ro l. By that time th e foun­dati on s had lon g been la id for t he wealth and powerof hi s sta te . Also, there were m an y capab le m en in c iv­ic and mi litary offices. All Ch in Shi h Huan g h ad to cI owas swim w ith the current, issue orde rs, and reap theha rvest,

The second of th e reason s which enu hlc d Chin S hi hHuang to eli minate the six s ta tes was their lack of uni­ty , wi th devel opments in these states favouring Chin 'splan s of aggran d izem ent . F or exam ple, the st at e of Chuwi th it s lnrge a re a and population was more ca pa hlethan th e others t o com pe te with Chin ; but due to th oassass in ation of reformer Wu Chi by the nobles, there

') '-l.')

;vas no ,reform thc~e like that of S h an g Yang in Chin,dI~d, ~ ulthel'lnore , It l,ost S un w« a brillian t mili tar yl~a~le l. The sta te of Chao could abo h av e s tood u toCh ~n'l .but th er? OCcurre d a traged y between the fa~hera~H us sons III th e fa m ily of Prince Chao ,V 1-1' .g: fte d leader . Lat~J' , Ch.ao's tr oop s leu by Cha~ II~~Il;~,\ ere def eated . Chin buried a live 400000 ca t d CI .sold ' . . . I I . ' <pure laoi lOIS , aIH t Ie s ta te of Chao never re cov er ed fro n tl ..oss . Besides, Ch in Hsi ao Kung and each of th e s ulccee~l:m g m onarch s ca ptu re d co ns idera ble territor y from nei '1 ­boul'lng states, th us ellla J'uing th e CII1' II s ta te' I rg nun I t ' I . '" < S i urn an(.. ( rna erra pot ent ial. By th e t ime Chi n Sh ih H uan ucame t? pow er all .the s ix s la tes were well on the wagto decli n e, a nd Chin had no difficll)li e~ to defeat the[~O ILO by ono . .

~(:':' ab?u t t ~Ie in,tr odtH:tioll of tho sys te m of prefec­~llte !l a.n~ co untlC~ . 1he I'cJeet ion of the syste m of s ta tes~n~f the 1ll.tr~duc.tlOn of pr efe.dUl'es and co un ties folJow­~no th e e1JmlIl~llOl~ ~ f the SIX s ta tes wa s ce r tainly notinvented J~y Chin S hi h Huan g himself. Thi s we ca n seefrom tl ~ e ,fa,cts of h is lory , After S ha n g Yang's r eform th es ta te of ,Cln n wa s divided into 31 coun ties . Fo llowing th eanIl .ex il t l? l~ of the s ix st a tes, th e Chin c ru pi ru was di vid­ed In to ;Jb prefectu re s, each of whi ch was divided in toeou ntios . T his Was there for e a pro jection of ShanzYang's po~icy . The conver sion of sta tes into Jlrcfeet.llre~a nd countIe~ help e~l tho, C)~in dynasty to se t up a s inglef~ud al em pire. TIll S co inc ide d with th e political n eedsof th e la ndlord class , whi ch n eed ed a ce n tralised powerh.ead ed by .a!l empero r, with prefectural a nd coun ty ol fi­cia ls exerClSlllg local go ve rnm ent. This secu red a peace­~ 1l 1 se ttin g for explo it in g and oppressin g th e pea sants,ITl contrast to th e ceaseloss civil wars that had occurredwhen there were many sta tes a nd " ba tt les for a loca litycovered. it with co r ps es and battles for a town filled itwith dead people" .

Com pared with a coun tr y divid ed into uiany s ta les,the s ing le feudal m ona rch y was, of course, a s top for­wa rd.

Bu t we ea n see from t he ah ove analysi s of concreteeven ts tha t the cre dit for thi s act o f progressive sign ifi­cunce docs not belong to Chin Shi h Hu a ng a lon e. Ye tMao uso ri bes it a ll lo h iui . T his on ly het. ra ys Mao 's ex ­tremely subjective volun tar istic approach to hi stor y.

R esid es, it is not r igh] . to judge Chin Sh ih Huan g onth o m erit s of ju st lit o progrcssiv e s ig niflc,n nco of th euui hcal.iuu into a single Ieud al em pire of a cou n try th athad consisted o f ri val s la tes . Look at the cons equencesof thi s for th e toiler s. From tho Ma rxi st poin t of vie w,and thal. of the working people, th e latter a s pect is muchrnorc irn port.a nt. Chin Sh ih Huang united China in th e2Gth year of his rule (22 \ 13. C.). Bu t had h e don e an y­thing for the peopl e from t he li me wlw,~ Ite fou,ll de~ 1 th os ingle feudal monarch y to th e da y of h is dea th ? DId h eever g-ive an y th ou ght to th e welfare a nd need s of th opeople? Th e a ns we r is n o. All his th ou ghts a nd dl~ edswere rlirect crl \ 0 h is own Interests a nrl t ho lu s ti tu t iou ofa n " e terna l empire" for himself and hi s fa mily . Look a tChi n Shi h Hu an g's main wo rk s of th a t poriod.

According to Ssu-iua Chie n 's ll istoricat R ecord andother so urces , the follow ing w as wh a t Chin Shi h l luaugprinci pall y eng aged in :

L Appropr iating th e crocli t and glor~ for th e. deeds ofother s , he pr ocl aimed himself a s ha vlll g . " e~I,1.1' s?1 1 thethree Huuugs in meri t, and ex ce lled the live lis 11,\ 1lI0­

ru lity " " . H e look th o ti tle o f Chin S hih Hu ang-i t andpel'f Ol' m ed " t ou rs of inspection" across fl\l~ous mou n­ta in s and large rivers, putting up gl'aven m onu ments01' glory" to immortalise his "ex plo its" every~vhel'e hewcnl. H e orde red that highways sho uld b~ l aid wher ehi s route would pass - w ille eno ug h for his SUlll ptuou Ss ix -hor se ca rriugo Ilauk ed by mou nted guards, a nd f,ootso ld iers. Man y millions of peopl e were press~d into bu ild­in g th ese road s , paved not Silllp ly b y their labour buta lso bv th eir swea t, bl ood a nd bon es . The human a ndm ul.cri al was te of this is ea sil y imagined .

2. T h ou gh internecin e wars ended, Chin S.h ih Hu.angco n tiu uousiy loosed wars o f aggressio n aga ins t ueigh ­bouring s ta les a nd tr ibes , The hope of the . I?eopl e fordeliver a nce Irom th e sco urge of wa r and 1111 11ta ry con­scr iptio n prov ed in va in . Not on ly were more peo ple ~~ r~cllinto u iil lturv se rv ice in vi ew of th e cease less ho sllhtllJs,hut th er e was al so a f HI' l arger a mo u nt of for cedlahou r th a l th ey h ad to d o.

':. Th e three " uangs ar e Huang Ti , Shell "ung, and Fu Xi;the fiye Ti s a re Sh Ari IIao, Chuan H~u , Ti. Kll, "Y ~w a nd S~Ull,TllC' ~e IIr c ah brevia ted lIame s of sem l-my ll llenl wise ru ler s ofrclllo tc antiquity.

.3. I n dread of the augury of a stargazer th at " Ch inwill be deslroyed by (h e HUj'eJls ( Hun s) " CI' Shi11 . , '. " li n _:> 11 1

ua ng se n t a n a rmy of 300,000 und er lIIell g 'T' teng '\ge tl H I hi , ien 0bU'1 1 1 ie . U,~I S , anr I1~0 ili sed million s of people to

1 ( l re th ou sands of k ilometres 101lg Grea t \Y'II Ic (l lc ~ and h u nger and illn ess , do ing back- b l'ea ki n rr'\;o l'l~1m ost of them s lllTCl'ell death before th e \,... II '" ,1)\ l • I I) 1\1 ., . " a W,U:i COll\-, e. C(, lilt j no regard s th e Gre a t W all as on .

Shih H ua ng's grea le t hi ". e of Chiui " I r· . · : ~c ievemcnts, and never fails toI~' ue 0 1ergu g ues ts to rnspect iL Yet Ch i SJ 'J H ' .

~iJ(~v~~t11:.tntao~i7~~e I~~~~: ~If' ::in·L10•.lI1I ? iJ~to fth e~I,~a;; ; Iin;~~~~~~ T I ' . ' IOUS (J tOI ers .

, . 0 mild himself a m ausol eum CI " 1 'Jsu uu uouc d IIlor e th an 700000 " , ,: • li n ? I! I Il unu gcra ftsme n. T h en 10 keen I ,COIl\ldllC! erlInlllHls Hndbu ri ed a live i ll it s \' i cin~r/ l a secr et, h e had all of them

,S . T o p~' e\'('nl revolt an d se cure th e th ro ne for hi _s"e lf and his desceudau ts , Chin S h ill Hll "lllg mud n III

I ' t • . I " « nvor y-JOl J urn III t iei r weapon s 'J'h o"'e \\'110 I I '} ' I I ' I '. . . .., . r e usee we re~ ,xeLu ?ec • H I i ug o l~ l1I1lb er . Th e an us were smelted downdll(~ J ~ / flor lllous Idols wer e made o ut of LIds meta l i llHSl l)l ~-,l nng (Lheu lh o imperi al ca pit a l) .

0 , . ,1,0 S U IJ pre~s . I he ~Ii scontenled und th ose suspectedof d iscon Ien t, Ch 111 Sh ih II lia n g cons ign ed hundreds of~,1 lOll sallds .01' peopl e to deat h, tortu re, inca rc er ation , han­ishm en t, forced luhour, deportati on to remote borde ra reas 1'01' building for fifica tion s, and tho like. An in ca l­cula ble ,lIymbl'r of g uil tless people fell prey to his sav­age pol ic ies .

7. Seeking inuuort nli f.y a nd wan t iug 10 liv e " le u lhou­sand years", Chill S hih H uan g did not. hesita te 10 sq uun­del' hu m a n an d material r es ource s , and 10 send monksand sec ta ria ns to all parts of th e world in search of" m ethods of longevit y" and " el ix irs of l ifo".

8. T o gratify hi s wanton lusts , Chin Shih Huang col­Iected va st su ms of m on ey in all parts of th e couutryand had s ever a l million people waste th eir labo ur 011b uild ing th e palacu of EluIuug, which is sa id to haveno equa l in hi stor y, Its edifices cove re d an area of hu n­d rods of kilom etres in leng th and breadth . H ere S h ihl Iu a ug I, cpl hi s Cl lllC, U hin es captl1l'ed in the s ix cOllqnerel!s la l os, a llll s tor ed h is va rious t r easnres. Th e pal ace wa sIlll lin ishcl! wh en he di ed . LHter, \\'lIell Hsian r, 'tu at tIleh oad of hi s lroops ca pt u red H sieH-Y an g and seL lire to

Ehrfang, the flames raged unintermittently for morethan three months , This gives an idea of its size and oftho amount of labour and material that had gone intobuilding it. There were hanging bridges and undergroundpassages between dillorent parts of the palace, for ChinShih Huang did not venture to walk in the open, Hekept hi s whereabouts secre t not only because he wanted" more eas ily to m eet" th e " denize ns of heaven" , but als oand chi p-fl y because hi s cri mes h ad made him an objectof univer sal hatred , and h e sa w in eve ry man a poten­t ial threat to his life. When he was pa ssing through Po ­lansha on one of his "lours of in spection", a cer tainChang Liang mad e an attempt on his life despite theh eavily arm ed guard. Chang Liang threw a heavy ironhammer, but hi s vic Lim turned out to be a " double" ofCh in Sh ih Huan g's wearing the same clo thes as th e em­peror and se a ted in a carriage that wa s an exac t r eplicaof th e em peror's , Though the em pe ro r immediately 0 1'­

dered a ton-day se arc h for Chang Liang, th e man wa snever found . This shows that he wa s protected by thoemperor's bodyguard s and giv en conc ealment by thopeople. Chin Sh ih Huang was, indeed, a lone lies pot 011

wh om even his intimates am! his closest en tourage hadt urned th eir ba cks.

Hi s policy of befoggin g the pe opl e, aimed at perpc ­tuatiug Iris tyrannical rule and leading lo suc h barbar­isms as tho " bu rn ing of books aurl buryin g of scholars",ha s di shonoured hi s -nam e for all time,

In th e 13th ye ar of the Chin dynasty, that is, a yeara lter Chin S hih Huang's death (200 B, C.) , th ere wa s apeasant uprising under Chen She n and Wu Ku ang. Th eempire wa s shake n to it s foundations, and three ye a rslater (206 B, C,) it fell under the combine d on slaughtof th e armies of Hsi ang Yu and Lin Pang,

Why docs Mao extol Chin Shih Huang for having" conque red six states anrl founded a s ingle feudal em ­pire" ? Mainly in orde r to further hi s own designs or in­tensi lying war preparations against the Soviet Un ionand neighbouring Asian countries. Like the ruler s of th eMan chu Ching dynasty and the reaotionary warlords , heha s always regard ed countri es bord ering on China -theMon goli an P eopl e's Ilopubli c, Koru a , th e cou n tries ofInd ochina, Th ailand, Burma, Nepal and oth er s-as Chi ­nese territory. Besides, he wants 10 in corporate in China

the entire Soviet Far East, Th e m ilil ar isation of thec() ~n try ,and, the large-scal e war pr eparation s of r ecentye ars, ar e aimed not onl y at ca pturi ng Sovi et territorbut ~Iso at occ upying n eighbouring Asi an coun tri es a,~icr ea ting a Pan-Asiatic lVInois t em pire as a ste tow' I'S~ I ~ ll l hsHequent hid, for world supremacy. Mao el tols ~~(I'nS, u I lian g lo furth er J ' If'mad I ' I I us so -aggl'llnrl iZoIllent and his

,( uesign s, nne also to deceive th e I . "whom h e wan ts to pander t . I' . peop e o~ Chinn,cha uvin is t g'I'Cat-]lOWer amb ' t 'O ! IS arrogan t egrnsm and

WI I I IOn:; ,iy noes Mao make so m 'I .

