West Africa:Governance and Security in aChanging Region

Africa Program Working Paper Series

FEBRUARY 2009Abdel-Fatau Musah

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E I N S T I T U T E

Cover Photo: Fishermen casting a

net near Okrika, an island village

near the export oil refinery at Port

Harcourt, on the Niger Delta,

Nigeria. © George Steinmetz/Corbis.

The views expressed in this paper

represent those of the author and

not necessarily those of IPI. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit

of a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

Africa Program Staff

John L. Hirsch, Senior AdviserMashood Issaka, Senior ProgramOfficer

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, EditorEllie B. Hearne, Publications Officer

© by International Peace Institute,

2009

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Abdel-Fatau Musah, PhD, is Senior Adviser to the Danish

Agency for International Development (DANIDA) and

Senior Conflict Prevention Adviser to the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Previously, Dr. Musah served as Senior Program Officer

at the Open Society Institute - West Africa (2002-2004);

consultant to the UN Regional Office for West Africa on

peacebuilding and conflict prevention (2004-2005); and

Head of Research and Advocacy at the London-based

Centre for Democracy and Development (1998-2001).

Among other works, Dr. Musah is author of The ECOWAS

Moratorium on Light Weapons: Pitching Political Will

Against Reality (Accra: FOSDA, 2004), and co-editor of

Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (London:

Pluto, 2000) and Over a Barrel: Light Weapons & Human

Rights in the Commonwealth (New Delhi: CHRI, 2000).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IPI owes a great debt of thanks to the generous contrib-

utors to the Africa Program. Their support reflects a

widespread demand for innovative thinking on practical

solutions to continental challenges. In particular, IPI and

the Africa Program are grateful to the government of the

Netherlands. In addition we would like to thank the Kofi

Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, which

co-hosted an authors' workshop for this working paper

series in Accra, Ghana on April 11-12, 2008.

CONTENTS

Foreword, Terje Rød-Larsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Geostrategic Dimensions of Securityin West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

VULNERABILITIES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

THE SAHEL-SAHARA DIVIDE

ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES

Internal and External Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

THE ROLE OF INTERNAL GOVERNANCE PROCESSES

DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES AS OPPORTUNITIESAND THREATS

NIGERIA AND THE “ENCLAVE POWERBROKERS”

THE EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN ANDREGIONAL SECURITY

Responding to Security Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICANSTATES

THE AFRICAN UNION

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Future of Human and RegionalSecurity in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

STAYING THE COURSE

WORST CASE: DOOM AND GLOOM

BEST CASE: EL DORADO

Conclusion: A Strategy for SustainableHuman and Regional Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

A MULTISTAKEHOLDER COMPACT FOR REGIONALSECURITY

Further Reading. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Foreword

IPI is pleased to introduce a new series of working papers on regional capacities to respond to securitychallenges in Africa. The broad range of United Nations, African Union, and subregional peacekeeping,peacemaking, and peacebuilding initiatives in Africa underscore a new sense of multilayered partnership in thesearch for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa. As the total number of conflicts on the continent hasbeen significantly reduced in the past decade, there is widespread recognition of the opportunities for a morestable and peaceful future for Africa. But there is also a profound awareness of the fragility of recent peaceagreements, whether in Kenya, Liberia, or Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, continued violence in the Sudan, theDemocratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe; the long absence of a viable central government in Somalia;and continued tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea—to name only a few cases—reflect the legacy ofunresolved historic disputes and ongoing power struggles.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has selected Burundi and Sierra Leone for its firstefforts, and will shortly be addressing the security challenges facing Guinea-Bissau which has become a majortransit point for narcotics traffic between South America and Europe. Yet, the impact of the PBC on promotinggood governance and facilitating economic growth remains to be determined. In sum, progress toward sustain-able peace and meaningful economic development in Africa remains checkered and uncertain.

On April 11-12, 2008, IPI and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre co-hosted a meetingof African civil society representatives and academics in Accra, Ghana, to consider “Security Challenges inAfrica: Regional Capacities to Respond”; and on June 1-3, 2008, IPI held a seminar in cooperation with theAustrian Ministry of Defense and the Austrian Ministry of European and International Affairs entitled “Copingwith Crisis in Africa: Strengthening Multilateral Capacity for Peace and Security.” Each meeting sought toidentify the most important trends facing the continent and to propose effective and far-reaching strategicapproaches to meet the new challenges facing Africa in the twenty-first century. Five key points emerged fromthese discussions:

1) Multiple global challenges in a rapidly changing world confront Africa. No part of the globe suffers morefrom global warming; no population is more at risk from rising food and energy prices; and Africans areseverely affected by the inequities of the current international trading system. At the same time, Africansmust face the consequences of misgovernance, corruption, interstate and intrastate conflicts of the post-Cold War era, and the urgent need to repair or replace failed or failing states.

2) Which Africa—2008, 2020, or 2050? While addressing the crises of today, there is an urgent need to lookinto the future. By 2050 there will be an estimated 1.9 billion people on the continent. The pace of interna-tional change is accelerating, but the development of institutional capacities in the African Union andAfrican subregional organizations to respond to new challenges remains challenging and slow. How can thestrengthening of these capacities be accelerated? How can comparative advantages among international,continental, and subregional organizations be identified and strengthened?

3) Whose Responsibility? Negotiating the proper balance between the responsibility of the state and theresponsibility of the international community in the face of intrastate ethnic violence remains a topic ofvigorous discussion. Yet, it is now widely accepted, in the aftermath of the tragedies of the 1990s, that theinternational community cannot simply stand aside in the face of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,and crimes against humanity. The AU Constitutive Act of 2000 established the right of intervention by theUnion to stop genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity occurring in one of its member states. And

i

ii

in September 2005, a summit of world leaders endorsed the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).But RtoP is not primarily about military intervention. The idea of “sovereignty as responsibility” puts thestress on building the capacity of states to prevent these crimes and violations in the first place. All statesneed to be responsible for the safety and wellbeing of their populations, but if they manifestly fail to do so,the broader international community must act. The ongoing violence in Darfur and the difficulties in thedeployment of UNAMID (African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur) reflect how difficultthe transformation of words into deeds remains. What more needs to be done to give the African Union,the regional economic communities, and African states the capacity to implement these commitments?And what can international actors do to assist them in this regard?

4) New Actors, Old Conflicts: Key European states, the European Union, and the United States have evincednew interest in strengthening African conflict management capacities. At the same time, China and India,the new actors on the continent, are making major investments in African infrastructure and economicdevelopment. While cognizant of African perceptions, arising from Europe’s colonial past in Africa, thereis an opportunity to forge new partnerships based on contemporary realities. To what extent can thesedivergent interests be harmonized? To what extent can historic suspicion and distrust be replaced bycooperative agendas based on a common interest in ending old conflicts and producing sustainableeconomic agendas?

5) Peacekeeping is Not Enough—Creating the Bridge to Peacebuilding: Deployment of UN and African Unionpeacekeepers to address ongoing conflicts is important but insufficient to meet the challenges ahead. Noris governmental and international institutional engagement sufficient. The agenda for postconflictreconstruction will be long and arduous. Incentives and encouragement—material and moral—should becreated for the involvement of African civil society, international nongovernmental organizations, and theAfrican diaspora in the future of the continent. This will require new openness on the part of the AfricanUnion, regional economic communities, and African governments, as well as on the part of outside actors.

Many if not all of the most critical challenges to human and international security today have particularrelevance to the African continent. Africa’s future will be directly affected by the ongoing international debatesover climate change and food insecurity; over how to respond to increased population pressures and thedemands of international migration; and over the global impact of the health pandemics that have taken anenormous economic as well as human toll on the continent.

These papers form a part of the IPI Africa Program’s four year initiative of research and policy facilitationintended to generate fresh thinking about the multiple challenges facing the African continent in the comingyears and decades. Each of the five papers in this series seeks to address one or more aspects of the issuesoutlined above from the perspective of challenges facing one particular region: North Africa, Southern Africa,Central Africa, Eastern Africa, and West Africa. Yet as the series illustrates, there are many commonalitiesamong the crises and challenges in each region. It is my hope that as you read this paper, and the others in theseries, you will give thoughtful consideration to how all of us can best contribute to strengthening Africancontinental and regional capacities in the interest of Africa itself and its many friends around the globe.

Terje Rød-LarsenPresident, International Peace Institute

IntroductionThis paper addresses the challenges to human andregional security in the territory covered by theEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS).1 It examines causal factors and theireffects, profiles the actors shaping the securityenvironment, and describes the nature and impactsof their interventions. Finally, it projects possiblefuture scenarios based on the current securitydynamics. The paper examines the geopoliticalenvironment of West Africa, with emphasis on thestrategic importance of the region and the vulnera-bilities emanating from its location. Within thiscontext, it discusses the roles of local, regional, andinternational actors in the evolving regionalsecurity architecture, sifting through their actions,motivations, and interventions. It analyzes theattempts by national, regional, and internationalinstitutions to transform the security environment,highlighting their roles, strengths, and weaknesses;and it projects various security scenarios,proposing policy options to meet the challengesthat these scenarios present.

Within the United Nations system, the term“human security” has been stretched beyond theprimordial notion of “security” to encompassnational, regional, and international interventionson any issue remotely related to the promotion ofthe organization’s concept of internationalsecurity—“freedom from fear” and “freedom fromwant.” The United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) divides human security intoseven components: economic, food, health,environmental, personal, community, and politicalsecurity.2 For his part, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reckons that freedom fromwant, freedom from fear, and the freedom of futuregenerations to inherit a healthy natural environ-ment together constitute “the interrelated buildingblocks of human—and therefore national—security.”3 For the purposes of this paper, “regionalsecurity” describes the common political,economic, and security arrangements that acontiguous transnational space of sovereign states

with a degree of “pooled” sovereignty based onshared fears and expectations, may implement topromote mutual assistance and ensure the collec-tive well-being of its population, institutions, andvalues, and their protection from perceived threats.4

Geostrategic Dimensions ofSecurity in West AfricaWest Africa’s complex security challenges are afunction of three broad factors. The first setincorporates the region’s natural resourceendowments, the vulnerabilities inherent in itsgeographical location, and environmental anddemographic factors. The second source of insecu-rity relates to internal and international governanceprocesses. Finally, regional and external geopoliticsexert distinct pressures on the region’s securityarchitecture.

The West Africa region, 4.7 million squarekilometers in area, is more than twice the size ofWestern Europe. Its 6,000 kilometer coastal arc,which stretches from the upper reaches of Angolain south-west Africa to the lower reaches ofWestern Sahara to the north and washed by theAtlantic Ocean, embodies its value as an area ofglobal geostrategic importance as well as its vulner-able security. The Gulf of Guinea is home to hugehydrocarbon deposits, making it a future resourceto meet global energy needs. Nigeria’s proven oiland gas reserves are estimated at 40-50 billionbarrels. Indeed, the recent oil finds (estimated at 3billion barrels off Cape Three Points in Ghana),reserves in Cote d’Ivoire, and the optimisticprognosis in the Mano River Union (MRU)5 basinand Mali, are an indication that almost all theECOWAS countries sit on huge oil and gasdeposits. Besides its hydrocarbon riches, the Gulf isalso a reservoir of rich fish stocks. Inland, WestAfrica is endowed with precious and strategicnatural minerals, including gold, uranium,diamonds, and titanium. The lush, but dwindling,tropical rainforest belt stretching from Guinea inthe west to Cameroon in the east accounts for more

Abdel-Fatau Musah 1

1 The Economic Community of West African States comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo; Mauritania quit the organization in 2000.

