42
8/10/2019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/werne-hamacher-the-relation 1/42

Werne Hamacher- The Relation

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 142

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 242

29

The Relation

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r

Goethe Universitaumlt Frankfurt am Main

Translated by Roland Veacutegsouml

What relation

e one that allows to ask which relation is being talked aboutmdashin what

sense and if it is a ldquorelationrdquo at all erefore the one that allows to ques-

tion and to speak Clearly the question ldquoWhat relationrdquo is not asked

primarily because we are speaking of a relation that is still unknown and

is therefore astonishing but because there is something being spoken at

all something addressed and addressing touching and entering into a

relation

Does this mean that the question concerning the relation is in truth

no question at all but an answer And then does this mean that the

answer is not an answer to a question but an answer to something that

[is excerpt from a longer text entitled ldquoDas Verhaumlltnisrdquo in German is in some passages among other things a response

to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos essays ldquoOn the Nonadequate Traitrdquo ( Of Minimal ings Stanford 983089983097983097983097) and ldquoe Eclipse of Differencerdquo

( Inventions of Difference Harvard 983089983097983097983092)]

CR The New Centennial Review Vol 8 No 3 2009 pp 29ndash69 983145983155983155983150 1532-687xcopy 2009 Michigan State University Board of Trustees All rights reserved

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 342

T h e R e l a t i o n30

we cannot call either a question or an answer yet something that speaks

with and accompanies every question and every answer

ldquoSpeaks withrdquo and ldquoremains silent withrdquo and who knows maybe even

remains mute or becomes muted in every question and answer In any

case the difficulty of the relation that we are speaking about lies in that

we must already speak from it when we speak about it We can call what

we call a ldquorelationrdquo only because another ldquorelationrdquo already precedes it

that remains unnamed

We may also say that this other ldquorelationrdquo always accompanies the nameor the notion of the ldquorelationrdquo whenever we use it and allow the syn-

tax of our statements (of our ldquorelationsrdquo [Verhaumlltnisse] and ldquobehaviorsrdquo

[Verhalten] with each other) to be determined by this name or notion

Regardless of whether this other ldquorelationrdquo precedes or accompanies its

naming evidently there must be a particular relation between the lin-

guistic expression ldquorelationrdquo and the ldquorelationrdquo that makes this expression

possible in the first place But the relation between the one and the other

relation whether that of a ldquobeforerdquo or a ldquowithrdquo cannot be defined by the

concept that we form of it since the latter is first rendered possible by

the other relation

erefore we will have to assume first that there is a ldquorelationrdquo beyond

the one that we designate with that name Furthermore we will also

have to assume that this further relation allows the so-called ldquorelationrdquo

in the first place And third we must assume that this relation beyondthe named and nameable relations on its part does not speak in that it

allows speech and rather holds itself back with speech withholds speech

and only this way withholding it preserves it as speech

e other the further relation of which and from which we are speaking

would not be then a simple relation ( Relation) nor a relation of relations

( Relation von Relationen) It would be a relation (Verhaumlltnis ) that we could

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 442

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 542

T h e R e l a t i o n32

holds all other relations but not because it preserves the fullness of a

capability and releases from it all imaginable possibilities and realities

rather because it is itself a ldquonotrdquo of a capability and thereby makes it

possible to miss its capabilities

So what about this ldquoholdingrdquomdasha holding which is supposed to be at the

same time a carrying and as such this holding and carrying should be

something steady durable enduring yet without being capable of being

So far we have always thought language from amdashrarely clearly definedmdash

capability But since this clearly fails to grasp the structure of language

we might not be able to continue to think it from what corresponds tothis capability this potentia or essentia as substance or carrying hold We

may not continue to think it as a thing or as something as a being even

as the highest that grounds everything Such a relation the other and

further relation of which we are speaking such a mis-relation must offer

a completely other ldquoholdrdquo that offers nothing but a ldquohaltrdquo

erefore this hold is notmdashit is not a beingmdashbut a not mdasha not to beings

and so that which first releases beings as such

What we call language must be thought from this holding of the ldquonotrdquo

from this holding back without a hold and this hold without hold We

could then describe it if it is possible to do so at all without the risk of

misunderstanding or self-misunderstanding as the relationmdashdas Verhaumllt-

nis mdashand more precisely the relation of all relations mdashdas Verhaumlltnis aller

Verhaumlltnisse

We are approaching Heidegger and his ldquolanguagerdquo As far as I know

he was the only one who spoke of Verhaumlltnis in the sense of this emphatic

polysemy the only one who did not use this wordmdashthis word of wordsmdash

in the usual meaning of the German concept the only one who used

it always also in the sense of the Greek epocheacute and the Latin retentio

and thereby turned it into a neologism that could hardly be any less

ldquoGermanicrdquo In ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo he spoke of the ldquoepocheacute of Beingrdquo

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 33

as the ldquoholding to itself with the truth of its essencerdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) In the

ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo to the question how Being relates to ek-sistence

he gave the answer ldquoBeing itself is the relation [das Verhaumlltnis ] to the

extent that It holds to itself [an sich haumllt ] ek-sistencerdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983093983091)

And in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo the essence of languagemdashin modern high

German language as happeningmdashis written as Ver-haumlltnis and is thought

from what he calls the event of appropriation ( Ereignis ) which is defined

along with language in the following way ldquoFor that event appropriating

holding self-retaining is the relation of all relationsrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093)

All this quite frankly is so awkwardly formulated that one longs for aHeideggerian Dialect Dictionary to translate it into at least a usable if

not a usual language

Dictionaries list meanings but not relations of tension not the paths and

movements between them which can only be presented in sentences and

even there not without losses and additions To approach this Verhaumllt-

nis mdashthis relation this retention abstention and holding to itselfmdashand

thereby approach language and if we try to do so by the detour of some

of Heideggerrsquos texts we need to strike another path We could describe

this path tentatively and reservedly as that of a ldquocritical variationrdquo and

start it at the point that we have already touched

At the ldquonotrdquo

In the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Heidegger summed up in a few sentenceshis observations on ldquonothingrdquo from Being and Time and from his inaugu-

ral lecture in Freiburg ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo and thereby specifically

rejected the assumption that the ldquonotrdquo could be derived from the ldquonordquo

of an already constituted language ldquoWhat annuls makes itself clear as

something that is not is can be addressed by the lsquonorsquo e lsquonotrsquo in no way

arises from the no-saying of negation Every lsquonorsquo answers to the claim of

the annulment that has become clear Every lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation

of the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) First of all this apodictic explanation emphasizes

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 742

T h e R e l a t i o n34

that no-saying can only posit a ldquonotrdquo thatmdashas something said posited

and signifiedmdashis at the same time ldquosomethingrdquo and is not the ldquonotrdquo that

is at stake here Before any no-saying in the sense of a negation through

an act of positing there must have been a ldquonotrdquo that as an address must

have already directed itself to a possible speech if this speech is to be able

to address not only an existing ldquosomethingrdquo but precisely the ldquonotrdquomdashand

especially the ldquonotrdquo in its happening as annulment Although within the

medium of language the ldquonordquo can be said every such ldquonordquo as a statement

can refer only to ldquosomethingrdquo that is already given and contained in the

form of representation Furthermore as an instrument of language this

ldquonordquo itself must be a given for representation erefore this ldquonordquo wouldbe an exemplary word for a commercium among present-at-hand beings

which can only count with what is sayable but has no access to what it

no longer or not yet is and thus has no access to the factum that it is and

to the way it is not With the derivation of the ldquonotrdquo from the word of a

constituted language something represented is derived from another

representation e ldquonotrdquo is converted into a being and thereby misses

the point that it is precisely not this namely a being

ldquoNotrdquo is underivable But it is not solely the ldquonotrdquo that cannot be said

by any language and its ldquonotrdquo It is also the ldquonotrdquo that must inexplicitly

speak withmdashremain silent with and fall mute withmdashin every language as

the not-sayable e ldquonot rdquo is sensu strictu a not-word It is the counter-

linguistic the counter-word as such through which every language can

become language If it is a language it is the language from this ldquonotrdquo that

is missing from it and resists it

Language is the ldquonordquo to the ldquonotrdquo that precedes it and must precede it

in itself as its own proper ldquonotrdquo if it is to speak as language at all and

speaking is to be in the movement from its not -yet to its not -anymore

is is why Heidegger says of language that it is the answer to the move-

ment of the ldquonotrdquo that it can only speak in response to the address of the

ldquonotrdquo and in its turn address its not-ness But if it is an answer it is not

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 35

so as the existing acknowledgement of an existing object or a content of

representation but only in the way that as language it itself corresponds

to the ldquonihilationrdquo or ldquoannulmentrdquo that addresses it

Language cannot speak but by letting the ldquonotrdquo that addresses it happen

in languagersquos own happening e residuum of correspondence theory

that persists in this explanation demands however that we conceive of

language as the answer and correspondence to the counter-linguistic

ldquonotrdquo and understand every ldquonordquo as only the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and at

the same time understand the happening of language itself and in general

as a ldquonordquo as the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and of nihilation Language how-ever corresponds to the nihilationmdashand the correspondence dissolves

itself in itmdashonly in such a way that it ent-spricht it corresponds to itself

as language as not-saying It loses its linguistic nature (ent-sprachlicht )

as it evacuates its contents as well as its forms and it allows its being to

become a not-saying and with this not-saying the naked ldquothatrdquo of saying

Saying ldquonordquo to itself as a being in all its moments language speaks and it

speaks beyond itself and the totality of beings transcendence of language

in its being as the movement of ldquonotrdquo

is is why Heidegger can write describing the movement of Being and

along with Being also that of language ldquoBeing annulsmdashas Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983090983095983091) It annuls as language in as much as it departs from itself as an exist-

ing correlation to other beings and it is evicted from what it can be as an

instrumental structure of reference ek-sistence of language into a Being

without beings

is movement that language never performs through acts of positing by

its speakers this movement that occurs not only occasionally and never

intentionally or caused by motives this movement that defines language

as the language expelled from language was defined by Heidegger in his

Freiburg lecture as the language of anxiety as the angst-ridden language

At the end of a short description of an experience of anxiety this reduc-

tion of language to its most properly own is characterized in the following

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 2: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 242

29

The Relation

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r

Goethe Universitaumlt Frankfurt am Main

Translated by Roland Veacutegsouml

What relation

e one that allows to ask which relation is being talked aboutmdashin what

sense and if it is a ldquorelationrdquo at all erefore the one that allows to ques-

tion and to speak Clearly the question ldquoWhat relationrdquo is not asked

primarily because we are speaking of a relation that is still unknown and

is therefore astonishing but because there is something being spoken at

all something addressed and addressing touching and entering into a

relation

Does this mean that the question concerning the relation is in truth

no question at all but an answer And then does this mean that the

answer is not an answer to a question but an answer to something that

[is excerpt from a longer text entitled ldquoDas Verhaumlltnisrdquo in German is in some passages among other things a response

to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos essays ldquoOn the Nonadequate Traitrdquo ( Of Minimal ings Stanford 983089983097983097983097) and ldquoe Eclipse of Differencerdquo

( Inventions of Difference Harvard 983089983097983097983092)]

CR The New Centennial Review Vol 8 No 3 2009 pp 29ndash69 983145983155983155983150 1532-687xcopy 2009 Michigan State University Board of Trustees All rights reserved

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 342

T h e R e l a t i o n30

we cannot call either a question or an answer yet something that speaks

with and accompanies every question and every answer

ldquoSpeaks withrdquo and ldquoremains silent withrdquo and who knows maybe even

remains mute or becomes muted in every question and answer In any

case the difficulty of the relation that we are speaking about lies in that

we must already speak from it when we speak about it We can call what

we call a ldquorelationrdquo only because another ldquorelationrdquo already precedes it

that remains unnamed

We may also say that this other ldquorelationrdquo always accompanies the nameor the notion of the ldquorelationrdquo whenever we use it and allow the syn-

tax of our statements (of our ldquorelationsrdquo [Verhaumlltnisse] and ldquobehaviorsrdquo

[Verhalten] with each other) to be determined by this name or notion

Regardless of whether this other ldquorelationrdquo precedes or accompanies its

naming evidently there must be a particular relation between the lin-

guistic expression ldquorelationrdquo and the ldquorelationrdquo that makes this expression

possible in the first place But the relation between the one and the other

relation whether that of a ldquobeforerdquo or a ldquowithrdquo cannot be defined by the

concept that we form of it since the latter is first rendered possible by

the other relation

erefore we will have to assume first that there is a ldquorelationrdquo beyond

the one that we designate with that name Furthermore we will also

have to assume that this further relation allows the so-called ldquorelationrdquo

in the first place And third we must assume that this relation beyondthe named and nameable relations on its part does not speak in that it

allows speech and rather holds itself back with speech withholds speech

and only this way withholding it preserves it as speech

e other the further relation of which and from which we are speaking

would not be then a simple relation ( Relation) nor a relation of relations

( Relation von Relationen) It would be a relation (Verhaumlltnis ) that we could

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 442

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 542

T h e R e l a t i o n32

holds all other relations but not because it preserves the fullness of a

capability and releases from it all imaginable possibilities and realities

rather because it is itself a ldquonotrdquo of a capability and thereby makes it

possible to miss its capabilities

So what about this ldquoholdingrdquomdasha holding which is supposed to be at the

same time a carrying and as such this holding and carrying should be

something steady durable enduring yet without being capable of being

So far we have always thought language from amdashrarely clearly definedmdash

capability But since this clearly fails to grasp the structure of language

we might not be able to continue to think it from what corresponds tothis capability this potentia or essentia as substance or carrying hold We

may not continue to think it as a thing or as something as a being even

as the highest that grounds everything Such a relation the other and

further relation of which we are speaking such a mis-relation must offer

a completely other ldquoholdrdquo that offers nothing but a ldquohaltrdquo

erefore this hold is notmdashit is not a beingmdashbut a not mdasha not to beings

and so that which first releases beings as such

What we call language must be thought from this holding of the ldquonotrdquo

from this holding back without a hold and this hold without hold We

could then describe it if it is possible to do so at all without the risk of

misunderstanding or self-misunderstanding as the relationmdashdas Verhaumllt-

nis mdashand more precisely the relation of all relations mdashdas Verhaumlltnis aller

