Whose Professionalism-separating the Institutional Roles of the Military & Police

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Whose Profess ion alism? : Sepa ra ting th e Inst itut ion al Roles of the Military & Police

Conflict Stu dies Research Centre

ISBN 1-903584 -53-1

Novemb er 2 001

Wh o se P ro fe s s i o n a l ism ? :

Se p a ra t i n g t h e In s t it u t io n a l Ro le s o f t h e Mili t a ry &

Police

Lar ry L Wat t s

With the end of the Cold War, Western reform assis tance to Central and East

European militaries reflected US and NATO concerns regarding potential challenges

to s t i ll un consolida ted democratic au th orit ies an d n ew dan gers a r is in g from non -

trad it iona l an d non -mili tary tran sn ational threa ts . In order to gua rd against the

firs t danger Central and East European authorit ies were encouraged to introduce,

as qu ickly as poss ible, the Western libera l model of dem ocratic civilian cont rol. To

address the second concern, regional authorit ies were encouraged to better

integrat e milita ry fu n ction s with th ose of law enforcemen t.

In encouraging better military-police integration, US assistance was relying

sign ifican tly on h abits learned in intera ction with Latin American tran sit ion s ta tes

an d militaries. Althou gh differing great ly from each oth er, the th reat in both ca ses

was n on-tr ad itiona l for the milita ry. In Lat in Ame rica, th e threa t was in tern al leftist

insu rgencies rather tha n a foreign m ilitary threat . In Centra l an d East Eu rope, it

was organized crime, terrorism , weapon s trafficking an d dru g sm u gglin g. Th e US

approach to the training of Latin American mili tar ies was, in fact , to have them

perform police fu n ctions. En cou raging bette r m ilita ry-police in tegration has th e

sa m e pra ctical effect.

Herein lies the central codependency issue for transition military and police

ins t itu t ions . Centra l an d Eas t Eu ropean t ran s it ion e lites mu s t contend, on th e onehand, with the s t i l l predominant insti tutional confusion result ing from the

previou sly au th oritarian govern m en ts inten tion al convergen ce of m ilitary an d police

roles un dertaken in order to ens u re the intern al defence of th eir regimes. On th e

other hand, they must also contend with the almost diametr ically opposite pull of

Western advice to better integrate their mili tary and police in order to combat the

new t ran sna t ional threats th a t h ave ar isen with the collapse of comm u nism a nd the

opening of their borders . Unless preventive measu re are taken , the pra ctical

cons equ en ce of th is is also likely to reflect ea rlier experien ce in Latin Am erica whe re

m ilitary insti tu tions as s igned policing a nd int erna l security fu nctions did not retain

th eir political n eu tra lity an d be cam e m ore directly in volved in d omes tic politics.

Approaching the problem from the perspectives of his tory and theory, this s tudy

disaggregates the ins ti tutiona l roles of th e m ilitary an d th e police an d exam ines the

different nature of their professionalism in terms of their respective tasks, expertise

an d social respons ibili ty. It th en an alyzes the practical consequ ences of

ins titu tion al convergen ce on profess ion alization an d inst itut ion al beh aviou r. It

concludes with some observations and recommendations regarding current civil-

military relations theory and practical advising.


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Th e Na t u r e o f t h e P r o b lem

Wh at was th e military designe d to do? In p rimitive societies th e m ilita ry fu n ct ion

was originally defence of the community against external foes.1 The body which

fulfilled that mission retained this defensive aspect even as i t added conquest ,

plunder, revenge, etc to i ts functions. 2 I t did these other things in addit ion to

comm u n ity defence, not in place of i t . With th e creation of the na tion-s t ate in th e

18th centu ry, the m ili tary was essen tial ly re-ass igned th e defence of the broader al l-

inclu sive comm u nity as its pr ima ry rais on d etre.

Along with th is ou tward ly-orien ted r ole, however, inst an ces of th e m ilitarys u se in a

m yriad of domestic roles remained comm onplace. Exam ples of the m ilitary

behaving as tradit ional national defender, supplementary force to the police,

independent internal security force, part isan poli t ical actor , government usurper ,

an d vigilan te terror organ ization coexist in th e contem pora ry world. Given th e

broad range of observable military behaviour, social scientists were faced with the

problem of wha t to in clu de in a defin ition of n orm al m ilitary fu n ction s. Whe reas

th e external-defens ive fu n ction was deemed t oo na rrow a descriptor , casting the nettoo broadly risked the inclusion of both normal and pathological behaviour in

th e defin ition.

The dilemma of reconciling the wide variety of military behaviour led social

scientis ts to reject an ends-based or norm-derivative definit ion based on a

consensus that the mili tary could not be usefully defined by either i ts function or

ju r is d ict ion . Th e m ilita ry, it wa s th ou gh t , cou ld be better defin ed by th e m ean s it

em ployed. As first form u lated by Harold Lasswell, the unique specialty of the

m ilitary was th e m an agem en t of violence.3

Las swells definition greatly in fluen ced t h e way we t h ink ab ou t civil-milita ry

relations a nd su bsequ ent th eoris ts h ave modified th at d efinit ion only at i ts m argins .

For Sam u el Hun tin gton, th e m ilitarys s pecial skill was the application of violence

under certain prescribed condit ions.4 According to Morris J an owitz, m ilitary

un iquenes s consis ted of i ts expertise in war-making and in the organized use of

violen ce.5 Amos Perlmutter and Will iam LeoGrande asserted that t h e militarys

designated functions are maintaining internal order and waging war. 6 It becam e

common practice for civil-military relations theorists to define the military as the

unique manager of violence whose primary functions included those tasks that

required the concentration of coercive force, both external defence and th e

m ainten an ce of interna l order .

The problem arises because, contrary to this closely held precept of civil-militaryrelations l i terature, the mili tary is neither the only insti tution specialized in the

m an agem en t of coercive force nor th e only cu stodian of th e sta tes m onopoly of

legitim ate force. Ever since th e inst itut iona l differen tiation of th e civilian p olice

from th e mili tary in the 19 th cen tu ry there ha ve been at leas t two sp ecialists in th e

m an agemen t of violence at t he comm an d of th e s ta te/ poli ty.7

Comparing our current definit ion of the mili tary with the s tandard means-based

definitions of th e police inst itut ion h igh lights th e problem. According to Carl

Klockars, the police institution is distinguished by its general right to use coercive

force by the s ta te with in th e sta tes d omes tic territory.8 David Bayley describes the

police as that institution authorized by a collect ivity to regulate social relations

within itself by u tilizin g, if n eed be, p h ysical force.9


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Police specialists universally differentiate the police from the military primarily by

its ju risdiction - the legitima te tar get of its activity. In d oin g so, th ey delimit a

sp ecific jur isdiction for th e milita ry as well. As Bayley n otes :

An army is publicly consti tuted to use force, jus t as police are, but i ts

ju r is d ic tion is ext ern a l to th e collectivity. An a rm y u ses for ce to defen d a

community from th reats outside itself; a police force protects againstth reats from within.10

Th e ad option of Las swells m ean s-b as ed d efin ition effectively su bs u med th e police

within the military rendering it definitionally impossible for civil-military theory to

distingu ish between th e two ins titut ion s. Th e theoretical ram ifications of th is over-

inclu siveness h ave, in tu rn , hobbled conceptu al developmen t an d generated fu rth er

confusion as unresolvable debates were sparked over such central questions as

whether increasing professionalism encouraged or discouraged the intervention of

th e m ilitary in dom estic politics. Concept u ally blind ed to one of th e cen tra l

phenomena under observation, social scientis ts were led into theoretical cul-de-

sacs , su ch as the search for a new pa radigm to explain Com mu nist civil-mili tary

relations.

More significantly, this theoretical shortcoming continues to be reflected in Western

practice in the form of mili tary advice and assis tance to transit ion s tates in the

rea lm of civil-military reform with frequen tly coun terpr odu ctive resu lts. Th e failure

to disaggregate military and police functions at the theoretical level has encouraged

th e ten dency of polit ical elites in tran sit ion s tates to ass ign intern al secu rity tas ks

to th eir m ili tary ins titu tions.