2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press), pp.24-25.3 See United Nations, Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia, UN Doc. SG/SM/7382, May 8-10, 2008.4 For further definitional issues, see E. Adler and M. Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.29-32. 5 The Mano River Union comprises Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

2 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

than two thirds of global cocoa needs, while furthernorth, the Savannah and Sahel regions are a majorsource of cotton, peanuts, and shea butter.VULNERABILITIES IN THE GULF OFGUINEA

Maritime security in the territorial waters of WestAfrica is precarious. The material assets of theNigerian navy, the largest and best equipped in theregion, with 5,000 personnel and about 2,000coastguards, consist of not more than fifteenwarships, and its maritime reconnaissancecapability is limited to four helicopters.6 InNovember 2007, the Chief of Naval Staff, ViceAdmiral Ganiyu Adekeye, appealed to the federalgovernment to urgently revamp the naval facilities,pointing out that the country’s “Naval ForwardOperating Bases lacked basic facilities such asjetties, surveillance radars, shore batteries andmobile control towers.”7 The Ghanaian Navy is thesecond largest with 1,000 personnel. Much ofNigeria’s maritime security prioritizes onshoresecurity to police oil exploitation and shipment.There is little or no surveillance and interceptioncapability beyond 100 nautical miles of the vastGulf coastline, rendering it vulnerable to variousforms of criminal activity, including piracy,poaching, and dumping of toxic waste. The searoutes also provide easy channels for arms andhuman trafficking.

By far though, drug trafficking constitutes themost serious immediate security threat to theregion. While proximity and easy access to theAmericas make the Gulf of Guinea a high-valuesource of low-sulfur oil for the US, the same factorscoupled with lax maritime security havetransformed the Gulf of Guinea into the favoritetransshipment zone for the Colombian and otherLatin American narcocartels and their localaccomplices seeking less-protected routes intoEurope and the US. In 2007 alone, security forcesseized more than six metric tons of cocaine in theterritorial waters, seaports, and airports in sevencountries, namely Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, The

Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Mauritania, and Senegal.The largest single seizure occurred in Senegal,where the authorities uncovered a Latin Americanoperation with 1.2 metric tons of cocaine destinedfor Europe.8 Nigeria has also been cited as thetransshipment point of approximately one-third ofthe heroin seized by US authorities.9 According tointernational antitrafficking agencies, including theUnited Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC), US Drug Enforcement Administration,and INTERPOL, a growing criminal network isbeing forged between Latin American drug baronsand European (mostly Spanish and Italian) andAfrican criminal gangs to facilitate the triangulartrade in narcotics.10 Indeed, rogue security agentshave been arrested in several countries in theregion, including Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, andNigeria, for collaborating with drug barons.Ghana’s interior minister, Kwamena Bartels, hasdescribed as “alarming, police officers’ involvementin the illicit trade when they were supposed tocombat it.”11 In Guinea-Bissau, an emergentnarcostate, the beleaguered government has beenforced to adopt a “shoot-to-kill” policy against thebarons and their accomplices in a desperate bid toreverse the trend. Thus far, West Africa has beenused mainly as a transit point for the trade. Whilethis represents a security threat in itself, the realtragedy will strike when, due to more stringentcontrols in Europe and the US, the region, particu-larly its restless violence-prone youth, is groomedinto a narcoconsumer society. Already, statisticsreleased by security agencies and medical sourcesattest to a growing use of Indian hemp, cocaine, andother narcotic drugs across the region. This couldherald the emergence in the near future of narco-lords and turf battles in the region.THE SAHEL-SAHARA DIVIDE

If securing West Africa’s territorial waters is amatter of concern, the security challenges along itsnorthern frontiers are even more daunting. TheSahel-Sahara divide that stretches from north-western Chad through northern Niger and Mali to

6 See Mark J. Sorbara, “The United States and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea,” Petroleum Africa, July 2007, p.56. See also, International Institute for StrategicStudies, The Military Balance, 1990-1991, (London: Pergamon, 1990), p.139.

7 See Felix Nnamdi, “Overhaul the Navy Now – Naval Chief Tells FG,” The News, Abuja, November 16, 2007, available at www.thenewsnig.com/zmagazine. 8 See “Drug Trafficking: An Alarming Human Security Threat,” WARN Policy Paper, West Africa, September 12, 2007, p.1.9 See J. Peter Pham, “Securing the New Strategic Gulf,” World Defense Review, June 7, 2007.10 See US Drug Enforcement Administration, “Statement before the House Judiciary Committee,” September 21, 2006, available at

www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct092106.html. 11 Ghana Web, “Bartels admits Ghana transit point for drugs,” available at www.ghanaweb.com, January 25, 2008.

Abdel-Fatau Musah 3

12 “Conflit armé dans le Nord du Niger : analyse des enjeux géopolitiques et impacts sur le cadre démocratique,” Rapport de synthèse de la Journée de réflexionorganisée par l ’ ANDDH et Alternative Espaces Citoyens, Niamey, August 11, 2007, p.9.

Bobo-DioulassoSikasso

Gao

Kayes

Néma

Lagos

Ibadan

Maiduguri

Tamale

Tombouctou

Tambacounda

Thiès

Kaolack

Kankan

Parakou

Koforidua

Saint-Louis

Diourbel

Takoradi

Kumasi

Savalou

Djougou

Dosso

Sokode

Gagnoa

Bouaké

Korhogo

AgbovilleBuchanan

Sassandra

Bo

Bonthe

Dabola

Kindia

Boke

Ziguinchor

Abidjan

Kano

Tahoua

MaradiZinder Diffa

Potiskum

Gombe

PortHarcout

EnuguBenin City

Ogbomosho

Oshogbo

Calabar

Campo

Douala

Ngaoundéré

'Ayoûnel 'AtroûsKaédi

Rosso

Kaduna

Birnin Kebbi

Dakar

Banjul

Bissau

Conakry

Freetown

MonroviaYamoussoukro

Accra

Lomé

Yaoundé

Abuja

Porto-Novo

Niamey

Nouakchott

BamakoOuagadougou

Malabo

Senegal

Gambia

Niger

Niger

Bandama

Volta

AT

LA

NT

IC

OC

EA N

G u l f o f G u i n e a

Lac deKossou

LakeVolta

LakeChad

B i g h t o f B e n i n

Benue

Bight ofBiafra

MAURITANIA

SENEGAL

GAMBIA

GUINEA-BISSAU

G U I N E A

SIERRALEONE

LIBERIA

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

GHANA

BENIN

CHAD

N I G E R

M A L I

BURKINA FASO

TO

GO

N I G E R I A

CAMEROON

SAO TOMEAND PRINCIPE GABON

CONGO

EQ

UA

TORIAL GUINEA

Cape Palmas

Cape Three Points

WEST AFRICA

Department of Peacekeeping OperationsCartographic Section

Map No. 4242 UNITED NATIONSFebruary 2005

The boundaries and names shown and the designationsused on this map do not imply official endorsement oracceptance by the United Nations.

0 100 400300200 500 km

0 100 200 300 mi

Mauritania (about 20 degrees north of the equator),epitomizes the rising challenges of complexemergencies in West Africa. The latest low-intensity conflicts in West Africa are located in thisvulnerable belt. In Niger, the insurgent Tuareggroup, Mouvement Nigerien pour la Justice (MNJ),is locked in a deadly conflict with the governmentover autonomy, uranium revenue, and the brokenpromises of resettlement following peace accordsthat ended an earlier rebellion in 1995. As in similarconflicts in the region over the last two decades,genuine grievances have been adulterated withbanditry, terrorism, and trafficking in humans,drugs, and cigarettes to transform the Agadezregion and other northern parts of Niger (and alsothe vast Kidal region of northern Mali) into themost insecure zones in West Africa today. As isoften the case, external interests are fueling theunrest. Libya lays claim to 30,000 square kilometersof territory in northern Niger, and Niamey hasoften accused Tripoli of arming and sheltering itsrebels. Also, ethnic affiliations make Algeriaanother favorite rear-base for the rebels.12

The porous nature of West Africa’s northernborders and the proximity of the Sahel-Sahara

divide to the troubled Maghreb states of Algeriaand Morocco, as well as to the Middle East and thePersian Gulf, make the region most vulnerable toterrorist incursions, arms trafficking, and destabi-lization, and also to human trafficking and refugeeflows from the conflict zones to the east in Sudanand Chad. The southward encroachment of thedesert is adding an environmental dimension to theprecarious livelihoods of the pastoralists andnomads, injecting an incendiary element into age-old conflicts with the sedentary farmers furthersouth. In addition, common water sources arebecoming an object of conflict across the region. ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES

West Africa is prone to extremes of climate change,alternating between severe cyclical droughts andheavy flooding. Erratic climate change has visited aheavy toll on human life, food security, and healthacross the region in recent months. Heavy rainfallin the Sahel region of West Africa in 2003 wasaccompanied by increased breeding by desertlocusts that devastated thousands of hectares ofcrops in Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger in2004. Between 2005 and 2006, the knock-on effectof the locust invasion and drought in the same

region led to severe famine in Niger. The beginningof 2007 saw the drying up of the Volta River inGhana, the source of irrigation and electricity forthe country and its immediate neighbors to thenorth and east, only to be followed by torrentialrains between June and September 2007. Theensuing flooding and waterborne diseases lefthundreds of people dead, close to half a millionhomeless, and thousands of hectares of cropswashed away in the Savannah regions of Ghana,Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Nigeria.

Such environmental hazards are in part the resultof heavy deforestation, particularly in Côte d’Ivoireand Ghana, and irresponsible mining practices inthe diamondiferous areas and goldfields in theregion. In addition, gas-flaring and oil-drilling inNigeria and the widespread use of dangerousinsecticides across the region have resulted inserious water and air pollution. According to EstherObeng Dapaah, Ghana's Minister of Lands,Forestry, and Mines, Ghana’s forest cover which wasabout 8 million hectares in 1960, had dwindled toless than 2 million hectares by 2007, due largely toover-logging by timber contractors, excessivesurface mining, and unregulated conversion ofnatural forest into agricultural land.13

Given the fact that warlords and unscrupulouspoliticians in the region have often manipulated therivalries associated with the scramble over scarcenatural resources to incite ethnic groups toviolence, the continued destruction of arable landand water sources through man-made and naturaldisasters in the Sahel region adds an incendiaryelement to simmering tensions. It is not improbablethat land and river wars will come to dominate thelocal and cross-border conflict landscape in theregion within the next decade.

Internal and ExternalDimensionsThere is no gainsaying that internal politics,regional power-plays, and bad governance nurturethe acute insecurity in West Africa. Richly endowedwith human and material resources, the regionremains one of the most impoverished in the worldfor reasons related mainly to a dearth of leadership

and poor political and resource governancecapacity.14 Also, the notion of “territorial integrity,”so jealously guarded by member states, soundshollow when tested against the fact that all thecountries in the region are stuck in a stage ofincomplete statemaking, with national borders andinternal enclaves constantly under contestationfrom within and without. Thus, much asgovernance processes within individual countriesremain the key drivers of security dynamics in WestAfrica, the actions of the regional hegemon andother subregional powers also exert a decisiveinfluence on the regional security architecture.THE ROLE OF INTERNALGOVERNANCE PROCESSES

Empirical data from conflict zones in West Africaspeak unequivocally to the correlation between badgovernance and political instability. Prior to the endof the Cold War, governance in much of WestAfrica was the pastime of an elite civil-militarydiarchy. These regimes were maintained by clanallegiance, patronage, and repressive securityrackets, which were sustained by criminal networksand illicit businesses. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, andGuinea-Bissau, governance became synonymouswith the imposition of a “violent peace” character-ized by institutional corruption and greed, zeroinfrastructure development, hatred and discrimi-nation along ethnic lines, as well as the alienationand consequent disillusionment of the youth. Thesefactors combined to undermine the integrity of thestate, sparking violent conflicts whose effectsreverberated across the region. The erosion of stateinstitutions and infrastructure in turn led to thecollapse of the formal economy and the rise of theshadow state in which warlordism, impunity, andcriminality flourished. Challenges to badgovernance from below provoked instability first inBenin and Mali, and later, civil wars that ravagedmuch of the MRU basin, Guinea-Bissau, and Côted’Ivoire. These wars exposed the soft underbelly ofthe security apparatuses of the repressive regimesas, for the first time, civilian warlords, militants,and mercenaries became a serious factor threat-ening the very survival of the region’s hitherto state-centric security apparatuses. The ensuing violentconflicts unleashed many of the latent security

4 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

13 See Ghana Web, “General News,” available at www.ghanaweb.com, November 24, 2007.14 UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change—Human Solidarity in a Divided World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

threats in the region.The threats included a clash of identities based

on skewed notions of citizenship (Côte d’Ivoire),and ethnic and clan-based animosities (Liberia andSierra Leone). Beyond that, they revealed theextent of the youth crisis and the propensity fornatural resource mismanagement. The manipula-tion of these weaknesses by warlords, corruptgovernment officials, and shady business andmercenary networks15 occurred in the unstablecontext of the immediate post-Cold War era. Thisprovoked acute insecurity in the region thatmanifested itself on the one hand in collapsedinstitutions and infrastructure; food insecurity;and environmental and public health hazards; and,on the other, through resource grabs; refugeeflows; human trafficking and drug trafficking; theproliferation and criminal use of weapons; andmassive violations of human rights.