Verhaumlltnisse

We are approaching Heidegger and his ldquolanguagerdquo As far as I know

he was the only one who spoke of Verhaumlltnis in the sense of this emphatic

polysemy the only one who did not use this wordmdashthis word of wordsmdash

in the usual meaning of the German concept the only one who used

it always also in the sense of the Greek epocheacute and the Latin retentio

and thereby turned it into a neologism that could hardly be any less

ldquoGermanicrdquo In ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo he spoke of the ldquoepocheacute of Beingrdquo

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 33

as the ldquoholding to itself with the truth of its essencerdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) In the

ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo to the question how Being relates to ek-sistence

he gave the answer ldquoBeing itself is the relation [das Verhaumlltnis ] to the

extent that It holds to itself [an sich haumllt ] ek-sistencerdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983093983091)

And in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo the essence of languagemdashin modern high

German language as happeningmdashis written as Ver-haumlltnis and is thought

from what he calls the event of appropriation ( Ereignis ) which is defined

along with language in the following way ldquoFor that event appropriating

holding self-retaining is the relation of all relationsrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093)

All this quite frankly is so awkwardly formulated that one longs for aHeideggerian Dialect Dictionary to translate it into at least a usable if

not a usual language

Dictionaries list meanings but not relations of tension not the paths and

movements between them which can only be presented in sentences and

even there not without losses and additions To approach this Verhaumllt-

nis mdashthis relation this retention abstention and holding to itselfmdashand

thereby approach language and if we try to do so by the detour of some

of Heideggerrsquos texts we need to strike another path We could describe

this path tentatively and reservedly as that of a ldquocritical variationrdquo and

start it at the point that we have already touched

At the ldquonotrdquo

In the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Heidegger summed up in a few sentenceshis observations on ldquonothingrdquo from Being and Time and from his inaugu-

ral lecture in Freiburg ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo and thereby specifically

rejected the assumption that the ldquonotrdquo could be derived from the ldquonordquo

of an already constituted language ldquoWhat annuls makes itself clear as

something that is not is can be addressed by the lsquonorsquo e lsquonotrsquo in no way

arises from the no-saying of negation Every lsquonorsquo answers to the claim of

the annulment that has become clear Every lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation

of the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) First of all this apodictic explanation emphasizes

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 742

T h e R e l a t i o n34

that no-saying can only posit a ldquonotrdquo thatmdashas something said posited

and signifiedmdashis at the same time ldquosomethingrdquo and is not the ldquonotrdquo that

is at stake here Before any no-saying in the sense of a negation through

an act of positing there must have been a ldquonotrdquo that as an address must

have already directed itself to a possible speech if this speech is to be able

to address not only an existing ldquosomethingrdquo but precisely the ldquonotrdquomdashand

especially the ldquonotrdquo in its happening as annulment Although within the

medium of language the ldquonordquo can be said every such ldquonordquo as a statement

can refer only to ldquosomethingrdquo that is already given and contained in the

form of representation Furthermore as an instrument of language this

ldquonordquo itself must be a given for representation erefore this ldquonordquo wouldbe an exemplary word for a commercium among present-at-hand beings

which can only count with what is sayable but has no access to what it

no longer or not yet is and thus has no access to the factum that it is and

to the way it is not With the derivation of the ldquonotrdquo from the word of a

constituted language something represented is derived from another

representation e ldquonotrdquo is converted into a being and thereby misses

the point that it is precisely not this namely a being

ldquoNotrdquo is underivable But it is not solely the ldquonotrdquo that cannot be said

by any language and its ldquonotrdquo It is also the ldquonotrdquo that must inexplicitly

speak withmdashremain silent with and fall mute withmdashin every language as

the not-sayable e ldquonot rdquo is sensu strictu a not-word It is the counter-

linguistic the counter-word as such through which every language can

become language If it is a language it is the language from this ldquonotrdquo that

is missing from it and resists it

Language is the ldquonordquo to the ldquonotrdquo that precedes it and must precede it

in itself as its own proper ldquonotrdquo if it is to speak as language at all and

speaking is to be in the movement from its not -yet to its not -anymore

is is why Heidegger says of language that it is the answer to the move-

ment of the ldquonotrdquo that it can only speak in response to the address of the

ldquonotrdquo and in its turn address its not-ness But if it is an answer it is not

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 35

so as the existing acknowledgement of an existing object or a content of

representation but only in the way that as language it itself corresponds

to the ldquonihilationrdquo or ldquoannulmentrdquo that addresses it

Language cannot speak but by letting the ldquonotrdquo that addresses it happen

in languagersquos own happening e residuum of correspondence theory

that persists in this explanation demands however that we conceive of

language as the answer and correspondence to the counter-linguistic

ldquonotrdquo and understand every ldquonordquo as only the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and at

the same time understand the happening of language itself and in general

as a ldquonordquo as the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and of nihilation Language how-ever corresponds to the nihilationmdashand the correspondence dissolves

itself in itmdashonly in such a way that it ent-spricht it corresponds to itself

as language as not-saying It loses its linguistic nature (ent-sprachlicht )

as it evacuates its contents as well as its forms and it allows its being to

become a not-saying and with this not-saying the naked ldquothatrdquo of saying

Saying ldquonordquo to itself as a being in all its moments language speaks and it

speaks beyond itself and the totality of beings transcendence of language

in its being as the movement of ldquonotrdquo

is is why Heidegger can write describing the movement of Being and

along with Being also that of language ldquoBeing annulsmdashas Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983090983095983091) It annuls as language in as much as it departs from itself as an exist-

ing correlation to other beings and it is evicted from what it can be as an

instrumental structure of reference ek-sistence of language into a Being

without beings

is movement that language never performs through acts of positing by

its speakers this movement that occurs not only occasionally and never

intentionally or caused by motives this movement that defines language

as the language expelled from language was defined by Heidegger in his

Freiburg lecture as the language of anxiety as the angst-ridden language

At the end of a short description of an experience of anxiety this reduc-

tion of language to its most properly own is characterized in the following

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 3: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 342

T h e R e l a t i o n30

we cannot call either a question or an answer yet something that speaks

with and accompanies every question and every answer

ldquoSpeaks withrdquo and ldquoremains silent withrdquo and who knows maybe even

remains mute or becomes muted in every question and answer In any

case the difficulty of the relation that we are speaking about lies in that

we must already speak from it when we speak about it We can call what

we call a ldquorelationrdquo only because another ldquorelationrdquo already precedes it

that remains unnamed

We may also say that this other ldquorelationrdquo always accompanies the nameor the notion of the ldquorelationrdquo whenever we use it and allow the syn-

tax of our statements (of our ldquorelationsrdquo [Verhaumlltnisse] and ldquobehaviorsrdquo

[Verhalten] with each other) to be determined by this name or notion

Regardless of whether this other ldquorelationrdquo precedes or accompanies its

naming evidently there must be a particular relation between the lin-

guistic expression ldquorelationrdquo and the ldquorelationrdquo that makes this expression

possible in the first place But the relation between the one and the other

relation whether that of a ldquobeforerdquo or a ldquowithrdquo cannot be defined by the

concept that we form of it since the latter is first rendered possible by

the other relation

erefore we will have to assume first that there is a ldquorelationrdquo beyond

the one that we designate with that name Furthermore we will also

have to assume that this further relation allows the so-called ldquorelationrdquo

in the first place And third we must assume that this relation beyondthe named and nameable relations on its part does not speak in that it

allows speech and rather holds itself back with speech withholds speech

and only this way withholding it preserves it as speech

e other the further relation of which and from which we are speaking

would not be then a simple relation ( Relation) nor a relation of relations

( Relation von Relationen) It would be a relation (Verhaumlltnis ) that we could

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 442

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 542

T h e R e l a t i o n32

holds all other relations but not because it preserves the fullness of a

capability and releases from it all imaginable possibilities and realities

rather because it is itself a ldquonotrdquo of a capability and thereby makes it

possible to miss its capabilities

So what about this ldquoholdingrdquomdasha holding which is supposed to be at the

same time a carrying and as such this holding and carrying should be

something steady durable enduring yet without being capable of being

So far we have always thought language from amdashrarely clearly definedmdash

capability But since this clearly fails to grasp the structure of language

we might not be able to continue to think it from what corresponds tothis capability this potentia or essentia as substance or carrying hold We

may not continue to think it as a thing or as something as a being even

as the highest that grounds everything Such a relation the other and

further relation of which we are speaking such a mis-relation must offer

a completely other ldquoholdrdquo that offers nothing but a ldquohaltrdquo

erefore this hold is notmdashit is not a beingmdashbut a not mdasha not to beings

and so that which first releases beings as such

What we call language must be thought from this holding of the ldquonotrdquo

from this holding back without a hold and this hold without hold We

could then describe it if it is possible to do so at all without the risk of

misunderstanding or self-misunderstanding as the relationmdashdas Verhaumllt-

nis mdashand more precisely the relation of all relations mdashdas Verhaumlltnis aller

Verhaumlltnisse

We are approaching Heidegger and his ldquolanguagerdquo As far as I know

he was the only one who spoke of Verhaumlltnis in the sense of this emphatic

polysemy the only one who did not use this wordmdashthis word of wordsmdash

in the usual meaning of the German concept the only one who used

it always also in the sense of the Greek epocheacute and the Latin retentio

and thereby turned it into a neologism that could hardly be any less

ldquoGermanicrdquo In ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo he spoke of the ldquoepocheacute of Beingrdquo

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 33

as the ldquoholding to itself with the truth of its essencerdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) In the

ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo to the question how Being relates to ek-sistence

he gave the answer ldquoBeing itself is the relation [das Verhaumlltnis ] to the

extent that It holds to itself [an sich haumllt ] ek-sistencerdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983093983091)

And in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo the essence of languagemdashin modern high

German language as happeningmdashis written as Ver-haumlltnis and is thought

from what he calls the event of appropriation ( Ereignis ) which is defined

along with language in the following way ldquoFor that event appropriating

holding self-retaining is the relation of all relationsrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093)

All this quite frankly is so awkwardly formulated that one longs for aHeideggerian Dialect Dictionary to translate it into at least a usable if

not a usual language

Dictionaries list meanings but not relations of tension not the paths and

movements between them which can only be presented in sentences and

even there not without losses and additions To approach this Verhaumllt-

nis mdashthis relation this retention abstention and holding to itselfmdashand

thereby approach language and if we try to do so by the detour of some

of Heideggerrsquos texts we need to strike another path We could describe

this path tentatively and reservedly as that of a ldquocritical variationrdquo and

start it at the point that we have already touched

At the ldquonotrdquo

In the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Heidegger summed up in a few sentenceshis observations on ldquonothingrdquo from Being and Time and from his inaugu-

ral lecture in Freiburg ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo and thereby specifically

rejected the assumption that the ldquonotrdquo could be derived from the ldquonordquo

of an already constituted language ldquoWhat annuls makes itself clear as

something that is not is can be addressed by the lsquonorsquo e lsquonotrsquo in no way

arises from the no-saying of negation Every lsquonorsquo answers to the claim of

the annulment that has become clear Every lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation

of the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) First of all this apodictic explanation emphasizes

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 742

T h e R e l a t i o n34

that no-saying can only posit a ldquonotrdquo thatmdashas something said posited

and signifiedmdashis at the same time ldquosomethingrdquo and is not the ldquonotrdquo that

is at stake here Before any no-saying in the sense of a negation through

an act of positing there must have been a ldquonotrdquo that as an address must

have already directed itself to a possible speech if this speech is to be able

to address not only an existing ldquosomethingrdquo but precisely the ldquonotrdquomdashand

especially the ldquonotrdquo in its happening as annulment Although within the

medium of language the ldquonordquo can be said every such ldquonordquo as a statement

can refer only to ldquosomethingrdquo that is already given and contained in the

form of representation Furthermore as an instrument of language this

ldquonordquo itself must be a given for representation erefore this ldquonordquo wouldbe an exemplary word for a commercium among present-at-hand beings

which can only count with what is sayable but has no access to what it

no longer or not yet is and thus has no access to the factum that it is and

to the way it is not With the derivation of the ldquonotrdquo from the word of a

constituted language something represented is derived from another

representation e ldquonotrdquo is converted into a being and thereby misses

the point that it is precisely not this namely a being

ldquoNotrdquo is underivable But it is not solely the ldquonotrdquo that cannot be said

by any language and its ldquonotrdquo It is also the ldquonotrdquo that must inexplicitly

speak withmdashremain silent with and fall mute withmdashin every language as

the not-sayable e ldquonot rdquo is sensu strictu a not-word It is the counter-

linguistic the counter-word as such through which every language can

become language If it is a language it is the language from this ldquonotrdquo that

is missing from it and resists it

Language is the ldquonordquo to the ldquonotrdquo that precedes it and must precede it

in itself as its own proper ldquonotrdquo if it is to speak as language at all and

speaking is to be in the movement from its not -yet to its not -anymore

is is why Heidegger says of language that it is the answer to the move-

ment of the ldquonotrdquo that it can only speak in response to the address of the

ldquonotrdquo and in its turn address its not-ness But if it is an answer it is not

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 35

so as the existing acknowledgement of an existing object or a content of

representation but only in the way that as language it itself corresponds

to the ldquonihilationrdquo or ldquoannulmentrdquo that addresses it

Language cannot speak but by letting the ldquonotrdquo that addresses it happen

in languagersquos own happening e residuum of correspondence theory

that persists in this explanation demands however that we conceive of

language as the answer and correspondence to the counter-linguistic

ldquonotrdquo and understand every ldquonordquo as only the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and at

the same time understand the happening of language itself and in general

as a ldquonordquo as the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and of nihilation Language how-ever corresponds to the nihilationmdashand the correspondence dissolves

itself in itmdashonly in such a way that it ent-spricht it corresponds to itself

as language as not-saying It loses its linguistic nature (ent-sprachlicht )

as it evacuates its contents as well as its forms and it allows its being to

become a not-saying and with this not-saying the naked ldquothatrdquo of saying

Saying ldquonordquo to itself as a being in all its moments language speaks and it

speaks beyond itself and the totality of beings transcendence of language

in its being as the movement of ldquonotrdquo

is is why Heidegger can write describing the movement of Being and

along with Being also that of language ldquoBeing annulsmdashas Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983090983095983091) It annuls as language in as much as it departs from itself as an exist-

ing correlation to other beings and it is evicted from what it can be as an

instrumental structure of reference ek-sistence of language into a Being

without beings

is movement that language never performs through acts of positing by

its speakers this movement that occurs not only occasionally and never

intentionally or caused by motives this movement that defines language

as the language expelled from language was defined by Heidegger in his

Freiburg lecture as the language of anxiety as the angst-ridden language

At the end of a short description of an experience of anxiety this reduc-

tion of language to its most properly own is characterized in the following

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 4: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 442

