Water Sector Governancein Africa

Volume 1Theory

and Practicewww.afdb.org

The Water Partnership Program and its mission

The Water Partnership Program (WPP) promotes effective water management policies and practices at regional and countrylevels. It operationalizes the African Development Bank’s Integrated Water Resources Management policy in the Bank’sregional member countries.

WPP pursues its goal through the generation and dissemination of a range of knowledge products, fostering dialogue onkey sector issues and promoting partnerships that enhance knowledge sharing.

Water Partnership Program WPP

The African Development Bank,

Temporary Relocation Agency (TRA),

13 Avenue du Ghana, BP 323,

1002 Tunis Belvédère, Tunisia

Tel. (216) 71 333 511 / 7110 3450

www.afdb.org

ISBN 978-9973-071-48-4

Agencecanadienne dedéveloppementinternational

CanadianInternationalDevelopment Agency

WATER SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA Final.Couv.qxd:wpp charte en cours COVER 17/09/10 17:31 Page1

Water Sector Governancein Africa

Volume 1Theory

and Practice

ISBN 978-9973-071-48-4

This document was prepared by the Water Partnership Program (WPP) of the AfricanDevelopment Bank.

While every effort has been made to present reliable information, the African Development Bankaccepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequences arising out of its use nor is any opinionexpressed in this publication necessarily the opinion of the Bank. The material in this publication iscopyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission of theAfrican Development Bank may be a violation of the applicable law.

AcknowledgementsThis study was coordinated by Thomas Roberts, Senior Water and Sanitation Engineer, with supportfrom OWAS / AWF during review of the study outputs during the three stages of its development.

The Bank acknowledges the authors Michael McGarry, Silver Mugisha, Luc Hoang-Gia, Per Unheimand Meghan Myles from Cowater.

The African Development Bank Group undertook the study with the financial support of its WaterPartnership Program donors i.e. the Government of Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada (CIDA).

LogoAfrican Development BankExternal Relations and Communication UnitYattien-Amiguet L.

Graphical ConceptualizationAfrican Development Bank, External Relations and Communication Unit in cooperation with FinziUsines graphiques; Justin Kabasele T. and Mouna Lazzem

PhotosPictures on pages ix, 3, 31, 39, 44, 73 and 75 by Cowater. All other pictures by AfDB.

PrintingFinzi Usines Graphiques

CoordinationConsultants Bent Nørby Bonde and Sören Bauer

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Table of contentsAcronyms ivForeword viiExecutive Summary ix

1.1 Governance 11.2 Sector Policy and Legislation 51.3 Regulation 111.4 Decentralization 181.5 Sector-wide Approaches 261.6 Sector Financial Management 301.7 Monitoring and Evaluation 341.8 Water Resources Management 401.9 Transparency and Accountability 441.10 Corruption 471.11 Civil Society Participation 521.12 Alternative Service Providers 571.13 Gender 621.14 Rights and Voice 661.15 Equitable Service Delivery 70

Annex A: Field Assessment Results 74References 78

List of Tables Table 1: Broader Aspects of Governance and their Linkages to the Water Sector 4Table 2: African Water Sector Regulation Models 11Table 3: Alternative Service Providers 58Table 4: Access to Improved WSS in Sub-Saharan Africa (2006/1990) 70Table 5: Improved Sanitation Coverage by Wealth Quintiles in 38 Developing Countries 71Table 6: Distribution of Those who Usually Collect Water 71

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AfDBAMCOWASPAWFCIDAGISGWAGWPH&AIFPRIIMFIPCCIRCIWMIIWRMJMPM&EMDGMTBFMTEFMTFFMWENDWNWSCODAODIOECDOSSOPMOWASPFMPHAST

African Development BankAfrican Ministers’ Council on WaterAlternative service providerAfrican Water FacilityCanadian International Development AgencyGeographic Information SystemGender and Water AllianceGlobal Water PartnershipHarmonization and alignmentInternational Food Policy Research InstituteInternational Monetary FundInternational Panel on Climate ChangeInternational Water and Sanitation CentreInternational Water Management InstituteIntegrated water resources managementJoint Monitoring ProgramMonitoring and EvaluationMillennium Development GoalsMedium Term Budget FrameworkMedium Term Expenditure FrameworkMedium Term Financial FrameworkMinistry of Water and Environment, UgandaNational Directorate of Water, MozambiqueNational Water and Sewerage CorporationOfficial development assistanceOverseas Development InstituteOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentSahara and Sahel ObservatoryOxford Policy ManagementWater and Sanitation Department, AfDBPublic financial management Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation

Acronyms

v

PPPPRSPPSPRBORWSSSADCSWApTATITPTCTWRMUNICEFWHOWHSWPMWSPWSS

Public-private partnershipPoverty Reduction Strategy PaperPrivate sector participationRiver basin organizationRural water supply and sanitationSouthern African Development Community Sector-wide ApproachTechnical assistanceTransparency InternationalTripartite Technical CommitteeTransboundary water resources managementUnited Nations’ Children’s FundWorld Health OrganizationWorld Health SurveyWater Point MappingWater and Sanitation ProgramWater supply and sanitation

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equitable service delivery. The study highlightscurrent thinking and research on all these keyelements and issues affecting their quality.

Contemporary literature on water sector financingunderstandably focuses on the mechanisms andchallenges associated with funding tangible watersupply and sanitation services. This study howeverdraws attention to the importance of financingoverarching water management and governancefunctions, from strategy, planning and policy-making and engagement with sector stakeholdersto water resource development, allocation andmanagement.

Based on the report’s findings, indicators andtargets have been developed to improve thesector’s governance. Volume 1 titled: “Theory andpractice” presents the findings, indicators andtargets to be achieved while Volume 2 presentsconcrete “Assessment guidelines” for conductingwater sector governance assessments forprograms and projects in Africa, based on thefindings of Volume 1.

The Bank is pleased to offer this thought-provoking assessment and the tools developed asa contribution to efforts at improving governancein Africa’s water sector.

Bobby J. PittmanVice PresidentInfrastructure, Private Sector & Regional Integration

AfDB

ForewordWater governance has been described as “…therange of political, social, economic andadministrative systems that are in place to developand manage water resources and the delivery ofwater services, at different levels of society.”

Good governance mainly depends on the qualityof leadership, the strength of the institutions andhow efficiently, effectively, sustainably, andtransparently the resources are managed bysector institutions and main stakeholders.

On the African continent however, rigoroustechnical, financial, economic and institutionalassessments undertaken in support of projectshave not guaranteed sustainability of projectoutputs and outcomes. This checkered history ofwater sector projects over the past three decadesprovided the rationale for the African DevelopmentBank to launch this initiative to assess watersector governance in Africa.

This report takes preliminary steps to investigatewhether poor governance has been a majorcontributing factor to this lack of sustainability.Specifically, the report provides an overview andassessment of the state of water sectorgovernance in Africa – looking at a very broadrange of governance-related elements, includinglegislation and regulation, decentralization anddevolution, sector-wide approaches, financialmanagement, monitoring and evaluation,accountability and corruption as well as civilsociety participation, gender, alternative serviceprovision, public-private partnerships and

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Not surprisingly, the Study identified numerousbut common governance risks that havecontributed greatly to this chequered history. Itfound that these are readily identifiable andeasily mitigated against, and that substantialgains would be made if governanceassessments became standard procedure andgovernance criteria were introduced into donorproject approval procedures.

This report, an abridged version of the Study’ssecond chapter, provides an overview of thestate of water sector governance in Africa andhighlights current thinking and research on thekey elements and issues affecting its quality.These include: sector policy, legislation and

Executive Summary

The objectives of the AfDB-financed AfricanWater Governance Study1 from which this reportwas derived were to assess the state of watersector governance in Africa, develop indicatorsand targets for its improvement, and raiseawareness among all stakeholders.Furthermore, Volume 2, “AssessmentGuidelines” provides guidelines for AfDB watersector staff and other water sector practitionersto use when developing programmes andprojects in Africa.

The current state of water sector governanceacross Africa was assessed through missionsto seven countries, a literature review, and fourAfDB-OWAS and in-country workshopsorganized between June and December 2008.

The chequered history of sector projects overthe past three decades provided the rational forthis initiative. This history has amplydemonstrated that despite the rigoroustechnical, financial, economic and institutionalassessments undertaken in support ofprojects, the sustainability of project outputsand outcomes remains far from certain. TheStudy’s underlying assumption was that poorgovernance has been a major contributingfactor in this regard.

1Cowater International, (2008b) “AfDB Study on Water Sector Governance: Final Report,” Water and Sanitation Department

(OWAS), African Development Bank, Tunis, December.

AfDB and Cowater representatives at a workshop on the Water sector Governance Study

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been the subject of significant debate and areaddressed individually in the report. In short,however, it can be said that:

i) sector policy is widely recognized a meansfor creating the enabling environment necessaryfor sector development, despite the lack of aclear blueprint on what related policies shouldentail;

ii) legislation is the mechanism forincorporating this policy into national politicaland legal frameworks, ensuring the effectivefunctioning of the sector, protecting individualand communal water rights and establishingconflict resolution mechanisms; and

iii) regulation entails the system of instrumentsthat enforces and oversees the implementationof sector policy and legislation.

Decentralization has become a keymechanism in sector reform since the conceptof subsidiarity – the management of waterresources at the lowest appropriate level – wasintroduced within the Dublin Principles in 1992.

regulation; decentralization and devolution;sector-wide approaches; water sector financialmanagement; monitoring and evaluation (M&E)integrated and transboundary water resourcesmanagement (IWRM and TWRM); transparency,accountability and corruption; civil societyparticipation; alternative service provision andpublic-private partnerships; gender; rights, voiceand recourse; and, equitable service delivery.

The Study’s findings are summarized below.

While local and national institutions have themost visible role to play in governing the watersector, it is the sector’s underlying policies,legislation and regulations that provide thefoundation for its overall governance. Some ofthe key roles sector institutions andorganizations need to fulfil in developing andcarrying out the underlying legislation, policiesand regulations include strategic policy-makingand planning for water and related sectors;conflict resolution and arbitration; and, theregulation and monitoring of water users andservice providers. The various approaches andprinciples underlying each of these roles have

Rural water supply,Cape Verde

2 Van Hofwegen, Paul (2006) “Task Force on Financing Water for All: Enhancing Access to Finance for Local Governments;

Financing Water for Agriculture,” World Water Council (WWC), Global Water Partnership (GWP) and the 4th World Water Forum.

xi

sector. Whereas in some countries, such asUganda SWAps appear to be having a positiveimpact on sector governance, their impact in themany Sub-Saharan African countries that lackthe appropriate institutional capacity to managethem effectively appears to be neutral at bestand inhibiting at worst, particularly if theresources devoted to managing them arediverted away from more critical pursuits.

The contemporary literature on water sectorfinancing – epitomized by the 2006 Gurria TaskForce on Financing Water for All2 – focusespredominantly on the mechanisms andchallenges associated with funding tangiblewater supply and sanitation services, from ruraland urban water supply schemes to sanitationinfrastructure. Yet what this focus on financing

The concept of decentralization – a general termcommonly referring to the transfer of political,financial and administrative authority, includingdecision-making and management, from centralgovernment to lower levels – is first distinguishedfrom devolution, which falls under the largerconcept of decentralization and refers to thetransfer of management and decision-makingpowers, rights and assets to local institutions,governments or communities that are largelyoutside the direct control of the centralgovernment, and from deconcentration –referring to the transfer of administrativeresponsibility for specific functions to lowerlevels within the central governmentbureaucracy without any real transfer ofauthority between levels of government. Thesection goes on to note that while the process ofdecentralization has become widespreadthroughout Africa, the devolution of water sectordecision-making authority to local levels isoccurring with varying degrees of success, inmany cases due to excessive central controlover sector revenues and intergovernmentaltransfers. This can often serve as a majorconstraint to effective and transparent planning.

With regards to sector-wide approaches(SWAps), it is noted that while each arepromising in theory, debate continues over theireffectiveness in practice across the developingworld, particularly with regards to the water

Water pipeline, Sidi Bel Abbès, Algeria

3 Rees, Judith, Winpenny, James and Hall, Alan W. (2008) “Water as a Social and Economic Good,” TEC Background Papers

No. 12, Global Water Partnership. 4Dublin Statement (1992) “Dublin Statemet on Water and Sustainable Development,” International Conference on Water and

the Environment, Dublin, Ireland.

water supply and sanitation (WSS) servicesignores, others argue, is the importance offinancing overarching water management andgovernance functions, from strategy, planningand policy-making and engagement with sectorstakeholders to water resource development,allocation and management3. In other words,effective water governance depends not only onhow much financing can be mobilized, but alsoon the extent to which these resources aremanaged and allocated efficiently, effectively andsustainably by recipient institutions across thesector. While the literature demonstrates astrong degree of consensus on the importanceof decentralizing WSS delivery and expendituremanagement responsibilities to the lowestappropriate level, this is accompanied byrecognition of the need to first improve themanagerial and technical capacities of localauthorities.

Monitoring and evaluation has become anessential tool not only for good watergovernance, but also for sector developmentand environmental sustainability. Nevertheless,the calibre of water sector M&E systems acrossthe African continent is generally recognized tobe at an early stage of development. Mostmonitoring systems are project-based and haveserved mainly the purposes of donors, doinglittle to support sector planning, budgeting andmanagement processes. Far more in-depth and

better quality monitoring istherefore needed for sectormanagement, transparencyand accountability, especiallywithin the budget supportframework. The section on integrated andtransboundary waterresources management(IWRM and TWRM,respectively) notes that thetwo are inter-related conceptsthat have been the basis forsector reform in recent years.Although the principles to beapplied in the sector underIWRM are sound, actual implementation iscompli-cated. African countries tend to belagging behind in this regard, althoughadvances are beginning to be seen in thesector. The Dublin Principles4 form the basisfor IWRM, which has since become anaccepted model for improved governance inthe water sector by providing a viableframework for the sustainable use andmanagement of water resources based on thecatchment or basin being the most appropriatescale for water resources management.TWRM, on the other hand, represents asituation in which water governance iscomplicated by issues of politics andcompetition for scarce resources between two

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Africa, leading to increased costs to users forWSS service provision. According toTransparency International, the water sector isespecially vulnerable to corruption for severalreasons: the existence of numerous agencies,actors and government institutions in a singlesector blurs lines of accountability and reducestransparency; the water sector involves theprocurement of significant quantities of goodswith large volumes of public money; informalservice providers less subject to officialoversight mechanisms play a key role in servicedelivery; and the widespread presence ofmonopolies promotes unfair or discretionarybusiness practices. Finally, informal providers,often vulnerable to corruption, also play a keyrole in service delivery. Others add that thesector is characterized by widespread financialdisorder, few service providers are accountableto their customers and financial management isnot transparent.

With regards to civil society participation insector governance, the involvement of all usersin the process of developing appropriate policiesand regulations for water resourcesmanagement and use is essential for effectivewater sector governance. Participation of civilsociety and the permanent mechanisms that willenable it are essential in every aspect ofgovernance, from project and programmeselection and planning, to budgeting, policy andregulation. This not only improves sustainabilityof services, but also improves transparency,accountability and regulatory enforcement.

or more countries. The literature on thesubject notes that TWRM cannot beconducted purely on a state-to-statebasis, however, for many otherstakeholders from the local to theinternational level typically need to beinvolved. Furthermore, weak legal andregulatory frameworks, a lack ofbasin-wide institutional arrangementsfor joint development andmanagement of transboundary waterresources, poor water resourcesinformation systems, poor financingand a lack of stakeholder participationalso affect the success of TWRM.

Two basic principles discussed widely in theliterature and considered prerequisites for goodwater governance are transparency andaccountability, which are closely related to oneanother within the context of governancesystems. For instance, transparencynecessitates strong sector performancemonitoring systems, which will enhanceaccountability for the use of resources byservice providers. Decentralization provides anopportunity for the introduction of transparencyand accountability measures, but alsointroduces threats to the same if communityand civil society voices are not well articulated.

Moreover, corruption in the water sectorresults from a lack of transparency andaccountability. Corrupt practices are endemicto most WSS institutions and transactions in

A Well in Northern Malawi

Women’s participation in water sectorgovernance has become widely recognized asessential to the sector’s development. Manydeclarations have been agreed upon andcommitments made at international meetingsin support of gender equality. The DublinStatement (1992) recognized the pivotal roleof women, the Rio Declaration (1992)recognized their full participation as essentialto sustainable development, the WorldSummit on Sus-tainable development calledfor ensuring that infrastructure and servicesare gender sen-sitive, and the MDGs include2015 targets on gender equality andempowerment of women. Gender equalityand mainstreaming in the sector have also

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been given extensive attention, and methodsby which these can be assessed andaddressed are being demonstrated. Yet thereis still little evidence to suggest that watermanagement has deliberately and consciouslyaddressed gender concerns. National waterpolicies rarely include more than the mentionof women’s important role and do not have acomprehensive and consistent gender focus.

Closely related to the questions of gender andcivil society participation in water sectorgovernance are the issues of rights, voice andrecourse and equitable service provision.Numerous international conventions protectindividual rights to basic services such as

Diama dam,

Senegal

xv

sufficient, clean, accessible, and affordablewater and sanitation and seek to protectvulnerable and marginalized groups fromdiscrimination. All too often, however, researchindicates that water is not distributed equitablyamong all users, resulting from factors relatingto transparency and accountability underscoredby inadequate mechanisms for citizenparticipation. Of particular concern are the largeand increasing numbers of slums and peri-urban areas and their female inhabitants inparticular who, despite being responsible forwater, sanitation and the health of their families,

are often disempowered and left out ofdecision-making processes.

Finally, public private partnerships andalternative service providers are shown to playa significant role in the water sector in Africaand that further investment from the privatesector will be required to meet the MDGs.Nevertheless, there is no clear blue printsolution for private sector participation in watersector reforms. Yet if the realities of theirsituation are understood, the poor can stand tobenefit from it.

Queuing for Water in

Nampula province,

Mozambique

1

1.1 Governance

The concept of governance applies at both themacro (country level) as well as micro(institutional or sectoral) levels. As a result, itsmeaning depends on the context within whichit is used.

For the purposes of this study, governance atthe macro level is defined as:

The exercise of economic, political andadministrative authority to manage a country’saffairs at all levels … it comprises themechanisms, processes and institutionsthrough which citizens and groups articulatetheir interests, exercise their legal rights, meettheir obligations and mediate their differences5.

While this definition implies that governmentsat the central, regional or local level are theprimary actors in a country’s system ofgovernance, public institutions are in fact onlyone category of actors with a determiningstake in national governance. Civil society,composed of non-governmental andcommunity-based organizations (NGOs andCBOs), donors, research institutes, religiousgroups, media, lobbyists, and individuals,among others, also play an important role. Ananalysis of governance must therefore focus onall the actors and structures in place to makeand implement the decisions that shape andregulate the lives of citizens.