In countries spared the scourge of civil wars,unrest is nevertheless spurred on by the opulentextremes of the tiny elite minority compared to theabject poverty of the vast majority, the unjust distri-bution of profits from abundant natural resources,criminal neglect of the social sector and theenvironment, endemic corruption, and theperceived discrimination against minorities.Banditry and challenges to state authority in largeswathes of territory within ECOWAS are notable,especially in the Niger Delta, northern Niger, andCasamance in Senegal. Disputes over land, water,and chieftaincy have claimed hundreds of lives inlow-intensity conflicts in northern Ghana, Mali,and western Côte d’Ivoire, among others. Theconflicts have created major human and regionalsecurity threats through spillover effects and theexport of bad practices that have blighted theregion’s development perspectives. Thus, theCasamance conflict has embroiled neighboringGuinea-Bissau and The Gambia just as the exportof worst practice from the Liberian conflict hasinformed the acute insecurity in western Côted’Ivoire. In the same way, the insurgency innorthern Niger has influenced the resurgence ofseparatism and banditry in northern Mali amongthe local Tuareg.

DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES ASOPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

Even though civil wars grabbed the headlines in the1990s, democratization processes have beengathering pace since 1990, and today, all sittingpresidents in the region have been either elected orconfirmed in their positions through the ballot box.This stabilizing factor is creating the requiredenvironment for internal investment and economicgrowth, with statistics indicating an average annualgrowth of around 5 percent in a number ofdemocratizing states.16 However, the seeds ofinstability can also be firmly embedded in theseformal democratic processes.

The challenges are economic and ultimatelypolitical, because accountable resource governanceis predicated on good political governance.Politically, with the possible exceptions of Benin,Cape Verde, and Ghana, democracy is in retreat inmuch of the region. Some of the regimes bear agreater resemblance to constitutional monarchies,autocracies, and virtual one-party states than toemerging democracies; at best, they are illiberaldemocracies. It should be remembered that suchregimes created the conditions for the emergence ofmilitary dictatorships in the late 1960s through the1980s. Other threats to the democracy project inthe region include the unacceptably high cost ofpolitical campaigns and electoral administration.They also include the temptation by incumbents tocling on to power, the gullibility and opportunismof sections of civil society and the media, as well asthe absence of internal democracy, and organiza-tional and financial capabilities within the politicalparties, in particular those belonging to the opposi-tion.

On the economic front, democracy is provingnotoriously slow in translating “popular” mandatesand economic growth into development dividends.Economic growth in the region, reputed to be about5 percent, masks serious structural weaknesses inproduction relations. With the current averageannual population growth rate of about 3.5 percent,the region would need to grow its economy at therate of 7 percent or more to be able to significantlyimpact on poverty. Most troublesome, outside raw

Abdel-Fatau Musah 5

15 See A-F. Musah and J. K. Fayemi, Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (London: Pluto, 2000). 16 "Towards the Achievement of ECOWAS Vision 2020," ECOWAS Commission Interim Report 2008, Abuja, May 2008, pp. 7 and 13.

material exports, almost all the West African statesengage mainly in speculative activities rather thanin the production of goods and services, and areactually producing less wealth than they did threeor four decades ago.17

Meanwhile, the region is experiencing the fastestpopulation growth in the world. From 120 millionin 1975, West Africa’s population is projected to hit430 million by 2020, with 45 percent under the ageof fifteen.18 Across the region, educational facilitieschronically lag behind the growth in school enroll-ment figures at the lower levels, resulting in debili-tating deficiencies and gender discrepancies.Coupled with the dearth of employment opportu-nities for the youth (conservative estimates putyouth unemployment at 60-70 percent), thesefactors cast a dark shadow on the future prospectsof the region. Against this backdrop, the region issteadily losing its medical and engineering profes-sionals mainly to Europe and the US in anunchecked brain-drain that is seriouslyundermining health delivery, infrastructuredevelopment, and maintenance. Across WestAfrica, life expectancy stands at forty-six years.Thus, though relative progress has been made ongood governance, all the West African states excepttwo remain in the Low Human Developmentcategory, with five member states propping up theglobal league table of 177 states surveyed, accordingto the 2006 UNDP Human Development Report.19

Reversing the potential for human securitythreats to arise out of the democratization processcalls for concerted interventions by allstakeholders—states, civil society, the privatesector, ECOWAS, and the internationalcommunity—directed at strengthening both thedemocratic and economic processes. In theSupplementary Protocol on Democracy and GoodGovernance (2001), ECOWAS produced anormative document to guide democraticpractice.20 Its domestication and application inmember states, however, remain suspect.

NIGERIA AND THE “ENCLAVEPOWERBROKERS”

A few ECOWAS member states exert dispropor-tionate influence on the security dynamics in theregion for a number of reasons. While some play aleadership role at the regional level, othersinfluence processes either through their status orthe best or worst practices that their leaders projectwithin smaller clusters of states (enclaves). Thesheer size of Nigeria, with its unrivaled military andeconomic might and institutionalized Afrocentricforeign policy doctrine, make it the undisputedregional hegemon. Two other categories ofmedium-sized states also exert considerableinfluence on regional security trajectories by virtueof their assumed status within their immediategeographic area: they are the “enclave powerbro-kers.” The influence of the first group, whichincludes Senegal, Guinea, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire,derives from its members’ relative might withintheir regional enclaves and their ability to formstrategic alliances; they may thus project enduringinfluences. Other enclave powerbrokers, such asLiberia (under Charles Taylor) and Burkina Faso(under the successive leaderships of ThomasSankara and Blaise Compaore), owe their status tothe personality of their respective leaders. Theirpower and influence are personalized rather thaninstitutionalized and, therefore, ephemeral: amaverick leader may emerge in any given countryand transform that country into a temporaryenclave powerbroker. Nigeria’s Regional Hegemony: The Good,the Bad, and the Ugly

Nigeria’s role in regional security in West Africa isimmense. As the key driver of integration, it hasbeen the decisive force behind much of the progressof ECOWAS over the last fifteen years. It was thecentral pillar behind the region’s daring militaryinterventions in the MRU in the 1990s, in terms ofpolitical commitment, funding, troop, and materielcontribution. At one stage, the country was reputedto be spending up to $1 million a day to sustain the

6 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

17 "West Africa: Analysis of Social and Economic Data, 1960-2001," OECD-Club du Sahel, 2004.18 Ibid.19 United Nations Development Programme, Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, Human Development Report 2006 (New York: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2006).20 ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism For Conflict

Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Dakar, December 2001, available atwww.comm.ecowas.int/sec/en/protocoles/Protocol%20on%20good-governance-and-democracy-rev-5EN.pdf.

intervention by the ECOWAS Cease FireMonitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia (1990-1997). The country committed enormous financial,military, and diplomatic resources to the seminalLiberian elections in 2005 to ensure their success. Itthreatened would-be spoilers with reprisals andconvinced the eventual loser, George Weah, toaccept the outcome and restrain his followers. Italso led the processes to stabilize the politicalsituation in Guinea-Bissau (2003) and Togo (2005).The country hosts the major institutions ofECOWAS and is by far the largest contributor to theregional body’s budget, accounting for more than60 percent.

The positive influence that Nigeria brings to theregion is, however, often at odds with the social,political, and security situation in the country. Theeighth leading producer of oil in the world, Nigeriaexhibits the worst income disparities in the region,with only 1 percent of the elites controlling 80percent of accrued oil wealth, almost 70 percent ofwhich is held in foreign banks, while close to 80percent of the population live below the UN-designated poverty threshold of $1 per day.21

The April 2007 elections in the country wereinvariably described as the worst in its history. Theruling People’s Democratic Party was accused of apriori targeting and “capturing” almost all the seatsin Nigeria’s thirty-six states before going throughthe motions of an electoral charade that has beendescribed as naked political armed robbery. Theruling elite only relinquished opposition strong-holds that demonstrated a credible resolve to fightback, such as Lagos and Kano. Indeed, over a yearafter the elections, the election tribunals are stillannulling the worst election results one afteranother. By June 2008, ten gubernatorial, twelvesenatorial, eleven House of Representative, andfifteen state assembly results had been overturned.However, by-elections conducted in the aftermathof the annulments have so far returned to power theguilty incumbents, who had had a year to consoli-date their influence. In February 2008, the courtsupheld the results of the presidential election,

narrowly averting a constitutional crisis and apossible security meltdown. Contrasting Nigeria’sregional posture with its internal political economy,a politician described the country as having anuncanny habit of exporting what is in scarce supplyin the country (electricity to Benin and Togo,conflict resolution and democracy to Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Togo), while importing what ithas in abundance (petroleum products)!

The inability over the years of organized civilsociety to make any significant impact in thestruggle for democracy and accountability could beattributed to the fact that there appears to be anumbilical chord linking almost all identifiablesocial forces in the country, in particular theemerging private sector, to the all-powerful oilindustry which, in turn, is jealously controlled bythe state apparatus which, when need be, can turnoff the oxygen that animates such reformist-minded and opposition forces.

In response to the extreme inequality andpolitical illegitimacy, militancy and crime arechallenging the status quo. The restive Niger Deltais seething with anger at the despicable social andenvironmental neglect in the oil-producing regionand has responded by bunkering oil, stockpilingsophisticated weapons, launching widespreadattacks on oil installations, and kidnapping foreignoil workers. Criminal gangs have added spice to thepolitical struggles led by the Movement for theEmancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), theNiger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF), the NigerDelta Volunteer Front (NDVF), and otherestablished politically-motivated groups. There areobvious regional dimensions to the conflict linkedto the pivotal role of Nigeria in regional securitymatters. Reports of copycat oil bunkering in Ghanaand at refineries in Cote d’Ivoire22 are creeping intothe media, and anecdotal evidence has traced someknown militants from the wound-down wars in theMano River basin to the Niger Delta, where they arereported to be teaming up with criminal networks.23

Small arms and light weapons from the conflicts inthe Great Lakes Region, the Sahel, and the MRU

Abdel-Fatau Musah 7

21 See Jerome Afeikhena, "Managing Oil Rent for Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction in Africa," paper presented at the UNU-WIDER JubileeConference, "Thinking Ahead: The Future of Development Economics," Helsinki, June 17-18, 2005, available athttp://website1.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2005-3/conference-2005-3-papers/Jerome.pdf.

22 “ECOWAS, Oil Conflicts, and the Geopolitics of Ungoverned Space of the Gulf of Guinea,” concept paper, CDD and WACSOF Civil Society Consultative Forumon Security in the Gulf States of West Africa, Port Harcourt, June 6-7, 2008.

