When Will We Ever Learn?...When Will We Ever Learn? IPA Backgrounder, Vol. 16/2, 2004 3 Valuing this loss of biodiversity is difficult, although some attempts have been made on the

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‘No person or department can be allowed to use the forest in such away as to create a state of danger to others. If conformity with thisrule cannot be brought about, the offender must be put out of theforest…’

— Stretton Report on the 1939 bushfires

‘The Inquiry considers that fuel management through controlled burn-ing is the only practicable way of reducing the excessive build-up offuel loads in the ACT’s extensive areas of park and forest…’

— McLeod Report on the 2003 ACT bushfires

When Will WeEver Learn?by Jim Hoggett & Aled Hoggett

Backgrounder

When Will We Ever Learn?

IPA Backgrounder, Vol. 16/2, 20042

WHAT HAPPENED LAST YEAR?What happened last fire season was an extremefire event. It included the following:• Vegetation and wildlife on a vast area of land

were destroyed (Table 1).• The fires were of exceptional ferocity.• There was only limited success in contain-

ing them.These are the bare bones of the story.

THE TOTAL COST WAS

IMMEASURABLE

It is not possible to put a precise figure on thetotal cost of the fires, but some idea of the ex-tent of the damage can be given.

Devastation of ParksWe have seen the destruction of many of theenvironmental ‘jewels in the crown’. Three-quarters of Kosciusko National Park was burned.Most of Namadgi National Park in the ACTburned. Large areas of the Gippsland forestsburned.

This compares with annual clearing rates ofnative vegetation of less than 20,000 hectaresin total in NSW and Victoria. Incidentally, wild-fires would fall within the statutory definitionof ‘clearing’ of native vegetation. The fires canalso be compared with average annual loggingof 60,000 hectares in Australia. The fires werethe equivalent of 150 years of clearing or 50 yearsof logging, compressed into in a few weeks.

Loss of BiodiversityPerhaps more significantly for environmentalpolicy, there was an immediate and enormous lossof biodiversity which must be of profound con-cern to all who love the Australian bush. Bil-lions of trees and other plants were destroyed andbillions of animals and insects were killed. It isalso of profound concern that conservation landmanagers have given us no assessment of the se-verity of this impact. Where are the reports/thetransparency required of other land managers?

INTRODUCTION

Last year, more than 3 million hectares of SouthEast Australia burned. This was an environmen-tal disaster on a giant scale. Large areas of wil-derness, including old growth forest, have beenburned out and may never regenerate in theiroriginal form. Rare, endangered and threatenedspecies over those areas have been exterminated.There was loss of human life and severe prop-erty destruction.

An environmental incident of a much smallerand less damaging kind, for example a major oilspill at sea or unauthorized logging in a forest,would have generated expressions of extremeoutrage from environmental organizations. Thebushfire disaster produced little more than ex-pressions of dismay and regret married to some-what frantic pleas that the public not indulgein the ‘blame game’.

A number of official inquiries into the disas-ter have since concluded their work. It is pos-sible to begin to see the truth about the fires—why they started, why they were not stopped,who helped to create the conditions that fedthem and why Australia, with its long experi-ence with fire and much improved fire-fightingcapability, seems to manage fire no better thanit did decades ago.

Clearly, our policies with respect to bushfireshave failed. We cannot simply accept that hugeareas of Australia will suffer highly destructivewildfire, people will die and fire-fighters willrisk their lives every few years.

DamageState/Territory in hectares

ACT and NSW 1,595,000

Victoria 1,324,000

Queensland 115,000

Tasmania 41,000

Western Australia 31,000

Total 3,106,000

(Source: National Association of Forest Industries)

Table 1: Hectares Burned in 2003 Bushfires,by State/Territory


IPA Backgrounder, Vol. 16/2, 2004 3

Valuing this loss of biodiversity is difficult,although some attempts have been made on thebasis of trade-offs with potential commercial de-velopment. At one extreme,environmental groups mightput an almost infinite valueon the loss of areas of suchhigh conservation value. Oth-ers might estimate the loss ofamenity, timber resources orthe cost of the fire-fighting ef-fort.

Assuming a one-off virtu-ally total destruction, then avery conservative, nominalvalue of $1,000 per hectare oflost biodiversity (less than in-finite but more than the likelyannual commercial timberyield), results in a biodiversityloss, in a few short weeks,equivalent to over $3 billion.

It is unlikely that conservationists would behappy to ascribe a monetary value of this kind,but a legitimate question then arises: what dothey think is the loss in conservation values fromthe wildfires?

Change in Forest StructureWhat we are trying to capture are the one-offlosses. Of course, the bush and forest will re-generate over time and they are already doingso. But the time involved may be very long giventhe thoroughness of the destruction, and the re-sultant pattern may not resemble the original.For example, the opinion of CSIRO scientist,Phil Cheney, was that it would take 200 yearsfor the forests in the west of the ACT to recover.

Furthermore, this does not take into accountthe likely longer-term adverse effects of wild-fire. Very hot fires kill plants and animals, andsterilize the soil. They destroy habitat. They alsoexpose the soil to erosion and damage catchmentsand aquatic life. In the context of our nationaldialogue on conservation, this kind of destruc-tion is much more complete and widespread thana controlled burn or a managed forest operation.

In the longer term, the ecology and landscapewill be irrevocably altered.

Economic and Personal LossesProperty damage was extensive. Five hundredand six homes were destroyed in the ACT. Four

people died. The InsuranceDisaster Response Organis-ation put the insured losses at$415 million and stated thatthe uninsured losses ‘cannotbe estimated’. There weredoubtless uninsurable losses,which cannot be guessed at.