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 542

T h e R e l a t i o n32

holds all other relations but not because it preserves the fullness of a

capability and releases from it all imaginable possibilities and realities

rather because it is itself a ldquonotrdquo of a capability and thereby makes it

possible to miss its capabilities

So what about this ldquoholdingrdquomdasha holding which is supposed to be at the

same time a carrying and as such this holding and carrying should be

something steady durable enduring yet without being capable of being

So far we have always thought language from amdashrarely clearly definedmdash

capability But since this clearly fails to grasp the structure of language

we might not be able to continue to think it from what corresponds tothis capability this potentia or essentia as substance or carrying hold We

may not continue to think it as a thing or as something as a being even

as the highest that grounds everything Such a relation the other and

further relation of which we are speaking such a mis-relation must offer

a completely other ldquoholdrdquo that offers nothing but a ldquohaltrdquo

erefore this hold is notmdashit is not a beingmdashbut a not mdasha not to beings

and so that which first releases beings as such

What we call language must be thought from this holding of the ldquonotrdquo

from this holding back without a hold and this hold without hold We

could then describe it if it is possible to do so at all without the risk of

misunderstanding or self-misunderstanding as the relationmdashdas Verhaumllt-

nis mdashand more precisely the relation of all relations mdashdas Verhaumlltnis aller

Verhaumlltnisse

We are approaching Heidegger and his ldquolanguagerdquo As far as I know

he was the only one who spoke of Verhaumlltnis in the sense of this emphatic

polysemy the only one who did not use this wordmdashthis word of wordsmdash

in the usual meaning of the German concept the only one who used

it always also in the sense of the Greek epocheacute and the Latin retentio

and thereby turned it into a neologism that could hardly be any less

ldquoGermanicrdquo In ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo he spoke of the ldquoepocheacute of Beingrdquo

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 33

as the ldquoholding to itself with the truth of its essencerdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) In the

ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo to the question how Being relates to ek-sistence

he gave the answer ldquoBeing itself is the relation [das Verhaumlltnis ] to the

extent that It holds to itself [an sich haumllt ] ek-sistencerdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983093983091)

And in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo the essence of languagemdashin modern high

German language as happeningmdashis written as Ver-haumlltnis and is thought

from what he calls the event of appropriation ( Ereignis ) which is defined

along with language in the following way ldquoFor that event appropriating

holding self-retaining is the relation of all relationsrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093)

All this quite frankly is so awkwardly formulated that one longs for aHeideggerian Dialect Dictionary to translate it into at least a usable if

not a usual language

Dictionaries list meanings but not relations of tension not the paths and

movements between them which can only be presented in sentences and

even there not without losses and additions To approach this Verhaumllt-

nis mdashthis relation this retention abstention and holding to itselfmdashand

thereby approach language and if we try to do so by the detour of some

of Heideggerrsquos texts we need to strike another path We could describe

this path tentatively and reservedly as that of a ldquocritical variationrdquo and

start it at the point that we have already touched

At the ldquonotrdquo

In the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Heidegger summed up in a few sentenceshis observations on ldquonothingrdquo from Being and Time and from his inaugu-

ral lecture in Freiburg ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo and thereby specifically

rejected the assumption that the ldquonotrdquo could be derived from the ldquonordquo

of an already constituted language ldquoWhat annuls makes itself clear as

something that is not is can be addressed by the lsquonorsquo e lsquonotrsquo in no way

arises from the no-saying of negation Every lsquonorsquo answers to the claim of

the annulment that has become clear Every lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation

of the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) First of all this apodictic explanation emphasizes

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 742

T h e R e l a t i o n34

that no-saying can only posit a ldquonotrdquo thatmdashas something said posited

and signifiedmdashis at the same time ldquosomethingrdquo and is not the ldquonotrdquo that

is at stake here Before any no-saying in the sense of a negation through

an act of positing there must have been a ldquonotrdquo that as an address must

have already directed itself to a possible speech if this speech is to be able

to address not only an existing ldquosomethingrdquo but precisely the ldquonotrdquomdashand

especially the ldquonotrdquo in its happening as annulment Although within the

medium of language the ldquonordquo can be said every such ldquonordquo as a statement

can refer only to ldquosomethingrdquo that is already given and contained in the

form of representation Furthermore as an instrument of language this

ldquonordquo itself must be a given for representation erefore this ldquonordquo wouldbe an exemplary word for a commercium among present-at-hand beings

which can only count with what is sayable but has no access to what it

no longer or not yet is and thus has no access to the factum that it is and

to the way it is not With the derivation of the ldquonotrdquo from the word of a

constituted language something represented is derived from another

representation e ldquonotrdquo is converted into a being and thereby misses

the point that it is precisely not this namely a being

ldquoNotrdquo is underivable But it is not solely the ldquonotrdquo that cannot be said

by any language and its ldquonotrdquo It is also the ldquonotrdquo that must inexplicitly

speak withmdashremain silent with and fall mute withmdashin every language as

the not-sayable e ldquonot rdquo is sensu strictu a not-word It is the counter-

linguistic the counter-word as such through which every language can

become language If it is a language it is the language from this ldquonotrdquo that

is missing from it and resists it

Language is the ldquonordquo to the ldquonotrdquo that precedes it and must precede it

in itself as its own proper ldquonotrdquo if it is to speak as language at all and

speaking is to be in the movement from its not -yet to its not -anymore

is is why Heidegger says of language that it is the answer to the move-

ment of the ldquonotrdquo that it can only speak in response to the address of the

ldquonotrdquo and in its turn address its not-ness But if it is an answer it is not

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 35

so as the existing acknowledgement of an existing object or a content of

representation but only in the way that as language it itself corresponds

to the ldquonihilationrdquo or ldquoannulmentrdquo that addresses it

Language cannot speak but by letting the ldquonotrdquo that addresses it happen

in languagersquos own happening e residuum of correspondence theory

that persists in this explanation demands however that we conceive of

language as the answer and correspondence to the counter-linguistic

ldquonotrdquo and understand every ldquonordquo as only the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and at

the same time understand the happening of language itself and in general

as a ldquonordquo as the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and of nihilation Language how-ever corresponds to the nihilationmdashand the correspondence dissolves

itself in itmdashonly in such a way that it ent-spricht it corresponds to itself

as language as not-saying It loses its linguistic nature (ent-sprachlicht )

as it evacuates its contents as well as its forms and it allows its being to

become a not-saying and with this not-saying the naked ldquothatrdquo of saying

Saying ldquonordquo to itself as a being in all its moments language speaks and it

speaks beyond itself and the totality of beings transcendence of language

in its being as the movement of ldquonotrdquo

is is why Heidegger can write describing the movement of Being and

along with Being also that of language ldquoBeing annulsmdashas Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983090983095983091) It annuls as language in as much as it departs from itself as an exist-

ing correlation to other beings and it is evicted from what it can be as an

instrumental structure of reference ek-sistence of language into a Being

without beings

is movement that language never performs through acts of positing by

its speakers this movement that occurs not only occasionally and never

intentionally or caused by motives this movement that defines language

as the language expelled from language was defined by Heidegger in his

Freiburg lecture as the language of anxiety as the angst-ridden language

At the end of a short description of an experience of anxiety this reduc-

tion of language to its most properly own is characterized in the following

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 5: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 542

T h e R e l a t i o n32

holds all other relations but not because it preserves the fullness of a

capability and releases from it all imaginable possibilities and realities

rather because it is itself a ldquonotrdquo of a capability and thereby makes it

possible to miss its capabilities

So what about this ldquoholdingrdquomdasha holding which is supposed to be at the

same time a carrying and as such this holding and carrying should be

something steady durable enduring yet without being capable of being

So far we have always thought language from amdashrarely clearly definedmdash

capability But since this clearly fails to grasp the structure of language

we might not be able to continue to think it from what corresponds tothis capability this potentia or essentia as substance or carrying hold We

may not continue to think it as a thing or as something as a being even

as the highest that grounds everything Such a relation the other and

further relation of which we are speaking such a mis-relation must offer

a completely other ldquoholdrdquo that offers nothing but a ldquohaltrdquo

erefore this hold is notmdashit is not a beingmdashbut a not mdasha not to beings

and so that which first releases beings as such

What we call language must be thought from this holding of the ldquonotrdquo

from this holding back without a hold and this hold without hold We

could then describe it if it is possible to do so at all without the risk of

misunderstanding or self-misunderstanding as the relationmdashdas Verhaumllt-

nis mdashand more precisely the relation of all relations mdashdas Verhaumlltnis aller

Verhaumlltnisse

We are approaching Heidegger and his ldquolanguagerdquo As far as I know

he was the only one who spoke of Verhaumlltnis in the sense of this emphatic

polysemy the only one who did not use this wordmdashthis word of wordsmdash

in the usual meaning of the German concept the only one who used

it always also in the sense of the Greek epocheacute and the Latin retentio

and thereby turned it into a neologism that could hardly be any less

ldquoGermanicrdquo In ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo he spoke of the ldquoepocheacute of Beingrdquo

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 33

as the ldquoholding to itself with the truth of its essencerdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) In the

ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo to the question how Being relates to ek-sistence

he gave the answer ldquoBeing itself is the relation [das Verhaumlltnis ] to the

extent that It holds to itself [an sich haumllt ] ek-sistencerdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983093983091)

And in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo the essence of languagemdashin modern high

German language as happeningmdashis written as Ver-haumlltnis and is thought

from what he calls the event of appropriation ( Ereignis ) which is defined

along with language in the following way ldquoFor that event appropriating

holding self-retaining is the relation of all relationsrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093)

All this quite frankly is so awkwardly formulated that one longs for aHeideggerian Dialect Dictionary to translate it into at least a usable if

not a usual language

Dictionaries list meanings but not relations of tension not the paths and

movements between them which can only be presented in sentences and

even there not without losses and additions To approach this Verhaumllt-

nis mdashthis relation this retention abstention and holding to itselfmdashand

thereby approach language and if we try to do so by the detour of some

of Heideggerrsquos texts we need to strike another path We could describe

this path tentatively and reservedly as that of a ldquocritical variationrdquo and

start it at the point that we have already touched

At the ldquonotrdquo

In the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Heidegger summed up in a few sentenceshis observations on ldquonothingrdquo from Being and Time and from his inaugu-

ral lecture in Freiburg ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo and thereby specifically

rejected the assumption that the ldquonotrdquo could be derived from the ldquonordquo

of an already constituted language ldquoWhat annuls makes itself clear as

something that is not is can be addressed by the lsquonorsquo e lsquonotrsquo in no way

arises from the no-saying of negation Every lsquonorsquo answers to the claim of

the annulment that has become clear Every lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation

of the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) First of all this apodictic explanation emphasizes

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 742

T h e R e l a t i o n34

that no-saying can only posit a ldquonotrdquo thatmdashas something said posited

and signifiedmdashis at the same time ldquosomethingrdquo and is not the ldquonotrdquo that

is at stake here Before any no-saying in the sense of a negation through

an act of positing there must have been a ldquonotrdquo that as an address must

have already directed itself to a possible speech if this speech is to be able

to address not only an existing ldquosomethingrdquo but precisely the ldquonotrdquomdashand

especially the ldquonotrdquo in its happening as annulment Although within the

medium of language the ldquonordquo can be said every such ldquonordquo as a statement

can refer only to ldquosomethingrdquo that is already given and contained in the

form of representation Furthermore as an instrument of language this

ldquonordquo itself must be a given for representation erefore this ldquonordquo wouldbe an exemplary word for a commercium among present-at-hand beings

which can only count with what is sayable but has no access to what it

no longer or not yet is and thus has no access to the factum that it is and

to the way it is not With the derivation of the ldquonotrdquo from the word of a

constituted language something represented is derived from another

representation e ldquonotrdquo is converted into a being and thereby misses

the point that it is precisely not this namely a being

ldquoNotrdquo is underivable But it is not solely the ldquonotrdquo that cannot be said

by any language and its ldquonotrdquo It is also the ldquonotrdquo that must inexplicitly

speak withmdashremain silent with and fall mute withmdashin every language as

the not-sayable e ldquonot rdquo is sensu strictu a not-word It is the counter-

linguistic the counter-word as such through which every language can

become language If it is a language it is the language from this ldquonotrdquo that

is missing from it and resists it

Language is the ldquonordquo to the ldquonotrdquo that precedes it and must precede it

in itself as its own proper ldquonotrdquo if it is to speak as language at all and

speaking is to be in the movement from its not -yet to its not -anymore

is is why Heidegger says of language that it is the answer to the move-

ment of the ldquonotrdquo that it can only speak in response to the address of the

ldquonotrdquo and in its turn address its not-ness But if it is an answer it is not

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 35

so as the existing acknowledgement of an existing object or a content of

representation but only in the way that as language it itself corresponds

to the ldquonihilationrdquo or ldquoannulmentrdquo that addresses it

Language cannot speak but by letting the ldquonotrdquo that addresses it happen

in languagersquos own happening e residuum of correspondence theory

that persists in this explanation demands however that we conceive of

language as the answer and correspondence to the counter-linguistic

ldquonotrdquo and understand every ldquonordquo as only the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and at

the same time understand the happening of language itself and in general

as a ldquonordquo as the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and of nihilation Language how-ever corresponds to the nihilationmdashand the correspondence dissolves

itself in itmdashonly in such a way that it ent-spricht it corresponds to itself

as language as not-saying It loses its linguistic nature (ent-sprachlicht )

as it evacuates its contents as well as its forms and it allows its being to

become a not-saying and with this not-saying the naked ldquothatrdquo of saying

Saying ldquonordquo to itself as a being in all its moments language speaks and it

speaks beyond itself and the totality of beings transcendence of language

in its being as the movement of ldquonotrdquo

is is why Heidegger can write describing the movement of Being and

along with Being also that of language ldquoBeing annulsmdashas Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983090983095983091) It annuls as language in as much as it departs from itself as an exist-

ing correlation to other beings and it is evicted from what it can be as an

instrumental structure of reference ek-sistence of language into a Being

without beings

is movement that language never performs through acts of positing by

its speakers this movement that occurs not only occasionally and never

intentionally or caused by motives this movement that defines language

as the language expelled from language was defined by Heidegger in his

Freiburg lecture as the language of anxiety as the angst-ridden language

At the end of a short description of an experience of anxiety this reduc-

tion of language to its most properly own is characterized in the following

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 6: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 33

as the ldquoholding to itself with the truth of its essencerdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) In the

ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo to the question how Being relates to ek-sistence

he gave the answer ldquoBeing itself is the relation [das Verhaumlltnis ] to the

extent that It holds to itself [an sich haumllt ] ek-sistencerdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983093983091)

And in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo the essence of languagemdashin modern high

German language as happeningmdashis written as Ver-haumlltnis and is thought

from what he calls the event of appropriation ( Ereignis ) which is defined

along with language in the following way ldquoFor that event appropriating

holding self-retaining is the relation of all relationsrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093)

All this quite frankly is so awkwardly formulated that one longs for aHeideggerian Dialect Dictionary to translate it into at least a usable if

not a usual language

Dictionaries list meanings but not relations of tension not the paths and

movements between them which can only be presented in sentences and

even there not without losses and additions To approach this Verhaumllt-

nis mdashthis relation this retention abstention and holding to itselfmdashand

thereby approach language and if we try to do so by the detour of some

of Heideggerrsquos texts we need to strike another path We could describe

this path tentatively and reservedly as that of a ldquocritical variationrdquo and

start it at the point that we have already touched

At the ldquonotrdquo

In the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Heidegger summed up in a few sentenceshis observations on ldquonothingrdquo from Being and Time and from his inaugu-

ral lecture in Freiburg ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo and thereby specifically

rejected the assumption that the ldquonotrdquo could be derived from the ldquonordquo

of an already constituted language ldquoWhat annuls makes itself clear as

something that is not is can be addressed by the lsquonorsquo e lsquonotrsquo in no way

arises from the no-saying of negation Every lsquonorsquo answers to the claim of

the annulment that has become clear Every lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation

of the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) First of all this apodictic explanation emphasizes

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 742

T h e R e l a t i o n34

that no-saying can only posit a ldquonotrdquo thatmdashas something said posited

and signifiedmdashis at the same time ldquosomethingrdquo and is not the ldquonotrdquo that

is at stake here Before any no-saying in the sense of a negation through

an act of positing there must have been a ldquonotrdquo that as an address must

have already directed itself to a possible speech if this speech is to be able

to address not only an existing ldquosomethingrdquo but precisely the ldquonotrdquomdashand

especially the ldquonotrdquo in its happening as annulment Although within the

medium of language the ldquonordquo can be said every such ldquonordquo as a statement

can refer only to ldquosomethingrdquo that is already given and contained in the

form of representation Furthermore as an instrument of language this

ldquonordquo itself must be a given for representation erefore this ldquonordquo wouldbe an exemplary word for a commercium among present-at-hand beings

which can only count with what is sayable but has no access to what it

no longer or not yet is and thus has no access to the factum that it is and

to the way it is not With the derivation of the ldquonotrdquo from the word of a

constituted language something represented is derived from another

representation e ldquonotrdquo is converted into a being and thereby misses

the point that it is precisely not this namely a being

ldquoNotrdquo is underivable But it is not solely the ldquonotrdquo that cannot be said

by any language and its ldquonotrdquo It is also the ldquonotrdquo that must inexplicitly

speak withmdashremain silent with and fall mute withmdashin every language as

the not-sayable e ldquonot rdquo is sensu strictu a not-word It is the counter-

linguistic the counter-word as such through which every language can

become language If it is a language it is the language from this ldquonotrdquo that

is missing from it and resists it

Language is the ldquonordquo to the ldquonotrdquo that precedes it and must precede it

in itself as its own proper ldquonotrdquo if it is to speak as language at all and

speaking is to be in the movement from its not -yet to its not -anymore

is is why Heidegger says of language that it is the answer to the move-

ment of the ldquonotrdquo that it can only speak in response to the address of the

ldquonotrdquo and in its turn address its not-ness But if it is an answer it is not

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 35

so as the existing acknowledgement of an existing object or a content of

representation but only in the way that as language it itself corresponds

to the ldquonihilationrdquo or ldquoannulmentrdquo that addresses it

Language cannot speak but by letting the ldquonotrdquo that addresses it happen

in languagersquos own happening e residuum of correspondence theory

that persists in this explanation demands however that we conceive of

language as the answer and correspondence to the counter-linguistic

ldquonotrdquo and understand every ldquonordquo as only the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and at

the same time understand the happening of language itself and in general

as a ldquonordquo as the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and of nihilation Language how-ever corresponds to the nihilationmdashand the correspondence dissolves

itself in itmdashonly in such a way that it ent-spricht it corresponds to itself

as language as not-saying It loses its linguistic nature (ent-sprachlicht )

as it evacuates its contents as well as its forms and it allows its being to

become a not-saying and with this not-saying the naked ldquothatrdquo of saying

Saying ldquonordquo to itself as a being in all its moments language speaks and it

speaks beyond itself and the totality of beings transcendence of language

in its being as the movement of ldquonotrdquo

is is why Heidegger can write describing the movement of Being and

along with Being also that of language ldquoBeing annulsmdashas Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983090983095983091) It annuls as language in as much as it departs from itself as an exist-

ing correlation to other beings and it is evicted from what it can be as an

instrumental structure of reference ek-sistence of language into a Being

without beings

is movement that language never performs through acts of positing by

its speakers this movement that occurs not only occasionally and never

intentionally or caused by motives this movement that defines language

as the language expelled from language was defined by Heidegger in his

Freiburg lecture as the language of anxiety as the angst-ridden language

At the end of a short description of an experience of anxiety this reduc-

tion of language to its most properly own is characterized in the following

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 7: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 742

T h e R e l a t i o n34

that no-saying can only posit a ldquonotrdquo thatmdashas something said posited

and signifiedmdashis at the same time ldquosomethingrdquo and is not the ldquonotrdquo that

is at stake here Before any no-saying in the sense of a negation through

an act of positing there must have been a ldquonotrdquo that as an address must

have already directed itself to a possible speech if this speech is to be able

to address not only an existing ldquosomethingrdquo but precisely the ldquonotrdquomdashand

especially the ldquonotrdquo in its happening as annulment Although within the

medium of language the ldquonordquo can be said every such ldquonordquo as a statement

can refer only to ldquosomethingrdquo that is already given and contained in the

form of representation Furthermore as an instrument of language this

ldquonordquo itself must be a given for representation erefore this ldquonordquo wouldbe an exemplary word for a commercium among present-at-hand beings

which can only count with what is sayable but has no access to what it

no longer or not yet is and thus has no access to the factum that it is and

to the way it is not With the derivation of the ldquonotrdquo from the word of a

constituted language something represented is derived from another

representation e ldquonotrdquo is converted into a being and thereby misses

the point that it is precisely not this namely a being

ldquoNotrdquo is underivable But it is not solely the ldquonotrdquo that cannot be said

by any language and its ldquonotrdquo It is also the ldquonotrdquo that must inexplicitly

speak withmdashremain silent with and fall mute withmdashin every language as

the not-sayable e ldquonot rdquo is sensu strictu a not-word It is the counter-

linguistic the counter-word as such through which every language can

become language If it is a language it is the language from this ldquonotrdquo that

is missing from it and resists it

Language is the ldquonordquo to the ldquonotrdquo that precedes it and must precede it

in itself as its own proper ldquonotrdquo if it is to speak as language at all and

speaking is to be in the movement from its not -yet to its not -anymore

is is why Heidegger says of language that it is the answer to the move-

ment of the ldquonotrdquo that it can only speak in response to the address of the

ldquonotrdquo and in its turn address its not-ness But if it is an answer it is not

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 35

so as the existing acknowledgement of an existing object or a content of

representation but only in the way that as language it itself corresponds

to the ldquonihilationrdquo or ldquoannulmentrdquo that addresses it

Language cannot speak but by letting the ldquonotrdquo that addresses it happen

in languagersquos own happening e residuum of correspondence theory

that persists in this explanation demands however that we conceive of

language as the answer and correspondence to the counter-linguistic

ldquonotrdquo and understand every ldquonordquo as only the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and at

the same time understand the happening of language itself and in general

as a ldquonordquo as the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and of nihilation Language how-ever corresponds to the nihilationmdashand the correspondence dissolves

itself in itmdashonly in such a way that it ent-spricht it corresponds to itself

as language as not-saying It loses its linguistic nature (ent-sprachlicht )

as it evacuates its contents as well as its forms and it allows its being to

become a not-saying and with this not-saying the naked ldquothatrdquo of saying

Saying ldquonordquo to itself as a being in all its moments language speaks and it

speaks beyond itself and the totality of beings transcendence of language

in its being as the movement of ldquonotrdquo

is is why Heidegger can write describing the movement of Being and

along with Being also that of language ldquoBeing annulsmdashas Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983090983095983091) It annuls as language in as much as it departs from itself as an exist-

ing correlation to other beings and it is evicted from what it can be as an

instrumental structure of reference ek-sistence of language into a Being

without beings

is movement that language never performs through acts of positing by

its speakers this movement that occurs not only occasionally and never

intentionally or caused by motives this movement that defines language

as the language expelled from language was defined by Heidegger in his

Freiburg lecture as the language of anxiety as the angst-ridden language

At the end of a short description of an experience of anxiety this reduc-

tion of language to its most properly own is characterized in the following

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 8: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 35

so as the existing acknowledgement of an existing object or a content of

representation but only in the way that as language it itself corresponds

to the ldquonihilationrdquo or ldquoannulmentrdquo that addresses it

Language cannot speak but by letting the ldquonotrdquo that addresses it happen

in languagersquos own happening e residuum of correspondence theory

that persists in this explanation demands however that we conceive of

language as the answer and correspondence to the counter-linguistic

ldquonotrdquo and understand every ldquonordquo as only the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and at

the same time understand the happening of language itself and in general

as a ldquonordquo as the affirmation of the ldquonotrdquo and of nihilation Language how-ever corresponds to the nihilationmdashand the correspondence dissolves

itself in itmdashonly in such a way that it ent-spricht it corresponds to itself

as language as not-saying It loses its linguistic nature (ent-sprachlicht )

as it evacuates its contents as well as its forms and it allows its being to

become a not-saying and with this not-saying the naked ldquothatrdquo of saying

Saying ldquonordquo to itself as a being in all its moments language speaks and it

speaks beyond itself and the totality of beings transcendence of language

in its being as the movement of ldquonotrdquo

is is why Heidegger can write describing the movement of Being and

along with Being also that of language ldquoBeing annulsmdashas Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983090983095983091) It annuls as language in as much as it departs from itself as an exist-

ing correlation to other beings and it is evicted from what it can be as an

instrumental structure of reference ek-sistence of language into a Being

without beings

is movement that language never performs through acts of positing by

its speakers this movement that occurs not only occasionally and never

intentionally or caused by motives this movement that defines language

as the language expelled from language was defined by Heidegger in his

Freiburg lecture as the language of anxiety as the angst-ridden language

At the end of a short description of an experience of anxiety this reduc-

tion of language to its most properly own is characterized in the following

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 9: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 942

T h e R e l a t i o n36

terms ldquoNot a hold remains [ Es bleibt kein Halt ] In the slipping away of

beings only this lsquonotrsquo [kein] remains and comes over usrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)983089 e

ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo beings as a whole (983096983096) that we

experience in anxiety leaves nothing enduring nothing that speech or

action could offer to hold on to no hold apart from this ldquonotrdquo of the hold

the hold without hold ldquoNotrdquo is the word for the language no longer of be-

ings but for language as it happens as a partingmdashparting from everything

that can be defined represented and held It speaks only by saying that

nothing remains to be said and therefore it corresponds to its own ldquonotrdquo

still speaks speaks for the first time and speaks as language even beyond

what in and through it is definable ldquoNonerdquo ( Kein) is not a word nor isit a mark it is the counter-word and the counter-mark to all that could

be merely stated and signified But as this anti-word ( Anti-Wort ) it is the

answer ( Antwort ) of bare speech to the merely speakable It is the primary

Ur-word the word-word as such the only word of language language

itself as this single word as it exactly says its Sein its ldquordquoBeingrdquo

ldquoNot a hold remains In the slipping away of beings only this lsquonotrsquo remains

and comes over usrdquo ldquoNotrdquo does not say anything about Being It speaks

itself as Being Being happens in the ldquonotrdquo and nowhere else It is the

hold without hold the up- and with-holding dwelling ( Auf-ent-halt ) that

language is as the house of Being the only ethos Language speaks only

when it becomes this house of the ldquonot rdquo in all its idioms in every word

and every silence and thereby gains its Being as that which is not a being

ldquo Not rdquo contracts the individual appearances in their nihilation into the

whole of a ldquothererdquo It allows to step back from the world assembled underthe deletion mark of the ldquonotrdquo it is the word of the epocheacute of every word

and every world Still precisely as speaking beyond all merely real and

possible words it speaks as one that does not represent anything does

not declare signify or does anything but simply happens it is the ldquothatrdquo

of its self and as this ldquothatrdquo it is the horizon of Being within which every

being can first be what it is It is the word of apocalypse the revelation

of the possibility of all worlds and words Epocheacute and revelation the re-

turn of beings into their ldquonotrdquo and the rise of Being In the ldquo not rdquo beings

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 10: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 37

and Being separate and (d)emerge as different ldquo Not rdquo is the word of the

ontological difference

A theory of the origin of language and at the same time of the origin of

Being and beings with language ldquo Nonerdquo or not would be then the fiat the

finite not the originating but the witnessing the Dasein-opening fiat of

the homo humanus of whose humanitas Heidegger speaks in the ldquoLetter

on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo Although here the connection between the origin of

language and the ldquonotrdquo remains only a suggestion it defines the gesture

that carries Heideggerrsquos thought in general namely that something

emerges as something first in its slippage For example the hammer inthe becoming useless of the ldquoequipmentrdquo the ldquoworldrdquo in the loss of reason

in anxiety the possible wholeness of Dasein in ldquobeing-toward-deathrdquo the

work of art in the rejection of the usual coherence of the world the Being

of the word in its ldquoapartnessrdquo and its ldquoinfirmityrdquo

e ldquonot rdquo reveals nothing and it is as this revelation a historical moment

in which nothing will be seen apart from the ldquonotrdquo of seeing ldquoBeing is

more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

However the ldquonot rdquo can reveal the nothing only because as a citationmdash