Huang's r ej ection of the s st lie 1 FO.J~ e ov er C~Iin Shi htion of the sys tem of y em 0 s la tes and introdu c,to furth er Ilis plans fo~r~Liftures and eoun ties? Mainly,People 's Liberation Army It m~lf savag-e purges of th eing his pr epa ration s for tJ , ~VI I be r ecalled tha t dur­launch ed th~ campa iO'Il }tel cUl tulra l prevolu tio n" Mao

I '"" Ie w 10 p, ar ty the I Ipcop e mu st learn from rho PLA " T! ' , " . W 10 eplayoff on e sec tion of th PLA ' . lIS was don e toand "captura power " fa Cle , aMgalnst othe r sec tions

I' ianmao ao. When lIP ,t~ and govern ment bodi es wer e smashe d b fca U1,-

fJUlg~ (red guards ) and tsaofan s ( trouble_m:ke::)ng~el­~~~~olllted comma~d ers of military regions 01' pro~inci:~

I PIS to head re\"o!ul ionaJ'y cOlTIm iLl ees " 'Inc! IIa So 'pa r lv COllI itt "i B , ' Iell. IllJ ees . sut a fte r t he so- ca lled T ' FJ' ,cas e he g '11 " ,In I<lO." , r ew , st ~ mor e sus picious of com mande rs orI egtonat, provtncial and local troop" Now lIe' . "I ' " , " IS again'; anIlll.'g a mass purge of th e P eople's Liberation AI'For this h e will use the "mil it ia" the "r ed g ds" m

yl,II Iik b' . , uar S , a ru

. Ie, I co, ut cllle flr I~ e will pl ayoff on o part of the PLAagainst othe~s , ~lllS l ~ why he is again making threats,again engag,l1l g 111 swi ndlos, aga in issuing pro mis es and~ g~ll1 , rcsort.ll1g to, in citem ent in orde r to dis rupt com'ru llll­ship III var rou s 1 LA units and se t one RP- ne ra l aga in stallothe,~" He h ~s Iaun ch cd the " PLA mu st learn from th"ppeople campa!~n , on the one hand, and is shu fl1 ing com­mandcrs of military regi on s and provincial units on theoth er, This ,is b?in g done to se t th em u p for di sllli sSfl]al.HI r?presslOn III th e next round of t he " cr iti cis m ofLin Piao and th e r ectification of style " or wh en a seco nd" cultural revol ~~tion" erupts, Thus, t he purpose ~f Irisa.ttacks ,?n th e system of s tates" is clear- the denuncia­lion of se parate s la tes" and "disobedient warlords" willbe a pretext for assaulting military commanders in the

localiti es. And th e purpose of hi s su p port for th e "sys ­tem of pr ef ectures and cou nt ies" is to s tren g th en t11l~

" a bs olu te ce n tral pow er" or, m or e pre cisel y, th e I ~' eac­ti ouary d icl at 01'sh ip uf Mao Tse-tlll~g , . a nd " re llnr o. pu L­li e npluiou" fur th e persecuti on 01 I'LA cadres III tho

" " '1' '1"n am e of th e "centra l com m it tee ", /)) 1 it nr v counet ,a nd " central govel'nnw llt" ,

Certain lmpcri alis; paper s observ e th a t local gene ralsin China have too mu ch power: they expect th at a fterMao' s death , as after that of Y uan Sh i h-kai~ t h is w illlead to intern ecin e s tr ife between w a rlords . 1 hese COUI­

iu euts are hclpiug Mao to ca,~ry ou t hi s CO lls I~ i r il,?Y.In the hegi nning of t h e cul tural revol ution peo ple

sa id th at Mao was Chin S h ih Hua ng No .2, th at h e Wl~ Sa s t ill biggel' ty rau! tha n Chin Shih Huang, and tha t hisHew "burning 'of books and buryi n g o f scho lars" : vas 110

less bnrharous than Chin Shih Huang's,. At tha.t tl~ne , I ~ ewould not accept thi s view and s till t~lCd to just ify hi sac ti ons. No w, like an incorrigible crimina l, murd er er andfu-obrand co nvict ed by ample ev idence and co mpelle d tondruit hi s crim es, Mao h ns la uncherl a pr ess (:ampa ~ gll

exo ne ra ti ng Chin S h ih Huang and , in cile ct, adlll lUlng

th at h e is a m od ern ~hin ~h i h HlIan~: , 1 toMaos prai se of Ch ill Sh ih Huang 1S me ant not. 01 1 y

forbi'd ~lCopl e Lo denounce crimes li ke lit he llll r n,i" g of hool~ Rlind buryi ng o f schola rs" , but also to ':en no l~ Ie ' the ty nlll ~ simage a nd u se it as a m ea ns for ele v~t,lIlg himself and .,Ill.t­ti rur o the rs, II e h a s a lready q ua li fied n tt acks ou L ~ 1l1lS hih Hua ng a nd on the burning of hooks and .h urYlIlgof sc ho la rs as a "cr ime " conu n i ttc d hy ' Ya ng ~ l ln g' , a ndc(;ndc m na t ioll o [ Chin S h ih H ua n g [or hU l'll.i l l~ book sand buryi ug sc ho la rs and reading of ~!la ~lg ~ l l1eh s \: er~ eTh e Pits for Burnin g B ook s as a crune com mittedby Lin Pia u, No w he can level thes~ ch arges at (~nyon~w ho m he ha s decid ed to pers ecute III th e ca m prugn 01" cr i ticis i ng Lin I' iao aw l rectifyin g style" 01' i n th e S? C­

ond " cul tura l revoluti on" , becau~e m ost peopl~l , \~I~hthe sole oxc option of the Mao cl iqu e, r ecall Ch~ n SIIIIIHuan g a nd hi s a tro citie s with h OI'1'o.1' a~HI, revu lsio n . HI!tw e trust t ha t Mao's tr eatment of Chin SIn h Huang-thIsdespot a nd ty ra n t known a s such to e,: ery Chin ?se - a shi s proto type and t eacher will not add ei ther to Ill S pl'e~­l.i ge or lo hi s pow er, On th e c,on t.rn r y, we tru st t.hat d ,will add to th e people's ui saffectiun a nd res is ta nce ,

2) \Vh)' and how Mao attacks Confucius

Ind eed , why hAS Mao found it necessarv to a tt ac kC<.l1lfur ius . whiu- ex tolli ng Ch in Sh ih H uang '!) T o be gin:: 'Itll , hcca us« Mau h illl,self, lik e Chin S hih /I liang , iHIS

. burned hooks a nd buri ed scholars". Th e so lo dillerenceIS th at Mao has grea t ly su r passed Ch in Sh ih Hu a n c inth e num ber of hook s IHII'IlCd a nd in tell ectn al s Illas s;H~'ed .J~] s uch crin~ i na l nets as viola ti ng th e grave of Couf'u­~ 1Us, destroy ing hi s m on uments , and burning his d well­lu g an d tern plo , Ma o also followed in Chin Shih Ifuaug'sfoot step s.. Th o othe r r.e~so ll is. t ha t th er e a re fun dam en ta l id eol og ­1. ~a.1 and pol iti cal di fleren cos between Mao a nd Ch inSInh Hnang, a ll th o one hanri , and Conf' uoius, OIl theother . Let us cons ider a few cxa m plos t.h nt Su ppor t. thl ss ta tem en t.

1. Confueius h eld th at " wh en th e peopl e are tr eatedas . lh~ f~ulld ali on, .of tI ~ e s ta te , th e latt er en jo ys wel1­'-~C1.Tlg . S uch pol iti cal Ideas a rc Iu tu le ra hlu for' ChinS h ih. Huang and M no 'I'se-Lu n p , th es l' t.wo d espots whoconsider th em selves "SOilS of h ca vun " a nd are acc us­tomed to trampl ing' a ud abus ing the peop le.

,2. r,onfllc~uR pra ise d r ul ers w ho gave up th ei r h igho ffice of th eir own fr ee w ill , as Ya o to Sh u n, a nd S h un10 Yu, :' as the d ismi ssal 1'0 1' in com petence of Tse b yTall.g, a nd likewise Wn W an g 's military ca m pa ig ;1uga ms t Chou ' Ya ng. This is as incom pat ibl e as wa tera lid lir e w ith the way of thinki ng of th e ca reor lsts CII i II

Sh ih Huang a nd Mao T sc-tun g, w ho cl ing to th ei r t. h rou esand want to pe rpetu a te t heir dynasty.

3 . Confuciu s w an ted th e " mo na rch to trea t hi s s u b­jects with r esp ect, and t h e su bjects to se rve the monarchwith loyalty" (An alects , 4; " Pa I" , 3) .

By su bjects Confuei us m ea n t not. only big and sm allofficial s , bu t a lso (" ever ywhe re th e ear th is inh uhitcd bys u b jects of tho monarc h" ) I.he ent ir e lu;opl e. S uc h polit­ical id ea s are a te l'l'ifyin g' wa rni ng to a ll anci ent a ndpr esent-da y desp ots who do not tr ea t th eir "s ub jec ts" aspeople.

,'. 1\1. th e tim e of Yao, Shun and Y11 th ere wa s no slale , Volun­tary chango or beadm lll\ship was cons islent with th e tr aditionof elect ing trilJal chiefs .

4: Confucius ,~ns in favour of lelling people Increase~ I,lell' number s, ~Ive prosperously, and a mass knowledge,1he1'e IS a special re cord to th is effect in the Analects'

" On a~Ti'.'ing in th e W ei sta te ill th o com pa ny of Jal;Yu, Confucius exclaimed:

" ' How ma ny people !'" 'Y os, many people, What else should on e wi sh '?' Jan

Yu asked.:: 70 give the.m pro sperity,' came the answer.

Ami assu nu n p that prosp erity has been ac h ieved,w hat el se should he ad ded ?'

" 'T o give them an education.' " (A nalects 16' "TsII-III", 13) . ' ,

Confucius advocated good treatment of toil ers. Peop le,he sa id, must not wear th em selv es ou t in toil. Th ere isa fra gment on thi s SCore ill th e A nalects :

"Tsu-lu asked how the people shou ld be governed."< F irs t the people must be given advantages, a nd

thereafter th ey must he given work,' Confucius said." 'What el se is needed?'" ' People must not be worn out,' carne th e a nswe r ."

(Analects, Hi; "Tsu-lu", 13) .For Chin Shih Huang a nd Ma o Tse-Lung, wh o arc con­

ce rned only with their own interests and give no thoughtto th e needs of the people , th ese ideas are unacceptable.

S. Confucius wa s all advocate of ed uca tion and opposedth e pnli cy of befogging th e peopl e. H e said: Ming ke shitt« chii . Pu ke siu chji chit (Anl/lects , 9; "Tai P o" , 8).Thera arc two in ter pr eta t ions of this pa ssage (becauseth er e were no punctuation marks in th e olden da ys).Some put a com ma after th e first cli]i in ming k e sh! yllchj i, .. . Th en th e say ing m ea ns "a people should he madeto work , but must not be g iven knowl edge" . In thisinterpretation, on e that is pre-ferred by the Maoist press,Confucius is made out to be in favour of befogging t hepeople: T he other interpre tation, ming ke shi, yu chji;tni ke shi , chji chit, means: "if a people wants to pe r­Iorm services, le t th is be so; if , however, th e people donot want to perform se r vices , they must be to ld whatis wh at" . This interpretation is obviou sly the correct one,be cause, as we know, Confucius was in favour of educ a­tion and prosp erity in pea cetime.

Confuc ius ad voca ted publi c ed uca t ion even iuwar t.i me.H e said : " T o plunge people into a war and , not edu-

ca te th em is to abandon th em to the vaga ries of fate"(An alects, 16; " Tsu-l u" , 13) .

Chin Shih Huang and Mao Tse tuhand follow ed li , f b .- ng, on tho othe r

, a po ICy 0 ofoggm g pe 1· ' fl 'th ey did 110t ev en shrink from "b um ing boor e , dorb t 11Slllg scholars" It is , " a {S a n ur y­ideas of Conf~c' s not surpr ls111g, th er efor e, that the

C. , . lU S were r epugnant to them

hIll Shih Huang a nd Mao '1' .loggerheads with Confucius Tl .~e - tung are clea rly at1I10 l'e progressi ve ca mp ' 'd ie I( eas of Confucius were1:-1 are to those of CI' oJ 'J( uang, who lived more th n 200 . 1m " 11 Ian d they 1 < n years after Confuciusof Mao TS:~L~nag~'o t~orehP~'IogreSSive than the " though L~

. ,oug 1Y ao was born more tha 2 hOOYfiears after Confucius. Confucius said' " 'l'l des n d'uIlls one with awe ' who 1- . ie oscen ant

a ny thing to tllOS ~ Jivin ~n~ws '~hether h e will concedeknown t l t J ' g oday . H e co uld not have

ia tor ay It would be more right to sa ' that " t ldoscond an t fills one with s ham e ' lie I'S 'et ' ~ .d I U, I I " 1 rogr a 0 ovencomparee to t ioso who lived ill a n tiquity"

Th e a ttack Oil Confuci . d . d '_ . ' . I U S 15 csrg n e to pruruote Mao'spoli tica l auns. F or exam ple : .

L In th e article, " On the W orshiP of Confucianismand t he Struggle Against . Fn-chio"; ::. s ig u ed S h ih[JllII , ~'lao m aintains that " Confucius was a diehardcl~amplOn .of.. t he di ctatorship or the s lave-owni ng class"(se ~ Jenm~ llJ lh[Ja () 0: 25 Octob er i On OJ' Il u ngch i No. H),

I fl73) . TIll S conten tion betrays Mao 's la ck of elem en tn­I'y knowl edge of th e epoch of Confuci us. We ha VI' a lreadysh own th a t in Confucius' lifetime the s la ve-o wn i n zilys te m. wa s lo~g over ami that serfdom, too, had Legll~to decl ine. It IS, th erefore, con t.rary to the facts of hi s­tory ~o dcscr~be Con fuc ius as a " diehard ch am pion of~ he (h~tatorshlp of the sla ve-o wnin g class" . This chnrgeIS obviously groundless and can not be taken ser iously .

Mao' s con te mpt of the hi storical facts h as a I'ar­reachi ng aim : to use specio us " his torica l para llels" to at­tack tho se wh om he wants to destroy as " foll owers ' ofConfucius" ill the cam p a ign of " cri tic.ism of Lin Pi a oan d rectifica ti on of s tyle" or a second " cultu ra l r ev olu ­tio n" , that is , accu se th em of being " diehard ch a mpionsof the di ctator ship of th e bourgeoisie" , an d treat t he maccordingl y .

::. Fa-chia-c-legnl ists, champions of legalism, a politi cal schoolin unclon t China.

,)Io t

2. Mao accuses Confucius or " trying to restore th owh ole political system and ord er that exis te d under th erule of th e slave-owning nobility in W est ern Chou" . T o"support" this charge he fal sifies th e sens e of Confuci us 'saying : ke tsi lu li wei jen. ,~

The ar ticle, "Right Opp ortunism and the Ideas ofConfucius" , sig ne d by 8. Ch in Yun-ko , said the follow­ing:

" len is th e core of th e id eas of Confu ciu s; it s purposeis to 'revive e tique tte '. *~ Confucius said: self -im prove­ment for the sake of r eviving eti quette - th is is [en(Analects , "Yan Yuan"). 'Reviving etiquette' impliesthe wi sh to rest ore the wh ole political sy ste m and ord erthat had exis ted under the rul e of th e slave-own ingnobi li ty of Western Chou " (see l cnminj ih. pao, 21 Novem­ber Hl73 or llu ngch i No. 12, Hln ) .

In th e ar ticl e "O n the W orship of Confucianism andthe Strugg le Against Fa-chic" th er e ar e id entical pa s­sages, though the two were signe d with different names.This sh ows that both were written on the orde rs of MaoTse-tung.

For young Chinese read ers to obtain a cleare r id ea ofthis issue, I must first of all bri efly ex plain the ori ginalmeanin g attache d to th e te rms [en a nd eti que tt e in th oleaching of Con fu cius.

In ancien t times " [en" m eant sim ply " man". It saysin th e comm en tary to th e Book of R ites: "len alsom eans man". M enc ius and Shuo-uren ,~*~ al so say: "Ienis m an". And this is the ri ght interpretation.

"Fan Chih as ked, 'what does " jeri" mea n?' Confuciusreplied: 'Love of man ' " (Analect s, 1;); "Yan Yuan ",12) .

In the specific hi stori cal env ironm en t of that time"[ en m eans man " and "[en means love of m an " connot­ed th at man should be treated humanely and cou ld nolon ger be r egarded a slave or serf. Relati ons between

.. "Se lf-impro veme nt in accordance with etiquette- thisis [en",

*" The author wrongly interprets Confucius' saying as fol­lows: "Self-improvement for the sake of reviving etiquette-thisis [ en ";

,"'* Sliuo-uren is short for the title of H SlI Sheri 's great oty­rnolo~i cal di ctionary , Sh u o-ur e n C hten- t eu , wrlttan ill the era ofEas tern Han (2nd century).

peopl e mu st be human. tn the langu age ot our time" jen" mea ns " humanism". Since anci ent times mos tConfucia n scholars cuns idere d " jen " th e progressivel~ucleu~ uf ,the Confucian doctrine. OUl uf this n ucleus~Oll fUCIUS IIlforJ'cd th e mo tive for noble deeds, self­~m pl:?Velll ent, good gov~rnment and peace on earth. Follo w­~.ng th e q~\()stlO~ of ' an y ua n concorn ing 'je ll came

th o .que stlOn . of Chun/? Ku ng concerni ng ' jen ' " , "thequestion of Ssu-rna NIII concern ing 'jen '" , I " Iqu estion of Fan Chih concerning '[en' " 'T ' la ncr It teConfuciu diff . 0 eac i ot t iern

. s gave a 1 ere n t r epl y. This is evide nce tha tC~~fuclUs was a ~~illful teach er who geare d his ex l~l ­na tions to the abilIty of hi s disci ules More 't' p.den ' f t l di . ! ' . , I IS eVI-

co o. .l e rvers tty of m eanin gs attache d to ' .Ih e~ ~un f ucian teaching. Jen III

" I ~tlqu.et,~e origl na lfy meant "sum of r ites ", " corem on ",,~~ l ~~~li~~ ' "and In a mor e ge ne ra l se nse it me:nta lsol ha s ce , etc. In the Conf UCIan teaching, "eti quetto"

. s a bro?d con ten t and meani ng- includ inexpedl~nce of varIOUS acts, im provem en t of self r.; ta tes~m un sh ip, and the like. . , . , .