Governance at the macro level is increasinglybecoming a central focus of developmentassistance. As a result, several different toolsand frameworks have been developed toassess the quality of governance withinindividual countries. These include indicatorsthat enable comparisons over time as well asacross countries and regions. They generallyfocus on specific subsets of governance thatrelate to democracy, human rights, policies,public sector management, accountability,legislation, corruption, financial managementand internal conflict.

Nevertheless, while indicators such as theseprovide a general overview of governance in acountry, they seldom address the gap betweenformal arrangements and realities on theground. It is therefore prudent to use them onlyas one of many sets of tools to inform policyand decision-making in any particular country.

5 UNDP (2001) in Rogers, Peter and Hall, Alan, (2003) “Effective Water Governance,” GWP TEC.#7

Rwanda

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Subsets of micro-level indicators, such as“water sector policy,” can be used to explorespecific aspects of governance. In both cases,however, attention should be paid to marginsof error as few governance indicators areobjectively measurable; most includesubjective perceptions.

Some of the most informative data sets ongovernance in the public domain include:

• World Bank Country Policy and InstitutionalAssessment (CPIA-WB);

• African Development Bank Country Policyand Institutional Assessment (CPIA-AfDB);

• World Governance Indicators (WGI), Kauff-man, Kraay and Mastruzzi, World Bank;

• Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Trans-parency International;

• Failed States Index, Fund for Peace;• Millennium Challenge Corporation Coun-

try Scorecards; and,• Ibrahim Index of African Governance.

From these assessments, trends in the quality ofgovernance in individual countries across theworld can be observed. The World GovernanceIndicators, for example, demonstrate significantchanges in 31 percent of countries over the pastdecade in at least one of its six aggregate

indicators. This indicates that changes in gover-nance can occur within relatively short periods oftime, even if those changes are not necessarilypostive; after 12 years of monitoring governanceusing these indicators6, there is no convincingevidence to conclude that there have beensignificant improvements worldwide. With respectto corruption, Transparency International’s latestCorruption Perception Index rates all sub-SaharanAfrican countries below 6 out of 10, and mostbelow 57. Some countries have experiencedsignificant changes from the last index, whileothers have witnessed significant deteriorations.Overall, the CPI serves to highlight thatperceptions of corruption are capable of changingquickly both positively and negatively.

6Kauffman et al, (2008), Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996 – 2007, World Bank,

Washington.7Transparency International, (2008), Corruption Perceptions Index.

Water and Sanitation Development Board Offices, Ashanti, Ghana

8UNDP, (2004), “Water Governance for Poverty Reduction,” UNDP, New York, p.17, 9 Plummer and Slaymaker, (2007), “Rethinking Governance in Water Services,” Overseas Development Institute, London, UK

3

Water Sector Governance

As described above, the concept of governancecan be applied at both the macro and microlevels: to countries as a whole as well as toindividual institutions and sub-sectors withinthem. Water sector governance, at the microlevel, is defined by GWP and UNDP as: “…therange of political, social, economic andadministrative systems that are in place todevelop and manage water resources and thedelivery of water services, at different levels ofsociety”8. Many of the processes and institutionswill be defined directly by the central government,and these must function within the existinggovernance framework in the country.

Good water governance is based on principlesof good governance, which include equity,efficiency, participation, decentralization, inte-gration, transparency and accountability. Yetthere is also a tendency in the water sector toreduce issues to their component parts andthereby lose sight of the overall governancepicture. Until recently, most aspects ofgovernance have been treated in isolation. Theapplication of mitigation measures (e.g.decentralization, participatory planning, etc.) hasoften been seen as an end in itself. Realimprovements in governance have become lostand linkages between sector governance andthe wider governance context overlooked.

Table 1 (adapted from Plummer and Slaymaker,2007) demonstrates how water sector

governance is closely tied into broader aspectsof governance at the national level.

Moreover, recent studies have demonstratedthat there is a direct correlation between thecountries most lacking water services and thosewith the weakest governance9. Improvinggovernance in the water sector is therefore notonly about government systems and servicesdelivery; it encompasses a much broader rangeof factors, including engaging civil society, non-state agents and their relationship togovernment. Sustainable services are notachieved without involvement of otherstakeholders and particularly water users in thedevelopment of the policies and laws for sectordevelopment. This applies equally well to waterresources management, with good sectorgovernance backed by appropriate policies andlaws being a key determinant of the sustainabilityof water resources.

Presidential

palace,

Senegal

4

With an understanding of the linkages betweenthe broad concept of governance and itsapplication at the sectoral level, water sectorpractitioners are better equipped to formulatepolicies, projects and programmes intended toimprove the governance of their sector and its

subcomponents. The sections that followdescribe how each of the sub-componentsnoted in the table above affect and fit into watergovernance systems and practices andtherefore contribute to or detract from thequality of macro-level governance.

Governance Aspect Water Governance Context

Political stability and personal security Role of water in conflict-resolution and as an essentialbasic service in recovery and reconstruction.

Economic and social policy management Integrating water into poverty reduction strategies; role ofwater services in facilitating economic growth.

Government effectiveness and service deliveryCapacity of local government/utilities in managing, andmaintaining WSS service delivery.

Revenue mobilization and public financial management Financing WSS service provision at national and local levels.

Conditions for private sector investmentPolicies, legislation, regulations and incentives for privatesector participation in WSS service delivery.

Political participation and checks & balancesStrengthening consumer/user voice to enhanceaccountability for WSS services.

Transparency and mediaImproving access information on WSS rights, access,planning, budgeting and expenditures.

Judiciary and rule of lawEnsuring water rights and providing for recourse,arbitration, conflict resolution and appeal.

Civil societySupport sectoral social accountability mechanisms toensure effective service provision.

Respecting human rightsProcess of articulating, agreeing, implementing andmonitoring the fulfillment of rights to WSS.

Pro-poor policyWater service delivery approaches responding to incre-asing demand from poor households for adequate andaffordable services.

Gender equityGender-based approaches to service delivery, women’sparticipation in user groups and decision-making bodies;gender-disaggregated data.

Regulatory qualityRegulatory environment that encourages pro-poor servicedelivery and minimum standards for water services whilecombating water pollution.

Corruption and integrityTackling misallocation and diversion of resources intendedfor WSS service delivery improvements.

Table 1Broader Aspects of Governance and their Linkages to the Water Sector

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1.2 Sector Policy

and Legislation

The overall purpose of sector policy is to serveas the means for establishing and maintainingthe enabling environment necessary for sectordevelopment. From a governance perspective,involving all relevant stakeholders in the policy-making process is as important as thedefinition of policy objectives and mechanismsthemselves10.

With regards to objectives and mechanisms,policies tend to either (1) focus on high levelgoals such as increasing access to water andsanitation for the poor, or attaining theMillennium Development Goals (MDGs) – acommon feature of most contemporaryPoverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) –or (2) emphasize mechanisms such as the useof local resources in WSS infrastructuredevelopment, mechanisms to finance sectorprojects11, means to improve the capacity ofirrigation schemes12/13, or private sectorparticipation in service delivery, as has been

the case in Ghana14. Many policies take amore holistic approach by combiningobjectives and mechanisms, as has recentlybeen the case in Ethiopia’s sanitation sector.There, stakeholders have been working tocreate an enabling environment for andachievement of universal access to sanitationover the past five years “through theformulation of an appropriate policy andstrategy followed by the launch of a NationalWASH programme. The national hygiene andsanitation strategy sets out key principles,and the National Hygiene and SanitationProtocol describes what needs to be done toachieve universal access.” Moreover, “thestrategy and protocol are rooted ingovernment programmes like the WASHUniversal Access Programme and the HealthServices Extension Programme15.”

With regard to process, the ways in whichpolicies are developed is a major determinant ofthe quality of eventual policy outcomes. Twobroad approaches to policy development –centralized and decentralized policy-making –can be compared.

10 Gordon McGranahan and David Satterthwaite, “Governance and Getting the Private Sector to Provide Better Water and

Sanitation Services to the Urban Poor,” Human Settlements Discussion Paper Series (International Institute for Environment

and Development, 2006)11 AMCOW (2008) “Can Africa Afford to Miss the Sanitation MDG Target?” A contribution to AfricaSan 2008, African

Development Bank, World Bank and WSP p. 41.12 nternational Water Management Institute (IWMI) (2006) “Water Governance in the Mekong Region: The Need for More

Informed Policy-Making,” Water Policy Briefing, Issue 22, based on research by Francois Molle and Randolph Barker, IWMI.13 Global Water Partnership (GWP) (2005) “Integrated Water Resources Management Plans: Training Manual and Operational

Guide,” GWP, Stockholm, Sweden.14 Fuest, Veronika and Stefan A. Haffner, “PPP-Policies, Practices and Problems in Ghana’s Urban Water Supply,” Water

Policy, Vol.9. No.2 (IWA Publishing, 2007) pp 169-19215AMCOW, 2008, 41.

6

In centralized systems, an executive-levelplanning body of senior officials from apexministries coordinates and controls sectorplanning and policy development. Policyformulation is unencumbered by longconsultative processes with local governmentsand user associations. Some argue thatgovernance is thereby strengthened throughrapid development and implementation of sectorpolicy. This approach seems to have served

Tunisia and Israel well, but it does not allow forsufficient demand-side input during the policy-making process. This creates a greater risk of thepolicies not being appropriate to or accepted atlower echelons. Furthermore, this approachcircumvents the opportunity to build policynetworks with key decision-makers within andaround sector ministries that will help determinethe eventual success of policy at theimplementation stage.

Ismailia Canal, Egypt

7

Uganda’s Water Action Plan16

The first milestone in Uganda’s IWRM processwas the development of the Water Action Plan(WAP) – the first of its kind following theinternationally agreed principles from the UNConference on Environment and Developmentin Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The WAP outlined aframework for water resources managementbased on identification of the key water resour-ces issues set against the background of gapsand constraints in the enabling environment,the institutional roles and the managementinstruments. The action plan assisted thedevelopment of the water resources policy andthe legislative framework, defined short termand long-term roles and responsibilities of theinvolved institutions and assessed their needsfor capacities, capabilities and managementinstruments. Cross-sectoral aspects weredealt with in a committee with representativesfrom a number of relevant ministries, fromdistricts, from water services providers andfrom the private sector. A number of actionswere programmed all aiming at supporting theoverall policies and strategies.

Over the last ten years the IWRM frameworkhas been built up to a degree where Ugandahas asserted its role in the Nile Basin, where aconsistent policy and legislation provides theguidance and rules for priorities of water use,allocation and wastewater discharge, andwhere stakeholder participation and decen-tralization provides local level involvement. The

identified programme activities in the WaterAction Plan 1994 has provided the road mapfor this development. This has resulted, amongother things, in empowerment both at local,regional and international levels.

Mali’s National Sanitation Policy17

Mali’s first National Sanitation Forum took placein Bamako in 2006 and concluded that therewas an urgent need for a National SanitationPolicy and sub-sector strategies. Since thendraft documents have been written by theDNACPN in collaboration with the NationalDirectorate for Water (DNH) and with assistancefrom international and national consultants. Theywere discussed and improved upon at thesecond National Sanitation Forum in 2007 byrepresentatives of central governmentinstitutions, local authorities, international anddomestic NGOs, private sector representativesand donor agencies. The final version of theNational Sanitation Policy was disseminated thefollowing week to the Secretariat General of theGovernment for discussion and validation. Thenew policy determines guiding principles for thesector, sets goals to be achieved by 2015 or2020, clarifies the responsibilities of eachstakeholder, proposes the creation of acoordination mechanism, exposes guidelines fora sustainable financing of the sector anddescribes the main features of the capacitybuilding plan and M&E system to be put inplace. The Parliament was expected to pass theNational Policy law by the end of March 2008.

Box 1: Uganda and Mali : Participatory Policy-making Processes

16From Jønch-Clausen, Torkil (2004) “IWRM and Water Efficiency Plans by 2005: Why, What and How?” TEC BackgroundPapers No. 10, Global Water Partnership, Annex 4.5, p. 43.17AMCOW (2008), Box 4, p. 42.

8

In the decentralized and participatory policy-making model, local governments and waterusers can play a much stronger role in the policy-making process. By doing so they can have a fargreater impact on policy and overall sectorgovernance than they could have under acentralized policy-making model. Two countriesdemonstrating the benefits of decentralized andconsultation-rich policy-making are Mali, via itsNational Sanitation Policy18, and Uganda throughits National Water Action Plan19.

Lastly, feeding the policy-making processesdiscussed above, and the decentralizedapproach in particular, are the institutions,

organizations and individuals recommending awide variety of policies and associatedframeworks recognized as “best practices.”Though some may indeed be suitable for anumber of different countries, research indicatesthat caution should be employed by any countrythinking of adopting them before they have beenfully scrutinized and tailored to the local context.As argued by Carter20 and IWMI21, “off-the-shelf”policy proposals not tailored to local contexts butchampioned by donors and some internationalorganizations should be examined critically, asthey may be unsuitable governance tools in manycountries despite their effectiveness in others.

Legislation is the mechanism for incorporatingpolicy into national political and legal frameworks,setting water quality standards, protectingindividual and communal water rights, managingconflict resolution and, perhaps most importantly,for specifying the roles and responsibilities ofsector institutions. Given the plurality ofinstitutions involved in developing and managingthe water sector, the latter function can be aparticularly strong determinant of effective watergovernance.

In this regard, the World Health Organization(WHO) advises that the key principle that should

18AMCOW (2008), p.42.19Jonch-Clausen, Torkil (2004) “IWRM and Water Efficiency Plans by 2005: Why, What and How?” TEC Background Papers

No. 10, Global Water Partnership, 43.20Carter, Richard C. (1998) “Prospects for Sustainable Water Management Policy in Sub-Sharan Africa,” in Water Resource

Management: A Comparative Perspective, (Ed: Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi), Greenwood Publishing.21International Water Management Institute (2006)

Water management meeting, Malawi

9

underlie the legislative structure of the drinkingwater sector should be to “protect and improvepublic health through the sustainable provision ofdrinking water of adequate quality in sufficientquantities to all the population continuously at a pricewhich is affordable22.” IWRM legislation should “bebased on a stated national water policy that cutsacross sectoral and stakeholder divisions,addresses water as a resource and stresses thesocietal priority for basic human needs andecosystem protection23. In the case oftransboundary water management, clear legislationis essential to provide clarity over institutional rolesand responsibilities across shared jurisdictions andbe based on the principles of equitable andreasonable use, duty to cooperate, and disputeprevention, resolution and compliance24.

As in the case of water policy formulation, expe-rience cautions against adopting overly rigid or “off-the-shelf” legislation. While legislation empowersregulators, an overly legalistic approach towardswater quality and supply is self-defeating. “Theprimary concern should be to influencemanagement decision-making to reduce risks topublic health25.” Caution is also advised againstrelying on legislation to push forward water sectorreforms, since many are not enforced despite beingset out in law.

In practice, despite the existence of numerousgood examples, African water legislation oftenconsists of a disparate collection of laws andregulations developed over several decades, manydating back to colonial times. These are often overlycomplex burdened by redundancies as well asgaps that handicap good governance. Forexample, remnants of colonial laws may still existthat define institutional roles long after namedinstitutions have been replaced. Similarly,customary water law, in which water was seen as acollective right and safeguarded by the tribal group,may persist in spite of new laws modernizing thesector. Unfortunately, harmonizing and updatingsector legislation can be a daunting task. Strongpolitical commitment and tenacity is needed to drivethe process forward.

Lastly, policies and legislation may overreachgovernment’s capacity to implement and enforcethem. Policies that are developed withoutsufficient finance in place for implementationcomplicate sector governance by adding to theexisting collection of unenforceable or unrealisticlegislative or policy initiatives. Likewise, thepursuit of targets or objectives set out in policywithout sufficient attention being given to theprocesses and resources needed to attain themalso inhibits effective sector governance.

22World Health Organization (WHO), “WHO Seminar Pack for Drinking Water Quality”, WHO, Geneva,http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/S16.pdf 23Ferragina, Eugenia, M. Marra and D.A.L. Quagliarotti (2002) “The Role of Formal and Informal Institutions in the WaterSector,” Plan Bleu, Sophia Antipolis.24Shultz, Anna (2007) “Creating a Legal Framework for Good Transboundary Water Governance in the Zambezi and Incomati RiverBasins,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 2007(1), Georgetown University Law Centre, Georgetown.25WHO, “WHO Seminar Pack for Drinking Water Quality”

11

1.3 Regulation

A regulatory framework is basically a set ofrules, processes, and monitoring andenforcement mechanisms that ensure serviceproviders adhere to national service and qualitystandards. These also serve to “level the playingfield” between user and provider in an otherwisemonopolistic environment. A functioningregulatory system is thereby a central feature ofgood sector governance.

The effectiveness and enforceability ofregulation is a function of the quality ofgovernance writ large, or “the set of traditionsand institutions by which authority in a country isexercised26.” This can be assessed usingvariables measured by instruments such as theWorld Bank’s “World Governance Indicators:”(1) voice and accountability, (2) political stabilityand the absence of violence, (3) governmenteffectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule oflaw, and (6) control of corruption. The rule of lawis arguable the most important category withrespect to water sector regulation given that itenables enforcement of existing standards.

Within the rule of law are the key requisites of (1)sound law courts, and (2) the ability to enforcecontracts.

Regulation is typically applied to urban bulkwater suppliers and service providers. The focusis on tariffs, service quality andconsumer protection.Although the usual institutionalmodel entails reliance on asingle regulatory authority,water sector regulatorsencompass many oversightmechanisms including theauthority, a ministry, an assetholding company or authority,a customer group, inde-pendent experts and / or theservice provider itself throughself-regulation. Regulations are stipulated inlegislation, contracts, by-laws, personalcommitments and service charters. They areenforced by the regulator exacting penalties,financial incentives (both positive and negative),withdrawing licenses, political pressure and useof the media.

Self-RegulationRegulation byContract

Regulation byContract withRegulator

Regulation byAgency withLicensing Regime

Municipal Durban, RSA Zambia: 6 utilities

Regional & National DjiboutiSenegal, GabonUganda, Burkina Faso

NigerMali

Table 2: African Water Sector Regulation Models

26Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. (2004). “Governance Matters”, Washington, DC: World Bank.

Rwanda: This card is used for the sale of water.The seller ticks a box when selling a jerrican.

