Case Blue

Case Blue (German: Fall Blau), later renamedOperation Braunschweig,[8] was the German ArmedForces (Wehrmacht) name for its plan for the 1942 strate-gic summer oensive in southern Russia between 28 Juneand 24 November 1942.The operation was a continuation of the previous yearsOperation Barbarossa, intended to knock the SovietUnion out of the war, and involved a two-pronged attackagainst the oil elds of Baku as well as an advance in thedirection of Stalingrad along the Volga River, to cover theanks of the advance towards Baku. For this part of theoperation, Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Sd) of theGerman Army (Wehrmacht Heer) was divided into ArmyGroups A and B (Heeresgruppe A and B). Army GroupA was tasked with crossing the Caucasus mountains toreach the Baku oil elds, while Army Group B protectedits anks along the Volga.Initially, the oensive saw gains, with an advance intothe Caucasus capturing large areas of land and several oilelds. However, the Red Army defeated the Germans atStalingrad, following Operations Uranus and Little Sat-urn. This defeat forced the Axis to retreat from theCaucasus. Only the city of Kursk and the Kuban regionremained tentatively occupied by Axis troops.

1 Axis strategy

1.1 BackgroundOn 22 June 1941 theWehrmacht had launched OperationBarbarossa with the intention of defeating the Sovietsin a Blitzkrieg lasting only months. The Axis oensivehad met with initial success and the Red Army had suf-fered some major defeats before halting the Axis unitsat Moscow (November/December 1941). Although theGermans had captured vast areas of land and importantindustrial centers, the Soviet Union remained in the war.In the winter of 1941/1942 the Soviets struck back in aseries of successful counteroensives, pushing back theGerman threat to Moscow. Despite these setbacks, Hitlerwanted an oensive solution, for which he required the oilresources of the Caucasus.[9] By February 1942 the Ger-man Army High Command (OKH) had begun to developplans for a follow-up campaign to the aborted Barbarossaoensive - with the Caucasus as its principal objective.On 5 April 1942, Hitler laid out the elements of the plannow known as Case Blue (Fall Blau) in Fhrer Direc-tive No. 41.[10] The directive stated the main goals of

the 1942 summer campaign on Germanys Eastern Front:holding attacks for ArmyGroup (AG) Centre, the captureof Leningrad and the link-up with Finland for AG North,and the capture of the Caucasus region for Army GroupSouth.

1.2 The oileldsThe Caucasus region, traversed by its eponymous moun-tains, culturally diverse and larger than the US State ofMontana, is bounded by the Black Sea to the west and theCaspian Sea to the east. The region north of the moun-tains was a production center for grain, cotton and heavyfarm machinery while its two main oilelds, at Maykop,near the Black Sea, and Grozny, about halfway betweenthe Black and the Caspian Seas, produced about 10 per-cent of all Soviet oil. South of the mountains lay thedensely populated region of Transcaucasia, comprisingGeorgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. This heavily industri-alized area, which had a greater population density thanNew York State, contained some of the largest oileldsin the world. Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, was one ofthe richest, producing 80 percent of the Soviet Union'soilabout 24 million tons in 1942 alone.[11]

The Caucasus also possessed plentiful coal and peat, aswell as nonferrous and rare metals. Manganese depositsat Chiaturi, in Transcaucasia formed the richest singlesource in the world, yielding 1.5 million tons of man-ganese ore annually, half of the Soviet Unions total pro-duction. The Kuban region of the Caucasus also con-tained vast swaths of wheat, corn, sunower seeds andsugar beets, all essential in the production of food.[11]

These resources were of immense importance to Hitlerand the German war eort. Of the three million tonsof oil Germany consumed per year, 85 percent wasimportedmainly from the United States, Venezuela andIran. When war broke out in September 1939, the Britishnaval blockade cut Germany o from the Americas andtheMiddle East leaving the country reliant on oil-rich Eu-ropean countries such as Romania to supply the resource.An indication of German reliance on Romania is evidentfrom its oil consumption; in 1938, just one-third of the7,500,000 tons consumed by Germany came from do-mestic stocks. Oil had always been Germanys Achillesheel, and by the end of 1941, Hitler had nearly exhaustedGermanys reserves, which left him with only two sig-nicant sources of oil, the countrys own synthetic pro-duction and the Romanian oilelds, with the latter sup-plying 75% of Germanys oil imports in 1941.[12] Aware

1

2 2 PLANNING

of his declining oil resources and fearful of enemy airattacks on RomaniaGermanys main source of crudeoilHitlers strategy was increasingly driven by the needto protect Romania and acquire new resources, essentialif he wanted to continue waging a prolonged war againsta growing list of enemies. In late 1941, the Romani-ans warned Hitler that their stocks were exhausted andthey were unable to meet German demands. For thesereasons, the Soviet oilelds were extremely important toGermanys industry and armed forces as the war becameglobal, the power of the Allies grew, and shortages startedto occur in Axis resources.[13][14]

