Fichte’s idealism

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (b. Rammenau, Saxony, 1762-1814 (typhus) in Berlin (founded in 1810)

Philosophy ought to be a science (hence Fichte had little in common with the Romantics); philosophy ought to be a system of propositions where each proposition had a logical order and these propositions are prioritized – i.e., having a fundamental proposition (on risk that otherwise it would not be one science) and this proposition must be self-evidently true. Evidently, this notion of science was inspired by mathematics (geometry) as one science, and philosophy is the science of science: or the doctrine of knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). The question is what is the fundamental proposition?

Philosophy is called upon to clarify the ground (basis of) of all experience, and experience (the contents of acts of consciousness) is of two kinds: (1) presentation accompanied by feelings of freedom and (2) presentations accompanied by feelings of necessity. Hence, the question is what is the ground of these two presentations of consciousness? Since consciousness is always consciousness of an object (intelligence), philosophy is called on to abstract from this relation of consciousness in order to isolate intelligence-in-itself (S) and the thing-in-itself (O). Therefore in order to answer the question what grounds these two presentations of consciousness we can (1) try to explain experience in terms of the thing-in-itself (dogmatism, materialism, and determinism) or (2) we can try to explain experience in terms of intelligence-in-itself (idealism). If we choose the former, then the latter will eventually be considered an epiphenomenon (as is evident in the new science and in our contemporary world, also of psychology).

Kant tried to find some compromise between these two options (idealism and dogmatism/materialism), and he did by presupposing the thing-in-itself (which could not be “known” but belonged to the noumenal world) but had to function as an apriori condition of the possibility of phenomenal knowledge (i.e., in how it affected the mind). However, Fichte is uncompromising and he held that our choice of either option is dependent on “inclination and interest” (presumably of the philosopher, scientists, etc.). That is, the choice is made on the basis of the kind of “man” (human being) one is (and needless to say Fichte was the kind of man who favored idealism). On the other hand neither system has yet been worked out completely and there is no principle on which to choose one over the other.

Fichte held that the philosopher who is maturely aware of his freedom as revealed in practical moral experience will always be inclined to idealism, while the philosopher less mature in moral consciousness is inclined to dogmatism/materialism. Thus, the “inclination and interest” is a question of the self and it was the self that was Fichte’s highest interest. In other words, Fichte was convinced of the primacy of human beings’ practical free moral activity. In that sense he continues Kant’s insistence on the primacy of the practical reason or the moral will (in Kant’s 2nd Critique), but Fichte insisted that this position would have to follow the path of pure idealism. The reason is that Fichte detected behind Kant’s thing-in-itself (which could not be known but was deemed to be noumenal) lurking the specter of Spinoza’s exaltation of nature (monism) and therefore the disappearance of freedom. Hence, if we are to exorcise this lurking specter of Spinoza we must reject Kant’s compromise (and his distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal).

[Of course, one can detach Fichte’s focus on the philosopher’s inclination and interest by understanding this choice and merely focus on “philosophy’s options” and this in fact happened when in the late 19th c. Wilhelm Dilthey and later Karl Jaspers, considered “inclination and interest” under the heading of (the psychology of) “world-views” but world-view itself would then become an “object” for consideration of the same two options.]

If we choose as Fichte did idealism, then the first principle of idealism must turn to the question of what is intelligence-in-itself, or as Fichte would ask it, “what is the ego?” Hence the origin of experience begins on the side of the ego – consciousness is derived from the ego. But of course the idealist immediately finds that there is also a natural/material world which affects us in various ways – always, we are contingent beings. Hence, idealism must also account for this material world.

Before looking at this problem of the world, let me first ask “what is the ego such that it can serve as the first principle of idealism? Obviously to answer this question we must go behind the objectifiable (empirical) self (as a phenomenon of perception or as of introspection to the pure ego. Fichte once said: “gentlemen think of the wall”, now “think him who thinks the wall” (clearly we can proceed in this way in infinite fashion). In other words, no matter how we try to objectify the self, it is always possible to ask about the self that transcends the objectification of the self. Hence, the ego transcends objectification and so the ego must be the condition of possibility of the unity of consciousness (very Kantian). It is presumably the latter, pure consciousness, deprived of its objectification, which is the first principle of philosophy of idealism.

Obviously if one were to ask Fichte but where is this pure ego Fichte would answer that the pure ego cannot be found by asking “where is it?” since it is always a necessary condition of possibility of our being able to ask this question or make the necessary observations. But note that this reply also is also one that takes Fichte away from his own methodological starting point in experience or in consciousness. Having repudiated Kant’s view of theoretical knowledge (and bifurcation of the phenomenal and noumenal), Fichte now seems to have fallen into the same trap.