Th e lim its of this book trai f .. . resrmn us rom exa rni ninp,t,'lO. r11ffer~n t . meanmgs and interpreta tion s of [ en. a nd. etiquette g iven by Confuc ius in th e Armlectu, But itIS d ear from th e af or esaid that jen and " etiquette" donot mean wh at Mao Tse-tung wants them to mean.~o:"" l et . us compare Mao's in ter pr eta tion of Ice ts i fu l l

ioei ten WIth th e corre ct in ter pr et a tion of this phrasefr om the Analects. This will show tha t Mao's falsi fica­tion is wholl y incom pati hle with the original sense ofth ese words.

In the Analect s (" ¥an Yuan", l S) , we read:" Yan Yu an ask ed for th e m eaning of ' jen '. Con fucius

repli ed : " 'self-improvem ent in accorda nce wit h et i q lln tt.(~- th is is [en',

" ' Ple ase explain in detail ,' Yan Yu an sa id." And Confucius replied: 'See not wh at is not in accor d­

ance with eti que tte. Ileal' not what is not in accordancew ith etique tte. Speak no t wh at is not ill accorda nce withetiquette. Do not do what is not in accordance with eli­qu eue'. Yan Yuan said: 'T houg h I am not cle ver , I wantto beh ave in accorda nce with wha t yo u hu vc said' ."

What conn ection can there be bet ween this dialogueand "restoration of the whole political system and orderHi" 243

that exis ted under th e rule of th e slave-own ing nob ilityi ll W estern CII(H1 " ? Non e wh atever , '1'11 0 con ve rs a tio n be­tw een teach er and di sciple concer ns se lf-im pro ve men tan d has n o r elation to Mao's fal se imputation ,

Furth er , the a r ticle s ig n ed by Ch in Yun-ko m isinter ­pr ets Conlu ci us ' say in g, " what yo u do not lik e wh endon e to yourself, do not do to oth ers", as an appeal " totrea t th e enemy hon estl y a nd magnanimou sl y" ; in othe rword s, do no t fight t he ene m y, pardon th e ene my, a ndeve n su rre nde r to t he m er cy of the ene my. Let us, how­ever, c hec k th e right m eaning of th ose wo rds in th oAnalects.

Confucius s poke these words on two occasions , Thefirst time he spoke th em directly foll owing the "ques­l ion of );a ll Yu an co nce rning ' je n ' " in answeri ng the"q ue s tion of Ch ung Kun g concc rn iug ' jen' " . C?nf uci us 'an sw er consi sted of live se n te nces , one of whi ch wa s," wh a t yo u do not like when done to yo urself do no t doto others" . T his sen t ence was meant to explain jen . Thesecond tim e, Confucius spok e these word s in his reply tothe question of 'l'su Kung: " Is ther e a word that onecould follow all life long?" Confucius r eplied: " T he wordis shu ": what, you do n ot like wh en done to yourself donot do to ot he rs ," (Analects , 18 ; " Wei Lin -kung" , 15) ,Hero Confucius s poke these words to ex plain shu. T herois noth in g in these dialogues to justify the interpretationn]' th is sen tence as being a n appeal to treat tll o enemyhon estly an d magn animou sl y. S uc h a n in terpretation isju s t, a no ther of Ma o's falsifi cation s.

Ma o's perverse under standing of t~~.? Ca nIucian teach­ing of jell , etique tte and chung shu .... .. on ly het.ra y s hisundiul cctical soph is tr y,

Chi n Yu n-ku 's article , " R ig ht Oppor tu nis m and tIll'Ideas of Confucius" , is based on t hese Maoist fal sifi ca ­ti on s , Afte r qualifying Confucius' id eas of jen, eti quettea nd chu ngs lui as id ea s of r ea ctionary slave-owners andan appea l to s urr en de r to th e ene my, Ch ill Y un -kol ink ed th em with th e so-called ri ght-op portunist id eas,ma intainin g tha t the latter fed 011 the id eas of Confu­ciu s. TIe won ; on to say that th e irleas of Confucius were" a tool wh er eb y right-opportunists tried to subver t.

" Sh ll- he re , pu L yourself in the place o f nn othor, kindlll' ~ ~ .

.,.•,. Cilll n gs /Ill- be faithf ul to your duty and show concern 101'

others, hon esty,

~1Je Chinese rev oluti on a nd are trying to r estor e it IIsm in CI' " TI , ~eap l a -. . nna'. i cr euu on , th e a u tho r of IIIC nrtlcl

heaped III SU1l S and sla nder all th ose leaders of t l ' CPCwho had at dilTCI'ent times 0 lO S I I Ietiona ry "tho "J t ," f AI ?,I e.( t i e cou n ter- re volu-. II 1 S O li no l se-Lu!]<r TI is ' !In three la rge fragm ents. The f1 ~~ ,J, ~ ~ \V,as l on ed ev!~L ed to s la nde ri ng W a ng i\I ing ' tan~! aA'p~~~;~t T~;',~huai , tlw secon d to slandel'inO' Liu S I , '1' '" 'th ird to slanderlng Li n P iau . '=' 1<1 0 - (, II , und t1w

! YetI itl

is Cnol.lC o ther than Mao Tse-t ung' who has he-r'ay er t w hiu eso r evolution and' I "

soc ia list sys tem in China. IS unr erlllIIJ IlIg th e

. By, att ack ing Con Iu cf us , Mao Int.ends uot only tJust.dy til e " blll'Jl iug of hook s and bu ry iu g o r s~ l lO l a rs'~a ~l d the other tyrannical ac ts of Chin S hih HUHng andIIIruself , hut also Lo create a, n ew pretex t ror pers ocuti u (T

peopl e. !I,1 the next s tage 01 the "c ri ti c is ru o f Li n Pia~and I'ecllhcation of s t yle" or when ' I second " c JI '. 1 'I ' " 1 ' , o v .u .urn rev-o :1 t.I,~n , )('~a ks . ou t, ,\te will be ab le to acc use au von ehe wi she s of bei n g a follow er of Confuci us", whi chwll lbe, tantamount. to charging him with su bver tin o th eCllI lles,e l:e \'o l ~l t J(J Il an d tr ying to re s tore c ap i t a li s l ~ ,, ~lHd.l1eIllS In'ed m or e tha n 2,500 years ago. Due to the

I lIllJ ta tlOn~ and peculia ri ties of tho se tim es, h is teachingwa s d ual I II ch aracter : ba ckward for it s "wors hi p of th emonarch " and progressive for it s tea ching of jen. Feuda lrlJl er~ of all lat er epochs, as well as reactionary warlor ds,exploi ted th e backward aspect of Con lu ci anism , whilepro gress iv e thinkers promoted it s pr ogr essive aspect.

Bogin n ing wit h Ha ll W u- ti ( Liu Che ) who " d is ba nd edall other sc hools and revered on ly Confuci us " , all fe u­dal dynasti es up to a nd including t he P ciyaug wa rlordsa ud Chia ng Kni-sh ck , made th e m ost of th o backwa rdas pec t of Conlu ci anism, worshi p of th e m onarch , lo but­t ress their OWIl reactionar y r ille a nd to attack th ei r po­litica l opponents. Th e Ma y F ourth Movem ent (Hl HJ),which was a s truggle aga inst im peri alism , lite l'ei yangwarlords a nd th e feudal or der, oppose d th e backwardaspect of Confuci anism and opened the doors to lhe new,revolu l.inn ar y id eas of Marxi sm-L eninism. Tn th e thirti es ,Chi ang Kai-shok used th e te ac hing of Confucius, Mon g­Isu , B uddh ism a nd T aoi sm to pr om ole hi s Ne w Lif'nMovement w hich was, i ll cllcct, a cumoullagcd Iascistmo vem ent .

. Wh~n exposing ~IJian~ J(a i-shp;k' s rea ctionary jugg l­11l g' w ith the teucluug of Co n Iu ci ue uud M cug-t.su , weCommunists c rit ic ise d th e backward aspect of Confucian­ism. This was co rrec t and necessary because it weak­ene d, even neutralised, th e influence 0 11 the m asses ofreactionary groups that used the back ward aspect of thoteach in g of Confucius and Mcng-tsu for sel fish ends.

Tt is com mon knowledge that the backward asp ect ofConfu cianism, "worship of th e monarch and expuls ionof for eigners" , is an im portant ideologi cal so urce lindpart of the "though ts of Mao Tse-tung". Worship of themonarch means worship of th e "son of heaven", and"expulsion of for eigners" means China's identificationwith th e Celes ti al Empire. Th e "son of heaven " id eologyli es at th e root of Mao's egoce ntrism and extre m e indi­viduali sru, while th e Cel estial Empire ideology li es a tthe root of his extrem e nationalism and chauvinis m .Jn fa ct , there was a time when h e used to describe him­self as "a politician who is outwardly a Confu cianist andinwardly a Taoist" . T his is tantamount to admitting that.he is "a politician who nev er tires to s peak of vir tueand m orali ty, but thinks only of plots and intrigues".

Mno Tso-tung, as we see, was a lso one of those whoused Confucianism to buttress their r eacti onary r ule.In this re spect, h is purpose wa s the same as that of alltil e previ ou s reacti onary rulers of China.

But hi s present approach has changed-he attacksth e progressive conc epts of anc ie n t Confucianism baser!on the teaching of j en in order to ex tol Chin Shih Hua ngand re tain hi s grip on power, Having betrayed commu­ni sm a nd having becom e a se rva n t of imperialism , Maoreg ards a ll reaction a ry id eas and doctrinos -e-Irom th erea ctionary id eologi cal sc hools of an tiqu ity to modernfascism - as " par tners" of tho " though ts of Mao Tse­tung", while Marxi sm-Leninism and the progres sive con­ce pts of anci ent Confucianism are for him mortal ene m iesof hi s rea ction ary "thoughts". In fact, ex plo iting thebackward as pec t of Con fucianism and attacking its pro ­gressive as pect, tho ugh antipodal in approach, pursuenne and th e sa me aim by di fferent m ean s and are there­fore two sides of on e and th e sam e r eactionary schem e.

Mao T se-tung attack s [ en as the nucleu s of th e Con ­fucian teaching, and also attack s the tradit ional Chinesemorality. His attack s un hum anism , which is accep te d

by all pr ogressives as the foundation of mora litosp('cia~ J y veh em ent. :rhis proves, on th e une h'anl' t~~~the ~Illnese C~mm~lllsts were right to de scrib M fthe s tyle recllflcatlOn ca m ai" I " e ao 0lio n " as a m all total! la ckfn g~ anr c ul tura l revolu-m orali ty and sh . y I g 11l humaIllty, cons cience

" . arne , on t re othe r hi ' ff 'se lf admitted to being (I vnid f I' e I~S III o oct him­e 01 0 I UIna lllty . ti Iesty, kindn ess , and decenc _ . ' .Jus I C~ , IOn-cyn ical a d h 1 y . a m a n who IS pe r fi d ious. n same ess, sc he m ing to ' ,s till more immoral a bom' t ' I com m it many ot he r ,

J } , Ina IOns t has co m e tw ioro 10 cons ide rs eve r ethi i 0 a passprotest or ri di cu lo dir ect eYd ~ca hr '!le an accusa tion orI . agru ns t un

t IS sa fe to say On the evid .far from helping Mao reach I .. e~ce °lf .past hi stor y thatly to lead to the vel' ( 0 1I~ arms, lIS conduc t is like-used th e back ward as:ect~rge. fA I! r?actionaries wh ofor persecllting progressive revofnt'uclallls~ as a pretextex po nen ts, came to the sam u ionary Ideas and theirand for th eir reactionary id e end~ldefeat for thcm solv esan d th eir ex on e ,1 eas,. w l ~ e r evolution ary id ea sst ill reate~' Pints eme i ge d vic torio us a nd covere d withs ivo s~de of C

g O? .A~~ ~ao, who a ttacks the pro gres-L " on ucranrsm m order to persecu te Marxl'srrlenllll sm d 't . -} f . ' I ' an I s ex ponents will , as the re ac tiona riesJle 0.1 e 11m, come to the sa me sad en d - f nal and con

c USlve def eat. -

N:J\vaday~ , .~~ao persecutes Communist s and intellec-tua ls fur IlJ shklllg Chin Shih Huang and lik i C f" . Thi • • l Ing on u-1;1u.s . IS sho ws that hi s campa ig n of ex tolling ChinS ~lIh Huan g and eri ~icising Confucius is in tertwined withhi s consplrac~ agams t th e Com m unist P arty and th epeo~le of . China on th e home front, an d against th eSOVIet Union and th e world co m m un ist mo vemen t on th eex tern a l fr ont,

Let .~.e. only add that. his praise of Ch in Sh ih Huangand cr iticism of Confucius have two ot he r secre t aims.One of them is to divert people fr om the struggle andto obfu sca te it s cha racter; in other words . he is del iher­ate ly creat ing con fusion in or der to portray the strugglebe tween th e revolutionary id ea s and policy of Marxism­Leni n ism and the react ionary "thoughts" and policy ofMao Tse-tung as a st ru ggle between those for andagainst Chin Shih Hu ang or between those for andagainst Con fucius. The othe r a im is to co nfus e peopleby juggli n g with ancient "wisdoms". Sinc e not on ly t he

mass of workiug peopl e, but also the you nger genera~ionor in tell ectuals h ave only a scant knowledge of ancioutwritings and the fa cts of ancient h istory , Mao thinks thathi s manipulations will identify the strugg le of the pres­ent with ancient history and t hereby obscure the tru estate of affa irs.

It is our duty, therefore, to be vigilant and to e.xp? seMao's ma chiuations , lIe is very likely to r eso rt, to simi larploys in future as well. For example, he may instructcer tain per sons to write articles extolling Shang Chou­wang ::. and the lat t er 's favourite ~oncubine Ta-c~li, sayingthat Chou-wane was not a Ierocious de spot, did not in­dulac the whims of Ta-chi and did not comm it abomina­ti01~';, while Ta-chi did not enc ourage Chou-wang's ty­ranny a nd that th e downfall of the Shang dynasty IS

not t; be blamed on the wrongdoings of Cho u-wa ng andTa-chi. A11 this, or course , wouIII be de signed to exoner­ate Mao Tse-tllng' and Chiang Ching. Or he may, forex am pie, fa ls ify the teaching (if Mo-tsu , descri be . Mo-ts uas a r enction ary thinker, and t hen u se t he stIgma; of"follower of Mo- tsu" to persecu te peopl e, and the 11 ke,But wh a tever s tr a ta gem s Mao may som e day use, wesh all be able to sec through them, to se e hi s desigu sand th eir "su bt le t ies", if we employ the "lie detector"of Marxi sm-Lcnini srn.

3) Why and how Mao Tse-tungabuses the name of Lu Hsun

In conclusion let us se e how Mao abuses the name ofLu Hsun in hi s pra ise of Chin Sh ih Huang and cr iti­r.ism of Confucius.