2 Planning

2.1 Axis forces

Waen-SS infantry and armour advancing, Summer 1942

The oensive was to be conducted across the south-ern Russian (Kuban) steppe utilizing the following ArmyGroup units:[15]

ArmyGroupA, underWilhelmList (Caucasus cam-paign)

First Panzer Army Seventeenth Army Third Romanian Army[e] Eleventh Army[f]

Army Group B, under Maximilian von Weichs(Volga campaign)

Second Army Fourth Panzer Army Sixth Army Second Hungarian Army Fourth Romanian Army Eighth Italian Army

Luftotte 4, under Alexander Lhr

Fliegerkorps VIII Fliegerkorps IV

German air strength in the east numbered 2,644 aircrafton 20 June 1942, over 20% more than a month earlier.Whereas in 1941 most units fought on the central frontsupporting Army Group Centre, 1,610 aircraft (61%),supported Army Group South. Initially commanded byLhr, on 20 July 1942, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofentook command of Luftotte 4.[3]

The German plan involved a three-stagedattack:[16][17][18]

Blau I: Fourth Panzer Army, commanded byHermann Hoth (transferred from Army GroupNorth) and the Second Army, supported by the Sec-ond Hungarian Army, would attack from Kursk toVoronezh and continue the advance, anchoring thenorthern ank of the oensive towards the Volga.

Blau II: Sixth Army, commanded by FriedrichPaulus, would attack from Kharkiv and move in par-allel with Fourth Panzer Army, to reach the Volgaat Stalingrad (whose capture was not deemed neces-sary).

Blau III: First Panzer Army would then strike southtowards the lower Don River, with SeventeenthArmy on the western ank and Fourth RomanianArmy on the eastern ank.

The strategic objectives of the operation were the oileldsat Maykop, Grozny and Baku. As in Barbarossa, thesemovements were expected to result in a series of grandencirclements of Soviet troops.[16]

2.2 Soviet forcesThe Soviet army command (Stavka) failed to discern thedirection of the main German strategic oensive antici-pated in 1942, even though they were in possession of theGerman plans. On 19 June, the chief of operations of the23rd Panzer Division, Major Joachim Reichel, was shotdown over Soviet-held territory while ying an observa-tion aircraft over the front near Kharkov. The Sovietsrecovered maps from his aircraft detailing the exact Ger-man plans for Case Blue. The plans were handed over toStavka, in Moscow.Joseph Stalin, however, believed it to be a Germanruse,[19] remaining convinced that the primary Germanstrategic goal in 1942 would be Moscow, in part dueto Operation Kremlin (Fall Kreml), a German deceptionplan aimed at the city. As a result, the majority of RedArmy troops were deployed there, although the directionfrom which the Case Blue oensive would come was stilldefended by the Bryansk, Southwestern, Southern andNorth Caucasian Fronts. With about 1 million soldiers

3.1 Opening phase 3

at the frontline and another 1.7 million in reserve armies,their forces accounted for about one quarter of all Soviettroops.[4][20] Following the disastrous start of Case Bluefor the Soviets, they reorganised their frontlines severaltimes. Over the course of the campaign, the Soviets alsoelded the Voronezh Front, Don Front, Stalingrad Front,Transcaucasian Front, and the Caucasian Front, thoughnot all existed at the same time.[15]

With the German thrust expected in the north, Stavkaplanned several local oensives in the south to weakenthe Germans. The most important of these was aimed atthe city of Kharkov and would be conducted mainly bythe Southwestern Front under Semyon Timoshenko, sup-ported by the Southern Front commanded by RodionMa-linovsky. The operation was scheduled for 12 May, justprior to a planned German oensive in the area.[21] Theensuing Second Battle of Kharkov ended in disaster forthe Soviets, severely weakening their mobile forces.[22] Atthe same time, the Axis clearing of the Kerch Peninsulatogether with the Battle of Sevastopol, which lasted untilJuly, weakened the Soviets further and allowed the Ger-mans to supplyArmyGroupA across theKerch Peninsulathrough the Kuban.[22][23]

3 The oensive

3.1 Opening phase

The German advance from 7 May to 18 November 1942.to 7 Julyto 22 Julyto 1 Augustto 18 November

TheGerman oensive commenced on 28 June 1942, withFourth Panzer Army starting its drive towards Voronezh.Due to a chaotic Soviet retreat, the Germans were ableto advance rapidly, restoringWehrmachts condence forthe upcoming major oensive.[24]

Close air support from the Luftwae also played an im-portant role in this early success. It contained the Red