23 From discussions with Niger Delta militants, Liberian refugees, and a UK Department for International Development (DFID) official in Nigeria.

have found their way to the region to fuelinsurgency and banditry.24 Ethnic and religiousstrife has also become a common feature in mixedcommunities across the country. Radical Islam hasrecently been on the ascendancy in the north withseveral state governments imposing sharia laws.Armed robbery and carjacking have becomerampant and entrenched in the big cities and on thehighways. In response, vigilante groups aremushrooming in the communities while sophisti-cated security gadgets, tracking devices, privatesecurity, and armor-plated vehicles have becomestandard accessories for the rich. With almost two-thirds of the inhabitants of West Africa living inNigeria, should the country implode, the regionwould go up in flames with it.

Nigeria’s internal turmoil has often sent jittersacross the region. For this reason, while thecountry’s military and economic strength confer onit the responsibility to lead the region, it clearlylacks the moral consistency to inspire. However,compelling mitigating factors call for optimism.Tentative steps have been taken in recent years tocombat graft and a few oligarchs have been draggedto the law courts to face corruption charges. On theeconomic front, there are tangible signs that thecountry is diversifying away from the oil industryinto light manufacturing, banking, and servicedelivery. Also, a culture of disclosure about foreigncurrency reserves from oil exports and revenueallocations is gradually taking root in the bodypolitic. Politically, there is growing consensusamong the elites across the country on the need topreserve the territorial integrity of the nation at allcosts. Further, Nigeria boasts relatively strongsecurity and judicial institutions and a robustmedia landscape, which make it more resilient to apossible security meltdown. These circumstancesbode well for regional security.The “Enclave Powerbrokers” andRegional Security

Guinea acts as the ultimate powerbroker and “bigbrother” in the MRU. Besides Nigeria, Guinea wasthe main backbone of the Sierra Leonean govern-ment’s war against Foday Sankoh’s RevolutionaryUnited Front rebellion in the 1990s. The late

President Lansana Conte was instrumental,alongside US intelligence, in cobbling togetherdisparate anti-Taylor elements into the insurgencygroup, Liberians United for Reconciliation andDemocracy (LURD), in 1999 as the arrowhead ofthe coalition that pushed Charles Taylor out ofoffice in 2003.25 Though the country managed toavoid outright war, it suffered greatly during theMRU turbulence through refugee flows and cross-border incursions. For over two years now, Guineahas been embroiled in an internal power struggleamid authoritarian rule, economic meltdown, andgrave human rights violations.

It is against this backdrop that, after more thantwenty-four years of rule, President Conte died onDecember 22, 2008, having succumbed to aprotracted illness. A day after his death, militaryofficers led by Captain Moussa "Dadis" Camarastaged a coup and quickly took control of thecountry, promising to reestablish constitutionalrule by the end of 2010. Both ECOWAS and TheAfrican Union condemned the coup and suspendedGuinea's membership for carrying out an unconsti-tutional change of government in violation of theAU Constitutive Act and the ECOWAS Protocol onDemocracy and Good Governance. ECOWASfurther ordered the junta to restore constitutionalorder within a year. And on January 15, 2009, thecoup leaders established a new military/civiliangovernment in which military officers control thekey ministries.

Beyond its borders, Guinea is locked in a territo-rial imbroglio with its recent ally, Sierra Leone,which is accusing Conakry of annexing part of itsterritory—the Yenga strip—along the states’common border. Since acrimoniously breakingaway from French rule in 1958, Guinea has beenfiercely nationalistic but also integrationist. Thecountry has been a strong and consistent advocateof regional integration but has often staunchlyresisted any “interference” in its internal affairsfrom the outside, including ECOWAS. For thisreason, ECOWAS has struggled to influence theinternal dynamics in Guinea.

Côte d’Ivoire was the main powerbroker inFrancophone West Africa until the outbreak of civil

8 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

24 See Abdel-Fatau Musah, “Small Arms: A Time Bomb under West Africa’s Democratization Process,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no.1 (2002): 239-250, seep. 249.

25 Conversation with a top commander of the erstwhile Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, Accra, July 2007.

war in 2002. The country has a history of influencepeddling in neighboring states, including its role inthe Nigerian civil war of the late 1960s, theoverthrow of Ghana’s president Kwame Nkrumahin 1966, and the invasion of Liberia in 1989. Even atthe height of its own civil war, it still wieldedconsiderable economic influence on theFrancophone countries.

Senegal behaves as the overlord state in theSenegambia, a volatile enclave that has oftenproduced maverick leaders and simmeringtensions, and which incorporates Cape Verde, TheGambia, and Guinea-Bissau. Mauritania has alsooften been classified within this enclave. With therecent troubles in Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal alsoaspired to replace Côte d’Ivoire as the leader ofFrancophone West Africa. A major contributor tointernational and regional peacekeeping efforts,Senegal has often striven to punch above its weightin regional matters. With a population of about 10million and bereft of any economy of scale, thecountry nonetheless put itself forward as a rival tothe continent’s big powers for a permanent seat atthe proposed revamped UN Security Council.Many analysts have accused the country, which waschair of ECOWAS at the outbreak of the Ivoiriancrisis in 2002, of undermining regional efforts tocontain that crisis and have blamed the ill-fatedLinas-Marcoussis Accords, which were mooted bySenegal and France, for prolonging the conflict.The country has waged a war with Mauritania andhas invaded The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in thepast, mainly over control of water access or to propup embattled friendly leaders. The Gambia hasoften accused Senegal of harboring intentions toannex the small country that is almost entirelysurrounded by its bigger neighbor, and givingsanctuary to dissidents opposed to the regime ofGambian president Yaya Jammeh. The twoneighbors have often clashed over access to theGambia River. President Yaya Jammeh has hadrunning battles with his Senegalese counterpart,Abdoulaye Wade, in the last few years, and hasconsistently opposed the wish of Senegal toconstruct a bridge over the river to provide theshortest and most convenient link between thelatter’s southern and northern territories.

The force of personality of individual leaders hasoften been critical in the transformation of securitydynamics in the region. As a case in point,

President Blaise Compaore’s Burkina Faso hasundergone a dramatic image makeover since 2003,transforming itself from perceived mischief-makerinto peacemaker. Accused in many quarters in thepast for supporting rebellions, the country hasrecently been instrumental in stabilizing thepolitical environment in the region mainly throughthe personal touch, diplomacy, and commitment ofits leader, President Compaore. Ironically,Compaore played a major role in uniting thedemocratic opposition to Charles Taylor in thebuild up to the Accra peace process that ended theLiberian civil war in 2003. As chairman ofECOWAS, Compaore is credited with facilitatingthe dialogue between the Togolese government andthe opposition that culminated in the holding of thefirst truly inclusive and democratic parliamentaryelections in more than three decades in 2007. In atwist of fate, he was also to become the main forcebehind the Direct Inter-Ivoirian Dialogue in 2007that effectively ended the civil war in Côte d’Ivoireafter years of fruitless efforts.ECOWAS and the Powerbrokers

It is important to appreciate the limits ofECOWAS’s influence over member states. Itsleverage on Nigeria in particular, and othermedium-sized states nominally at peace, isunderstandably constrained. Though the bodycondemned the April 2007 elections in Nigeria asdeeply flawed, it left the country’s judiciary alone toresolve any disputes. Its success so far in theSenegambia enclave has been limited to attempts towean Guinea-Bissau, the weakest postconflictcountry in the region, off its militarized politics andcriminality, and to push for deep economic andsecurity system reforms. It also successfullybrokered a peace deal between Senegal and TheGambia in the dispute over river access. However,appeals by ECOWAS to Senegal not to fiddle withits Constitution on the eve of the February 2007presidential election fell on deaf ears. The maverickJammeh in The Gambia rules his country with aniron fist, clamping down on the opposition andmuzzling the press. So far, however, he has notfaced any sanctions from ECOWAS, beyondthwarting his efforts to assume the chairmanship ofboth ECOWAS and the AU. In Guinea, the regionalorganization was able to broker a partial power-sharing arrangement between Conte’s regime andthe opposition in 2007 only after sustained labor

Abdel-Fatau Musah 9

and civil society demonstrations had pushed thepresident to the wall. And even then, ECOWAS hadto intervene via a former head of state that had thepresident’s ear. In May 2008, Lansana Kouyate, theconsensus prime minister proposed by the opposi-tion, was fired and no significant progress wasmade in the efforts to end the crisis beforePresident Conte’s death at the end of 2008. In Côted’Ivoire, ECOWAS was able to project its influenceonly after the country’s central authority hadbroken down and anarchy had descended followingthe 2002 crisis.THE EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OFHUMAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY

France and the United Kingdom have held swayover all other powers in West Africa since thecolonial era. They are the region’s main tradingpartners and destinations of its raw materials, aswell as the focal points for the region’s interactionwith the European Union. While France hascontrolled the security environment in the majorityof ECOWAS states, the UK has exerted influence inthe two most populous states, Nigeria and Ghana.Of the two, France has exhibited the more aggres-sive geopolitical posture, controlling businesses andmaintaining military bases in Dakar (Senegal),Bouake (Côte d’Ivoire), and Lomé (Togo). The UK’sinfluence, meanwhile, has been more subtle,combining military training, business deals, and ahuman security posture through UK-basedhumanitarian agencies, such as Oxfam andChristian Aid, to assert its influence and hang on toits interests.

Since 2000, however, the grip of West Africa’straditional overlords has been steadily loosening.France built its West Africa policy around Côted’Ivoire, the economic powerhouse of FrancophoneWest Africa. However, apprehensive of the desire ofthe new nationalistic-minded regime of LaurentGbagbo to diversify foreign economic relations andforge closer ties with other nations, in particular theUS and South Africa, the French made strategicmiscalculations during the Ivoirian civil war (2002-2007). Today, anti-French sentiments permeate thepolitical atmosphere in the country. In Senegal andGuinea, the US is becoming an important player in

military matters. The handling of the strategic portof Dakar and Senegalese aviation have slipped fromFrench hands into those of the United ArabEmirates and Morocco, respectively, while in Niger,the French nuclear energy giant, AREVA, findsitself increasingly embroiled in the Tuareg rebellionalongside Chinese companies. France underNicolas Sarkozy has expressed its determination toreassert its influence in the region, but the presidenthas started his charm offensive in the worst possiblefashion. His speech in Dakar on July 26, 2007, waswidely seen by Africans as condescending, deeplyoffensive, and the wrong way to go aboutreasserting French influence in the continent. In ithe implied that Africans “never really enteredhistory and had neither the capacity for humanendeavor nor the ability to conceptualize progress,and that it was the duty of Europe to help Africacombat disease, hunger, poverty, and war.”26

The European Union

Almost half a century after independence, the EUremains the main trading partner of West Africabut the region accounts for only 1.2 percent ofoverall EU trade. ECOWAS states provide 80, 15,and 10 percent of EU cocoa, rubber, and fishimports, respectively. Exports from the ECOWASregion to the EU market increased from $8.8 billionin 2002 to $14 billion in 2005 but much of this wasdue to the significant increase in the export of oiland mineral products—from 48 percent of EUimports to 69 percent in the same period. Overall,81 percent of ECOWAS imports from the EU arecomposed of manufactured products while rawmaterials, agricultural products, and fish make up90 percent of the region’s exports to the Europeanmarket.27 The widening inequalities in economicrelations with its traditional partner reflect theprincipal reason why African countries rejected theproposed Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)with Europe at the Euro-Africa summit in Lisbonin November 2007.

Outside trade and military training exercisesoften conducted by France and the UK, most EUcountries have structured their interventions inWest Africa around governance and the humansecurity agenda through instruments such as the

10 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

26 See Katy Cisse Wone, Quand Sarkozy insulte l’Afrique a partir de Dakar, Walfadjri, August 2007.27 Mohamed Ibn Chambas, “The Role of the Economic Community of West African States in Achieving the Economic Integration of West Africa,” Lecture at the

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, October 19, 2007.