Heidegger puts it between quotation marksmdashfrom the inner- worldly

discourse of Dasein it opens up the distance that allows Dasein to relate

to the world as a whole as its ldquothererdquo (983089983097983097983096 983089983088983097) e ldquonordquo as the word of

transcendence is at the same time that of the difference between Being

and the beings of the world It can be both transcendence and differenceonly as exposed from every determinable meaning And yet this ldquonot rdquo

does mean But it does not mean what ldquosomethingrdquo or ldquoonerdquo ldquocoverrdquo or

ldquoLazarusrdquo means but rather always their and its own ldquonotrdquo Heideggerrsquos

ldquonotrdquo however does not remain only a residue of innerworldliness and

meaningfulness It also follows a direction in which it approaches Dasein

relates to its language allows its affirmation and even its recognition

and allows Dasein to be bound to the ldquonotrdquo in its ldquoyesrdquo and ldquonordquo ldquoEvery

lsquonorsquo is simply the affirmation of the lsquonotrsquo Every affirmation consists in

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 11: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1142

T h e R e l a t i o n38

recognition Recognition lets that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo

(983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) Just as in Hegel in the ldquoLetter on lsquoHumanismrsquordquo the ldquonotrdquo is

the ldquonotrdquo of something But even when in an ek-sistential conversion it

turns itself into the something of a nihilation this nihilation remains

as counter-phenomenon oriented toward something and remains ca-

pable of being grasped in an answer which even though a citation a

remainder a residue and a trace remains still the determined trace of

a determined being and not the ldquoessential impossibility of determiningrdquo

beings as a whole (983089983097983097983096 983096983096) In contradistinction to his claim Heidegger

does not describe the ldquonotrdquo itself but the ldquonotrdquo of a self Even though the

ldquonot rdquomdashldquoonly this lsquonotrsquordquo (983096983096)mdashis supposed to be the ldquonot rdquo of the hold ona determinable meaning and a determinable direction it moves toward

the transcendental ldquonordquo of language and toward the dwelling in its house

it remains a directional ldquonotrdquo

And the other way around if the ldquonordquo of language is the ldquothe affirmation of

the lsquonotrsquordquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) then this ldquonotrdquo can be affirmed only as the one that

language moves toward e spoken ldquonordquo according to Heideggerrsquos words

is an already addressed ldquonordquo in which only the ldquonotrdquo as an intentional

object will be affirmed language retains for Heidegger an intentional

structure even in its epocheacute Accordinglymdashand in fact in the sense of

a correspondence in a relational pairmdashthe ldquonotrdquo in Heideggerrsquos ldquoLetterrdquo

is attuned to the affirmation of its affirmation It is an intentionally

disposed and moreover affirmative ldquonotrdquo Only this way can the whole

domain of meaningfulness be thought in it as simultaneously suspended

and founded

Furthermore if the recognition of the ldquonotrdquo as Heidegger writes ldquolets

that toward which it goes come toward itrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) the recognition

becomes the place of the advent of the ldquonotrdquo and the intentional ldquonotrdquo

becomes not only linguistically affirmable but moreover recognizable

and locatable in its recognition In all these structures the ldquonotrdquo appears

to be reduced to something less than what as the ldquoannulmentrdquo should

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 12: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 39

refuse every recognition and remain placeless wordless and non-inten-

tional Since ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091) the

ldquonotrdquo should be more nihilating than any nihilation within the horizon of

intentional acknowledgement It should remain irreducible to relational

pairs and it should withdraw itself from such alternatives as speaking to

and turning away from presence to and absence from Since it is ldquonotrdquo

it should not remain restricted to pressure constriction and anxiety It

should each time happen as that which in these relations releases from

them and makes them possible in the first place

ldquoBeing is more in being than any beingsrdquomdashHeideggerrsquos catchy formulaemploys a comparative to describe the relation between Being and beings

and thus the relation as such It compares the two that should remain

absolutely incomparable It speaks of Being in the language of beings

and says that it is a Being of enhanced intensity e formula however

remains ambiguous It says on the one hand that being is in being and

even more in being than beings On the other hand however it says that

it is in being only in such a way that it transgresses the measure and

range of beings releases itself from all beings and gives up every hold on

them e relation that this formula speaks of is therefore the relation of

the dissolution of every relation of transcendence into the relationless

and of not only quantitative and merely relative but of the ontological

difference between Being and beings Catchy as it is it speaks only the

slippage of Being out of every form of every existing languagemdashand

hyperbolically speaks beyond its own speech Language in difference to

language language of difference language out of it

e syntagm ldquobeing more in being than any beingsrdquo is at the same time

a hypertagm It offers a proposition and steps outside everymdasheven its

ownmdashproposition

Horrifying (entzetzliche) language Every language is displacing (en-

tzetzlich)

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 13: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1342

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 14: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 41

of the structure of intentionality which is too strongly emphasized in his

thoughts on the ldquonotrdquo to have merely slipped into them For Heidegger

it is important that the ldquonotrdquo is not a nihil negativum or absolutum not

an empty ldquonotrdquo merely posited by a ldquosubjectrdquo or an ldquoIrdquomdasheven if posited

like in Fichte and Hegel through a not-positing For if it were a positum

it would not only be a logicized ldquonotrdquo but also a something (ens rationis )

and so precisely what it is not At the same time it is also important for

Heidegger that the happening of the ldquonotrdquomdashwhich albeit always pos-

sible still ldquorarely enoughrdquo really is (983089983097983097983096 983096983096)mdashdoes not disappear in an

annihilation once again in such a case the ldquonothingrdquo would not be a

ldquonotrdquo it would not be ldquothererdquo it could not be experienced as a happeningor the happening of the withdrawal from happening Joined together the

two observations can be understood in such a way that the ldquonotrdquo cannot

be either a ldquosomethingrdquo or the fait accompli of a mere absence It opens

itself as the zone of separation between beings and empty nothing and

it can be the ldquonotrdquo only as that which emerges in the experience of the

departure or slipping away of all beings e experience of this ldquonotrdquo and

the ldquonotrdquo of this experiencemdashand an abyss opens up in the reversibility

or irreversibility of these expressions and their double genitivesmdashis the

decisive pre-predicative synthesis It is not an archeacute an in itself unified

principle It is structurally an-archic (and in this sense originary) since it

is a synthesis only because of the split that crosses it Heidegger describes

this bifurcation as a ldquorepelling reference toward beings [abweisende

Verweisung ]rdquo983090 (983089983097983097983096 983097983088) as a reference to beings through which they are

brought together and at the same time repelled as a whole At the same

time as this ldquonotrdquo that formulates itself as a ldquonordquo and in Heideggerrsquosdefinition as reference carries an emphatically linguistic trait the experi-

ence of Being itself emerges as the happening of this repelling reference

e ldquonotrdquo is the in itself differentiated archi-disjunction

e separation therefore takes place between beings as a whole and

Being and not between the ldquonotrdquo and beingmdashthis separation is accom-

plished or is (or ldquoexistsrdquo) in the ldquonotrdquo ldquoe nothing itself annulsrdquo (983089983097983097983096

983097983088) it is what happens in the repelling reference and it is that it happens

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 15: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1542

T h e R e l a t i o n42

as this reference Since the ldquonotrdquo would not be without its happening

(without its nihilation) the previous phrase can be made more precise

ldquoBeing nihilatesmdashas beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983091)

is is to say Being is always already not-anymore and always not-yet It

is in that it is the ldquonotrdquo of itself As difference from itself it is at the same

time the difference from everything and in everything that exists

e title of ldquoBeingrdquo in Heideggerrsquos thinking belongs only to the movement

of the ldquonotrdquo to the separation the difference as inter-rift (Unter-Schied )

the ontological difference is is why we find in the preface to ldquoOn theEssence of Groundrdquo the following ambiguous formulation ldquoe onto-

logical difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is

programmatic formula can be misunderstood because it places the ldquonotrdquo

between beings and Being as if they were two beings of different nature

or intensity But this ldquonotrdquo is to be thought as the ldquobetweenrdquo with which

Being emerges as differentiated from all even the highest of all beings

Being is what is resulting from and in the separation that happens in the

ldquonotrdquo and thus itself is the ldquobetweenrdquo the difference erefore Heide-

gger can write ldquonothing and Being the samerdquo ldquoHolding itself out into the

nothing Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole Such

being beyond beings we call transcendence if [Dasein] were not in

advance holding itself out into the nothing then it could never adopt a

stance toward beings nor even toward itself rdquo (983097983089)

For Heidegger to transcend means above all to transcend into a ldquonotrdquoand therefore to transcend into a ldquonotrdquo of even this transcending It does

not mean indication and relation ldquotordquo but repelling and repelling reference

ldquofromrdquo as well as repelling of all reference in-predication ir-relation

dis-intention Transcendingmdashif it is not already connected through

a continuous movement with a homogenous other and thereby in no

need of transcendingmdashmust transcend into a nec trans and can only be

a transcending into the un-enterable it must be attranscendence

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 16: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 43

ldquoLe pas au-delagraverdquo writes Blanchot step beyond not beyond step beyond

to the not of the step

Only as transition into the not-going can it reach the zone of difference in

its own movement where first a possible toward of this movement opens

up as a relation to something and an intentional attitude to beings as

beings becomes possible us intentions are grounded in a structure of

transcendence that in its turn is defined by a ldquonotrdquo a halt a putting on

hold or a suspension Only this arrest offers the possibility of a relation

to something only in this suspension happens not something but only

the that of it happening

e ldquonotrdquo of this in-transcendence therefore can happen in two ways

the retreating reference to something and the experience that the hap-

pening of this reference is other than and different from the reference

conceptualized as a relation and its correlates

is arresting of the ldquonotrdquo in in-transcendence clearly defines the mini-

mal structure of language Whenever and in whatever way language is

spoken there is reference that distances But beyond this something else

also happens that cannot be reduced to this (repelling) reference and the

agents emerging from it the referents and their relations to each other

Whether absolutely novel or older than old it is incommensurable with

them e intentional attitude only exists as crossed out by the event of

its own epocheacute

erefore it appears to be insufficient and even erroneous to speak of

ldquothe claim of nihilation that has come to the clearingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983090983095983090) and

to say that ldquonihilation first requires the lsquonorsquo as what is to be said in the

letting-be of beingsrdquo (983090983095983091) is phrase attributes a linguistic structure

to the ldquonotrdquo that is at the same time also denied Language is defined as

something claimedmdashnot claimed by a pre-linguistic ldquoexistentiell rdquo beyond

of language but by its own exterior limits and thus by what cannot raise

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 17: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1742

T h e R e l a t i o n44

claims Heidegger therefore goes around in circlesmdasheven if we consider

all the complications of going going over and inaccessibility He goes

against himself and he might be going that way because he thinks lan-

guage as a response

e commentary on the structure of transcending (namely that it must

be that of in-transcending) and intentionality (that it must be suspended

in dis-intending) made it clear that these movements for Heidegger

always emerge first in their ldquonotrdquo and their suspension In very much

the same way we could clarify the structure of the claim as Anspruch

as Heidegger understands it not by reading this word according to themeasure of its dictionary meaning but by reading it based on its context

with an emphatically stressed An speaking onto

en the claim raised by the ldquonotrdquomdashfrom nowhere by nobody and mind

you nevermdashwould be a ldquospeakingrdquo onto and in the proximity of language

and its words and particles of negation which persisting in the onto

would never make it out of this proximity to reach language e claim

would be a speaking onto because it would never be a speech in the sense

of a statement or a performative act It would always be en route or on

the way to language An-spruch would be toward language what language

itself is not and that it itself is not presentmdashit would be the irruption of

language its start

In fact according to Heideggerrsquos text ldquothe claim of nihilationrdquo cannot be

more than this cannot be language For he says of this claim that it callsfor the ldquonordquo as what is to be said but never as something already said

never already given in or by language rather as a ldquonordquo that remains still

and always yet to be said and as what is to be said remains forever im-

minent in every possible future Speaking onto and speaking its ldquonot rdquo onto

language the claim would be the retentive relation in which language is

kept away from itself but at the same time held to and held back from

itself and sustained and held in this holding onto and holding back But

unlike what an obvious misunderstanding would suggest this sustaining

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 18: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 45

does not hold in potentia as something always merely ldquopossiblerdquo but

never ldquorealrdquo Rather it holds on this side of all modal categories in statu

nascendi et moriendi (as Celan writes in an explicit reference to Heidegger

in a letter to Werner Weber) held out into the happening of language as

perpetual beginning (983089983097983097983095 983091983097983096)

is understanding of the speaking-onto of the ldquonotrdquo also clarifies the

structure of intention It would not be some already given relation of an

already constituted consciousness to a content of consciousness but the

irruption of these relations in their pre-withholding and therefore inten-

tion only arising out of the freedom from such a relation and the opennessto it us every An- that Heidegger writes is to be read not merely as a

ldquoclose tordquo or ldquoontordquo in the sense of a given extension but always also as

the echo the Greek ana- as a privative in- or un- In words like Anspruch

(claim) or Anruf (call) or Answesen (presence) Angehen (approach) and

Ankunft (arrival) with every ldquoclose tordquo and ldquoontordquo at the same time a ldquonotrdquo

and a ldquonordquo is also said that relates relation to irrelation reference to ir-

reference direction to indirection An- is the prefix of differencemdashbut

not only of an intra-linguistic difference between different meanings of

one and the same morpheme but before meanings can appear at all the

difference between language speaking its ldquonotrdquo and language speaking

onto something An- not unlike vor- zu- hin- and aus- is the prefix of

ontological difference Whoever uses ldquospeaking ontordquo in this sense in fact

is saying something insufficient and erroneous but is also saying that this

insufficiency and erroneousness belongs to the structure of language

Language itself is the speaking onto language and therefore a speakingonto another language or something other than language

Understood as ldquospeaking ontordquo ( An-spruch) language is its othering ( An-

derung )

e An- is therefore the word and the fore-word of the madness of lan-

guage In the essay ldquoLanguage in the Poemrdquo Heidegger writes as a com-

mentary on the line ldquoe madman [Wahnsinnige] has diedrdquo from Georg

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 19: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 1942