He h as pulled out Lu Hsuu 's pamphlet, The lJifferellGesand Resemblances Bet ween th e Burning of Books inChina and Germany , written in '1933, to vi~dicate t~e"burnin g of books and bu rying of sch olars by ChinShih Hu a ng., T ho main id ea in Ln H s u u's pamphlet was corr -ect:h e h el d that though Hitl er and Chin Shih H uang hadboth b ur'n ed books , H itl er was th e more abominable. Bya nalogy, had L u Hsun been alive in tho la t ter h alf of

. . " A con tcrnptiblo tyrant, th e last ruler of the Shang dynasty(17{j(j-1'1 22 n. C.).

th e sixt ies and h ad he writ t en a pamphlet on th e d iffer­e nces and resem b lances between the hu rn in jr o f book sill nntiqui ty a nd th e present tim e, h is main idea wouldsurel y have b een that th ough Mao an d Chin Shih Huanghad hot.h burned hook s. Ma o was the more abom inable,and th is, too. would ha ve been COJTect. Bu t ill hi spamphlet Lu HSUIl did not denounce t he burnino of~~ook~ by Chin Sh ih .I-Iu~ng. On the contra ry, he w;ote:

It. IS true th a t Chin Shih Hu an g burn ed hook s. H eburn ed ~h e ~ll fOI' tile ~ake o f ideologica l uni t.y" . Tll is , ofCO\Jl's~, IS mcorrect, Yet , in the ear lier mentioned arti­clos, ' Tn I? ef~ncH of je ng shu k engiiu:', ::- " On th e W or sh ipof Confucia ni sm and th e Struggle Aga ins t Fa-chia" and" Chin Shih Hu ang Was a P~litir.ian Who Combatt edAttempts a l HestoL"iug Slave-Owners ", the ir authors,do ing Mao's bidding, used this phrase of Lu B sun's toj ustify 1I0t only the burning of hook s by Chin Sh illHuang a nd not only the crimes of Mao Tse-tung whoburned books du r ing th e " c u ltur a l r evolution " . but. also th efasci s t mil it ar ists in Chi le, wh o ar e a lso burnin g' hook s.

By thi s phra se of Lu Ilsuu's Muo is trying t(; justifyt lte pa st, pr esen t and any fu tu r e burning of books byreacuonaries and , of cou rse, abo ve all to justify the end­less des tr uction of cu lt ure and the persecution of intellec­tuals by Mao him self in h is successiv e "cult ura l revolu­t ions ", But hi s e ITor ts are in vain. 1£ only hecause in nna rt icle . "On T wo or Three Ch inese Affairs" , written inH1:14. Lu lI SIlIl, in eller.t.. r evi sed his Iorrn cr viewpo in ton the burnin g of books by Chin Shih Huang. Lu Tlsunwrote: " Ch in Shi h Hu a ng b urn ed books. This h as ea rne dhim the reputation of a not oriou s per sonality, uu d hi sac t is eve n ref erred to as a pr eced ent for the hurniu g ofbook s hv Hitler". Lu H sun m ak es clear th ereb y th a t theburninz 01' books by Chin Shih H uan g. as we ll as b y Hit­ler, wa s a crinriual ac t , with t he so le di fference beingtli e lapse in ti me. Mao avo ids any mention of this, forotherwise h e would no t he able to use what Lu Hsunsaid in '1933 to ju sti fy hi s ow n crimes. Rut facts areIncts, Th e works of LIl Hsun are intact. And h ard as th oMaoist gro u p m a y try to hush up th o fact s , th o hulk ofLu Hsun's r ead er s kn ow th orn.

:, Fengsh u li <? ll b'j i u - l.Iw burning of books and burying of~chol al"s .-Tr.

Tho authors of tho above articles quote what Lu Hsunwrote in 1933 about the burning of books by Chin Sh ihHuang to justify the "burning of hooks" and the " b ury­in~ of scholars" as deeds of the same order. By HO

doing they try to persuade their readers that Lu Ilsunalso approved of the burying of scholars by Chin ShihHuang. The fa cts show, indeed, that Chin Shih Huangof ~ntilJuity, Hitler of the thirties, Mao Tao-tung of thesixties, the Iascist gang in Chile of the seventies, andal! other reactionaries com bine d the burning of booksWIth th e ph ysical elimination of intellectuals. The onlydifferenco is that Chin Shih Huang buried Confucia~lscholars, while the present-day reactionaries executeMarxi sts-Leninists, fighters against imperialism, and rev­olutionary intell ectuals. It is no accid ent, th erefore, thatMao justifies the " b ur uiu g of hooks" and th e " buryingof sc~h olars" as things of the same order .

Yet, in fa ct , Lu Ilsun protested against th e "burningof books", and also against the "burying of scholars".Take hi s "Short Introduction" to Sandals (1!.l::l4) , a col­lection of Chinese writers in English translation. Herehe wrote: "All progressive writers became revolutionarywriters and their suppression became increasingly vi ­cious-bans on publication, burning of books, and exe ­el u tion of writer s. During this dark ni ght many youngpeople paid for their work with their lives." This showsthat Lu Ilsun's 1933 reference to the burning of booksby Chin Shih Huang was no more than a temporary aber­ration. He protested furiously against such despotic actsas the burning of books and the execution of intellec­tuals.

In th e ahove-mentioned " Shor t Introduction", Lu Hsunprotest ed against the burning of books and the killingof intellectuals by Chiang Kai-sh ek. 1£ he had liv ed to ­day, he would surely have protested still more indig­nantly against the burning of books and killing of intel­le ctuals by Mao Tse-tung and the Chilean fa scists.

The Iacts show that Chin Shih Huang did not secure"unity of ideas" or save his dynasty by "burning hooksand burying sch olars" . On the contrary, there was stillgreater ide ologi cal turmoil, which hastened the downfallof th e Chin dynasty. Mao, too, who is burning books andslau gh tering intellectuals, will s uffer tho same fate asChin Shih Huang.

Few peopl e, I am sure, will be m is led by th e usc of LuHsun 's cr iticism of Con fu ciu s to suppor t Mao's an ti­Confucian ca m pa ign.

, ~o be,9in witl~ , M.ao used a sentence from Lu Hsuu'sai ticl e, Confu cIUS ll1 Modern China" , wri tten in 'I\)35as an argumen t against Confucius. Here it is' "Q 't'true, Con fuc ius drew 1I1J excellen t plan s of ho . t III eom a sta te, hut all of th em wer e designed tCI wj o .gov

t­

the mas ' f tl I ' ( onuna e' . SOlO peop o and wer e drawn up for tl . .

authol'lty; th ere was noth ing in th em for the peopl its elf ~,~~.t'e(~o ~l:~d~~~lt atd tl lOLiillHPlicatfons c~f thi s phrase, e,~~c;~Ill~st

o e 0 u Sun s artICle H e ref er d itl~ymp,7,thy to .the life of Con fuc ius and ti j() fa te of :ti ~ Wl j I

~;~g~vro~~ e .r,I~I Sf?rtl~n es °If Confuciu s in his own fathe('t:~~ ~~'1 I "1 ega n on g wfore th e twenti eth century" He

s lOWe( th at Confu ciu s was "a rna I I 'mu ch du rin g- hi s lifetim e " TI ~ <II JW 10 lad su rfer'edtl I I . ' lei eupon ie not ed l.h nL a It.er

10 (eat 1 of Can Iuc ius he was "presentod by di IT " truler s u nd er all kinds of disguises by means of ~a ~;~;ll::;fa~e powder's, and was ra i,sed to an awesome height". LuHSI~~~ d elllonstl'a ~ed tha t ,Ill past eras all aspira nt \'0 all

offi ci al post s tu di ed the f our B ook s and the Five Rooks,~nd ~I'ote essays in the paku style, usill ~ th em n~

a brick for knocking on the door ". "The moment thodoor , 01?en ed ," he ad ded, "the b rick was thrown away.Confu cius , too. was used af te r his death as a 'br ick (ork nuckin g on th e door'. " Ending' his ar ticle , L u l l su nwrote: " If we take exam ple s from recent times, thi s willbe still clearer." He scoffs a t Gen eral Sun Ch ua ng-fan gwho, " havi ng in sta lled himself in Kiangsu an d Ch ekiang,chupped off th e h ead s of villagers on th e roads at will",and ridicules General Ch an g T sung-ch an g, " who ha s lostcoun t of his t reasures, soldiers, and conc ubi nes". Thesetwo wort.h ies had also tried to escape defea t hy pa yinga tribute of de ference to Con fu ciu s, and had al so recitedConfucian sayings. It was in his sati re agai ns t th e Pei­yang warl or ds w ho t rl erl in va in to escape d ef ea t by kow­towing to Confucius that Lu Hsun m ad e the a ioru- m un­t.ioncd cr itica l refer ence to the pl an s of Confucius as being" drawn up for those in autho rity" . In short, th e motiva-

". "T he St ruggle Betwee n Fri end s and Foes of Confuciu s inth e Pa st One Hundred-Odd Years" in: l e n.nit ru ihpao , 7 December1973; th e art icle was signed hv "tho Peki ng and Tsinghua uni­versi ties group of big cr iticism,l. .

Lions be hind Lu Hsuu's criticism of tho backward aspectof Confucianism wore the sa m e as those of revolutioua­rip s and Conun uui sts at th e time of the May Four thMovement and ill the t hirties. Whi le denoun cing the US H

of Confuciani sm by warlords and Chiang Kai -shek as ameans of huttressing reactionary rule, they (:riticised thebackward aspect of Coulucianis m to le ssen or even elim­inate til e influ en ce of t ile reactiona ry rulers who ab usedthe name of Confucius.

Apart from the above article, Lu Hsun passed j udge­mcn t 011 Con fucius and the teaching of Confucius n urlMong-tsu in some of his sh or t pieces (sketches, r eviews,and essays) coll ec te d und er the title, Various S ent im ents.T he se were not specific studies of Confucius 01' tho teac h­ing' of Confucius and Mcug-tsu. They m erely r- irlicn lcdcontemporary rcn ct ion ari es wh o soug h t sa lva tion in lau gh­a ble " wors h ip of Confu cius" awl " rec i ta l of Co nfucianwritings". Everybody knows tha t in his Various Senti­melds Lu Ilsun expressed hi s own thoughts on this sc o re.Awl what he wrote co in cide d with the cr itic is m of Con­Iur.iu s by revolutionaries and Communists at the timeof th e Ma y Fourth Movement and in th e thirti es .

From antiquity to th e present tim e all inca lculablenumber of works has been written on Co nfuci u s and thetea chinz of Coulucius and Meug-tsu. Theil' aut horsexpress~d di sparate opinions , SOllie of th em diam etrica llyo pposite on es, and eac h expo unded what was b y undla rgo hi s own view . Mao, however, not on ly " sanct.i­Iiod" Lu Hsun's pronouncements on Confucius ami thetea ching of Con Iu cius unci Meng-tsu as i udispu tah le dog­ma, but also made them a " reason" for persecuting COI11­

munists and revolutionary int ellectual s , For this th orois absolutel y n o justifica t ion ,

Of lute , Mao has begun ide ntifying Lin Piao a nd Con­fu ci us . In hi s ca m pa ig n 01' " cr i tic is ing L in Piao and Co n­Iu cius" he makes s pec ific use of Lu Hsuri 's pron ounce ­iucn ts on the teaching' o f Confu cius and Meug-Lsu, Th is,as we h ave a lready noted, is mea nt to purl ruy the s tru g­g le between i\I ao Tse-tung and Lin Piao as a s tr ugg le be ­tw een Mao' s nnti -Conlucianisru and Lin Pian 's worship ofCouluci anism in order to obfuscate the tru e motives o ]tho s tr uggle between Ma o and Lin I' iao.

It is com mo n knowled ge th at Mao began abu sing,dis tortin g, and Ial sify iug' l .u I lsuu' s pronouncements, and

us in u Lu Ilsun 's nam e 10 prom ote hi s own rcactionarvaim s:, a long time ago: )~~a rs ago, :lIl d es pec ia lly durin gth e c ultura l re vulu tio n " , Mao d istort cd and fal si fiedLu JIsun arbitrarily to a ttac k pe ople wh oru he wantedto put o,u t of th? wa y. H ere is a sam ple of one cr udefa~s"lcfl~~on . rn h IS tes tament , Lu Hsun sa id among othe r~ l llllgs: 111 .Europe, when some one di es he usually per­forms th? rite of bogging th e forgiven ess of oth er s , anda lso Iorgivos others. I have m a ny enem ies .. , hut T f01 '.givc non~ of them.': Jn Oct ob ?r 1966, a t n m eeting on theBOth aunrvorsary of Lu Hsun s death , Chen Po -tu quotedthese words from L u Hs un s testa men t in h is co ncl ud in gremarks, H e added-eVide n tly on Mao 's hehalf: " I con ­s ider thi s. it \"C I'y important testament left us by LuTIsu.n , which we must never forget. " By d el iberatoly di s­torl lug' what Lu Hsun wrote , Ma o tri ed to crea te th eill1 r,,'e s~ioJl t.ha~ the great writ er would n ot forgive thoser ev olutionar-y litera ture and art worker s in sid e a nd out­s ide th e P arty who harl opposed him in the di scu ss ionsof th e twenti es a nd thirties. But the facts from Lu H suu'slif e con tra dic t this arbitrary interpretation,

In th e thir ti e , in the Lea gue of Lef t-Wing WritersLu Hsun was closely associa te d with th e r evolutionaryw r iters and arti sts who had opposed him in t' ) d iscus ­s ions of th e twenties. In 1932, in a foreword to hi s Col­lection of a Triple Loafer, he referred to th em withwarmth and gratitude. " T here is one thing for which1 am forever gra te fu l to th e Crea tive Art Soc ie ty . Its purre d m e to readi ng ce rtain works on the science ofliter a ture," Lu Hsu n wrot e. " This help ed m e to di sp elth e dou bts w hich Iormor hi storians of li tera ture had de­bated at su ch enorm ous len gth that they create d s t il lgreater confu si on. In doin g so, I transl a t ed Pl ekhun ov 'sbook, On th e Arts , in ord er t o rectify my mi stake anda lso the mistak e! of th ose w ho h ad s uffered because of lll L' ­

the mistake of one-sided, all-absorbing fa ith in th e th eoryo f evo lution ," Jointl y with th e co nn -ados of the Leagu e ofLeft-Wing Writers" (with whom h e had Callie to grips

". Th e League of Lef t-Wing Writers, founded un der the direc­tion of th e Cl'C, existed fro m 1930 to 1930, It brought tog ethermany writer s- some were Commu nists, some were out side thePar ty, and all of the m were rovol uuo nnri es. In 1936 th e Leaguedi ssol ved it self in connection wit h the omcrgence of the unitednntioua 1 anti-Japauese front and th e need Ior uniting the country's patriotic writers.

in a discussion in the summer of 193tJ) , Lu Hsun signe r!a declaration in earl y Octob er 1936, en t itled Declarationof br oth ers in literatu re and art on unity for th e sake ofresisting aggr ession and sec uring fr eedom of speec h .Jointly with th em he fought the ene my. But for Ius un ­timely death on J9 October 1936, I.le would surely havefought on for an anti-Japanese united front I~ ar.t andliterature jointly with those who had opposnd him Ill . th ediscussions. Lu Hsun always distinguished between Iriondand foe. He is the very oppo site of Mao Tao-tung, wh o d~­

liberately distorted Lu Hsun's testament and, W~lat ISwor se used it as a pretext for persecuting revolutionarywriLe;s and artist s , and th e vast m~jority of CPC lead ersand rank-and-file memb er's as encnues, .

One more example. Th e discussion th at erupted 1Tl theLeague of Left -\Ving Writors over the .two slogans t':on­cerning the establishment of a~ anti-J apanese Im/te~1

front in art and literature, ended III tho summe r of 1G?!J.Already then, taking guidance in the correct CPC poh.cyof a united national anti-Japanese front, th e adversarl.esanived at til e conclusion that th ere wa s no essen t laldifferenc e hetween the slogan "literature of national de­fence" and th e sloga n "mass literature of nation al revo­lutionary war ". This wa s wh y in hi s a r ~ icle, " Re ply ~()

Il su Mao-yun g on th e Question of th e Anti-J apanese Unit­ed Front", Lu Hsun acknowledged the Heed for th e "co­exis te nce" of th e two slogans " inas much as th e s logan"li te r a tu re of nati onal defenc e' is highly popul ar and iskn own to many, and can in crease our political and literaryinflu enc e". The facts of history show, ind eed, that in thopolitical climate of that tim e th e slogan " ~i te l'U ture of na~

tional defence" was more in keapi ng With the task 01building an ant i-Japanese united front in ar t and literature.This was why it won public approval ami was welcomedby writers and artist s. Slogans such as "poetr y and songsof nati onal defence", " plays of nation al defence" , " Ii Irusof nat ion al defenc e", and th e lik e, were quickly putforward.