12

• Performance monitoring regulation by aspecific performance contract review com-mittee (PCRC) made up of a multidiscipli-nary membership. This approach is beingused in Uganda;

• Regulation by performance contract is com-mon between asset owner and public or pri-vate utility, as in Uganda and Burkina Faso;

• Regulation by contract is also used in ahybrid form in which an independent re-gulator provides supervision but also usescontracts;

• Licenses are provided by independent re-gulators, as in the case of Zambia, that setout the terms under which they are to pro-vide services;

Water meter, Senegal

In most countries, urban water services areprovided by the municipality, a public or para-public utility and by private operators that arecontracted by the municipality under perfor-mance contracts. In some cases the utility maybe regional or even national in scope, providingservices to a group of municipalities. The mostcommon ways in which service providers areregulated are listed in Table 2, above, anddescribed in further detail in the list below27:

• Self-regulation is most often used by mu-nicipalities, ministry departments or state-owned companies. Private entrepreneurservice providers also use a form of self-regulation through peer-to-peer regulationin a competitive environment;

27Adapted from Trémolet, s. & C Hunt (2006) “Taking Account of the Poor in Water Sector Regulation”, WSP, Washington, DC, USA

13

• Regulation through an asset holding au-thority such as SONEDE of Senegal thatuses a performance contract as the basisof regulation but otherwise monitors andassures good customer relations by theservice provider; and,

• Regulation by a network of stakeholders,each representing an agency facet or sub-sector.

The regulator that is often considered mostdesirable is the independent or autonomousregulatory authority. The advantage this modelhas is that the regulator is independent fromthe political arena in its decision-making and isable to satisfy the three criteria stipulated forinfrastructure regulatory systems28:

1. Legitimacy: the regulatory systemprotects consumers from the exercise ofmonopoly power, whether through highprices, low quality of service or both;

2. Credibility: investors (e.g. private sectorutilities or capital market investors) musthave confidence that the regulatorysystem will honour its commitments (e.g.maintain agreed minimum tariff levels);and

3. Transparency: regulation and relatedinformation are transparent.

27Adapted from Trémolet, s. & C Hunt (2006) “Taking Account of the Poor in Water Sector Regulation”, WSP, Washington, DC, USA28World Bank (2006) “Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems”, Washington, DC.

Water Storage Tank, Uganda

14

Complete autonomy may be the ideal but it israrely seen in practice. There is inevitably someform of government and/or political influence.In practice, partial independence has becomeaccepted although most often with the hopeand understanding that the regulatory systemis transitioning to independence. The country,however, may lack commitment, capacity, orboth. Indeed, the full independent regulatormay be too risky a model to attempt as a firststep in regulation. Also, some aspects of theideal autonomous model regulator may beincompatible with the legal and cultural normsof a country. In the real world, the bestapproach is to obtain the best fit, instead ofinsisting on a universal set of “best practices.”This is the case in South Africa, where theDepartment of Water Affairs has pro-activelyassumed the role of sector regulator, though itlacks independence. Although it is said to be intransition, it could take several years to achievethe desired state of independence fromgovernment and the political arena. Onbalance, it is far better that governmentassume a regulatory role at this time than therebe no such role being played at all.

The greatest number and most deprived ofservices are undoubtedly the poor, the MDG’sprimary target. They are special in that they areleast served by formal and regulated serviceproviders such as urban utilities. In 2006, forexample, it was reported that Maputo’s waterutility provided only 20% of the urbanpopulation through house connections and

20% by standpipes. Another 20% bought theirwater from their neighbours, 30% boughtwater from small unregulated networkoperators and the remaining 10% collected orbought water at wells or boreholes and/or fromvendors.

The poor are unlikely to have houseconnections, particularly if connection chargesare high or they do not have land tenure. Theycommonly pay much more per litre than thosethat enjoy piped water. Their services are oftenpoor and intermittent. In addition, they lackinfluence, voice and channels to complain tothe regulator, if regulation exists at all. The poorrepresent the most difficult to reach but need tobe if the MDGs are to be achieved. This is a keygovernance issue for the water sector.

Reaching the poor can be facilitated throughspecial provisions in the regulatory framework.

Water vendor, Uganda

15

Trémolet and Halpern have maderecommendations for improving servicedelivery for the poor. These are areparaphrased below29.

Regulating access expansion: Coveragetargets may be overly restrictive by definingservice at higher levels than can be affordedwhether by the utility or the customer. Allowingfor differentiated service levels, such as throughregulated independent networks or vendors,can provide greater access and improveservice delivery. Coverage targets might alsobe too ambitious, making it impossible forutilities to achieve even under pro-poorperformance contracts. Alternatively, usingpositive incentives rather than penalties toencourage achievement of targets (particularlyin poor areas) can be more effective, especiallywhen funds are scarce and capital financingdifficult.

Regulating tariffs: Tariffs need to be set atappropriate levels to permit cost recovery andcontribute to investments while not generatingexcessive profits. Tariffs that are too low,although favoured by politicians, lead tofinancial insolvency and inability to extendservices, particularly in the less accessible poorareas. On the other hand, tariffs that are toohigh, as may happen in non-competitive orunregulated environments, provide little

incentive to improve productivity and enablepoor management and rent-seeking.

Subsidies, where they exist, need to be welltargeted. The rich are subsidized throughsewerage provision and piped water supply,whereas the poor who are excluded fromsewerage networks and pay higher prices perlitre of water to vendors. Subsidizedconnections such as “social connections,”using clear cut definitions of poor customers,are often better targeted. Also, differentiatedservice levels (regulated standpipes and privateand condominial networks) provide for targetingand a form of self regulation. When faced withlow tariffs and difficulties in extending services,there may be possibilities of providing financialincentives to the provider to specifically extendservices into the poorer areas.

29Trémolet, S., & J. Halpern (2006) Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services, Getting Better Service to Poor People”, GPOBA

Working Series Paper 8, Washington, DC

New handpump,

rural Uganda

16

Regulating service quality: One way to keeptariffs at affordable levels is to provide lower-cost services through the use of servicestandards matched to local needs. Servicestandards need to be flexible, and potentialtrade-offs between service quality and priceneed to be recognized. Care also needs to betaken in applying excessively rigid waterresources regulation such as banningentrepreneurs from abstracting from wells nearpoor areas when they are providing a legitimateand improved service. Similarly, the uniform

application of service standards can create lostopportunities of cost-savings and reaching thepoor. An example is mandatory 24 hourpressure. In some areas reduction of pressureand/or intermittent services (using roof tanks)may be appropriate if well-regulated. There areother areas of service standards, such as hoursof service, pressure, taste, physicalappearance and customer service standardsthat could be researched further to findinnovative ways by which costs could belowered without jeopardizing public health.

Regulating alternative service providers: Insome countries, alternative service providersprovide services to up to 60 and 70% of urbanpopulations. Unfortunately they are oftenunrecognized and are regulated againstwithout understanding what they have to offerin extending services to the poor. Indeed,alternative service providers may be the onlyalternative many utilities have in extendingservices into poor areas. The first step is to geta better understanding of the situation.Alternative providers offer services in manyways: piped networks, standpipes andvendors, and tankers. Domestic resellers(neighbours) may also provide water to asubstantial percentage of consumers.Bringing alternative providers into the formalsector would be complicated, and manymight shy away from being “formalized”. Theycan be brought under the regulation umbrellaby being flexible and recognizing the verydifferent conditions and needs in improving

Rural water supply,

Cape Verde

.....

17

services in low income areas. “Light handed”regulation is required in order to keep costsdown and avoid driving those providers out ofbusiness. One objective should be to providefor a “level playing field” and focus on thoseaspects most important to the consumer(affordability, reliability and quality) while

leaving other less important criteria to marketforces. One approach is through licensing anddefining areas of operation and servicesprovided. Monitoring can be conducted byorganizations closer to the service areascontracted to do so by the regulator, such asan association of alternative providers.

Flap valves of the Massingir dam, Mozambique

18

1.4 Decentralization

The second principle of the agreementstemming from the International Conference onWater and Environment (ICWE) (Dublin, Ireland,31 January 1992) states that:

Water development and managementshould be based on a participatoryapproach, involving users, planners andpolicy-makers at all levels. The participatoryapproach involves raising awareness of theimportance of water among policy-makersand the general public. It means thatdecisions are taken at the lowestappropriate level, with full public consultationand involvement of users in the planning andimplementation of water projects.

Taking decisions at the lowest appropriate levelis referred to as the principle of subsidiarity. Inthe water sector its goal is to achieve moresustainable use of water resources through theclose involvement of stakeholders at the locallevel30. To achieve this, decentralization needsto be implemented in a transparent, accoun-table and participatory manner31. It also needssupportive and enabling policies, legislation,regulation and adequate capacity within localgovernments. Local stakeholders must parti-

cipate in setting strategic directions, planningand implementation. All of this calls for sub-stantial local government capacity and strongpolitical commitment32.

Decentralization entails the transfer of authorityfor decision-making, financing and mana-gement to representative and accountablelocal governments as well as the delegation ofcertain public functions to autonomous orsemi-autonomous bodies, such as publicutilities. Fiscal decentralization requires bothimproving local revenue generation capacity

30Dinar, Ariel et al. (2005) “Decentralization of Basin Management: A Global Analysis,” World Bank Policy Working Research

Paper 3637, Washington, USA.31Water Aid (2008) “Local Millennium Development Goals Initiative: Local Government and Water and Sanitation Delivery,”

London, UK.32Rees, et al. (2008)

Kids enjoying free flowing water

19

and devolving budgeting and expenditureauthority to the lower levels. It can be arguedthat the retention of sector financing control bythe centre can have its advantages, such asbeing able to better respond to nationalpriorities and donors that do not normally dealwith sub-national authorities. On the otherhand, national governments tend to give lowerpriority to the water sector than localgovernments. Control over budgeting andexpenditure by local government facilitatesneeds-based and demand-responsive serviceprovision33.

It is recognized that if roles, responsibilities andfunctions are to be devolved to lower levels,and if these lower levels lack human resources,management capacity and financial resources,then water service provision will suffer34. Costsmay actually increase in parallel with decliningservice levels. Obviously, a balance is neededin control over sector financing andmanagement that is tailored to specific andevolving realities.

Many African countries have attempted todecentralize the water sector but few haveachieved devolution (successful transfer ofdecision-making authority). Most have de-concentrated the apex ministry in some form orother, but are reluctant to truly devolve andhave been slow in resources and assetstransfer. Key staff may have been moved to thelocal levels, but they continue to report to thecentre, which retains power over their functionsand performance. Examples of this among the

countries visited through the Water Gover-nance Study include Malawi, Kenya, Tunisiaand Burkina Faso. Far closer to devolution inthe water sector are South Africa, Uganda andSenegal.

Despite its potential benefits, however, there isalso a danger in decentralizing too quickly,before enabling policies and legislation are inplace and before local capacity and compe-tence can be strengthened. This applies inparticular to the areas of procurement, projectand financial management. A major challengein this regard is the actual level of controlassigned to local level institutions to determinehow funds will be spent on sector developmentactivities. One indicator of central governmentsupport for decentralization is their willingnessto support and facilitate local level financialmanagement without maintaining intrusivecontrol over decision-making35.

33WaterAid, 200834Global Water Partnership (GWP) (2008) “Water Financing and Governance,” GWP, Stockholm, Sweden35Dinar, et al. (2005)

Massingir dam, Mozambique

20

In Uganda for example, the government hasdeveloped and implemented policies and aninstitutional framework that provides clarity andseparation of functional roles and respon-sibilities with minimum overlap, gaps andduplication. Service provision and mana-gement is undertaken at the lowest appropriatelevel and procurement has been devolved todistrict levels, accompanied by regular audit,capacity building, follow-up monitoring andenforcement of findings, and feedback forlearning lessons.Similarly, in Senegal, decentralization has beenimplemented so that management of serviceprovision is done at the lowest appropriate level

and technical capabilities, resources andmandates adequately devolved to regional andlocal levels to effectively support programmesand projects. The needs and preferences oflocal communities are included in sector plansand project designs through participatory pro-cesses, and local operation and maintenancemanagement is achieving cost-effective servicedelivery. Asset ownership is formalized, andconsumer organizations are legally recognized.

While South Africa has demonstrated goodpractice in achieving some significant progressin decentralization, problems remain inharmonizing sector legislation to clarify rolesand responsibilities of stakeholders. Theprocess of asset transfer has not beenstraightforward, and asset management hasbeen deficient in the smaller municipalities.Shortage of skills among staff in municipalitiesis a key constraint, despite longstandingtraining efforts. Procurement skills areparticularly weak, resulting sometimes in non-transparent transactions and rent seeking.

Malawi is attempting to decentralize its watersector but is facing many difficulties. Beginningwith a lack of clarity in and support fordecentralization from the Ministry of LocalGovernment, decentralization of the sector hasbeen handicapped by a chronic lack ofcapacity especially at district levels that hasresulted in deconcentration (centralgovernment staff posted at the local level toadminister programs) rather than devolution.Accompanied by little progress in fiscaldecentralization, most sector development iscentrally controlled and sometimes subject toMzimba water management committee, Malawi

21

political influence. While there has beenprogress in putting in place regional waterboards, the management of significant sectordevelopment initiatives is controlled byprogram and project management units, whichcan bypass the government structures.Community participation in decision-making isstill in its early stages.

In assessing what would be the best balanceneeded for decentralization and preservation ofresidual capacity in central government, thefunctions at each level need to be determined.The following paragraphs provide examplesunder the principal functions of (1) planning andbudgeting, (2) project supervision andmanagement, (3) procurement, and (4)monitoring and evaluation (M&E). For each one,a suitable balance in the devolution ofresponsibilities between the centralgovernment and the decentralizedstakeholders (regions, local governments, andcommunities) is discussed under the generalprinciple of subsidiarity.

These indicators propose a “generic point ofbalance” applicable in the context of countrieswhere decentralization is still rather limited.They may not be as relevant for countriesalready far along in the decentralizationprocess, such as Benin.

• Planning and budgeting. A balanced dis-tribution of functions between the centreand decentralized stakeholders could bethat central government is responsible forcoordinating dialogue on and setting na-

tional sector policy, consolidating budge-ting, mobilizing and allocating resources,and arranging for transfers from the Minis-try of Finance. Local stakeholders wouldidentify needs, participate in planning (lo-cal development plans and local water andsanitation plans), channel demands andset investment priorities and formulate lo-cal rolling plans and budgets. In otherwords, the central government would bemainly responsible for facilitating the sec-tor’s planning and budget and setting therules for distribution and use of resources,while the decentralized stakeholders wouldbe responsible for local planning, projectdesign and effective use of resources.

• Project supervision and management co-vers tasks linked to implementation: raisingawareness, facilitating community capa-city building and dialogue with beneficia-ries, project planning and technical design,works supervision, information-education-communication, etc. Most of these activi-ties are carried out by service providers(companies, consultants, NGOs) under thesupervision of the project team inside theministries in charge of water supply and/orsanitation. An appropriate balance betweenthe central and local level would be one inwhich these tasks are supervised and ma-naged by decentralized stakeholders ei-ther at the regional level or by decentrali-zed project teams that may be supportedby external technical assistance. As such,the role of the centre would be confined toquality assurance and administrative andfinancial management support.

22

Where legal authority for water supply and/orsanitation has been devolved to localgovernment (as in South Africa, Tanzania andUganda) they should have the capacity forassuming responsibility for implementation.The reality in most African countries, however,is that decentralization has reached only thedeconcentration stage, and the main flow ofresources is still channeled through sectorapex ministries. Local governments do not yethave the capacity and staff to assume this levelof responsibility (as is the case currently inMalawi and Mozambique). As a temporarymeasure, a reasonable balance would be thatthe local governments delegate part or totalresponsibility for supervision and managementto the region, or contract with them fortechnical assistance (as is the case in Senegal).

• Procurement: Experience in devolving res-ponsibility for procurement has emphasi-zed the essential need to first build procu-rement skills and capacities locally (e.g.Uganda). A generic point of balance in themeantime could be that the region bemade responsible for preparation of ten-der documents, managing the tender pro-cess and transfer responsibility for contractmanagement to local authorities. The cen-tre would be responsible for oversight, qua-lity assurance and relations with the financeministry and donors or lending institutions.This balance is not ideal but is a step to-wards devolution and ahead of an entirelycentralized procurement process (as is thecase in Burkina Faso) without requiringsubstantial reforming of procurement re-

Water supply facilities in a

school, Rwanda

23

gulations. It is stressed, however, that eventhis partial devolution requires trained andexperienced procurement staff.

• Monitoring and evaluation is one activitywhere decentralization is critically impor-tant from both data collection and feed-back perspectives. An appropriate balancewould be that all the responsibilities rela-ted to the production of data should be asdecentralized as possible (local govern-ments, water service providers, water userassociations, project implementing teams,communities), while the responsibilities fordata consolidation and management (i.e.storage, maintenance, publishing) wouldbe located at regional and central levels.The increasing accessibility of online com-munications in rural areas in many Africancountries has made the centralized mana-gement of web-based databases feasible,for their contents can now be made ac-cessible to any authorized stakeholder withan internet connection.

In this configuration, data collection is theresponsibility of (trained and authorized)local government, municipality or serviceprovider with community support and par-ticipation. Data collection would be at ei-ther local or regional levels and analysis,storage, feedback and disseminationwould be a central responsibility. It shouldbe recognized that the dissemination anduse of data is as important as its collec-

tion and analysis. Management at all le-vels therefore needs to trained in its pro-per use. Likewise, the public needs to begiven access to the full range of informa-tion concerning their systems and overallsector status, including access figures,plans, budgets and expenditure data.

While these represent ideal models to strive for,there is no one-size-fits-all solution to makingdecentralization a reality. Each country isattempting to achieve its own balance and rateof change according to its stage ofdevelopment, size and administrative capa-bilities. Devolution calls for a major effort instrengthening local government administrative,financial management and technical capacities,increasing financial resources allocated to thesector, and substantial changes in attitudes

Lake Kivu in Cyangugu, Rwanda

24

and perceptions among bureaucrats, politi-cians and the general public. Institutional roles,responsibilities and accountabilities must alsochange. While specific tools, such as localdevelopment plans, have been promoted to aiddecentralization, local governments often lackthe necessary skills and political maturity toplan their sector development andmanagement effectively, frequently resulting inunrealistic, non-implementable and inequitablelocal development plans and programs.

Decentralization is normally driven by autho-rities outside of the water sector, such asOffices of the President or Cabinet, throughMinistries of Local Government or Finance.Sector agencies respond to and comply withdecentralization reforms and directives withvarying degrees of enthusiasm and commit-ment. Strong and consistent leadership fromthe highest levels is therefore necessary toencourage change in bureaucratic practice andprocess.

Decentralization has developed from a relativelysimple concept expressed as subsidiarity to acomplex and often confusing reality that exists inmany partially implemented forms across Africa.But certain areas of emphasis are clearlyeffective in advancing the process ofdecentralization to achieve sustainability ofsector development. These include continuedand more targeted effort in capacity building atall levels, especially in local governments.Supporting and assisting stakeholders at all

levels in accepting, adapting to and managingchange is often overlooked, but critical.