There were further esti-mates of economic losses. Forexample, it was estimated thatthe loss in four Victorianshires alone was $121 million.Twenty thousand hectares ofproduction Alpine Ash wereburnt in Victoria. The cost totourism in the Alpine regionhas been estimated at $121million.

It seems likely that the combined economiclosses could be well in excess of $1 billion.

Other ImpactsThe equivalent of 25 per cent of our total an-nual greenhouse gas emissions were released.Some of this release, however, would occur overa more extended period with more moderate fireregimes.

There is massive soil loss and sedimentationof water storages with short and long term eco-nomic and environmental costs.

Smoke effects in urban areas were also sub-stantial.

COULD THE FIRES HAVE BEEN

MITIGATED?A question that continually recurs is whether cata-strophic fires can be avoided or at least mitigated.

Evidence was presented at the official inquir-ies by those involved in fighting the fires thatbolder and more vigorous early attacks on thefires might have limited their severity. Variousreasons were given why this did not happen. Theincreased awareness of health and safety regula-

IT IS UNLIKELY THAT

CONSERVATIONISTS

WOULD BE HAPPY TO

ASCRIBE A MONETARY

VALUE OF THIS KIND,BUT A LEGITIMATE

QUESTION THEN

ARISES: WHAT DO THEY

THINK IS THE LOSS INCONSERVATION VALUES

FROM THE WILDFIRES?



the fires caused around the urban areas. Mostwould also have not wanted the destruction thatoccurred in farming areas. Many would also haveliked to save the Parks and forests.

But preferences of that kind have no meaningunless they are accompanied by practical actionto give them effect. If that is not done, then thedeclared preferences are, at best, empty or, atworst, diametrically opposed to the real prefer-ences.

So, if we choose to live among fire hazards, asit is apparent that many urban residents wantto do, and we enact regulations or pursuebehaviours that make hazard-reduction difficultor impossible, then can we really say we have astrong preference for damaging fires not to hap-pen? Australians cannot claim to be ignorant oftheir high eventual probability.

And if we create large new National Parkswilly-nilly and then refuse to accept the need toreduce fuel build-up, are we not implicitly en-couraging and sanctioning more extreme fireevents over much larger areas?

tion, the acute sensitivity to environmental dis-turbance and the well-grounded fear of legal re-prisals for mistakes slowed the response and vir-tually guaranteed that the fires would run outof control.

The corollary of this cautious approach wasan excessive degree of centralized control. Therewere numerous anecdotes of the disjunction be-tween the operational demands on the fire frontand the instructions from the control centres.Bureaucratic structures are cumbersome at thebest of times, but are particularly ineffective indealing with emergencies.

In this practical sense, suppression of the fireswas bound to fail and the catastrophe was inevi-table. Repetition at some future time also seemsinevitable unless there are significant changesto fire-fighting and fire-mitigation operations.

There is a larger issue here. There has been adrift of public policy away from mitigation offire risk towards suppression of fires. But sup-pression is not an effective long-term policy onits own. If the fires had been successfully sup-pressed last year, that would simply have pre-served the accumulation of fuel waiting for thenext set of conditions favourable to ignition.

More effective suppression will always be im-portant but something more than suppressionis needed (see below).

DID WE WANT THIS TO HAPPEN?This is not as absurd a proposition as it mayseem at first sight. Its premise is that any sig-nificant build-up of fuel on our continent willeventually burn. Any expressed preferences mustbe based on this historical certainty.

Australia is a fire-prone continent. Yet thereis a strong reluctance in the natural psyche andthe national public conversation to look at theAustralian bush as two things—a complex ecol-ogy and fuel. It has been said that the rural bushis becoming an exurban bush, subject to a fireprotectorate that projects urban and industrialvalues. The aim becomes the preservation of allvegetation—living and dead—and hence, per-manent suppression of fire.

Most people would undoubtedly have pre-ferred to avoid the loss of life and property that

Box 1:Controlled Burns Are Threatening—

Wildfires Apparently Are Not

Why are wildfires not listed as a ‘keythreatening process’ under the NSWThreatened Species Conservation Act?After all, the destruction of ThreatenedSpecies by wildfires is several ordersof magnitude greater than most of thecurrent listed processes. Wildfireswould then have their own ‘threatabatement plan’. And the need for athreat abatement plan would seem tobe obvious and pressing. It mightinclude provision for substantial andfrequent areas of reduced fire hazardas refuges for fauna and stores ofseed. Instead, the Act lists ‘too frequentfires’ as a key threatening process—a provision directed at hazard-reduction burning.



We even have statutory forms of selective vi-sion here (see Box 1).

Conservation and local resident groups haveexpressed varying degrees of opposition to fuelreduction by controlled burning. They may notwant wildfires to happen, but they are, in ef-fect, advocating policies that make them inevi-table.

These are practical, not academic, matters.They are at the heart of the explanation for thefires and the pessimism that many feel that noth-ing will be done to avoid the next disaster.

ON DENIAL—OR DID THIS REALLY

HAPPEN?The outpouring of greenhouse gases in thebushfires was matched by an outpouring of de-nial by some groups.

The National Parks Association (NPA)rushed into print on 22 January 2003 proclaim-ing that there was ‘not a skerrick of evidence’to support the accusations of insufficient haz-ard-reduction burning. On-ground experienceand all subsequent official reports flatly con-tradict this. The NPA also asked how a firethat was burning in the ACT could be blamedon a NSW department, apparently obliviousof the propensity of fires to travel great dis-tances. This was then followed by the routinefurphy concerning failure to sign the Kyototreaty.

The Nature Conservation Council (NCC) urgedmore focus on homeowner preparedness and de-velopment controls and less on hazard reduction.