But Fichte insists that is not so. For Fichte maintains that the pure ego (intelligence-in-itself) has intellectual intuition about the world of experience (intellectual intuition is something that Kant’s attributes solely to God – we cannot have intellectual intuition about “reality”, hence the thing-in-itself cannot be known strictly speaking). However, it is important to note also that for Fichte this intellectual intuition attributed to the pure ego is not some mystical force/thing existing behind consciousness; rather, Fichte claims that the ego is the activity of consciousness, and it is through intellectual intuition that I am always conscious that my actions, all my activities, are mine. Consciousness is an activity aware of itself as activity and in this sense consciousness as activity is the foundation of life (and, writes Fihcte, this principle is without death). In other words, anyone who is conscious of an action as his own is aware of himself acting, and in this sense he has an intuition of the self as activity. Fichte writes: if you are not convinced of this, then reflect on your consciousness (there is no logical proof and there is no observation that will convince you of its existence). Just reflect on your own consciousness and you will be convinced that the ego is not a thing (being) but an activity. [Note how different this is from the empiricists who held consciousness to be an accompaniment of passive impressions/ideas.]

A word here is necessary about the meaning of “activity”. In psychology we think of activity as “behavior” - this is obviously the result of psychology buying into scientific materialism – but “activity” is much broader than this for Fichte. Activity includes thinking, feeling, willing, acting as in conduct; in other words, it includes what we might call “mental” and “physical” activity, doing, performing, behaving, believing, and touching, etc. etc. Incidentally, that is also how Russian activity theory psychology (e.g., Vygotsky) thinks of activity; it is also how Marxist oriented thinkers, following Hegel, think of activity.

It does not follow of course that in reflecting on consciousness I am reflective aware of this intellectual intuition as a component element of consciousness. It is only the philosopher who is reflectively aware of it and this for the simple reason that transcendental reflection (in which reflection is directed at the pure ego) is a philosophical act abstraction from ordinary conscious relations to objects in the world. Hence, the philosopher who wishes to convince anyone or the reality of his intuition can only draw attention to consciousness and invite others to reflect for themselves. One cannot show another that intuition exists in a pure state unmixed with other functions for it never exists that way. Nor can we convince others by some abstract proof. We can only invite others to reflect on their own consciousness – better self-consciousness in that it is directed towards the “subject” – to see that it includes an intuition of the pure ego, not a thing, but an activity. That is, the power of intellectual intuition cannot be demonstrated through concepts nor can it be developed through concepts - everyone must find it immediately in him/herself, or else one will never know it.

Thus, the pure ego cannot be turned into an object for/of consciousness in the way say that a desire can become objectified, say, as a “drive” (in psychology). In fact, it is absurd to say that through introspection I can see a desire, an image, or a pure ego. The reason is that every act of objectification already assumes/presupposes a pure ego, and for this reason it can be called the transcendental or pure ego. But it does not follow from this that the pure ego is an inferred occult entity, for it manifest itself in the activity of objectification. When I say, for example, ‘I am walking”, I objectify my action in the sense that I make it (my walking) an object for a subject (walking is what I am doing). Now it is the pure ego (“I”) that reveals itself in reflection as engaged in this activity of objectifying my activity of “walking”. Hence, consciousness or pure ego (intelligence) is simple the activity of doing. For idealism, intelligence (ego) is activity and not a (objectified) thing.

Note that this position as first sight appears to contradict Kant’s claim that the transcendental ego cannot be known but is simply a transcendental condition of the possibility of the unity of consciousness and can neither be sensibly intuited (sensed) nor proven. But Fichte disagrees and claims that his position is not contrary to Kant’s. Fichte’s claims his position is the same as Kant’s namely that we cannot know the ego as a thing (since we cannot know supersensible realities as Kant rightly noted) but then it was not Fichte’s claim that we can know the ego as some entity, material or spiritual; rather, his claim is that we know the pure ego as activity and we do this in reflection on consciousness. In fact, Fichte claims that Kant should have seen this (given that Kant also always begins in experience/consciousness) since obviously Kant spoke of practical reason as having priority over theoretical reason; Kant spoke of the “moral imperative”, and consciousness of the moral imperative involves the intellectual intuition of the pure ego as activity. That is Fichte claims that Kant should have seen that the moral imperative (of the 2nd C) is the pure ego’s activity in freedom; that is, it is only through the moral

law that I apprehend my-self; that is, I apprehend my-self in the pure ego’s activity of freedom. [We once again see Fichte’s strong moral bend.]

We might remind ourselves that Hume whose assumption was that human beings were to be investigated empirically (through sense impressions, i.e., the “new science”), and who then quite naturally assumed that the ego or self was empirically nothing but a bundle of perceptions, ignored that the all-important psychical phenomena precisely become psychical phenomena (i.e., appearing to a subject) only through the objectifying activity of the subject which, however, itself transcends such objectification. At the same time, it should be obvious that it is not Fichte’s intent to reduce the world to a transcendental ego, and the relation between the self as pure subject and the other aspects of the self is also essential to a phenomenology of consciousness. In this regard Fichte clearly shows insight which was totally lacking in Hume.