The problem, already debil i tat ing during the Cold War, has been further

exacerbated in the post-Cold War period as th e n eed for better integrating military

fu nctions with th ose of law enforcemen t to m an age non-tra dit ional an d n on-mili taryt ran sn at ional threats h as become a centra l concern in the US and Wes tern Europe

an d in th e advice they purvey to Centra l an d Ea s tern Eu ropean au thor it ies .11 This

flawed th eoretical us age h as directly in fluen ced US (an d NATO) m ilitary a dvice a n d

as sis tan ce to tran sit ion s tates for almost ha lf a centu ry. Its imprint is clear not

only on the US military assistance programmes (MAP) to Latin America during the

1960s an d 1970s , bu t a lso on military reform a dvice and ass is tance extended to the

pos t -Commu nis t s ta tes du r ing the 1 990s as well.12

I t is therefore not surpris ing that the tendency to consider the mili tary and police

functions as loosely interchangeable remains a hallmark of the new Western-

trained defence experts an d officials in Centra l an d Ea stern Eu rope. According to

one of the first civilian defence officials in Poland, the military is the organization

designed to bring sheer force to bear in the most efficient way possible, whenever

the s tate requires i t .13 Likewise, a leading Czech defence expert affirms that the

m ilitary is th e ins tru men t u sed to ens u re s ta te sovereignty and secu rity, as well as

a m e a n s of intervening in poli t ics and sustaining or changing the domestic

situation. 14

The continued failure to more clearly delineate military and police functions in

theory and practice places transit ion s tate el i tes in a double-bind, reinforcing a

relationsh ip of codependen cy. On the one ha n d, tran sit ion elites mu st contend

with the s t i l l predominant insti tutional confusion result ing from the previously

au th oritarian govern m ent s inten tion al convergen ce of m ilita ry an d police rolesu nd ertaken in order to en su re the intern al defence of their regimes. Unfortun ately,


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what was deemed unacceptable for a non-elected government is often readily

emb raced by weak elected governm ents a s legit imate. Unless a n d u nti l a clearer

delineation is es tablished which excludes the mili tary from internal security tasks

an d dem ilitarizes th e military this confu sion will contin u e to genera te problems . At

the same t ime, t rans i t ion author i t ies mus t a lso contend wi th the a lmos t

diametrically opposite pull of Western advice to better integrate their military and

police in order to combat the new transnational threats that have ar isen wi th thecollaps e of comm u nism an d th e opening of th eir borders . 15

The failure to recognize that two institutions with different roles and different types

of professionalization are engaged in the management of violence partially reflects

lags in t he developm en t of th eory in t he two fields . Th e th eoretical stu dy of th e

mili tary began in earnest in the 1930s and the now class ic reference works of

Hunt ington , J an owitz, an d F iner a ppeared a t the en d of the 1 950s an d beginn ing of

the 1960s .16 In contrast , l i terature on the police only began appearing in the mid

1960s , par t ly due to concerns of police abuse during the civil rights movement in

the United States .17 By the t ime th eoretical works on the police ma de th eir debu t in

force, civil-military theory was already set upon a track with a research a genda

conditioned by the broad, inclusive definition of the military institution.18 On e

artifact of this developmental pattern is the consis tent reference and explici t

compa rison to the m ilitary foun d in police literatu re an d th e contras tin g absen ce of

an y referen ces to th e police as a n in stitu tion in civil-m ilita ry relations litera tu re.19

Although police ta sks were su bsu med within s ta nd ard definit ions of the mili tarys

role, specialists have long recognized that assigning police functions to the military

is problematic for civil-military relations and particularly for civilian control of the

m ilitary. Withou t iden tifyin g it as ins titu tion al con vergence, Alfred St epa n n oted in

197 1 th at t he expans ion of th e m ilitarys r ole to inclu de intern al s ecurity

corresponded to an increased military role in domestic politics as well. 20 More

recently, Micha el Desch notes th at militar ies with in ternal security missions tend toprod u ce th e worst pa ttern of civil-milita ry relations.21 Likewise, J u an Rial ass erts

that s ince the tasks of maintaining internal order and the defence against external

threats are so entirely different, their combination runs the risk of eroding the

m ilita rys profess iona l eth os a n d of redu cing its a ccou nt ability and su bordination to

elected civilian authorities.22

Differe n t ia t ing th e Mili t a r y & t h e Po l ice

In spite of an increasingly generalized recognition that the assignment of police

ta sk s t o the m ilita ry com plicates civil-milita ry relat ions , specialist s d o not ord ina rilyinvestigate th e reason why they do so. Havin g su bsu med p olice fu nctions with in

the military, civil-military relations theory simply does not focus on the difference

between the military and police institutions or the different types of

professiona lization necess ary to each . Th is shortcoming is accom pan ied by

corresponding inabil i t ies to recognize when those insti tutions are undergoing

convergence or understand what the l ikely consequences of convergence are for

m ilita ry profess ion alization an d for th e civil-military relat ions hip genera lly.

Th e firs t s tep in u nd ersta n ding why police fu nction s are p roblema tic for th e m ili tary

is to consider why the police function differentiated from that of the military in the

firs t place. Th e s tan ding Eu ropean a rm y, th e inn ovation which serves as th e model

for contemporary mili tary es tablishments throughout the world, made i ts appeancein the 15th century and became the prevalent form of mili tary organization during


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the 17th century .23 Separ ate police bodies a ppea red only at th e end of this p eriod

and another 200 years were required before the police was insti tutional ly

differentiated from the mili tary as a general practice in the 19th century. 24

Signif icantly, the police insti tution appeared during the same period that the

m ilitary began its own p rocess of profess ion alization. Th e profess ion alization of th e

mili tary thus occurred as a process separate from the insti tutionalization and

professionalization of the police.

Prior to the 19th centu ry it was comm on p ractice to employ the m ilitary as a police

force. Policin g in its earliest form lack ed an y specializat ion , train in g or recru itmen t

an d was scarcely more th an the not a lways su ccessfu l use of military force to quell

particularly troublesome instances of collective res is tance to imposit ions such as

enslavement, conscription, and taxation.25 Loyalty was often problematic as

locally-recruited mili tary personnel were found in many instances to sympathize

with rebels protes ting new taxes, for examp le. Es pecially problem at ic were the

typically bloody and disproportionate consequences of employing the military for

crowd dispersal and internal security, wh ich tended to foster bitterness, hostility,

an d dis tru st towards p oli t ical au th ority.26

Sepa rat e civilian police organization s ca me into being largely in resp onse to th e self-

defeatin g effects of using the military for law enforcement and internal security

tasks .27 On the one hand, recruitment policies and training proved inadequate to

ens u re th e loyalty necessa ry for in terna l m issions. One the other ha n d, the

m ilitarys p rima ry expertise - th e m an agemen t of dea dly violence - ill-served th e goal

of tra n sform ing the politys power into au th ority. According to Au stin Tu rk:

As mili tary dominance and jurisdiction are achieved authorit ies

consolidate their posit ion by insti tuting a system in which internal

control is accomplished by the process of policing instead of the more

costly and less efficient one of military occupation Occupationconfirm s power; policin g tran sform s power in to au th ority.28

Contemporary mili tary part icipation in peacekeeping and peace-support missions

represents only an apparent anomaly, al though such missions also ref lect dual role

ten sions . Du ring th eir first deca des of existen ce United Nat ions pea cekeeping

forces were plagued by officers resista n ce an d genera l comp lain t th at : We are

soldiers, not policemen.29 Only with the creation of specialized training centres

and programmes s ince the late 1970s did professional soldiers generally accept

service in peace-keepin g forces as not undermining their mili tary s tatus , al though

problems s t il l rema in. 30

In many respects peacekeeping missions resemble as tute postwar occupations,

such as that practised by US forces in I taly and Japan in the af termath of World

War II, which sought t o create an acceptable civil authority along with the

restoration of civil order.31 In other respects they are closely akin to the imperial

policing of colonies where long-term political considerations influence military

operations, where use of minimum force doctrines are in effect, and where civilian

power cont in u es t o exercise con trol bu t finds th e forces on which it n orm ally relies

ins u fficien t.32 For the purposes of th is argument , the mos t impor tant common

feature of military occupations, imperial policing operations, and peacekeeping and

peace-support missions is that part icipating mili tary units are operating beyond

th eir own borders a nd am ongst a popu lation with which they do n ot identify closely.