The dissenting report from the federal Houseof Representatives Inquiry, by Michael OrganMP, repeated a number of familiar distortionsof the case for hazard-reduction burning. Hestated that ‘you do not need to burn “a millionwild acres” to save a house on a small acreage’.This ignored the fact that nobody was suggest-ing that. In fact, the reverse is the case—thepurpose of hazard reduction was to prevent theloss of the more than 6 million wild acres thathad just occurred.

The Australian Conservation Foundation hasrecently released on its Website a series of so-

called ‘Myths’, including a self-exculpatory piecedenying any responsibility by ‘greenies’ for thefires and a denial that more prescribed burningequals less bushfires—which may be true, butdoes not address the problem of the much moredamaging wildfires.

Regular media reports also appear wheneversome isolated remnant of plant or animal life isdetected in the desolate landscape of the burnt-out parks.

This rush to denial is partly self-justificationand partly utter incredulity at nature’s demoli-tion of a carefully constructed but unsound be-lief that we can preserve biodiversity by sup-pressing fire. With these fires, environmentaldogma came face to face with ecological reality.

WHY DID IT HAPPEN?Almost the whole of Australia is fire prone. Inthe more remote areas, regular large-scale firesare a natural feature and part of land manage-ment.

In South East Australia, such large-scale burn-ing is not part of the normal or natural pattern.Moreover, as fire science and management im-proved significantly from 1960 onwards, for aperiod, particularly in the 1970s, major fires inthe South East were the exception (see Table 2).

In recent decades, the advances in fire scienceand fire-fighting technology have been offset bychanges in fire mitigation policies. So better fire-fighting is not preventing more severe fires—indeed, the reverse appears to be true. The firesof last year illustrate this.

There are two immediate sets of reasons forthe 2002–03 fires. One set principally explainsthe occurrence of the fires and the other theirintensity and destructiveness.

Beyond that are a number of underlyingcauses. Many of these stem from human actionor inaction.

The Physical OccurrenceThe facts are relatively straightforward:• There was a large quantity of dry fuel

present.



• There were extreme weather conditions ofheat and wind.

• There were numerous natural and humanignitions.

This combination of factors is not unusual.90 per cent of fires are unplanned. Ignition wasinevitable.

Intensity and DamageThe facts here are less obvious, but are reason-ably clear:• The fuel build-up per hectare on the ground

and vertically was very large.• The build-up of fuel on the ground in euca-

lyptus woodland over a five-year period, ifnot removed, can amount to between 25 to40 tonnes per hectare.

• This generated huge energy releases duringthe fire.

• The higher energy releases led touncontrollable spread and more completedestruction of the ecosystems.

• Expanded Parks and less hazard reductiongave greater connectivity of fuel and greatergeographical scope to the fires.

• The inaccessibility and eventual scale of thefires made suppression difficult.

• Early suppression efforts were often too ten-tative and risk-averse.

These facts are hard to dispute but some stilltry. Even the Premier of NSW, in a radio inter-view during the fires, played down the influ-ence of fuel loads. Conservationists tended tostress the extreme weather conditions. This is

consistent with a some-what fatalistic view of thefires. But many fire-fight-ers emphasized the slowand inadequate start tooperations, restricted ac-cess to the fires and thefuel build-up.

There are some ironiesin all this. The Kosciuskoand Namadgi Parks wereboth initially promotedpartly as catchment pro-tection. Intense wildfiresseriously and adverselyaffect both water quality

and the stability of the catchment. Also, the ACTand Victorian fires could probably have been con-trolled earlier, but then the fuel and future firerisk would have remained. Furthermore, the em-phasis on fire suppression in order to protectbiodiversity led to the build-up of fuel but, whenthe fires became extreme, much of the fire-fight-ing effort was for the protection of property ratherthan ecosystems.

Underlying CausesThe description of immediate causes is notenough. In the litany above, there are certaininevitabilities of weather, presence of fuel andignition. We cannot stop the regular occurrenceof fire.

But what of the intensity? The cause here isthe massive widespread build up of fuel.

Fuel can be removed by two means—eitherphysical disposal by machine or prescribed burn-ing. The former is practicable only to a minordegree around cities. Given the size, nature andinaccessibility of much of the bush, it is not prac-ticable over wide areas unless allied with for-estry operations (a practice being reintroducedin the USA).

That leaves the deliberate, controlled use offire to reduce fuel loads before they become dan-gerous. Something like this took place in pre-European times. There is evidence that Aborigi-nal communities used fire extensively in all sea-sons for their own purposes. Natural ignitionsby lightning were frequent, and burns were lim-ited only by fuel and weather conditions.

Table 2: Major Bushfires

Year Event

1951–52 4 million ha burned in NSW—several lives lost.

1968–69 2 million ha burned in NSW—14 lives lost.

1982–83 Extreme fires in NSW, Vic and SA—81 died—2070homes lost.

1994 800,000 ha burned in NSW—4 lives lost—200 homes lost.

2001–02 Christmas fires in NSW—744,000 ha burned—109 homesdestroyed—50,000 fire-fighters deployed.

2002–03 3 million ha burned in NSW, Vic, SA, WA, Qld—mostprotracted fire season on record—103 aircraft used in asingle day.



In more recent decades, the areas of reservedland in parks have been enormously extended.At the same time, the policy towards fire hasturned towards suppression of fire rather thanuse of fire to reduce fuel load. In parallel, themanagement of public landhas shifted from a more closelymanaged use focus (grazingand timber production) withgenerally good access, to amore laissez-faire amenity fo-cus (preservation of ecosys-tems) with reduced access. Re-strictions on controlled burn-ing have been extended to pri-vate land by new native veg-etation regulations.

With this shift has come a change in thequantity and quality of fuel loads. This is partlythe result of Park managers reacting to a his-tory of frequent burning that they view as un-natural and damaging. It is also the fact thatParks’ bureaucracies are stretched by rapidly ex-panding Parks estates, and mired in minutiaeof government regulation relating to manage-ment of fuel on public land. In other words,governments appear incapable of financing andmanaging their new commitments to conser-vation.