2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the2007 OECD-DAC Principles for GoodInternational Engagement in Fragile States andSituations, which put emphasis on strengtheninggovernance institutions, and ensuring localownership and proper coordination among donorcountries. In the last five years, single-issue initia-tives by individual EU states targeting majorsecurity threats in Africa have become fashionable.The Tony Blair Africa Commission made signifi-cant inroads into debt cancellation through the G8while the Danish government has established itsown Africa Commission with youth empowermentas its focus.28 The EU maintains close cooperationwith ECOWAS within the framework of theInternational Contact Group (ICG), which coordi-nates joint interventions to stabilize the region’spostconflict countries. Also, the EU makes consid-erable contributions to the ECOWAS budget forinternal capacity building and preventivediplomacy in the region. On another front, theEuropean nations collaborate closely with theUnited States around common concerns in theregion, namely terrorism, illegal migration, and therising influence of China.The United States of America

Threats to US energy security emanating from theacrimonious relations with Venezuela, the crisis inthe Persian Gulf, and the unpredictable nature of aresurgent Russia make Africa a high-value sourceof low-sulfur oil to the US. According to PeterPham, by March 2007 Nigeria had overtaken SaudiArabia as the third largest supplier of oil to the US,delivering 41,707,000 barrels to Saudi Arabia’s38,557,000.29 Oil deliveries from Africa currentlyaccount for more than 20 percent of Americanimports and this figure is projected to reach 25-30percent by 2015, according to conservativeestimates. Overall, oil accounts for more than 70percent of all US imports from Africa. Concernsover energy and maritime security in the Gulf andthe fear of terrorist attacks on American soft targetsin the region define the American strategicobjectives in the region. Its strategy prioritizes

military assistance, encompassing joint militaryand naval exercises, military training, visits to thePentagon by senior African military officers, andnegotiating forward operating bases. It alsoincludes intelligence-gathering activities throughthe embedding of military and intelligence officersin countries and regional organizations, wiretapping, and “free” communication and internetservices.

The capital outlay of the US for “soft” securityassistance under the Africa Growth andOpportunity Act (AGOA) and the MillenniumChallenge Account pales in significance comparedto the human and financial resources devoted tomilitary security, to which the former, in any case,is tied. The cost in lost revenue to the US as a resultof AGOA facilities to Africa from 2004 to 2014 isprojected to be only $368 million.30 Meanwhile, theTrans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership(TSCTP), with a budget of $500 million over fiveyears,31 was set up in June 2005 by the US StateDepartment as a bilateral and multilateral initiativethat combines strategically targeted military anddevelopment assistance to root out and deny safehavens to terrorist organizations in the countries ofnorthwestern Africa.32 TSCTP replaced the $125million Pan-Sahel Initiative, which was set up in2002 and targeted only a few countries in the Sahelregion. It incorporates Algeria, Chad, Mali,Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, andTunisia. Under the initiative, American search-and-destroy troops have been slipping in and out of theregion in pursuit of terrorist leaders. Similararrangements are in place under the AfricanContingency Operations Training and Assistance(ACOTA) with the help of the Military ProfessionalResources, Inc. (MPRI) and DynCorp, twoPentagon-linked private military companies withmixed human rights records in the Balkans,Colombia, and the Niger Delta.

The US Africa Command (Africom) began life asa stand-alone military headquarters responsible forall military operations in Africa33 in October 2007with a start-up budget of $50 million. In public,

Abdel-Fatau Musah 11

28 The Danish Africa Commission was established in April 2008.29 J. Peter Pham, “Securing the New Strategic Gulf,” World Defense Review, June 7, 2007.30 See H.R. 4103, AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, as cleared by Congress on June 24, 2004.31 See Global Security, “Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative,” June 16, 2005, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm.32 Communication with Kane Moussokoro, USAID official in Accra, January 30, 2008.33 Before Africom’s establishment, military operations in Africa were shared by the European, Central, and Pacific Commands.

major African powers, including Nigeria, SouthAfrica, and Libya have expressed concern over anyUS military encirclement and have rejected anyidea of stationing the Command on African soil.President Umaru Yar’Adua’s declaration of supportfor the initiative during his December 2007 visit toWashington provoked consternation and angerwithin the public and military circles in Nigeria.General William Kip Ward, the Commander ofAfricom, insists that the US has no plans to stationthe Command, which will be half-military half-civilian, on African soil, and that it will beoperating from Stuttgart, Germany.34 Nonetheless,small units of the Command, such as reconnais-sance, logisticians, and other forward planners,would be based on the continent.

In any case, the US has already developed contin-gency plans to circumvent any opposition. In 2002,the Pentagon signed an agreement with the smalloil-rich island-nation of São Tomé and Príncipe thatincluded the situating of a naval forward operatingbase on the island. In another move, the US enteredinto a $200 million military agreement with Liberia,$35 million of which is earmarked for building upthe Liberian military largely through DynCorp.Besides Africom, however, even State Department-controlled organizations, including the US Agencyfor International Development (USAID), aresteadily expanding their governance and humani-tarian engagements in Africa to incorporatemilitary-related interventions. USAID is the leadingfinancier and technical support base for thecontinental and regional early warning systems.

There is growing apprehension within Africancivil society that the US African security doctrinerisks undermining fledgling democratizationprocesses in favor of “strong leaders” who canguarantee oil flows and clamp down on perceivedextremists at the expense of human rights. Thecritics argue that wherever and whenever thenarrow strategic interests of the US clash withdemocracy and human rights, the US privilegesstrong and autocratic leadership, as can be seenfrom examples in Pakistan, Egypt, and SaudiArabia. Also, given the fierce competition betweenthe Americans, Chinese, and Russians for energysources and markets, the region could once morebecome an arena of Cold War-style clientelism and

proxy wars. After the events of September 11, 2001, it is

difficult to fault American interest in counter-terrorism. Weak indigenous security capabilities inAfrica also justify the American preoccupation withhard regional security. However, just as Africancountries had no say in the operations of theEuropean and other commands under which the UShitherto projected its military might in Africa, sotoo are they powerless to oppose Africom, which isa solely American security arrangement. At best,African leaders would have to put their act togetherto minimize any negative impacts from the newdevelopment. African opinion would prefer that USassistance go solely toward building up indigenouscapability to carry out the policing rather thantoward American military build-ups along theirshores. More importantly, the US will fail to achieveits strategic objectives if it does not place humansecurity in Africa higher on its agenda than militarysecurity. Examples from the Niger Delta andelsewhere in the region indicate that there can be nomilitary solution to problems that are rooted in badgovernance and exclusion. Military assistance willcontinue to contain only the effects of regionalinsecurity until the US reinforces its preoccupationwith interventions that deliver a comprehensiveregional package to underpin infrastructuredevelopment, trade access, political and corporategovernance, and to combat chronic youthunemployment and the Malaria and HIV/AIDSpandemics. China and Other Newcomers

China has emerged as the second largest consumerof world energy and a powerful industrial giant.Motivated by an insatiable appetite for new energyand raw material sources as well as the search fornew markets, the country has made a comeback tothe African scene over the last decade. The reemer-gence of China as a development partner hasgenerally been welcomed by policymakers, who areincreasingly fed up with the West’s democracylectures and what they see as the “give-with-the-right-take-with-the-left” development policies.

In China, many African leaders see a partner thatis investing in areas that are key to rapid industrial-ization and competitiveness in the world market—

12 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

34 General W.K. Ward, Speech at the ECOWAS Strategic Level Seminar organized by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Bamako, Mali, February 24-29, 2008.

infrastructure development, market access, and thecancellation of debt. Since 2002, China has beensystematically increasing its development assistanceto Africa, from $1.8 billion that year to $10 billionpledged at the Sino-African summit in Beijing in2006. Additionally, the country has written off $1.3billion of African state debts, and has opened a $24billion credit facility to Africa (expected to rise to$100 billion by 2010) through the China-AfricaDevelopment Fund, which is managed by ChinaDevelopment Bank. The bank has already advanceda soft loan of $8.5 billion to the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, seen by experts as thepotential motor of African industrialization, forinfrastructure development.35

In West Africa, China has in principle agreed tofund the construction of a regional railway networkand other capital-intensive infrastructure venturesidentified by the region. Beijing is not averse totechnology transfer and is actively engaging in themanufacturing, construction, and service sectors(hotels, stadiums, dams, and other public facilities)in several West African states. In Nigeria, China hasalready struck a deal to fund a $3.46 billionhydropower project in Mambilla and a country-wide railway network in exchange for oil and gasexploration rights.36 Similar deals are underway inGhana (for the construction of the Bui Dam), SierraLeone, Mali, and many other states.

India’s new Africa policy mimics the Chinesemodel while Russia is replacing its past model(weighted heavily in favor of military cooperation)with one based on business, led by its energyindustry. Russia’s gas giant, Gazprom, has indicatedits ambition to “upstage” the West, China, and Indiain Nigeria by revamping Nigeria’s underperforminggas sector and buying out Western contracts inexchange for wide-ranging exploration rights.China, Russia, and India fit into the new thinkingabout the need to raise horizontal south-southcooperation to a higher level, thinking that has alsohelped countries such as Brazil, the United ArabEmirates, South Africa, Morocco, and Nigeriabecome big players in the aviation, banking, retail,entertainment, and telecommunications sectors.

From the security point of view, there areconcerns over China’s policy of flooding the region,already suffering from mass youth unemployment,with cheap labor, much of it reportedly drawn fromits prisons; rough estimates put the influx ofChinese migrants into Africa in the last five years at1 million. Other concerns include the country’spoor human rights and democracy record, itscynical exploitation of the “political noninterfer-ence” and “sovereignty” arguments by professing toseparate business from politics, and the export oflow quality, and at times, unethical products to thesubcontinent, including dangerous pesticides andconventional weapons. However, so long as thetraditional powers do not refocus developmentassistance into priority areas that African countrieshave identified to enhance their competitiveness inthe world market, no amount of scaremongeringwill deter African countries from what theyperceive as win-win relations with China and otheremerging powers. The danger, as far as Africa isconcerned, lies in the growing rivalry between theWest, China, and Russia, which may foist a newCold War on the continent.

In comparative terms, therefore, West Africa hasmade appreciable progress over the last fifteen yearswith regard to political governance and economicgrowth. However, weak state and civil institutions,poor leadership, and bad social policies, havecombined to stunt development and entrenchpoverty. The desire by the ruling elites to cling on topower, excruciating poverty and the pressures onland and other scarce resources make the popula-tions vulnerable to manipulation along ethnic,religious, and citizenship lines. The unfoldingyouth crisis constitutes a time-bomb which, if notdefused sooner, could reignite acute regionalinsecurity. West Africa’s rich natural endowmentsmake it a high-value asset in the strategic calcula-tions of regional and world powers. The promise ofinward investment flows that this situation holdswill be undermined if proactive steps are not takento fight greed and corruption on the one hand, andto prevent the transformation of the region into anarena for proxy wars. It is also to be observed that

Abdel-Fatau Musah 13

35 See United Nations, "Presentation to the Roundtable on Shifting Donor Paradigms," November 16, 2006, available atwww.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/Brussels_EU%20Development%20Days.pdf; Jacques deLisle, "Into Africa: China's Quest for Resources and Influence," February2007, available at www.fpri.org/enotes/200702.delisle.intoafricachinasquest.html; and AFP, "China Key to DRC Reconstruction," Praag.co.za, December 8, 2007,available at http://praag.co.za/content/view/1215/107/.

36 BusinessDay 6, no. 257, December 27, 2007.

the region lacks credible deterrent and emergencypreparedness capabilities at a time when it is mostvulnerable to external destabilization and climaticshocks, thus making it increasingly susceptible toterrorist incursions, irregular migration, foodinsecurity, and environmental emergencies.

