What is it like to be a brain in a box?

7/28/2019 What is it like to be a brain in a box?

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What is it like to be a brain in a box?--investigations into the philosophy of mind and the possibility of animal minds--

by joshua

brancheau



If we concede that consciousness is a physiological phenomenon in the brain, then it seems

impossible to deny that animals have conscious experiences. Donald Griffin holds the claim that

mental phenomena are just physical phenomena, and in his book Animal Minds, he argues that

animals do possess a form of consciousness. i His argument rests on the differentiation between

perceptual and reflective states of consciousness and on the empirical evidence of animal

behavior. His argument is sound, but the variations in belief among philosophers of mind about

what constitutes consciousness limit the acceptance of such a conclusion.

In discussing questions concerning the existence of animal minds, the controversies arise in

deciding where to place the limits on what can be considered a mind. Back in the seventeenth

century, Rene Descartes argued that animals had no minds and that they were just machines. A

lot of disagreements arise from Descartes interpretation of the mind. Descartes, no doubt

influenced by the church, wanted to argue that the first-person-subjective experience of thinking

was the voice of his soul, and thus he made the separation between the mind and the brain.

Since Descartes believed that he possessed an immortal soul, the mind became an indestructible

substance that had no physical dimensions, while the brain remained a part of the physical world

of decay and was not attributed with any of the thinking processes that occur there.ii With this

initiation of the mind-body problem, and the questioning of how a non-physical, “mental

substance” could possibly cause anything to occur in a physical world, arises the root of the

modern problems in philosophy of mind. Does consciousness entail the neurological activity of

the brain, or is it a consequence of it? Are mental characteristics the same as physical

characteristics, or are they entirely different? Contemporary views of the mind vary from

different types of materialism, like that of Griffin, in which mental characteristics are intimately

related to physical characteristics, to evolved forms of dualism following in the footsteps of

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Descartes, and more radical ideas like pan-psychism where everything is a mental substance, and

what has been labeled mysterianism,iii the viewpoint from which a tangible and objective

understanding of the nature of consciousness is unattainable because of its subjective qualities.

Depending on ones position in the philosophy of the mind, the scope of experiences

included in the definition of consciousness can vary a lot and affect ones position on whether or

not animals can possess conscious states. If we want to narrow the scope to an experience that is

strictly human then consciousness must be a unique experience of rational self-awareness within

space-time, with the possession of a complex language structure and introspective reflection; or

maybe, consciousness is specifically our internal dialogue, “self-talk,” which is continuous

through our waking experience. If we want to open up the scope of consciousness to all of its

possible manifestations, then we would not limit it to anything except its root characteristics, like

being a qualitative sensible experience from a unique subjective perspective. Thomas Nagel

defines conscious experience as, what it is like for an organism to be that organism,iv and if a

biological organism has a uniquely subjective experience then it also has conscious states. Nagel

agrees with Griffin that animals possess consciousness, but in his essay “What is it like to be a

Bat?” he questions whether we could ever possess knowledge of such an alien subjective

experience, using the example of a bat to highlight how difficult it would be to understand an

animal’s varying states of consciousness. Donald Griffin limits conscious states to physical

phenomena of neurological activity inside of the brain. This move automatically opens up the

possibility of conscious states to all mammals and even lower animals on the chain of

evolutionary development. Griffin argues that by looking at empirical evidence collected about

animal behavior we can be certain that animals do possess conscious awareness.

Griffin’s main obstacle in claiming that animals possess conscious states is behaviorism;

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the orthodox viewpoint of animal psychologists, which holds that animal behavior is void of

conscious states, and that animals are simply information processors which react to internal and

external stimuli. “Because so much of the coordinated and smoothly functioning information

processing in human brains takes place without any conscious awareness, many scientists have

tended to conclude, or at least strongly imply, that in nonhuman nervous systems none of the

information processing is conscious.”v From the text of one behavior ecologist, James

Wittenberger, he states that, “evolutionary reasons underlying the behavior are our principle

concern,” purporting complete ignorance of whether or not animals possess any sort of conscious

experiences.

vi

In order to counter this trend in science, Griffin instigated a new movement in

science which he dubbed cognitive ethology, joining the studies of the brain with studies of

animal behavior. Initially he intended to highlight the importance of studying cognitive activity

in conjunction with the existing behavioral studies.vii Now, however, Griffin finds it important to

include the subjective experience and potential awareness embedded in animal behavior, and the

traditional ethologists do not find it acceptable.viii Griffin states, “The taboo against considering

subjective experiences of nonhuman animals has become such a serious impediment to scientific

investigation that it is time to lay it aside and begin the difficult task of investigating the

subjective experiences of nonhuman animals.”ix

With two distinct traditions against him, Griffin still steps forward and argues for the

existence of nonhuman animal consciousness. Against behaviorism, Griffin rejects the limit of

study to strictly behavior, and invites new investigations into the realms of animal consciousness

and cognition. Against dualism, Griffin side-steps the issue by including Descartes’ mind with

the rest of the physical world, and embraces the position that attributes conscious states to the

physical properties of the brain. Griffin further establishes that the study of animal

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consciousness is productive because human consciousness is often an important factor or a “local

cause”x of human behavior, demonstrating that an understanding of the subjective experience of

animals would be informative in understanding aspects of their behavior.