It is now clear that hazard-reduction burn-ing in recent years has been grossly inadequate.This was true across NSW, the ACT andVictoria. The official reports all make this point.

The federal House of Representatives SelectCommittee Inquiry referred to the ‘…grosslyinadequate hazard reduction burning…’ and the‘…poor access…’ to the fire sites.

The Victorian Auditor-General called for ‘in-creased focus on strategic management of haz-ard reduction on public land…’

Inadequate hazard-reduction burning had al-ready been a major theme in the report of a Se-lect Committee of the NSW Legislative Assem-bly on the 2001–02 bushfires.

The first recommendation of the McLeod Re-port on the ACT fires was that ‘…fuel manage-ment through controlled burning is the onlypracticable way of reducing the excessive build-up of fuel loads in the ACT’s extensive areas ofpark and forest’.

Even the Esplin Report, the most tentativeof the official offerings, noted that ‘In recentyears, areas that have been prescribed burned inthe North East and Gippsland … are below rateslikely to be satisfactory either for fuel reduction

for purposes of asset protec-tion, or for the ecologicalneeds of plant communities’.Esplin even recommendedconsideration of burning inspring.

Government agencies haveshifted from a pre-emptiveapproach to wildfires to anemergency response; from apolicy of mitigating the riskto one of coping with the con-

sequences of neglect.Hazard-reduction still takes place, but much

of it is the so-called ‘thin red line’ around urbandwellings. It is asset protection rather thanbiodiversity protection.

For example, the Victorian Department ofSustainability and Environment’s officialWebsite declared that only 45,000 hectares ofbush has been subject to fuel-reduction burnsin the 2003 season. This amounts to 0.5 per centof the 8 million hectares of forest land whichthe Department is responsible for managing.According to the Victorian Association of For-est Industries, this compares to an average of225,000 hectares in the decade from 1974–75to 1983–84.

New South Wales is similar. Table 3 showsthe declining incidence of hazard reduction onpublic land and the substantially weaker andmore restricted effort made by National Parkscompared with State Forests. National Parksnow manages twice the land managed by StateForests (as opposed to one half at the beginningof the period), so the average rate of controlledhazard reduction in the parks is about 1 per centof the area managed compared with about 4 percent in State Forests.

Table 3 also shows that less than half of burn-ing in State Forests is uncontrolled, whereas 88per cent in Parks is uncontrolled.

On this evidence, one would have to concludethat State Forests is a better friend to biodiversitythan National Parks—or at least that they know

WE HAVE LOST AP-PRECIATION OF THE

FACT THAT FIRE IS AFRIEND OF THE

ENVIRONMENT AS

WELL AS AN ENEMY



what areas they are burning. The recent an-nouncement by the NSW government of sig-nificant budget cuts in environmentalprogrammes (including Parks) will make thedisparity greater.

The financial resources applied to bushfirecontrol appear substantial. But the proportionapplied to actual, in-the-field, hazard-reductionis a very small fraction of those absorbed by bu-reaucratic processes and the intermittent burstsof enormous expenditure in fire suppression, es-pecially in emergencies. You can buy a lot ofmitigation for the $11,000 per hour paid for anEricsson crane helicopter.

In effect, we spend most of our money on pre-serving fuel and fighting unplanned fires andrelatively small amounts on controlled reduc-tion of fuel.

We have lost appreciation of the fact that fireis a friend of the environment as well as an enemy.

Even if we were to accept that the 2003 fireswere not exceptional in the long stretch of his-tory (which is difficult to accept), we ought notaccept that we can do nothing to mitigate them.Advances in fire science, ecological knowledgeand fire-fighting technology and operations giveus the tools to do better.

The 2003 bushfires were greatly assisted byhuman inactivity and misallocation of fire con-

trol resources. If governments have a ‘duty ofcare’ for public lands, they appear not to havedischarged it in relation to bushfire hazard-re-duction.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?It seems an incontrovertible baseline for policythat vegetation/fuel on the Australian landscapewill inevitably burn and that larger quantitiesburn much more destructively.

To discover who helped create these exagger-ated conditions is to discover who is really re-sponsible for the severity of the bushfires. Whichwere the human agencies that could have madea positive difference and, by their action or in-action, did the opposite?

Poor Principles and Poor PolicyAs far back as 1994, Greenpeace was blaming theweather for catastrophic bushfires that year. TheACF emphasizes the activities of arsonists. TheNational Parks Service has blamed the public.

The World Wildlife Fund’s submission to theHouse of Representatives Inquiry declared, ‘In-appropriate fire hazard regimes can damagebiodiversity … Biodiversity conservation re-

Table 3: Hazard Reduction and Wildfire, 1992–93 to 2002–03

Prescribed Fire Area Wildfire AreaYear SFNSW NPWS SFNSW NPWS

1992/1993 75,133 ha No record 4,761 ha 21,772 ha

1993/1994 95,424 ha 47,816 ha 131,956ha 382,897 ha

1994/1995 99,915 ha 35,778 ha 126,060 ha 89,112 ha

1995/1996 95,395 ha 25,572 ha 23,904 ha 15,192 ha

1996/1997 144,226 ha 15,866 ha 17,578 ha 12,670 ha

1997/1998 80,105 ha 8,302 ha 87,921 ha 236,152 ha

1998/1999 60,275 ha 12,876 ha 4,808 ha 14,195 ha

1999/2000 61,478 ha 6,752 ha 824 ha 6,715 ha

2000/2001 35,989 ha 19,733 ha 76,498 ha 217,980 ha

2001/2002 58,893 ha 31,703 ha 81,903 ha 595,388 ha

2002/2003 54,509 ha 42,827 ha 167,112 ha 1,002,068 ha

Annual Average 78,304 ha/yr 24,723 ha/yr 65,757 ha/yr 235,831 ha/yr

Source: Adapted from Paul de Mar, 2000.



quirements need to be central to any fire man-agement policy and practice…’.