Air Force, through air superiority operations, and inter-diction through attacks on airelds and Soviet defencelines. At times the German air arm acted as a spearheadrather than a support force, ranging on ahead of the tanksand infantry to disrupt and destroy defensive positions.As many as 100 German aircraft were concentrated on asingle Soviet division in the path of the spearhead dur-ing this phase. General Kazakov, the Bryansk Front'schief of sta, noted the strength and eectiveness of Axisaviation.[25] Within 26 days, the Soviets lost 783 aircraftfrom the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 8th Air Armies, compared toa German total of 175.[26]

By 5 July, forward elements of Fourth Panzer Armyhad reached the Don River near Voronezh and becameembroiled in the battle to capture the city. Stalin andthe Soviet command still expected the main Germanthrust in the north against Moscow, and believed the Ger-mans would turn north after Voronezh to threaten thecapital.[27] As a result, the Soviets rushed reinforcementsinto the town, to hold it at all costs and counterattackedthe Germans northern ank in an eort to cut o theGerman spearheads. Major General A.I. Liziukov, incommand of 5th Tank Army, managed to achieve someminor successes when it began its attack on 6 July, butwas forced back to its starting positions by 15 July, los-ing about half of its tanks in the process.[28] Althoughthe battle was a success, Hitler and von Bock, comman-der of Army Group South, argued over the next steps inthe operation. The heated debate, and continuing Sovietcounterattacks, which tied down Fourth Panzer Army un-til 13 July, caused Hitler to lose his temper and dismissvon Bock. As part of the second phase of the operation,on 9 July, Army Group South was split into Army GroupA and B with Wilhelm List appointed as commander ofArmy Group A in place of von Bock.[27]

Only two weeks into the operation, on 11 July, the Ger-mans began to suer logistics diculties, which sloweddown the tempo of the advance. The German Sixth Armywas continually delayed by fuel shortages. Eight dayslater, on 20 July, shortages of fuel were still undermin-ing operations, leaving many units unable to execute theirorders. The 23rd Panzer Division and 24th Panzer Di-vision both became stranded during the opening phase.Once again, as it had done during the Norwegian Cam-paign in April 1940, and Barbarossa in 1941, the Luft-waes Junkers Ju 52 transport eet ew in supplies tokeep the army going. The situation remained dicultwith German troops forced to recover fuel from damagedor abandoned vehicles, and in some cases, leave behindtanks and vehicles with heavy fuel consumption to con-tinue their advance. This undermined the strength of theunits, which were forced to leave ghting vehicles behind.Nevertheless, the Luftwae ew in 200 tons of fuel perday to keep the army supplied.[29] Despite this impressiveperformance in keeping the army mobile, Lhr was re-placed by the more impetuous and oensive-minded vonRichthofen.[30]

4 3 THE OFFENSIVE

3.2 Splitting of Army Group South

Believing that themain Soviet threat had been eliminated,desperately short of oil and needing to meet all the am-bitious objectives of Case Blue, Hitler made a series ofchanges to the plan in Fhrer Directive No. 45:

reorganized Army Group South into two smallerArmy Groups, A and B;

directed Army Group A to advance to the Caucasusand capture the oil elds (Operation Edelwei);

directed Army Group B to attack towards the Volgaand Stalingrad (Operation Fischreiher).[27]

There is no evidence Hitler was opposed by, or receivedcomplaints from Franz Halder, the Chief of the Gen-eral Sta, or anyone else, about the directive until Au-gust 1942. The new directive created enormous logisti-cal diculties, with Hitler expecting both Army Groupsto advance along dierent routes. Logistics lines were al-ready at breaking point with ammunition and fuel short-ages most apparent and it would be impossible to advanceusing the conservative supply rates he demanded. Thedivergence of the army groups would also open a dan-gerous gap between the armies, which could be exploitedby the Russians. The Italian Alpine Corps, of the ItalianArmy in the Soviet Union, did not arrive in the CaucasusMountains with Army Group A, instead remaining withthe Sixth Army. Army Group A was expected to operatein mountain terrain with only three mountain divisionsand two infantry divisions unsuited to the task.[31]

The splitting of Army Group South enabled the launch-ing of Operation Edelweiss and Operation Fischreiher,the two main thrusts of the army groups. Both groupshad to achieve their objectives simultaneously, instead ofconsecutively.[27] The success of the initial advance wassuch that Hitler ordered the Fourth Panzer Army southto assist the First Panzer Army to cross the lower Donriver.[32] This assistance was not needed and Kleist latercomplained that Fourth Panzer Army clogged the roadsand that if they had carried on toward Stalingrad, theycould have taken it in July. When it turned north againtwo weeks later, the Soviets had gathered enough forcestogether at Stalingrad to check its advance.[33]

