Weichbrodt Grote Rules Routines v17 Nice final

Paper to be presented at the

Fourth International Conference on Organizational Routines

June 11-12, 2010

Nice, France

Rules and Routines in Organizations: A Review and Extension

Johann Weichbrodt & Gudela Grote

Organization, Work & Technology Group

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)

Zurich, Switzerland

[email protected] | [email protected]

ABSTRACT

Rules and organizational routines constitute essential parts of organizational life. In this

paper, we aim to precisely distinguish the two concepts and advance the understanding of

their relationship with one another. We review selected literature on both phenomena,

identify relevant stakeholders, and propose several clarifications in terminology. Building on

the understanding of rules as artifacts and routines as patterns of behavior, we develop

propositions in regard to their relationships: Alignment between rules and routines is

influenced by the type of rule, by how rules are perceived and enforced, and whether or not

rule-followers can influence the creation of rules. Furthermore, under certain conditions, rule

violations can lead to improvements in the rule system.

Weichbrodt & Grote: Rules and Routines in Organizations 2

INTRODUCTION

Rules and routines are a ubiquitous and essential aspect of organizational life. Recently,

turmoil on the global financial markets put the spotlight on the rules of financial systems.

"More regulation" is one of the most requested reactions to the current financial crisis.

Apparently, the under-regulation of banks and financial institutions – thereby giving too

much leeway to their managers and employees – was one of the main causes for the

worldwide crisis.

But apart from preventing crises, rules and routines play a much more mundane, yet

important role in any organization: They enable coordination among individuals and

organizational units by aligning activities and goals. They can also be viewed as providing

guidance and orientation for individuals. Having rules in place to work by reduces

uncertainty and ambiguity in carrying out a job. Ideally, rules can thus simultaneously

promote the interest of the organization as a whole as well as those of its individual members.

But rules and routines have of course also drawbacks: Excessive bureaucratic requirements

sometimes serve as an end in themselves and hinder innovation and change. Changes within

the organization or in its environment can lead to certain rules becoming obsolete and thus at

best useless, if not dysfunctional. If tasks become so routinized that awareness drops, work

can become boring and dissatisfying, and mistakes are more likely be made. And because

rules by definition restrict freedom of action, they are often not very popular.

Besides procedures laid out in written rules, behavior patterns without written procedures

attached to them exist as well. Not everything in organizational life is explicitly regulated


(nor is that even thinkable), but rather, unwritten rules and emerging routine behavior play a

crucial role as well.

With this article we want to achieve two objectives: First, we want to foster a clear distinction

between the organizational phenomena of written and unwritten rules, and behavioral

routines. Second, we want to advance the understanding of when and how regulation and

routinization are functional and what follows from that for rule-making in organizations.

To achieve this, the core of this article is to explore the relationships between formal

(written) rules and behavioral routines. Despite the key role of rules in organizations,

relatively little is known about how they "work": Formal rules are usually put in place with

the intent of creating or otherwise shaping organizational routines as forms of collective

behavior. But so far, the social processes which steer this transformation of text in a rule

book into collective patterns of behavior are not very well understood. Several authors have

addressed either aspects of regulation, formalization and bureaucracy and how individuals

cope with them, or the role and shaping of organizational routines, but a general

understanding of how rules can (and cannot) influence collective action in the form of

organizational routines is still lacking. We address this research gap by reviewing selected

literatures on both rules and routines in organizations. We first discuss theory on rules and on

organizational routines independently. Building, among others, on Pentland and Feldman's

(2005) conceptualization of organizational routines as patterns of collective behavior and

rules as artifacts, we then integrate both concepts and develop theoretical propositions about

how they are related.


Unless indicated otherwise, we will use the term "rule" to refer only to formal, explicit and

written rules, which can thus also be viewed as artifacts. To be more precise, we propose to

view the text of the rule as an artifact. An actual rule book is of course an artifact as well, but

it could be destroyed and the rules would still be in place. Therefore, rules are artifacts in the

same sense that a work of William Shakespeare constitutes an artifact of his time and culture.

Unwritten rules, in contrast, are considered a variant of cultural or group norms and thus

cannot be regarded as artifacts in the strong sense. They instead constitute one part of

organizational routines (namely the abstract principle, or ostensive aspect, of routines).

Behavioral patterns, i.e. routines as they are carried out in practice, constitute the other part

(or performative aspect) of organizational routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003).

RULES IN ORGANIZATIONS: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

Rules play an important role in any organization, as they serve a number of functions:

Probably one of the first things that comes to mind about rules, is that they are used by

management to impose a certain order within the organization – for example when a dress

code for employees is required. As much as this is true, it is of course a rather simplistic top-

down perspective. Rules also have important "horizontal" functions: They can serve as a

coordination mechanism among individuals and between organizational units (Van de Ven,

Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). For Okhuysen and Bechky (2009), rules provide a coordinating

function because they define responsibilities for tasks, can be used to allocate resources, and

help developing agreement among organizational actors.