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Throughout the his torical development of the mili tary the management of deadly

violen ce rema ined its defin in g expertise. However, the crea tion of th e na tion -sta te

an d th e in t rodu ct ion of ma ss arm ies ba sed on conscr ip t ion a lso in t rodu ced a more

at tra ctive ideology of th e military as na tional defen der. Th e new ideology

fundamentally modif ied what has been variously termed the motivational

orien ta tion or social resp ons ibility of th e profes sion al milita ry. Providin g defence

against external threats was perceived both by m embers of the insti tution and bysociety at large as a noble and necessary task. 33 The near universa l appeal and

legitimacy of this task enabled the military to rely on general conscription, rather

than a more narrow recruitment geared towards ensuring a more specif ic poli t ical

reliab ility, for its m an power.

Th is sh ift in recruitmen t ba se a dded yet an other impedimen t to the a lready exis t ing

da n ger tha t dom estic engagemen t of th e milita rys dea dly force cou ld lead to

m as sive fat alities. Simply pu t, with th e cons ecrat ion of extern al foes as the

legitim ate ta rget of its a ctivity, th e m ilitary beca me less availab le for u se in tern ally.

Involvement in police actions was now even more likely to set military personnel

against social groups with which they identif ied, thus increasing the r isk of

disobedience, defection an d inst itut ion al disintegrat ion . A distingu isha ble line

dividin g u s from them ha d been drawn at the border of th e n ation-s tate.

The more limited jurisdiction of its fully-legitimate activities allowed the military, at

least h ypothet ically, to rema in neu tra l an d ab ove pa rtisa n dom est ic politics. In

defending the community against threats i t was also defending the poli ty which

comm an ded it. Where the military is n ot alread y h eavily politicized, its na tu ral

tendency is to pro tec t th is non-par t isan s ta tu s a nd res is t a t tempts by the polity to

place it in opposition to society or an y of its com pon en t par ts . Whe re this

resis tan ce proves ins u fficient , the military ten ds to split into variou s grou ps as its

personnel are forced to contend with issues ordinarily considered resolved within

the ins t i tu t ion , such as the necessity of obedience to orders and the legit imacy of political au th orities. 34

In con tra st , the police were inst itut ion ally disa ggregated from th e milita ry at least in

pa rt to en su re a more specific resp ons ibility to a su b-sector of society. From its

initial differentiation the police institution was designed for the defence and

reproduction of the domestic s ta tus quo in terms of th e es tablished public order ,

commerce and routine patterns of social interaction. 35 Having been designed for

u se on beh alf of th e politics of s oc ial order and continuity, the police were never a

politica lly n eu tr al ins titu tion. 36 While policing came to be more narrowly

circumscribed during the course of i ts ins ti tution alization, the police remained an

integral part of the political economy of ruling.37

The evolutionary differentiation of the police was encouraged by the technical

requiremen ts of the n ew specialization. Prima ry amon g these were the em ployment

of gradations of coercive force and greater reliance on non-violent persuasion in

order to reprodu ce social order on a da ily basis in the least d isru ptive ma nn er. As

Richard Ericson notes, contemporary police commonly negotiate or der, variously

employing strategies of coercion, manipulation and negotiation. 38 The use of

deadly violence, the main expertise of the military, is strongly discouraged by

internal regulations, adminis trat ive practice, and broader legis lat ion, and many

police officers comp lete th eir careers with ou t ever firin g a s h ot while on th e job.

Police a re typically gran ted broad discretion over when , where a n d a gains t whom toen force th e law an d they exercise their resp ons ibilities as individua ls. Th e


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developm en t of in vestigation / in telligen ce tech niqu es to a llow m ore effective

m onitoring of society for th e p reven tion of cr ime/ th reats to th e social order h as

considerably increas ed t he potential of th e police as an ind epend ent poli t ical actor .

As one authority notes , s ince effective countermeasures presuppose adequate

knowledge, and because i t is impossible to know in advance just wh a t information

is useful, the scope of intelligence gathering is inherently limitless.39 The central

coordination of this intelligence capability in national police forces lend them am u ch greater poli t ical weight a n d generally a m ore expanded polit ical role th an th at

of decen tra lized police forces .

Regular mili tary personnel are not trained to use anything less than deadly force

an d th ere are no negative repercuss ions for its legit imate em ployment. Military

personnel commonly enjoy far less discretion regarding when, where and against

whom to employ this force, and they exercise their responsibilities as part of larger

m ilitary u n its rath er tha n as ind ividu als. Milita ry intelligen ce bodies in dem ocrat ic

states are typically prohibited from or greatly circumscribed in the collection of

information pertaining to civilian targets within their nation-state.

Th e m ilita ry an d police also differ in t h e a ccoun ta bility of th eir person n el before th e

law. In th e fu lfilmen t of th eir prim ar y resp ons ibilities military person nel operate

according to a separate set of laws pertaining to war and i ts prosecution.

Tra n sgress ion of th ese laws , of m ilitary regulat ion s, or of ordina ry laws a re typically

ju dged in specia l m ilita ry co u rts . Th e rea son for th is exc ept ion a lis m is th a t m ilit a ry

person nel ha ve a s pecial s tatu s a r is in g from th eir volu n tary ren u nciation of certain

civil righ ts in excha n ge for sp ecial protections . Th e comm an d hierar chy of th e

military, and to some extent the trust necessary for effective esprit de corps ,

requires soldiers to accept their orders u n condit ionally. For this reason, in cas es

where cr iminal orders have been issued and carr ied out, legal responsibil i ty

decreases as ra nk d ecreases .

In contrast , police are generally subject to the same legis lat ion and juridical

procedures as a ny other cit izen of th e s tate. A key factor in t he developmen t of

policing into a profession was its redefinition from a military force employed for

interna l secu rity pu rposes to an organization t ied to th e legal system . In stead of

being an extension of the violence potential of the state, the police now became

an ap pen da ge of th e law.40

Given that the legitimate target of police activity is within the society or community

itself, th e social respon sibility/ motivation al orien ta tion of th e police profess ion

differs significan tly from th at of th e military profess ion. Wh ereas t h e principal

target of military activity is an external foe, police activity is directed primarily

against a n intern al foe. The p olice not only ha ve the expertise appropriate to their

task, they are also granted the legit imate mandate for using their expertise against

a portion of th e domest ic popu lation . In stea d of form in g a m ore definite ba rrier

between society and an adversary lying outs ide the frontiers of the s tate as in the

case of the military, the line between us and them shifts within society itself

(an d between society an d th e polity.)

From the civil-military relations perspective the political nature of policing is the

m ost in terest in g for its impa ct on profess ion alization. Th e protection an d

reproduction of a given political, legal and social order necessarily ties the police

closer and m ore u n iquely to the poli ty th at en dorses i t . Since the social s tatu s qu o

is a lways u nequa l, inequi table an d/ or un jus t for a t least some portions of societythe police are inherently partisan and politicized. 41 In spite of the mostly public


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service role they play in contemporary democratic societies, the inherently partisan

nature of the police often l imits their general s tatus among society and l imits their

poten tial for p layin g th e role of n eu tra l arb iter bet ween compet ing political forces.42

State authorit ies tend to create layers of police with at leas t one (usually the best

funded) devoted explicitly to combating threats to the state. 43 Such s ta te secur i ty

agencies a re t ied even more directly to the polity an d a re th u s referred t o as polit ical

police, even though they may principally police offences that are not political in andof th em selves. Th e line between u s an d th em is drawn m ore clear ly an d closely

to the boun dar y aroun d th e poli ty itself.