In subs ta nce both slogans were based on docum entsof th e CC CPC: Chou Yang and others of th e CPC groupin th e Leagu e of Left-Wing Writers who advanced th eslogan, " li terature of national defence", in the beginningof Hl3G, had taken it from the Augu st First Appeal LoAll Compatriots on Resistance to Japan and for the Sal-

vation of ;he Motherl and, pu bli sh ed on 1 August Hl35 by~he .CC CI C a~ld the Centra l Government of the Chinese

oviet Hepu 1>1Ic to promote th e un it ed na tio nal ant'Jap~~ese fr ont. This Appeal adva nced th e sloga ns of 0;=yalllslllg an al~-China united government of na tional de­rl~lnc eAand forn!~ng an all-China anti-Japanes e un ion army

ie ugust 1< 11'5t Appeal alId 't I " .f . < I S S ogans govcrnm ent~, ~H1tlOJ1al r1 efence" and "anti-Japan eRe Union Ann "leples~mted a conc re te plan for resol Ving the m~stCOr~l)lIca ted probl ems of th e all-China united nationalan~l-Japanese fr ont. Pro-J apanese tr aitor Wang Ching­WeI held that tl~ e existence in China of different govern­mel.1 ts an d a.rmlCs precluded resist ance to Japan, whileantl-cOmIl1~~ist Chia.ng ,~ai.-shek exp loited these circum­~tances to s u bs ta n t ia j « his own s loga n, "hefore resist­lll~. ~!lC outsid e enemy we mu st put down internals u -ifo . Our : arty 's prop osal of an all-C hina united govern­me.ll t of nat iuna ] defence and an all-China anti-JapaneseunlO~ .a l'mx des troyed th ese "e xc uses" and "s ub­stantliltlOns , and ga ve th e peopl e of Chi na and all anti ­Jap~nese. ~arti ~s and groups the happ y persp ective ofending CIVil s trife and .l aunching a joint struggle agains tthe Japa,~ ese a~gresslOn . All of th em suppor ted theAugust 1< II'St Appeal of th e CPC, and acted on it. This iswhy, Loo, t!le slogan of " li teratu re of nationa l defence"Won ext e? SIVe suppor t am ong writers and art ists .

vVhen"lIl Ma ~: 1936 Lu H un and oth ers advaneNI theSlogan, ma ss li terature of nationa l revolutiona r y war"th~y were .guided by the CC CPC a ppeal of 19 Sept~lll ~hOI Hl31, Issu ed afte r the Japanese OCCII pation of She n­yang (Mukden) on 18 Se ptember, which ca lled for a na­tional rov.oluti o.na:y war by th e armed peopl e againstJapanese Imp eri al ism. Th e 10 Se ptember appea l was di­rected again st Chian g Kai -shek's policy of non-resist­ance. It was a mil itant app eal to th e Chinese peopl e tolaunch an arm ed struggle against the Japanese imperia l­ist aggression. Yet , as noted ea rlier, a t tha t tim e ourParty had not yet formul at ed th e policy of a united na ­tional anti-J apanese front directed to marsh alling allanti-Japanese forces of China. Sloga ns furthe ring thi spolicy were first issu ed a little over four months laterduring th e Sha ng hai battle against th e Japanese, wh ichbegan on 28 JUllu ary1932.

The facts of histo ry show that in th e condit ions creat-

ud by th e con t inuo us armed aggr essio n of Japnnose im­perialism an d Chiang Kai-shek 's an ti-com m u nis t war itwa s impossible to ca rry into effec t the militant sloganof an an t i-J a pa nese national r evolution a ry war, whichimplies unity of the whole nation , in the absence of aunited national an t i-J a pan ese front poli cy , Faithful tothe Ma rxis t-Leninist doctrine 0 11 nati on al r evolutionarywars, th e Com m u nis t P arty of China fir st. called for ananti-Japanese n ational r evolutionary war. S ubs eque n tly ,ta ki ng' guidance in Lenin 's theory on th o united nation ­a l an ti -imperi alist front, it worked o u t th e poli cy of aunited national anti-Japanese front. I n th e teeth of nu­merous difficulties , g u ided by th o Com intern and helpedby the COIll rnu n ist P arty 0 r th e So vie t Un io n, itse cured a n end to tho war between th e Kuomintang andth e Communis t Party , es tabli s hed coopera tion with theK uomin tang, a nd further ed nationwid e resi stance :toJ a pa nese ag g l'essi on , This wa s a vivid exa m ple of h~lW

the Communist Party of Chin a appli ed t he com m on prm­ciples of Marxism-Leninism to th e conc re te con d itio nsof the Chinese revoluti on, Al so, it wa s a hi stori ca l se r vicerender ed by th e CPC to th e Chin ese nat.ion.

Wh en during the eve n ts of 18 Se ptem ber 1931 t heParty issued the slogan of an anti -Japauese national rev­olutionnry war, Mao was in on e of th e So viet area s ofChina and learned about it o n ly som e time later. Dur­ing th e def ence of S han g hai against th e J apan es e inHI:J2, we issu ed th e slogan : " Wor kers , peasants, soldiers,st ude nts, intell ectual s, mer chants ! Un ite Ior joint res ist­ance to J apan a nd fo r th e salvat ion of the Mother ­lan d! " Ther eupon, the CPC offere d " th ree conditions"on which the Ch inese Reel Army was pr epill'eel t o con­elude an agr eement of joint armed ac tion again st theJapanese in vad er s with th e Kuornintang and any othera rm ed Ior ces. It advan ced a s ix- poin t ac t ion programmefOI' establish in g a comm ittee for th e armed sel f-d cf'ouc cof th e Chinese people, l t suggested a n ational unitedfront ag a inst Japan and Man chuku o, and was in strumentalin activating the No rtheas t An l.i-J a pa nese U n ion Arm y ,

It wa s in these documents a nd th e related ac ti onsthat th e poli cy o r a united nati onal a n ti -Japa nese frontwa s g l'ad ua lly ev olve d. In it s August First Appeal ando thol' docum ents , th e Party COl lSUlllll1a tcd t. bi s ba si c pol ­icy of resi stance to .I apan and salva Lio n of tIle Mother-

250

land. News of th ese d 1until later. H e was eit h:ve,opments di d n ot reac h Ma oon th e \Vestern March S oUl h0111of th e Sovie t areas orcou~d ll av e tu ken part in th o ;ad ta k en n o purl. norH13;:> that Mao m ude 'his W~m, t w,a s on 27 Decembers t~uggl e agains t .J apanese i~~;eOJ~af I eport on tactics ofwitb a. Central Commi ttee dec: i:lt Ism. H er e, com plyin gtl.1e um led nati on al anti-J 11 ano on , h e first llJ elltione dd1(1 not SUppo rt th e Cent t C se !ron~, But h is repor tJ,fl.panese unitv: Mao <; -t r'f~ 1 0111 ~nl ltee s poli cy of an ti-lin I' • , , se ar t I hi <; ow 1 f

e ( lrected aga inst Ihe Par lv 's - , n e t-opportun is tlh at th e r c nor t was not In d ' l'l y ohcy , .S lllal1 wond cr

D · - a e pun IC t 'l 1(" .eS{Jlte th e" e fa ct - f 1 ' uu I ) vears later. ~ , :; 0 IIst OI' . ~l . ' 0 c •

neSe pres.s published Ch ' CYh' ,Ill ," a~ch lDC() th e Chi-te rence on Lit erarr; . tny m g' s A otes on the Con­Thes e n otes aI·I..J' l,la ll( .I rt TV orh' in Ar1111/ Ull it ~ ':.

" , It 0 ier d OCl . . ,.furth er th e coun te r- revolu tio Ill~ ellt.~ publish ed later todeserihed the sloga n "li te r a t nary cu ~ t lJral r r.\'olu tion ",vancod by Ch oi Y ure of natioual defence" ad-Aug..· ust First A~pe:l~sanad ' ?bther s 0:1 the basis of the1 i tl ' . , ou rgeOls "logan" 1 1IlH e: ie mfluence of " W a n Min ' -, ' . . ac.opte(

a united n a tional anti- J apane;e fr g,~ defeatist po lIcy ofH sun a nd others ha <; ed thc : ~~t , Th e sloga n of Ludesl:l'ihed as u "pr~let o,n e

lI f) ~eplember Appeal was

l] I ' c arran s ozau in k 'e . , 1 'IO.Ug Its of 2\1 ao Tse- tun 1"" , e ping W it 1 the

ti 1 g on tI e policv of it dJO lla an li-Japanese front", Th e ' ' . a uru e na-sloga ns r f'la tl'n cr to ant' J d ISC. U5510n of th e two

c 0 ,1- apanese ' t 'turu, which wa s amicahly se tt l ! .um ? III art and li teI'H-Mao Tse-tun « n ow r esen t e( lll. t te ~ 11111 111er of 1floG,vocates ' f o"b P : s as a (hscu ss lOn between "d-

. " <; " 0 a our geois ,;loga" I "gan", and as a stru Ie - bet~vn al~~ a "prol ~t a:ian slo­oppo r tun is t lin e ill gargt and I.ete n t W~ng Mlll g s ri ght-

, . c , I era ure : a I " :\1 Ttung 5 r evolu tionar y l ine ill art a nd l ' t .' lI

t( :, ao so-

1'1 Iar , . , I era ureY ie acts, which are also known to M 0 : . Cl

ang and Lu Hsun ea ch ba sed ht sr a , aro: IOUdocu m ents of the CC crc b I IS sl oo~n on one of twoby ,.\ Va ng Mi n z: the 1 , ot I of which w ero \\Til ten

nmlatod by W~~Ig l\Ii~~~~:t ~~~J~ ~:l~aIn wr.~'() a lso fo~-tate to pr esen t the "1 9 S t b A ,.e tung clId not h esl ­('on ta ins th e "logan of a

e pe~ er

lpp ea l of "193 1, w hi ch

" < na IOna revolu tio nary wa r , as

':' Thl' se .voles of Chiang Chin d~aYlllg ,t1wL th l'y were thr ice correc~d b a letter by Lin PiaoIn t.he Journ al H lln.g ch i .'\u , 9, 1967. Y Mao Tsc-tun g. appeared

?,'1 '

his own correct line, and the August Fir~t Appe~I of1935 and it s slogan of a government of national defe.lIceas the "right-opportunist" line and slogan of Wang Ming.Could anything be more ridicul ous? . ,

It is quite clear that by means of this sl el ght-o ~- ltand

Mao intends not only to elevate himself and dellve,r ablow at Wang Ming, but also to portray the revolutl~Il­ary writers and artists of the thirties insid e and ()l1ts)(~ethe P ar ty as opponents of Lu Hsu u's and Mao Tsc-tung s

, • • 0 . " d 0 f 11 of " \Vang" li Lerary-a r tIs tIc line an as o. o~ver~ " 0 •

Ming's ri ght-opportunist literary-artistic hne , -and thi sin order to line them u p for brutal persecution . ' 0 1

The greatest insult to L~ HS.llll is l\luo 's hypoCr,J~lCa, of the zr cat writer III Iu s On N ew D emocra cij ,

pr al s.e . l:> 1 , H.)!10 Here Mao r ais ed Lu HSUll toPUh~,IShT~~o~e ~~i~ht' ; t~ use the latter 's words in refe,r­:~ce a~o " the specious' praise of Con~llcius by those III

1 , M osthumously pr oclaim ed Lu Hsun aaut iority. ao P f "1\'1 T .o-tunz's literary-" Mao ist" and an exponent 0 i V. ao " S H <> M inartistic thoughts", By so " el e~~tlllg , Lu SY:l'm a~On~tfact elevated h im self , Bu t Icaring s: ,peop'

d. Hsui

, " 1' Mao mudo Lu sun s WI ow,f~ll for .hls tric ~~t the meeting on th e 30th ann~versuryh .uang-pllllf; s~r dea th that " th o all-conqueri ng Ide~s, ofof her hus an s 1 ea dy then the supreme gUldmgM~o ,Tlse-t~ng rereH:u~ and all r evolu tionary literarypnnci p es or u T se tun was th o reddest of theand art workers .., Mao s - H g " d so forth. Yet, asr ed suns in the heart of Lu Isun 'fanM Tse tung" did

1 "th ig Its 0 ao -ev eryb?dy. knowsiI ~ Ie, l'f~~ime and i t would not havenot ex is t III LIl SUIll S It 0ln'pUl'C Ma o with the sun .

. d to anyon e t len 0 c < , , 1 .OCCUfJe J 1974 Jenminj ihpao carried an ac vel -

On 11 anuary . diti n of the complete worksti sem ent of a ni'~'1 revlfJ~ '~T~I~o mistakes made in com­of Lu Hsun, w llC I sa ' . IS edl'tl'on have been cor rec t-

'I' and diting the previot ' ,pi mg <In e I di tion ." The meaning is clear: Mao sed in th e present e I 1O~ . ffect that Lu Hsun's worksm outhpiece a~nounced, If :alsifl'ed to su it th e presenthav e been distor ted an , zrou 1 Everybody

d f Mao's coun ter- revolut IOnary '=' I , 0 hlinee sa·· M' is a ast master at gar mgknows, after all" that, ~o 1 the Pworks of other people,and doctoring lu~ ow ~ a nn . I it L Hs un's name in

~\'I Tse-tung is trying to exp 01 u . hi1 ao '; d L Hsun 's works as too ls III us

his own interests an u • 1 1 of0' ' Ve Ch inese Communists and t 10 peop eIntrlgup,s.

n oo

China must save Lu Hsun and his works from th e diu.bolic clutch es of Mao Tse-tung.

To save r evolutionary Lu Hsun from th e bl oodstainedhands of counte r- re volution ary Mao Tse-tung is als o thedu ty of all the true admirers of the gre at writer . Onthe on e hand, we must expose the wily devices of MaoTse-tung, who abuses th e name and works of Lu Hsun:on the other, we must ac quaint people with the true L~Hsun, the revolutionary writer. \Ve must help th e massof th e people to understand th at Lu Hsun's main distinc­tion, whi~h earned him fame as a revolutionary writer,wa s that in tho late twen ties and early thir ties he optedonce and for all for fri endship and cooperation with theCommunist Party of China and with the Soviet Union .He fought by their side, defended th eir interests , andattack ed their enemios wit h his sharp pen. And inasmuchas Mao has becom e an enemy of th e CPC , he is also anenemy of Lu Hsu n, and for this reason is trying to con­ceal the truly remarkable accomplishments of the gre atwriter.

Lu Hsun fought shoulder to sho ulder with the Com­munist Party of Chi na against th e an ti-commu nis t abom­inations and "extermina tion ca m paigns" of the im pe­rialists and of Chiang Kai -sh ek. He support ed th e CP Cpolicy of a united national an t i-J ap anese front th at wa sbeing organ ised for an anti-Japanese na tional revolution­ary war, In 1933, in a foreword to the Complete W orh'sof Li Ta-cha o, Lu Hsun referred to Li 'Fa-chao's civicfuneral organise d by th e people of P eiping ,;- in the fol­lowing terms: " I t was an entirely ju stified ceremony. "Of Li Ta-chao's literary legacy he said that it would"live ete rnally, hecause it is a brill iant monume nt tothe h istory of the revolution". In 1936, paying tribu te totha m em ory of Tsyui Tsyu-po, Lu Hsun pu blis hed a two ­volum e collec tion of Tsyui Tsyu-pos translations. writ­ing a for ewor d for eac h volu m e and paying homag e tohis comrade ,

But wh at did we see lat er ? Mao used armed force tocrus h the Comm unist P arty of China . H e massacredcoun tless Comm uni st s, He cons igne d the works of LiTa-chao and Tsyui Tsyu-po to the flam es. He dug upand desecrated the graves of the two revo lutionaries.

* Peking was then known as Peiplng,

?Sll

Th eil' r elatives -e-Li Ta-chao's son Li P ao-hua, a nd TsyuiTs vu -po's wido w Yang Chih-hua -have been brutallym altrea ted. If Lu Hsun h ad heen alive today , h e wouldsurely ha ve sai d to Mao: You ha ve commit te d more vil­lainies th an Chiang Kai -shek and all the know n nationalt raitors com bi ned; even they had not managed to re­press so m any Communists ; even th ey h ad no t dared tod esecrate th e graves of Li Ta-cha o and T syui Tsyu-po.\Vhat yo u h ave don e is an in sult to elementary Ch in esem oralit y.