Responding to SecurityChallengesThe ability to project legitimate power, preserveterritorial integrity, and assure the welfare of thepeople is the cornerstone of any sovereign state, andthe UN rightly places primary responsibility forpeace and security with member states. In thedeveloping world of incomplete state formation,weak institutions, and competing demandsbetween regime and human security, the state hasoften failed in this cardinal responsibility.Collective responsibility by diverse actors has oftenbeen called upon either to complement nationalefforts or to defend and promote human andregional security. In this regard civil society andhumanitarian agencies, as well as regional andinternational organizations, play critical roles.CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Much of the success in the incremental transitiontoward open societies and the rule of law in theECOWAS region can be attributed to the pivotalrole being played by civil society. Civil societygroups have been at the forefront of the relentlessstruggles against dictatorship and bad governancein West Africa over the years and continue to leadthe processes to strengthen human security.

While the media-savvy pro-democracy andhuman rights organizations are more likely tocapture the headlines, it is the community groups,women’s associations, and traditional and faith-based groups who have made a real impact onconflict management and human security. Forexample, the Mano River Women’s Peace Networkand the traditional and religious communities wereinstrumental in nudging warlords to the nego-tiating table and mitigating the effects of infrastruc-ture collapse and displacements in the conflicts inthe region. Likewise, the promotion of conflict-sensitive development is led by local developmentaladvocacy groups. Organizations grouped under theWest African Action Network on Small Arms(WAANSA) are at the forefront of the campaign for

practical disarmament; in the campaign for fairtrade and against environmental degradation, localgroups have taken the fight to the rich nations andthe extractive companies, often in conjunction withinternational advocacy groups. Today, civil societygroups do not only continue to mobilize againstrepression, as in Guinea and The Gambia, but theyare also actively engaged in the efforts to promotedialogue in Niger, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, andTogo. They also organize capacity-buildingworkshops for election administration andmonitoring bodies, and oversee the conduct ofelections across the region.

Often, however, the impact of civil society hasbeen hampered by the lack of a sustainable resourcebase, weak coordination capacity, as well as apropensity for spontaneity and susceptibility tocooptation. ECOWAS has sought to address someof the challenges by facilitating the emergence of acoordinating structure for the disparate civil societygroups in the region. As a consequence, the WestAfrican Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) has beenset up with the objective of facilitating capacityenhancement and networking among CSOs,popularizing ECOWAS initiatives in member statesand mobilizing critical civil society and researchinputs across the region to strengthen andaccompany regional integration efforts. ECOWAShas also cultivated partnerships with the privatesector to support work in the energy, transport,banking, and youth empowerment sectors. Theprivate sector is the main driving force behindECOWAS flagship infrastructure projects,including the $700 million West African GasPipeline project designed to pump cheap and cleangas from Escravos in the Niger Delta across theregion from 2008 and the setting up of the WestAfrican shipping company, Ecomarine.THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

Among Africa’s regional economic communities,the Economic Community of West African States isa leader. Arguably, it demonstrates the greatestpolitical will to transform a regional group of statesinto a “security community” on the continent.Recent indications of this include the decisiveinterventions to end wars in the MRU, theevolution of the ECOWAS Standby Force, and theincreasing supranational role of ECOWAS insetting regional norms of behavior and negotiating

14 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

deals with external partners on behalf of the region. ECOWAS emerged in 1975 with regional

economic integration and collective bargaining asits terms of reference. However, the institution isgradually transforming the region into a people-oriented security community. The evolving conflictdynamics in West Africa in the immediateaftermath of the Cold War convinced its leaders torethink the interrelationship between security anddevelopment and to raise security issues to thesame status as the development agenda. ECOWASaccordingly enacted new statutes to reflect the newrealities, adopting the Declaration of PoliticalPrinciples on freedom, people’s rights, anddemocratization in July 1991. Two years later, theECOWAS treaty was revised to confer supranation-ality on the regional body. In 1999, it adopted theProtocol Relating to the Mechanism for ConflictPrevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping,and Security, followed closely by the SupplementaryProtocol on Democracy and Good Governance in2001.37 Together, these legal instruments weredesigned to provide a comprehensive normativeframework for confronting the new threats tohuman and regional security on a more permanentand predictable basis.

ECOWAS is better known for its record inregional security matters, especially its peaceenforcement and peacekeeping exploits. Threefactors facilitated the relatively successfulECOMOG interventions: the presence of a regionalhegemon (Nigeria) ready to commit resources andtroops to the cause; the high level of political will;and the fact that several ECOWAS member states,including Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, had longbeen associated with international peacekeepingoperations. In the process, ECOWAS has developeda comparative advantage in the area of conflictmanagement and has become a model for thecontinent.

From an ad hoc institutional framework in 1990,ECOMOG is in the process of being transformedinto a multipurpose composite standby brigade, theECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), composed ofmilitary and civilian units from member stateswithin the framework of the African Standby Force

arrangement. When ready in 2009, the ESF will beon standby for observation and monitoringmissions, and preventive and humanitarian deploy-ment in addition to ECOMOG’s traditional peaceenforcement and peacekeeping assignments withinand outside the region. A noted weakness in theregion’s peace support operations is the absence of aregional humanitarian intervention capability.Neither ECOWAS nor the region’s nongovern-mental organizations possess the capacity topredict, avert, or even mitigate the effects of naturaldisasters that could result in social and politicalupheaval. Relief activities have become theexclusive preserve of the UN High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR) and foreign humanitarianagencies. To redress this imbalance, ECOWAS hastaken steps within its Emergency Response Teamand the ESF to promote effective humanitariancrisis prevention and preparedness within theregion and to create a bridge between relief andmedium-term rehabilitation and reconstructionefforts in postconflict and disaster settings.

Also learning from the shortcomings of pastECOMOG interventions with regard to humanrights, humanitarian matters, and logistics backup,ECOWAS has prioritized the development of acivilian component to complement the militaryelement of ESF. Thus, future interventions will seethe deployment of police, engineers, medicalpersonnel, social workers, and political and legalofficers alongside the military. It is also activelydeveloping logistics and humanitarian depots tostock equipment and relief supplies to supporteffective deployment. Three regional centers ofexcellence have been adopted by ECOWAS to facili-tate the rapid build up and professionalization ofthe ESF in the areas of strategic planning,operational and tactical training respectively, withsupport from the US, UK, France, and the Europe-based Multinational Standby High ReadinessBrigade (SHIRBRIG).38 Indeed, ECOWAS is well-placed to be the first regional economic communityto deliver its brigade toward the creation of thecontinental standby force; currently, the ESF servesas the lead institution in the development ofstandard operating procedures (SOPs) for the

Abdel-Fatau Musah 15

37 ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Lomé, December 10, 1999, available atwww.ecowas.int; ECOWAS, Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, Dakar, December 2001.

38 The centers are the National Defense College in Abuja, Nigeria, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana, and the Ecole deMaintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye in Bamako, Mali.

continental standby force.Currently, ECOWAS is perfecting its conflict-

prevention capabilities, particularly in the areas ofearly warning and preventive diplomacy. It operatesan early warning system composed of four zonalbureaus for early warning based in the field and asituation room and coordinating department atheadquarters. The bureaus cooperate closely withmember states and civil society groups in thegathering and processing of conflict data from thefield. The situation room furnishes incident andtrend reports on peace and security, as well as real-time preventive response options, to ECOWASpolicymakers to facilitate early interventions toavert or defuse situations of acute tensions. It alsocooperates closely with the African Union in thedevelopment of the continental early warningsystem. So far, however, the contribution of thesystem to ECOWAS’s response capability has beenminimal for various reasons. First, the system reliesheavily on open-source information, which often isdated before action can be taken. It is thereforemore useful for generating responses to short- tomedium-term human security challenges. Second,it has yet to secure effective cooperation fromnational intelligence agencies and skepticalmember states concerned with regime security.

Often, ECOWAS has deployed special mediatorsand members of its Council of the Wise (a group ofeminent personalities, including former heads ofstate, ministers, diplomats, and other highachievers) in fact-finding, facilitation, mediation,and negotiation missions in areas of potentialconflict. The effective application of traditionalalternative dispute resolution on the ground by theCouncil and the information it feeds back to theECOWAS hierarchy have been critical in avertingor defusing potential flashpoints across the region.The ECOWAS heads of state also apply methodssuch as peer influence, peer pressure, andconsensus building to resolve lingering crises,behind the scenes and often to good effect. Theefforts of the Council and special mediators werecritical in ensuring peaceful outcomes in sensitiveelections, in particular the presidential election inLiberia (2005) and the 2007 presidential election

that resulted in regime change in Sierra Leone; theyare also currently being applied to facilitatedialogue in the ongoing crises in Guinea-Bissau,Guinea, Togo, and Niger. Integration with Emphasis on Prevention

Since January 2007, the ECOWAS Secretariat hasbeen transformed into a commission with a visionto speed up the integration process by facilitatinggreater collective responses to human securitychallenges, including poverty reduction, infrastruc-ture development, implementation of commonagricultural, environmental, and water policies, aswell as trade negotiations with external partnersand the consolidation of democracy and regionalpeace and security.39

Underpinning the new vision is the organization’sdetermination to transform the region from an“ECOWAS of States” into an “ECOWAS of thePeoples” by enhancing free movement, forging acommon community citizenship, and progressivelyeliminating other barriers to integration. Indeed,West Africa is the only region in Africa toguarantee visa-free movement and settlementacross borders. Its macroeconomic policy conver-gence program aims to establish a singlecurrency—the eco—by 2010. This will lay thefoundation for a single-currency zone and marketin West Africa, boost intraregional trade, andstrengthen the region’s bargaining power in relationto external blocs.

In line with its new strategic vision with emphasison prevention, ECOWAS adopted a regionalhuman security strategy document, the ECOWASConflict Prevention Framework,40 in January 2008to serve as an operational tool to guide cooperationwith member states, civil society, and externalpartners to meet the challenges of cross-bordercrime, arms proliferation, the youth crisis, women’smarginalization, as well as political, security, andnatural resource governance. It has also set up aSecurity Unit to backstop cross-border cooperationamong security agencies to combat moneylaundering, trafficking in arms and drugs, as well asterrorism and dumping. To this end, the organiza-tion has brought the regional security body, the

16 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

39 These are the five medium-term priority areas under the new ECOWAS vision.40 See ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08, January 26, 2008, available at www.wacsi.org/wacseries/785vc7691r2u3h68594OP-

ED.pdf.

West African Police Chiefs Committee(WAPCCO), under its wing with support from theUN system and INTERPOL. Besides fightingcrime, the initiative seeks to promote regionalcitizenship and harmony among cross-bordercommunities through the promotion of modelborder communities, civil-military relations, andcommunity policing.

Chronic underfunding has been the bane of theAfrican Union and the regional economiccommunities as they strive to meet the challengesof human and regional security. Often, memberstates are either reluctant or unable to make theirfinancial contributions. ECOWAS has by and largesucceeded in overcoming this handicap by devisingthe innovative system of community levy, whereby0.5 percent of taxes levied by member states on allimports entering the Community is automaticallycredited to the institution. The levy generatesalmost 80 percent of ECOWAS’s annual operationalbudget, with external funding making up the rest.Also, the institution has set up the ECOWAS PeaceFund to strengthen its regular and unforeseenpeace support operations, with contributions fromthe community levy, the African DevelopmentBank, and development partners. This fund iscomplemented by a pool fund that is supported bydevelopment partners and intended for internalcapacity building.