Other conservation groups prescribe ecologi-cal sustainability, biodiversity and the precau-tionary principle as the governing principles inhazard-reduction.

The NSW Rural Fire Service Commissioner,Phil Koperberg, has also said publicly that theFire Service’s priority must be to preservebiodiversity, implying that hazard-reductionburning will be limited (but see below).

An allied theme is that we need to under-stand fire better, that we need more scientificevidence to justify active reduction of fuel loads.

There is nothing wrong with these elevatedprescriptions. As generalizations, most reason-able people would agree with them. But theyhave been applied in a way that paralyses landmanagement. And they resulted in what nobodywants—immense loss of biodiversity.

This has come about through a complex in-teraction of forces. Both sides of the debate—those who wish to leave the bush untended andthose who see the need for active management—can call on scientific support. The latter groupalso often has experience in and responsibilityfor land management.

The referee is government. It is aware thatthe political wing of the conservation movementholds the balance of power at elections and thatthe bulk of the population in urban areas is at-tracted to the general principles stated aboveand is not interested in the detail of how theymight best be satisfied.

The facts that our knowledge of fire scienceand fuel management is probably unmatchedand that our knowledge of ecology is confused(to say the least), swings the balance in favourof reactive rather than proactive policies.

Governments can also find support in thatstrand of scientific opinion that takes a ‘fine fil-ter’ to ecosystems—the reductionist approach.Focusing on individual ecosystems and theirunique characteristics reinforces a ‘no distur-bance’ mentality, an extreme version of the pre-cautionary principle. Moreover, there is an im-mediate political bonus in declaring Parks andapplying hands-off policies for native vegeta-tion. So the referee’s decisions generally go oneway.

Meanwhile, for the land manager, the fine fil-ter approach is a nightmare. It cannot be ap-plied over large areas, as the interactions withinand between ecosystems are unknown and at-tempting to preserve them results in enormouscosts or, more usually, paralysis. In action, thepolicy has some strange and perverse effects (seeBox 2).

Box 2: The Transgrid Wildlife Refuge

Some while ago the electricitytransmission agency, Transgrid,lopped native vegetation under itspower lines in Namadgi NationalPark. There was a huge outcry fromconservation groups at this removal oftrees from a relatively small area ofthe park and the media made anextended fuss. Transgrid was fined$500,000 and ordered to undertakeremedial work. In the fires last year,the area cleared by Transgrid was oneof the few refuges for fleeing wildlifeand will be one of the few areas withreasonable native vegetation cover ina park virtually cleared by fire. A casefor refund of the fine?

In the end, this precautionary policy is a policyof neglect. This policy does not lead to rever-sion to some ideal stable state. It creates unpre-dictable new conditions and new landscapesfashioned by wildfire. No assessment is evermade of the long-term consequences of fire sup-pression.

Poor Policy and Poor ProcessBy definition, hazard-reduction will cause somedamage even though the longer-term effectsmay be benign. For example, long-term stud-ies by NSW State Forests have shown no re-duction in the number of plant species due toregular burning.

However, the effect of applying ill-definedand general principles to practical land man-



agement is to stultify such regular prescribedburning by giving priority to short-term local-ized effects. Overall, the result is inadequate anddeclining rates of hazard reduction.

The administrative processes enforce thispolicy of inertia and give added opportunity tothe groups that seek to minimize hazard-reduc-tion burning. In a vain attempt to reconcile con-flicting philosophies, we have established pro-cesses that ensure that failure to agree stifles ac-tion. In these circumstances, inaction will gen-erally triumph over action.

NSW supplies a practical example of whathappens.

In NSW, the responsibility for bushfire riskmanagement rests with the Bushfire Coordinat-ing Committee, which setsout the model guidelines forthe 100-plus local bushfiremanagement plans. The localcommittees prepare their ownplans, which require approvalfrom the central committee.

The central and local com-mittees all allow for signifi-cant representation from theNature Conservation Councilof NSW (NCC) and the Na-tional Parks and Wildlife Ser-vice. The NCC’s bushfirepolicy gives overall priority toits interpretation of ecologi-cal sustainability. Applicationof this principle has resulted in restrictive fireintervals for prescribed burning and heavily con-ditional licensing.

The NCC also sat on the Inter-departmentalCommittee (IDC) that established the processesfor approval of hazard-reduction proposals in2001. It was the only non-government agencyto do so. Meanwhile, real stakeholders—privateland managers—were excluded. Nevertheless,the IDC recommended a streamlined environ-mental assessment process for hazard-reductionproposals.

The IDC was to deal with the so-called ‘per-ception’ in the mind of the public that the regu-lations were too complex—as if all that wereneeded was a better explanation of their tortu-ous content. In the event, even the streamlined

code is so complex that the Rural Fire Servicenow undertakes the environmental assessmentfor private landholders to simplify the processfor them.

The ultimate irony is that NSW has inad-equate prescribed burning even under the veryrestrictive fire intervals in the Code because thereare too few resources applied to hazard-reduc-tion.

An Engineered DisasterSo, at the most basic level, we all share respon-sibility for the fires, in our failure to think clearlyabout the ever-present threat of fire and our un-willingness to contemplate the difficult solu-

tions. The guiding principlesin bushfire control are impos-sibly vague and the capacityto act is increasingly con-strained.