T h e R e l a t i o n46

Traklrsquos ldquoPsalmrdquo ldquoe word Wahn comes from Old High German wana

which means lsquowithoutrsquo e madman sensesmdashsenses in fact as no one

else does But he remains without the sense of others He is of another

sense Sinnan originally means to travel to strive for to strike a direc-

tion e Indo-Germanic root sent and set means lsquopathrsquo e departed is

the madman because he is on his way somewhere elserdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983091)983091 e

other way that the madman follows is the way into de-parture into a dif-

ference that departs from every possible distinction and discrimination

So Heidegger can write about the stranger who is the madman without

the sense of the other ldquois stranger unfolds the essence of the human

into the beginning of what has not yet come to bearing [Tragen] (OldHigh German giberan) is quieter and hence more stilling element

in the nature of mortals that has not been borne out is what the poet

calls the unbornrdquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983095983093)983092 But if the other waymdashthis without-path the

aporiamdashleads into what has not been borne out how do we stand with

what is defined as ldquogesturerdquo in ldquoA Dialogue on Languagerdquo ldquothe originary

gathering of bearing against and bearing tordquo (983089983097983095983089 983089983097) And how does the

thought of the not-yet-born and the unborn relate to the thought of being

as difference which is described in ldquoe Onto-eo-Logical Constitu-

tion of Metaphysicsrdquo in the following way ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ]

alone grants and holds apart the lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming

and the arrival are held toward one another are borne away from and

toward each other e difference of Being and beings as the inter-rift of

overwhelming and arrival is the bearing out [ Austrag ] of the two in un-

concealing keeping in concealment Within this bearing out there prevails

a clearing of what veils and closes itself offmdashand this prevalence bestowsthe being apart and the being toward each other of overwhelming and

arrivalrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)983093

In these sentences it becomes clear that the words ldquoheldrdquo and ldquobornerdquo

are used in the same sense being held in relation (Ver-halten) is being

borne out ( Austrag ) Both describe the movement of differentiation that

Heidegger writes as Unter-Schied (literally inter -rift ) to separate it from

rational distinctions as well as from differences in perception and to

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 20: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 47

emphasize the ldquobetweenrdquo that corresponds to the inter of the unter in

the concept of Unterschied (difference) e German word Austrag is the

literal translation of the Latin differentia which in turn is a translation

of the decisive Greek term diaphoraacute In a definition provided in the first

essay on Trakl ldquoLanguagerdquo (in 983089983097983093983088) diaphoraacute difference and bearing

out are juxtaposed with the following commentary ldquoe intimacy of

dif-ference [Unter-Schied ] is the unifying element of the diaphora the

carrying out [ Austrag ] that carries through e dif-ference carries out

world in its worlding carries out things in their thinging us carrying

them out it carries them toward one anotherrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) And a few

sentences later the series of synonymous concepts is extended to includeEreignis the appropriating event gesture as bearing and granting ldquoe

dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bear-

ing a world it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo

(983090983088983088) In accordance with these connections in ldquoe Way to Languagerdquo

relation (Verhaumlltnis ) is thought out of the appropriating event and more

precisely as the appropriative happening of the essence of language ldquoFor

that appropriating holding self-retaining is the relation of all relations

us our sayingmdashalways an answeringmdashremains forever relational Rela-

tion [Ver-haumlltnis as holding to itself] is thought of here always in terms

of the event and no longer conceived in the form of a mere referencerdquo

(983089983097983095983089 983089983091983093) But if relation means appropriation if appropriation means

difference difference means differentia and diaphora and the latter two

mean the carrying out that carries through while carrying out means

bearing the question unavoidable emerges How do the concepts from

the Trakl commentary the unborn and what is not borne out relate to thisseries And how can this series be unified with the other the without-

path and the aporia of madness ese questions are not yet answered

by the remark that Heidegger understood human Dasein in the sense of

ek-sistence as the ecstatic being outside of itself of madness is only

makes the question more urgent of whether this being-in-madness can

be thought with the concepts of difference and ldquobearing outrdquo Or whether

this madness overburdens ldquothe carrying out that carries throughrdquo and the

ldquobearing outrdquo and is therefore thrown away evacuated and forgotten

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 21: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2142

T h e R e l a t i o n48

e question therefore is once again whether the madness of ek-sis-

tence of the ldquonotrdquo of Being and of language can still be articulated in a

languagemdasheven if it as outreacute as Heideggerrsquos

Or Is it possible to think the not-borne-out as the not-borne-out More

precisely Does the not-borne-out allow itself to be thought only as a not

yet or beyond that does it allow itself to be thought as a never borne

out

Hence Can the ldquonotrdquo as a ldquoneverrdquomdashas a never of the sayablemdashdefine the

horizon of language And can this ldquoneverrdquo then also provide the tran-scendental horizon of the possibility of what is sayable Is the ldquoneverrdquo

the condition of the happening of language and the horizon of being

Or Can the ldquoneverrdquo be thought But How could it be other than never be

thought Consequently If the ldquoneverrdquo were the pre- and proto-predicative

happening that is called ldquoBeingrdquo and later more precisely coming-over

(Uumlberkommnis ) because it is what ldquoovercomesrdquo sur-prises overwhelms

more than just comes andmdashoverburdens erefore Can the unbearable

be borne and borne out

Otherwise How could Beingmdashwhether as happening history destiny

or coming-overmdashas the unbearable not be borne Because Can the un-

bearable be found at all otherwise unbearable than as always still and

nevertheless borne And then still not erefore Is there not in Being

itself such a still and nevertheless a but that keeps Being at a distancefrom Being and keeps Being out of Being and in this out and apart brings

it together

However What does the ldquooutrdquo mean in ldquoout of each otherrdquo and in ldquobearing

outrdquo if it still contains a ldquotogetherrdquo Does it refer to an originary synthesis

before every predicative synthesis Is not such a reference misleading if it

suggests a ldquotogetherrdquo there where we can encounter only an ldquoout of each

otherrdquomdasheven if we encounter it in the impossibility of its encounter

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 22: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 49

In his seminar in Le or in September 983089983097983094983094 Heidegger cites a paragraph

from the chapter ldquoOn the impossibility of a cosmological proof of Godrsquos

existencerdquo from Kantrsquos First Critique ese stunning sentencesmdashwhich

with their evocation of sinking floating without stop and the abyss

may well have contributed to the descriptions of anxiety in Being and

Time (983089983097983094983090) and ldquoWhat is Metaphysicsrdquo (983089983097983097983096)mdashspeak explicitly not only

about the groundless but also about the unbearable Kant writes

e unconditioned necessity which we need so indispensably as the ultimate

sustainer of all things is for human reason the true abyss Even eternitymdash

however awful the sublimity with which a Haller might portray itmdashdoes not

make such a dizzying impression on the mind for eternity only measures the

duration of things but it does not sustain that duration One cannot resist the

thought of it but one also cannot bear it that a being might as it were say

to itself ldquoI am from eternity to eternity outside me is nothing except what is

something merely through my will but whence then am Irdquo Here everything

caves in beneath us and the greatest perfection as well as the smallest hover

without hold before speculative reason for which it would cost nothing to

let the one as much as the other disappear without the least obstacle (Kant

983089983097983097983097 983093983095983092 Heidegger 983090983088983088983091 983089983095) God the highest ground of what is appears in

its monologue as an abyss that does not carry it but lets it collapse And Kant

says of this thought of a God that does not carry itself that ldquoone cannot resist

the thought of it but one also cannot bear itrdquo

With this the primal scene of critical transcendental philosophy and

speculative idealism is described an ens realissimum et nesessarium that does not contain the guarantee of its own being a God that is not

a causa sui and sinks in the abyss of its own question after a ground

cannot offer beings any more hold and must therefore pull down in

its own fall the categories that render it thinkable necessary and real

What remains is the scene of the sinking away of the totality of beings

ldquothe greatest perfection as well as the smallestrdquo and with this scene the

form of representation the mere idea of reason in which beings as a

whole together with the categorial structures of their knowability survive

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 23: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2342

T h e R e l a t i o n50

under the condition of their transcendentality For the ldquotranscendental

objectrdquomdashthat Kant can only speak of after the sinking away of a world

and its transcendental groundmdashis not an empirical object and not even

an object at all is object as Kant writes ldquotherefore cannot be further

intuited by us and that may therefore be called the non-empirical ie

transcendental object = Xrdquo (983089983097983097983097 983090983091983091) In his Kant book Heidegger calls

this transcendental X ldquoa Nothingrdquo that is at the same time ldquoSomethingrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983096983094) and describes the X as ldquothe horizon of a standing-against is

horizon is indeed not object but rather a Nothing if by object we mean

a being which is apprehended thematicallyrdquo (983096983095) Furthermore ldquoOnly if

the letting-stand-against of is a holding oneself in the nothing canthe representing allow a not-nothing ie something like a being rdquo (983093983089)

In the Kant commentary the ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo ismdashlike

the anxiety scenes in Being and Time in the Freiburg lecture and more

abstractly in the ldquoLetterrdquo in different waysmdashthe gesture of the horizontal-

transcendental constitution of the domain of objectivity and with that

at the same time of no longer onto-theologically founded beings held

in the mere form of representation not a creatio but still a constitutio ex

nihilo e fact that ldquoholding oneself in the nothingrdquo as Kant examines

it in his critical philosophy stops at the form of representation (Vorstel-

lung ) and the idea of reason makes these gestures into a regulatio nihili

and prevents the further analysis of the transcendental form of being

represented and posited

Heidegger took on this further analysis starting with the exposition of

Dasein in Being and Time is analysis must show that the sinking of theens necessarium and with it that of mere being (which does not hold and

bear itself) remain irreducible to the beings of representation the idea

or the concept It must expose the fact that transcendental representa-

tion merely displaces the ldquonotrdquo that it encounters in the sinking of the

highest being instead of engaging it as the decisive content of being To

do justice to the implications of the anxiety-scene and the unbearable

question of God for his ground the classical analytical concept of differ-

ence between ground and the grounded positing and the posited must

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 24: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 51

be transformed into the concept of a difference that can no longer be

contained within the horizon of representation and its transcendental

language is analysis therefore should yield a concept of difference

that retains only a single transcendental remainder namely that even

the horizon of a transcendental representation offers no other hold than

the ldquono hold rdquomdashthus a difference in which everything that can bear is

abandoned except for this that nothing bears Being must be thought on

the basis of this difference and as this difference since Being is neither

its own ground nor grounded in the structure of representation

Consequently this difference cannot be said in a language of predica-tion of position or of synthesis It must be the difference of ex-thesis

im-predication and the ex-positing of all forms of representation the

concept and the idea Not only beings in their being-ness not only the

highest and grounding being but primarily and above all Being itself is

to be thought from and as this different difference ldquoBeing as differencerdquo

(983090983088983088983090a 983094983092) To bring out the difference of this difference Heidegger

writes Unterschied as Unter-Schied mdashthat is as inter-rift mdashand transposes

the Greek diasphoraacute and the Latin differentia to the German Austrag

With this no rational distinction and no stable distance in the space of

the represented can be defined only a movement that leaves the space

of representation and moves into an incommensurably other space

Bearing out is primarily the ldquobearing outrdquo between difference and bear-

ing out (It is a transposition a trans lation an ldquoUumlber setzungrdquo as it is

written in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo [983090983088983088983090b 983090983094983088] to show that it changesover from one domain of language and thought to another) Bearing

out now means nothing else but that the concept of difference has alto-

gether abandoned its meaning based in theories of representation and

consciousness as well as its historical-philosophical meaning which is

not replaced by anything of the same order that is by any meaning Not

only does Heidegger pursue in his whole work this elimination of the

historical meanings and contents of words and concepts he also always

explains it and comments on it is is what we find in ldquoLanguagerdquo where

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 25: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2542

T h e R e l a t i o n52

Heidegger discusses Unter-Schied ldquoe word lsquodif-ferencersquo [Unter-Schied ]

is now removed from its usual and customary usage What it now names

is not a generic concept for various kinds of differences It exists only

as this single difference It is uniquerdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) It is unique in Traklrsquos

poem ldquoA Winter Eveningrdquo as well as in its interpretation by Heidegger

Consequently it is unique in the now of the moment that is not only

world-historical but also belongs to the history of being the moment

that the interpretation of the poem tries to grasp e same is true for the

translation of difference into bearing out the historical word is withdrawn

from its customary usage and it is submitted to an anasemie that takes

out its usual meaning like a false figure from an equation and leaves onlythis evacuated meaning ldquoBeing as differencerdquo means being as bearing out

in the sense of the efference of nominal as well as predicative structures

as a carrying-out-of into an outside of all hold and at the same time as

an opening of an ex an out and a not inside the ldquohouserdquo of language

Being as bearing out is therefore the parting with beings and at the

same time with every habitual and inhabitable linguistic formulation of

being Bearing out is to be read as the difference and parting from itself

of an elementary philosophical concept as well as the parting difference

of being from itself in which alone it holds itself and holds onto itself as

being in that it holds itself away from itself Understood as bearing out

im-predicable being bears itself out in its own proper happening as this

im-predicable being bearing out fulfills itself as the efference the evacu-

ation and expropriation of historical beings

Since this evacuation of historical modes of being is the proper historical

happening of Being itself its expropriating bearing out is also its self-

appropriation and exists as the appropriating event of Being Bearing out

carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the history of

language It carries itself out in the sense of an appropriating event in the

history of thought and being which rests on nothing else but that being

suspends all of its habitual representations exposes itself as a coming-

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 26: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 53

over and allows beings as different and separate from itself to come to

their proper status of predication e appropriating event that carries

itself out in Heideggerrsquos Unter-Schied is an appropriation only out of ex-

propriation only possible due to the ex-propriation ex-nomination and

ex-predication of all concepts and sentences of representation that his-

torically speaking have fixed and still might fix themselves onto ldquobeingrdquo

and ldquobeingsrdquo But it is also the appropriation of ex-propriation and thus

the affirmation of the propriative structure of all happenings regardless

of whether it is understood as belonging to the history of being thought

or language erefore in On Time and Being we read ldquoought in terms

of the event of propriation this means in that sense it expropriates itselfof itself Expropriation belongs to the event of propriation as such By this

expropriation propriation does not abandon itselfmdashrather it preserves

what is its properly ownrdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983090983090ndash983090983091)

Bearing out therefore does not only mean evacuation and exference For

the same reason it also means carrying to an end and a goal a telos in

which something comes to its own and to itself and thus it designates

once again the archi-teleological movement of the whole history of

philosophy No matter how different the concepts and practices of dia-

phoraacute and differentia distinction and difference might be in this history

Heidegger pulls them together into the unity of the fundamentalmdashand

a-fundamentalmdashdifference and thereby clarifies the ference-structure of

the thought of Being in general Only hence the vocabulary of unity only

hence the symmetry between bearing ldquoaway fromrdquo and ldquotowardrdquo each

other only hence in the end the persistence of the phoraacute and ferre ofbearing ldquoat inter-rift [Unter-Schied ] alone grants and holds apart the

lsquobetweenrsquo in which the overwhelming and the arrival are held toward

one another are borne away from and toward each otherrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093)