To achieve greater success in decentralizingthe management of water service provision tothe lowest appropriate levels, it is recognizedthat the following criteria need to be consideredin designing sector support initiatives:

• The lowest appropriate levels for the ma-nagement of service provision have beenidentified for the range of sector services,considering the comparative advantagesof each level, their strengths and their ca-pabilities;

• The functional roles and responsibilities ofall sector stakeholders are clearly definedand separate from one another, so thatconfusion and conflicts resulting from over-laps, duplication and gaps are eliminated;

• Stakeholder relationships are clear, legiti-mized and governed by written proce-dures, agreements or contracts, so that allparties are aware of each others’ roles andresponsibilities and can monitor eachothers’ performance and results;

• Interests, incentives, mandates and res-ponsibilities are aligned among all stake-holders and there is a shared commitmentto achieving sustainable service provision;

• Regional and local level responsibilities areadequately supported by the decentrali-

25

zation of skills, capabilities, assets, humanand financial resources, and mandates;

• Capacity building is aimed at ensuring corecompetencies at all levels; and,

• Devolved procurement is accompanied bycapacity building, effective monitoring andregular audit.

Lastly, external funding from donor agencies isshifting from project-based to programme-based, and eventually to basket funding andSWAp mechanisms, as local level financialmanagement competencies and accountabilityevolves. Central governments will thereforeneed to proportionately increase their fundingto the decentralized sector, and localgovernment revenue generation capacity willalso need to increase.

A handpump in rural Senegal

26

1.5 Sector-wide

Approaches

The sector-wide approach (SWAp) hastraditionally fallen under the rubric of theprogramme-based approach to aid delivery:the coordinated disbursement and implemen-tation of development assistance at theprogramme rather than project level with theintention to reduce transaction costs andimprove aid effectiveness. While this may stillbe the case in many aid-dependant countries,governments are increasingly viewing SWApsas a means for coordinating and facilitatingsector development. In other words, aiddelivery may only be one part of this mecha-nism. As more countries develop strongerinstitutional capacities to manage them,SWAps are becoming increasingly recognizedas a “common sense planning tool that canhelp politicians and planners better dividepublic resources over priorities36” and a way ofcoordinating a complex sector, building trustthrough dialogue among all stakeholders andstrengthening domestic ownership37. Amongstthe countries visited through the African WaterGovernance Study, Uganda provided examplesof best practices in this regard. These arecentred on annual technical performanceassessments and joint sector reviews (JSRs)led by a sector-wide stakeholder workinggroup (SSWG).

SWAps typically encompass five mainelements: public financial management, sectorpolicy, accountability and performancemonitoring, aid alignment and harmonization,and institutions and capacities – all directlyrelevant to sector governance. They cantherefore link policy and planning objectives tobudgeting, implementation and monitoring; setup a framework for scaling up coverageimprovements over time; and generate buy-infrom ministries of finance and donors.

Eleven African countries are now using SWApsin the water sector and many more have SWApin their health and education sectors (see Table3.2b). As noted above, key elements in movingthe sector forward as a team are being foundto be SWAp’s SSWGs, regular sector technicalassessment and JSRs. These can draw allsector stakeholders together, harmonizeapproaches, underpin monitoring, reduceadministration and transaction costs, providean annual stakeholder review of the sector andidentify key areas for improvement on anannual basis. In doing so SWAps can provide aharmonized approach for donor support to thesector and facilitate the use of earmarkedsector budget support.

Sector policies and strategic plans, importantelements of any SWAp, are meant to providethe enabling environment for and articulate thedirection of sector development efforts. As

36Boesen, Nils and Dietvorst, Desiree (2007) “Sector Wide Approaches: From an aid delivery to a sector development

perspective,” Reflections from the Joint Learning Programme on Sector Wide Approaches, January 2006 to April 2007: 14,

www.train4dev.net. 37Train4Dev., www.train4dev.net

27

noted in the discussion on sector policy andlegislation in section 1.1.2, they provide aframework for overall sector governance. Asthe Joint Learning Programme (JLP) has found,“cobbling together a reasonably coherentpolicy framework can be one of the first stepstowards a sector or sub-sector programmeand often a number of policies and acts existthat could begin to form the basis for a broaderapproach38.” Yet this is no simple task. One ofthe largest challenges associated withadopting a SWAp in the water sector is theexistence of numerous overlapping policiesand the multiple institutions and actors involvedin their implementation. Given the complexity ofthe sector (with sub-sectors includingagriculture, forestry, environment in addition toWSS and IWRM), it is often said that SWApsare most effectively introduced at the sub-sector level, before being expanded to includeall sub-sectors.

The second major element of the sector-wideapproach is the coordination and managementof a “sector budget,” which in light of the pluralityof institutions and budgets involved is difficult toundertake in the water sector. One mechanismused to simplify budget decision-making andmanagement processes at the macro level is theMTEF, a three stage activity and output-basedfiscal planning process fed by fiscal policyobjectives, macroeconomic projections andmedium-term budget estimates. In sectors suchas water, where the development of a sectorbudget may be impossible due to the fact that

most budgets are created at the institutionalrather than programmatic level, it may be moreuseful to return to the essence of the SWAp as agovernance mechanism. That is, rather thantrying to create a sector budget out of thin air,the SWAp, in theory, encourages andnecessitates inter-institutional dialogue andfinancial coordination in the pursuit of sharedobjectives. This is particularly important inrelation to the management of aid contributionsand donor coordination. Since considerabledonor funding is now disbursed at theprogramme level, a SWAp is a means throughwhich dollars can be channelled to appropriateareas within the sector and aligned with nationalbudgeting processes.

This, of course, requires sufficient financialmanagement capacity to be in place in the focuscountry, which is often far from the case in reality.Dutch experience in Benin, for example, showedthat although considerable preparatory work hasbeen done by donors to help setup a pooledfund mechanism, the formal “conditions forSWAp” have not yet been met due to theweakness of local public financial managementcapacity39. Similarly, even when basic budgetingsystems are in place, donors and thegovernment in question may still not agree thatSWAps are the best approach. The Netherlandsfound that in Bangladesh, institutionalweaknesses, lack of political commitment andlack of interest from donors heavily constrainedopportunities for a water sector SWAp, and theDutch ended up continuing their project-based

39Van Woersem, Bert and Heun, Jetze, “Evaluation of Sector Support and Approaches in the Water Sector,” Final Report,

Policy and Operations Department (IOB), Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS), May 2008. 38Boesen and Dietvorst (2007), p. 20

28

approach40. Beyond the sector’s complexity, anadditional factor behind this reluctance is thebelief amongst some practitioners that SWApsmay increase corruption risks due to the lower

levels of project supervision, particularly on thepart of donors, they sometimes entail.

These elements combine to determine in largepart the scope for capacity building and reach ofperformance monitoring also typically included insector-wide approaches. A SWAp’s holisticapproach to sector development can helpprioritize capacity building needs and identifythose willing and able to undertake them. Yet itcan also unearth common disjunctures betweenpolicy objectives and a particular government’scapacity to implement them. Similarly, thetransparency promoted by the inclusion of allsector stakeholders in planning and budgetingprocesses can contribute to increasedaccountability. For example, many SWAps nowencourage participation of user groups in thedesign and implementation process andfacilitate stakeholder platforms to ensure theirvoices are heard41. With regards to monitoring,mechanisms such as Sector TechnicalAssessments and JSRs are said to helpstrengthen mutual accountability betweengovernments and donors.

40Van Woersem and Heun, (2008)41Boesen and Dietvorst, (2007)

Mulunguzi dam, Zomba, Malawi

29

South African’s water SWAp represents agood example of the way in which suchthese mechanisms are less about donorcoordination than about guiding sectorgovernance and development. Now in itsthird phase, «Masibambane», as it is kn ownlocally, has evolved from a water andsanitation policy and strategic planning toolto one that is guiding capacity buildingefforts not only whithin the WSS sub-sectorbut also water resources mangement. Thesethree phases are summarized below.Massibambane I :

• Three-year €75m pilot initiative begun in2001 focused only on supporting WSSservices in three of nice provinces. Intra-sector collaboration is the overriding theme.

• Managed by the Departement of Water Af-fairs but seen as a vehicle for sector de-centralization

• Water services policy (10-year strategic vi-sion and objectives for the sector) andtransfer policy (decentralization of WSS)developed.

Masibambane II :

• Objectives : strengthen water services sec-tor ; support local government ; expandfrom three provinces to entire country.

• 2004-2007, €60m• Identified too much of a facus on infra-

structure as opposed to operation andmaintenance of water services, poor qua-lity of sanitation services, the need for animproved monitoring system and a depen-dency on consulting support.

Masibambane III :

• Objectives : promote IWRM in the watersector throughout entire country

Box 2: South African’s Water SWAp

(« Masibambane »)1

30

1.6 Sector Financial Management

Effective water sector financial management iscrucial if services are to be provided equitably,transparently and efficiently. A review of sectorfinancial management practices can be brokendown into two broad categories: sectorfinancing and financial governance (budgetingand accounting mechanisms).

With respect to sector financing, a variety offiduciary mechanisms have been used in Africato finance service delivery, including inter-ministerial transfers, off-budget allocations (e.g.donor funding), cross-subsidization, taxation,user fees, and public-private partnerships42. Therelative utility and success of these mechanismsdepend to a large extent on the state ofdecentralization, poverty levels and affordabilityof services, external donor support, and theeffectiveness of financial management systems.In the vast majority of African countries, userfees and debt financing are not a realistic meansto fund service delivery alone43; government anddonor support will be required in most cases forthe foreseeable future.

Budget formulation and expendituremanagement frameworks are key componentsof sector financial governance. As in other

sectors, it is important that water sectorbudget formulation be policy sensitive, in thatpolicy objectives are reflected in sectorallocations. Budgets should reflect sectortargets, such as the MDGs or national sectordevelopment strategies, while also ensuringthat allocations to the water sector arebalanced with those to health and education.Strong accounting and monitoring systemsshould also be in place to ensure resources areallocated equitably to ensure the diverse needsof various user groups are addressed. As notedin the World Bank’s Public Expenditure andFinancial Accountability (PEFA) PerformanceMeasurement Framework, the outputs of thesemonitoring mechanisms, such as year-endfinancial statements and budget executionreports, should also be available to the public.

Medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs)and the Medium-Term Budget Frameworks(MTBFs) and Medium-Term Fiscal Frameworks(MTFF) that precede them have becomecommon tools to strengthen policy and spendinglinkages in macro-level expenditure planning.However, the capacity of many African countriesto implement them effectively is uncertain,particularly in the water sector44. Amongst thethree, MTBFs – focused on budgets for individualspending agencies – are often recognized as themost suitable mechanism for a highly complexsector such as water.

42Mehta, Merra and Mehta, Dinesh (2007) “Financing Water and Sanitation at Local Level,” Draft Synthesis Paper, WaterAid UK43Savage (2003)44Oxford Policy Management (2002) “MTEFs: Panacea or Dangerous Distraction?” OPM Review, May, Oxford, UK.

31

In South Africa, MTEFs and rolling plans are onlypartly effective. Allocations are still subject topolitical influence, although those to lower-levelsare formula-based and weighted to reflectneeds, population, poverty and implementationcapacity. Efforts are being made to continuallyimprove budget and expenditure monitoring toanalyze equity, effectiveness and efficiency oftargeted subsidies. Uganda is also using MTEFsand formula-based allocations to localgovernments. There the MTEF is used todevelop multi-year projections of sectorexpenditures. These provide stakeholders andlocal governments with reasonable and reliableestimates of future budget allocations, whichenable them to develop their own relativelyaccurate three-year rolling plans. Allocationformulae were developed in Uganda byconsensus and are said to reflect local levelneeds, although it has taken several years tohave them used on a consistent basis. Lastly, InMalawi, although MTEFs and rolling budgets are

in place and are consistent with policies,allocations are not predictable and formula-based allocations are not being used. Moroever,monitoring is weak and it is not yet possible tomeasure service equity or distribution ofallocations among various user groups.

While many of the tools intended to improvefinancial management (MTEFs, MTBFs, rollingplans and budgets, accounting systems, valuefor money audit etc.), have been found useful,the key areas requiring attention are allocationprocedures to local governments, equity ofallocation among users, efficiency of subsidytargeting, and financial management at locallevels. Participatory planning and budgetinginvolving users and local governments, forinstance, is essential for improving allocationdistribution, subsidy targeting and equitableservice provision. In this respect decentra-lization is viewed as a means to improve budgetallocation effectiveness by enabling lower levelsto participate in the formulation and expendituremanagement processes. Yet capacityweaknesses, especially at local governmentlevels, have proven to be a significantconstraining factor45. One response has beenthe use of conditional grants to local levels,changing to block grants as capacity increases.Furthermore, civil society organizations such asuser organizations and particularly advocacyNGOs have key roles in monitoring allocations,implementation and management of waterresources and services delivery.

45Savage, David (2003) “Governance and Financing of Water Supply and Sanitation in Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa,”

WSP Sector Working Papers: No.5, Water and Sanitation Programme; and Rees et al. (2008)

Waste Stabilization

Pond in Gulu,

Uganda

32

In light of the above, the following points repre-sent recognized mechanisms that can be usedto improve water sector financial management:

• Rolling plans and budgets to provide re-liable estimates of future allocations en-abling effective planning at local levels;

• Inclusion in sector budgets and expendi-ture monitoring of all sources of funds, in-cluding national, donor, banks, taxes, ta-riffs and NGO contributions;

• Accurate financial information enabling theanalysis of spending efficiency, equity andeffectiveness in meeting social needs;

• Formula-based and weighted allocationprocedures that reflect poverty, popula-tion, existing services and capacity;

• Harmonization of sector visions and targetswith budgets, allocations and subsidies;

• Financial management and accounting incompliance with recognized standards;

• External audit of expenditures is requiredat least annually and should include value-for-money checks; and,

• Applying lessons learned from government-wide PFM review processes using mecha-nisms such as the World Bank’s PFM Per-formance Measurement Framework46.

46The World Bank’s PFM Performance Measurement Framework allows for the measurement of country PFM systems,

processes and institutions over time. It is based upon a set of high-level indicators that measure a country’s performance

against critical dimensions of performance of an open and orderly PFM system at the central government level. As of

September 1, 2008, PFM Performance Reports had been completed for 23 African countries, with reports “substantially

completed” in 12 others. More information and country reports can be obtained through www.pefa.org.

Water Pumping in

Nakuru, Kenya

33

Water is life, water is fun!

34

1.7 Monitoring

and Evaluation47

Reasoning Well-functioning water sector monitoring andevaluation (M&E) systems – the mechanisms inplace to track water resource consumption andavailability; measure access to WSS services;analyse project inputs, outputs and outcomes;and collect data for sector planning purposes –lie at the heart of good water governance dueto their impact on transparency andaccountability, environmental sustainability, theequitable distribution of resources and sectorplanning.

M&E systems provide the foundation fortransparent and accountable sectorgovernance. Through the use of data collectedthrough these systems on sector investmentsand their associated outputs, for example –such as how much money has been invested,what it was used for, who received it andwhether value for money was achieved –sector stakeholders can hold politicians andgovernment officials to account for theirdecisions and be better equipped to participatein sector planning. Without these mechanismsin place, decision-makers are free to allocatethese resources with impunity. This is to thedetriment of the vast majority that are affectedby misallocations and corruption known topermeate the water sector in many Africancountries48.

M&E systems are also essential safeguards forensuring the sustainable use of waterresources. Through the use of data derivedfrom the indicators, tools and methods forbasic water resources monitoring that havebecome relatively well known and establishedacross Africa – as opposed to those for waterand sanitation services, which tend to be farless harmonized across countries – measurescan be put in place to mitigate the depletion ofunderground water tables49, the pollution ofsurface water resources and the decline in flow

47This text draws extensively from Cowater International’s Final Report (Cowater, 2008) from the Pan African Water Sector M&E

Assessment project undertaken on behalf of the African Water Facility (AWF). The report provides guidance on improving African

M&E systems at the country, sub-regional and regional levels in addition to a comprehensive assessment of the current state of

water M&E systems across the continent. For more information or copies of the report, contact Mr. Peter Akari at the AWF.48Transparency International (TI) (2008) “Global Corruption Report 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector,” Cambridge

University Press, New York USA.49Cowater International Inc. (2008a) “Pan African Water Sector M&E Assessment: Final Report,” African Water Facility, July, Tunis.

African Water Facility meeting on Monitoring and Evaluation, Tunis 2006

35

of major river systems. Without such data andthe policy, regulatory and project-related mea-sures that it would feed, averting innumerable“tragedy of the commons” scenarios – wherecommon resources such as river systems aredepleted or destroyed through the unregulatedand self-interested activities of countlessindividuals – becomes next to impossible, Thisserves to undermine the sustainability ofexisting water resources.

In addition, water sector M&E systems areessential tools for ensuring equitable access towater resources and WSS services, a keycharacteristic of good water governance.Monitoring tools such as Water Point Mapping,for example, which provides a geo-referencedmap of water points with essential informationon water point location, functionality anddistribution and is currently being used inMalawi, endow sector practitioners and civilsociety organizations with the information theyneed to improve access to water on the basesof need and equity rather than politicalinfluence.

Finally, M&E is an invaluable tool for sectorplanning and management. As noted in arecent World Bank report on developingresults-based M&E systems, effectivegovernance is not only about ensuring inputsare directed to the appropriate destinations,but also that their impact and outcomes are

measurable50. This allows practitioners toextract lessons learned, both good and bad,and thereby strengthen future programminginitiatives.

Nevertheless, while the use of informationderived from M&E systems for planning andbudgeting purposes is a strong indicator ofgood water governance, the bridge betweendata collection and use for these purposes islacking in many African countries. For example,while water resources and WSS data may becollected on a regular basis by the sector’sapex ministry, such as the ministry of water, itmay not be shared with other ministries andorganizations involved in the sector that couldalso use it to improve programme and policyplanning and management. Though this isoften the case domestically, such data – ifavailable and reliable – can also assist foreign

50Kusek, Jody Z. (2004), “Ten Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System: A Handbook for Development

Practitioners,” World Bank, Washington DC.

A well in rural

Burkina Faso

36

organizations and governments support acountry’s water sector from the outside. Forinstance, data collected by the Water andSanitation Programme (WSP)-Africa for their 16country report on progress towards theMDGs51 and by the WHO/UNICEF’s JointMonitoring Programme (JMP) helps donorsand international NGOs develop programmesto support those countries or sub-sectors thathave made limited progress to date in attainingtheir WSS MDG targets.

History and Current Status of Water Sector M&ECurrent challenges related to M&E have deephistorical roots. When monitoring systems werefirst introduced in Africa during the colonialperiod, they were primarily used to surveysurface water resources. Whereas rivergauging networks were generally wellmaintained under colonial authority andprotection, they have since proven expensiveto operate and protect from vandalism. TheDrinking Water Decade of the 1980’s saw anincrease in M&E of water supply projects.Project-based M&E systems establishedduring this period were intended primarily forproject management and post-projectevaluation, but like their water resourcemonitoring predecessors of the colonial era,most have since been abandoned ordownscaled after project completion andwithdrawal of donor support.