Fichte was also not just concerned with consciousness and its description (his phenomenological method), he also aspires to formulate a system of idealist metaphysics (what is real). This point is important, especially for all those who reject idealism because Fichte’s talk about the transcendental ego as activity no more commits him to talk about only one such ego than say an internist talking about the stomach commits him only to the one such stomach (the one which he happens to be examining). Nevertheless, if we propose to derive the whole sphere of nature and all selves insofar as they are to be objects for a subject, from a transcendental (pure) ego, then we either (1) must embrace solipsism or else (2) we have to interpret the transcendental ego (pure ego) as a super-individual productive activity – or an supra-individual absolute ego.

Thus, when Fichte speaks about the ego he is not speaking about an individual finite self; rather, in defending his Wissenschaftslehre, he is claiming that the ego is not the individual ego but the one immediate spiritual “Life” which is the creator of all phenomena including phenomenal individual selves. Note the transition here between ego and “Life”. Starting from Kant’s position in experience and wanting to transform Kant’s critical philosophy into idealism, Fichte naturally begins with the pure or absolute ego but he quickly saw that this Kantian absolute ego cannot be the finite self (subject), and hence ego became Life as infinite activity, and this shift from absolute ego to Life is Fichte’s metaphysics of idealism.

We see that Fichte presents us with both (1) a phenomenology of consciousness; and (2) the metaphysics of idealism. In a way one can separate these two endeavors. Thus, we can embrace Fichte phenomenology of consciousness (of the ego) without having to embrace his metaphysical idealism (absolute ego). Although it would be difficult, to say the least, to combine a phenomenology of consciousness with a materialist metaphysics…..

Now by itself the ego whatever else it may be is not yet a fundamental principle of philosophy. We therefore must distinguish between the spontaneous activity of the pure ego and the philosopher’s reconstruction of this activity. Thus, importantly, the spontaneously activity of the pure ego in grounding consciousness does not exists for itself. Rather the pure ego comes to exist only in the transcendental intuition (reflection) of the philosopher. That is, it is only in reflection (“activity directed towards an activity”) that the ego comes to be originally for-itself. In intellectual intuition the pure ego may be said to posit itself, and hence, the first fundamental proposition of philosophy is that in philosophical reflection: (1) the ego simply posits in an original way its own being.

This assertion is not open to logical proof; rather, in the activity of affirming itself it exists. To posit and to exists (to be) are the same.

So that while ordinarily we are aware of ourselves only in relation to the world, in reflecting on ordinary consciousness wherein we are always as selves opposed to what is not ourselves (world), we not only affirm to pure ego but we also affirm the non-ego (i.e., other than ego, or the world). This is the second proposition of philosophy then: (2) the non-ego is simply opposed to the ego. This opposition is of course done by the ego (subjectivity) itself otherwise we would have to abandon idealism.

The non-ego is infinite (unlimited) in the sense that objectivity is objectivity in general and not some particular other object. Thus, this infinite non-ego is opposed to the ego within the ego – and the reason is that Fichte is trying to reconstruct consciousness and consciousness comprises both ego and non-ego. Hence, the unlimited activity of the absolute go must posit the non-ego within itself. But if both ego and non-ego are unlimited (infinite) each will try to fill all reality to the exclusion of the other (they will try to annihilate the other and consciousness will be impossible). Therefore if consciousness is to arise there must be some reciprocal limitation of ego and non-ego. That is each must cancel each other out but only in part. In this sense both the ego and non-ego must be divisible. Hence, the third proposition in philosophy is (3) “I posit in the ego a divisible non-ego opposed to the divisible ego”. Thus, there can be no consciousness unless the absolute ego considered as unlimited activity produces within itself the finite ego and the finite non-ego each reciprocally limiting and determining each other (a plurality of selves and a plurality of non-selves).

Now if we mean by consciousness, above, human individual consciousness, the assertion that the non-ego is a necessary condition of consciousness is not difficult to understand. To be sure the finite ego can reflect on itself, but this reflection is possible only by bending the ego back from the non-self and hence the non-ego is a necessary condition of consciousness. But of course we may very well ask why there should be consciousness? Or how can we deduce the second proposition from the first?

Since there is no pure theoretical deduction for Fichte (as there was for Kant wherein he accounts for knowledge of the phenomenal world), we must have recourse to practical consciousness (deduction). That is, we must see the pure or absolute ego as an unlimited activity striving towards consciousness of its own freedom through moral self-realization. And what is necessary to attain this end is that the non-ego be posited. Of course, the absolute ego in its spontaneous activity does not consciously act for any end at all, but the philosopher in reflecting on (consciously re-thinking) this activity sees the total movement as directed toward a certain goal. That is, he sees that self-consciousness demands the non-ego from which the ego can recoil onto itself. The philosopher also sees that moral activity requires an objective field (world) in which moral actions can be performed.