But rules not only work as instruments of power and as coordination mechanisms. From an

interpersonal relationships perspective, rules can also be seen as the formalized outcome of a

negotiation process between different interest groups within the organization (e.g.

negotiations between management and labor unions regarding working hours). Yet another

perspective on rules is that, for the organization as a whole, rules are often needed to ensure

the overall quality of work and adherence to standards the organization imposed upon itself.

For example, abstract quality standards like ISO 9001 need to be "translated" into

organizational rules and procedures in order to take effect.

Organizational Stakeholders in Regard to Rules

In the most basic sense, for every organizational rule there are at least three relevant

stakeholders connected to it: First there must be someone (or some institution) who creates

the rule, a rule-maker. Secondly, there must be someone (usually a group) for whom the rule

is meant. We will use the term rule-follower, although it might be a little misleading: Not all

rules are being followed all the time – deviance is a common phenomenon (which we will

address later in this article). Therefore, the term rule-follower indicates the person or group of

persons who are supposed to follow the rule. A third stakeholder that is worth distinguishing

is that of the person or institution in charge of supervising adherence to the rule. We will call

this stakeholder rule-supervisor (although to be precise, the rule-supervisor does not monitor

the rule but rather the routine, i.e. the rule-follower's behavior).

Rule-making is a form of power, which leads to an inherent power asymmetry regarding

rules. Even when rules are created in a process of direct democracy, the rule-maker (in this


case, the collective of eligible voters) has power over individual rule-followers. In corporate

organizations democracy is rare, but rules are nevertheless not always made in a simple top-

down fashion. If we consider a basic example of a small enterprise with one owner and just a

few employees, this would probably be true. But if we look at a large firm, the issue becomes

more complex: Some rules may still be made by line managers for their direct subordinates,

but others may be made by specific departments (for example, the HR department issuing

rules regarding overtime), the top executives (a CEO declaring a rule in regard to a new

strategy), or even by outsiders (e.g. a food safety agency defining sanitary standards).

However, in each of these examples, the rule-maker holds an inherent form of power.

In a very small firm, the rule-maker and the rule-supervisor will usually be the same person.

In larger organizations, however, these roles can be fulfilled by different actors. For example,

a railway company may have a specific department concerned with the writing of safety

rules, and separately employ auditors who control rule adherence. If we take the example of

food safety standards again, here the rule-maker could be a state agency, and since the food

producing company's obligation is to make sure its employees follow these standards, it

effectively acts as rule-supervisor. In some cases, not only rule-making but also rule-

supervising is done by actors external to the organization, for example when a regulatory

body also employs auditors. Regardless of being a member of the organization or not, the

rule-supervisor's power is that of controlling adherence to the rule. Often though, rules do not

specify the complete details of their fulfillment. In these cases, the rule-supervisor’s position

entails the power of deciding whether a particular behavior is in accordance with the rules or

not, and thus whether or not sanctions are applied. Rule-supervisors also have (at least to

some degree) the power to "look the other way", thereby choosing not to enforce a certain

rule in certain situations, possibly undermining the rule-maker's power. It is therefore very


important for rule-makers to work closely together with rule-supervisors, if their rules are to

achieve the intended effect.

As it is with rule-makers, the position of rule-follower can be held by different organizational

actors, too. Although the most rule-following will be done by the employees of an

organization, in certain cases (e.g. government standards for food production) the company

itself assumes the role of a rule-follower. A special case is that of standardization

organizations (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000), where companies negotiate inter-organizational

standards by which the organization has to abide. With these standards, firms act both as rule-

makers (at least in part through negotiation) and as rule-followers.

Distinguishing the different stakeholders related to rules becomes particularly important

when trying to assess the usefulness of a rule, because it allows us to search for the main

beneficiary of any given rule. Ideally, rules will be beneficial to all individuals involved as

well as the organization as a whole, but this is probably not often the case in real

organizational life. Next, we will therefore look at the specific benefits of rules for rule-

makers and rule-followers.

Rule-Making as Organizational Control

Ouchi (1979, 1980) proposed a framework of different types of organizational control, where

rules constitute the informational prerequisite to a functioning bureaucracy. Other schemes of

control, namely markets and clans, instead rely on prices and traditions, respectively. In

Ouchi's view, rules are best suited when there is little goal congruency and high ambiguity


about performance evaluation among individual members of an organization. Under these

conditions – that is, when prices are too difficult to arrive at because of ambiguity and

uncertainty – rules offer the lowest transaction costs among individuals. When goal

congruency is high, however, clans are more efficient than bureaucracies, because they rely

on traditions instead of rules. Traditions, in Ouchi's view, are implicit, non-specified rules.

On the one hand, they are not easily accessible and therefore more difficult to learn. But on

the other hand, while rules are always specific to a certain problem, traditions can provide

much more general guidance for individuals. It is important to note that these forms of

control are ideal types, which in reality will never be observed in pure form: "[r]eal

organizations will each contain some features of each of the modes of control" (Ouchi,

1979:839). However, Ouchi saw the bureaucracy as the most dominant form, because both

markets and clans have much more specific requirements, whereas bureaucracies are more

"adaptable" and can exist within a large variety of environmental and organizational

conditions.