It follows that the use of the military as an internal security force will necessarily

politicize it. In stitu tion alizing su ch roles for the m ilita ry will lead to the

pr ofes sion alizat ion of a m ilitar y-police ins titu tion. Milita ry-police ins titu tions a re

genera lly not em ployed a s s u rrogates for regular police in order t o fu lfil the fu n ction

of reprodu cin g social order on a da ily ba sis . Rather , su ch h ybrid ins titu tions are

typically assigned the role of a political police defending the regime against internal

th rea t s .

Authoritarian governments uniformly conflated their police and military institutions

so that the primary function of the mili tary was expanded to the defence of the

s ta tu s quo. Under the Sovie t -imposed Comm u nis t sys tems in Centra l an d Eas tern

Europe the military and the police were joined together as the Armed Forces. 44

The convergence of internal and external defensive tasks was fostered by the

m ilitar ization of the police an d th e regular tr an sfer a nd cross-ass ign men t of mili tary

an d police officers . Combin ing th e inh eren tly pa rtisa n a n d politicized police role

with the more neutra l mi l i tary funct ion was conscious ly pursued as a manner of

politicizing the military, with the aim of tying it closer to the polity and making it a

more reliable defender of the regime against both external and especially internal

th rea t s .

Current civil-military theory permits and provides justification for the convergence

of th ese ins titu tion s. Alfred St epa n s con ceptu alization of th e m ilitarys old an d

n ew profess iona lism illus tra tes th e pr oblem . If Step an s old p rofess iona lism is

taken to be military professionalism, with very little adaptation, his new

profess ion alism conform s to p olice p rofess ion alism .

Milit a r y Pr ofe ss io n ali sm P olic e P ro fe ss io n alis m

In s titu t ion a l fu n ction E xtern a l s ecu r ity In tern a l s ecu r ity

Skills requ ired High ly specia lized m ilita ry

skills incompatible with

political sk ills

Highly interrelated political

and military skills

Impact of professional

socialization

Renders the insti tution

politically neutral

Politicizes t h e ins titu tion

Ada pted from Alfred Step an , The New Profess ion alism of Intern al Warfare a n d Military Role

Expansion, in Alfred Stepan, editor, Au th oritarian Bra z il: Origin s , Policie s and Fu tu re , New

Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, p52.

The problem is therefore not a new professionalism so much as a dual

professionalism or even retro professionalism, harking back to the time before the

m ilitary an d the police were differen tiated. Th e poten tial impa ct of su ch

convergen ce on democratic tran sit ion an d cons olidation is enormou s. Rather th anplaying their role as mutual checks and balances in democratic systems,


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ins t i tutional convergence leads to th e creation of a cen tralized power base th at can

eas ily ch allenge th e elected p olitical au th ority.45

A military which accep ts internal security functions cannot preserve their poli t ical

neutrality over time.46 As a police role is in st itu tiona lized m ilitar y pr ofes sion alism

is t ran sform ed into s ome h ybrid of police an d m ilitary profess iona lism th at

en cour ages th e new inst itut ion to intervene in dom est ic political str u ggles. Milita ryprofessionalism converges with police professionalism as institutional roles and

tas ks converge.

Herein may lie a central motivation for praetorian is m . Under the contra dictory pu ll

of dual professionalism where internal security roles are assigned to the military, it

may be unavoidable for the mili tary to adopt an independently interventionis t role

in dom estic politics. In an effort to reconcile th eir profess ion al social resp ons ibility,

which directs th em t o rema in ab ove politics, with police tas ks t h at requ ire th em t o

undertake repressive actions against a portion of society, the only means of

guaranteeing that the mili tary is not serving part isan poli t ical purposes is if the

mili tary i tself i tself determines when, where, and against whom to direct the

repr ess ive force of th eir inst itut ion . In th is sen se, praetoria n is m ma y be a common

reaction of m ilitary-police inst itut ions seekin g to recon cile th eir du al ins titu tion al

roles.47

This is a possible interpretation of the pattern evident in Peru (1964-1974), in Brazil

(1964-198), in Chile (1973-1989), and in Argentina (1976-1983), where the

enhanced internal security roles of the mili tary contr ibuted to their seizure of

power. Nolens vole ns , the regular ass ignment of internal security functions to the

mili tary may be preparation for mili tary government as the insti tution seeks to

reconcile its politically neutral orientation with the partisan task of defending the

s ta tus quo .

Tran sit ion s tates are par t icu larly vu lnera ble to problems aris ing from t he failu re to

recognize th e d ifferen t t ypes of profess ion alization t h at inst itut ion s fu lfilling m ilitary

an d police fu n ctions u ndergo. As noted above, tran sit ion s ta te elites common ly

inherit mili tary and police insti tutions that have been intentionally combined to

some degree. Of equa l importan ce, however, is th e often exclu sion ary na tu re of

poli t ics in transit ion s tates , where poli t ical ins ti tutions are unable to produce

compromise b etween conflict ing polit ical interests an d governm ents u n in terested in

esta blish ing dialogu e or pu rsu ing consen su s with their opposit ions .

Exclusionary politics are commonly accompanied by the politicization of state

insti tutions. Ind eed, there is an observable tenden cy am ong tran sit ion s ta te

au th orities to seek th e politicization of th e military for their own en ds . In Latin

America and in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, civil ian poli t icians have

often emp loyed th e m ilit ary as an instrument against domestic poli t ical opponents

in one way or an other .48 Since the na tu re of tran sit ion polit ics frequen tly resu lts in

the underdevelopment of mechanisms for dialogue and compromise as a means of

avoiding and managing conflict , demonstrations and mass protests are easily

perceived as th reat s to th e political system . Th e convergen ce of th ree fact ors:

exclusionary politics, politicization tendencies regarding the military, and the

app eara nce of perceived intern al threats to the s i t t ing adm inis tra t ion / governmen t ,

m ay set th e s ta ge for the u se of the m ilitary as an in terna l security force.49

Western mili tary advice based upon muddled theory has proven i tself counterproductive in circumstances ranging from assis tance aimed at countering


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armed insurgency to advice on establishing civilian control of the military where

governments have fe l t threa tened by unarmed demons tra t ions and t rade union

protests . In the 1960s an d early 1970 s, interna l secu rity was the domina nt

rationale a nd objective of US military assistance programmes (MAP) to Latin

America. 50 While the long term effects of that aid did indeed assist in defeating

insurgency and promoting rural development, i t also directly contr ibuted to the

creation of military-police institutions an d may have contr ibuted indirectly to theins tallation of m ilitary regimes in th e area .51

Th is d ilemm a lies in th e fact th at m ilitary coun terins u rgen cy specialis ts in the West

are t ra ined s pecifically to deal with, or train others to deal with, insurgencies in

other s ta tes .52 Counterinsurgency for them is fundamentally a task of external

secu rity. Th ere is no con vergence effect for th e Western military specialist

operating against adversaries beyond the borders of his s tate. 53 The s i tuation is

very different, however, for the militaries in those states where counterinsurgency

operations are required s ince they are the most suitable insti tutions to carry them

out . Thes e coun terin su rgen cy/ intern al secu rity tas ks inexorably lead to the

convergence of m ilitary an d p olice in stitu tion al roles.