More crucially, the govern-ments we rely upon to lookafter the public interest haveallowed the formulation ofpolicy to be unduly influencedby narrow groups with an in-terest in inertia. Governmentshave translated this inertiainto regulatory regimes andsupervisory processes in whichthese narrow groups continueto exert influence at the ex-

pense of land managers. They have continuallyexpanded the National Park estate and failed toapply the resources to manage it.

At another level, the conservation groups bearspecial responsibility. They have actively pro-moted the policies and been given privilegedparticipation in their formulation and supervi-sion. We have, in effect, had their policies inforce for the past two or more decades. Whendisasters like 2003 occur, they are not called toaccount. They sit on the numerous committees(sometimes paid by the public) and suffer noconsequences for the results of their efforts tominimize controlled hazard reduction (see Box3).

National Parks is already subject to litigationarising from allegations of fire impact on pri-

IF THE BUSHFIRE CEN-TRAL COMMITTEES

AND THEIR POLITICAL

MASTERS WERE

BOARDS OF PRIVATE

COMPANIES, THEY

WOULD SURELY HAVE

BEEN SACKED BY NOW



vate land. If the public were to seek damages forlost amenity and biodiversity from destructionin the parks themselves, all those involved inengineering the increased fuel build-up wouldsurely be culpable. Here we could include:• the conservation groups advocating the lock-

ing-up of park land and minimal hazard-re-duction; and

• governments and those agencies which haveabdicated their responsibility to formulate

and administer policy and haveunderprovided resources to mitigate fire.

If the bushfire central committees and theirpolitical masters were boards of private com-panies, they would surely have been sacked bynow.

HOW DO WE DO BETTER?First of all, we must accept that the Australianlandscape contains native vegetation that is bothamenity and fuel and that we are continuallyallowing the creation of a vast national bonfireof flammable material.

In this case, the question is not whether toburn, but what is the most sustainable way ofdoing it? The existing policy of fire suppressionis clearly inflicting unacceptable damage onproperty and the environment.

Can we modify the extent, intensity and dam-age of the fires?

Obviously, there is little that we can do aboutextreme weather conditions. Even if we acceptedthe contentious case for the Kyoto Treaty, it isnot a short- or medium-term solution.

There is also little we can do about reducingthe area reserved in National Parks. Indeed, thisis likely to continue to grow.

We can blame God or National Parks or thepublic for wildfires, but ultimately only humanagencies can reduce available fuel to prevent thecreation of the lethal combination of conditionsthat makes such fires inevitable.

Indeed, reduction of fuel loads offers the onlypractical means available to us for mitigatingthe extreme fires. All the arguments appliedagainst controlled burning—loss of biodiversity,weed invasion, soil destruction and erosion—apply with greater force to extensive, high in-tensity fires.

But, if it is to be effective, we have to acceptthis solution without placing a host of qualifi-cations and conditions on it.

Many approaches to controlled hazard-re-duction have been suggested, ranging from sci-entific research-based (negligible) burning tounrestricted precautionary burns. But two,more selective, versions are worthy of consid-eration.

Box 3: The Role of the NatureConservation Council

The NCC has been given a privilegedposition in the formulation of policy formitigation of fire in NSW. It has saton the central policy-making com-mittee. It has a seat on the central andlocal co-ordinating committees. Yet theNCC represents a negligible con-stituency. The bulk of its funding isprovided by taxpayers.

Despite this, it has a position on apar with the politicians and govern-ment departments responsible forpolicy and with the State Forests andParks agencies that manage the vastareas of public land. It has influencebeyond the tens of thousands of privatelandowners and managers who areresponsible for managing most landin the State, who have enormouscollective experience and depend onthe land for a living.

The NCC suffers no consequencesfrom the failure of the policies itadvocates. It does not have to clearup in the aftermath.

It is profoundly unfair and anti-democratic that a single unrepre-sentative group should have influenceof this kind over the interests of thosewith most at stake.



1. Limited Hazard Reduction

This would be close to what is now attempted(but not done). It would focus on asset protec-tion, that is the 3–5 per cent of bush surround-ing urban areas or rural assets. It would be avirtually continuous programme of removal offire hazards.

This programme would be reinforced by strictapplication of new building regulations so thathomeowners on the urban fringe would be sub-jected to the same rules as their rural counter-parts (dedicated fire-fighting equipment and wa-ter supply for every dwelling, fire-retardantbuilding materials, 50 metre fuel-free and fuel-reduced zones around buildings).

We should not minimize the cost and scopeof the task here or the resistance it would meetfrom property owners whosemuch-loved plants are re-moved, lopped or burned. Theurban interface alone is manythousands of kilometres, sothe active co-operation ofthousands of volunteers fromthe community would also beneeded.

If effective, this would re-duce the intermittent devas-tating property losses, al-though no asset-protectionzone will completely excludea high intensity fire.

The rest of the bush and for-est, mainly on public land,would be left largely untended except in theremnant, forest industry areas. It would there-fore suffer regular catastrophic fires, whichwould ultimately transform the landscape in amanner that is difficult to predict. Most of theNational Park area, however, is not used, so theimpact on human activity and perceptions wouldbe limited. In effect, we would protect one setof assets and leave the rest to take its chances.

2. Strategic Fuel Reduction

This would be a more active and extensive policy.It is consistent with a number of submissionsby forest experts to the various recent inquiries.

The policy would encompass the limited 3–5 per cent ‘thin red line’ as described above. Itwould undertake strategic burns progressivelyto another 15 per cent on a long (ten-year) cycleto allow access and fire control. Broad-scaleburning on a similar long cycle up to a further40 per cent of the bush would replicate/comple-ment the natural fire regime.

Thirty per cent would be untouched (exceptby unavoidable natural fires), covering sensitiveareas of rainforest, fire-sensitive plant commu-nities, regrowth forest and riparian vegetation.This is not to say that they would not burn any-way—especially if fire-fighting access contin-ues to be closed off.