By the mid-1990s it had become increasinglyapparent that in the face of population growth

and systems breakdown, the number of peoplewithout access to safe water supplies andbasic sanitation were increasing rather thandecreasing in many countries. Furthermore,doubts were being voiced about the reliabilityof country data. By the end of the 1990s,donor fatigue and frustration with lack ofprogress and accountability were tangible.These soon spawned renewed efforts that ledto the development of the MDGs, whichthough aimed at poverty alleviation includedkey targets related to water supply and

51WSP (2006) “Getting Africa on Track to meet the MDGs on Water and Sanitation: A Status Review of 16 African Countries,”

AfDB, AMCOW, EUWI, UNDP, WSP-Africa, Nairobi, Kenya.

Collecting water, Cape Verde

37

sanitation. During that decade the WHO andUNICEF teamed up to jointly track progresstowards these goals through the JMP, but it wasnot until 2000 that JMP statistics became basedon direct household surveys and confidencewas restored.

Since 2000 there have been increasingdemands for transparency and accountability bythe Auditors General (AGs) of donor countries.With aid gradually shifting away from exclusivelyproject based support to sector wide, pooledfunding or direct budgetary supportmechanisms, the AGs have been calling forincreased and improved monitoring andevaluation of expenditures and use of this lesstrackable support52. Such statements stronglyemphasize the need to create and/or strengthenmonitoring and evaluation systems in the watersector since monitoring inputs, outputs andoutcomes is one way by which donors canassure their taxpayers of accountability. M&E willtherefore become increasingly important in theyears to come as the transparency andaccountability of the budgetary supportmechanism become more widely scrutinized indonor countries.

In essence, monitoring has become an essentialtool for both sector development andenvironmental sustainability. While monitoring

progress regarding access is imperative forglobal reporting purposes, far more in-depthand better quality monitoring is needed forsector management, transparency andaccountability, especially within the budgetsupport framework.

Currently, M&E systems across the Africancontinent can generally be categorized intothree broad quality-related groups: strong,intermediate and weak. Yet even these generalcategorizations tend to err on the optimisticside. Most M&E systems across Africa areweak. Typically, they are project based andfragmented, have little capacity to gather,analyze and report, lack national frameworks,lack resources and sustainability and suffer fromthe little demand for the information they offer.Many evaluations have been undertaken, butthey again are of projects and serve mainly thepurposes of donors and do little to supportplanning, budgeting and managementprocesses. Countries with intermediate levelM&E systems all have substantial weaknessesbut are otherwise committed to their upgrading.These systems can thereby be argued to offerthe best potential for early improvement atreasonable cost. Likewise, those few countrieswith strong M&E systems also need to improvethem but have gone to some length inestablishing functional M&E.

52Cowater International (2008a)

Box 3: Diversity of M&E Systems in Africa Today

38

Water sector M&E systems in Africa vary significantlyin scope, quality and reliability. Below aredescriptions of two systems that exemplify thisdiversity from both the higher (Senegal) and lower(Congo-Brazzaville) ends of the scale.

Senegal’s Programme d’Eau Potable et d’Ass-ainissement du Millénaire (PEPAM)

PEPAM is a national programme launched in2005 to help Senegal reach the water and sanitation MDGs. With support from WSP-Africa,PEPAM’s Programme Coordination Unit (PCU)has developed a framework for a national waterinformation system that will aggregate andharmonize Using an electronic databasemanagement system (DBMS), this framework willallow stakeholders to monitor the evolution ofaccess to safe water and sanitation in Senegal,facilitate performance assessments of sectorstakeholders and allow for the use of an iterativeapproach to PEPAM’s implementation. Focusingon water supply and sanitation but also includingwater resources management, PEPAM’s modelemploys the WSP’s conceptual model for SectorInformation Monitoring Systems (SIMS), whichallows for both implementation monitoring (e.g.financial inputs, physical and non-physical inputs)and outcome monitoring (e.g. access to services,intermediate results).

Congo-Brazzaville’s Water Resources and WSS Monitoring Network

Having only brought to an end in 2003 adecade-long series of devastating civil warsthat destroyed much of the country’s basic

infrastructure and pre-existing watermonitoring networks, urban and rural WSSand water resources M&E systems in Congo-Brazzaville are currently either weak or non-existent. Nevertheless, some sub-sectorinstitutions have developed action plans forrebuilding pre-war infrastructure orframeworks for the development of waterresources databases, and practitionersrecognize the importance of M&E as a tool foreffective planning and sector governance. Forexample, the Republic of Congo developed aPRSP in 2003 that serves as a framework foraddressing sector-related MDGs.

Water resources data is collected and analyzedprimarily by the Direction Générale de RechercheScientifique (GRSEN). Hydrological data iscollected through a network of five surface watermonitoring stations (down from 40 prior to the civilwar) that measure water height, flow and waterquality but lack limnographs.

The country’s primary water provider, la Sociéténationale de distribution de l’eau (SNDE), relieslargely on the under-resourced Laboratoire deBromatologie of the Direction de l’hygiènenationale for water quality testing. The SNDE’swater consumption and quality monitoringnetwork is plagued by the lack of automaticcounters at the household (consumption) andindustrial (production) level. Its informationmanagement system is “embryonic” according toofficials. Rural water supply monitoring is now theresponsibility of the Ministry of Energy andWater’s (MEH), National Rural Water Agency(ANHR), which is still in its infancy.

39

An overriding constraint to the growth of M&Esystems is the lack of demand for informationby management typically inexperienced in theuse of MIS. This is true of both water resourcesand WSS sub-sectors. As a result, watersector information in most countries is typicallyfragmented, unreliable and out-of-date.Nevertheless, indicators, tools and methods forbasic water resources monitoring are relativelywell known and established.

The same is not true for water supply andsanitation. In a single country it is common tosee a variety of indicators and methods of datacollection used to measure the same parameter,which renders comparative analysis impossible.Most data is collected, analyzed and stored bythe service providing agencies and apexministries, such as ministries of water and/or

agriculture and local government. Theseagencies normally estimate “coverage” using the“capacity” of systems built rather thandetermining access to services through directhousehold observation surveys. This introducesinaccuracie s that severely limit use of theinformation in sector planning and management.

Fortunately this generally does not applyacross all countries in Africa; instead, severalgood examples of best practices were madeevident through this project’s country missions.In Uganda, for example, M&E is bolstered bydemand for information generated through thesector-wide approach processes of annualtechnical performance assessments and JSRs.Indicators are harmonized and while there areareas needing improvement, the M&Econtinues to serve the sector well.

Water Resources Management

Planning, Congo Brazzaville

40

1.8 Water Resources

Management

Integrated water resources management(IWRM) and transboundary water resourcesmanagement (TWRM) are inter-relatedconcepts that, in recent years, have providedthe basis for sector reform efforts. Theprinciples of IWRM and TWRM are sound, buttheir implementation is complex and is provingdifficult in many African countries53.

In 2008 the UN conducted an internationalreview of progress in IWRM and TWRM plandevelopment and their implementation54. Africawas found to be lagging in comparison with Asiaand the Americas; nevertheless, the 22 Africancountries surveyed were found to be moreadvanced in specific areas such as stakeholderparticipation, subsidies and microcreditprograms. Most countries were found needingto prioritize IWRM and water efficiencymeasures, for which substantial external support

will be required. While most have put IWRMpolicies in place, or are in the process of doingso, only 38% of the African countries surveyedhave completed IWRM plans and few haveimplementation substantially underway.Implementation needs to be prioritized,roadmaps agreed to and financing strategies forimplementation prepared with donors, preferablyunder SWAp arrangements. Experience andlessons learned to date also need to beevaluated and shared. The context behind thesefindings is explored in further detail below.

53UN Water (2008) “Status Report on Integrated Water Resources Management and Water Efficiency Plans,” Prepared for the

16th session o the Commission on Sustainable Development; and GWP (2008).54UN Water (2008)

Lake in Gaza province,

Southern Mozambique

Windmill

water

pumping,

Cape Verde

41

Integrated water resource management hasbecome an accepted model for improvedgovernance in the water sector and has itsbasis in the International Conference on Waterand the Environment’s (1992) DublinPrinciples. IWRM advocates a shift to moreintegrated and coordinated watermanagement55. IWRM is essentially a politicalprocess, providing a viable framework forwater resources management at thewatershed, basin or catchment scale.Management at the basin level, for example,allows national governments to allocate andregulate water more rationally and equitably,since the basin boundaries cut acrosstraditional jurisdictional and administrativeboundaries, encouraging users to come toagreements on sharing basin water resources.Community involvement and stakeholderparticipation are fundamental building blocksof IWRM. Stakeholders all have diverseinterests in the use of water, and theseinterests must be accommodated within thepolitical process in order to overcome localdevelopment, environment, property andaccess conflicts56. Typically, basinorganizations are established to institutionalizestakeholder participation and provide foraccountability from government57.

In Uganda, progress is being made towardsIWRM through pilot basin water resourcemanagement projects – the most advanced

being in the Risvi River basin where basin orga-nizations are being established and resourced– and through ongoing programmes. The pilotshave demonstrated examples of effective civilsociety stakeholder participation and con-sensus building in water resource allocation,setting of standards, planning and waterresource protection. Senegal has achievedmuch the same progress as Uganda.Monitoring systems supporting good basingovernance are in place, resourced andfunctional.

In South Africa, IWRM is being piloted in severalbasins, and in general water allocations areconsidered to be in line with sustainable use,social equity and economic efficiency. Majorwater users are managed through a permit orlicensing system. The monitoring system isbeing strengthened and is providing basicmanagement information for decision-making.

55Global Water Partnership (GWP) (2002) “Dialogue on Effective Water Governance,” Stockholm, Sweden

Basins,” Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Germany.56Boge, Volker (2006) “Water Governance in Southern Africa – Cooperation and Conflict Prevention in Transboundary River

Basins,” Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Germany.57Schulz (2007)

Rainwater harvesting

tank, Uganda

42

Malawi has just recently prepared a nationalIWRM plan, which awaits cabinet approval. If itcan be implemented it is hoped that furtherdegradation of Malawi's water and associatedland resources can be prevented. Malawi’smonitoring and information systems havedeteriorated over the past several decades, butrenewed efforts are being planned torehabilitate and expand them so that they canform the basis of the new IWRM programme. Environmental management is closelyassociated with IWRM. Many countries haveestablished functional policies and legislationfor the management of ground and surfacewaters. Mandatory project approval proce-dures provide oversight and definition ofmitigation against water pollution, excessivegroundwater extraction and watershed protec-tion. Many also have environmental impactassessment procedures being used along withsocial and environmental safeguard measuresrequired by external donors. Nevertheless,enforcement continues to be an area ofconcern. Political influence is used in attemptsto reduce investment in mitigation measures,and legislation in many countries does notadequately separate roles and responsibilitiesof stakeholder agencies involved in environ-mental management so as to avoid duplication,confusion and even conflict.

The key governance indicators relating toIWRM that were selected in this Study’sgovernance assessment tools focus on the keyissues of:

• The scaling-up of pilot projects in IWRMto regional and national programs throughevaluation of results, learning of lessons,and incorporation of this information intoplanning and design;

• Water allocation procedures and the de-gree to which they are sustainable, socially-equitable and economically efficient;

• Management of major water users’ use ofwater resources through a permit or licen-sing system;

• Water resources monitoring systems, datamanagement and information sharing andavailability;

• The meaningful involvement of stakehol-ders in regularly updating of basin-levelplans;

• Consideration of potential effects of cli-mate change in planning, managementand utilization of water resources; and,

• Continued efforts at establishing functio-nal transboundary water resources mana-gement mechanisms.

Transboundary water resources managementprovides for governance of water resourcesshared between two or more riparianneighbouring countries. Issues of differing andelastic political agendas and competition forscarce water resources complicate thesituation. There are many shared water basins

Footpump in rural

Burkina Faso

43

in Africa, the Nile Basin being geographicallythe largest with 10 riparian countries andcomplex upstream/downstream issues to bedealt with. In the South African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) alone, there are 13transboundary rivers shared by two or moreriparian states. As many local, national andinternational stakeholders are involved, TWRMcannot be conducted purely on a state-by-state basis. Multi-national dialogue andnegotiations are the basis of wide-rangingagreements between riparian states. The needfor cooperation and information sharing is anessential element. This can be facilitated by thecreation of transboundary-basin institutions oragreements – such as the Congo-Oubangui-Sangha International Basin Commission(CICOS), the still-born Zambezi BasinCommission, or the Nile Basin Initiative –established to monitor the policies of riparianstates and ensure equitable utilization of waterresources, create development strategies, andmonitor the implementation of national IWRMplans. In most cases, however, suchinstitutions have faced severe challengesimpeding their ability to get off the ground.

As one of the world’s largest and mostcomplex efforts at TWRM, the Nile BasinInitiative (NBI) was established in 1999 as apartnership between the Nile’s 10 riparianstates. The objective is to develop waterresources in a sustainable and equitable way,and to ensure efficient water management andoptimal use of the Nile’s water resources.The NBI is led by the Council of Ministers ofWater Affairs. Major achievements have been

the development of a shared vision programmeto facilitate cooperative action, buildconfidence and capacity in riparian states, andpursue cooperative developmentopportunities.

In the SADC Region, the SADC Water Protocolwas prepared in 1995 to encourage theestablishment of appropriate institutions formonitoring, ensuring equitable utilization andstrategizing for water resources development.The Protocol also provides for essential dataand information exchange between riparianstates. Progress has been made in forgingagreements in some shared basins, such asthe Zambezi, Orange-Senqu and Incomatibasins, and some water monitoring networkshave been established that are now providinginformation to riparian states. Efforts to get theZambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM)up and running five years after an agreementwas signed by seven of eight riparian states todo so continue to be bogged down by politicaldisputes.

Water for Livestock,

Rural Senegal

44

1.9 Transparency

and Accountability

Stemming from colonial times, many Africangovernments remain characterized bybureaucratic behaviour of secrecy, exclusivityand upward rather than downwardaccountability (government accountable to thepeople). In the water sector such behaviour is arecipe for failure, especially when the ability ofservice providers to reach poorer communitiesand maintain services in a sustainable mannerdepends on community participation and input.It is therefore now acknowledged that the crisisin the water sector is a crisis in governance. Inturn, the crisis in water governance is a crisis in

accountability, to which transparency isinextricably linked.

Accountability and transparency in governanceare closely inter-related, as transparency is aprerequisite for real accountability. Forinstance, transparency requires strong sectorperformance monitoring systems that serve toenhance accountability for the use of resourcesby service providers. Only through access tothe information these systems produce is thepublic able to keep service providers andgovernments accountable and participate fullyin public consultation and appeal processes.The involvement of beneficiaries in planning,design and management of water systems (bethey for water resources or services) implies thesharing of information between providers andusers, and this in turn necessitates serviceproviders being responsive and therebyaccountable to the public they serve. Civilsociety involvement in expenditure reviews,auditing and performance reviews of sectorinstitutions can therefore provide neededchecks and balances that accountable watergovernance demands. In addition, participationby disempowered groups such as women andthe poor in water budgeting and policydevelopment can enhance the pro-poor focusof spending.

There are several mechanisms that can beused to increase transparency andaccountability in the water sector. Many pertainto access to information and participation ofbeneficiaries. Several are described below.

Poster of the International

Commission of the Congo-

Oubangui-Sangha Basin

45

• As discussed above, decentralization pro-vides an opportunity for the introductionof transparency and accountability mea-sures but also introduces threats to thesame if community and civil society voicesare not well articulated and if citizens donot have a clearly defined role in sectormonitoring and regulation. For example,without appropriate safeguards in place,powerful groups may claim an unjust shareof resources. Other ways to improve trans-parency and accountability through de-centralization include the alignment of fis-cal powers with functions, internalizationof accountability for expenditure decisions,and the clear definition of responsibilitiesof national and local institutions58.

• Use of water point mapping tools (nowused in Malawi and Tanzania) to map andanalyze the equity of services distribution,service levels and functionality of rural wa-ter supply. Such mapping and analysis isuseful in identifying distortions in distribu-tion and possible political interference inthe planning process. They are also inva-luable in district water sector planning andensuring the equitable distribution of ser-vices and investments.

• Sectoral budget analyses and their publi-cation can say a great deal about whomactually benefits from water subsidies in-tended for the poor and disadvantaged.Such analyses are also useful in subse-quent public participatory budgeting pro-cesses and have been demonstrated to

have direct impact on pro-poor budgeting,spending and expanded access. The pu-blic should also be involved in tracking andauditing expenditures to provide retros-pective information on expenditure. Theknowledge that the public may be invol-ved in such investigations has a powerfuleffect on corruption and inappropriatespending.

• Community-based management, fromplanning through to operations and main-tenance, and the participatory processesthis entails opens the door to informationon the project and sector to local benefi-ciaries. This makes local government asservice provider far more transparent andaccountable than it would otherwise bethrough centralized management pro-cesses.

58Savage (2003)

N’tjilla dam, Mali

46

• The citizen report card is another effectivetool to improve transparency, accounta-bility, performance and ultimately the qua-lity of service provision. Most often coor-dinated by civil society organizations, thereport card monitors performance with di-rect input from the poor. Benchmarkedperformance indicators are published and,if favourable, can be used by local politi-cians to back their claims or, if unfavou-rable, can be used to bring both politiciansand organizations to account.

• Private sector providers operate underperformance contracts that can be upgra-ded to include requirements for transpa-rency such as clear lines of responsibility,responsiveness to the public and servicequality standards. These performance cri-teria are set into contracts that can bemade available to the public and used inensuring downward accountability. In allsuch cases disclosure requirements alsoneed to be included into performancecontracts, including public disclosure ofinvestment plans, management contracts,rate-setting information, and financial andoperational performance information.

• Monitoring, reporting and disclosure of in-dicator targets and achievements need tobe included in performance contracts withutilities. There are several public utility per-formance indicators and targets that arewell recognized, easily understood by thepublic and in common use. They include

coverage rates, unaccounted for water,fee collection rates, employee per connec-tion ratio, service uptime, and water qua-lity.

• Utilities that interact positively with consu-mer associations in building consumer re-lations ensure that their perspective is beingunderstood by the public. Dakar’s water uti-lity is a case in point. It regularly interactswith its three consumer associations in pro-viding information and even giving tours ofexpansion works and explaining project andoperational costs to its consumers. Simi-larly, as representatives of JohannesburgWater have testified, opening avenues suchas complaint centres (internet or call-in) canimprove public relations and reduce costs.They allow consumers to voice theirconcerns and have them addressed by theutility and keep the utility informed aboutdistribution and service problems. Such in-teraction also builds trust and confidencebetween parties that is invaluable when thetime comes for tariff negotiations.

• As mentioned earlier, one of the three es-sential criteria for effective regulation istransparency – a requirement if the regu-latory authority is to build trust and confi-dence in utility investors and customers.Unfortunately, transparency is not a com-mon attribute of regulatory authorities. Ina 2005 survey of regulators, for example,fewer than one third of regulators publi-shed contracts and licenses59.

59Bertolini, l., (2006) “How to Improve regulatory transparency: Lessons Learned from an International Assessment”,PPIAF Gridlines Note #11, World Bank, Washington, DC.