3.3 Army Group A: Caucasus

3.3.1 Breaking into the Caucasus

With air support from the Ju 87s ofSturzkampfgeschwader 77, Lists Army Group Arecaptured Rostov, the gate to the Caucasus, on 23July 1942 relatively easily.[34] The Luftwae had airsuperiority in the early phase of the operation, whichwas of great help to the ground forces.[35] With the Don

German troops and a Sd.Kfz. 251 armored half-track on theRussian steppe, August 1942

crossing secured and the Sixth Armys advance aggingon the Volga front, Hitler transferred the Fourth PanzerArmy to Army Group B and sent it back to the Volga.[36]The redeployment used enormous amounts of fuel totransfer the army by air and road.[37]

After crossing the Don on 25 July, Army Group A fannedout on a 200 km (120 mi) front from the Sea of Azov toZymlianskaya.[38] The German Seventeenth Army, alongwith elements of the Eleventh Army and the RomanianThird Army, manoeuvred west towards the east coast ofthe Black Sea, while the First Panzer Army attacked tothe south-east. The Seventeenth Army made a slow ad-vance but the First Panzer Army had freedom of action.On 29 July the Germans cut the last direct railway be-tween central Russia and Caucasus, causing considerablepanic to Stalin and Stavka, which led to the passing ofOrder No. 227 Not a step back!".[39] Salsk was cap-tured on 31 July and Stavropol on 5 August.[23] Althoughthe army group made a quick advance, by 3 August thevanguard comprised only light mobile forces and most ofthe tanks lagging behind, due to lack of fuel and supplybreakdowns, despite the eorts of Fliegerkorps IV (KurtPugbeil), which ew in supplies around the clock.[37]

On 9 August, the First Panzer Army reached Maikop inthe foothills of the Caucasus mountains, having advancedmore than 480 kilometres (300 mi) in fewer than twoweeks. The western oil elds near Maikop were seizedin a commando operation from 89 August but the oilelds had been suciently destroyed by the Red Armyto take about a year to be repaired. Shortly afterwardsPyatigorsk was taken.[23] On 12 August, Krasnodar wascaptured and German mountain troops hoisted the Naziag on the highest mountain of the Caucasus, Mount El-brus.[40]

The length of the German advance created chronic sup-ply diculties, particularly of petrol; the Black Seawas judged too dangerous and fuel was brought by railthrough Rostov or delivered by air but panzer divisionswere sometimes at a standstill for weeks. Even petroltrucks ran out of fuel and oil had to be brought up oncamels.[41] With the Soviets often retreating instead of

3.3 Army Group A: Caucasus 5

ghting, the number of prisoners fell short of expecta-tions and only 83,000 were taken.[42] As Hitler and OKHbegan to conventrate on Stalingrad, some of Kleists mo-bile forces were diverted Kleist lost his ak corps andmost of the Luftwae supporting the southern front, onlyreconnaissance aircraft being left behind. The Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS) brought in about 800 bombers,a third of which were operational. The transfer of aircover and ak units, Soviet bombers were free to harassthe German advance.[43] The quality of the Soviet resis-tance increased, with many of the forces used comingfrom local levies, who Kleist thought were willing to ghtharder for their homeland.[43] The quantity of replace-ments and supplies the Soviets committed increased andfaced with these diculties, the Axis advance slowed af-ter 28 August.[23][44][45]

3.3.2 Oilelds

In the south-east, the Wehrmacht headed in the direc-tion of Grozny and Baku, the other important petroleumcentres. More installations and industrial centres fell intoGerman hands, many intact or only slightly damaged dur-ing the Russian retreat. From AugustSeptember, theTaman Peninsula and a part of the Novorossisk navalbase were captured.[46] The Germans continued towardsTuapse on the Black Sea coast and in the east, Elista wastaken on 13 August.[47] In the south, the German advancewas stopped north of Grozny, after taking Mozdok on 25August.[48] German paratroopers assisted an insurgencyin Chechnya, operating behind Soviet lines.[49] Germanmountain troops failed to secure the Black Sea ports andthe advance fell short of Grozny as supply dicultiesarose once more. The Soviets dug in the 9th and 44tharmies of the North Transcaucasian Front along the rockyTerek River bank in front (north) of the city. The Luft-wae was unable to support the German army that farforward and Soviet aviation attacked bridges and supplyroutes virtually unopposed. The Germans crossed theriver on 2 September but made only slow progress.[50]