But rules as forms of control of course also have drawbacks: Sole reliance on rules can lead

to failure, as not all possible circumstances can be anticipated and put into a regulatory

system. Thus even in highly regulated environments, individual decision-making and

creativity is essential (Dekker, 2003; Woods & Shattuck, 2000). Large bureaucratic systems

can be a hindrance to innovation and change (Rousseau, 1978), and studies have shown that

formalization can have a negative effect on job satisfaction (Arches, 1991) and can lead to

feelings of powerlessness and self-estrangement (Kakabadse, 1986). In order to address these

disadvantages of rules as systems of control, organizations can react either by abolishing

rules and reducing the overall rules density or by implementing more rules to counteract the

shortcomings of the existing rules. Classic bureaucratization theory (e.g., Weber, 1978)


argues that formalization has a self-promoting tendency to create more rules, but Schulz

(1998) found that rules do not infinitely "breed" more rules – instead, the production of new

rules slows down as more rules are already in place. Walsh and Dewar (1987) suggested that

formalization has a greater positive effect in the beginning of organizational life as it

increases efficiency, but later on negative effects take over, because, "as formalization fosters

the development of administrative power and influence, it may ultimately contribute to

organizational ineffectiveness and decline" (Walsh & Dewar, 1987:221).

This shows that finding the right degree of formalization is not at all a trivial task for an

organization. Tackling this challenge over time typically leads to phases of lower and higher

levels of formalization in organizations – just as on a larger level, western societies seem to

go through ups and downs of bureaucratic organization (Olsen, 2008). In a decade-long case

study of a small moving company, Cardinal, Sitkin and Long (2004) portrayed the phases of

balance, imbalance and rebalancing of informal (strong culture, motivation through personal

contact) and formal (formalized job descriptions, rules, and fines for violations) forms of

control. They conclude that maintaining a balance is seldom achieved by small, incremental

changes. Instead they observed a strong "pendulum-like" movement from one extreme to

another: "Because managers remain vulnerable to the pressures that initially caused the

imbalance, rebalancing activities may go too far and lead an organization to remain

imbalanced, just in a different state" (Cardinal et al., 2004:428). The authors also state that

very little is known so far about what causes these differences in the level of formalization

over time. Grote (2004, 2009) frames this dilemma in terms of the management of

uncertainty, for which she distinguishes two general approaches: Uncertainty can either be

minimized through central planning and standardization (thereby reducing operative degrees

of freedom), or be dealt with locally, which requires flexibility by maximizing operative


degrees of freedom. She suggests that loose coupling (Weick, 1976) can serve as a principle

of balancing standardization and flexibility. Adler and Borys (1996) tried to aim for a

"middle course" by proposing the concept of enabling bureaucracies. They viewed

formalization as an organizational technology and drew upon research on the design of

equipment technology. According to them, rules and regulation - like equipment - can be

either enabling or coercive, the former having a positive effect on employee's attitudes

(reinforce commitment, increase efficiency) and the latter a negative (deskilling, less job-

satisfaction). Enabling bureaucracies show the following features: First, "repairs" in the rule

system (i.e. changes in the rules) are made by the operators rather than specialists; second,

internal transparency (providing a rationale for rules) as well as global transparency

(extensive information to all employees) is promoted; and third, rule systems are flexible,

meaning that users have an influence on deciding when the rules apply and when deviations

are necessary. They further argue that in enabling bureaucracies, deviations from the rule can

be seen as opportunities for learning (see also Desai, in press).

Rules from the Rule-Follower's Point of View

So far, we have reviewed literature about advantages and disadvantages of rules from a rule-

maker's point of view. It is just as important, however, to look at rules from a rule-follower's

perspective. For an individual member of an organization who is supposed to follow rules,

they do provide a number of benefits: Following rules is a way of reducing complexity and

simplifying decision-making. By not having to make a new decision in every situation and

instead using the provided rules, efficiency can be improved to a large extent. In this way,

individuals can benefit from organizational knowledge that is codified in rules (Burr, 1998).


Further beneficial aspects from the individual's point of view are that rules provide guidance

and support for the task one is faced with (e.g., especially for new or very complex tasks) and

in general offer orientation for new employees. However, rules are also restrictive and one is

not always in the position to choose whether or not to follow the rules. Because of their

nature as instruments of organizational control, rules are usually combined with sanctions for

violations. From this follows that, from the rule-follower's point of view, rules have both a

supporting aspect (by reducing complexity and offering guidance) and a restricting aspect

(by reducing freedom of action).

