Why Groups Divide: Understanding the Mechanisms that Lead to Polarization in Deliberative Polling™

Shawn TutejaB.S. Mathematics ’15

M.S. Statistics ’15

Introduction

Polarized Society

• Congress: divided societies are unproductive• Studies show that inter-party marriages are

increasingly frowned upon (~9% of couples are Democrat-Republican)• Democrats and Republicans have stated

that they tend to avoid each other in social contexts.

But Is Polarization Bad?

• Polarization is not inherently bad– It often leads to debate

• In the United States, divisions are often not based on factual or researched opinions.

Phantom Opinions

• 1975 George Bishop• 1991 Washington Post• Pew Research Center 2014

Can Education/Deliberation be the Solution?

• Studies show that people choose news that they agree with.

• A recent Pew Research Center showed that 47% of conservatives get their news from Fox News, whereas liberals get their news from a blend of CNN, MSNBC, and the New York Times.

• The same study shows that people discuss news with like-minded individuals.

Closed-loop debate is futile

Research Question

Research Question

• What explains the shifts in group opinions that occur during deliberations?– Radicalization – the shift of a group in the

direction of the pre-deliberation views; indicated by change in median).

– Group-Splitting – the division of the group following deliberation (e.g. radicalization when there are multiple factions); indicated by increase in variance

Extrema A Extrema B

Deliberation

Spectrum of opinion

Deliberation on issues often leads to radicalization of opinion in groups

Extrema A Extrema B

Deliberation

Spectrum of opinion

In groups with multiple factions, deliberation drives each faction to extreme opinions.

Hypothesis/Model

Hypothesis/Model

• I hypothesize the more balanced group discussions are, the more unpredictably groups shift.

• Dependent Variable– Two different groups shifts

• Independent Variable– Balance of Argumentation

Testing by Deliberative Polling

• I test the research question in deliberative polling—a particular type of deliberative forum.

• Other types of deliberative forums include juries, focus groups, and crowdsourcing campaigns.

June 26 2011, Torrance, California

Courtesy managementexchange.com

Literature

Relevant Literature

• Radicalization has been shown to happen in certain types of deliberative forums regularly

• Luskin et al (2007) showed that deliberative polling does not have systematic shifts

Sunstein/Manin Explanation

• Briefing materials help push larger majorities into smaller ones prior to the poll.

• Unprecedented diversity of opinions/representativeness in small groups.

• “The empirical answer is not available”(Manin 8).

Methodology

Dependent Variable

• Radicalization and Group-Splitting on three topics: – Budget Stability– Greater Equity– Revisiting Proposition 13

Dependent Variable:Index Formation

12345678910111213

Index 1: Budget Stability [0-10]

Index 2: Greater Equity [0-10]

Index 3: Proposition 13 [0-10]

Dependent Variable:Index Formation

Index/Topic 1 (Budget Stability)

Index 2(Greater Equity)

Index 3(Prop 13)

Number of questions

5 3 5

Questions 2aa-2ae 2af-2ah 2ai-2am

Observations 338 329 297

Alpha 0.79 0.62 0.86

Independent Variable

• Balance of Argumentation (Warranted and Unwarranted)– Obtained through a coding process of all the

transcripts• Knowledge (Control)

Results

• Exploratory Analysis: Dependent Variable• Exploratory Analysis: Independent Variable• Regression– Dependent Variable: Radicalization– Dependent Variable: Group-splitting

Exploratory Analysis: Median

Index 1 Index 2 Index 3

Average shift of mean toward radicalization

0.113 -0.039 (toward midpoint!)

-0.563 (toward midpoint!)

% of groups that became more radicalized

66.67% 37.5% 29.17%

Exploratory Analysis: Variance

Index 1 Index 2 Index 3

Average Increase in Variance

-0.390 -0.585 -1.546

% of groups with increase in Variance

29.17% 37.5% 25%

Exploratory Analysis: Independent Variable

Exploratory Analysis: Independent VariableIndex 1 Index 2 Index 3

Imbalance in Warranted Arguments

35 15 -15

Imbalance in Unwarranted Arguments

8 0 -11

Total Warranted Arguments

277 258 198

Total Unwarranted Arguments

93 94 74

Difference (p-value)

0.459 0.926 0.904

Exploratory Analysis: Independent Variable

Index 1 Index 2 Index 3

Persuasive Argument Hypothesis (Median)

75% 33.33% 41.67%

Groups with Prior Leanings

95.83% 66.67% 83.33%

Regression:Radicalization

Regression:Radicalization Index 1

Coefficient Std. Error T value p-value

(Intercept) -0.1388 0.2363 -0.587 0.5635

Warranted Arguments

1.1256 0.5277 2.133 0.0455*

Unwarranted Arguments

-0.2891 0.3363 -0.860 0.4001

Knowledge Gain

1.1237 1.5822 0.710 0.4857

Multiple R-squared

0.2541

p-value 0.1114

Regression:Radicalization Index 2

Coefficient Std. Error T value p-value

(Intercept) 0.2811 0.3448 0.815 0.4245

Warranted Arguments

1.2397 0.5801 2.137 0.0451*

Unwarranted Arguments

0.2833 0.3603 0.786 0.4408

Knowledge Gain

-1.2473 2.1988 -0.567 0.5768

Multiple R-squared

0.2485

p-value 0.1191

Regression: Radicalization Index 3

Coefficient Std. Error T value p-value

(Intercept) 0.5365 0.4526 1.185 0.250

Warranted Arguments

-0.6047 0.5966 -1.014 0.323

Unwarranted Arguments

-0.1323 0.4475 -0.296 0.771

Knowledge Gain

0.8500 2.7699 0.307 0.762

Multiple R-squared

0.05545

p-value 0.7605

Regression: Group-Splitting

Regression:Group-Splitting Index 1

Coefficient Std. Error T value p-value

(Intercept) 0.8425 0.6013 1.401 0.176

Warranted Arguments

1.2113 1.3427 0.902 0.378

Unwarranted Arguments

0.5124 0.8558 0.599 0.556

Knowledge Gain

-6.1393 4.0259 -1.525 0.143

Multiple R-squared

0.1266

p-value 0.4278

Regression:Group-Splitting Index 2

Coefficient Std. Error T value p-value

(Intercept) -1.1327 0.6455 -1.755 0.0946

Warranted Arguments

2.5309 1.0862 2.330 0.0304*

Unwarranted Arguments

0.3126 0.6746 0.463 0.6480

Knowledge Gain

3.2608 4.1168 0.792 0.4376

Multiple R-squared

0.266

p-value 0.1547

Regression:Group-Splitting Index 3

Coefficient Std. Error T value p-value

(Intercept) -0.9006 0.8970 -1.004 0.3274

Warranted Arguments

-2.6239 1.1825 -2.219 0.0382*

Unwarranted Arguments

0.5821 0.8871 0.656 0.5192

Knowledge Gain

-0.5393 5.4902 -0.098 0.9227

Multiple R-squared

0.2421

p-value 0.1284

Implications

Deliberative Democracy

• Additional Support for Merits to Deliberative Polling

• Sunstein/Manin Question– “What leads to group shifts?”

• Role of Moderators in Deliberation

Policy Recommendations

• Classroom Simulation• Congressional Committees• Federal Incentives to present multiple views

Acknowledgments

• Professor James Fishkin and Dr. Alice Siu at the Center for Deliberative Democracy (CDD)

• Professor Francis Fukuyama and Dr. Didi Kuo at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)

Questions