Lu Hs un jo ined ba ttle aga in s t th e irn per ialist warmon­ge rs. H e angrily exposed imperialist slande r against theSo vie t Union . IIl an article, Never Again S hall W e B eDeceived, wh ich appeare d in HI:)2, h e wro te: " T he im pe­rl al is ts want to make war on th e ussa. T h e more suc ­ce ss fully th ings go with the USS R, the grea ter the ir wi shto at tu ck and th e mor e S II rel y they h ead fo r a fall. " T oexplai n why Im perialist s slande r th e S~:iet Union ~ndarc poi sed to al. l nck it , Ln Hsun wrot e :. ~hey are g Ol1l g'

t o seed. They ca n barel y k eep on th eir fee t. Th ey aretrying to save th em selves, and hate th e progress .of theSoviet Uniou. Neithe r slu uders, nor curses, n or invoca­ti ons, nor venomous h at red can h el p th em. The on lythin g th ey ca n do is to prep are fo r a n ar rr,l ~d ,~ IJacl~ .Th ov will not rest until th ey crush the USS R. ThiswOll'lel a lso he a tr ue descr-ipti on of Mao's a tt it ude to th eSoviet U n ion if we added "and Mao T se-t u ng after thew ord " im perial ists" 0 1' s ubs tit uted " Mao T se-tuug" 1'01'

" im per ial is ts" . In the same ar ticle Lu Hsun exp lainedwha t the attitude of th e Chin ese people sh ould h e to­ward s a war against t he USSR. H e wrot e : II f f the me­ni al s of imper ia li sm wi sh to go to war, let them followtheir masters . W et the people, h ave ent iro ly di ffer ent in­t erests than theirs . We are against attacking the USSR.On the contrary , we wa n t to ov er th ro w a nd dest roy t hed em on who wants to attack the uss n, no matter howh on eyed hi s speech or how n obl e th e mask behind ,,:h it~~he hid es. This and only this is our .road to. salva tion .

Mao Tso-tu ng has become a men ial of Im pel'l all sm.H e is itc hing to attack the USSR. Y et th e tho ugh ts oft.he Chinese people on this sco re are the same as LIlH su n's : "overth row and des troy the demon who wa nts1<.1 attack t he USSR " bccuuse " Lh is and only this is ourroiul to salvat ion" .

260

The Ch in ese Communists have always treated LnH sun and hi s works with lov ing care aild conc ern. i n193~ the CC CPC trusted L u II sun with th e ol fico of~~l ~lI'Ill a ll of th e Lea~ue of Left -Wing W riters. From July.1.J .J ~ to J a nu ary 1D.i 4., Tsyui Tsyu-po, who had a so l­l.d lit erury backgro un d ~nd much experience, hel ped o i­l e~t the Leagu e on the instructions of the Central Com­millee: In HJ:14 h e was se n t to the Sovie t area s of Chi­n a. J0ll111~: with th e CP~ gro u p in th e League, h e helpedL~, Hsun. III m att ers of Ideology an d politics , a nd also inIu s practical work. In th e la te s prin g and ea rlv summerof HI3/j, on learning fr om Ern i Siao t ha t Lu IIsun wa sgra vel y ill, I asked Georgi Dirnitrov to invite h im tot.'w Sovie t Union for treatment. \Ve sent Pan Ha n-ni cnfr on.1 Moscow to Shanghai to arrange for Lu Il sun and hisfamily to come to the Soviet Union. Pan Han-m en madea ll th e a rrangemen ts hu t un For tunat ely Lu II suns h ealthhad deteri orated and h e was unable to m ake th e lonzjourney . W h en he died on 2.1 October 1931i, I wrot~an obi tu ar y in the nam e of th e Communist P art y ofChina, "Sad Loss of t he Ch inese Pe op le". for th e ta«.k uosh ipuo, a weekly appearing in P ari s. ':. And at apublic meeting in Chungking on 19 Oct ob er 1939, Ispoke on be!la lf of 1I.~ : CC CPC on til e :lr d anniv ersaryof Lu Hsu n s death.r" I referred to Lu Hsun and hisw orks in gl owin g terms. ca ll ing on writ er s a nd artists,a nd on youth , to learn fr om Lu H sun an d hi s wor ks thespirit of rev olutionary s truggle, and to redouble thei rcontr ib u tion to th e r esi st ance to Ja panese aggress ion.

There is nothin g in common betw een tile a t titudesto wards Lu H sun of the Chinese Com munists and ofMa o Tse-tun g. For us Lu Hsu n is a comrade -in -an us andhi s works n ot on ly a pr eciou s literary legacy. hut alsoH wea pon furthering the rev olutionary ca us e. Ma o, (I ll

the other hand, us es LIl Hsun's name and works to dis­gui se h is coun ter-revo lu tio nary trick s. He " ido li zes " LuHsu n. m aking him an object of bli nd worship. l lo al so" idolizes" th e works of Lu JIsun, trying to turn th emillto dogm a for se nseless exe rc ise. H e does this in ord er

.;. A Chinese-language weekly published in Paris by the CPCdele gati on to th e Com intern with the help of th e Cominternleadersh ip. Wang ~[jn g was it s editor-in-chief.. I,,,· Th e full text of this speech appeared a ll th e Ioll owinc day111 th e Hs inh ua j thpao, appe aring in Chungking. .,

') ' I

to be ab le to use, distort, an d fal sif y Lu Hsun 's sayingsand views, and to ' prevent anybody fro m eve r daring toquestion anyth ing.

This is why it is so vital for Ch ina today to under­stand Lu Hsun, We must sq uash the vile intrigues ofMao Tse-tung, who tries to use Lu Hsun and his works;for reaction ary ends by "idolizing" him. We must see­to it. that every time Mao exploits the nam e of L11 Hsunto di sguise his own reactionary visage people sho uldbe abl e clearly to distinguish truth from untruth andsee where Mao ab uses, dist orts , and fal sifies the greatwrite r.

Mao 's treatment of Lu I-Isun on ly shows that Mao isan inveterate pragmatist and an exponent of sub ject iveidealism, the most reactionary of all philosophicalsch ools.

q) " Criticis m of Lin Piao and Confuciu s"and th e fate of the " Ione desp ot"

We have already shown that Mao praises Chin ShihH uang in order to praise himself, that he berates Con­fucius in order to vindicate persecutions, and that heabu ses Lu Hsun's name for hi s own reactionary ends.Not only is this a part of th e pre sent ruthless " criticismof Lin P iao and rectification of s tyle" campaign, but al­so a preparatory measu re for a second "cu ltu ral revolu­tiou", The idea that "cul tural revoluti ons will have tobe carried out many times in the future" has been of­ficially recorded in the " par ty constitution" adopted bythe Maoist 10th Congress. The re por t to Congress onthis "cons tituti on" said that carrying out " cultural re vo­lutions" every seven or eight years is "an objective lawas revealed by Chairman Mao". The " docum ents of theIOth Congress" and the joint New Year 's edi Lorial ofthe "Maoist three newspapers and one journal" sai d:" Th ere is great di sorder in the whole of the earth", "adeluge is ab out to break out in the mountains" and"ga les are blowing through th e house" . Yes, gales havealready begun to - ra ge in P eki ng, Nankin g, and othe rChin ese cities .

On 12 J anuary '1974 the Jenminj ihpao anno unce d onits Iront pa ge: "T he letter and extrac ts fr om the diaryof Huang Shuai, the red guard girl from School No. J ofth e P eking su burb of Chungkuangchun, and an after-

~ (i2

:~ol'(l of the edito rs, which were publish ed in Jenmin­[ihpao and Pefch ingj ihpao, have arou sed deep feelingamong t~l e pup~ls and teachers of secondary ' and primaryschoo ls 11l P.ekIng; and also amo ng the public a t large;tJ~ ey have given Impetus to the unfolding cr it icism ofI~lJl .P lao and ~h~ .rect ifica tion of s tyle, cri t ic ism of revi ­s .ornsm, and crt tici sm of the bOllrgeois wor ld ou tlook' fu rthermore, they have h elped to promote the rcvoluLi~n Inth e ed uca tional field. "

It Was clear to one and all tha t th e so-ca lle d letterand ex trac ts from th e diary of Hu ang S huai, in whichs he com pla in ed of being ill -treated by her teacher , wer e.a. ~ta~e-n~~~aged Jllo~ to in cite a cam pa ign a ga in st " re­VlsIOl1lSIIl III education. The paper a tt acked such "ana ­chronism" as " the incontestable authori ty of the teach­er", "elI~pIH~sis ,~n m.ental edu cation " , and "the syste mof exam inat ions . ThIS was mea nt to lead to th e foll ow­ing conclusi on: th e qu estion s raised by Huang Shua iare not qu estions concerning an individual a schoo l orthe rela ti onship between teacher and pup'il ; th ey (;on­c er n the struggle between tw o classes, two lines, a nd"the struggle against revision ism and for Lhe preven tio nof revisi onism" .

The Jenminj ihpao anno unce me nt was reminiscent ofMao's manoeu vres prior to launching the Iirst "cul turalrevolution " : they di ffered only in lh~ par ticulars. I t w a snatural to expect, therefore, that h e would soon shifthis attack from secondary an d pr imary schools to thelligher schools, and then from the educa tiona l field toParty, gov ernment an d mili tary organs as a pre text for's teppin g up th e "criticism of Lin Pi ao and rect ification-of style" and starting a second "cultu ra l r evolution ".

As expec ted, on 18 Januar y th e l enminjih pao publishedon its front page the "Application for Relea se fromStudy" of one Ch un g Chih-ming, a Nanking Unive rs ity.studcn t, son of an old military cadre , wi th editorial com­m ents. This served no tice that th e "struggle betw eentwo cla sses and two lines" , th e " struggle a ga ins t r evi­sionism and for the prevention of revisionism " , and thelike, would spread from higher schools to the army, Par­ty, gov ernmen t, and other areas. Clearly, a second "cul­tural revolution" was immin ent.

The mudslinging in Mao's anti-Sovi et pro pa gand a has<of late been accompanied by suc h infla mm aLory anti-

263

Soviet acts as the arrest and maltreatment of Soviet d~p­lomats and me rn beT'S of their famili es hy P eking securi tyagen cies. Orde rs had corne fr om " h ig h up" , and worked

as As si~~~a:~ted, on 2 F ebruary 197!l the Jell rn inj ih~a?ca rried an edito rial, "C arry Out to th e E nd ~he Cri t i­cism of Lin Piao and Confucius". Judging hy lt ~ gro ss­ness and tone of au thority it must hav e been wl'1 ~ten orr evised by Mao himself. In effect, i t was t~1C ,?ffiC.IDI a n­nouncem cnt of a second "cu lturul r evolul1? n " with theslogan of "c r-it icls iug Lin. Pi ao a,nd Confucius , and. onemor e of Mao' s declara tIOns of war on the ChineseCommuni st s and t.h e people of China. "' In its ~p'~ni ng passag e the edito r ial declared Ll~ a ~ ,o. ~~

th e personal init ia tive a nd und er the per son al g~lld an~ eof Ma~ Tse-tu ng "a mass pol itical ,s truggle I S b,eu~f

1 I . I ' , 11 fi'elds to cri t ic ise Lin PIao and Confucius .a unc leI 111 a ' . " I Ilow fAbus e wa s hea ped on Lin Pi~o for b,~mg a 0 ower 0

Confucius to th e marrow of Ins b(~lI e s . ')','1'0 "s ubstan tiate" the con ne ct ion between Lin Piao

. ', . C f' . , rin g k eand Con fu cius, the editor ial ci ted on ucm.s Sa\1ll ,isi fu li (se lf-impro vemen t in accordunce with e ti que t te }t ~L "sh ow" tha t Confucius wanted " to res to re the sl av~-

. sv s te in " and Lin Pi ao wanted " to rest or e capi-ownIng.. c I . ,' ,t Iism 'j'he whol e thinz is a crude and c uuisy I11S111 Ucl-

tfo~ Tile Maoist politi~al r eport. t o the 10th ~on~resssho,~'s clearly that it is none other th~n Mao se-tu ll

tg

. di ', 1' I and III fact wan ts 0who oppose s buil ing SOCIa isn (, k 'f hi s l ', I t L· ck th e clock 0 11:-> ory .rest or e ca pit al ism ant urn uc . . . t to

Thereullon the ar ticle en umerated sevefn C 1Jof~nC~lI S "P · "foll ow er 0 on u ,1 '. ."1T'OVe" that Li n iao was a .' I

I I ~I I d et out to cr i ticis e Lin Pino amInasmuc 1 as 1, ao la s . P ' . . . ' IConfucius togeth er and to IPro~,e ~h=st ~~;nCOI:r\~C~u~\ O:~l~

I I d we re based on t ie savin g ' Ia ile c ee s . 1 f I gic l et alo ne th e scientifiC m eth ? l ,elementary I U es 0 0 , , ' . f Confuc msr equired him to cite th e rcle\'~nt saym~~ 0 , f ' . to

, 'I even points WIth a precise re erence .Oil each of l l el sl nzside give th e re levant wO I'(I s or dee dsthe source, an r a 0 '" . 'I . thefT' P iao also with corro boraLmg evir once, on .

a ..1ll c , c. ' \ S This would h ave enabl ed th e reade rsamle se ven P~I~~s~'ns and a rrive a t th e du e conclu sion s.to c raw compall . " . 1 M . ly one of

. Y ct in the se ve n " proofs giv en ) ':1 I ao, on . t his. 1 1 C Iu cius and eve n IlS

t.he .ph ruses ,,:a5 spo { e~ ? h ~il sho w 'b~low. 'i' h e "qu o-phrase Mao mi squot ed , as S a

tations" in the oth er six points w er e no t fro m Confucius .This is why Mao does not provide any pre cise da ta asto wher e and what Confucius said, and tries to m isl eadpeopl e with offhand " refer enc es" , su ch as " Confuc iusand Mellg-tsu main tained ", "C on lu cius awl l\leng­tsu preached ", and " t he followers of Confucius and Menc-tsu " said or did.; <>

One can only wond er how Mcug-t su, WIIO was bor n107 ye ars a ft er Confuc i us ' dea th, could "maintain " or" preach" together with Confucius. As 1'01' I he " followersof Confucius and Mcn g-t su" , there wer e cou ntl ess n um­bers of the m in the past 2.500 years. and it. would belegi tima te to ask wh ich of th em Ma o had in mind.Thou gh. a ll th e same, whoever they may be, th ey ca nnotspeak for Confu ciu s him self.

Th e el em entary demand s of scie nti fi c logic -e- to be oh­jcct ivc a nd specifll:- rcqui re th at on ly wo rd s spoken byConfuc iu s him self sho uld be r ef CITed to Confucius. N ei­th er th ose of :\[png-t sll nor th ose of any oth er foll owerof Conf ucius CHII be legit ima tely ascribed to Con fucius .F ollowing the rleuth of Confuci us the 1II 0l'e than 70 ofhi s best disciples broke IIp int o se ve ral gro u ps, eac h ofwhich had its own int erprel ation s for muny of Confu­cius' sayings. In shor t, Confucius and Merig-t su s ho uldno t be heaped together . Th e Iat l ers words should o n 110

account be ascr ib ed to th e former. Be si d es, ou t of th eSeven " proofs" put forward by Ma o on ly one and a ha lfsente nces reall v belong to ;\[eng-tsu and . fu rt hcrruore,th eir int erpret at ion is highl ~' dubiou s ,

In th e first part of ea ch of t he seven poin ts Mao fab­ricated sayings, ascr ibe d th em to Con f ucius, and inter­preted (h em to s uit hi s ends. In the second pa rt of eachpoint he falsifi ed Lin I 'i ao's words and al so guve themhi s own interpret ation. It is clear a t the vory first gla ncet hat th e wh ole th ing was an in venti on to prom ote" crit icism of Lin Piao and Confucius ". One canno t helpno ting. moreover. t ha t i II SOllie of h is references to LinP ial' . Mao unconsciousl y admitted that in the matt er a thand Lin Pia a opposed hi s opin ion .

Now let us cons ider each of Mao's se ven fabricated,points. .