Depending on the organizational context and nature of the rule, one of these two aspects of

rules will usually be more prominent than the other. For instance, guidebooks or checklists

can help accomplish a task and provide support without much restriction. Although it can be

argued whether or not they constitute rules in the strong sense, it is nevertheless conceivable

that some formal rules can be phrased more as advice or suggestions than as a command, thus

emphasizing the supporting aspect. But because rules are seldom exclusively in the

individual's interests, and instead also serve organizational interests, the supporting function

will often not be the dominant one. In the case of "red tape", that is, ineffective and excessive

bureaucratic regulation, the supporting function is lost and rules only restrict actions and slow

down work processes (Pandey & Scott, 2002). Research devoted to the phenomenon of "red

tape" has mostly been aimed at identifying and describing it, but so far little is known about

how to avoid it. Sitkin and Bies (1993) describe a somewhat similar phenomenon, namely the

trend towards "legalistic organizations": managerial decisions are more and more influenced

by legalistic concerns (fear of public and legal scrutiny), resulting in increased usage of

formal policies and procedures, neglecting other criteria relevant to organizational decision

making (e.g. efficiency, profitability, or positive employee relations), and increased use of


legal rhetoric. Legalistic organizations can be seen as an example where the benefit of the

rules for management (i.e., the rule-makers) outweighs by far their benefit for the rule-

followers. The restricting function is over-emphasized in the interest of the rule-makers, at

the cost of the supporting function (or even any usefulness at all) for the rule-follower. In

contrast, Adler and Borys' (1996) idea of an enabling bureaucracy can be seen as an example

where rule-followers benefit most from the rules, because their supporting function is

emphasized. In a similar vain, DeHart-Davis (2009) recently proposed a theory of "green

tape", or effective rules. She argues that rules are most effective when they are written down,

have valid means-end relationships, employ optimal control, are applied consistently, and

their purposes are understood by stakeholders.

Whether or not rules fulfill all their intended functions for individuals and organizations, or

fail at doing so, depends to a large extent on the quality and on the appropriateness of the rule

itself: Is it written clearly (for the intended audience)? Is it suited well to the processes it is

meant to regulate, is there no over-regulation? Are restricting and supporting aspects both

taken into account enough? Ouchi posed the following problem in his conclusion: "The

design problem thus becomes one of assessing the social and informational characteristics of

each division, department, or task and determining which of the forms of control ought to be

emphasized in each case" (1979:839). It is worth adding that even with just rules as a form of

control, the question of "how much" regulation and "what type" of regulation is not trivial

(Grote, Weichbrodt, Günter, Zala-Mezö, & Künzle, 2009). In regard to safety rules, Hale and

Swuste (1998) proposed a system of categories for rules. They distinguish rules at the level of

action regulation they offer: Rules can define actions on a very concrete and detailed level

(action rules); they can serve as solution search rules by specifying the means of how to

come to a decision about the right course of action (process rules); or they can just define a


goal to be achieved, leaving it up to the individual how to accomplish it (goal rules). While

goal rules offer the most decision latitude, i.e. the least restriction, they also offer only little

guidance and support. In contrast, action rules are high in both aspects – they support

individuals by guiding their action very narrowly, but do this at the cost of also highly

restricting it. Hale and Swuste therefore emphasize the balancing function of process rules as

a possible compromise between the two extremes.

In any case, a good rule system is always a trade-off. Weick (1979) stated that scientific

theories can never be accurate, general and simple at the same time. A similar statement can

be made regarding rules: When rules are optimally accurate and general, they will inevitably

become more complex. When they are simple, they may also be general, but then they will

not be very accurate. And likewise accurate and simple rules will always lack generality.

Hence, regulation is always a trade-off between these three characteristics.

Putting Rules into Practice

Looking at the effectiveness of rules or at the characteristics of an organization's rules system

is, however, just one side of the story. Studying aspects of rules and regulatory systems as

forms of control from the rule-maker's point of view or looking at different aspects of rules

for rule-followers are both fruitful perspectives. But in doing this, we focus on rules as social

structure and thus neglect human agency as the other side of the story. From this point of

view, we have to look at what rule-followers make of the rules, how they adopt or don't adopt

them, and how their behavior patterns in turn may influence formal rules. After all, whether

or not rules as text can serve any of the above mentioned functions depends on how


individual people put them into practice. Rules are a recipe, but it is human action that creates

the cake.

Rules in organizations are most effective when they influence rule-followers' behavior in two

regards: first, when they create collective behavior (that is, to induce coordinated action of a

number of individuals), and second, when they lead to patterns of behavior (in the sense of

repetitive and predictable occurrences of human action). Both are also typical characteristics

of organizational routines, which are commonly viewed as collective patterns of action. This

concept seems therefore fruitful for focusing on the agency aspect of rules, or the "cake-

making". Therefore, we will next discuss the concept of organizational routines and try to

clarify some terminology issues. After that, we will then look at the specific relationships

between rules and routines.

ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES:

DIFFICULTIES IN TERMINOLOGY AND SOME SOLUTIONS

The origins of the organizational routines concept are traced back to the works of

behavioralist organizational theorists Herbert Simon, James March and Richard Cyert. While

March and Simon do not explicitly discuss routines but rather "performance programs in

organizations" (March & Simon, 1958:142), and Cyert and March use the term "standard

operating procedures" (Cyert & March, 1963:101), these ideas are still regarded as

foundations for the organizational routines concept. However, these early works lack a clear

definition of and distinction between rules and routines.