Th ere ar e n o eas y solutions to this dilemm a. Effective coun terins u rgency often

requ ires the stru ctu re an d coordina tion of a fu lly m ilitary organ ization. However,

explicit u n dersta nd ing an d recognit ion of the convergence problem beforehan d m ay

lead to the developmen t of more effective m echan isms for m onitoring a n d cou nter-

ba lan cing th e increa sed powers of th e resu ltin g m ilitary-police inst itut ions . Beyond

th at , th e cau tion of Larry Diam ond an d Marc Plattn er is worth y of men tion:

As soon a s possible, th e m ili tary mu st also be rem oved from su rveillan ce,

policin g, m ediation, an d intimida tion of dom estic political life. Th is ma y

well require a far-reaching reorganization of the intelligence apparatus,

with institutional separation between foreign intelligence and domesticcrimina l an d an titerroris t intell igen ce. It also often requ ires su bsta ntial

professiona l enh an cemen t a n d training of th e civilian police (an d pos sibly

the creation of an intermediate riot-control and antiterrorist force). 54

Ins u rgency/ cou nterins u rgency is th e ha rd case of the Western as s is tan ce

ins titut ion al convergen cedysfu n ction al civil-m ilita ry relations codepen den cy. In

cases where armed insurgency is not an issue as , for example, in Central and

Eastern Europe, civil-mili tary relat ions theory as i t currently s tands also produces

am bigu ous a nd contr adictory ad vice on th e domestic u se of th e mili tary. It is n ot

u ncom mon for theoris ts / advisors to clearly s ta te th e need for the m ili tary to be

protected from politicians who would use their authority over it to enhance

partisan interests and their own power, and then insis t that the mili tary has an

obvious duty to protect governments from illegal interventions by any party,

including those res iding within the s tate.55 Even where it is explicitly noted that

poli tical neu trality an d n on-par tisa ns hip requ ire th e m ili tary to forgo the temp tation

to cons ider itself th e u ltim ate gua rdian of th e st ates s ocial/ political order , it is

also recomm ended th at th e military u nd ersta nd its legit ima te role as servan t of th e

governm ent in power rath er th an as servan t of the s ta te.56

Th ere ha ve been at least four incidents in Centra l an d Eas tern Eu rope s in ce the fal l

of Communism where s i t t ing governments used or at tempted to use the mili tary as

an internal security force against what they deemed to be threats to the poli t ical

system . In al l four incidents t he respective governm ents ju stified th eir actions a s alegal response to illegal challenges to the existing political order and legitimate


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governm ent. Of thes e, perhaps th e most n otorious was Ceau sescu s m obilization of

th e a rm y u nd er th e false just ification of foreign in vasion in Decemb er 19 89 in order

to defend h is regime against widesprea d popular dem onst rations . After init ial

confusion fed by security police provocations, the military sided with the Romanian

population against Ceausescu determining the outcome of the revolution and

pres ervin g the m ilitary in s titut ion at th e cost of som e 1,0 00 lives, over 20% of which

were military casualties.57

In Hun gary, in October 19 90, th e Democratic Forum governm ent of J oszef An tall

at tem pted to call in th e military again st s tr iking trans port workers . The m ove was

blocked at the last moment, and a civil-military crisis narrowly averted, by the veto

of President Arpad Goncz, an opposit ion party member, with s trong backing from

the military.

In March 1997, the adminis trat ion of Sali Berisha called in the Albanian Army

against protesting victims of governm ent- tolerated pyramid schem es. Berish a

ju s tified h is m ove on th e ba s is of th e illega l n a tu re of th e dem on s tra t ion s a n d

labeled th e dem ons tra tors red com m u n ist u n its directed b y foreign intelligence

agents .58 The military disintegrated, s p li t t ing into three factions with the bulk of

the soldiers s iding with the protesters .59 This dis integration was accompanied by

th e opening of th e mili tarys weapons s tores to the p u blic, and the s u bsequ ent

proliferation of arm s a m ong the p opulation contr ibuted to the general break down of

law enforcement capabilities and social order, necessitating the intervention of a

number of NATO and non-NATO militaries in the UN sanctioned Operation Alba in

April 1997.

In January 1999, the adminis t ra t ion of Pres ident Emil Cons tant inescu and h is

Democratic Convention governm ent in Roma n ia ordered t he arm y to deploy against

miners protesting their exclu s ion from decis ions on the t iming and geographic

dis tr ibution of mine closures .60 After declaring the protest illegal the presidencyan d th e governm ent a lleged th at th e miners demon stra tion consti tu ted a th reat to

nat iona l security mounted by the neo-communist opposition and foreign

forces.61 A last m inu te decis ion of the Prime Minis ter to a ccept discus sion with the

miners avoided a direct confrontation between the mili tary and the miners but did

n ot avoid resen tmen t of senior officers towards the govern men t a n d a dm inis tra t ion

for what they deem ed illegal and inappropriate orders to deploy against a socio-

econ omic protest .62

In all of these cases, political elites believed that since they possessed the authority

to command the mili tary their intention to employ i t as an internal security force

was fu lly jus tified. Tru ly, from a con st itutiona l an d legal pers pective th e

governm ent/ adm inis tra t ion p ossessed th e r ight to call on th e military in s u pport of

th e civil adm inis tra t ion. The issu e, however, is n ot who can comma n d th e military

to do what, nor is i t to whom the mili tary owes service, but rather for what

pu rposes it can be legit imately u sed withou t dysfu n ctiona l repercus sions . If th e

mili tary is to be kept out of domestic poli t ics then, as Diamond and Plattner

conclude: Combating crime and controllin g violent or illegal domestic protests

sh ould not b e th e bu siness of the m ili tary.63

Th e problem of pra ctical advising derived from fau lted th eory is furt he r comp licated

when advisers overlook the fact that their recommendations are based on

equivocal results, both for the goal intended and for civil-military relations. 64 A

case in point is advocacy of an increased role for the military in drug interdiction.There is an identifiable body of opinion emerging in the US, for example, that is


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seriou sly critical of th e u tility of su ch m issions and of their impact on the health of

th e m ilitary an d th e civil-milita ry relat ion sh ip.65

The dilemma of Western advice is most difficult regarding problems that require

greater mili tary-police cooperation because most Western advisers are apparently

oblivious to the fact that these transition states have not yet fully re-differentiated

th eir police an d military in stitu tion s. Th e predictab le resu lt of th eir ad vice in su chcases , when i t is taken to heart , is to renounce reforms aimed at re-establishing

th is clear differen tiation. The att itud e of Roma n ias Dem ocratic Convention

governm ent towards th e two in sti tutions du ring 1999 -2000 i llu stra tes the problem.

When the m iners ma rched t oward Bu cha rest , neither th e defence m inis ter (who, as

former inter ior m inis ter , h ad previou sly comm an ded th e police an d genda rmes ) nor

th e depu ty defence m inis ter were h esitant in proclaiming th eir willingnes s to order

the m ilit ary to use all of the means at i ts disposal to compel the miners to s tand

down.66 At the height of the cr is is , the deputy defence minis ter was transferred to

th e post of inter ior minis ter , t ran sferr ing with him th ree army genera ls . In th e

pu blic discu ssion after the events both the inter ior m inis ter an d th e ju stice minis ter

advocated a blan ket am nes ty for the m ili tary regarding th e 1989 revolu tion in order

to facilitate i ts u se by th e cu rrent governm ent for intern al security tasks .67

Subsequently, long-discussed plans for the demilitarization of the police were

shelved during the res t of 1999-2000 s ince i t was considered that such a move

would diminish both police effectiveness and military-police cooperation during a

period of increasing crime and multiplying non-mili tary threats to the national

secu rity. Fortu n ately, with in the first six m ont h s of th eir m an da te followin g th e

November 2000 elections, the new adminis trat ion of Ion I l iescu and his Social

Democrat ic government adopted an unambiguous s tance agains t the in ternal

employment of the military (aside from natural disaster relief) and introduced

legislation de-militarizing the police, while the new defence minis ter insti tutedmeasures to depoliticize the military.68 However, there is nothing immutable about

th ese policies . Unless Western advice is u n am bigu ous in th is regard, the potential

return of the Democratic Convention or any of i ts consti tuent part ies currently in

opposit ion to government in 2004 could roll-back this progress and recreate the

same dysfunctional policies.