Point On e. Mao maintains that Conf uci us an d Me ng­tsu pr each ed " knowledge from birth". T h ere is a varie tyof r ecor ds on thi s sc or e in the Analects, bu t in so fa r as

Confucius is concerned, he said tho very opposite. Takethe Analects, 8; "Shu Erh", 7. There it says in so manywords :

" Confuc ius said: ' I am n ot one who possesses knowl­edge from hirth, but one who acquired it throu gh lilylov e of an tiq ui ty and diligen ce in learning'. "

Ma o also sa ys, " Confuc ius and Mcng-tsu adver tised:'If vou want to govern the stale with success, then whoelse' bu t m e is there among th e contempora ries capableof doing it' ?" Confucius nev er said nnything of the sor t.Besides' this se n te nce by Men g-tsu is in complete. Befor elIe utte red the above, he said : " Heaven did not wishthe sta te to be gov erned with suc?,ess", and the:eupo.nhe said: " ' Vhy am I downh ear'l ed ? Mcn g-tsu s a ~ d t ~llSas h e wa s leaving th e slate of Chi, where his apphcatlOnfor an official post had been turned down. A m an by th ename of Ch ung Yu, whom h e met on the way, had askedhim why he look ed so sad. Uttered in rep~y La ChungYu, Mong-tsu 's words connoted sel~-consolaLlOn and,, ~01~­fidence, but not that h e tntan ded going anywhere to ,., ( ~' ­ern th e state with success", let al on e se ize pow er . YetMao ju ggles words that he ascribes to Confucius, anddistorts th e m eaning of the words spoke n by ~~eng-tsuto accuse Lin Piao of expounding a "theory of iutellec­tual genius" and call in g hims elf "extr.a-noblo ' ''. and. tl~elike. Mor e, h e porlrays this tWls~~d l ine as ~m _~ l.ao s" anti -pa r ty theoretical programme and brandl.sl.l c ~ It asproof of a "cons piracy to usurp the party and ~e l z.e pow­er, and an atte m pt at Imposlng hi s person al d~ clator~sh ip" . T his is Lruly a case of lying without a t"'Illg~ ofconscienc e. The fa cts show that the man wh o thinkshimself a " gen iu s", " gre at", "exceptional" and. "su per­human", who invente d an "anti-par ty th eor eti cal pro ­gram me ", who h at ch ed " a conspiracy to usurp th e p.artyand se ize powe r" , and who imposed hi s per~onal dicta­torship. is non e other than Mao T se-tung ,~llmsel~.

Po int T wo. Th e se n tenc e Mao qu oterl , the hi gh es twi sdom and th e low est folly cannot ch ange into on e ano th­er ," w as, indeed, spoke n by Confucius. But Ma o eitherm isunderst ood or deliberately garble d its m eaning. Ac­cording to a note by Kun g An-kuo to "Yang R o" in theAnalects, it means: "T he h ighest wi sdom cannot he madeto b reed evil any mo re than the lowest foll y can beforced to becom e virtuous." T he sen tence was spok en by

CO~:~fll: i llS to exp la in wh y he did not wan t to meet ta­fU . 1.aug H~, What he" n~eant is that Yang Ho ca nnotfOI co Confucius of the highest wisdom" to h ttc ' I I I e a par yrIo evi c p-ec"s any m or e .,than Confu cius can m ak e Yang. of the lowes t fully to becom e virtuous under theJllj]uence of othe rs . K ung A n-k uos nol l' is unqucsf ioua hl r

correct, hec~lIse h e as sociated the saying wi th th« S C I I S~of the OPCllJ~g words of the tal e: " Ya ng- Ho wish ed to~eet .~onfuclll s, bu t Con fuc ius did IlI)t wa n t to ~ cehim." ...... . -

.Yet Mao descrtbed th e phrase as an " ide alis tic viewol} he l.a l ~ a bou t tI.le lu zhest wisd om and th e lowest fo l­ly • claiming th a t It expre ssed con tem pt for toil er s. Thisshows that the row of ancient books 0 11 Maos boo k­sh ~ l !,*" :' ~ s no more than a di spl ay of spurious "scho lar­ship des igned to dec eive workers, peasants, so ldie rs . andth e you~ h. Eit her he has not se r ious ly read the first ofth e an.cIent books, the Analects, or has fa il ed to und er­s tand It.

Poin t Thr ee. ~lao m ai nt ains : " Confu cius and Mcng­tsu pr each ed Jll or~:ity, humanity, ho nesty, loyal ty andconc ern fo r others . All these a re distinct e th ical con­cepts, not Con fu cius' sayin gs . Yet Mao uses hi s conten­tion to " prove" tha t Lin P iao "opposed rcvolutiouarv fo rceand opposed dic ta tor ship of the proletariat" . Hcfhere­by. unwittingl)~ admitted that Lin Piao opposed the bru­tality of Mao s counter-revolutionarv " cultura I revo lu­tion" and Mao's reactionary on e-m an military-te rro r is tcli cla~orship over Communists and work ing peop le .

Point Four. Mao says that Confucius and Menz-tsu" propagated' the chungyung principle. ,:.,:.,:. ::. As we k~lOW,

T'ahsu eli (Groat Learning) and Chunginuig (Doc trine ofthe Mean ) wer e pa rts of Li Chi (Record of Rites ) . Inthe S ung dynasty , Chen Hao and Ch ell Yi describe dTa~sll~h. fr om th e Record of R ites as the " legacy of Con­fUCIU S in order to combat Buddhism an d Lao Tse. Lat­P.I', Chu Hs i incorpora ted Chungyung fr om the R ecordof R ites with th e Analects, MencillS and the Doctrine of

., Tal l/- ancient titl e of a feu dal cour tie r..,.•,. For de tails see A.nalects, 20; ..Yang TI o". 1T,

';""" Judgi ng fI:om rec en t photogr aph s in the Jell III tn i iltpao,Mao I'CC C1Ves for eign guests against the background of book­she~~~~ and a desk piled high with ancie nt book s.

-f".,., Cllllngyung-the gold en mean .

the Mean to cO~llpilc The Four B ooks. Thereafter peo­ple ~le~an reIc~Tlllg to t he chungyung prin cip le as 'h eingConfucian. Neither Confucius nor Mcn g-tsu ever propa­gated any chungijung principle .

The " . t" 1- . 1,, '" arg.umen : icre is la sed on Confucius' phrase:• S ITlCC anc ie n t times , ch. un guun g as the perfect v ir tueIS ver y rarely ob ser ved by peopl e." ':. This was cer tain lyno apI~ea l for peopl e to observe ch ungijung, On the con­Lrary, ~ t WH S H stat em ent of fnet: people ver y rarely acte da; l'ordmg to chu ng ij ung 0 1' had com ple tely abandone d it.)' e l M a o names c]lll ngYlln g as Ih e re nsun wh y Lin P iaoevidently opposed hi s conduc t in " t he struggle againstr evi sioni sm" for being "excessively extre me" . H er e Maounwillingly admits Lhat in some thi n gs Lin Pi ao dis ­a greed with his candid ly pro-imperi ali st and rab id ly reac­tionary a nti-Sovie t for ei gn policy .

i 'oin t Fi ve. Mao maintains that " Confuc ius and Meng­tsu pr each ed a philosophy of life that amo unte d to 'sw al ­lowing ins ults Ior th e sake of success''' . Neither Con fu­cius nor Mcng-tsu ever preach ed any suc h ph ilosophica lconcept. To " pro ve" that Lin Pi ao foll owed thi s " phi los­ophy", Mao Inbri cat ed the stor y of h is borrowing LWolines of ver se fr om the popular classic novel. Th e rT hreeKingdoms: "Com pelled for lile t ime being to dw ell inth e den of the tiger" and " dlsc ro tion a nd a quick wi L­th ose a rc t he miracles one ca n tru st. " 'l'herebv Ma o ad­mit ted t ha t as clo se a n in timat e of hi s liS Lin 'Piao, whohad constantly been by hi s side, felt th at " to be in thecompa ny of t he monarch was like being with a tiger" ,and that. for this reason , he had had to net up to Mao,r-olvinz on " discr etion and a qu ick wit" lest th is fl'ro­cio'us t iger devoured h im. If thi s wa s the case with LinP iao, then what could be sa id of the oth er s '?

Poin t Six . Mao m aintains th aL " Conf uci us and Meug­t su pr each ed : 'T he ment al worker governs peo ple, them anual worker is governed by peopl e' . " These wordsbelon g to Men g-t su, not Con Iuoiu s.

H ere Mao tri es to find th e reason wh y Lin Piao opposedth e May Seven th Cad re Sc hoo ls for bein g " a vari ety ofconcen tra t ion cam p", " han ish me ut of cadres to the lowerdep th s for m anual l nb ou r", "a vari ety of unem ploy­ment" , "banishment or youth to mountains and vi llages

' f A na lects, 7; "Yun Yi", 6,

for re-edu ca t ion by forced la bour" I .Ma o also uIlwi ttingl v admits th a ' a~( t~e like, Ther eb yperseeution of c a (h;e ~ and tl L t Lin PIaO opposed th eyo uth-whi ch are i;ld'eerl 1 ~ Ll'allSrorta tioll of educa te dby cver vb odv ' , cr imes l rat made Mao ha te d

) . ' ..I oint Seven. Mao main ta i ns tl " J '

Con fuci us and Men g Isu J I·LI ra t I ie follo wers of' I . • -.. a io IS led one 1 Ir d~11l( wOI's ill PIWd onlv Coufuoinm " U lun~ re schools;ng to do w it h Confuci us hill;;~I~mT'h e I.l.\/Jy.~. has vo t h­

iundrsd schools and worship of C· f ',')O I IOn a one11

' . ' on Hems 0 I " I,Ie Ii mes 01 E mperor I lun "r T ' Y n y date to

en Conf uciu<; '" J ' " , lJ " I. e t u n dru- P oi n l :::;I..y-, - I , C largc( WIth th e manlier of T • •

mon t passed down before his deat h bv Cho ,' \T gO' PI li­to \\ 'u-\Van " An 0 I • U en - wa n gtation l ':. g .. 1 tragcous sample of mi srepresen -

As we see, Mao re sor ts here to till I . .more ill it era ta '111 (1 -uu ba s I c umsier. s t ill

n , , I mor e razen f · lsif t.i~1,lO S C fabr i,ca ted by him t h ree yea'rs b;~(~I~C C~I 'l O~ ,LI ,~mcu l led OUtJlIlP. of P roject " 571 " . , lJl ic so-

~l{~o Tse-tuug, a past mas ter a t sla nde r ing a nd lvinhas, Ind eed, r each ed to th e bottom of tho t I y in g'Tl C· . lC!. l're .

,Ie on f,uc lUs . who is heing cr it icised bv Mao is~Iao sown invention . and cer tainly not the r~ al C f~l1ls . A nd the Li.n P iao who is being cr it icised b;o~I (~~IS a!so cO IlIlter.fe l ~e d, an d not the rea l Lin P ia o. h fol-l o:v~ .thaL Mao S in te n t ion to "CIIl'l'Y out to tl I 1cr i tic f L ' Pl Ie one t ill. .icism O I,n HIO and Confuc ius" is an intent ion to~.O:l~!) :~t the ,LIll P iuo and Confu ciu s Mao had h i mscl fa 1I. l c al~ed . Could there be an ything funnier a nr l 111M'"

cy u lca r ' Y

Ma ? ~lisp,layed "pers~naI iu it iut ivc ' and is "pcrsouul­ly g,UJ(~lIl ~, .t he e~lIlpalgn of "cri ticising Lin P ian andConfuciu s , III :vlli ch ele mentary respect. justice and de­ccnc~ an: conspicuous by their absence, and this not on lyto di sgu is e the true con te nt of the pol iti cal clash be­tw een Mao aIH' Lin Pi ao, but also to be ab Ie to use thela bels "Conf ucianist" and " followe r of Li n Piao" to per­sec ute peopl e in the second "cultura l rev olu tion " . I n the"second cultural revolution" Mao in tends to get rid ofthose wh o are obs tructi ng th e ex treme reacttonarv hom eand for ei gn poli cy of the LOth Congress, tha t is, t hose

". Chou Wen-wan died in t 135 B. C.; Confuc ius was born in531 B. C.

who .he thinks are obstructing th e per petuation of hi sreacti on ary rul e, h is intention to leav e his "throne" toCh~ang Ching and create a " fam ily empire", the prepa­r ation s for war agains t the USSR and inc ite ment of anew world war , and h is coll us ion with ex treme react ion­a ry imperi ali st groupings . For th e imperi ali sts and fortraitor Mao T se-tung, all Marxists-Leninists and expo­nents of pr olet ari an internati on ali sm, all anti-imperial­isLs and fr iends of soc ia lis m, a ll revol u lionaries and vet ­erans of revolut ionary wars, all peopl e who distinguis hbetw een fri end and foe and wh o possess kn ow ledg e anda revolutionary outlook, all intellectuals and pr ogressiveyo u th - all t hese are mortal enern ies "subjec t to sup pres­sion",

Th is is w hy Mao's edi tor ial portrayed his " cri t icismof Li n P iao and Confucius" as a "ser ious class struggle"and a " radical revolu ti on in the field of ideology". There­up on, he threatened: "activeness or passiven ess is th et est of every lead er in so colossally important a matteras the cr iti cism of Lin Piao and Confuciu s" , adding that" only with struggle ca n we advance; withou t s truggleth ere can be on ly retreat, without str uggle there ca n heonly di slocation , without struggle th er e can he on ly re ­visi oni sm", Then he demanded: " Le aders a t all level smus t he in the forefront of th e s tru ggle; they must re­gard the critici sm of Lin Piao and Confucius as a m at­ter of paramo unt importance, a nrl give it t he ir para-mou nt attention ."

At th e end of the articl e Ma o issued this stri ct in s truc-ti on : revolu ti onary cadres and th e rewlilltion ary intelli­z en tsia mu st tak e an active part in th is struggle . and~rork diligently to re mould their worl d outlook. T hosein tellectua'ls who are " re lative ly strongly contami natedwith Coulucius and Meng-tsu mu st eng age in se lf-ed uca tion" .

Thi s amounts to an u ltimatum for " every lead er"," leaders at all levels", "revoluti0l111ry cadres and the rev­olu tionarv inLelligentsia", and " those in tell ectuals whoarc rel ativelv stro ngly contaminate d with Conf uc ius and

,,' dO" " " t ld" to "be in theMcnz-tsu ' to stan tests , 0 rcmouic' , 1'" I " 0. " . If d[orehont of t he str u g g e ,an to engage III se -e uca-

lion", T hos e who have li ved throu gh t he "sty le rectifica­ti on campaign" and the "cultural r evolution " k now that ,s poken by Mao Tse-tung , the words " te sts", " be in th e

forefron t of the struggle" " re mo uld " and " .il f 0. . ., ' ,engage III~e -e ucat ion , mean that th ov are beinc declared s bJect to d . . • '" c , lI-. enuncia tion , persecution. imprisonment Ilozg mg, t~r~u re , banishment,. and death, T hese words' mea"'~~hat ?1Jlhon s of Communists, revolu tionary worker s theInt~~hgents ia and yo uth ,. must prepare th emselves' formora l torment and physical suffering "bitt tear I11 d" d ' er em s anr) 00 : an . that many of them will die .