Nor is it to say that the areas subject to pre-scribed burns would not suffer some loss ofbiodiversity, but the loss would be much less

than occurs in intense wild-fire. Indeed, the intentionwould be to mitigate and slowcatastrophic fires. In thissense, the burning should beregarded as pro-environment.

Thorough maintenance ofaccess tracks and strengthen-ing of the existing rural fire-fighting force would be re-quired. This would meetwidespread criticism by fire-fighters of the management offire-fighting operations lastyear and the standards of com-munications, maps and equip-ment.

This regime would recognize the probableextent of pre-European human and natural burn-ing, but would be done progressively, in a con-trolled fashion and not during the summermonths (which Aboriginal populations did do).

This would be a very ambitious programme,even allowing for the fact that most of the areaof prescribed burning would be on a selectivelong-term pattern. With a ten-year target, itwould involve burning at least 4 per cent ofthe bushfire prone areas each year. It would beimpractical without very extensive and well-coordinated effort by private land managers andthe application of considerable additional full-time resources to National Parks to effect a con-

IN EFFECT, WE HAVE

HAD THE FIRE POLICIES

RECOMMENDED BY

CONSERVATION

GROUPS FOR MANY

YEARS NOW AND THEY

HAVE FAILED. WE NEED

TO TRY A NEW WAY



tinual programme of burning. It would alsorequire a much less restrictive regime of per-mits.

Of the two options, thisappears much the preferablealternative. It would reducethe risk of catastrophic firesand the associated loss ofbiodiversity.

This alternative is also con-sistent with the thrust of theJoint Memorandum signedlast year by the Commissionerof the NSW Rural Fire Ser-vice and the Director-Generalof National Parks, which stated that, in addi-tion to burning for asset protection:

…both Services also recognise the needfor extensive burning in strategic wildfirezones…(and) As a matter of principle,both Services subscribe to the philosophy,that hazard reduction by prescribedburning is both a fire mitigation andenvironmental management tool.

It is consistent with the recommendations ofthe official reports. And it is consistent with re-search undertaken by experienced silviculturistsin NSW State Forests who have concluded thatbiodiversity is favoured by more extensive, lowintensity fires.

It is consistent with a report of the UnitedStates General Accounting Office which con-cluded, in relation to fire management in theWestern USA that

…the costs and risks of inaction aregreater than the costs and risks ofremedial action.

Hanging over both of these alternatives isthe uncomfortable fact that prescribed burninghas always been restricted to a relatively fewdays annually when the fuel is ignitable andweather conditions are judged to be safe. Thisreinforces the need for a prompt approval pro-cess, preferably decentralized to local level.

Either of these alternatives would reduce therisk of a huge damage bill and loss of life. Thesecond one would also increase the chance of sur-vival of species and thus the maintenance ofbiodiversity.

Neither would entirely prevent wildfires.

There are those who argue against the practi-cality of eliminating available fuel. Any accu-

rate measure of practicalitywould have to be weighedagainst the cost of doing noth-ing. The combined cost offighting the recent cata-strophic fires and repairingtheir damage will be veryhigh.

Other options have been of-fered which more or lessclosely approximate to the ex-isting, failed practice. TheAdditional Comments section

of the House of Representatives report noted thechange in land management practices towardsprescribed burning being done

…on a strategic basis according tonegotiated and agreed fire managementplans, and on the basis of comprehensiveresearch data…

Given the size of the fire hazard area, the im-practicability of gathering comprehensive (thatis, very detailed) research data and the impossi-bility of reaching agreement between totallyopposed philosophies, this formulation simplyprescribes inaction. In the light of last year, it isno more than irresponsibility masquerading ascaution.

CONCLUSION

We need, first, a clearer expression of what weare trying to achieve with fire management andthe conservation of fire-sensitive values, be theylife, property, amenity or ecological. On all countswe failed in 2003. If the aim is to preservebiodiversity through the retention of vegetationcover and native fauna, then the 2003 fires tellus that what we are doing is not working.

While some of what happened was naturaloccurrence, the intensity and extent of the firescan be explained by reference to human activ-ity and, more importantly, inactivity.

The broad credo of governments is to preserveall ecological values everywhere in a centrallyplanned ecology. This is patently unachievable.And governments have proved much better at

REDUCTION OF FUEL

LOADS OFFERS THE

ONLY PRACTICAL

MEANS AVAILABLE TO

US FOR MITIGATING

THE EXTREME FIRES



1. Australian Building Codes Board, ‘Strategyon Bushfires’, Media Release, March 2003.

2. Australian Conservation Foundation,‘Bushfires: The Myths, The Reality’,www.acfonline.org.au 2004.

3. Cheney, NP, ‘Bushfires—An Integral PartOf Australia’s Environment’, AustralianBureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia,1995.

4. de Kleuver, M, ‘Insurance: Lessons learntfrom the January Bushfires, Report to ACTBushfire Recovery Taskforce’ (undated).

5. de Mar, Paul, ‘Fire Management on StateForests’, Paper to NCC Conference, 2000.

6. de Mar, P, ‘Unhealthy bent to suppressionbiased policies’, Paper to 3rd InternationalWildland Fire Conference, October 2003.

7. Esplin, B, ‘Report of the Inquiry into the2003–2004 Victorian Bushfires’, October2003.

8. House of Representatives Select Committeeinto the recent Australian bushfires, ‘A Na-

REFERENCES

tion Charred: Report on the inquiry intobushfires’, 23 October 2003.