To Griffin, consciousness is purely the active processes of the brain that we experience in

our waking life: emotions, thoughts, sensations, self-awareness unified through our body and the

possession of memories. In his argument, Griffin distinguishes two separate levels of

consciousness, perceptual consciousness and reflective consciousness.xi Perceptual

consciousness is simply the state of being aware of something, and reflective consciousness is

the more active self-awareness of thought and action. Griffin wants to argue that nonhuman

animals possess perceptual consciousness, allowing the egos of man to maintain sole dominion

over reflective consciousness. Nonetheless, Griffin puts forward that denying animals the

possibility of reflective consciousness is “in effect postulating that a perceptual ‘black hole’

encompasses their most intimate and pressing experiences.”xii To emphasis this claim, Griffin

illustrates an example through an animal’s possible encounter with a predator. No doubt animals

are very aware of predators, and when an animal is in close proximity with a predator, instinct no

doubt tells them to escape. Could that instinct be accompanied by fear? Griffin poses the

question, what if an encounter with a predator occurs more than once in the same geographic

area over a short period of time. Would the animal remember how it barely escaped the previous

brush with death and respond with intelligence or would the animal respond mechanically and

attempt escape in a mere random fashion? Intuitively it seems that animals respond intelligently

to the outside world. They seek out food, they create shelters, and they actively respond to their

surrounding environment. It would be ignorant not to acknowledge that animals obviously

respond intelligently to the external world. They do not self destruct, they find ways to survive.

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In order to not claim more than what is certain, Griffin establishes a scale of probability

which reflects the various positions that could be held about the possibility of animal

consciousness.xiii He places the certainty of animal consciousness at 1.0, and the absence of it at

0. For all of those scientists unwilling to entertain questions about animal consciousness he

provides the probability of 0.5. Almost in response to Nagel’s claims about the impossibility of

gaining definite knowledge of alien subjective experiences, Griffin creates a huge sliding scale of

grey-area for the possibility of animal consciousness to be measured on. He observes, “perhaps

the best we can do in most cases is to think in terms of only three ranges of values for [the

probability of animal minds]: below 0.5, about 0.5, and above 0.5.”

xiv

With this scale of

probability, Griffin can claim that animal consciousness exists, and he is relieved of the

requirement to prove it with absolute certainty.

In order to legitimize his claim, Griffin provides three groups of empirical evidence from

animal behavioral studies. First, from various studies he demonstrates that animals actively

respond to their environment enacting problem-solving in times of necessity. In order to eat

nuts, chimpanzees have discovered that rocks make good tools for cracking them open.xv

Second, Griffin uses the similarities of the physiological activities in human and animal brains to

correlate similar states of consciousness. A brain is a brain, right? Then third, through the

analysis of animal communication Griffin feels there are examples of the enactment of

intentionality, and attempts to convey meaning through communication (why this might have

ever been doubted??). A specific type of African bird has been observed leading badgers to bee

hives, in order to feed on the honeycomb which by itself it could not break open.xvi

The large quantity of empirical data is available from the long history of studying animal

behavior. My own observations have demonstrated to me that while I was feeding a local family

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of blue-jays, who routinely pestered me for more peanuts, they would be very aware of the

presence of my cat in the yard, and act in accordance to this awareness, never making a move

that would put them in a vulnerable position to be attacked by my cat. My experience with the

blue-jays, like the piles of empirical evidence, demonstrated to me that the birds definitely

possessed perceptual awareness of the cat. The experience, in my opinion, also raises a high

probability that the birds’ brains were making complex calculations about their distinct positions

in regards to the cat in space, which is a strikingly reflective mind-state.

Throughout his book, Donald Griffin thoroughly develops a strong argument for nonhuman

animals’ possession of conscious states. He rejects dualism and adopts a perspective on

consciousness that is applicable to a broad range of possible animals; he rejects the approach of

traditional ethology and creates cognitive ethology; he simplifies consciousness to simple, empty

awareness, and with empirical evidence demonstrates why it is probable that animals possess

greater amounts of consciousness than that. Among his explanations and descriptions, Griffin’s

most definitive argument for the existence of animal consciousness is his correlation between the

similarities of human and nonhuman neuro-physiological brain processes. If we were certain

that consciousness was a physical process in the brain, and we could pinpoint conscious neuro-

activity, then we could make concrete claims about the state of consciousness in other animals.