Nelson and Winter (1982) later emphasized the role of routines in organizations in their

theory of evolutionary economics. They, too, employed a very wide and flexible

interpretation of routines. They proposed that routines can serve three functions: They can

serve as organizational memory, they can constitute a truce in intra-organizational conflict,

and they can serve as a target for control, replication and imitation. Since the publication of

Nelson and Winter's work, the concept of organizational routines has been picked up by

numerous authors and has become a central construct in organizational science (Becker,

2004; Cohen, 2007). It is often used in such a way as to encompass a large share of all of the

activities that go on inside an organization. How much of organizational behavior can

reasonably be called routine, is of course debatable (Felin & Foss, 2009). But the popularity

of the concept nevertheless supports at least the notion that routine behavior plays a major

role in organizations. However, as the concept of organizational routines has been used in

various research settings and contexts, it has also been ascribed different meanings and

different definitions have been offered.

Especially the idea of routines as "storage" for organizational knowledge has resonated with

organizational theorists (Argote & Darr, 2000; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Levitt & March,

1988). Cohen and Bacdayan defined routines as "patterned sequences of learned behavior

involving multiple actors who are linked by relations of communication and/or authority"

(1994:555). Drawing on psychological theories of the memory of skills, they proclaimed that

organizational routines are stored as distributed procedural memories. Gersick and Hackman

(1990), on the other hand, focused on the behavioral side of routines. They studied routines

within groups, and according to them, "[a] habitual routine exists when a group repeatedly

exhibits a functionally similar pattern of behavior in a given stimulus situation without

explicitly selecting it over alternative ways of behaving" (Gersick & Hackman, 1990:69).


The conceptual work of Martha Feldman and Brian Pentland (2003) introduced an advanced

view on organizational routines. They define routines as "generative systems that produce

repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent action carried out by multiple participants"

(Pentland & Feldman, 2008:236). Feldman and Pentland argue that in analogy to Latour's

conceptualization of power (Latour, 1986), routines also share a duality of principle and

practice: routines incorporate ostensive aspects (the principle, the common understanding, or

articulated pattern of a routine) as well as a performative aspect (the practice, or execution of

a routine at a specific time and place). Ostensive aspects of a routine can be a taken-for-

granted norm or the abstract idea of the routine. However, as this understanding may not be

exactly the same from person to person or in different situations, ostensive aspects "should

not be conceptualized as a single entity" (Pentland & Feldman, 2005:797). This idea of the

routine has to be put into practice in order for the routine to exist. In this performative

process, the abstract principle of the routine is adapted to the specific circumstances of a

concrete situation.

In Feldman and Pentland's concept, both aspects of a routine serve a number of functions:

The principle of a routine (ostensive aspect) helps through guiding, accounting, and referring:

It can guide in the sense that it can serve as a normative goal for action. It can also provide an

explanation for one's action, thus support accounting for what one is doing. Finally, since the

principle of a routine is a simple label for a complex action pattern, it can be used in

communication as a commonly understood reference. The practice of a routine (performative

aspect), on the other hand, is essential for both the establishment and maintenance of the

ostensive aspect, as routines only develop and continue to exist through repeated action.

However, due to the situational characteristic of the performative aspect (each performance


of a routine has to be adapted to the situation at hand, where circumstances may change), it

can also modify the principle, and thus the routine as a whole.

The different definitions and understandings of routines in the organizational science

literature are the reason that despite the growing body of research (or maybe precisely

because of it), some ambiguities persist concerning what exactly an organizational routine is.

Next, we will address some of these issues in terminology with the aim of further

clarification.

The question whether routines should be regarded as an individual level or collective level

construct has been answered by Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000) in such a way that habits

describe individual level patterns and routines describe patterns between multiple actors (thus

at the collective level). However, several other open issues remain.

Routines as Latent Disposition or as Observable Behavior

Nelson and Winter (1982) conceptualized routines by way of analogy as the organizational

equivalent to individual skills. They also further explored the metaphor of viewing routines

as the genes of an organization. Both analogies emphasize the aspect of capacity for a certain

behavior, rather than execution of actual behavior: A skill gives an individual the potential for

executing a certain (routinized) behavior, but it is not equivalent with that behavior.

Likewise, genes constitute the potential for an organism's phenotype, but by no means do

they fully determine it. Nelson and Winter, however, also emphasized that, in order for an

organization to keep this potential, routines have to be executed in everyday organizational


practice: "The idea that organizations 'remember' a routine largely by exercising it is much

like the idea than an individual remembers skills by exercising them" (Nelson & Winter,

1982:99). Regardless of Nelson and Winter's dualistic notion of routines as both capacity and

behavior, a large stream in the organizational and economic literature has picked up the

notion of routines as capabilities (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002) .

Hodgson (2008), for example, very rigidly defines routines not as behavior but as

dispositions. In his view, "a routine is […] defined as a generative structure or capacity

within an organization. Routines are organizational dispositions to energize conditional

patterns of behaviour within an organizational group of individuals, involving sequential

responses to cues" (Hodgson, 2008:25, italics in the original). At the same time, other authors

have focused on the interpretation of routines as actual patterns of behavior (e.g.,

Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2001; Essén, 2008; Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Howard-

Grenville, 2005; Reynaud, 2005).

In attempt to resolve the question whether routines should be viewed as behavior or as

disposition, we propose that the term "routine" should be used to focus on collective

behavioral patterns, while the term "capability" should be used for emphasizing the

dispositional aspect at the firm-level.