Means -ba sed d efinitions of th e in stitu tions of st ate coercion, initially con ceived a s a

way of more accurately defining the military, have actually complicated our

understanding of both that insti tution and of the police, part icularly where their

roles an d profess ion alization converge. It m ay be more u seful to th eory

developm en t to recons ider the adoption of a norm -derivative definition. Th e

m ilitary, al thou gh i t is often ca lled u pon to perform oth er ta sks , is th at ins titu tion

of s tate coercion designed for use against external foes and i t accomplishes this

ta sk prima rily th rou gh th e m an agemen t of leth al violence. It is only in

concentrating on this res tr icted role and jurisdiction that the mili tary can remain

poli t ically neutra l over the long term. Peacekeeping an d peace su pport m issions,

the modern variant of imperial policing albeit for nobler ends, do not adversely

impact that neutrali ty when they are confined to operations beyond the borders of

th e p art icipating m ilitary ins ti tution.

The police, on the other hand, is the insti tution of s tate coercion designed for use

with in th e domestic commu n ity to defend a n d reprodu ce order on a da ily bas is . In

order to accomplish their task the police employ gradations of force, relyingprimarily on negotiat ion and persuasive coercion but extending in extremis also to


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th e us e of letha l force. Becaus e of the n atu re of the ta sk, policing is a n inh erently

pa rtisa n an d political act . Th erefore, th e en gagemen t of th e milita ry in

policing/ intern al secu rity fu nct ions n ecess arily politicizes it. Su ch politicization is

coun terprodu ctive to dem ocratic cons olidat ion.

On the practical level, if codependency is to be avoided it is crucial that assistance

and advis ing to transit ion s tates explici t ly recognize and understand the centralproblem: military institutions assigned policing and internal security functions will

not retain their political neutrality and will become more directly involved in

dom estic politics. It ha s been widely noted t h at civilian politician s in tran sition

st ate s, includ ing new dem ocracies, often seek t o politicize their m ilitaries in order to

gain or retain th e advanta ge in part isan polit ical competi t ions . Calling u pon th e

mili tary to defend the poli t ical s tatus quo during internal cr ises is the most

concrete exam ple of th is ph enomen on.

There are a number of concre te measures which can be taken to prevent such

convergence. Firs t , th e police an d i ts fu nctions n eed to be fu lly sepa rated from th e

m ilitary. Their task s are essen tial ly in compat ible an d combining th em en coura ges

ina pp ropriate political in tervention by th e milita ry. Second , an d closely related, th e

police mu st be dem ilitarized as soon as possible. Person n el cross-a ss ign me n t

m u st en d. Th e two tas ks requ ire two different s orts of expertise an d resu lt in t wo

different sorts of professionalization.

Until separation and demili tar ization are successfully carr ied out, the two

insti tutions will not comprise part of the system of mutual checks and balances

cha racteris t ic of dem ocracies . In stead , they will represen t a tem pting ins ti tutiona l

power ba se for ch allen gers to th e legitim ate govern men t. Until th is sepa ra tion is

accomplished, advising that encourages closer or better integrated military-police

cooperation in order to enhance the capabil i ty to deal with non-tradit ional, non-

m ilitary tran sn ationa l threats is also likely to un derm ine th e process of in sti tution alre-differen tiation an d comp romise dem ocratic civilian con trol of th e m ilitary. Modes

of police-military cooperation and coordination that have proven themselves

effective for comba ting th ese th reats in cons olidated democracies can n ot be s imp ly

tran sferred with out u ninten ded con sequen ces. This is not to deny the uti lity or

even th e need for su ch cooperation an d coordination. Rather , i t is only to s ignal the

need for careful consideration of its likely impact on professional identities and

dem ocratic consolidation in tr an sit ion s tates .

Wherever possible, the m ili tary in tran sit ion s tates sh ould be s tron gly discoura ged

from assuming any internal security functions and the civil ian poli t ical leadership

sh ould be s trongly discoura ged from as signing it su ch roles . Given th e tenden cy of

civilian authorities in new democracies to enlist the military in the domestic

political competition, it is advisable that the domestic use of the military is as

s tr ict ly controlled as possible, for instance, by subjecting such use to the prior

democratic approval of elected legislatures, where both government and opposition

have a voice, rather than arrogating such decis ions to the executive branch

(govern men t or pres idency).


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ENDNOTES1 See, eg, Maurice Davie, The Evolution of War, New Haven, Yale University Press,

192 9, pp3 an d 229. See also, Elman R Service, Primitive Social Organization: An

Ev olu tion ary Pers pective , New York, Random, 1962; and Morton Fried, The Evolution of

Political Society , New York, Random, 1968.2

Kenneth Otterbein noted in his s tudy of 46 primitive societies that the mili taryfought for economic reasons in 37 cas es, for social/ prestige reas ons in 1 5 cas es, an d for

reason s of polit ical control in 9 cas es, whereas all 46 fou ght for d efence of the comm u nity.

Kenn eth B Otterbein, The Evolution of W ar, New York, HRAF Press , 197 0, pp 66-6 7.3 Harold Lasswell, The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence, American Journal

of S ociology , Vol XLVI, (J an u ar y 1941 ), pp4 55-4 68.4 Samuel P Hunt ington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-

Military Rela tions , Camb ridge, Harvard University Press , 195 7, pp1 1-12.5 Morris J an owitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Glencoe, IL,

Free Press , 1971, p15.6 Am os Perlmu tter & William M LeoGran de, Th e Part y in Uniform : Toward a Th eory of

Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems, The American Political Science

Review , Vol 76, No 4 (Decemb er 19 82 ), pp7 82.

7 Lasswell implicitly noted the military-police duality in the titles of his subsequentwork: The Threat Inherent in the Garrison-Police State, in Na tional S ecu rity and Ind iv id ual

Freedom , New York, 1950, p23-49, and The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the

Garrison-Prison State, in Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R M MacIver, editors,

Perspectives on a Troubled Decade: Science, Philosophy, and Religion, 1939-1949 , New York,

1950, pp323-328.8 Carl B Klockars, The Idea of Police , Beverley Hills, Russell Sage, 1985, pp9 and 12.

See also, Car l B Klocka rs , editor, Thinking About Police , New York, 1983.9 David H Bayley, The Police and Political Development in Europe, in Charles Tilly,

editor, The Formation of National States in Western Europe , Princeton, Princeton University

Press , 1975, p328 .10 Bayley in Tilly (19 75), pp3 28 -329 .11 For example, both the US Army War College and the US National War College

dedicated their annual s trategy conferences in 2000 to the problem of homeland defenceagains t th ese threa ts .12 The rationale that drove US mili tary assis tance programmes is outl ined in Willard F

Barber and C Neale Ronning, In te rn al S ecu rity and Military Pow er, Coun te rins urge ncy and

Civic Action in Latin America , Ohio State University Press , 1966. See also, Depar tm ent of

Defence, Regional Conflict Working Group of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term

Strategy, Comm itmen t to Freed om: Security Ass is tance a s a US Policy Ins trum ent in th e Third

World, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, May 1988.13 J an u sz On yszkiewicz, Polan ds Road to Civilian Contr ol, in Diam ond & Platt n er

(1996), p99.14 Stefan Sarvas, Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern

Europe, Arm ed Force s & S ocie ty , Vol 26, No 1 (Fall 1999), p103.15

There is considerable trepidation over the empowerment of the mili tary as lawenforcers given the possibil i ty for abuse and related threat to freedom even in the US The

first recommendation of the US Army War College conference was, in fact, to avoid granting

th e US mili tary a greater law enforcement/ int erna l secur ity ma n date as a quick an d easy

solution to the complex issues surrounding homeland defence. Strategic Studies Insti tute,

Conference B rief: US Army Wa r College 1 1th Ann ual S trategy Conference , Carlis le Barrack s,

PA, April 11-13 200 0, pp3 -4. Similar concern is expressed in J G Diehl, The Cop and the

S oldier: An Enta ngling Alliance?, Carlisle Barra cks , US Arm y War College, 19 97, Vol 1. See

also, Geoffrey B Demarest, The Overlap of Military and Police in Latin America , Fort

Leavenworth , Foreign Militar y Stu dies Office, 1996 .16 Alfred Vagts, A His tory of Militaris m : Rom ance and Re alities of a Profes s ion , New

York, Norton, 1937, is generally cited as the beginning of modern civil-military relations

th eory. The firs t edit ions of Hun tington & J an owitz app eared in 195 7 and 196 0,

respectively, closely followed by Samuel E Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of theMilitary in Politics , Lond on, Pa ll Mall, 19 62.


