Why Proactive Assessment of Hydrogen Fuelling Risks is ... · Center for Hydrogen Safety, 15-17 September 2020 8 Yes –According to Historical Events 1989 Polysar Sarnia Canada •700

Copyright BakerRisk. All rights reserved.

Authors: Karen Vilas & Robert Magraw

Presenter: Robert Magraw

Hazards30 - VIRTUAL

Process Safety Conference

26-27 November 2020

Why Proactive Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Fuelling Risks is Essential

Hazards30 VIRTUAL, 26-27 November 2020 2

Current H2 Fuelling

Landscape

Introduction to H2fuelling technology.

Safety Concerns &

Historical Events

What is the industry

facing in obtaining

widespread adoption?

Assessing Risk for H2Fuelling Technology

Current practice and a

proactive way to move

forward.

Conclusions /

Discussion

Challenges for future H2fuelling planning relating

to risks.

Presentation Overview

Zero emissions reached when human-caused GHG emissions are balanced by removing GHGs from the

atmosphere.


Top 10 Solutions: Includes a shift to zero emissions

vehicles according the World Resources Institute.

Introduction – Reaching Zero Emissions


A 2017 survey of 1,000 global auto executives concluded hydrogen fuel cell technology will

ultimately outperform battery-powered electric vehicles.

Introduction – Vehicle Technology

Tesla Model S – Battery vs. Toyota Murai - Hydrogen

Elon Musk: Statements about “fool cells” including “success is simply not possible” and “[they are]

mind-bogglingly stupid”

In the right market circumstances, FCEV may prove to be viable by 2030.

FCEVs have great

performance, low

maintenance, and are

eligible for rebates and incentives.

Clean, safe fuel alternative

with zero emissions that

don’t create greenhouse

gases or pollutants.

Economies of scale and

infrastructure are key to

FCEV becoming a

viable replacement alternative.

Fueling Station Locations – January 2020 (H2Stations.org)


Introduction – Current H2 Outlook

Hard to change the public’s “normal”.

• Public perception of hydrogen

o “Bombs” and disastrous explosions

• Hydrogen safety concerns are

different but not necessarily more

severe

o Primary hazard is the production of

flammable or explosive mixture in air

Hindenburg Disaster (1937) and H-Bomb Testing Marshall Islands (1946-1958)


Public Perception of Safety Concerns

Ignition

• Easily ignited

• Wider flammability range than most hydrocarbons

Areas of Emphasis

• Containment, leak detection, and ventilation

• Layers of protection

Areas of Concern

• Public as operators

• Colorless, odourless, and hydrogen cannot be odorized

Are Unconfined H2 VCEs Credible?

Zalosh and Short (1978):

• Reviewed > 400 H2 accidents (1965 – 1977)

• Slightly > ½ of incidents were explosions

• 3/4 of incidents involved H2gas (v. liquid releases)

• Significant portion of those documented were gas explosions

Center for Hydrogen Safety, 15-17 September 2020 7

Ordin (1974):

•Reviewed incidents from NASA operations

•62% of releases to environment ignited (i.e., 38% did not) & some ignitions were delayed (explosions)

• Prompt ignition is not guaranteed

Center for Hydrogen Safety, 15-17 September 2020 8

Yes – According to Historical Events

1989 Polysar Sarnia Canada

•700 psi release from partially failed gasket

•Est. 60 lbm release with 10-15s ignition delay

•Building damage consistent with a detonation of 50 lbm of H2

1992 Sodegaura Japan

•H2 Release from heat exchanger

•10 fatalities, 7 injuries

•Significant damage to facility

2007 Muskingum River Plant, OH, USA

• Rupture disc failure on outdoor storage tank

• 3-10 sec. ign. delay

• 1 fatality

• Heavy damage to adjacent buildings

2009 Silver Eagle Refinery, UT, USA

•10-inch H2 release at 630 psi

•Explosion caused

•severe damage to 2 homes

•minor damage to others

2010 - Present reviewed on

following slides

Accidental H2 VCEs at Fuelling Stations

• Nel/ Uno-X hydrogen fuel station, 10 June 2019o Sandvika, Norway, explosion

o Minor airbag injuries (drivers passing station)

o Leak from inadequately tightened bolts attaching bush to high pressure cylinder