Mindfulness or Mindlessness in Carrying out Routines

Several authors have argued that routines are not mindless behavior, but in contrast they

constitute an "effortful" and "ongoing accomplishment" (Feldman, 2000:613).While there is

certainly some truth to this idea, it is also important to remember that routines (or habits) in


general are carried out with less consideration and mindfulness than non-routine activity.

After all, one purpose of task routinization is to free up resources for other issues.

On the individual level, it can be said that habits are necessary for mastery. A highly

successful person needs to be able to do many things routinely, freeing resources for other

tasks. No skills will be developed without the forming of habits - e.g. one does not learn to

play a musical instrument by once studying the theory of it, but rather by practicing

repeatedly and habitually. Indeed, psychologist William James urged his readers to "make

our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy. […] For this we must make automatic and

habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can […]. The more of the details

of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our

higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work" (James, 1983:48). At the

same time, habitualization bears the peril of doing things in the learned way despite

circumstances having changed, thus potentially resulting in inefficiency or even failure

(Luchins, 1942).

This dilemma of the "two faces of habits" (or routines) can cautiously be applied to the

organizational level: Organizations, too, routinize established processes to be able to focus on

other issues, while at the same time facing the danger of sticking to the routine despite

circumstances having changed. In their article about habitual routines in groups, Gersick and

Hackman (1990) describe a possible example of particularly disastrous wrongful collective

routine-following: In 1982, Air Florida Flight 90, scheduled to fly from Washington, D. C. to

Fort Lauderdale, FL, crashed shortly after take-off because of snow and/or ice adhering to the

aircraft's wings, killing 78 people. There had been moderate to heavy snowfall, but the crew,

which was not very acquainted with flying under such circumstances, neglected to use the


anti-ice capability of the aircraft to remove the snow and/or ice from its wings (National

Transportation Safety Board, 1982). Gersick and Hackman raise the question whether the

crew routinely skipped the de-icing of the airplane, because they were not used to conditions

of snowfall and cold temperatures and regularly did not need the anti-ice procedure. Dekker

(2003) further explored this dilemma in regard to safety rules by describing two models of

how procedures can be followed (either as route rule-following or as substantive cognitive

activity) and their implications for high-risk organizations.

In summary, it can be argued that routinization is two-faced: On the one hand it is a

necessary measure for any organization to improve efficiency and productivity by freeing

resources which are otherwise needed for solution finding and decision making. In that sense,

routines are always carried out less mindful than non-routine behavior. On the other hand,

routines may discourage the learning of new, possibly better ways of doing things, and sole

reliance on routines may lead to failure, when conditions have changed and the routine no

longer applies.

Routines as Behavior and Rules as Artifacts

Feldman and Pentland further developed their conceptualization of routines by integrating

artifacts, i.e. physical manifestations of a routine (Pentland & Feldman, 2005, 2008).

Examples for artifacts can be the written procedures, like rules or checklists, that prescribe a

certain way of doing things, or the log files or other forms of transaction history that are

produced by computer systems as the outcome of a routine. Artifacts such as rules can also be

embedded in further artifacts like computer programs and decision-making tools. In this case


they can be especially powerful in shaping behavior (D'Adderio, 2008). Because rules are

necessarily abstract and incomplete, they never fully align with routines. Divergence between

rules and routines is therefore a focus of the remaining part of the paper. But this

conceptualization of formal rules as organizational artifacts in contrast to routines as

collective patterns of action not only opens up opportunities to theorize about the potential

relationships between rules and routines. It further lets us begin to get a theoretical

understanding of informal (or unwritten) rules: An unwritten rule can be seen as the principle

(an ostensive aspect) of a routine for which there is no artifact like a written rule. Research on

unwritten rules in organizations is scarce. In one of the few works on this topic, Henderson

and Argyle (1986) analyzed informal rules of work relationships. They found two types of

unwritten rules for relationships at the workplace (between peers as well as between superior

and subordinate): Firstly there are maintenance rules which reduce or regulate conflict,

thereby maintaining the relationship (e.g. not to disclose what is said in confidence, not to

criticize the other publicly). Secondly, there are reward rules which provide a reinforcing

output for the participants (e.g. sharing knowledge for cooperation on a common task). The

authors view these informal rules as "shared cognitions, rather than shared behaviour"

(Henderson & Argyle, 1986:260), which relates to the notion of ostensive aspects of routines

as a shared understanding. However, as research on informal rules is so limited, a clear

understanding of the relationship between routines and informal rules is difficult to arrive at.

In the next part of the paper, we therefore focus on the relationships between formal rules and

routines, outlining the ways in which they influence one another in more detail. The above

developed different aspects of rules and routines along with the relevant stakeholders are

summarized in figure 1.


Figure 1: Rule, routine, and the relevant stakeholders in organizations


THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES AND RULES

So far, we have laid out the theoretical foundations for routines and rules independently,

which leads us to the core question of how both are connected. It is obvious that rules are

often put into place with the intent to create routines, but as rules are static artifacts, and

routines are patterns of action, incorporating a certain extent of variation, it is clear that this is

not a trivial process. We will make four propositions on how this process unfolds in

organizational life.