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15

17 The evolution of police literature is discussed in David H Bayley, The Police and

Political Change in Contemporary Perspective, La w and S ocie ty Revie w , Vol 6, No 1 (Au gu st

197 1), pp19 -112. Ear ly landm ar k works in clu de Micha el Ban ton, The Policeman in the

Community , New York, Basic Books, 1964; David H Bayley, The Police and Political

Develop m ent in Ind ia , Princeton, Princeton University Press , 1969; Egon Bittner, Th e

Functions of the Police in Mode rn S ociety : A Review of Back groun d Factors, Current Practices ,

and Possible Role Models , Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970; Bayley in

Tilly (1975), pp328-379; Peter K Manning, Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing,

Cam bridge, M.I.T. Press , 1977; and Herm an Goldst ein, Policing a Free Society , Cambridge,

Ballinger, 1977.18 It deser ves n ote tha t political science neglected police th eory m ore gener ally. One

authority notes that: One can find discussions of the s tructure of governments , the s tate,

the meaning of s tabil i ty and change, legit imation processes, control and coercion, yet the

police, the agency which is central to how such policies are effected and what impact they

have are notable mainly by their absence. Otwin Marenin, Police Performance and State

Rule: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of Coercion, Comparative Politics , Vol 16, No 1

(October 198 5), p1 19.19 See, eg, Hun tington (1957 ), J an owitz (196 0), Alfred St epa n , Re th ink ing Military

Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone , Princeton, Princeton University Press , 1988; LarryDiam ond & Marc F Plattn er, editor, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy , Balt imore, Johns

Hopkins University Press , 199 6; J ohn P Lovell & David E Albrigh t, editors, To Sheathe the

Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy , Westport, CT, Greenwood, 1997;

David R Mares, Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin

Am erica , S ou th ern As ia , an d Ce n tra l Eu rop e , Boulder, Westview, 1998; and Constantine P

Danopoulos & Daniel Zirker, editors, The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc,

Boulder, Westview, 1999.20 The new look professionalism was first noted in Luigi R Einaudi & Alfred C Stepan

III, La tin Am erica n Ins titu tional Develop m ent: Ch anging Pers pectives in Peru and Braz il, #R-

58 6-DOS, Sa n ta Monica, RAND, April 19 71, pp 6-7. It was r efined in St epa n s, Th e New

Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role-Expansion, in Alfred Stepan, editor,

Au th oritarian Bra z il, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, and his Reth ink in g Military

Politics : Braz il an d the S outh ern Cone , Princeton, Princeton Un iversity Press , 19 88.21 Michael C Desch, Threat Environments and Military Missions, in Diamond &

Plattn er (19 96 ), pp13 -14 . See also, Sa m u el P Hu n tington , New Contin gencies, Old Roles,

Join t Force s Qu arte rly , Vol 1 (Au tu mn 199 3), pp3 8-43.22 J u an Rial, Arm ies an d Civil Society in Latin Am erica, in Diam ond & Plat tn er

(1996), p56.23 The s tanding army appeared in France wi th the es tabl ishment of the Compagnies

dOrdonnance in 1445 , and in En glan d with t he New Model Arm y in 1645 . Perman ent

skeleton regiments appeared in Italy and Spain in the early 1600s whereas a s tanding

force was not created in Pru ssia un til 165 5-1660 . Sam u el E Finer, Stat e an d Nation-

Bu ilding in Eu rope: The Role of th e Arm y, in Cha rles Tilly, The Formation of National States

in W es tern Eu rope, Princeton, Princeton Un iversity Press , 1 975, p 99.24 Again, France led the pack with a separate police in the 17th century while Great

Britain, Italy an d Germa n d id so in th e mid an d late 19th centu ry. Bayley in Tilly (1975 ),

pp3 42-34 7. As Egon Bittn er notes: Th e t iming of th e foun dation of th e modern police is

sequentially the last of the basic building blocks in the s tructure of modern executive

govern men t. Egon Bittn er, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of

Back ground Factors , Cu rren t Practice s , and Pos s ible Role Mod els , New York, J as on Aron son ,

1980, p102.25 Austin T Turk, Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defence of Authority , Beverley

Hills , Sage, 1982, p22. The s pecialized tra ining an d recru itment of th e police cont inu ed to

lag int o the 20t h cen tu ry. Brit ish cons tab les were firs t given t raining differentiated from

m ilitary inst ru ction only in 190 7. Bayley in Tilley (197 5), p333 .26 For example, such l i teral overkil l occurred in the Gordon Riots and the Peterloo

Massacre in Great Britain at the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century.

Bayley in Tilly (19 75), p357 . See also Thom as A Critchley,A His tory of Police in En gla nd andWales , London, Cons table, 1978.


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27 First in France, then in Italy and Germany, a separate mili tary force possessing

heavier arms and greater mobili ty - the Gendarmerie (Carabinieri in Italy) - was initially set

u p for policing pu rposes. This body was recru ited, paid an d trained by the variou s War

Ministries but comm an ded by th e Int erior Ministries . In Italy, th e Guardia de Publica

Sicurezza was later created to replace the Carabinieri in large cities since the latter were

considered too rigid to handle the manifold duties of city policing. Bayley in Tilly (1975),

p348 .28 Tu rk (198 2), pp21-2 2.29 Charles Moskos Jr in Morris Janowitz & Jaques Van Doorn, On Military Ideology ,

Rotterda m, Rotterdam Un iversity Press , 1971, p2 2. See also David N Soloma n, The

Soldierly Self and the Peace-Keeping Role: Canadian Officers in Peace-Keeping Forces, in

J aqu es Van Doorn, editor, Military Profes s ion and Military Re gim es , The Hague, Mouton,

1969, p65.30 See, eg, L L Miller, Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive

Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia, Arm ed Forces & S ocie ty , No 23 (1997), pp4 15-450 .31 See, eg, Harry L Coles & Albert K Weinberg, US Army in World War II Special Studies,

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors , Washington, DC, Center of Military History, US

Arm y, 1986.32

See, eg, Major-General Sir Charles W Gwynn, Im perial Policin g, London, Macmillanan d Co, 1936, especially pp1-33.33 See, eg, M R van Gils, editor, The Perceived Role of the Military , Rotterdam,

Rotterda m Un iversity Press , 197 1, an d van Doorn (1969).34 Every military is characterized by a dual loyalty tension owing to its twin roles of

defend er of th e na tion-st ate (society) an d servan t of th e centra l poli t ical au th ority. Fin er

(196 2), pp2 5-26.35 As Philip J ohn Stea d n otes, u n til th e ninet eent h cen tu ry, th e word police signified

th e interna l govern an ce of th e comm u nity. Philip J ohn Stea d, The Police of France , New

York, MacMillan , 198 3, p 3.36 Turk (1982 ), p115 . Likewise, David H Bayley sta tes th at police forces are th e

creat u res of politics in Bayley (19 71 ), pp 91 -112 .37 Maren in (1985 ), p102. See also the Introdu ction in J ohn D Brewer, Adrian Guelke,

Ian Hume, Edward Moxon-Browne & Rick Wilford, The Police, Public Order and the State:Policing in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic, the USA, Israel, South Africa,

and China , New York , St Mar tin s Pres s, 1 99 6, p pxiii-xxxi.38 Richard V Ericson, Reprod ucin g Ord er: A S tu d y of Police Patrol W ork, Toronto,