German Gebirgsjger in the Caucasus

Axis ships transported 30,605 men, 13,254 horses and6,265motor vehicles across the Black Sea fromRomania,

from 12 September. With the reinforcements, the Ger-mans capturedmost of the Black Sea naval bases but wereheld up at Novorossisk, where the Soviet 47th Army hadprepared for a long siege.[51] The port fell on 10 Septem-ber, after a four-day battle and was the nal German vic-tory in the Caucasus, except that the Soviet 47th Armystill held the heights south of the port and several coastroads. Attempts to push out of Novorossisk were costlyfailures and the Axis also failed to break the defences onthe coastal plain fromNovorossisk to Tuapse, having onlythe strength to stabilise the line. Romanian Army losseswere particularly high and the Romanian 3rd MountainDivision was nearly wiped out by a Soviet counter-attackfrom 2526 September.[52]

Further east, the Axis enjoyed greater success and on1 September, the Germans took (Russian: -), halfway between Elista and Astrakhan.Khulkhuta[53]During August and September, German patrols raidedthe railway between Kizlyar, north-east of Grozny andAstrakhan, marking the farthest advance of the Germanforces towards the Caspian Sea.[54] In the south, the FirstPanzer Army advance on Grozny was stopped by the RedArmy and the 14th Air Army. By late September, supplyfailures and the resistance of the Red Army slowed theAxis advance.[55]

German Gebirgsjger operating a 2 cm anti-aircraft gun in theCentral Caucasus near Teberda, September 1942

On 26 or 28 October, the 2nd Romanian Mountain Di-vision and 13th Panzer Division took Nalchik, capitalof Kabardino-Balkaria and captured 10,000 prisoners intwo days, before the advance toward Grozny was stoppedagain west of the city at Vladikavkaz.[56] On 5 Novem-ber, Alagir was seized and the AlagirBeslanMalgobekline reached became the farthest German advance in thesouth.[57][58] By this time, the gap between army groupsA and B had left them vulnerable to a counter-oensive.Only the German 16th Motorized Infantry Division re-mained inside the gap, guarding the left ank of the FirstPanzer Army by securing the road towards Astrakhan.[59]In November, after several Soviet counter-attacks, theGermans decided to remain on the defensive and wait forthe spring of 1943 to resume the oensive, if the Stalin-grad operations proved successful.[57]

6 3 THE OFFENSIVE

3.3.3 Luftwae oil oensive

In the rst week of October 1942, Hitler came to recog-nise that the capture of the Caucasus oil elds was un-likely before the Russian Winter forced the Germanforces to take up winter positions. Unable to capturethem, he was determined to deny them to the enemy andordered the Oberkommando der Luftwae (OKL) to in-ict as much damage as possible.[60]

On 8 October, Hitler called for the air oensive to be car-ried out no later than 14 October, as he required air as-sets for a major eort at Stalingrad.[61] As a result, on 10October 1942, Luftotte 4sFliegerkorps IV was orderedto send every available bomber against the oilelds atGrozny. The air eet was in poor shape by this time VonRichthofen had begun Case Blue with 323 serviceablebombers out of a total of 480. He was now down to 232,of which only 129 were combat ready. Nevertheless, theforce could still deliver damaging blows. Attacks on thereneries reminded von Richthofen of the attacks on Sev-astopol several months earlier. Thick black smoke rosefrom the reneries to a height of 5,500metres (18,000 ft).On 12 October further raids caused even more destruc-tion. It had been a strategic mistake not to have madegreater eorts to hit the oil reneries at Grozny and Bakusooner as their destructionwould have been a greater blowto the Soviets than the loss of Stalingrad, where most ofthe air eet was deployed. On 19 November, the Sovietcounter-oensive at Stalingrad compelled von Richthofento once more withdraw his units north to the Volga andbring an end to the aerial oensive.[62]

Much damage was done at Grozny, but the remainingoilelds were beyond the logistical reach of the Ger-man Army as well as the ghter aircraft of the Luft-wae. Grozny was within range of German bombersfrom Fliegerkorps IV, based near the Terek river. ButGrozny and the captured oilelds at Maykop producedonly ten per cent of Soviet oil. The main elds at Bakuwere out of German ghter range. German bomberscould have reached them, but it meant ying the mostdirect, thus most predictable route without protection.In August it may have been possible to carry out theseoperations owing to the weakness of Soviet air powerin the region, but by October it had been considerablystrengthened.[63]

3.4 Army Group B: Volga3.4.1 Don bend

On 23 July, the main body of Army Group B startedits advance toward the Don. The Germans met with in-creasing Soviet resistance from the new Stalingrad Front,with the 62nd and 64th Soviet armies. On 26 July, theXIV Panzer Corps broke through and reached the Don,where the new First and Fourth Tank armies conductedseveral counter-attacks but the attacks were made by in-

Advance towards Stalingrad at the Don

experienced troops and failed.[39] In the south, the FourthPanzer Armymade better progress against the Soviet 51stArmy. After crossing the Don, the Germans advanced onKotelnikovo, reaching the town by 2 August. Soviet re-sistance convinced Paulus that the Sixth Army was notstrong enough to cross the Don by itself, so he waited forFourth Panzer Army to ght its way north.[64] On 4 Au-gust, the Germans were still 97 kilometres (60 mi) fromStalingrad.[65]