Alongside the achievements and promises,however, ECOWAS has been hampered in itsefforts to promote human security by its internalcapacity deficit, the exigencies of regional security,and lingering divisions in the region. Perhaps moresignificantly, the clash between the supranationalityof ECOWAS and the religiously defendedsovereignty of member states hampers the ability ofECOWAS to oblige member states, in particular theregional and enclave powerbrokers, to abide byregional norms and standards beyond behind-the-scenes pleas.

This situation may only change with sustainedcivil society advocacy and pressure. Civil societycan contribute immensely to the transformation ofthe region into an ECOWAS of the Peoples byinterrogating and transforming the regionaldecision-making processes and modes of represen-tation at the regional level, such as at theCommunity Parliament. Left on their own, the

heads of state would not be in a hurry to commitpolitical suicide by surrendering their control oversuch processes.

Similarly, lingering tensions betweenFrancophone West Africa and the Anglophonemember states is hampering the drive to integrationand collective decision making, which is based onconsensus. Since the end of the Cold War, theregion has witnessed an increasing convergence ofthe Francophone Union économique et monétaireouest africaine (UEMOA) and ECOWAS. In 2000,UEMOA agreed to concentrate on economicmatters and to collapse its peace and securitymechanism under the ECOWAS mechanism.ECOWAS and UEMOA cooperate closely in theareas of regional monetary convergence, infrastruc-ture, and agriculture, and have formulated acommon regional position in the ongoing EPAnegotiations with the EU. THE AFRICAN UNION

ECOWAS is recognized as a building block for theAfrican Union. It cooperates with the continentalbody in several areas, not least in the developmentof the continental early warning system and theAfrican Standby Force. Indeed, the two most recentformer AU chief executives were from West Africa.All the major ECOWAS peace initiatives have beenmade in concert with the AU and UN. Despite itsintentions, however, the continental body hasremained relatively peripheral to the region’s peaceand security efforts for a number of reasons. First,the spillover effects of conflicts and the need forearly response compel regional organizations totake ownership of peace and security processes andlead from the front. Second, the AU is evolving atthe same pace as, if not slower than, the regionaleconomic communities (RECs), such as ECOWAS.In several areas, the RECs have actually set the pacein peace and security matters. Thus, thoughECOWAS is a subsidiary to the AU, its comparativeadvantage in West Africa and proactive stance onconflicts, as well as its internal organization andinstitution-building capacity, are often ahead ofsimilar processes within the AU.

The AU’s desire to set the continental agendaoften runs into internal limitations, resulting inpiecemeal and often uncoordinated interventions.The AU often sends token observers, independentof ECOWAS, to elections in the region without any

Abdel-Fatau Musah 17

coordination between the two institutions, andhigh-level meetings between the AU and the RECsare rare. Indisputably, states’ commitment to theirRECs appears much stronger than to the AU as theyidentify more intimately with local concerns. Giventhe circumstances and its internal capacity deficit,the AU will struggle to exercise oversight ofregional processes, including the development ofthe regional standby arrangements.

In frantic efforts to reverse this trend, initiativesare currently being rushed to inject a new sense ofpurpose and urgency into AU-REC relations. At theAU Summit in Accra in November 2007, Africanleaders called for regular consultations and greatercooperation between the AU and the RECs at thehighest level; they also recommended the exchangeof liaison officers between them. Building on thisinitiative, the RECs and AU signed a comprehen-sive memorandum of understanding at the January2008 Summit in Addis Ababa to enhance andstreamline their cooperation on the implementa-tion of the continent’s peace and security agenda.The memorandum is underpinned by the princi-ples of subsidiarity, complementarity, and compar-ative advantage. Thus, while recognizing theprimary responsibility of the AU in the mainte-nance and promotion of peace, security, andstability in Africa, the memorandum also acknowl-edges the role and responsibility of RECs in thesedomains in their respective regions of mandate. THE UNITED NATIONS

In contrast to the current cooperation betweenECOWAS and the AU, relations between ECOWASand the UN in the maintenance of regional securityhave been more consistent and productive. Thisowes much to the comparative advantages that thetwo bodies bring to the table. ECOWAS hasdemonstrated a remarkable capacity to intervenequickly in violent conflicts. On the other hand, theUN possesses greater expertise and experience insustainable peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,and peacebuilding; it also commands greaterresources. Thus, ECOMOG interventions in WestAfrica often created the necessary bridgehead forthe subsequent deployment of larger UNpeacekeeping and international humanitarianmissions through the rehatting of troops.

Progress in human security cooperation betweenthe two institutions has, however, been patchy overthe last few years. The UN put Sierra Leone on the

agenda of the newly established PeacebuildingCommission, and Guinea-Bissau is soon to beconsidered. However, the process of identifyingpriorities and developing a program of action hasnot been inclusive enough. ECOWAS, a keystakeholder in the region’s peace processes, is notadequately involved, nor are meaningful andinclusive consultations held with stakeholderswithin the beneficiary countries. Often, thedevelopment of a blueprint for internationalassistance is left in the hands of the ruling govern-ment which, in an immediate postconflict situation,is often partisan and epitomizes the enduringdivisions within the community. The UNSecretary-General appointed a special representa-tive to West Africa and set up the UN Office forWest Africa (UNOWA) in Dakar in 2002 for thepurposes of coordinating the efforts of UN agenciesin the region to support ECOWAS interventions,but there has not been any significant coordinationor joint action of note. Joint cross-border andpeacebuilding initiatives agreed between the UNand ECOWAS over the past three years have stalled.This situation owes more to the frequent changes inpersonnel at UNOWA and the aggressive competi-tion for resources and territory among the variousagencies within the UN system than to a lack ofdesire to cooperate. Since the beginning of 2008,however, UNOWA-ECOWAS cooperation appearsto be steadily growing with the appointment of SaidDjinnit, who comes with vast experience in conflictmanagement at the AU level, as the new SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General inFebruary 2008.

Since 1994, the UN has held a series of high-levelmeetings with regional organizations on coopera-tion to maintain international peace and security.Security Council Resolution 1631 of October 17,2005, requested the Secretary-General submit areport on the opportunities and challenges of thecooperation between the UN and regional organi-zations. The high-level meetings have identifiedseveral axes of cooperative interventions in peaceand security, and the requisite capacity-buildingrequirements for the regional organizations in theseefforts. Considering the capacity discrepanciesbetween the AU and the RECs touched on earlier,the challenge facing the UN is to devise an effectivethree-way cooperative arrangement with the AUand RECs, instead of a top-down approach via theAU, to avoid bureaucratic delays and ensure better

18 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

efficiency of delivery and complementarity ofagendas.

The Future of Human andRegional Security in West AfricaPredicting the future of human and regionalsecurity in West Africa is fraught with risks.Impressed by the relative progress that the regionhas made in the areas of economic growth,democracy, and human rights, local and interna-tional observers are urging countries to stay thecourse. More cautious critics applaud the advancesbut urge greater efforts to consolidate the gains.The pessimists are not convinced about the securitysituation and predict a new cycle of doom andgloom. The realistic outlook lies somewherebetween these prognoses.STAYING THE COURSE

There is no denying the fact that West Africa hasmade steady progress in the last fifteen yearscompared to the “lost decades” (1970-1990) whenall human development indicators pointeddownward. Not only has the region, led byECOWAS, succeeded in stabilizing the conflictsituation, but it has also seen steady gains in thepromotion of democracy and human rights. Signsof sound economic management are also graduallyemerging: the region has enjoyed steady annualgrowth of 5-7 percent, even though the people haveyet to see the dividends in their daily life. Civilsociety has become more proactive in thepromotion of human security. ECOWAS is growingin sophistication and expertise in matters relatingto regional security and it is putting mechanisms inplace to deal with challenges in a more sustainableand predictable manner. Above all, it enjoys theconfidence and support of the population, regionalleaders, and external partners. Even though insecu-rity persists in several areas, ECOWAS and itsmember states appear capable of containing it.

Given this “normal” scenario, the optimistswould argue that “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” andthat the gradualist, incremental approach wouldeventually yield sustainable human and regionalsecurity. It is however obvious from earlier analysesthat demographic trends (the youth crisis) and foodinsecurity are fast outstripping economic growth.

Threats are building up within the region and alongits external borders, and the unpredictable environ-mental challenges have to be factored in as well.Consequently, the region will continue to react toevents rather than preempt them. To even ensurethis posture of containment, West Africa will needto deepen democratization. While a number ofleaders continue to exhibit a tendency towardauthoritarianism, they lack authority and legiti-macy. Civil society will have to increase its vigilanceto prevent the vulgarization and derailment ofdemocracy by democratically elected leaders.ECOWAS and member states will have to instillpublic discipline and a culture of maintenance inthe conscience of the people. Beyond that, theregion will need to maintain a high tempo ofeconomic growth and institute deliberate policies toencourage the emergence and consolidation of anautonomous entrepreneurial class.

The raw-material-based economies of the region,so susceptible to the vagaries of the global market,make such a scenario improbable. West Africaalready finds itself at the bottom of the globalhuman development league table. As it were, theviability of the cautious approach would continueto rely heavily on external assistance directed atsupplementing national budgets, internal capacitybuilding, and the social sector; and this is notguaranteed. This “do-nothing-radical” approach is,therefore, not sustainable in the long run, andsticking to it would eventually lead to a doom-and-gloom scenario.WORST CASE: DOOM AND GLOOM

The collapse of fledgling internal democracy anddevelopment projects, negative external pressureson the fragile economies, resurgence of civil wars,and the criminalization of politics in a number ofcountries could spell doom for West Africa withinthe next fifteen years. An environmental or externalshock, such as a collapse of world markets, massiveflooding, or drought, could well hasten this doom-and-gloom scenario. Internally, the region couldfail to transform its rich natural and humanendowments into capital for sustainable foodsecurity and the expansion of economic and socialinfrastructure due to the persistent weakness ofinstitutions, a return to bad governance, andworsening corruption. This could result inincreased poverty and youth desperation. Underthese conditions, the narcotics and arms problems

Abdel-Fatau Musah 19

could spiral out of control, sound the death knell ofthe fledgling democracy project in the region, andherald the return of the warlords, shady business,criminalized politics, and wars of attrition.

The worsening global financial environment, ifnot halted, would dry up inward investment andremittances from the diaspora, worsen capitalflight, and add an exacerbating influence on thedownward peace and security spiral. Should thefragile economies in the region lose their desperatefight for survival against the established markets,the scene could be set for the erosion of the modestgains made in the areas of human rights,democracy, and development.

West Africa’s survival as an integrated securitycommunity will be closely tied to developments inNigeria. Consequently, Nigeria’s internal politicaldynamics, particularly the fate of democracy andtrends in the Niger Delta, would serve as thebarometer for regional security. Besides Nigeria,the collapse of the peace processes in the MRU andCôte d’Ivoire, and worsening conditions in theSenegambia enclave, the Sahel-Sahara divide, or theGulf of Guinea could have a catalytic effect on aregional security meltdown. Without propermanagement, the region could find itself caughtbetween the anvil of home grown crises andenvironmental threats on the one hand, and thehammer of external power struggles played out onits soil on the other. BEST CASE: EL DORADO

On the brighter side, the eternal optimist couldimagine the West African region transformed intoan ideal community, self-governing and free fromfear and want, within the next quarter- to half-century. As the ECOWAS mission statement puts it,this golden scenario would be “a borderless regionand integral part of the continental space in whichthe peoples have access to and are able to harness itsenormous resources through the creation ofopportunities for sustainable production anddevelopment, and in which they transact businessand live in dignity and peace under the rule of lawand good governance.”41

Buoyed by consensus among the elites ongovernance and the imperative of deeper regional

integration in which regional institutions acquiregreater supranationality, El Dorado would be adisciplined, self-governing, and self-regulatingsociety in which democracy would become routinenationally and at the local level, and where discrim-ination and marginalization would disappear. Theregion, just like the rest of the continent, wouldboast capable parliaments, independent andconscientious judiciaries, and security agencies thatare well equipped and guided by democraticcontrol and human-rights principles. Thesedemocratic institutions would control corruption,efficiently police society, and enjoy the confidenceof the populace.