9. Hessburg, PF and Agee, JK, ‘An environ-mental narrative of Inland NorthwestUnited States forests, 1800–2000’, 2003.

10. Institute of Foresters, Submission to JointSelect Committee of NSW Parliament, 12April 2002.

11. Koperberg, Phil (Commissioner NSW Ru-ral Fire Service) and Gilligan, Brian, (Di-rector General, National Parks and Wild-life Service), Joint Memorandum, ‘HazardReduction’ (Undated), Bushfire Bulletin, Vol.25, No 2, 2003.

12. McLeod, R (AM), ‘Inquiry into the Opera-tional Response to the January 2003Bushfires in the ACT’, 1 August 2003.

13. Murphy, Dean E, ‘An Oasis of Fire SafetyPlanning Stands Out’, New York Times, 2November 2003.

14. National Parks Association of NSW, ‘Na-tional Parks Not To Blame For Bushfires’,

creating parks than looking after them. Protec-tion of the National Parks is the responsibilityof government. It is a responsibility they haveself-evidently discharged very poorly. It is a re-sponsibility they have for a long time delegatedto groups and to processes that have utterly failedto achieve what they were set up for—the pres-ervation of the most precious parts of the Aus-tralian environment. These delegated entities no-tably include the leading conservation groups,some of which are generously funded by gov-ernment to advise on bushfire management.

In effect, we have had the fire policies recom-mended by conservation groups for many yearsnow and they have failed. We need to try a newway.

If the community has a duty to respond tofire emergencies, then the government has a dutyto minimize the risks that are present. Allow-ing massive fuel build-up is not a proper dis-charge of its responsibility.

Fires have been part of our landscape for ae-ons. The question is not whether we will havebushfires, but what sort of bushfires we willhave.

For the future, we have a choice on the basisof known facts. We know that if we do not con-duct more extensive hazard-reduction burning,we will have large-scale, intense wildfires.

More prescribed burning would have to beaccompanied with dramatic changes to urbanplanning and lifestyle to prevent loss of life andproperty damage. Urban residents can no longerenjoy unrestricted close interpositioning withthe bush or forest.

For this to be effective, government must re-sume control of the policy processes and makethem work effectively. It implies giving greaterweight to the advice of land managers and localbushfire brigades, whose property and lives areat risk, than to conservation groups, bureaucratsand committees.



Post-fire pollution and erosion at Flea Creek, renowned trout-breeding stream onthe Goodradigbee River, Brindabella. One of countless examples

of catchment destruction.

Media Release, 22 January 2003.15. Nature Conservation Council, Annual Re-

ports, policy statements and media releases,www.nccnsw.org.au 2004

16. NSW Legislative Assembly, Joint SelectCommittee on Bushfires, Report on Inquiryinto 2001/02 Bushfires, June 2002.

17. NSW Rural Fire Service, Annual Reports2001, 2002, 2003.

18. NSW Rural Fire Service, Bush Fire Environ-mental Assessment Code, July 2003.

19. NSW Rural Fire Service, Bushfire Bulletin,Vol. 25, No. 1 and Vol. 25, No. 2.

20. NSW State Forests, Bush Telegraph Magazine,Winter 2003 and Summer 2003.

21. Productivity Commission, Interim Report onImpacts of Native Vegetation and BiodiversityRegulations, December 2003.

22. Pyne, Stephen J, ‘Fire’s Lucky Country’, un-dated paper.

23. Shields, James M, ‘Biodiversity Credits: ASystem of Economic Rewards for Ecologi-

cally Sustainable Management’, NSW StateForests, 6 March 1999.

24. Jurskis V, Bridges, R and De Mar, P, ‘FireManagement in Australia: the lessons of 200years’, NSW State Forests (undated).

25. State Forests of NSW, Annual Report 2002–03.

26. State Forests of NSW, Bush Telegraph Maga-zine, Summer 2003 and Autumn 2004.

27. Sydney Morning Herald, ‘Bushfire blamepinned on public’, 27 October 2003.

28. Victorian Auditor-General, ‘Fire Preventionand Preparedness’, Performance Audit Re-port, May 2003.

29. USA Forest Service, ‘Protecting People andSustaining Resources in Fire-Adapted Eco-systems’, October 2000.

30. Worboys, Graeme, Deputy Vice-ChairMountains, International Union for the Con-servation of Nature, ‘A Report on the 2003Australian Alps Bushfires’, 24 March 2003.E-mail: [email protected]



Front cover: Flaming cloud from the Broken Cart fire South Brindabella—18January 2003. One of numerous extreme fire effects.

The photographs on the front cover and on page 15 were provided by theBrindabella community. They illustrate the extreme and freakish behaviour ofthe fire and the devastating after-effects. The local community is convinced thatthe neglect of hazard-reduction burning was directly responsible for the extremenature of the fire and the widespread total destruction of the environment.

ABOUT THE PHOTOGRAPHS

Jim Hoggett is a Senior Fellow with the Institute ofPublic Affairs. Before he joined the IPA he workedextensively in the Australian public and private sec-tors. He spent 16 years in the Commonwealth Trea-sury, advising on matters such as international finance,industry policy and foreign investment and serving aterm on the Australian delegation to OECD. He wassubsequently Economic Adviser to the Business Coun-cil of Australia. He has worked in senior managementpositions in Pioneer International, Australis Media andStar City Casino.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

This Backgrounder is published by the Institute of Public Affairs Ltd (A.C.N. 008 627 727)Head office: Level 2, 410 Collins Street, Melbourne VIC 3000. Tel: (03) 9600 4744; Fax: (03) 9602 4989

E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.ipa.org.au

Aled Hoggett is a university-trained forester. In 2001,he ended a 12-year career with State Forests of NSWwhere his last position was as the organization’s Silvi-culturist. He has undertaken four years of postgradu-ate study at the University of British Columbia(Canada) examining natural disturbance process inforest ecosystems. His professional experience spansAustralia, Canada and Vietnam.

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