• Airgas filling station, 12 December 2019o Waukesha, Wisconsin, USA

o Explosion

o Hydrogen fuel plant supplying bulk high pressure H2 from facility

o 1 injury, reports of offsite impact

o “Video that shows a large H2 vapor cloud released from a storage tank. The vapor cloud did find an ignition source in or around the base of the tank…”• https://www.jsonline.com/story/communities/waukesha/news/waukesha/2019/12/23/waukesha-airgas-

explosion-still-under-investigation/2715005001/

9Center for Hydrogen Safety, 15-17 September 2020

https://www.jsonline.com/story/communities/waukesha/news/waukesha/2019/12/23/waukesha-airgas-explosion-still-under-investigation/2715005001/

• Air Products Santa Clara (2019)o 3-4 month shutdown for the only provider in

the Bay Area region

o Disruption of distribution resulted in FCEV owners abandoning their vehicles

• Gangwon Technopark (2019)o Destroyed facility half the size of a soccer

field, killing 2 and injuring 6 more

o Public protests, refusal to incorporate in stations, etc. delay rollout of FCEV tech

• Uno-X Norway (2019)o Leak from improperly installed plug

o Closed 10+ Uno-X stations around Europe due to lack of public trust

South Koreans Protest Gangneung Storage Tank Explosion

Air Products Santa Clara Valley – Supply Disruption


Introduction – Public Perception

Uno-X Station Explosion in Norway


• H2 fuelling station safety

o Regulated internationally and country-by-

country

o Studies done based on local regulatory

requirements (inconsistency)

o PSI transfer from vendor to

owners/operators may be limited or

contain communication gaps

• Unique safety concerns

o Hydrogen explosion energy can result in

catastrophic events

Summary – H2 Technology Safety

• Hydrogen Mobility Europe

o Flagship Programme giving FCEV drivers

access to pan-European network of

refuelling stations

• Hydrogen USA

o US Department of Energy (DOE)

o Public-private partnership with FCEV

equipment manufacturers

• The Canadian Hydrogen Fuel Cell

Association

o Raise awareness to accelerate

commercialisation

H2ME Flagship Program, 45+ Stations Planned

H2USA, 50+ Stations Online


Introduction – Current Initiatives


• Hazards/risks are

addressed based on

local regulatory

requirements

• Regulations differ

from country to

country

o Lack of consistency

• Standardisation of

technology

Differing Regulations

• Some situations

require detailed

modelling

o Sensitive

neighbouring

property

o Potential worst-case

event

o Public concern

• Company guidelines /

best practice

• International

o SAE TIR J2601

Hydrogen Fuel

Dispensers

o ISO/TS 19880-

1:2016 Minimum

Design Characteristics

o ISO/FDIS 19880-1

Hydrogen Technologies

• USA

o See next 2 slides

• Looks at operational

risks of fuelling

stations

• Applies order of

magnitude

consequences and

frequency

• Doesn’t look at an

overall risk profile for

facility or

location

Spacing Distances

HAZOP / LOPASelect Detail Modeling1 2 3 4

Current Practices – Assessing Risk

• Risk reviews typically involve a PHA/LOPA approacho Scenario-based operational risks

o “Worst-case” events typically reviewed to determine required level of safeguards

• Availability of PSI for package unitso Multiple vendors may own IP –

communication limited or difficult

o Safety studies done differently/ not available; understanding of full system

• Properties of hydrogeno Ignition and explosion characteristics

o Public perception and safe handling

Public Influence – Inherently Safe Systems

Selecting the Right Location for Fuelling


Current Practices - Limitations


US EPA – Fuel Handling and

Storage

- Gasoline storage and fuellingoperations

- Regulated by individual States

TSSA – Propane RSMP

- Reactive to LPG BLEVE events

- QRA of propane fuelling stations

- Reactively looking at site compliance

• Completely normal to go to the fuel

station to fill our tank with petrol or

diesel, right? Nobody thinks twice!

Lessons Learned - Be Proactive About Risks!


In operation and under construction.

Some stations have H2 Production

Equipment –additional concerns.