Volatile internal enclaves would have beenpacified through permanent dialogue to resolvegrievances, accountable and equitable naturalresource management, and the availability ofsustainable social amenities and job opportunities.The society would flourish within secure externalborders achieved through effective cross-bordercooperation with external neighbors and internalpolicing, it would be equipped with an efficientcrisis-and-disaster prevention-and-managementcapability.

ECOWAS in this scenario would be a valuablepartner within the international community, and adependable contributor to global peace andsecurity. In the economic sphere, the era of raw-material production would be replaced by a healthymix of sustainable food production and agro-basedindustries. Trade with external partners would bebased on fairness and mutually beneficial transac-tions.

Conclusion: A Strategy forSustainable Human andRegional SecurityWest Africa faces daunting security challenges and,against the backdrop of the region’s weak internalcapacities and its peripheral status in the globalmarket, the prognosis for the state of human andregional security over the next two decades appearsgrim. However, through properly coordinated andcalibrated measures aimed at incrementallystrengthening democratic institutions, expanding

20 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

41 ECOWAS Strategic Vision 2020 as adopted by the ECOWAS Summit, Abuja, June 2008. For information on "ECOWAS Vision 2020," seewww.ecowasvision2020.org.

infrastructure, and creatively transforming themyriad of other negative indicators enumerated inthis paper, the security environment could witnesssignificant improvement in the coming years.

Success in these endeavors will be predicated onthe effective division of labor and greater coordina-tion, cooperation, and sensitivity among the keystakeholders in the evolving security architecture,namely member states, civil society, ECOWAS, theprivate sector, development partners, the AU, andthe UN. As frontline implementation agencies,member states bear principal responsibility forpeace and security. Together with civil society theymust ensure the domestication and implementationof regional norms and standards aimed at strength-ening collective peace and security. ECOWAS, forits part, has a responsibility to promulgateminimum regional norms, standards, and policieswith regard to key conflict-inducing issues,including natural resource exploitation, andpolitical and security governance. It should alsofacilitate the internalization of such standards andmonitor compliance within member states.

A systematic approach to consolidation shouldbegin by strengthening institutions at regional,national, and local levels, and promoting respon-sible leadership among political aspirants, theyouth, and women. To achieve this goal, ECOWASand its member states must execute a paradigmshift in their security posture, moving from areactive to a preventive mode by paying greaterattention to the “soft” (developmental) aspects ofhuman security and building capacities to confrontthe current and emerging threats to regionalsecurity—extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking,and environmental degradation. AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Policies and practices at the national level exertconsiderable influences on human and regionalsecurity. Consequently, attention must be focusedon building the capacities of national institutions(including at the local government and communitylevels) to take ownership of the design, implemen-tation, and monitoring of initiatives in the strategicareas of natural resource governance, politicalgovernance, youth empowerment, and infrastruc-ture development. Against the backdrop of thelimited resources at the disposal of governments,the role of the private sector assumes even greaterimportance for development. Encouraging local

entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sectorthrough tax breaks, grooming, and the adoption offorward-looking macroeconomic policies is a sureway of promoting infrastructure development andjob creation. In addition, the private sector anddevelopment partners should fund capital-intensiveventures in infrastructure, technology transfer, andyouth employment.

The costs of electoral administration andcampaigns in these winner-takes-all processes areoften obscene and at variance with the abjecteconomic conditions of the countries; thisundermines the postelection development agenda.Caps on these expenditures must be written intolaw and strictly implemented. Civil society institu-tions and the media must be strengthened toenhance their watchdog role. These measures, inaddition to the emergence of common platformsthat offer avenues for dialogue and the peacefulresolution of election-related disputes, wouldtransform electoral processes into routine episodesin the democratization process instead of theperiods of tension and violence that they havebecome. The capacities of national parliamentsneed to be enhanced in several areas, including inbasic computer literacy, parliamentary procedures,and links with constituencies. Above all, nationallegislatures should concentrate on the developmentagendas that flow from regional priorities andwhich promote national cohesion.

Political parties constitute the basic organiza-tional unit in the democratic process and, as such,must constitute the object of targeted policyinterventions at the regional and national levels.There exists the need to push for the rationalizationand strengthening of political parties which, withthe independent electoral management bodies, civilsociety, and the media, represent the levers thatmust further pry open the democratic space byensuring adherence to the principles of the separa-tion of powers, democratic control of the securityservices, the independence of the judiciary, the ruleof law, and popular participation. AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

The region’s economic salvation, however, lies inthe ability of ECOWAS to follow through on itsmission by ensuring the emergence of a commonmarket and integrated citizenry. This will need toentail a massive commitment to infrastructuredevelopment with the collaboration of the private

Abdel-Fatau Musah 21

sector, and the prioritization of the production andmanufacturing sectors, particularly the agro-basedindustries.

ECOWAS should also lead in the design andfacilitation of programs for regional transport,energy, and telecommunication networks. Further,the institution should develop minimum regionalstandards and regulatory frameworks to meet thechallenges of natural resource governance,including the management of liquid and solidminerals, the scramble for land and water, and theaccompanying ethnic and religious tensions. Itshould also lead the efforts to build up the region’spolitical, intelligence, and military capabilities toconfront the menace posed by the evolvingscramble for energy resources and markets in theGulf of Guinea, transnational and cross-bordercrime, as well as terrorism and increasing localmilitancy. Above all, urgent action needs to betaken to strengthen regional capacities to antici-pate, prevent, and combat environmental disastersand killer diseases, and mitigate their effects.

A common factor underlying these challenges isthe worsening youth crisis and gender inequality,which call for a comprehensive regional andnational agenda that prioritizes the expansion ofsocial infrastructure, including schools, health, andother social amenities to underpin youth empower-ment, employment opportunities, and affirmativeaction. Discourse within the region and withdevelopment partners about migration should notbe focused mainly on halting so-called illegalmigration, but conceptualized within theframework of the development agenda. Thus,Europe and America should be willing to compen-sate the region for the loss of medical professionalsand engineers, who are often enticed by attractivepackages to migrate, after huge sums have beenspent in West Africa to train them at a time whenpandemics like malaria, river blindness, andHIV/AIDS are ravaging the region.A MULTISTAKEHOLDER COMPACT FORREGIONAL SECURITY

A sustainable development agenda cannot beachieved if concomitant steps are not taken toaddress the direct and intermediate regionalsecurity challenges, including securing externalborders against terrorist incursions, combatingdrug trafficking and related cross-border crime,

and enhancing regional preparedness againstnatural disasters and humanitarian crises.Emphasis must be put on building up local capaci-ties in the security sector. The security forces andservices in the region are grossly underfunded. Thefailure of the military, border, and custom officialsto control trafficking and other crimes is not due somuch to a lack of ability as to a lack of suitableequipment and motivation. External partners inmilitary cooperation must take on board the factthat the sustainability of any strategy designed tosecure the region in the long term must be based onstrengthening the capacities of the ESF and nationalsecurity agencies to enable them to take the lead insecurity matters. Similarly, UN agencies operatingin the region, particularly UNHCR and the Officefor the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,would be promoting sustainable human security ifthey focused more on building local capacitiesrather than simply being delivery agencies.

Successfully containing the security challengesemanating from the Sahel-Sahara belt and the Gulfof Guinea is beyond the capacities of individualmember states and ECOWAS. Besides the efforts ofmember states sharing the Sahel-Sahara belt, thecooperation of ECOWAS, the Maghreb Union, andthe Intergovernmental Agency for Development(IGAD) will be needed in any meaningful initia-tives designed to eliminate the many threats thathave been identified. The AU would play a mostuseful role under such circumstances just as theinvolvement of the United States, France, and theUN would be required for reasons of capacitybuilding, legitimacy, and sustainability. Thechallenges of the Gulf would also require a similarformula involving ECOWAS, the EconomicCommunity of Central African States, the SouthernAfrican Development Community, and the AUfrom the continent, as well as the UN, US, andother development partners.

With properly choreographed and coordinatedinterventions by all the identified stakeholdersaimed at strengthening local capacities andownership, and with sufficient financial injections,transfer of know-how and the guarantee of fairtrade, West Africa can raise human and regionalsecurity to a higher level by institutionalizingdemocratic governance, improving livingstandards, and protecting physical security.

22 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

Abdel-Fatau Musah 23

Further Reading

Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett, eds. Security Communities (Cambridge Studies in InternationalRelations) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Adler and Barnett put forth the idea that the concept of community can exist on the international level.They examine regions where actors have come to expect peace, where they are working toward it, andwhere peace is merely hoped for rather than assumed.

Aning, Kwesi. “Africa: Confronting Complex Threats,” Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, InternationalPeace Academy, New York, February 2007.

While broad in scope, Aning’s paper provides the reader with a nuanced introduction to continent-widesecurity, regional, and issue-based challenges.

Deng, Francis M., and Terrence Lyons, eds. African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance. Washington,DC: Brookings Institution, 1998.

This title examines how Africa may improve its governance by exploring sovereignty. Deng and Lyonsalso investigate the question of accountability at the regional and international levels.

Goodwin, Andrew, and Zebulon S. Takwa. “Drug Trafficking: An Alarming Human Security Threat.” WARNPolicy Paper, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, Accra, September 12, 2007. Available atwww.wanep.org/image/pb_wa_sept07.pdf.

This policy brief seeks to draw international attention to the threat presented by drug trafficking in WestAfrica. Rather than investigating the issue in depth, it provides a brief overview of the drug abusesituation in the subregion and outlines the human-security consequences, as well as some options forresponse.

Krause, Keith, and Michael Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases. London: UniversityCollege London Press, 1997.

Critical Security Studies contains contributions by a diverse selection of analysts. The volume examinesissues in contemporary international relations that fall under the umbrella of “security studies,” andprovides a critical perspective on this multifaceted subject.

Lubeck, Paul M., Michael J. Watts, and Ronnie Lipschutz. “Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the‘Securing’ of Nigerian Democracy.” International Policy Report, Center for International Policy,Washington, DC, 2007. Available at www.ciponline.org/NIGERIA_FINAL.pdf.

This policy paper provides an informative look at the United States’ involvement in Nigeria’s democracy,which, the authors assert, hinges largely on America’s energy interests.

Musah, Abdel-Fatau, and J. Kayode Fayemi, eds. Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma. London: Pluto,2000.

In this book, we critique mercenary involvement in post-Cold War African conflicts, particularly those in

Sierra Leone, Zaire, Angola, Uganda, and Congo. Mercenaries also investigates the relationship ofmercenary involvement with the rise in internal conflicts and with arms proliferation.

Pham, J. Peter “Securing the New Strategic Gulf,” World Defense Review, June 7, 2007.

In this short article, Pham looks at the new strategic importance of Africa, particularly the Gulf ofGuinea, in sourcing alternate oil supplies.

24 WEST AFRICA: GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING REGION

The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,

international institution dedicated to promoting the prevention

and settlement of armed conflicts between and within states

through policy research and development. For information on all

IPI Publications and electronic access to additional papers go to

www.ipinst.org/publications.

IPI's Africa Program was launched in 1992 with an initial focus on

strengthening the capacity of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

to better manage and resolve conflicts on the continent. The program’s

current phase (2007-2010) is focused on the analysis of subregional

capacities, and the strengthening of regional mechanisms and actors in

conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The Africa Program Working Paper Series forms an important part of

the program’s current phase, specifically examining the subregional

capacities to respond to the multiple challenges facing the African

continent today and into the future. Each of the five papers in the

series focuses on one particular subregion: North Africa, SouthernAfrica, Central Africa, Eastern Africa, and West Africa.

777 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017-3521 USA

TEL +1-212 687-4300 FAX +1-212 983-8246

www.ipinst.org