So we see that the first and second proposition stand in relation of thesis to antithesis and this gives rise to their synthesis in the third proposition. As we have seen, the ego and non-ego tend to cancel each other out if both are unlimited. If consciousness is to arise at all, the activity that grounds this consciousness must produce a situation in which the ego and non-ego can limit each other. Therefore, from one perspective, this dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis takes the form of the progressive determination of the meaning of the initial propositions, and the contradiction which arise between proposition one and two are resolved, in that they are shown to be only apparent. For example, the claim that

the ego posits itself as infinite and that it posits itself as finite would be contradictory if it were posited as both infinite and finite in one and the same sense. But as Fichte points out the contradiction is resolved when we realize that the infinite activity expresses itself in and through finite selves.

Yet as Hegel points out Fichte’s philosophy is insufficiently speculative (rational) and it does not allow for strict theoretical deduction (e.g., Fichte introduces ideas which cannot simply be obtained through and analysis of the initial proposition. Thus, to proceed from the second to the third proposition Fichte postulates a limiting activity on the part of the ego but such an idea of “limitation” cannot be obtained simply from an analysis of the first and second proposition. Hence, Hegel accuses Fichte of introducing, like a deus ex machine, activities of the ego that allow for the deduction of one proposition to another.

(1) The ego posits in an original way its own being (A=A, principle of identity)(2) The non-ego is simply opposed to the ego (Not -A not = A, positing Not -A

presupposes positing A and is thus opposed to A)(3) I posit in the ego a divisible non-ego opposed to a divisible ego (A in part = -A

and conversely)

Obviously, Fichte procedure does not square well with his claim that natural philosophy is a deductive science. Yet we should remember that the philosopher is engaged in consciously reconstructing the active process of grounding consciousness to be a process which takes place unconsciously (i.e., we have no awareness of it). In doing so the philosopher has as his point of departure the self-positing of the absolute ego, and his point of arrival is human consciousness as we know it empirically. If his requires that the ego has to be given a certain mode of functioning, so be it. Thus even if the concept of limitation is not obtained through strict logical analysis of the first two propositions, this concept of limit is required simply to clarify their meaning. In this sense, Fichte maintains that logic is dependent on Wissenschaftslehre.

Now it is the idea of reciprocal limitation (of ego and non-ego) that is the basis for the two-fold deduction of consciousness that Fichte deems necessary. For consider the claim that the absolute ego posits within itself the finite ego and the finite non-ego as reciprocally limiting one another. This implies (1) that the absolute ego posits itself as limited by the non-ego, and (2) that the absolute posits within itself the non-ego as limited (determined) by the finite ego. These two implications are the basic claims of theoretical and practical deduction of consciousness. Thus, if we consider the ego as affected by the non-ego we have the theoretical deduction of consciousness which Fichte calls the “real” acts (determined by the non-ego, e.g., sensation) but if we consider the ego as affecting the non-ego, we proceed with the practical deduction of consciousness which Fichte calls the “ideal” acts e.g., desire, free action). Of course these two deductions of consciousness are complementary, together comprising the reconstruction (deduction) of consciousness. At the same time the practical ideal deduction is primary since, presumably the absolute ego is an infinite striving towards self-realization through free moral activity, and the non-ego (nature/world) is its means (or, instrument) for doing so (i.e., attaining this self-realization). It is therefore the practical deduction which gives us the reason why the absolute ego posits the non-ego as limiting and affecting the finite ego - and this leads us to ethics (which is Fichte’s philosophy, namely “ethical idealism”).

In Fichte’s metaphysical idealism all activity is that of the absolute ego and the non-ego exists only for consciousness. Let’s be clear about this. The idea that the non-ego exists

independently of all consciousness (a reality out there in the sense of “scientific materialism”) would simply reintroduce Kant’s thing-in-itself and hence it would be to abandon idealism. Yet from the perspective of ordinary consciousness there is a distinction between presentation (Vorstellung) and thing (i.e., we do have the immediate sense that there is a world independently of me). Hence, Fichte must show how this ordinary consciousness (about an independent world/nature) comes to be (since idealism claims to explain - and not deny - the facts of consciousness on idealist principles).

Obviously, Fichte must demonstrate this without falling into the solipsism of Berkeley how the non-ego finds its origin in the ego – that is, the absolute ego, and the absolute ego must posit the non-ego in a way that is not detectable by consciousness. That is, when we are ordinarily conscious of the world, the work of the absolute ego must already have been accomplished as it takes place below the level of consciousness (otherwise we could not explain that nature appears to exist independently of ourselves, namely as simply “given” or “out there”). As we have seen, it is only in philosophical (transcendental) reflection that we can retrace the productive activity of the absolute ego. Now Fichte claims that transcendental intellectual reflection relies on the power of the imagination (which Kant restricted to unifying sensibility and understanding to yield theoretical knowledge). But for Fichte the productive power of the imagination is all important for grounding empirical consciousness. It is the activity of the absolute ego itself.