Types of Rules and the Effect on Routines

It is well established that rules can never completely prescribe the desired behavior in every

last detail, that even in highly regulated environments rules have to be – to some degree –

translated and interpreted (Bourdieu, 2005; Desai, in press; Reynaud, 2005). Rules are

abstract and general in nature and therefore need to be translated to concrete actions, and

parts that haven't been specified need to be added in. When this translation process occurs in

the same way on multiple occasions and with different actors, it leads to the establishment of

an organizational routine. There is, however, considerable variation in the degree to which

rules prescribe and thus influence behavior. Some rules may shape behavior by prohibiting

certain acts, thereby functioning as boundaries, within which the rule user is (more or less)

free to do what he or she sees fit. Other rules are designed to influence behavior to the

smallest detail, dictating the exact process of how to accomplish a task from beginning to

end. One example of a more elaborate classification of rules in regard to their level of action

regulation is the categorization scheme for safety rules by Hale and Swuste (1998) discussed


above. From this follows that, depending on the level of detail a rule contains, it is more or

less tightly connected to the corresponding routine. Or, in other words, the degree of

overlapping between the behavior described in the rule and the routine depends (among other

factors) on the nature of the rule. If, for example, a rule just states a goal that is to be

achieved, or prohibits a single certain action, the corresponding organizational routine will be

influenced less by that rule than by a rule which prescribes the process in detail. A boundary

defining rule (goal rule or proscription) can thus lead to more variation in the connected

routine than an action rule. Depending on the circumstances, variability of routines can either

be a desirable or an adverse effect: When creativity or innovation is desired, a few boundary

defining rules can prevent the "red tape" phenomenon and leave rule-followers enough

leeway, while at the same time ensuring at least some aspects of the production outcomes.

Similarly, when rule-followers are faced with high uncertainty and frequent unforeseeable

situations, goal rules or proscriptions can provide the high amount of flexibility needed to

adapt routines quickly. On the flip side, strict regulation will lead to less variable routines,

which are usually desired for high-risk tasks with low uncertainty.

Proposition 1: The likelihood of variability in a routine increases when it is regulated

by boundary defining rules, and decreases when it is regulated by action rules.

Perceptions of Rules and the Effect on Routines

The impact of rules on routines not only depends on the nature of the ruler themselves, but

also on characteristics of the rule-followers, namely their perception of rules. In the field of

health care, McDonald, Waring, Harrison, Walshe, and Boaden (2005) showed how rules as


artifacts can be interpreted very differently by people with different professional

backgrounds. Comparing doctors' and nurses' views on rules and guidelines in the operating

theater, they found that members of these two professions differ largely on the importance

they ascribe to rules: Doctors tended to play down the importance of written rules,

emphasizing the non-routine nature of events in medical care and that following rules and

procedures prevents people from thinking for themselves. They deemed rules useful for

trainees with little experience, but believed that experienced doctors can provide the best care

using their tacit knowledge. In their view, rules are therefore primarily restricting. Nurses, on

the other hand, regarded following the rules as an important part of their professional ethic.

For them, working by the rule was regarded as important because it reduces the risk for errors

and thus was regarded as a key element in providing safe and high-quality patient care. They

thus emphasized the supporting aspect of routines. It is not far-fetched to assume that the

different belief systems of doctors and nurses lead to a different form of "translating" rules

into routines: When rule-followers view rules primarily as supporting, they will most likely

adhere more to the rules than when they view them as restricting. Hence, routines will be

more in alignment with the rules. However, the reverse is not automatically true: Under a

system of strict supervision and sanctions, (i.e., with high involvement of the rule-

supervisor), rule-followers will abide by the rules even if they view them as mostly

restricting.

Proposition 2a: When rule-followers perceive the rules as supporting, the likelihood

of alignment of rules and routines increases.

Proposition 2b: When rule-followers perceive the rules as restricting, involvement of

the rule-supervisor is necessary for alignment of rules and routines.


Participation in Rule Creation

One way in which routines can influence written rules is the process of formalization. While

formalization has been studied by some social scientists as a static characteristic of

organizations (e.g., Walsh & Dewar, 1987), it is worthy to focus on formalizing as a process

that goes on within organizations. If, for example, an organization wants to get certified in

accordance with the ISO 9001 standard for quality management, documented procedures

have to be developed for quality-critical processes. When the routines that are already

established are deemed fit and are thus put into writing to become the required documented

procedures, this can be regarded as a case of routines influencing rules. This influence

depends, however, on the level of participation by rule users. Such rules, SOPs or standards

can of course be imposed completely top-down. But when those who already practice the

routine in question take an active role in the process, their established patterns of action

(performative aspect) as well as their ideas about and concepts of the routine (ostensive

aspects) can have an impact on the written rules. As rule-followers can bring in their "expert"

knowledge about the routines to be regulated, the ensuing rules will be better suited to the

circumstances. These rules will then more likely be in alignment with the corresponding

routines.