By 10 August, the Red Army had been cleared frommostof the west bank of the Don but Soviet resistance contin-ued in some areas, further delaying Army Group B. TheWehrmacht advance on Stalingrad was also impeded bysupply shortages caused by the poor state of Soviet roads.The Luftwae sent an ad-hoc force of 300 Ju 52 trans-port aircraft, enabling the Germans to advance; somebombers were diverted from operations to supply ightsunder the Stalingrad Transport Region force.[65] The So-viet defence at the Don forced the Germans to commitmore and more troops to an increasingly vulnerable front,leaving few reserves to back up the Axis divisions on ei-ther ank.[66] The Soviets made several counter-attackson the northern ank of Army Group B, between Stalin-grad and Voronezh. From 2028 August, the 63rd Armyand the 21st Army counter-attacked near Seramovich,forcing the Italian Eighth Army to fall back. The 1stGuards Army attacked near Novo-Grigoryevskaja, ex-tending its bridgehead. These and several other bridge-heads across the Don, opposed by the Eighth Italian andSecond Hungarian armies, were a constant danger.[45]

On 23 August, the Sixth Army crossed the Don andArmy Group B established a defensive line on one ofits bends.[45] The Sixth Army reached the northern sub-urbs of Stalingrad later that day, beginning the Battle ofStalingrad. The Hungarian, Italian and Romanian armieswere 60 kilometres (37 mi) from Stalingrad, which wasin range of forward air bases and Luftotte 4 attacked thecity, turningmuch of it to rubble.[67] The Soviets reportedthat civilian casualties from 2326August, were 955 deadand 1,181 wounded. (Although this was a preliminary to-tal, later reports of casualties in the tens of thousands wereprobably exaggerations.)[68]

3.4 Army Group B: Volga 7

Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers over Stalingrad

The Sixth Army advanced from the north via Kalachand the Fourth Panzer Army coming up from the souththrough Kotelnikovo. In the rst few days, the XIVPanzer Corps opened a corridor between the main bodyof the Sixth Army and the northern Stalingrad suburbs atthe Volga and in the south, Soviet resistance repulsed theFourth Panzer Army. On 29 August another attempt wasmade with Hoth turning his forces west directly throughthe center of the 64th Army. The attack was unexpect-edly successful and the Fourth Panzer Army got behindthe 62nd and 64th armies with the chance to encircle andcut o the 62nd Army. Von Weichs ordered the SixthArmy to complete the encirclement but a Soviet counter-attack held up the advance for three days and the Sovietsescaped and retreated towards Stalingrad.[69] The rapidGerman advance caused a slump in morale among the So-viet troops, who retreated in chaos abandoning the outerdefences of the city.[70] After defeating the last Sovietcounter-attacks, the Sixth Army resumed its oensive on2 September and linked up with Fourth Panzer Army thefollowing day and on 12 September, the Germans enteredStalingrad.[71]

3.4.2 The Battle of Stalingrad

Main article: Battle of StalingradThe advance into Stalingrad against the 62nd Army wascarried out by the Sixth Army, while the Fourth PanzerArmy secured the southern ank. The city was a 24 km(15 mi) ribbon along the west bank of the Volga, whichforced the Germans to conduct a frontal assault and theruins of the city gave the defenders an advantage. Tocounter Luftwae air superiority, the commander of the62nd Army, General Vasily Chuikov, ordered his troopsto hug the Germans, negating German tactical mobil-ity. The Luftwae suppressed Soviet artillery on the eastbank of the Volga and caused many casualties during So-viet attempts to reinforce the defenders on the west bank.Frommid-September until early November, the Germansmade three big attacks on the city and ground forward inmutually-costly ghting. By mid-November, the Soviets

Street ghting in the destroyed city

were penned into four shallow bridgeheads, with the frontline only 180 m (200 yd) from the river. Anticipating vic-tory, substantial numbers of Luftwae aircraft were with-drawn to the Mediterranean in early November, to sup-port the Axis operations in Tunisia. The Sixth Army hadcaptured about 90 percent of the city.[72][73]

On 19 November, the Soviets launched OperationUranus, a two-pronged counter-oensive against theanks of the Sixth Army. With the battle for the cityand the exhaustion of the Fourth Panzer Army, the anksweremainly guarded byRomanian, Hungarian and Italiansoldiers. The Third Romanian Army, on the Don Riverwest of Stalingrad and the Fourth Romanian Army south-east of Stalingrad, had been under constant Soviet attacksince September. The Third Romanian Army had beentransferred from Caucasus on 10 September, to take overItalian positions on the Don, opposite the Soviet bridge-heads. The Romanians were understrength and had onlyaround six modern anti-tank guns per division. The bulkof the German tank reserve, the 48th Panzer Corps, con-sisted of about 180 tanks, half being obsolete Panzer35(t)s.[74] The two Romanian armies were routed and theSixth Army, with parts of the Fourth Panzer Army wereencircled in Stalingrad.[75]