In what he calls the pragmatic history of consciousness, Fichte pictures the ego as spontaneously limiting its activity (and making itself passive) in being affected by sensation. But then the ego re-asserts itself and objectifies sensation by referring sensation to that which is other than itself (world, non-ego). Thus, we have a distinction between representation (image) and thing. In empirical ordinary consciousness the finite self regards this distinction between image and thing as the distinction between subjective and objective and that is because ordinary consciousness is ignorant of the work of “projection” – which is the work of the productive imagination operating below the level of consciousness to posit an independent world.

Obviously consciousness requires more than an indeterminate non-ego it actually requires particular things/objects. But to have distinct objects there must be a sphere of objects (space) which is also the power of the imagination. Similarly, there must be an irreversible time series such that successive acts of intuition are possible and this too is the productive work of the imagination. Hence, both space and time are the spontaneous activity of the absolute ego. Moreover, empirical consciousness requires that objects in space and time be rendered even more determinate –and this is accomplished by the powers of judgment and understanding. The understanding fixes presentations of objects as concepts while the power of judgment turns these concepts into extended thoughts. “If we have no concepts we can have no judgments and if we have no judgments we have no understanding.”

Note that if we remain at the concrete level of presentations (perception) we can have no abstraction and hence no understanding or judgment. However, here in the pragmatic history of consciousness we find the ego rising “above” the unconscious activity of the productive imagination in acquiring a certain freedom. Freedom relies on conceptualization and judgment.

However, self-consciousness requires more than the power to abstract (distance itself) from particular object in favor of the universal. It presupposes the power to abstract from

the object in general in order to achieve reflection on the subject. This power of absolute abstraction is what Fichte calls Reason (Vernunft). When reason abstracts from the sphere of the non-ego (the world) the ego remains, and we attain self-consciousness. Yet we can never have perfect self-consciousness (self-transparency) (i.e., we can never abstract fully from the non-ego or world); it is ever only an approximation. The more I can think myself (as object) away, the closer my empirical self-consciousness approximates pure self-consciousness. It is precisely the power of reason which enables the philosopher to apprehend the pure ego and to retrace in transcendental reflection its productive activity in the movement towards self-consciousness. But as I noted above the intellectual intuition of the absolute ego is never unmixed with other elements and, hence, not even the philosopher can achieve the ideal of pure self-consciousness.

In summary, the practical deduction of consciousness goes behind the work of the productive imagination and reveals its grounding in the absolute ego’s as infinite striving. To say “striving” here assumes that it strives towards something (presupposing the existence of a non-ego or world). But if we now start with the absolute ego as infinite striving then we need not presuppose the existence of a non-ego (on risk that otherwise we return to Kant’s thing-in-itself). Nevertheless, striving commands a counter-movement since otherwise all striving would stop; hence, by its very nature the absolute ego must posit a non-ego (productive imagination) in its “real” activity. Or, we can say that the absolute ego is conceived as activity which is infinite striving in overcoming the non-ego (nature/world). Hence, the absolute ego must posit the non-ego as necessary (Nature is necessary) to the absolute ego’s own self-realization – or we can say that nature becomes the field for absolute ego’s activity.

Fichte takes this striving (impulse/drive/Trieb) by the absolute ego in the empirical ego as a form of feeling of constraint. Hence for ordinary consciousness, it is feeling that is fundamental to the belief in reality. Feeling and hindrance go together – this is our sense of the “real”. Here Fichte maintains that feeling is already an elementary form of reflection – the ego is itself the impulse which is felt – feeling is always self-feeling. In the progression of the practical deduction, we see this feeling (striving or impulse) becoming more determinate in form as distinct impulses, drives, or desires. But because the ego is infinite striving it can never remain satisfied with the satisfaction of any desire/interest/hope/aspiration – that is, can never be satisfied (by finding satisfaction for any of its desires, instincts, wants, needs) in its ideal goal through its free activity. Even so this goal always recedes and must do so if the ego is infinite and endlessly striving. In the end then we have action for the sake of action (endless restlessness).

However, in his ethical theory, Fichte suggests that this striving approximates its goal in the moral vocation of human beings in freedom and self-consciousness. Regrettably this process of the practical deduction of consciousness is notoriously difficult to follow in Fichte, and it is enough to note that the absolute ego is from the beginning a moral ego and it is this moral ego which takes precedence over the theoretical deduction of consciousness (world). Moral consciousness (philosophy) while complementary to theoretical consciousness nevertheless takes precedence over epistemology, science, or theoretical knowledge.

I should note that this claim that the absolute ego as activity is a moral ego is not as arbitrary as it first appears. Consider that in ordinary consciousness activity is always activity which is inter-personal (all that we do/think is always related to other people). This is what is so problematic about called activity “behavior” (or “cognition”) as both these words imply complete moral/ethical neutrality; these words also imply that

behavior or cognition are function of individual “organisms”. But as we have seen for Fichte the absolute ego is not individual but supra-individual or absolute ego and, as such, that is as endless striving or activity it embraces all finite individuals. In other words, in Fichte’s idealism individuals are never mere individual “organisms” but conscious and self-conscious selves whose freedom and activity (in relation to other selves) is grounded in the absolute ego. Consciousness is then always moral consciousness and all individual activity is embedded or situated in this moral conception of free activity. On this view psychology is not only necessarily “social” (meaning “historical”) but is it necessarily moral, meaning that it is “normative” (not morally or ethically neutral) but always cognizant of its relationship to others and the world. In this sense Fichte speaks of Life as a moral “vocation” (see below).