Proposition 3: Participation by the rule-followers in rule creation increases the

likelihood of alignment between rules and routines.


Rule Violations and Rule Change

Rule violations can have a number of different causes: Certainly some rule violations occur

because of workers' negligence or for personal gain (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). However,

other violations can be considered "necessary" to ensure productivity and efficiency

(Morrison, 2006), or because circumstances have changed and the rules no longer suit the

situation at hand. In what is now a classic example of "productive" rule deviation, Bensman

and Gerver (1963) analyzed the use of the tap in airplane construction. Workers routinely

used the tap, a tool to "re-drill" holes, when the components to be screwed together would not

align properly. This was "the most serious crime of workmanship conceivable in the plant"

(p. 590), as this practice bears significant risks for the stability of the airplane's structure, yet

it happened frequently, and even was (unofficially) requested by foremen. Bensman and

Gerver described how workers would specifically not use the tap whenever inspectors were

near and how professional norms prevented the overuse of it. They point out that this practice

had an important function in order to ensure productivity, since not using the tap meant

serious delays in production. Similarly, in a study conducted at a UK railway company,

Lawton (1998) analyzed shunters' behavior and attitudes towards breaking rules. She

developed a classification of rule violations with which she distinguishes (among three other

types of rule infringements) "routine violations": They constitute a shortcut which has

become regular behavior. They are quite common and usually concern less risky actions (or

the violator at least thinks he or she can take the risk because of his or her high competence)

and often go unpunished. Bourrier (1998) analyzed maintenance work in four nuclear power

plants. She found in her comparative case study that the workers' compliance with rules was

higher when they had influence over changes in the rules system. Changing conditions in the

plant can lead to workers being "forced" to work against the rules in order to do the right


thing, when these rules are not adapted quickly. Two of her cases she therefore identified as

"self-correcting organizations", for which it is typical that procedures can be very easily

modified by the people who have to work by them, thus reducing the necessity of rule

violations.

These examples show how well-intended rule violations can be incorporated in

organizational routines, which then deviate significantly from the rules in place. As Bourrier's

example illustrates, these "violating routines" can be seen as an opportunity for improvement:

When violations become the norm, and the actual routines "drift off" from the prescribed

procedure, this can be a clear sign that rules should be re-written. However, this form of

organizational learning does not happen automatically. Rather, rules have an inherent drive to

keep their validity because of sanctions attached to them: Treating rule deviations as "bad

behavior" is the default way of dealing with them. Violations are usually hidden practices,

thus actually helping to keep the formal rules in place. Therefore, rule-supervisors need to

consider if a given rule violation is in fact it not "bad behavior" but a case of "bad rules". This

can generally be facilitated by increasing participation by rule-followers. Employees who

have to work by rules can be considered as "experts" on these rules. Since they are the ones

doing the "translation" and interpretation, they are the first to know when rules no longer

provide support or produce more problems than they solve. Without them, it is difficult to

assess the appropriateness of a rule. Therefore, regularly involving rule-followers in the

evaluation of rule violations facilitates rule change.

Proposition 4: When rule-supervisors include rule-followers in evaluating rule

violations, the likelihood of identifying and correcting inadequate rules increases,

thus leading to higher rule-routine-alignment.


CONCLUSION

Our goal in this article has been to clarify the terminology in regard to rules and

organizational routines, as well as to advance the understanding of their relationship and

functioning in organizations. We discussed literature on both rules and routines, and made

propositions about how they are related.

In our view, the crucial point in regulating is matching the right type of rule with the right

process within the organization. The overall organizational goal can be viewed as achieving a

balance between standardization and flexibility (Grote, 2009), while from the point of view

of the individual, rules need to provide the right level of both support and restriction. In order

to achieve a continuous balance in these conflicting goals, participation of all stakeholders in

rule creation and adaption is crucial. Issuing rules in order to shape individual's behavior in a

top-down fashion may seem tempting for rule-makers – and in some cases, e.g. command-

and-control environments like the military, it may function well. But all rules have to be

"translated" into concrete action in the form of organizational routines, and because this

translation process allows for variation, the outcome is not entirely predictable. Therefore, it

is important for rule-makers to keep in mind that a number of other factors influence

organizational routines as "outcomes" of rules: For example, the nature of the rule itself, how

it is perceived by the rule-followers, how they are involved in the process of rule creation,

and how it is monitored by rule-supervisors. Furthermore, violations of rules are not always a

bad thing: They can be seen as opportunities for improving the rule system, but for this, rule-

followers must participate in the process.


Future research on the subject matter should focus on further conditions that potentially shape

the relationship between rules as artifacts and routines as patterns of behavior: For example,

the role that organizational culture plays in this is so far understood only very little. It can

also be estimated that training and education about rules have an impact on how they are

carried out – thus shaping routines. Furthermore, a more detailed look at the rules itself can

prove fruitful: More fine-grained categorization systems of rules can be used to better answer

the question of what type of rule is best suited for a certain routine. Lastly, the role of

informal, unwritten (or even unspoken) rules is heavily understudied. It may very well be that

in some cases, unwritten rules have even a much stronger influence on behavior patterns than

formal rules.


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