And ldquoOf itself it holds apart the middle in and through which world

and things are at one with each other e dif-ference for world and

thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world it disclosingly

appropriates world into the granting of thingsrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983088) As long as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 27: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2742

T h e R e l a t i o n54

thought of being is understood as difference and carrying out it remains

caught in the logic of the event of appropriation of the property even in

expropriation as well as the logic of bearing and of the bearable

After this long detour we must now return to the problem of what

happens with Godrsquos unbearable question about his own ground with

a ground that does not hold and holds nothing with what cannot be

borne and with the unbearable that ldquoone cannot resist the thought ofrdquo

Furthermore we must also ask if what happens here can still be called

or thought of as a happening And in what relation if it still is a relation

does it stand with the other way of madness

Kant calls the thought of ldquothe ultimate bearer [Traumlger ] of all thingsrdquo that

is not its own groundmdashcausa sui mdasha true abyss for finite reason For rea-

son only positional and propositional being is thinkable only being as

positing but never as an ab-solute being emerging from its self that is

from the ldquonotrdquo of every position Such a being without position such an

ex-posed being is the unbearable from which reason transcendentally

posting its own horizon and always made anxious by it must turn itself

away Bare being cannot be borne at there ldquoisrdquo such a thing is attested

by the thought that Kant calls unbearable What it also attests to at the

same time is an abyss a ldquonotrdquo of reason that belongs to reason as its

own property and not although but precisely because and as long as this

ldquonotrdquo expropriates reason dispossesses it and makes reason unbearable

for itself

e ldquonotrdquo of bare Being is always carried and borne only as the simply

unbearable that cannot be rejected Being which does not obey reason yet

belongs to it must therefore be thought as bearing out of the incapability

to bear out ldquoBeing as differencerdquo must be thought as ex -ference of di ffer-

ence and diaphoraacute As a result thinking must be thought as un-thinking

When the unbearable must be thought it must be thought as the unbear-

ability of thinking itself It must be thought as the unthinkability or the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 28: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 55

forgetting of thought Not-thinking belongs to the structure of thinking

itself As long as it does not think its not-thinking it does not yet think

To be thinking it must bear its difference from itself and therefore its own

not-thinking inking must bear its ldquonot being able to bearrdquo

A difference that does not bear anything apart from its not-bearing It

would bear the ldquowithoutrdquo of ference But would it be its own ldquowithoutrdquo

and could it be the ldquowithoutrdquo of its own ference A bearing out that would

be unbearable for itselfmdashcould it still give itself in its property and in

the end obtain itself Are these possessive pronouns in fact justified

when we are dealing with a ldquonotrdquo that precedes every act of positing bya subject and thus it must release all nouns pronouns and possessives

that are made possible by such an act

A difference that bears nothing but a ldquonotrdquo can never exclude the pos-

sibility that the ldquonotrdquo it bears is its own But it cannot renounce the other

possibility either namely that it can not be its own It is always possible

to turn the ldquonotrdquo into a possessive (even if it is primarily ldquoonlyrdquo a linguistic

possessive) or into a ldquonotrdquo of something a genitive or dative ldquonotrdquo but

with this putting into relation of the ldquonotrdquo its reduction leads to a depen-

dence that is in fact dissolved by the ldquonotrdquo e ldquonotrdquo remains irreducible

to something other since it means not-other It remains irreducible to

itself since it means not-self Neither other nor self the ldquonotrdquo is a ldquonotrdquo

also to the Hegelian ldquoother of itselfrdquo It is other than other the movement

of unstoppable othering and as such always the other as well as the self

yet never one of the two It is the tie between them but only a tie thatdissolves itself

e ldquonotrdquo would be the solutionmdashbut only as the dissolution of the ldquonotrdquo

is is why it bears and does not bearmdashand the formula ldquoe ontological

difference is the lsquonotrsquo between beings and Beingrdquo (983089983097983097983096 983097983095) is insufficient

It is not borne and cannot be the bearing out of itself to itself and to

the beings disclosed by it Even the directional formula ldquodifference from

Being toward beingsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983096983089) represents a restriction of difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 29: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 2942

T h e R e l a t i o n56

namely its restriction to the teleological relation between ldquoBeingrdquo and

ldquobeingsrdquo If this restriction is removed the directional character of the

ldquoessencerdquo of difference is suspended by the ldquonotrdquo that it carries and also

does not carry but rather mis -carries carries away or throws off is way

bearing out as well as being and beings can only be thought of as one of

the possibilities of difference that is always thwarted by the other that

the ldquonotrdquo of Being the Being from ldquonotrdquo is not and does not bear itself

out to beings Between these two possibilities of the ldquonotrdquo between these

two impossibilities a difference in the sense of a bearing out can and also

cannot be thought and must remain therefore un-thought is is why

Heideggerrsquos assumption that ldquothis localisation which assigns the differ-ence of Being and beings to bearing out as the approach to their essence

could even bring to light something all-pervading which pervades Beingrsquos

destiny from its beginning to its completionrdquo983094 (983090983088983088983090a 983094983095) either must be

considered erroneous or must be abandoned It does not bear out and

pervade because it does not bear witness to the alternative possibility

that the aporetic structure of the ldquonotrdquo breaks up every process before

its end and completion

ldquoNotrdquo is the exproprium par excellence It is what approaches yet does not

ever approachmdashanything or anybody anytime In this not-approaching

approach it is the not-bearable that cannot be borne out e difference

that bears the ldquonotrdquo of its bearing at the same time also always bears

the ldquonotrdquo of another bearing and the ldquonotrdquo of something other than bear-

ing And since it can not be its own difference cannot be thought in the

emphatic sense as bearing out as the gesture of bearing the birth andthe gift of the ldquonotrdquo of being and neither can bearing out be thought

as the unconcealing of the concealment of being and the arrival of be-

ings Rather it must be thought as the withdrawal of bearing out as the

epocheacute of difference the deactivation of giving and the depassivation

of bearing Since it does not ever belong ( gehoumlrt ) and does not belong

to itself as a ldquonotrdquo it cannot be either heard (houmlrt ) or simply not heard

it can neither be stilled nor reached through the saying not-saying that

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 30: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 57

Heidegger speaks about at the end of Identity and Difference As the abyss

of reason it is also the abyss of hearing and of every language that seeks

to answer it It is silent not only in the sense that language could be ldquothe

peal of stillnessrdquo (983090983088983088983089 983090983088983093) it is (if we can still say is here) also mute

Since it must precede every distinction between outside and inside it is

simply what cannot be interiorized in memory and yet also what simply

cannot be forgotten either

Both may be said of Heideggerrsquos phrase of the forgetfulness of being In

the final chapter of the Kant book (983089983097983090983097) it is spoken of as ldquothe primal

metaphysical factum [Urfaktum]rdquo of Dasein ldquois factum consists in thefact that what is most finite in its finitude is indeed known but neverthe-

less has not been grasped e finitude of Daseinmdashthe understanding

of Beingmdashlies in forgetfulness is [ forgetfulness] is not accidental and

temporary but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formedrdquo

(983089983097983097983095 983089983094983091ndash983094983092) e moderate assessment of this forgetfulness shows itself

in that even as it is a ldquoprimal factumrdquo it nevertheless must be possible to

ascertain and even as it is forgetfulness it must still be apprehensible Al-

most 983090983088 years later in ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Sayingrdquo (in 983089983097983092983094) Heidegger writes

the following no longer from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein but

from that of the history of being ldquothe destiny of Being begins with the

oblivion of Being so that Being together with its essence its difference

from Being holds back with itself rdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) e tension between

forgetfulness (veiling concealment holding back with itself) and mani-

festation (unconcelament experience clearing) is dissolved here in the

thought of the trace the trace of the erasure of the trace of difference thistrace ldquothe oblivion of the differencerdquo that Heidegger defines as ldquothe event

of metaphysicsrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) remains legible because it bears difference

in its very forgetfulness and brings it out from its forgetfulness and bears

it out (983090983095983093) With the oblivion of difference the trace (the differentiality of

difference that Derrida writes as diffeacuterance) carries two things it carries

difference and hence the ldquoessencerdquo of Being but also carries it together

with its forgetting withholding and withdrawal erefore on the one

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 31: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3142

T h e R e l a t i o n58

hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of beings in which their Being emerges on

the other hand it is carrying the ldquonotrdquo of this ldquonotrdquo in which it conceals

and maintains itself

Heideggerrsquos difference is the amphora of being lethe-phoraacute and aletheia-

phoraacute and as such the sheltering that unfolds itself into unconcealment

and concealment and defines the whole ldquoworld-history of the Occidentrdquo

(983090983088983088983090b 983090983095983093) yet maintains itself securely preserved and remaining

equally in both as sheltering Heidegger writes ldquoe difference collapses

It remains forgottenrdquo (983090983095983093) But since this collapse and forgetting remains

unforgotten at least in the trace of a trace which remains the primal factum of the self-preservation of being and forgetting it does not fall

and does not collapse but is rather preserved and maintained as the

erased and self-erasing Nothing is forgotten e forgetting as thought

by Heidegger is the sublation of forgetting Being and self

But it is not so in the sense of a sublation in an absolute knowledge that

knows itself in its negativity and secures its past in internalizing memory

It is rather a keeping of forgetting and keeping forgetting in a medium

thatmdashbefore every subjectivity of consciousness and every objectivity

determined by its representations and conceptsmdashmakes consciousness

and self-consciousness possible in the first place and therefore cannot

be thought or remembered by it Whereas Hegel can think forgetting as a

moment of internalizing memory he cannot think it as the unthinkable

that still remains to be thought and to be thought in its stillness Forget-

ting does not allow itself to be internalized or remembered Internalizingmemory in which the gallery of forgotten contents of consciousness is

re-presented does not forget the forgotten but forgets forgetting itself If

in the Kant book ldquoremembering againrdquo (written in quotation marks) is

described by Heidegger as ldquothe basic fundamental-ontological actrdquo (983089983097983097983095

983089983094983092) it does not make a case for a platonic anamnesis of what is was

and will be but rather refers to the primal fact of forgetfulness and hence

to something absolutely un-rememberable that offers the possibility of

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 32: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 59

remembering it as absolute withholding as that which cannot be held

or held up kept maintained or preserved

Being forgets itself this fact of the pre-ontological de-facticity of finite

and thus defective Dasein cannot be raised into internalizing memory

and therefore cannot be sublated Neither can it be reversed arrested

or postponed It resists every classical analytical work of dissolution

as well as every act albeit a basic act of separation or repression of

internalization or opposition or positing at being forgets itselfmdashthis

auto-amnesia in the ur- and un-factum of happening in generalmdashblocks

every operation of and every access to memory remembrance and think-ing that tries to grasp and revive to understand or explain a ldquowhatrdquo or a

something is self-forgetfulness of Being is the ldquoinaccessiblerdquo (983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)

the unanalyzable phenomenologically inexposable in every attempt at

access analysis and exposition Precisely because it is an irresolvable im-

possibility and in that sense a necessity it must be thematized however

and in fact must be thematized as the un-thematizable What remains

still unthought is the ldquooblivion of the differencerdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983093983088) which is

not contingent and episodic but structural oblivion forgotten from the

beginning never-yet-thought and still-to-be-thought

End of thinking ( Denk-Ende)mdashthe one thought to be thought the un-

thinkable one erefore Heidegger speaks of memory not as internaliz-

ing Erinnerung but as Andenken once again with the emphatic isolation

of the prefix as An-denken which could hardly be understood differently

than ldquoto think against a wallrdquo or ldquoto think of something that withdrawsitselfrdquo e one who thinks forgetting thinks the ldquonotrdquo of thinking and

thinks toward against and from the ldquonotrdquo of this thinking He thinks

from that which cannot be thought by his thinking itself as long as it

happens with this thinking itself and happening this way resists thinking

Always thought from the difference of thinking the ontological difference

is at the same time forgetting and the forgotten the outmdashthe ex- and

exitusmdashof thinking happening and being Being as difference difference

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 33: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3342

T h e R e l a t i o n60

as bearing out therefore means the bearing out of the ldquooutrdquo into the

ldquooutrdquomdashinto lethe forgetting death It also means the appropriation of

the ldquooutrdquo as the end from which every experience receives its definition

Furthermore it means the appropriation of beings as those which first

receive their contour from their ldquooutrdquo

However this ldquoekrdquo and ldquoexrdquo this lethe death and forgetting the ldquonotrdquo does

not allow itself to be thought It can be said and passed on written and

repeated but it cannot be thought So when Heidegger speaks of An-

denken when following a metaphor from Houmllderlin and Rilke he speaks

of the trace of difference and the trace of the erasure of the trace (983090983088983088983090b983090983095983093) he tries to do justice precisely to the factum of the unthinkablity of

this factum At the same time however he also tries to insist that this

ldquonotrdquo of the thinkable must be thought and with this insistence he goes

astray He means the trace to be of necessity the trace of difference the dif-

ference always difference of being forgetfulness always the forgetfulness

of difference But forgetfulnessmdashif it deserves its namemdashmust always be

able to be also something non-relational non-genitive and non-genetic

and nothing is able to ascertain that it ever was not without a tie to

Being Although there are innumerable passages in Heideggerrsquos texts that

discuss with utmost care the double meaning of the genitive as subjec-

tivus and objectivus there are none that formulate a serious thinking of

genitivity as such When being forgets itself its forgetfulness must also

be able to be the dissolution of the tie that bound it to the forgotten If

the forgotten difference leaves behind a trace this trace must always also

be able to be the trace not of this difference but released and abandonedby it without a memory trace And finally if the difference of Being from

beings is truly a difference it must also be able to be such that it does not

remain the difference of Being but absolved from it and stepping into the

cold light of something indeterminably other than being

This other difference and this other forgotten which can never be

without the possibility of a relation to the one examined by Heidegger

manifests itself in his language with the re-segmentation the de- and

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 34: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3442