We can also say that Fichte in giving priority to practical deduction of consciousness overcomes, or tries to, Kant’s distinction between human beings lower nature (inclinations/instincts/drives) and higher nature (moral ethics). For Fichte it is the self-same striving that grounds both inclination (desire) and morality. In fact, Fichte sees the categorical imperative (Reason) as prefiguring in desire/longing (even as he recognizes that there may be conflict between instinct/desire and duty/obligation) – cf. Plato and contra Freud - and he does so by appeal to the unified view of the absolute ego’s activity.

From the perspective of the phenomenology of consciousness, Fichte deductions of consciousness might appear simply as stages in arriving at the conditions of consciousness as we know it (his method of phenomenology then becomes an archeology of consciousness). If we see it that way then the question of temporal or historical relations between the different conditions are irrelevant. For example, Fichte takes the subject-object relation as essential to consciousness, and if this is so then there must be both subject and object, both ego and non-ego at least if there is to be consciousness, and the historical conditions then appear irrelevant.

But as we have seen the deductions of consciousness is also idealist metaphysics, and the pure ego has to be understood as the supra-individual ego, and as transfinite activity, and we can ask Fichte does the absolute ego first posits the sensible world and only afterward (or simultaneously) the finite ego? At first sight this may appear a silly question if the historical viewpoint is presupposed in the constitution of the empirical consciousness. Hence, the transcendental deduction of empirical consciousness necessarily transcends the historical order since after all time is itself deduced. Fichte has no intention of denying empirical consciousness in which nature precedes the finite self; rather, he is concerned to find the grounds for this empirical consciousness.

Bu the matter is not quite so simple. For Kant it was the human mind’s activity that by way of the apriori forms constituted the phenomenal world. True for Kant this activity of the transcendental ego worked unconsciously and it acts “as if” and therefore was not any particular (individual) mind (simply reason giving itself conditions of possibility). If we now, as Fichte does, eliminate the thing-in-itself and we hypothesize the transcendental ego as the absolute ego, it is quite natural to ask whether the absolute ego posits nature immediately or mediately through the infra-conscious levels of human beings. Obviously, if mediately then the ego determines the non-ego and hence must be independent of it but as we have seen the ego needs the non-ego to become conscious and this leads to a contradiction.

Fichte resolves this contradiction in his claim that the absolute ego immediately posits/determines the non-ego whereas it posits/determines the finite ego mediately by

way of the non-ego. In other words, the absolute ego does not posit the world through the finite ego (many egos) but rather does so immediately. Fichte confirms this when he writes that the material world is deduced as an absolute limitation of the productive power of the imagination – that is as a self-manifestation of the one Life.

Now this position demands that Fichte move away from Kant’s point of departure and that the pure ego, arrived at through human conscious reflection, should become an absolute Being which manifests itself in the world. The latter is Fichte’s claim but obviously in order to get there (at this position of metaphysical idealism) he never quite succeeds in kicking away the (methodological) ladder he climbed to get there. That is, while he maintains that the absolute posits the World as a filed of moral activity, he also maintains that the world exists only in and for consciousness. For although consciousness is said to be Absolute’s consciousness, the Absolute is also said to be conscious only through finite egos and that it cannot be considered apart from human beings.

Upshot: reflection on consciousness (phenomenology of consciousness) leads to the absolute (metaphysical idealism) even as the absolute is itself a deduction from consciousness (phenomenology). Fichte is caught in trying to bridge between consciousness and matter/nature.

Fichte’s moral theory

We can have knowledge of our moral nature (subjection to the moral imperative) in two ways: (1) at the level of common (ordinary) moral consciousness (conscience) and this immediate knowledge is quite sufficient for knowing one’s duties and moral behavior; (2) we can assume ordinary common moral consciousness as something “given” and then inquire into its grounds or bases. A systematic deduction of moral consciousness from its roots in the ego is the science of ethics and provides “learned knowledge”. The latter does not give us a moral nature or new morals rather it enables to understand our ordinary common morality as given in conscience.

What is meant by human being’s moral nature? It is our natural impulsion to act for the sake of acting or not to act for the sake of not acting. As I noted above, in case of human beings this “striving” (the ego’s activity) or impulsion is necessarily “moral or ethical” in nature. To understand the grounds of our moral nature is the task of ethics. As we have seen the ego is striving (infra-conscious) and from the point of view of human beings this striving is to ascribe to the system as a whole self-preservation (and as such people are an organized product of nature). Hence in reflecting on myself I can say that I am (posit myself as an object) an organized product of nature (impulses/strivings).