Hitler ordered the Sixth Army to remain on the defen-sive, rather than try to break out. It was intended thatthe army would be supplied by air but the quantity ofsupplies necessary was far beyond the ability of the Luft-wae to carry, the strength of Sixth Army diminished andthe Soviets gained the upper hand inside the city.[76] Tostabilise the situation on the Eastern Front, Army GroupDon (Heeresgruppe Don) under Field Marshal Erich vonManstein was created to ll the gap between army groupsA and B.[77] On 12 December, a relief operation calledOperation Winter Storm began. Spearheaded by some ofthe rst Tiger tanks, the oensive got within 48 kilome-tres (30mi) of the southern Sixth Army front but the Ger-mans made no attempt to break out.[78] The failure wasfollowed by a siege that lasted for almost three months,during which the Sixth Army was destroyed.[79]

8 6 NOTES

4 Aftermath

4.1 Operation Saturn

Soviet forces during Operation Little Saturn

Following the success of Operation Uranus, the RedArmy began Operation Saturn, to cut o Army GroupA and all troops east of Rostov.[80] During the Germanrelief operation at Stalingrad, Soviet forces had been re-deployed, lesser objectives substituted and the operationrenamed Little Saturn. The attack fell on the EighthItalian Army, the remnants of Third Romanian Army andled to the destruction of most of the Eighth Army. On theverge of collapse, army groups B and Don were able toprevent a Soviet breakthrough but Army Group A was or-dered to withdraw fromCaucasus on 28December.[81][82]

The Soviets launched several follow-up oensives, latercalled the Voronezh-Kharkov Strategic Oensive. TheOstrogozhskRossosh Oensive began on 12 Januaryand destroyed large parts of the Second Hungarian Armyand the remnants of Eighth Italian Army at the Donsouth-east of Voronezh. With the southern ank in dan-ger, the German Second Army was forced to withdrawfrom Voronezh and the Don. The operations contin-ued until January and led Stavka to believe that theycould deal a fatal blow to the Germans and decide thewar in southern Russia. Operation Star, conducted bythe Voronezh Front, was aimed at Kharkiv, Kursk andBelgorod. Operation Gallop was conducted by the South-western Front against Voroshilovgrad, Donetsk and thentowards the Sea of Azov, to cut o the German forceseast of Donetsk. The operations began simultaneouslyat the end of January, the Soviets broke through quicklyand in the north, Kursk fell on 8 February and Kharkivon 16 February after a German withdrawal, while in thesouth the Germans were pushed back to a line west ofVoroshilovgrad. Army groups Don, B and parts of ArmyGroup A [g] were renamed Army Group South, com-manded by Manstein on 12 February.[83][84]

The Kharkiv and Donbas operations began on 25 Febru-ary by the new Central Front led by Rokossovsky, with

the forces freed after the surrender of the German forcesin Stalingrad on 2 February. The operations were aimedat Army Group Centre in the north and timed to coin-cide with the expected successes of the Soviet operationsin the south. Army Group South escaped encirclementand prepared a counter-oensive, which led to the ThirdBattle of Kharkov and the stabilisation of the front.[83][84]The disaster at Stalingrad was the end of Case Blue andthe territorial gains had been reversed by the end of 1943,except for the Kuban bridgehead on the Taman peninsula,retained for a possible second oensive to the Caucasus,which was held until 9 October 1943.[85][86]

4.2 Analysis

Due to the initial success of the German summer oen-sive in 1942, Hitler and the German commanders be-came more ambitious, putting great strain on the Ger-man army.[40] Hitler did not expect the Soviets to beable to launch a counter-oensive as big as OperationUranus and sent troops elsewhere, ordering theWehrma-cht to simultaneously achieve several goals. Oppositionled to Hitler sacking dissenters and interfering more incommand.[87][88]

Overstretch reduced the capabilities of the Heer and itsallies to defend this territory and the Soviets mounteda decisive oensive at Stalingrad, encircling a Germanarmy. Soon both sides concentrated on the battle forthe city, making Caucasus a secondary theatre.[23] WithArmy Group B unable to hold the Volga line, Soviet of-fensives almost cut o Army Group A in Caucasus andit was forced to withdraw. The surrender of the SixthArmy was a huge blow to German morale and it came asa great shock to Hitler. Despite the destruction of SixthArmy, the Soviets were only able to force the the Heerback from Caucasus, delaying the nal decision on theEastern Front. The Soviet command overestimated itscapabilities and pushed its forces forward to the limit ofits supply lines, which led to defeat at the Third Battle ofKharkov and left the Germans able to ght the Battle ofKursk in the summer of 1943.[82][89]