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 61

re-semantization of customary words and syntagms in the continuous

denaming of the already named in the invention of a idiolect which

should set against or next to the thoughtlessness of common ldquometaphysi-

calrdquo languages not only a new terminology but an alternative gesture of

thought No less does it show itself in an attention to the languages of

poetry and art which remain without an equal in modernity from Hegel

to Benjamin Even if he leaves no doubt that he understands language

as the answer to the ldquonotrdquo of beings the ontological vocabulary is used

conspicuously more discreetly in the texts devoted to language and po-

etry than in the quasi-systematic and historical works No matter how

infinitely problematic these texts remain they correspond to a trait oflanguage that corresponds to neither beings nor Being and cannot be

defined by the forgotten or preserved difference between the two In

them we encounter something other than Being its oblivion and the dif-

ferentiality of its residual traces without however being able to exclude

their possibility obtrusion and terroristic gestures of gathering It speaks

with another and for another ldquonotrdquo in which occasionally still another

may intervene

More not

Still more Language is a matter of the still of the ldquostillrdquo of a not-anymore

and of a still-not And this still the one in the other and this in that

speaks in such a way that its correlates can first extract themselves from

it the ldquonotrdquo of what has been and what is still to be in the future of beings

and their presence and absence is spoken and thought from a ldquostillrdquo that precedes both thinking and language

e concern that this ldquostillrdquo may be only a further variant of the ontologi-

cal difference in which its structures of appropriation stabilization and

presentation repeat themselves one more time might perhaps be dis-

persed through two observations On the one hand the still of language

always says moremdashno-more and still-more In its still-more it exceeds

every comprehensible limit of the form of representation as well as the

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 35: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3542

T h e R e l a t i o n62

analytic of its collapse in the history of being It speaks for a still-more

than what all being and its oblivion could grant for a forgetting that is

not even forgotten or still more than forgotten and therefore speaks

beyond what is merely thinkable and thinking Its still-more does not

say more of the same but still-another and still-other-than-other With

its ldquostillrdquo language speaks itself free from everything that can be said and

thought

On the other hand the ldquostillrdquo and the ldquostill-other-than-otherrdquo of language

is delirious Two substantial pages of Heideggerrsquos ldquoAnaximanderrsquos Say-

ingrdquo bear witness to this that are not too far separated from the passagein which he defines thinking as based on language and its poetry ldquoe

thinking of being is the primordial form of poeticizing in which before

everything else language first comes to language enters that is to say its

essence inking is the ur-poetry which precedes all poesyrdquo (983090983088983088983090b

983090983092983095) Somewhat later we read ldquoBy revealing itself in what is Being

withdraws itself In this way in its clearing Being invests the beings with

deliriousness or errancy What is happens in errancy deliriousness in

which it strays from Being and so founds error and delirium is is

the essential space of historyrdquo (983090983093983091ndash983093983092) Furthermore after the ldquoepocheacute

of beingrdquo is described as the ldquoclearing keeping to itself with the truth of

its essencerdquo Heidegger writes ldquoEach time that Being keeps to itself in

its sending suddenly and unexpectedly world happens Every epoch of

world-history is an epoch of errancy and deliriousness e epochal

essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Da-seinrdquo (983090983093983092ndash983093983093)

Delirious Aberrant It is not only the bright madness of language but also

that of Being and the epochs of its history As Being discloses (or bears

out or gives birth to) itself in beings it keeps to itself with its truth with-

draws and conceals itself it shelt-ers and errs What it releases from itself

is its errancymdasha delirious birth-giver of delirious births If every epoch of

world history is an epoch of errancy it is because the epochal character

of being as it keeps to itself does not allow anything other than what

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 36: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3642

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 63

is held outside of its truth and held into the errancy of Da-sein into the

ldquothererdquo and ldquoekrdquo of ek-sistence as its un-truth To think the epochality of

the epochs of being means to think errancy as the irreducibility of epochs

to a truth that would not be un-truth withdrawal and forgetfulness e

ur-poetry of thinking is the err-poetry of Being in which its epocheacute comes

about as the oblivion of thinking

e essence of being which lies in its existence and not its essentia (983089983097983094983090

983094983096) and its differentia could be called only errentia (if the word existed

and did not have to be first invented) It does not lead only into errancy

but is in errancy and exists as it spells the ldquoisrdquo of all beings in the errantlanguage of its errant Being as ldquoerrsrdquo

e appropriating event of language ( Ereignis )mdashexposed in the language

of poetrymdashthat bespeaks its happening its essence and its existence

would be the mis-appropriating err-ent ( Err-eignis oder Irr-eignis ) since

it goes astray unbound from its essence and without access to it And the

bearing out of its essence its ek-sistence and errancy would be the bearing

out of its epochal impossibility of bearing out its holding to itself and its

withdrawal bearing out in errancy and always still more errant bearing

out in its diaphora as aphora difference as diff-errence

If language were thought otherwise (as logos apophantikos proposition

expression structure of signification communication of information) it

would always be thought only within a specific epoch but not from the

epochality of each epoch e epocheacute of the happening of language how-ever says that the opening as such is held back and therefore allows still

other epochs to be announced and to arrive It says that still more errors

and errancies are possible without the horizon of this still being able to

set a limit and a measure for a truth other than that of the guarding of its

un-truth Epochality insists on a ldquostillrdquomdasha still-not-yet of the appearance

of Being as such a still-yet and a still-yet-another of the appearance of

Being in its delirious errancy

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 37: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3742

T h e R e l a t i o n64

ere ldquoisrdquo then only a parodic beingmdasha being on the errant track of its

mere being offered named represented posited and positionedmdashbut

not one that can be defined by such positional and propositional state-

ments that would allow a more than an epochal erroneous delirious

parodic access to its truth its refusal ldquoClearing of beingrdquo thus does not

mean that something but rather that always only the disappearance and

the unclearablity of its happening will become clear ldquoe clearing of

what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) means the revelation of the

impossibility of revelation the release of the without-being of everything

that could be said and done of everything that could be

To the ldquoepochality of beingrdquo (983090983088983088983090b 983090983093983092) and the ek-static character of

Da-sein corresponds in terms of the method of thinking the ldquostep backrdquo

of which Heidegger speaks taking up a phrase from Schillerrsquos twentieth

letter on ldquothe aesthetic education of manrdquo (983090983088983088983093 983093983095) In a marginalium

to Identitaumlt und differenz he describes it in the following terms ldquothe step

back before the whole of the destiny of Being is in itself awakening from

the appropriating event into the appropriating event as expropriation

from the jointurerdquo (983090983088983088983094 983093983097) is step which is supposed to relinquish

the appropriating event of being as expropriation into the errancy of the

without-being is (or ldquoerrsrdquo) similar to the parekbasis in Greek comedy a

parodic step that even in the step back from ldquothe whole of the destiny of

beingrdquo enters its parodic structure

ldquoAwakening from the appropriating event into the appropriating eventrdquomdash

ldquothe step backrdquo does not step out of ldquothe whole of the sendings of BeingrdquoEven when it does step out it does so only in such a way that it steps

into it as an outside without interiority It is a step into the step itself

going into going itself thinking toward ( An-denken) the toward ( An) of

thinking speaking toward ( An-sprechen) the toward ( An) of language yet

it is not something said thought or reached If this step is to be taken

then it cannot take place as one of the historically already realized or the

still possible further historical steps thoughts or statements in which

Being occurs It cannot be presupposed or experienced as one among

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 38: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3842

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 65

other ldquodestinies of beingrdquo because the offering and giving character of

being itself its sense of ldquooccurringrdquo first occurs in this stepmdashand with

the occurring of ldquothe whole of the giving of Beingrdquo is also its going astray

and erring its un-destinal and ex propriating sense Being shows itself as

what never shows itself but as the self-withdrawing shows in itself as

withdrawal of every showing Being step into the distance and the gift

an ellipse

If this is the meaning of aletheia it is precisely the originary aletheic truth

that errs It cannot be anything but what originarily jumps away from

itself and therefore can only be erroneous But inasmuch as it is its ownerrancy only this errancy comes close to it not the direct but only the

indirect wordmdashone may think here of Kierkegaardrsquos ldquoindirect communi-

cationrdquo only the ldquoironicrdquo yet neither the objectively nor the subjectively

ironic but rather the irony of history and Being which cannot be any

rhetorical figure or trope since as an anatrope it makes possible in the

first place every trope figure form and shape of Being and thinking

and makes them possible by withholding itself in its silence or muteness

Being is an-tropological erefore it cannot be grasped by thought but

must come about through poetry Poetry is the language in which the

errancy of Being finds itself as errancy as its only truth the truth of its

truth It is the err-language that deceives itself as little about the absence

of truth as about the fact that there is truth Errancy without errancy

ironic

Aletheia thus should not be understood simply as revelation but asldquoa clearing of what veils and closes itself off rdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983094983093) as revelation

of concealment e concealed that shows itself in this clearing is not

something kept secret that would be finallymdashwho knows through what

processmdashexposed e concealed is concealment It is the unstoppable

itself unstoppability that holds itself back the finitude the forgetting

the passing away that conceals itself in everything that shows itself and

what can only show itself as self-concealment by withdrawing from

erasing and crossing out this (and precisely this) showing concealment

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 39: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 3942

T h e R e l a t i o n66

e privation of lethe in the alpha privativum of aletheia belongs to lethe

itself unconcealment belongs to concealment When it allows itselfmdash

ironically or parodicallymdashto be written in poetry and therefore to be

thought it does not stand before our eyes as the unconcealed as such

but always only in such a way that the moment of its appearance is that

of the blinding glare of precisely this moment and the concealment in

this unconcealment e structure of the aletheic the originary truth is

paraletheic it is the truth about truth that it is the ldquonotrdquo of truth that it

is always almost and approximately that it is by or close to truth to the

now already past and the now still coming truth that it is forever in error

about error itself and therefore not is but errs

ere is no ldquoproperrdquo apart from the refused and therefore only a going

astray deliriously

Every ousiacutea is para-ousiacutea in this par-odos that offers no passage to no

ending on this other way that Heidegger reads in the madness (Wahnsinn)

of Traklrsquos poem

A somewhat other way of language than the one that is on the way to

it already naming language as the goal which can be anticipated and

therefore promised a way

ldquoworstward hordquo Beckett writes ldquonohow onrdquo

into the ldquocloseness of the inaccessiblerdquo of which ldquoRimbaud vivantrdquo speaks(Heidegger 983089983097983096983091 983090983090983094)mdashinaccessible but always taken always traversed

always in every errancy fulfilled

e epocheacute of being holds only to itself mdashit does not hold others And hold-

ing to itself it does not hold on to the name or the matter of ldquobeingrdquo

e title of our discussion could also have been epocheacute mdashldquoTo hold back

is in Greek epocherdquo (983090983088983088983090c 983097)mdashand still it would have been misleading

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 40: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4042

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 67

We have tried to speak of what holds what does not hold and what does

not hold itself and thus neither bears nor can be carried or borne We

had to try it in a perhaps errant and probably labyrinthine waymdashand

the labyrinth is a horizontal abyss Our dialoguemdashor as we have become

other and have been mute our contribution to a comical com-mutismmdash

could not therefore bear any title at all or only the kind that it does not

bear and that at least refers to the complications of bearing bearing out

difference diaphoraacute

is sounds as if our reflections could begin only here as if we had to

turn around now and return to begin again As if we did not know whereour head is or if we still had one and not only feet without a ground And

what turn could we find if ldquoOur Occidental languages are languages of

metaphysical thinking each in its own wayrdquo (983090983088983088983090a 983095983091) and are there-

fore delirious and erroneous yet we have tried to take two or more steps

back to probe them these languages and these steps

It must not be a word from the lexicon of one of these languages But it

could be two from different languages which somehow play together

approach each other and distance themselves from each other miss

something and thereby allow something to be readmdasheven if only a littlemdash

from that of which we spoke

For example

The Aphora

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 41: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4142

T h e R e l a t i o n68

983150 983151 983156 983141 983155

983089 Translation slightly modified

983090 Translation modified

983091 Translation modified 983092 Translation modified

983093 Translation modified In what follows the Heideggerian term Austrag will be of central

importance e verb austragen means to carry out deliver discharge To maintain the

continuity of argument that centers around tragen it will be translated as bearing out

or carrying out depending on the context

983094 Translation modified

983154 983141 983142 983141 983154 983141 983150 983139 983141 983155

Blanchot Maurice 983089983097983095983091 Le Pas as-delagrave Paris Gallimard

Beckett Samuel Nohow On Company Ill Seen Ill Said Worstward Hordquo ree Novels New York

Grove Press 983089983097983097983094

Celan Paul 983089983097983097983095 Fremde Naumlhe Celan als Uumlbersetzer Ausstellung und Katalog Ed Axel Gellhaus

Marbach Deutsche Schillergesellschaft

Gascheacute Rodolphe 983089983097983097983092 e Eclipse of Difference In Inventions of Difference On Jacques Derrida

Cambridge MA Harvard University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983097 On the Nonadequate Trait In Of Minimal ings Stanford CA Stanford University

Press

Heidegger Martin 983089983097983094983090 Being and Time Trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson New

York Harper

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983095983089 A Dialogue on Language (983089983097983093983091983092) Language in the Poem (983089983097983093983090) e Way to Lan-

guage (983089983097983093983097) In On the Way to Language Trans Peter D Hertz New York Harper and

Row

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983096983091 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983091 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 983089983097983089983088ndash983089983097983095983094 Frankfurt am

Main V Klostermann

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983095 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Trans Richard Taft Bloomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983089983097983097983096 Letter on ldquoHumanismrdquo (983089983097983092983094) On the Essence of Ground (983089983097983090983097) What Is Meta- physics (Freiburg Lecture 983089983097983090983097) In Pathmarks Trans William McNeil Cambridg UK

Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983089 Language In Poetry Language ought Trans Albert Hofstadter 983089983096983093ndash983090983088983096 New

York Perennial

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090a e Onto-eo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics (983089983097983093983094ndash983093983095) In Identity and

Difference Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago University of Chicago Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090b Anaximanderrsquos Saying (983089983097983092983094) In Off the Beaten Track Trans Julian Young and

Kenneth Haynes Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983090c On Time and Being Trans Joan Stambaugh Chicago Chicago University Press

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press

Page 42: Werne Hamacher- The Relation

8102019 Werne Hamacher- The Relation

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullwerne-hamacher-the-relation 4242

W e r n e r H a m a c h e r 69

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983091 Four Seminars Le or 983089983097983094983094 983089983097983094983096 983089983097983094983097 Zaumlhringen 983089983097983095983091 Boomington IN Indiana

University Press

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983093 Uumlbungen fuumlr Anfaumlnger Schillers Briefe uumlber die aumlsthetische Erziehung des Menschen

Wintersemester 983089983097983091983094983091983095 Ed Ulrich von Buumllow Marbach am Neckar Deutsche Schiller

Gesellschaft

mdashmdashmdash 983090983088983088983094 Gesamtausgabe Vol 983089983089 Identitaumlt und differenz Frankfurt am Main V Kloster-

mann

Kant Immanuel 983089983097983097983097 Critique of Pure Reason Trans Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Cambridge

UK Cambridge University Press