But of course, I am also intelligence, a subject of consciousness and as such the ego is necessarily intent on determining itself through itself alone (in freedom and independence). Hence, we have an organized system of impulses derivative from nature and, in opposition, we have the subject or the spiritual impulse of ego as intelligence (as completely self-determining). We have here lower (necessity) and higher (freedom) spheres and hence we have a dichotomy within human nature. Hence we can look on “man” from two points of view – and to this extent Kant’s distinction between phenomenal and noumenal is justified. Yet Fichte maintains that this distinction is not ultimate – thus natural impulses aiming at satisfaction and spiritual impulses aiming at freedom are from a transcendental viewpoint one impulse. Thus, it is a great mistake to suppose that man as an organized product of nature is in the sphere of mechanism alone. It is the organism that strives – and this same striving leads me to satisfy my instincts and it leads me to reach out to infinity. Of course, the latter is only possible because of consciousness – and so consciousness becomes the dividing line between man as product of nature and man as rational ego, as spirit. Yet philosophical reflection sees only one impulse – man is both subject and object at once. If I regard myself solely as object whether determined through sense perception or through cognition then what is one impulse suddenly becomes a natural impulse since I view myself from the perspective of nature. If I regard myself solely as subject, the impulse becomes spiritual and self-determining. But the ego is always both these in reciprocity – one and the same impulse in relation to itself.

Now this oneness (unity of self) has important implications for ethics. Thus, Fichte maintains we can distinguish between formal and material freedom. Formal freedom only requires the presence of consciousness. Even if we always followed our natural impulses directed at pleasure (satisfaction) we do so freely when we are conscious and deliberately pursued the satisfaction of these impulses. In contrast, material freedom is expressed in a series of acts that tend toward the realization of the ego’s complete independence – and these are moral acts. Note that we have here a distinction between (1) natural acts that are rendered determinate by reference to a particular object (even if we are freely conscious of them), and (2) acts which exclude all determination by particular objects and performed solely in accordance with freedom. The question is “How to bring these two together?”

Obviously we cannot stop acting from natural impulse (e.g., eating/drinking/sexuality) but what Fichte demands is that we not act simply for immediate satisfaction. Rather our acting for the sake of impulses should be such that these acts are members of a series of converging acts towards an ideal end which we set before ourselves as a spiritual subject – in realizing our moral nature. But this resolution suggests that we substitute spiritual ideals for natural pleasures (which may be at variance with Fichte’s picture of morality as demanding action for action sake or non-action for non-action sake); at any rate, the spiritual ideal is for Fichte self-activity (action determined by the ego alone). Such action must take the form of determinate action in the world which at the same time must be

determined by the ego itself and hence express freedom rather than subjection to the world. This means that action should be performed for the sake of performing them (and not pleasure or any other satisfaction).

We see here that Fichte makes a resolute attempt to exhibit the unity of human nature and to show that there is continuity between man as natural animal and man as spiritual subject of consciousness. Yet it also shows continuity with Kant in making morality the supreme principle.

The essential character of the ego (by which it is distinguished from everything external to it) consist in the tendency to self-activity for the sake of self-activity and it is this tendency which the ego thinks when the thinks in and for itself (without relation to anything outside of it) and then it thinks itself as free and self-determined. But the ego cannot think itself in this way without conceiving of itself as subject to law: the law according to which it thinks itself in accordance with the concept of self-determination. Thus, if I conceive my objective essence as the power of self-determination, the power to realize absolute self-activity, I must also conceive myself as obliged to actualize this essence of self-determination. We therefore have two sides of freedom and law.

But just as the ego as subject and the ego as object are distinguishable in consciousness and yet inseparable and ultimately one, so the ideas of freedom and of law are inseparable and ultimately one. When you think of yourself as free, you are compelled to think of your freedom as freedom as falling under law, and when you think this law, you are compelled to think of yourself as free. Freedom no more follows from law than law follows from freedom. They are two ideas which must be thought together, as dependent on each other, yet they are one and the same; they are a complete synthesis.

It is by way of this tortuous route that Fichte deduces some fundamental principle of morality. The free human being ought to bring his freedom under law, namely the law of complete self-determination (absence of external determination of the object). This law should not admit of exceptions because it expresses the very nature of freedom. But the rational being cannot ascribe freedom to itself without conceiving the possibility of a series of determinate free actions caused by the will which is capable of exercising free causal activity. But the realization of this possibility demands an objective world in which a rational being can strive towards a goal through a series of particular actions. The natural world can therefore be regarded as the material or instrument for the fulfillment of duty, sensible things appearing as so many occasions for pure ought. Since we have already seen that for Fichte the absolute ego posits the world as an obstacle which renders possible the recoil of the ego onto itself in self-consciousness, we now see this posited world in an ethical context. The world or non-ego is the necessary condition of a rational being’s fulfillment of its moral vocation – without the world there can be no content of free moral action.