47

1.10 Corruption

Corrupt practices are endemic to most watersector institutions and transactions in Africa60

and therefore inhibit effective water governanceat all levels. On a global scale they directly andprofoundly affect the lives of literally billions ofpeople, and to a disproportionate extent, thelivelihoods of women, the poor and themarginalized. For instance, corruption in thewater sector, as recently highlighted in thelatest Transparency International report oncorruption61, can account for an estimated 30percent increase in the cost of a householdwater connection. Not only does this cost getpassed on directly to consumers, but it alsoinflates the overall costs for achieving theMDGs for water and sanitation by more thanUSD 48 billion, thereby diverting money awayfrom beneficial initiatives to improve the lives ofthousands. As is frequently recounted indiscussions on the topic, this situation led theHon. Prof. Wangari Maathai to state that “theglobal water crisis ... is a crisis of governance:man-made with ignorance, greed andcorruption at its core. But worst of them all iscorruption.”62

I do not take bribes,I do not practicefavoritism, and I donot tolerate anyonewho implies me insuch practices.

60Plummer and Cross (2007)61Transparency International (2008)

62 Hawkins, J, Herd, C and Wells, Dr. J. (2006) “Modifying Infrastructure Procurement to Enhance Social Development,”Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), London, UK.

Poster on the door of a Government Office in Rwanda

48

The degree of corruption in the wat er sector inmany cases mirrors the prevailing corruptionenvironment in the country-at-large.Transparency International62 has rated mostAfrican countries using its CorruptionPerception Index (CPI), and while some arerelatively less corrupt – for example: Botswana,Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles,South Africa and Tunisia – most still suffer fromsignificant corruption. Only three Africancountries scored 5 out of 10 or higher in the2008 CPI.

Corruption manifests itself in numerous waysthroughout the water sector project cycle,from identification through to implementation.The World Bank (2007) has published auseful list of warning signs in the project cyclethat may indicate corruption, while the UnitedKingdom's Institution of Civil Engineersthrough the Engineers Against Povertyorganization have also conducted a study ofcorruption in sector procurement. Thisresearch has uncovered the following set ofrisks typically found at each stage of theproject cycle.

• Project Identification: Large infrastructureprojects in water resources and piped wa-ter supply and sewerage are “high rent”,offering greater chances for bribery andcommissions. Projects may be “hard wi-red” to favoured companies who controlmarket segments (such as the supply of

pipe which meets stringent technical spe-cifications).

• Project Preparation: Capital expendituresor equipment requirements may be deli-berately over-estimated. Studies can bemanipulated to open up paths for fraudand corruption during implementation. Su-pervisory mechanisms may be weak, un-der-designed or under-resourced, therebyincreasing the risk of corruption particu-larly in remote or inaccessible locations.Projects that give discretionary powers toindividuals to grant subsidies, issue per-mits or authorize payments run the risk ofabuse.

• Project Implementation: Lax verification ofworks supervisors or inspectors overseeingand certifying the quality of work and ma-terials opens the doors to both petty andlarge scale corruption risks. Watch for thedeliberate use of weak supervisors andmonitors: weak financial managementsubstantially increases corruption risk, asdoes the lack of regular independent au-dit. Poorly-formulated project budgets pro-vide an opportunity for misallocations thatincrease rent-seeking behaviour. Faultyprocurement practices are most suscep-tible to corruption, in areas such ascontract packaging, procurement me-thods, technical specifications, and bidevaluation criteria. Tender advertising andprequalification of bidders are other areassusceptible to manipulation. Change or-

49

ders and product substitution are com-mon ways to circumvent contract admi-nistration rules.

Furthermore, corruption, particularly “pettycorruption,” is widely known to pervadescheme operation. It comes in the form of rentseeking efforts between service providers andconsumers such as:

• Bribery for falsification of accounts to in-dicate payment or to avoid disconnectionon default of tariff payment;

• Fraudulent meter reading or tampering withmeters;

• Bribery for free bulk water to vendors;• Bribery to allow illegal pollution;• Speed money for new connections; and,• Bribery for illegal water extraction.

These are just some of the most commonforms of corruption in the water sector.Individually they appear relatively small andpetty, but combined they represent large lossesto both consumer and provider. Equally asimportant is that the most seriously affected arethe poor, who often have to rely on bribery toobtain services. Those which they do receiveare often poor quality despite having to payhigher prices than the rich and being less ableto afford it.

It is commonly agreed that corruption thrives insituations that lack transparency andaccountability, and that meaningful stakeholder

participation in all stages of the project cycle isa primary means to expose corruption andmake it more difficult to get away with. As aresponse to these increasingly visible risks andmanifestations of corruption and withencouragement and support from externalagencies, many African countries havedeveloped or established anti-corruptionpolicies, legislation, guidelines, processes andorganizations. Anti-corruption measures oftenfocus on improving procurement procedures,increasing stakeholder participation, andsetting-up functional monitoring and evaluationsystems. But increased emphasis on these andother areas is required to reduce the costs ofand increase access to WSS services by furtherreducing corruption. Unfortunately, many ofthese countries continue to lack the necessaryhuman resource capacity to implement thesereforms effectively and do not have sufficientpolitical will to drive them forward.

That being said, things can still improve withappropriate governance mechanisms inplace. Political stability, governmenteffectiveness, clear and enforceablelegislation, accountability and transparencymeasures are all means of mitigatingcorruption. The following examples fromcountries visited over the course of the WaterGovernance Study exemplify some of thepositive measures being put in place in somecountries as well as the lack of progressinhibiting good sector governance in others.

50

• In Uganda there has been progress madein increasing the competitive environmentfor bidding on sector projects so that unitcosts of service provision between pro-jects are comparable and are indepen-dent of project funding sources and im-plementing agencies. Good sectormonitoring systems and procedures havehelped ensure that unit costs can betracked.

• Senegal and South Africa have both fo-cused on making their sector procure-ment processes for goods and servicesmore open and transparent and their ap-peal mechanisms more available, utilizedand effective. Bid evaluation results aredisclosed to all bidders, with financial bidsbeing opened in their presence. Goodsector monitoring systems enable equi-tability of service access and service qua-lity information to be tracked, and this in-formation is made public in easilyunderstandable forms. In South Africa,progress has been made in facilitating theestablishment of civil society advocacyorganizations to watch over sector insti-tutions, officials and politicians.

• Sector procurement in Kenya was heavilyaffected by corruption in the 1990s, butfollowing the introduction of reforms to es-tablish a legal framework, appropriate pu-blic procurement institutions and monito-ring and evaluation mechanisms, thesituation has improved markedly. Imple-mentation of these reforms has been cen-tral to the government's objectives.

Additional steps that are recognized as ca-pable of reducing corruption in this sectorinclude:

• Measures to increase commitment to, andadvocacy of, anti-corruption measures inthe sector, including procurement reform,skills upgrading, and creating a culture ofprofessionalism and integrity;

• Implementing Ethics Codes or Codes ofConduct within water sector institutions.Such codes can set out in broad termsthose values and principles that define theprofessional role of public officials, or theycan focus on the application of such prin-ciples in practice. For example, they canspecify what actions are appropriate inconflict-of-interest situations such as thereceipt of gifts or other benefits from pri-vate firms bidding for large projects63;

• Ensuring that sector regulators and pro-curement officials are technically compe-tent through training and oversight;

• Establishing mechanisms that enable ci-vil society organizations to monitor waterresources management and environmen-tal protection, and assisting these orga-nizations to become credible, active andvocal;

• Reinforcing decentralized management ofservice provision by providing capacity buil-ding, enabling participatory planning, andencouraging public display of budgets, ex-penditures and procurement outcomes;

• Insisting on regular, independent audits in-cluding comprehensive or value-for-mo-ney audits;

63For more information, see “Ethics Codes and Codes of Conduct in OECD Countries,” Directorate for Public Governance

and Territorial Development, OECD, www.oecd.org.

51

• Training of sector professionals, includingtask managers, in the revised procurementprocedures;

• Networking of sector specialists and taskmanagers in country offices with RMC anti-corruption campaigns and organizations;

• Acting on Country Procurement Assess-ment Reports (CPAR) undertaken by theWorld Bank and Borrower countries as acomponent of the Bank’s Country Assis-tance Strategies64.

64The main purpose of the CPAR is to establish the need for and guide the development of an action plan to improve a

country's system for procuring goods, works, and consulting services. The CPAR (a) provides a comprehensive analysis of

the country's public sector procurement system, including the existing legal framework, organizational responsibilities and

control and oversight capabilities, present procedures and practices, and how well these work in practice; (b) undertakes a

general assessment of the institutional, organizational and other risks associated with the procurement process, including

identification of procurement practices unacceptable for use in Bank-financed projects; (c) develops a prioritized action plan

to bring about institutional improvements, and (d) assesses the competitiveness and performance of local private industry

with regard to participation in public procurement, and the adequacy of commercial practices that relate to public

procurement. For more information visit: http://go.worldbank.org/9FMKK5Y040

Water Reservoir,

Rural Rwanda

52

1.11 Civil Society

Participation

History and Reasoning Behind Civil SocietyParticipation: In many respects, civil societyparticipation in water resources managementand water supply and sanitation is the key tosuccessful sector governance, encompassingmanagement, quality service provision andsustainability. This has been recognized in theDublin-Rio principles, which are clear in theirstatements that water development andmanagement should be based on aparticipatory approach, involving users,planners, policy-makers at all levels and thatwomen play a central part in the provision,management and safeguarding of water65. Thiscalls for a sharing and balance betweenstakeholders (both top down and bottom up) intheir planning and management. It has alsobeen recognized that service provisionfunctions should be delegated to the “lowestappropriate level” at which stakeholdersinvolved in management need to be identified,resourced and mobilized.

It follows that in the water sector, far more thanmost, the beneficiary needs to be involved at allstages of the project cycle from monitoring andneeds identification right through maintenanceand basin and system management. Despitethis being acknowledged as far back as the

1970s and demonstrated time and again sincethen, civil society participation has only nowbecome a regular feature of projects andprogrammes.

There are many reasons for this, but the two ofthe most significant are tradition andexperience. Following on from the colonial era,as discussed earlier, most African governmentshave continued their traditional top downbureaucratic behaviour and practice upwardaccountability, which place the citizen as asecondary priority. Secondly, the experience ofthe average citizen has been one of the passiverecipient and not participant in governmentprojects. On the one hand, government isreluctant to provide information and respond tosuggestions from the client public; on the other,the community is unfamiliar with interactingwith government and exerting influence inprojects.

The 1980s witnessed perhaps the greatestadvances in local participation in developmentprojects to date. These projects tended to beisolated and NGO-driven, and the participatoryexperience gained was seldom imported intogovernment programmes. By the 1990s,however, the lack of government outreach andinability to maintain the schemes they wereimplementing became obvious and reached acrisis point. User participation becamemandatory in scheme development if only for

65GWP (2000) “Integrated Water Resources Management” TAC Background Paper No. 4

53

sustainability reasons. Policies began toemphasize the importance of civil societyinvolvement and projects incorporated it in theirdesign; however, the resources, time andcommitment needed to achieve meaningfulcommunity participation was oftenunderestimated and success and sustainabilitywere spotty. It was therefore not until thisdecade, which brought with it clear evidence offailing systems, that governments and donorscame to recognize how essential communityinvolvement is to project and programmedesign and implementation. In a similar timeframe, IWRM became recognized as the best,if not only, way by which water resources couldbe properly managed. At the heart of IWRM iscivil society participation in basin planning,resource allocation, environmental protectionconsensus building and conflict resolution.

Widespread decentralization reforms acrossAfrica over the last decade have greatlyfacilitated civil society participation. In line withthe principle of subsidiarity, many localgovernments on the continent have nowassumed responsibility for implementing ruralwater supply projects. Likewise, manymunicipalities are outsourcing water servicesdelivery to public or private utilities. This hasenabled new participatory approaches to beundertaken, although both government andcommunity representatives continue to needorientation and training with such newapproaches to service delivery.

Civil Society Participation in Practice: BurkinaFaso, Senegal and South Africa use similarapproaches to ensure the enhancedparticipation of target communities inprogramme design and implementation andcome closest to what could be defined as bestpractice. Benefiting from decentralization anddemocratic systems that avail responsiverepresentation and local governments, theseapproaches centre on participatory planning inthe development of Local Development Plans(LDPs) and, commensurate with them, LocalWater and Sanitation Plans (LWSPs). TheLWSPs are a platform for the identification ofspecific projects that are prepared in conceptand budget estimates for approval by local ormunicipal councils and forwarded to regionaland national levels. The LDPs and LWSPsconstitute a useful framework for sectorplanning that is based on community andcommunity organization participation. Theysuccessfully integrate community involvementand local government ratification with regionaland national planning and budgetingprocesses.

Each level of government has separateresponsibilities in plan formulation. Allocatingresources across the country in accordancewith national priorities is a central responsibilityof the apex ministry for the water sector.Further allocation of resources to theprogramme level is taken at the regional andlocal government levels to reduce gaps in the

54

region or the programme intervention zone.Allocation of systems is done on a communitydemand-responsive basis incorporating thepriorities of the LWSPs, and detailedlocalization of works and waterpoints/connections within the community aredecided at community level by the beneficiarieswithin the limits of the project.

Nevertheless, no one size fits all. There is nosingle community development methodologyto involving communities to ensuresustainability that can be used across Africa.There are many successful variations to thetheme and it seems that each country andsometimes regions within countries have theirown appropriate approaches. But the objectiveis consistent and minimum requirements aresimilar.

As just one example, WaterAid has coordinateda Local MDG Initiative (LMDGI) encompassingGhana, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria todemonstrate community participation withlocal government in implementing ruralschemes66. Despite differences in localcontexts, each country’s challenges and

solutions were found to be quite similar.Common to all was the huge gap betweenlocal government and communities. Extensiveawareness raising and building of trust wasneeded before the initiative could makeprogress, which take time, patience andunderstanding to achieve. Similar experienceshave been reported across Africa67.

The starting point for improving civil societyparticipation can be an assessment of existingservices. This may be accomplished throughhousehold surveys that are used to assessdemand for services. Such assessments arenormally made on the basis of overall socio-economic and poverty considerations andseldom on field assessments. An approachused in Senegal is based on market analysisand provides a channel for households toexpress their voice and choice individually68. Itsstrong points are that (i) the voice of vulnerablegroups, especially women and the poorestpeople can be captured, and (ii) statisticalmarket analysis techniques are used to assessthe willingness to pay along with the elasticityof demand for segregated services and servicelevels.

66M. Abdul Nashuri (2006) Citizen’s Engagement for Transparency and Accountability in Decentralized Water and Sanitation

Service delivery, WaterAid, Accra, Ghana.67Mvula Trust (2003) A Decade of the Mvula Trust in South Africa (1993-2003), Johannesburg, RSA; Cowater International

(2008) Final report, COMWASH Project, Ottawa68Such an approach has been recently used in Senegal for the preparation of rural electrification concession contracts by the

Agence Sénégalaise d'Electrification Rurale (ASER). Surveys made over several thousands households were used to

determine the package of services to be proposed and related acceptable tariffs, and then to calculate the level of subsidy

required over the investments to make this service activity an attractive business opportunity for private service providers.

55

Participatory needs assessment and planningalso call for combined community-based localgovernment facilitated data collection. Formost local governments this may be their firstexperience in working directly with thecommunity in collecting field information data.There are then several steps before a sectordevelopment plan is created and projectpriorities agreed upon before acceptance bythe local government council and incorporationinto LDPs and LWSPs. In BushbuckridgeBohlabela’s case in South Africa69, theseincluded:

• Training of local government officials;• Field assessment with the community

using open meetings and Participatory Ru-ral Appraisal (PRA) tools;

• Local water resources and uses mapping;• Household surveys and assessments;• Verification workshops;• Priority setting and project definition; and, • Combining participatory approaches with

local government planning.

Of note are the several steps and time required,the specialized expertise in working withcommunities, logistical and transportrequirements and the integration of thedevelopment approach with project planningand development that is usually driven bytargets, budgets and deadlines.

These stages are essential for communityownership and acceptance of responsibility forlong-term management and maintenance ofthe facilities, without which the facility cannotbe sustained. Omit them and the entireprogramme may be in jeopardy. South Africa,where overly ambitious targets and supplydriven approaches have cut back drastically onits previously successful communitydevelopment approaches, is a case in point.South African municipalities are unwittinglylimiting the “soft” components of their projects.As a result, inadequate maintenance and poorservices management has become a seriousthreat to the national programme.

Community-based user organizations can playa large role in facilitating civil societyparticipation. These can actively participate insector governance processes alongsidedemocratically elected and representative localgovernments, consultative committees andmarket mechanisms. Yet this does not meanthat decision-making being devolvedcompletely to the community level is desirableor necessary; instead, a balance is needed andpossible between community level andgovernment organizations. To achieve this, civilsociety groups need to be created andstrengthened so that they can meaningfullyparticipate in operational water resourcesmanagement70. User organizations need to be

69Maluleke, T., T. Cousins & S. Smit (2005) Securing Water to Enhance Local Liovelihoods, Community Based Planning of

Multiple Uses of Water in Partnership with Service Providers”, CARE, RSA70WSP-AF (2002) “Rural Piped Supplies in Ethiopia, Malawi and Kenya: Community Management and Sustainability”, Nairobi,

Kenya

56

provided the training and skills to manage andmaintain their water supply systems.

A recent comparative study of three countries(Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi) identifiedcommon elements for success in involving thebeneficiary in community management.Beyond the participatory data collection andplanning methods described above are:

• The employment of paid staff to undertaketechnical, administrative and financial ma-nagement responsibilities at scheme level.Volunteers cannot be relied upon to de-vote the time required over an extendedperiod. Schemes need good, reliable wor-kers not just for technical tasks but alsofor management and administration;

• Targeted training to help empower com-munity members in asserting their gover-nance role in relation to their own commu-nity;

• Sound financial management and achie-vement of financial viability through houseconnections and tariffs. Schemes that at-tempt to serve everybody commonly ex-perience low water demand and, combi-ned with low tariffs, generate inadequateincome to pay maintenance costs;

• Cohesion of the community resulting inclarity of purpose and a sense of owner-ship resulting in sustainability of the sys-tem; and,

• Continuing technical and professional sup-port available when the community needsit. This is provided by local government or

provider authority that also monitorsscheme operation and service quality.

There is also a wide variety of roles to be playedby private entrepreneurs, NGOs, communitiesand user groups in the participatorymanagement of surface water and groundwaterresources. At the river basin level, organizationsvary enormously, from those with mandates forwater rights allocation and licensing to othersresponsible for advisory services. As a result, aforum is often needed for stakeholders todiscuss and decide on water related issues – akind of “parliament” for the basin needed tooversee the planning and budget formulationand approval processes. Central governmenthas a role as a stakeholder in ensuring thenecessary links and conformity with nationalpolicies. It is emphasized, however, that suchorganizations should only be created andmandated in response to stakeholder demand.In addition, reliable, timely and relevantinformation needs to be made available for theparticipatory process to be effective. Thismeans that surveys, inventories, benchmarkingefforts and information on water use, dischargesand water rights and allocations needs to bemade available to the public along withoperational information and performanceassessments of regulators, governmentagencies and service providers involved. Inother words, management of river basins needsto go beyond professionals and experts toinclude all stakeholders in an open andtransparent manner.