University of Toronto Press, 1982, p9.39 Tu rk (1982), p16 4.40 Mann ing (19 77), p4 0. However, variations in th e organ izat ion of police in stitu tions

are far m ore extreme tha n th e alm ost un iversal s tru ctu re of mili tary forces. For exam ple,

the police in France and Italy are s t i l l considerably more t ied to the s tate and subject to

administrative control than those of Great Britain or the US, corresponding to the greater

role of n at ion al p olice in p olitics genera lly.41 Since their task is managing order, policing is always politicized as order is always

seen, by some, as u nequ al and inequ itable. Marenin (1985 ), p112. See also, Ericson

(19 82 ), p7. The politicization is at times mu ch more direct. For exam ple: "For m ost of

modern American police his tory, promotion as well as hiring and firing was almost

exclu sively a m at ter of ones r elation sh ip to th e local political par ty in p ower. Klocka rs

(198 5), pp5 8-60.42 Marenin, for inst an ce, describes th e police fu nction a s indefens ible an d n ecessary . . .

indefensible because, so far, i t has always been unjust; i t is necessary because even

injus tice n eeds order. Maren in (19 85 ), p11 9. As Bittn er point out, policing by n ecessity

has divisive effects in society and the police must also contend with the stigma of constant

dea lin g with evil, crime, perversity, an d disorder. Th ough it ma y n ot be rea son ab le, it is

common that those who fight the dreadful end up being dreaded themselves. Egon Bittner,

Th e Police Char ge, in Richa rd J Lu n dm an , editor, Police Behaviour: A Sociological

Perspective, New York, Oxford University Press , 19 80 , p3 9.43

See, eg, Tom Bowden, Guarding the State: The Police Response to Crisis Politics inEurope, Britis h Jou rn al of La w and S ociety , No 5 (Su mm er 1978), pp6 9-88. While th is

ph enom enon is un iversa l , it is particularly evident am ong auth oritarian s tates . See, eg, E K


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Bramstedt , Dictators h ip and Polit ica l Police : Th e Te ch n iqu e of Con trol by Fear, London,

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945.44 As of 2001, the consti tutions of a number of these countries s t i l l retained this

overa rch ing definition .45 The danger is particularly great when the mili tary is assigned tasks of domestic

intelligence gat h ering. See eg, Chr istoph er Clap h am & George Philip, editors , The Political

Dilem m as of Military Regim es , London, Croom Helm, 1985, pp142-144; and Stepan (1988),

pp1 4-44 especially.46 As Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner note, the more the mili tary is assigned internal

security functions, the greater the risks of i ts becoming embroiled in domestic polit ical

conflicts, an d of its wieldin g democra tically un accou n ta ble power in civic life. Diamon d &

Plat tn er (1996 ), pxxxi.47 Classic works on praetorianism may err in considering the Roman Praetorian Guard

to be milita ry. Their role was confin ed to the pr otection of th e polity th e Em peror against

prima rily domes tic th reats , a role com mon ly performed toda y by sta te secur ity police. See

eg, Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments , Englewood Cliffs,

NJ, Pren tice-Hall, 197 7, especially pp 2-29 .48 Micha el C Desch m akes th is point in Diamon d & Plattn er (199 6), p14. See also,

Mares (1996), p18; Anton Bebler, ed, Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States:Central and Eastern Europe in Transition , Westport, CT, Praeger, 1997; Elizabeth P

Coughlan, Democratizing Civilian Control: The Polish Case, Arm ed Force s & S ocie ty , Vol

24, No 4 (Su mm er 1998), pp5 19-53 3; and S arvas (199 9), p114.49 Mares (1996), p18.50 See, eg, David F Ronfeldt & Lu igi R Eina u di, In te rn al S ecu rity and Military As s is ta nce

to Latin America in the 1970s: A First Statement, Report #R-924-ISA, Santa Monica, RAND,

1971, p1.51 The politicizin g effects of su ch a ss istan ce were noted ea rly on. See, eg, United Sta tes

Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs ,

United States Military Policies and Programmes in Latin America , Hearings , June-July 1969,

91s t Congress , 1s t ses sion, US Governm ent Printing Office, Wash ington, DC, 19 69.52 See, eg, th e pr ogram m es of th e British Special Air Services (SAS)

Coun ter/ Revolu tiona ry Warfare Staff College at Cam berley, England.53 This also cha ra cterizes ma rgina l cases su ch as t ha t of Ireland, Corsica an d Sar dinia.54 Diamond & Plattner (1996), pxxx.55 See, eg, the otherwise provocative and insightful argument in Douglas L Bland, A

Un ified Theor y of Civil-Militar y Relat ions , Arm ed Forces & S ocie ty , Vol 26, No 1 (Fall 1999),

pp7 -26, especially pp13 -14.56 Frank E Fields & Jack J Jensen, Military Professionalism in Post-Communist

Hungary and Poland: An Analysis and Assessment, Eu rop ean S ecu rity , Vol 7, No 1 (Spring

1988), pp119 and 13 9.57 Larry L Watts, The Romanian Army in the December Revolution and Beyond, in

Daniel N Nelson, editor, Rom ania Af te r Ty ranny , Boulder, Westview, 1992 , pp9 5-126. See

also, Romanian Military Archives, Arm ata Rom an a in Revolu tia d in Dece m brie 19 89: S tu d iu

documentar, Bucharest , Editura Mili tara, 1998.58 Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska and Carolina Fernandez, The Army in Albania, in

Dan opoulos & Zirker (1999 ), p2 10.59 Denny Lane, The Disintegration of the Albanian Army, Med ite rra nean Qu arte rly ,

Vol 9, No 2 (Spring 1 99 8), p1 9.60 The mobilization required a parliamentary-approved government ordinance in the

abs ence of an externa l th reat. The ordin an ce regarding sta tes of s iege and sta tes of

emergency, No 1/ 1999, was forwarded to Par liam ent on J an ua ry 21 1999 , bu t was th en

withdra wn u na pproved.61 For administration charges see Rom ania Lib era an d Na tional, J anua ry 27 1999 , and

Ad evaru l, Febru ary 6 1999.62 Au th ors int erviews. This resentm ent was widely discus sed in th e press and t he

government and administration made a series of public declarations to allay the tension.

See, eg, Cronica Roma na , Febru ary 26 1999.63 Diamon d & Plattn er (19 96), pxxx. See also Desch in ibid, p2 6 an d Rial in ibid, p62.


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64 This applies to ins u rgency an d coun terinsu rgency as well. See, eg, Richa rd L

Rutledge, United S tates Future Involvem ent in Ins urgency: No Simp le Mode l, Carlis le Barra cks

PA, US Arm y War College, March 20 19 93.65 See, eg, Carl H Builder, Me as urin g th e Leverage : As s es s ing Military Con trib ution s to

Dru g Inte rd ict ion , Santa Monica, RAND, 1993; Gary C Carlson, Los t in th e Dru g W ars : Tim e

for a Ne w Parad igm , Carlisle Barracks PA, US Army War College, February 9 1993; Michael

F DeMayo III, Counternarcotics Campaign Planning: A Basis for Success or a Malaise for the

Military ?, Fort Leavenworth, KS, US Army Command and General Staff College, School of

Advanced Military Studies, 1992.66 Cronica Roma na an d Curierul Na tiona l, J an u ary 20-21 1999. The Romanian Genera l

Staff was n ot cons u lted beforehan d.67 See, eg, Cronica Roma na , Febru ary 26 1999.68 Larry L Watts, The Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations, Problems of Post-

Communism , forthcoming.


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A revised form of th is pap er will appea r in Robin Rem ington, editor, "Codepen den cy

& Globalization: Central , East , Southeastern Europe", Boulder , Rowman &

Littlefield, forth com ing.

Discla imer

Th e views express ed a re th ose of th e

Au thor a n d n ot necessa rily those of the

UK Ministry of Defence

ISBN 1-903584-53-1


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Whose Professionalism-separating the Institutional Roles of the Military & Police