However to be a moral action each of these actions must fulfill certain formal conditions: act according to your best conviction of duty, or act according to your conscience. The will which acts according to conscience is the good will (this is Kant’s influence). It is clear that Fichte wants to find an absolute criterion of right and wrong. He also like Kant wants to avoid heteronomy. Hence no external authority can fulfill this criterion. Furthermore this criterion must be available to all (whether the person is learned or not). Fichte therefore focuses on conscience and describes this as immediate feeling – practical power does not judge and hence conscience must be feeling.

Of course, Fichte’s appeal to conscience is how ordinarily we act morally. I feel this is the right thing to do, yet feeling is hardly unerring. Yet Fichte claims that it is feeling that harmonizes empirical and pure ego and it is the latter which is true and hence feeling is not erroneous or deceptive.

This does not mean that theoretical thought is excluded from morality. The ego’s fundamental tendency to complete freedom and independence stimulates thought to look for determinate content of duty. After all, we can and do reflect about what we ought to do in particular circumstances. But of course any theoretical judgment we do make can be mistaken. Hence, Fichte argument is intended to attend to different circumstances such that we can attune the empirical ego to the pure ego. This attunement expresses itself in feeling – immediate consciousness of one’s duty. This immediate consciousness of one’s duty immediate stops theoretical reflection which would otherwise be prolonged indefinitely….thinking does not lead to action, feeling does.

Fichte rejects the possibility that anyone whose immediate consciousness of duty can also resolve not to do his duty. This would be self-contradictory and yet at the same time no finite being is confirmed in the good. Conscience cannot err but it can be obscured (i.e., I may not give my empirical ego a chance to click with the pure ego), or vanish (I may act in accord with my own advantage or blind impulse to assert our lawless will).

According to Fichte then the ordinary person if he chooses has available an infallible criterion for assessing his duties (namely, conscience) which does not depend on knowledge of the science of ethics). But of course the philosopher can inquire into the grounds or bases of conscience and Fichte offers a metaphysical explanation as we have seen.

Conscience is thus the supreme judge in practical moral life. But the dictates of conscience are not arbitrary and the reason is that our feeling is the expression of our implicit awareness that a particular action falls inside or outside a series of actions which fulfills the fundamental impulse of the pure ego. Therefore the philosopher ought to be able to show that theoretically any action belongs or not to the class of actions that leads to the ego’s moral goal. Thus while he cannot deduce the particular obligation for a particular individual which is always a matter of conscience, a philosophical application of the fundamental principle is possible within the general principles or rules.

For example, I am under obligation to act for only through action can I fulfill the moral law. And the body is the necessary instrument for action. Therefore, on the one hand, I ought to treat my body as if it were itself a final end, on the other hand, I ought to preserve and foster the body as a necessary instrument for action. Thus, self-mutilation or suicide would be wrong. However whether this particular act of self-mutilation is wrong is a matter of conscience/feeling.

Similarly I can formulate general rules in regard to the use of cognitive powers. We need to bring together complete freedom of thought and research in the conviction that “knowledge of my duty must be the final end of all my knowledge, all my thought, and all my research”. The synthesizing rule is that the researcher/scholar should pursue his researches in a spirit of devotion to duty and not merely out of curiosity (or some other satisfaction such as power, fame, or money).

The philosopher therefore can lay down certain general rules of conduct as applications of the fundamental principle of morality. But an individual’s moral vocation is made up

of countless obligations in regard to which only conscience is the unerring guide. Thus each individual has his/her own real moral vocation, and his/her own personal contribution to make to converging series of actions which tend to realize a moral world order - which is the perfect rule of reason in the world. The attainment of this ideal goal requires as it were a division of moral labor and, hence we can state the fundamental principle of morality as “always fulfill your moral vocation”.

We can now say what Fichte’s vision of reality is. From our (human) point of view, ultimate reality is the absolute ego or the infinite Will which strives spontaneously towards perfect consciousness of itself as free, towards perfect self-possession (transparency). As we have seen in Fichte’s view, self-consciousness must take the form of infinite self-consciousness, and the infinite Will’s self-realization can occur only through the self-realization of finite wills (human beings). Hence, infinite activity spontaneously expresses itself in a multiplicity of finite selves or rational, free human beings. As we have also seen, self-consciousness is not possible without a non-ego from which the ego can recoil (draw back) onto itself. Moreover, the realization of the finite free will through action requires a world in and through which action is possible. Hence the absolute ego or infinite Will must posit a world, Nature, if the infinite Will is to become conscious of its own freedom through finite selves. The moral vocations of finite selves are a common goal and hence can be seen as the way in which the absolute ego or infinite Will moves towards its goal. Nature is then simply a condition, though a necessary condition, for the expression of the moral will. What is the really significant feature in the empirical world is the moral activity of human being (finite selves) which is itself the expression of the infinite Will as an activity of doing (not being), which acts spontaneously and necessarily.