57

the household level. Also involved in theregulation of the urban water sector is theDirection de l’Hydraulique Urbain (DHU),established in 2007 under the Ministry of Waterto monitor and enforce adherence to nationalwater supply policies and regulations71. Similarbut locally adapted arrangements exist in manycountries and cities of Africa72.

Most often overlooked, however, are the smalland often informal enterprises that fill thedemand for water and sanitation services fromhouseholds beyond the reach of public WSSinfrastructure. These households arecomposed of the poorer customers in smallercities, peri-urban and remote areas of mostdeveloping countries. Alternative serviceproviders (ASPs) provide them with access towater through private supplies such as wells,public stand posts, water kiosks, informaldistribution networks, tankers and small scalevendors73 and can account for up to 60 or 70%of market share in some countries74.

The following table provides an overview of themost common types of ASPs75.

71Cowater International (2008a)72See PPIAF, “Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Water Services: A Toolkit,” World Bank, 2006, Appendix A, for

additional examples. 73Foster, Vivien et al. (2006) “Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Descriptive Manual: Water Supply and Sanitation

Performance Indicators,” World Bank, Washington, DC. And OECD (2008) “Private Sector Participation in Water Sector

Infrastructure,” OECD Investment Division, France.74Trémolet and Hunt (2006:18), adapted from Kariuki and Schwartz, (2003)75Ibid

1.12 Alternative Service

Providers

Urban water supply infrastructure developmentand services provision is typically carried out bya mixture of public and private institutions.Senegal serves as an example of goodpractice. There, La Société Nationale des Eauxdu Sénégal (SONES) serves as the para-publicinstitution with primary responsibility over theplanning, development and regulation of urbanwater supply infrastructure and services. Theinstitution responsible for the actual operationand maintenance of these networks inSenegal’s major towns and cities is the privatesector company Sénégalaise des Eaux (SDE).Following the construction of urban waterfacilities and distribution networks, SDE leasesthis infrastructure from SONES and operatesand maintains it according to the regulationsand guidelines set forth in formal concessionsand performance contracts. As the watersupply utility, SDE collects and manages wateruser fees in addition to sanitation surtaxes at

58

Table 3: Alternative Service Providers

Dependent on the main utility for bulk water Dependent on the main utility for bulk water

Piped networks

Type of systemPrivate operator purchases bulk water from apublic authority or utility and distributes toconsumers through piped networks.

Private operator relies on or develops its own bulkwater sources (wells, etc) and connects consumersthrough piped networks.

Main regulatory issues

• Contract with the utility or bulk supplier• Bulk water rates • Business or operations license• Customer agreements• Consumer tariffs• Service quality

• Groundwater extraction permits (whereapplicable)

• Land title deeds• Resale permits• Bulk water quality testing• Business or operating licenses• Customer agreements• Consumer tariffs• Service quality

Point sources

Type of system

Point sources (kiosks, standpipes, institutions andhouseholds) are connected to a public utilitynetwork. Consumers purchase water in bulk fromthe point source.

Point source is linked to a private bulk water supplysuch as a well or borehole. Consumers purchasewater in bulk from the point source or from tankersthat transport water from the bulk source.

Main regulatory issues

• Contract with the utility and agreement to off-sell

• Operating license or permit• Bulk purchase price• Operator performance incentives• Consumer tariffs• Service quality

• Groundwater extraction permit (where applicable)• Operating license or permit• Bulk water quality testing• Consumer tariff structure• Service quality

Mobile distributors

Type of system

Tankers or trucks purchase water from bulksupplier (public utility) and deliver directly toconsumers (institutional, commercial, and otherusers).

Tankers or trucks obtain water from private sourceand deliver directly to consumers (institutional,commercial, and other users).

Main regulatory issues

• Bulk water purchase rate• Contract with the utility• Business license• Transport license and vehicle regulations• Consumer tariffs• Service quality

• Abstraction permits (where applicable)• Business license• Bulk water quality testing• Transport license and vehicle regulations• Consumer tariffs• Service quality

59

Youssef Ben Tachfine Dam, Morocco

60

Questions exist regarding whether and howsuch informal service providers can be broughtinto formal regulatory frameworks76 and thedegree to which they can be formally regulatedin practice. Many ASPs are being regulated byinstitutions that lack the capacity to carry outtheir oversight responsibilities. The result is oftenover-kill, which works against rather than forincreased access to improved services by thepoor. In this way “the best becomes the enemyof the better.” As a result, a more effectiveapproach may be “light handed” regulation thatrecognizes the constraints facing ASPs while atthe same time applying flexible and relevantcriteria that protects public health but reflectlocal conditions and consumer needs.

Constraints facing ASPs include barriers to entrysuch as investment risks, limited availability ofcredit, uncertain contract enforcementmechanisms, limited access to hydrants in peri-urban and slum environments, insufficient spareparts, monopolistic behaviour by existingservice providers, lack of qualified techniciansand limited access to business developmentservices.

There are many models currently being used tostimulate increased participation of alternativeservice providers in the water sector. For

instance, governments can act to bring ASPsinto the formal sector, which would providethem with increased investment security, lowerrisk of expropriation and improved access tofinance, which would bode well for bothregulation and service expansion tounderserved populations77. Box 4 presentsexamples from Mali and Niger.

As illustrated in Box 4, local governments canplay a significant role in water governance fromboth a regulatory and sector developmentperspective. With ongoing decentralizationreforms across Africa, this can only be expectedto increase. From regulatory and governanceperspectives, this includes but is not limited tofacilitating the operation of local water servicesboards, managing contracts with local serviceproviders, and collecting basic data on behalf ofnational regulatory authorities in order to monitorthe activities of ASPs. Other local levelinstitutions might also be involved in theregulation of alternative service providers intowns beyond the reach of national institutions.In Mali, for example, an ad-hoc body, theCCAEP, is in charge of supervising andproviding technical assistance to alternativeproviders, including verifying their financialaccounts and technical performance, in townsof less than 10,000 inhabitants.

76See the section in this report on regulation for a full discussion in this regards.77Water and Sanitation Programme-Africa (2002) “Water services in Small Towns in Africa: The Role of Small and Medium-

Sized Organizations,” WSP-Africa, Nairobi.

Box 4: Alternative Service Provision in West Africa

61

In Mali, the government’s National WaterDirectorate contracts the operation of small-town water supplies to civil society groupscalled Users’ Associations (UAs). The UAswork closely with a government technicalunit called the Council for Supply of TreatedWater (CCAEP), based in Bamako.Communicating by radio, CCAEP routinelyrecords operational details, guides the workof the UAs and, in the event of a breakdown,can dispatch spare parts. CCAEP alsochecks the monthly accounts of eachoperator, and its staff visit biannually to verifythe condition of the water supply systemsand to balance the operating accounts withthe General Assembly of the UA. Each UAcontributes to CCAEP a surcharge ofUS$0.025 per cubic metre of waterproduced78.

A Nigerian company, SONEXIE, managesthe water supplies in six centres in the northof Niger. SONEXIE started when its currentdirector was told by the local chief in onevillage that the water supply had brokendown and there was no project to assistthem. He then worked with other localentrepreneurs to repair and replace some ofthe equipment. The same situation occurredin other places. To formalise their investmentin this growing market, the group foundedSONEXIE as a company. SONEXIE hascapital of about US$6,500. The comm-issioning communities are share-holders init. Their shares are financially not verysignificant, but entitle them to certify theannual financial report. The operatordepends on economies of scale, even if incertain cases the selling price of water hasto be reduced. SONEXIE aims to break evenwithin its first five years.

From the sector development perspective, thereare substantial advantages to local governmentsand institutions working with ASPs to strengthentheir institutional capacity and scale up their

operations. This will help ASPs take advantageof the large economies of scale that can berealized in water delivery and sewerageprovision, as demonstrated by CCAEP in Mali.

78Trémolet & Halpern (2006)

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1.13 Gender

During the 1970s and 1980s, women werecommonly thought of as passive recipients ofwater and sanitation services and restricted toroles of water and health care in the home. Atthat time, the Women and Development (WID)approach was used in an attempt to improvetheir resources but did little to address unequalrelationships. The subsequent Gender andDevelopment (GAD) approach aimed atremoving disparities between men and womenas a precondition for achieving people-centreddevelopment. Although both WID and GAD arestill in use, a gender and empowermentapproach has been introduced in recent yearsto transform gender relations by stressingwomen’s self-empowerment.

Since that time women’s participation in watersector governance has become widelyrecognized as essential to the sector’sdevelopment. Many declarations have beenagreed upon and commitments made atinternational meetings in support of genderequality. The Dublin Statement (1992)recognized the pivotal role of women, the RioDeclaration (1992) recognized their fullparticipation as essential to sustainabledevelopment, the World Summit onSustainable development called for ensuringthat infrastructure and services are gendersensitive, and the MDGs include 2015 targetson gender equality and empowerment ofwomen. Gender equality and mainstreaming in

the sector have also been given extensiveattention, and methods by which these can beassessed and addressed are beingdemonstrated. Yet there is still little evidence tosuggest that water management hasdeliberately and consciously addressed genderconcerns. National water policies rarely includemore than the mention of women’s importantrole and do not have a comprehensive andconsistent gender focus.

This was confirmed during the field visitsconducted during the Water GovernanceStudy. While gender policies are in place andextend to being specific to the sector (as inUganda), they have been found difficult toimplement in ways that directly affect women insector programmes and projects. For example,typical gender training may inform policy-makers, but seldom changes attitudes. Realchanges in attitudes and practices have provenparticularly difficult to achieve in the usual male

Water Collection, Nampula Province Mozambique

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engineer-dominated sector institutions. Despitewomen’s increasingly influential role on localwater and sanitation user committees incountries such as Mozambique, Malawi andTanzania, few examples exist where womenparticipate meaningfully in planning anddecision-making roles in design,implementation and O&M of water services. InTunisia, for instance, very few if any womenparticipate in Groupements de DeveloppementAgricoles (GDA), local water user associations,in such roles. These shortfalls inhibit effectivewater governance by preventing the imple-mentation and monitoring of targeted policiesand programmes to reduce the dispro-portionately heavy costs on women’s well-being associated with poor access to safewater and sanitation services.

One explanatory factor behind this slow progressis that women and men continue to differ in theiraccess to power and resources. Hierarchicalrelations of power between women and mentend to disadvantage the former, particularly inpoorer and disad-vantaged communities. As aresult, women are seldom involved inmanagement and decision-making; men typicallycontrol planning and budgeting; women areoften left out of or go unheard in consultations;and despite attempts at inclusiveness andparticipation, women are often inexperienced inspeaking out in public. Gender relations are alsodynamic and strongly influenced by age, marital

status, caste and position in the family. Familyand household relations can make it difficult forwomen to express their views in front of malemembers of the family, especially in public, anddifferent abilities to participate, such as varyingliteracy levels, affect many women’s confidenceand experience in public fora. Furthercomplicating efforts to improve women’sparticipation in sector management is thatcommunities cannot be regarded as havingharmonious sets of interests and priorities, eachcontaining its own strong divisions based ongender, class, wealth and status.It is for these and many other reasons thatgender mainstreaming and analysis havebecome essential to programme and projectdesign, despite the challenges listed above.Gender mainstreaming is “a strategy formaking women’s as well as men’s concernsand experiences an integral dimension of thedesign, implementation, monitoring andevaluation of policies and programmes79… sothat women and men can benefit equally…” Itinvolves a gender analysis that provides for:

• Understanding gender differentiated sys-tems for access to resources, water, rightsand project benefits in each community;

• Recognizing that gender influences how peo-ple respond both collectively and individually;

• Revealing the gender dimensions of institu-tions at all levels, from government depart-ments to community based organizations;

79Gender and Water Alliance, GWA, (2006) “Mainstreaming gender in Water Management, A Resource Guide,” Netherlands,

www.genderandwater.org

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• Giving importance and recognition to wo-men’s responsibilities and views in projectdesign;

• Identifying concrete project objectives re-lating to gender equality and developingindicators for results tracking; and,

• Determining how the project will, both po-sitively and negatively, affect gender di-mensions in terms of income/resources,quality of life, and distribution of benefits.

There are examples of what could be definedas best practices in gender mainstreaming inAfrica. In Egypt, for example, the NGO “BetterLife Association for Comprehensive Devel-opment” (BLACD) facilitates water andsanitation services through a project covering700 households80. One of its main thrusts hasbeen gender mainstreaming. Women’s needshave been integrated into the project in acommunity that had traditionally been male-dominated. Women’s decision-making roleswere visibly increased and their security anddignity enhanced.

The Department of Water and Foresty(DWAF) and Mvula Trust of South Africaprovide another example of a best practice,this time a combined effort betweengovernment and an NGO81. Through the

Mabule Village Sanitation Project, the localcommunity was sensitized regarding genderissues and women took the lead in theproject committee. Gender was thenmainstreamed into each of the project’sactivities. The project succeeded in an all-inclusive and non-threatening way to providelatrines to all houses in their campaignagainst the prevailing cholera epidemic.

In addition to supporting initiatives such asthese, there are several other ways by whichgender-related governance can be improved bygovernments. These should start at policy levelbut can focus on the programme or project. Thefirst is the gender analysis mentioned above,followed by women’s inclusion in needsidentification and project planning and design insuch a way that also recognizes the constraintsto their participation listed above.

Furthermore, the capacities of both men andwomen need to be strengthened in gendermainstreaming that goes beyond traditionaltraining to build an enabling environment. Sectorprofessionals have often had an engineeringeducation with little or no experience inincorporating gender and social equityapproaches in their work. Capacity buildingneeds to recognize that women at the

80Gender and Water Alliance, GWA, (2006) “Empowering Women’s Participation in Community and Household Decision

Making in Water and Sanitation,” Egypt, www.genderandwater.org81Gender and Development Group (2007), “Water, Sanitation and Gender Briefing Notes,” World Bank, Washington,

http://sitesources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER

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grassroots level are often semi-literate andinexperienced in playing pro-active roles inprojects. In both cases capacity building needsto be a process rather than a one-off trainingevent. The inclusion of a gender unit in theproject, staffed by experienced local genderspecialists, may be called for.

While the following list of project developmentelements is not all-inclusive, it is useful inensuring that risks to gender sensitiveprogramming are mitigated:

• A review of gender and diversity issues insector policies through a gender analysisconducted by a local gender specialist andfeeding results into project objectives, plan-ning and implementation82;

• Involvement of government institutions res-ponsible for gender equality as well as wo-men’s advocacy organizations in projectdesign;

• Gender responsive budgeting at sectorand project levels and ensuring that re-sources are adequate for implementinggender equity components and monito-ring;

• Adequate women’s participation in grass-roots consultations, as water professio-nals and at all levels of government;

• Analysis of obstacles to women’s participa-tion and definition of ways to overcome them;

• Understanding of men’s and women’s dif-ferent views about technology and projectdesign as well as their willingness and abi-lity to contribute to the project;

• Involving both men and women in all stagesof the project cycle from needs identifica-tion to long term management of services;

• Understanding the commitment and ca-pacity of institutions to work with a gen-der perspective and promote women’s andmen’s participation at all levels;

• Ensuring that stakeholders are accounta-ble for contributing to and meeting gen-der equality objectives;

• Analysis of varying patterns of access andcontrol over water sources, supply and sa-nitation;

• Maximization of both women’s and men’sparticipation in consultative processes;

• Assessment of needs, roles and workloadsof women and men;

• Sex disaggregation of baseline data;• Inclusion, if appropriate, of gender speci-

fic project objectives;• Inclusion of gender issues in the results

based logical framework;• Identification and inclusion of gender rela-

ted indicators and gender disaggregateddata measurement; and,

• Inclusion of gender expertise in project stafffor on-going support and monitoring.

82SDC (2005) Gender and Water, “Mainstreaming Gender Equality in Water, Hygiene and Sanitation Interventions,” UK

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1.14 Rights and Voice

Human rights conventions related to water andmechanisms that allow for citizens to voice theirconcerns regarding access to essential servicesare both instruments that, support good watergovernance. Their various manifestations will beexplored and clarified in the section below.

Rights: The right to water and sanitation isimplied by the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),signed by 158 parties, amongst them nearly allAfrican countries. The Covenant requiressignatories to ensure that everyone within theirjurisdiction has access to the underlyingdeterminants of health, such as clean water andsanitation83. Similar entitlements to water andsanitation are contained in the Convention onthe Rights of the Child (CRC) and theConvention on the Elimination of all forms ofDiscrimination against Women (CEDAW).

These conventions call for universal access towater and sanitation, without discrimination.Non-discrimination means no exclusion orrestriction is made based on any ground(political, national or social origin, property, birth,race, colour sex, language, religion or otherstatus) that differentiates without legitimatereason. Groups that are vulnerable todiscrimination and marginalization include

women, children, inhabitants of deprived areassuch as slums, refugees and asylum seekers,the aged and disabled, victims of naturaldisasters, and nomads. Although manycountries are implementing poverty reductionprogrammes which address this issue, few ifany are resolving it. Of particular concern are thevast and increasing populations of slums andperi-urban areas, women and girls who,although responsible for water, sanitation andhealth of their families, are disempowered andleft out of decision-making.

The degree to which such rights are beingrecognized can be judged by the priority givento water and sanitation in budgetary andpolitical processes; the recognition of theserights in revisions to sector legislation andpolicies; measures taken to improve affo-rdability of services; and the purposeful inclusionof marginal groups through imple-mentation ofpro-poor policies and PRSPs. Similarly, thedegree to which rights to access, quality andquantity of water are being recognized can beassessed by the existence or non-existence ofpolicies and the implementation of setstandards for water quality, distance/time forcollection, and service reliability andsustainability.

Nevertheless, while progress is being made inmost countries towards the MDGs, unit costs arerising and, as a result, access to those remaining

83International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Articles 11 and 12, and the Cairo Conference onPopulation and Development (1994).

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without services – the poorest members of societyand marginalized groups noted above – isbecoming more and more difficult. Yetmisconceptions about such rights can lead tounnecessary conflict over access to services, theirquality and their cost. It is therefore worthwhile toclarify some of the most common.

First is the misperception that rights entitlepeople to free water; instead, water andsanitation should be clean, accessible andaffordable for all84. People are expected tocontribute financially or otherwise to the extentthat they can do so.

Second is the belief that rights allow forunlimited use of water; instead, rights entitleeveryone to sufficient water for personal anddomestic uses to be realized in a sustainablemanner for present and future generations.

Third, some argue that rights entitle all to ahouse connection; however, water andsanitation facilities need only to be within or inthe immediate vicinity of the household and cancome in the form of wells and standpipes.