• l\~ 11 0 s eth tor.ia l s~ id: "The broad mass of workers. pea s­~ l.l ts a.nd soldi ers IS ~he" main force in the cr iticism of" ~ ~ Pl ao and ~~n~uclU~ , adding that they "know best

of all how to crrticise Lin Piao and Con fuc ius" 1'1' ·" . I I "1 " lIS wass alt recause I ' ao kn ows that the vast m ajorl tv (If work-e rs, peasants and so ldiers haw little or no knowledzeof Confuci us and hi s teaching. So , those of them who doMa o's bid ding ca n berate none but the Confuci us Iabri­ca~ed. by M~o and the Lin Piao Iabrlcat cd by Mao, Allt h is . 1S not hing but s le ig ht- of-hand : wit h one hand Maofa.Jmcates a fal se Lin Pi ao and a false Confucius, andwith the other he directs people to revile t hem,

. Judging fro~ ~eports , Mao has of late been devotingh imself to training and arming a " m ili t ia" , Now. heh as t!'~ ~ sfe rred t~e "militia" from under the charge ofgle milit ary ~dmlllistra t i o n to the charge of the Maoistpal:ty cOl~mltt~es " and " revolutionary committees" . In

"~ e I~ l? ?,' Tl~,ntsm , Shanghai. Wuhan and other cit ies.1l1 11ltl amen . have already begun to perform th e func­

tions of poli cem en. It is repor ted th at Mao i nte ruls to"Use th em as storm-troop ers in tho second "cultural rev­ol,ut ion" against Party and military cad res, and cadres1Jf government organs, mass organ isa tions and educa­tioual establi~hments . Thereupon, he wi ll graduall yconvert them into regula!' troops to replace th ose P LAunits whi ch s t.i II hav e s trong re volu tiona ry tradi tions .

I t has heen reported th at in Shanghai the so-ca ll edm il itiamen have alread y begun putting up tatsiipaos(wa ~l newspapers) and holding s treet-corner meetings .Pek ing ne wsp apers have published ph ot ographs of tat­su paos stigmatising "class enemies". In Pcki nz an d manyother cit ies so-calle d rallies are held "to c; i ti cise Li~Piao an d Con fu ciu s". In ot he r words, 1\10.0 has alreadys ent hi s s torm -t roo per" into t h o s tr-aa ts t o sta rt a second" cul tural revolution".

2/1

Ma o describes hi s counter-revolutionary acLion s as adispla y of " the revolutionary s piril, th at boldly goesagainst the curr en t" and as " a march to m eeL s tormand tempest" . Documents of th e Mao ist i Oth Cong ress,too, urge "going boldl y against the c urren t" ,

\Vh at is th is "current" referred to by Mao and thoMaoist. LOth Congress? It is tho revolutionary curren tun exampled in volume which has arisen in th o heartsof the million s of Chinese Communists and the manyhundreds of mi lli ons of Chinese ag ui nst til e coun ter­revolution ary thoughts of Mao Tao-tung, th o coun te r­revo lutionary rule of Mao Tse-t u ng, and the counter-revo­lutionary "cultu ral revo lution". It is a vast cur ren t,ga the r ing mom en tum with " Len Iors" and " Le nagainsts" :

fo r revolu ti on ary Mnrvi sm -Lcninism and against thecounter-revolutionary " tho ughts of Mao Tsc-tung" ;

[or a genuine CPC an d Kom sornol , and again st Lhefalse CPC and Kornsomol of Mao T so-tu ng ;

f or people's demo cratic power under th e leader sh ip ofthe Communist Party, and against t he on e-man reactionary m ilitary-t crrort st di ct ator ship of Ma o Tse-tuug:

[or building soc ialism, and against Mao's policy ofundermining the pillars o f soc ial ism ;

[or improving the materia l and cultura l lif e of th epeopl e, and agains t Mao 's policy of perpetuating povertyand ba ckwardness ;

/ 0 1' th e P eopl e's Lib eration Army always to he a rHO­lutionary army defending th e Com mun ist Party andthe peopl e, and against its convers io n by Mao Into anan ti-communis t, anti-S oviet, and anti-p eople counte r­revolutionary for ce;

for th e eq ua l coex is te nce and pro sp eri ty of all ua tioua l­iti es in China, and against Mao's grea t-Llan natio nali smand oppression of nationa l minorities;

for unity with the Sovie t. Union an d all socia listcountries, and against Mao' s co llus ion with impertalistforces;

f or unity with all Asian, African and Latin Am er icancoun tries oppos ing imperialis m , colonialis m and nee ­coloniali sm , and against Mao's ideas of hegemony in the" th ird world" together with imperialists ;

fo r world pea ce, and against Mao's war pr eparati on sand in citem ent of a th ird world war.

272

Ma o Tse-tu ng is frighten ed of this mi ghty revolut ion­ary curren t. By th reats and promises he is makin g p r-nplejo in him in comba tting it. He hopes to stern it by meansof counter-revolution ary "cult ural revolu tions ".

Th e Chinese Communis ts and the people of Chill a knowtha t th ey must ove rco me Mao's perni cious rnovemen l.,which is raising a dovili sh ga le and di abolic wav es tha t.cause incal culab le ca la m ities . Then and only then willChina be saved.

The Chi nese Communis ts, th e peop le of China . andall men and officers of th e PLA m ust unite agai nst th ecounter -r evolu tionary " thoughts of Mao Tse-t ung" an dth e counter-revolu tionary "cu ltu ra I revo lu tion " . fn [ace­of tempes t and storm , they mu st go forward hol dlv un t ilcomplete victory is gaine d, so th at Maoism never aga inca uses anyone any harm.

'I'h eu and only th en will th e splendid flower of socia l­ism bu rst forth in bl oom , yieldi ng prodig ious socia lis tfru it. on th e soil o f 0 111' beloved mot hcrlu nd.

Th en and only th en wi ll workers , peasants, in tellec­tuals and th e yo uth of China li ve the free and happy lifethat is t heir bir th right.

Th en and on ly the n will our People's Lib eration Armyreally be a valiant rc vol utionary army pro te ct ing oursoc ialist land and perf orming its int ernationalist duty .

Then and on ly th en will the Chinese Communist s an dthe people of Ch ina be able to stand up to imperiali smand reactionaries of all coun tr ies, and to work for worldpea ce, fr eedom and happin ess sho ulder to shoulder witht he Soviet Union and the entire socialist communi ty. andwith th e communist parties and peopl es of all countries,

Mao T sc-tu ng and th e reac tionary imper ialist gro u ps.wielding th o co nducto rs baton behind his back rega rdsuccessiv e counter -revolu ti on ary "cu lt ura l revo lu tio nsas the ch ie f instrument Ior susta ining reactionary rulein China. But ti me will sure ly show th at "cultural 1'0" 0 ­

luti ons" , wh ich have roused the anger of th e ar med forcesand the mass of the peopl e, will in th e lon g I'UU br ingabout the downfall of the Mao dynasty. It is due to h iscounter-r evolution ary "cultural r evolution" that Mao hasbecome a "lone mo nk" ab andoned by disciples and fol­lowers and surrounded by internal and exte rnal " ene­mi es" . No ma tt er how he manipulates , how hi ghly heextols Chi n Shi h Huang, and how fi ercely he attacks

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Confucius and exploi ts the na me of Lu Hsun, no matter~vhat ?l~ys he uses and how much he curries favour withImpel'lahs~s, . seel~ing their aid and support, noth ing canprevent Iu s nnmment downfall.

As a re sult of his "cultural revolution" Mao is im ­mersed . I~ a tangle of in soluble internal'and external~on lradlct l ons. And the re acti onary home and for eign pol ­I~y of th e 10th Congress has only made th ese con tradic­tio ns more acute. Th ere is no doubt that th e revolution ­ary teaching of Marxi sm -Leninism will overcom e theCOll nt er-rcvol utionary "thou ghts of Mao Tse-tung" and thatpro letarian internationalism will overcome M~lO'S hour­~e~is IHlLioIla~ism. Certainly, the revolutionary forces ofChina and of th e world will over come Mao 's coun te r­revol utionary clique. TIll! Chin ese Communi st s and th eChiu ese people will surely conqu er th e on e-man react ion ­ary military-t errorist dictatorship of Mao Tse-tunz willTcbuild the socia lis t pilla rs unde rmined by the M"'~oistsand will put China back on the radiant road of socia l istcons truction.

Reaction in sid e the country and incitem ent of warso u tsid e arc typical of Mao's pre sent poli cy. Hitl er and1\1ussolini foll owed the same path to def eat. Collusion'with extreme reacti onar y imperia list gr oups, anti-corn­muuism in home policy , and an ti-S ovietism in for eign po l­icy - this is the essence of Mao's present-day course,Chia ng Kai -shek followed th e same path to h is downfall.Comparing himself to the s un is the pri III i \,i ve meth odMa o has been usin g for year s to deceive himselfand othe rs . This, too, is a road to defeat already troddenin antiquity by Tse-wang of the Usia dyn asty . Accord ­ing to Fu Sheng's book, S hangshii T'achuan (H an dy­nast v} , I h e la st ruler of the Hsia dynasty T se-w ang corn­pared himself to th e sun. "When the sun perish es," h esa id, " the n I shall peri sh". This was desi gn ed to deceiveaIHI in tim ida te people, who would thu s drea d hi sdeath and wi sh him immor tali ty . But the people hat edth e desp ot so implacably that they replied : "Let th e's uu ' di e, We will be gla d to perish with you just to seeyou di e" . No, id entificati on with the sun does not savedesp ots Irom defeat. And in the eye s of the P LA andthe wh ole Chinese people, traitor and despot Mao T se­tung is a sell- decla red sun lik e T se-wang of the Hsiady nasty, and the peop le hate him just as impl acabl y.

Mao knows th at h e is sitting on top of a vol cano thatis ab ou t to erupt. He is lon ely and impotent. This is whyin December 1970 he said to his Ameri can trusted per ­son, Edgar Snow, that he is a "lone m onk" walking thew(~l'ld with a leaky umbrell a. " Lone monk" is a eup he­nusm Mao emp loys for "lone desp ot " , as th e worst twotlr~Ults in Chinese his tory-Shang Chou-w ang and Ch inShih Hua ng-were ca lle d by the Ch inese people . In mor em oder n t im es the peo ple "confer red" the sa me titl eo f " lone desp ot " on two other tyrants and militarists­Yuan Shih- ka i and Chi ang Kai -sh ck . All th ose wh om th epeople ca lled " lone despots" came to a sad en d. Anrl ,ce rt ainly, th e new tyrant and militarist, Mao Tse-tun g,whom th e people have also begun to regard as a " loned esp ot ", will not esc ape the same fate.

In til e filial count, Mao T se-tung will he defeated , Ther eis no doubt about that.

But thi s does not mean tha t Mao can no longer breed-evil. On th e contra ry, the closer h e approach es his end,th o more re ckle ssly h e is str iking ba ck and th e moreenergy he is sp ending in hom e policy looki ng for wayst o prolon g hi s reactionary rule and leave hi s "throne"to Chi an g Ching, and in foreign poli cy to inten sify prep­arations for an anti-Soviet wa r and to in cite a worldwar. II e s topped at noth ing to achi eve hi s aims and makeCh in a tIle most reactionary centre of s truggle againstcOI11 I11.unism. th e So vie t Union , and peace and progress .He will stop at not h in g gradually to r econv ert China in ­to a semi-colony of world imperialism in ret urn for aid~nd suPPM! from ex tre me reactionary impo rial ist zrou p­m gs, Throu gh his first "cul tural revolution" he t l~ed towin . th ~ tl'uS~ ~f th e imperi ali st s and pa ve the way IorMaoist i rupcr-i alist coopera tion . Hi s second "cu ltural rev­olution" i~. aimed at widenin g the spheres and raisingth e " level of Maoist-imperia l ist coopera tion . -

.Under cover of "crit icis ing Lin Pi ao and Conf ucius ."Mao has, iu effect. beg un a second "cultu ra l re volu tion"as a c~n<:rete step in ca rrying out th ese desig ns .

. It W Ill he recalled th at since 1966, wh en Mao launch edhi s counter-revolutionary coup d'ptat behind the sc reenof a "cultural : evolution ", the Communist Party of Chi­na and the Chi nese peopl e hav e been immersed in un­heard-of tra gedy a nd suffer ing. The world soc ial ist sys­tem and th e worl d commu nis t and workin g-cl ass move-

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m ent hav e su ffered serious losses , and the anti-im peri al­ist national lib er nu on movement and the movement lorpea ce, democracy and social pr ogress have al so in cu rredg l'l~a t losses, It ha s h e nn a hoon for intern ation al i 111 ­periali sm a nd rea ction aries ill all countrie s.

A " second c ultu ra l r evo lu t ion " will 10 0 s p.1l fresh ca la m­ities a t hom e, an d ca u se severe setbacks on the inter ­n ational scene .

1t foll ows th a t Man's se cond "cult u ral revolufiou "conc erns n ot only Ch in ese Commu ni st s a nd th e peopleof China , a nd no t only th e world com m u nis t m ovem entautl the socialis t com m unity , hut al so all pr ogr essivesa nd all pea ce forces in th e world.

In Chill a , th e Communists and peoples of all nation­a li ti es face a m ortal , diffi cult and grave s truggle. Andas th ey char t th ei r plan s and de termine thei r ac t io nsagain st Maoism and th e " cultural re vol u tio n", th ey willdoubtless ta k e account of the peculiar feat ures of th epr es ent internal and internat ional si tua tion , Thev wills um up th e results of th e str u ggle aga ins t th e fn's't " c ul­tural revolution " , and draw le sson s fr om it. T h ey will.u se all av a ilable opportu ni ties Ior un iting th e an ti-Man­ist for ces an d oppon ents of th e "c ultu ra l r evolut ion". Tfth ey succeed in unil ing and organ is in g their ranks. th eywill ce r ta in ly be abl e to repu ls e and def ea t Mao's coun te r­r ev oluti on ar y " cultural ruvo lution ' and cou n ter-re vo­lutionary rule,

Th e Chinese Commu nists a nd th e peopl e of Ch inatru st th at in all coun trios Comm un ists , figh ters agai ns timperi ali sm nnd for pe ace, a nd all people of goo dw illwill stand by them .

AFTERWORD

A Chinese prov erb SHyS th a t 70 yea rs is a rare ng l' .Comrade W ang ~Iing li ved until 70, and succee ded "incom plat ing th e fin al page of th is book Tit is was noteasy. H e did not live to se e his work publi shed. All thesa m e, it s appearance is a big and im port ant even t. HereI wan I 10 express sp ecia l grati tude to th e So viet Com­munist s and t he Soviet people for th ei r cons ta n t fr iend­sh ip and support.

Of course, it is impossi ble t o presen t a detai led acc ountof events fro m the thirt ies to th e present da y much lesstlll~ so years' hi s tory of th e Communis t. Part;' ;)f China,in one book. .

After finishing this book Comrade Wan~ Mi n er h adplanne d to wri te a critici sm of the theoretica l lll i~tak('sin t he " !h oughts of Mao Tso-tung" , especia lly as con­cerns philosophy , He want ed to do th is becau se in th ep ast 3U-odd years the Ma rxi st -L eninist erlucn tiun of C PC?u dres a l~d m cm b el'S wu s seriously j mpai red b y l he crirn­inal an ti- Marxist. ant i- Len inist. ant i-Sovi et and ant i­Communis t. activity of Ma» T s e-t ung. Durin z the " cul­t u ral r evolu t ion ". w hich was essen lia llv ~, coun te r­revolut iouary cou p, Mao T se-tung am) hi s gro ll)l public lyd eclared th eir wish "'0 hoist the red banner of t hethou ght s of Ma o T se -tung ov er th e wo rl d", th ou gh. infa ct , the Maoists ;H'e s till compe lle d to disguise th ei rund erhand schemes with the banner' of " Ma rxism ­Lenini sm " bo th ins ide uurl outsi de th e co un trv. T his is whya th eor etical analysis an d fa ctual evidence' are requiredto s ho w how Mao distorte d. defam ed and betraved Marx­ism -L en inism. a nd how, und er th e s ig n boa rd ' of "S ini-

/.77

Iying Marxism " , he engaged in ideological contrnband-e­subs ti tu ting coun ter- revolutiona ry Maoi sm for Mar xism ­Leninism. In the la st years of his life Comrad e W an gi\1ing work ed very hard in thi s directi on. Unfortuna tely,hi s health, badly im paired in th e forties and fifti es, fa iledand he departed from us before he wa s able to com­plet e th e next stage of hi s pla nne d work.

Comrad e W ang Ming 's deat h is a very severe loss forth e Chinese Communist s and th e people of China. Yet ,he was always sure that th e Chinese Commun ists andthe peop le of China, who hav e th e sympathy of th e Com­munist s and peopl es of othe r countr ies, will ove rcome alldifficulti es and obstacles and bri ng Chi na back into thegreat socialist family h ead ed by th e Sov iet Union.

Meng Clung-s lue1979

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