Light-duty vehicles

10,000 psi compressed H2

Stations generally have the same

equipment.

Heavy-duty vehicles

5,000 psi compressed H2

Different designs based on

production, delivery, storage, and dispensing.

Objective QRA Approach – The Stations

Storage Equipment

•Can be stored as liquid, LP gas, or HP gas

•Based on station’s location, capacity, and purpose

Compressor(s)

•H2 compressed to reduce volume and increase pressure

•Used to replenish buffer tank storage

Chiller(s)

•Not to exceed temperature threshold of industry standard fueling protocol

Dispenser(s)

•Look similar to gasoline dispensers

•May share an island or have an independent island

Station equipment (at a minimum):


Selection of station location by leveraging “generic” risk model

Optimization of station layout for risk minimisation

Risk-based selection of safeguards

Determine and document as-built risk profile

Evergreen Risk Model - update as needed per MOC process

•Define representative set of hazard scenarios for “typical” fuelling station equipment for decision making purposes.

•For chosen location, “typical” equipment scenarios revised for existing PSI and iterated to review impact on risk.

•Review risk reduction options available and quantify the risk impact for implementation.

•Update preliminary QRA to reflect the as-built layout, design, and safety systems.

•Formally document risk profile.

•Update fuelling station QRA to capture relevant changes in operations, throughputs, or exposed populations.

Objective QRA Approach – The Process

Staged Risk Review Cycle – Design Efficiently for Safety


• Project team decides on

the site, plot, facilities,

and infrastructure

requirements.

o Identify permitting/

safety requirements.

• Risk assessment based

on “conceptual risk

profile”:

o Site selection

o Layout optimization

Select Front End Loading

• Updated periodically as

needed to capture:

o Deviation from

operating

parameters.

o Throughput changes.

o Population creep and

encroachment.

o Regulatory review

cycle & MOCs.

• “Small” changes can

have large impact on risk

profile.

• FEED is completed and

schedule is finalised.

o P&IDs, layout, and

project execution

plan are completed.

• Changes in scope are

minimal – detailed

engineering is completed.

• Risk model based on

updated site PSI.

o No longer

“conceptual”

• Project closed out.

o Facility, data, and

documents handed

over to operations.

• Final updates to

consequence and risk

modelling to reflect as-

built design and input.

o Finalised, fully

documented report/

results.

Detailed Design Update

Operational Risk Model

Evergreen Risk Model1 2 3 4

Objective QRA Approach – Staged Reviews


Be Proactive, Not ReactivePublic opinion matters – especially around

hydrogen, which is associated with past disasters.

As such, it is important to proactively address risk

rather than react to guidelines/standards written in

response to incidents (e.g., gasoline and propane

fuelling stations).

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3

2

4

Prebuilt “Concepts”Hydrogen fuelling stations have similar

equipment. As such, early stage risk reviews

can be efficiently conducted to optimise site

selection and layout to reduce future safety

expenses.

Siting is EvergreenAddressing issues such as network integration,

increases in throughput, and population

distributions can have an impact on the site risk

profile.

Ownership/ResponsibilityFuelling stations lend themselves to modular

packages, sometimes provided by different

companies / vendors. Ensuring transfer of PSI and

ongoing communications is essential to risk

understanding and ongoing safe operation.

Objective QRA Approach – Key Points


With a shift towards clean energy, many governments and companies are investing in

hydrogen technology to support agendas and diverse portfolios.

Moving towards carbon neutrality.

To achieve a publicly accepted shift, FCEVs need to be cost competitive, renewable

energy costs need to drop, and public must accept techology as safe and reliable.

Achieve widespread public adoption.

Public exposure to hydrogen and ongoing education. Hydrogen is different and this

needs to be communicated for safe handling and widespread understanding.

Establish the new normal as FCEVs.

Can ensure that when incidents do happen, impacts are limited due to preplanning with

respect to infrastructure design and site selection and layout.

Proactive & objective risk assessment.

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Conclusions

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Documents

Why Proactive Assessment of Hydrogen Fuelling Risks is ... · Center for Hydrogen Safety, 15-17 September 2020 8 Yes –According to Historical Events 1989 Polysar Sarnia Canada •700