Last is the belief that a country is in violation ofthese covenants and conventions if all of itscitizens do not have access to water andsanitation; in reality, the rights require that astate takes steps to the maximum of its

available resources to progressively realize theserights.

Voice: Bitter experience can teach the publicthat getting government to improve services isbest achieved through influence and bribery. Inmany countries this is reinforced by the lack ofavenues for recourse against delinquent serviceproviders. Even if such mechanisms exist, manyusers believe that, at best, complaint is futileand, at worst, even dangerous, as retribution iseasily taken against those without influence.This has a significant impact on goodgovernance, which demands accountability.This cannot be driven from above but has tobegin with those most informed and interestedin quality services. The public must have voiceand avenues to express it that are effective.Regretfully, few governments recognize the realvalue of providing open and responsive avenuesfor consumers to exercise their voice (e.g.complaint mechanisms), and therefore few haveexperienced the benefits that can be achievedwhen the combined interests of the serviceprovider, politician and consumer are aligned.

One government that has recognized the valueof giving voice to the consumer is the Republicof South Africa (RSA). A good example isJohannesburg Water’s (JW) customer careprogramme. It responded to (1) the WaterCommission of RSA’s finding of a direct link

84SDC, AAAS, UN-HABITAT, COHRE (2007) “Manual on the Right to Water and Sanitation”

http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/RWP%20-%20summary-A4-lowres.pdf

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between non-payment for services with servicelevels not meeting community expectations,and (2) the RSA Municipal Finance Mana-gement Act stipulation that customers musthave access to query, verify or appeal chargeslevied and to receive prompt corrective actionby the municipalities when appropriate. JWoperates two call-in centres (24 hours service,one for revenue related complaints and theother for technical) and two walk-in contactcentres while also offering contact by mail andemail to its customers. It also maintains anopen and transparent relationship with itscustomers and publishes a Customer ServiceCharter that declares the utility’s commitmentto provide the best possible service to itscustomers. JW has benefited enormously frommaintaining good customer care and relations.By responding quickly and providing feedback,customers are more likely to inform the utility ofservice failures that can then be rectifiedquickly. In response, customers are satisfiedand more willing to pay for the services. It is awin-win situation.

Many countries have established higher levelsystems of voice and recourse throughregulatory bodies, human rightscommissions, ombudspersons and thejudiciary, but these are inaccessible to thevast majority of the target population. In most,regulatory bodies lack independence andcannot guarantee impartial decision-makingand consumer protection. Depending on thedegree to which they are independent fromgovernment, such mechanisms can:

• Review legislation, policy and pro-grammes to ensure their consistency withrights agreements;

• Investigate complaints and ensure adequateredress and resolution of issues andconcerns for genuine complaints; and,

• Monitor compliance with national legis-lation and service standards.

In addition, civil society organizations such asadvocacy and development NGOs, themedia, research organizations and consumerprotection associations have a variety ofresponsibilities:• Monitoring and providing information, fa-

cilitating, strengthening and supportingcommunity based organizations;

• Building awareness and capacities in waterand sanitation rights and responsibilities;

• Conducting and sharing research; and• Advocating rights, equitable services pro-

vision, service standards, and consumervoice and protection.

Lastly, the community and its individuals alsohave their own set of responsibilities:

• Identifying needs and priorities and par-ticipating in planning, project design, im-plementation, maintenance, repair andextension;

• Becoming aware of and acting on theirrights and responsibilities;

• Contributing to the management, main-tenance and financial sustainability of theirservices;

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• Maintaining and conserving their environ-ment by avoiding pollution of their waterresources and maintaining good environ-mental hygiene practices; and,

• Assisting marginalized and vulnerablepeople within their communities gain ac-cess to services.

In light of the above it is the responsibility of thestate to ensure that information on water

resources and water supply and sanitation ismade available to the public (including themedia) in a format that is readily understood sothat civil society can participate in sectordevelopment, policy formulating and decision-making. It is also the state’s responsibility toenable participatory processes in sectorplanning, management and monitoring thatcounter discrimination and encourage equitableaccess to services.

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1.15 Equitable Service

Delivery

The preceding sections of this report haveaddressed numerous issues related to theequity of service delivery. These have included:

• The role of civil society in needs assess-ment, planning and decision-making pro-cesses at the local and national levels;

• The importance of women’s involvementin the development and management ofwater resources and water and sanitationservices;

• The role of alternative service providers inreaching under-served populations, typi-cally the urban poor in peri-urban areas;

• Adaptation of regulatory requirement to fa-cilitate services provision to the poor andmarginalized groups;

• Sector policy and legislation and their rolesin championing pro-poor strategies andensuring equitable access to WSS;

• The decentralization of the water sectorand its potential in narrowing the gap bet-ween rural and urban access to WSS ser-vices;

• The importance of monitoring and evalua-tion as a tool to hold decision-makers toaccount and reduce the politicization ofdecisions over resource allocation; and,

• International conventions that provide forrights to water and prohibit discriminationin service delivery.

As a theme that cuts across all aspects ofwater governance, the various tangiblemanifestations of (in)equitable service delivery –urban vs. rural, rich vs. poor, men vs. womenand powerful vs. the marginalized – are worthyof further attention. That is the purpose of thisconcluding section.

Disparities in access between rural and urbanareas are the most easily identified form ofinequity in WSS service delivery. Table 4 usesJMP data to compare access rates and rural tourban ratios for WSS in Sub-Saharan Africabetween 1990 and 2006. While the gap islarge, there is evidence that progress is beingmade to decrease it. Yet these improvementsshould still be viewed with caution: some arguethe 1990 figures offer an inappropriate andunreliable baseline against which to compareprogress towards in the water sector85.

Table 4: Access to Improved WSS in Sub-Saharan Africa (2006/1990)86

2006 1990

SanitationUrban: 42%Rural: 24%

Rural to urban ratio: .57

Urban: 40% Rural: 20%

Rural to urban ratio: .50

Water supplyUrban: 81%Rural: 46%

Rural to urban ratio: .56

Urban: 82%Rural: 35%

Rural to urban ratio: .42

85GTZ, “MDG Monitoring for Urban Water Supply and Sanitation: Catching up with Reality in Sub-Saharan Africa,” FederalMinistry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Eschborn, Germany.86World Health Organization and United Nations Children’s Fund Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation(JMP) (2008), “Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: Special Focus on Sanitation,” UNICEF, New York and WHO,Geneva.

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Regardless, the most important point toacknowledge is that rural WSS coverage inAfrica remains roughly half that in urban areas,a clear indicator to those concerned withsector governance as to where to concentratetheir efforts and investments.

Arguably the second-most visible manifestationof inequitable service provision today is thedisparity in coverage between the rich and thepoor. In general terms, the rich are those whocan afford “improved” water connections topiped systems and sanitation while the poorrely predominantly on “unimproved” water andsanitation, such as unprotected wells fordrinking and open defecation in the case ofsanitation. Table 5 illustrates the sanitation gapbetween the rich and the poor. It underlines theneed for effective governance, such as pro-poor policy development, increased civilsociety participation in decision-making andbetter monitoring.

Gender is another major source of inequality inthe water sector. As discussed on the sectionon gender above, women’s unequal positionvis-à-vis men manifests itself in numerous waysin the governance of the water sector. Fewexamples exist in Africa where women

participate meaningfully in planning anddecision-making roles in design, imple-mentation and O&M of water services.Hierarchical and unequal power relationsbetween women and men disadvantagewomen, particularly in poorer and disad-

vantaged communities. Men typically controlplanning and budgeting, while women areoften left out of or go unheard in consultations.Despite attempts at inclusiveness andparticipation, women often remain inexp-erienced and reluctant to speak out in publicgatherings. Sector development suffers as aresult, not only in terms of its not benefitingfrom women’s considerable knowledge andcommitment to the sector but also in the poordesign of facilities and lack of women’s input totheir maintenance and management. Inaddition, women and girls continue to suffer adisproportionate burden of unimproved accessto services as Table 6 illustrates. Combined,they account for 71% of those responsible forfetching water.

Finally, one of the most widespread causes ofinequitable service provision – arguably secondonly to a lack of financial and human resources– is the politicization and/or poor co-ordination

Table 5: Improved Sanitation Coverage by Wealth Quintiles in 38 Developing Countries87

Coverage 28% 40% 53% 70% 85%

Poorest 2nd 3rd 4th Richest

Table 6: Distribution of Those who Usually Collect Water87

Coverage 28% 40% 53%

Poorest 2nd 3rd

87Sugden, Steve and Stoupy, Olivier, (2003) “Halving the Proportion of People without Access to Safe Water by 2015: A

Malawian Perspective,” WaterAid Malawi, www.wateraid.org.uk

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of investments in sector infrastructure. Thisissue served as the basis for WaterAid’spioneering research into water point mapping(WPM) and the inequity of water pointdistribution in Malawi. There, like in manyAfrican countries, “in some communities thereseems to be a handpump every 250 metres,whilst in others people have to travel longdistances to the nearest water point87.”

WaterAid’s study found that methods ofallocating resources for the improvement ofwater supplies had been unfair and lackedcoordination. They had resulted in communitieswho already had access to adequate waterreceiving more while others that were short ofwater received none. While poor co-ordinationwas indeed an indicator of poor sectorgovernance at the local level, so was thepoliticization of resource allocation that likelycontributed to this skewed distribution. As iswell known throughout the world, politiciansoften take advantage of their authority toreward their constituents as a means ofstrengthening their position in office. In theabsence of monitoring tools such as WPM,such politicization and inequitable distributionof services will persist in Africa’s water sector. One of the most useful and innovative aspectsof WPM as a tool for governance is its ability tomap the (in)equity of water point distribution bygeographic area using quantitative data,thereby decreasing reliance on subjective andqualitative assessments. Using a database ofimproved water points generated through aGPS-based survey of several districts, pop-ulation data from a recent census WPMprovides “water point densities” (WPD); “waterdensity profiles” are then calculated andgraphed to compare the equity of services forplanning and budgeting purposes.

The outside observer seldom has theopportunity of observing inequities in services

87Sugden, Steve and Stoupy, Olivier, (2003) “Halving the Proportion of People without Access to Safe Water by 2015: A

Malawian Perspective,” WaterAid Malawi, www.wateraid.org.uk

A water tower in Morocco

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provision him or herself. Ways in which inequitycan be objectively measured and reported,such as through WPM, are few and subject toerror. Consequently, inequity tends to be eitherunderestimated or ignored altogether. Thisreport draws attention to several other waysthrough which inequity can be identified andaddressed. These include:

• Participatory planning and needs identifica-tion by grassroots communities themselves;

• Responsive democratic processes invol-ving elected representatives and localcouncils;

• Ensuring women, marginalized groups andthe poor are represented and active in de-cision-making;

• Providing responsive channels for consu-mer/user complaint, recourse and appeal;

• Raising awareness of inequities amongstgovernment officials and encouraging com-mitment to counter it;

• Strengthening alternative providers of ser-vices, particularly in the more difficult to reachpoor neighbourhoods and including themunder a “light handed” regulatory framework;

• Implementing PRSP and championing pro-poor strategies in sector development;

• “Depoliticizing” the water sector throughawareness raising campaigns amongst thepoliticians themselves; and,

• Improving monitoring and providing ac-cess to information on equity of servicesto the public and media.

Community meeting to review sanitation options in Thyolo district, Malawi

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Annex A: Field Assessment

Results

Within the scope of the project, sevengovernance assessments were conducted inthe field to develop and refine the indicatorsand the assessment process. These werecarried out in Senegal, Uganda, Burkina Faso,Kenya, Malawi, Tunisia and South Africa. Theobjectives of the missions were as follows:

• To undertake a review of water sector go-vernance in the country (including waterresources management, and urban andrural water supply and sanitation/sewe-rage);

• To hold meetings with sector professionalsworking and experienced in sector gover-nance;

• To meet and brief AfDB Resident Repre-sentatives and country teams, where avai-lable, on the project and mission findings;

• To identify key governance related issues,lessons learned and best practices; and

• To develop indicators, tools and where possi-ble targets and thresholds by which countrygovernance can be characterized and asses-sed, and used in programme/project identifi-cation, design and appraisal.

Senegal and Uganda were visited by members ofthe Project Team in the early stages of the study, inAugust 2008. These two countries represent modelsof water sector governance that are relatively

advanced compared with most other Africancountries. The missions included brainstormingsessions to develop indicators and governanceworkshops with key stakeholders where theindicators were tested to assess governance in eachcountry, and subsequently refined.

In Uganda, the key issues of governance in thewater sector were found to be:

• Significant differences in water and sewe-rage service provision, as well as in thequality of service provision between richand poor, and rural and urban populations;

• M&E system is still disaggregated betweensub-sectors, creating problems of dataconsistency, authenticity and verification;

• Little coordination between investments inthe sector, and poor coordination amongthe sub-sectors, causing inefficient alloca-tion of resources;

• Gaps in the regulatory framework, and alack of coherence among bodies respon-sible for sub-regulatory functions;

• The current system of budget allocationsto rural areas is formula-based and weigh-ted to reflect coverage and access requi-rements, but access figures are less thanreliable and prone to manipulation by lo-cal government leaders;

• Inadequate access to information by civilsociety organizations (CSOs), hamperingmeaningful advocacy;

• Lack of strong incentives for alternativeservice providers and competition in the

75

market deprives customers of increasedmanagerial efficiencies;

• Inadequate gender considerations at all le-vels of employment and decision-makingin the sector; and,

• Irregularities in unit costs, especially in rural areas.

Some of the mitigation measures to improvesector governance in Uganda include:

• Implementation of the sanitation strategy(developed in 2006) and mobilization of in-vestment funds for sanitation;

• Integrated information management sys-tem is being implemented to ensure har-monization of data capture methods, dataverification and trend analysis but needsto be extended to the district level;

• Assessment of the accuracy of access fi-gures and entrenching the use of invest-ment tools (sector investment plans (SIPs),etc.) into sector planning and monitoring.

• Strengthen regulatory framework such thatthere is meaningful customer protectionutilizing credible appeal mechanisms andfair price levels;

• Engage financial experts to provide adviceon asset management for WSS assets withlow return;

• In consultation with key stakeholders, theMinistry of Water and Environment is refi-ning the allocation formula. The need to fo-cus on equity and sanitation should be exa-mined;

• Strengthen conflict resolution / appeal mecha-nisms so that meaningful pressure can be puton service providers to improve efficiency;

• Harmonize best practices among sub-sec-tors through capacity building programmesto increase value for customers; and,

• Gender is often considered at a project le-vel, but sector gender policy should be im-plemented within sector management.

Group

discussion on

Participatory

Hygiene and

Sanitation

Transformation

(PHAST),

Malawi

76

In Senegal, the key issues of governance withinthe sector include:

• Little progress has been achieved in de-centralization and local governments arenot yet involved in decision-making for sec-tor management;

• NGOs and user associations have ack-nowledged that the participative approachadopted in PEPAM has given them oppor-tunities to express their voice, but at thesame time they consider their capacity toinfluence decision-making related to keyissues still very low;

• As a consequence of frequent changes ofgovernment teams during the past fewyears, sector responsibilities have movedfrom one ministry to another, hamperingthe continuity of strategic management;

• Resources allocated to IWRM are not inline with strategic goals;

• Access to water and sanitation is much lo-wer in rural areas than urban areas. In ru-ral areas, access to water is much lowerin the three southern regions comparedwith other regions in Senegal;

• Transparency and accountability remainimportant issues for the rural water sup-ply sub-sector. Weaknesses in financialmanagement and the absence of regularreporting to the population create condi-tions for local pre-emption and socialconflicts. External performance monitoringor independent audits of the ASUFOR arenot yet effective;

• There is a structural gap between the costsfaced by ONAS to operate and maintainthe sewerage and drainage infrastructureand the regular resources received throughthe sanitation tax that is included on wa-ter bills affecting financial sustainability;and,

• The ongoing lease contract with SDE willcome to an end in 2011, which leaves lessthan three years to implement a newcontractual delegation framework and re-quires that the government launch prepa-ratory studies now.

Mitigation measures for the sector in Senegal include:

• The voice and choice of the 320 rural mu-nicipalities has been strengthened throughregional joint reviews organized for the firsttime in 2008 prior to the national joint sec-tor review;

• A public-private partnership for maintenanceshould be effective in 2009 for 600 of the1,200 rural water supply schemes. Further-more, increased resources will be mobilizedby the DEM to assist in the development orreinforcement of water user associations.Innovative performance monitoring toolsusing mobile phones have been developedand are undergoing field tests with ASUFORmanagers. Scale-up is planned in 2009;

• The government has designated a techni-cal committee to study options for the evo-lution of the urban sector. This work willcover both technical and contractual op-

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tions to be considered for urban water sup-ply after 2011 and until 2030;

• An improved dialogue framework has beenestablished with civil society. Consumerassociations are members of the board ofSONES and ONAS as observers. A part-nership protocol has been signed betweenPEPAM and CONGAD;

• Implementation of sector budget supportprogressively, in parallel with MTEF, withpartners willing to endorse this approach,as this may be a way for the governmentto match its capacity for execution to theeffort needed to meet the MDGs; and,

• Intensification of the efforts initiated by thesector to achieve decentralization by ac-celerating the devolution of responsibilitiesto regional representative structures.

Additional country visits were undertaken bymembers of the Project Team to Burkina Faso,Kenya, Malawi, South Africa and Tunisiabetween September and November 2008.During these visits meetings were held withwater sector stakeholders in which the drafttools and indicators were used to assessgovernance in the countries and subsequentlyfurther refined.

78

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Boesen, Nils and Dietvorst, Desiree (2007)“Sector Wide Approaches: From an aid deliveryto a sector development perspective,”Reflections from the Joint Learning Programmeon Sector Wide Approaches, January 2006 toApril 2007: 14, www.train4dev.net.

Boge, Volker (2006) “Water Governance inSouthern Africa – Cooperation and ConflictPrevention in Transboundary River Basins,” BonnInternational Centre for Conversion, Germany.

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Ferragina, Eugenia, M. Marra and D.A.L. Quagliarotti(2002) “The Role of Formal and Informal Institutionsin the Water Sector,” Plan Bleu, Sophia Antipolis.

Foster, Vivien et al. (2006) “Africa InfrastructureCountry Diagnostic Descriptive Manual: WaterSupply and Sanitation Performance Indicators,”World Bank, Washington, DC. And OECD (2008)“Private Sector Participation in Water SectorInfrastructure,” OECD Investment Division,France.

Fuest, Veronika and Stefan A. Haffner, “PPP-Policies, Practices and Problems in Ghana’sUrban Water Supply,” Water Policy, Vol.9. No.2(IWA Publishing, 2007) pp 169-192

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GWP (2000) “Integrated Water ResourcesManagement” TAC Background Paper No. 4Hawkins, J, Herd, C and Wells, Dr. J. (2006)“Modifying Infrastructure Procurement toEnhance Social Development,” Institution ofCivil Engineers (ICE), London, UK.

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