The problem with materialism is that it is an attempt to attribute the subjective experience

of consciousness to objective phenomena. David Chalmers argues that, in principle, scientific

investigation cannot solve problems of a subjective nature, like consciousness.xvii He argues that

dualism is a logical possibility because he can imagine a possible world in which a biologically

identical zombie to himself, we’ll call him zombie dave, can exist without any conscious mental

states.xviii For me, this is only a logically possibility if consciousness were something like

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memory. Chalmers claims that zombie dave would know everything that the real David

Chalmers knows, he just wouldn’t be aware of it. “If we tell him that there's a basketball game

starting across town in half an hour, he'll immediately head for the driveway, an action that

seems to be best explained by the hypothesis that he wants to go to the basketball game, believes

that his car will get him there, and believes that his car is in the driveway.” xix These actions, and

the underlying awareness attributed to these actions seem to invoke some sort of conscious

mental process, but Chalmers claims they do not. How could a zombie, remote from

consciousness, correlate any action that involved itself? The very idea of consciousness is

subjective experience, and Chalmers claims there is nothing to be like the zombie, “everything is

there, but there are no lights turned on.”

Chalmers disagrees with the reduction of consciousness to material phenomena, because he

feels there is something more than nerves firing behind his conscious experience. Would it be

logically possible to have a world where you found conscious experience inside of a box;

subjective existence detached from a body? This does not seem logically possible, if we let it

free into the sensible world, what would it experience and how would it experience it? Through

vibrations in the air? David Chalmers might respond by asking, “What is it like to be a brain in a

box?” This is a good question because it gets us closer to the essence of consciousness. Like

pure consciousness in a box, a brain would have no perceptual capacities to form the roots of a

subjective experience. Even if the entire nervous system was in the box with the brain, there

would still be no way to translate experiences of the sensible world into conscious experiences.

A body is necessary for the existence of consciousness because it is a medium for the

accumulation of subjective experiences. All of the nerve-endings embedded in the body and our

more complex sense organs provide the brain with the experience of the physical world. The

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physical world is necessary for conscious states to exist. The brain is necessary to compile and

present the unity of experience that is considered consciousness. It seems like consciousness is

the result of memory organizing a single existence over time, maintaining goals, and actively

obtaining objectives. Materialism is a lot easier to maintain than dualism or pan-psychism. If

we can accept materialism, it is impossible to deny nonhuman animals have a high probability of

possessing consciousness.

Griffin’s arguments lead to the acceptance of the existence of animal minds. Descartes

could not fathom the existence of animal minds. However in this era, it is becoming popular to

shy away from Descartes’ claim that the mind is not just a brain and accept the possibility that all

conscious states are merely a physical reaction in the brain. Finding solutions to philosophical

problems requires one to formulate entire systems of inferences in order to create consistent and

sound arguments. Some of the most difficult, and probably the most interesting, philosophical

debates arise out of the variations found in all the different sets of assumptions. The problem of

consciousness is like this. If one philosopher limits consciousness to human language, and

human rationality, then this limits conscious experiences to only humans and well-trained

primates. If consciousness was defined as the subjective experience of being then the possibility

of many different conscious experiences becomes probable. Donald Griffin wants to maintain

that consciousness is a function of physical activity inside of the brain, and from this it follows

that other nonhuman animals do possess conscious states. Along with empirical evidence, and

the rejection of behaviorism, dualism, and certainty, Griffin produces a very strong argument for

the probable existence of consciousness in animals.

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i Griffin, Donald R. Animal Minds: beyond cognition to consciousness. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.2001—henceforth all references to this edition are cited as AM pg#

ii Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by Donald A. Cress, in Steven M. Cahn, ed. Classics

of Western Philosophy. 6th ed. Hackett Publishing Company. Indianapolis, IN. 2002iii Searle, John R. Mind: a brief introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford, England. 2004—henceforth all

references to this edition are cited as Mind pg# -Mind pg145iv Nagel, Thomas. “What is it like to be a bat?” …--henceforth all references to this edition are cited as Bats pg#v AM pg22vi Wittenberger, James F. Animal Social Behavior. Duxbury Press, Boston, MA. 1981 -pg48 (AM(23))vii AM pg9viii AM pg24ix AM pg11x AM pg17xi AM pg14xii AM pg17xiii AM pg12xiv AM pg12xv AM pg1xvi AM pg174xvii AM pg13xviii Chalmers, David, J. Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study. Published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences

16:35-36, 1993. retrieved from http://consc.net/papers/goldman.htmlxix Chalmers, David, J. Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study. Published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences

16:35-36, 1993. retrieved from http://consc.net/papers/goldman.html

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What is it like to be a brain in a box?