5 See also Reichskommissariat Kaukasus

6 Notes a Army Group A was under direct command of theOKH from 10 September 1942 until 22 November1942, when von Kleist took over.

b Not all of those tanks were serviceable at the be-ginning of the oensive, as tanks were in repair, al-

9ready engaged in combat, retting, or not present atthe frontline.[2]

c Axis casualties include all casualties of ArmyGroup A, B and Don until February 1943 (includ-ing 300,000 casualties at Stalingrad).

d Soviet casualties are from the Voronezh Defense,the Stalingrad Defense + Oensive and the North-Caucasus Defense + Oensive. Soviet casual-ties exclude all other Soviet oensives which werelaunched in January/February against Krasnodar,Kharkiv and Voronezh.

e The Third Romanian Army was later assigned toArmy Group B and was one of the two Romanianarmies heavily engaged in Operation Uranus.

f After the successful completion of the battle forthe Kerch Peninsula, 11th Army was split and onlyparts of it were assigned to Army Group A.

g The Seventeenth Army of Army Group A stayedin the Kuban bridgehead.

7 References[1] Holt (2009), p. 47.

[2] Antill (2007), pp. 2425.

[3] Hayward (2001), p. 129.

[4] Antill (2007), p. 29.

[5] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 4950.

[6] Antill (2007), p. 87.

[7] Glantz (1995), p. 295.

[8] Schramm (1963), p. 460.

[9] Antill (2007), pp. 712.

[10] Glantz (1995), pp. 108110.

[11] Hayward (2001), p. 2.

[12] Axworthy (1995), p. 19.

[13] Hayward (2001), pp. xvii, 25, 18.

[14] Bellamy 2007, p. 497.

[15] Glantz (1995), pp. 111113.

[16] Antill (2007), pp. 3132.

[17] Glantz (1995), p. 110.

[18] Hayward (2001), p. 131.

[19] Bellamy (2007), p. 498.

[20] Glantz (1995), p. 301.

[21] Antill (2007), p. 34.

[22] Antill (2007), p. 37.

[23] Antill (2007), p. 49.

[24] Beevor (1999), p. 75.

[25] Hayward (2001), p. 135.

[26] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 60, list of Red Air Force order ofbattle indicates these units were mainly in combat duringBlau, pp. 4950.

[27] Antill (2007), p. 40.

[28] Glantz (2009), pp. 14953.

[29] Hayward (2001), p. 142.

[30] Hayward (2001), p. 143.

[31] Hayward (2001), pp. 147, 149.

[32] Glantz (1995), p. 119.

[33] Liddell Hart 1948, pp. 204205.

[34] Hayward (2001), p. 145.

[35] Bergstrm 2007, p. 67.

[36] Antill (2007), p. 41.

[37] Hayward (2001), p. 156.

[38] Hayward (2001), p. 152.

[39] Glantz (1995), p. 121.

[40] Antill (2007), p. 39.

[41] Liddell Hart 1948, pp. 201203.

[42] Hayward (2001), p. 147.

[43] Liddell Hart 1948, p. 202.

[44] Glantz (1995), p. 120.

[45] Glantz (1995), p. 122.

[46] Antill (2007), pp. 1314.

[47] Schramm (1963), p. 583.

[48] Schramm (1963), p. 639.

[49] German Federal Archives. ""Die Brandenburger Kom-mandotruppe und Frontverband (in German). GermanFederal Archives. Retrieved 13 May 2011.

[50] Hayward (2001), p. 167.

[51] Hayward (2001), p. 169.

[52] Hayward (2001), p. 170.

[53] Schramm (1963), p. 667.

[54] Schramm (1963), pp. 639, 671.

[55] Hayward (2001), p. 171.

10 8 BIBLIOGRAPHY

[56] Schramm (1963), p. 65. and Hayward (2001), p. 174.

[57] Pusca, Dragos; Nitu, Victor. WorldWar2.ro Roma-nian Armed Forces in the Second World War The 3rdArmy in the Caucasus 1942. Retrieved 1 May 2011.

[58] Schramm (1963), pp. 719723.

[59] Hayward (2001), p. 172.

[60] Hayward (2001), p. 179.

[61] Bergstrm 2007, p. 84.

[62] Hayward (2001), pp. 179180.

[63] Hayward 1995, pp. 94135.

[64] Antill (2007), pp. 4445.

[65] Bergstrm 2007, p. 62.

[66] Antill p. 49.

[67] Beevor (1999), p. 106.

[68] Bergstrm 2007, p. 73.

[69] Antill (2007), pp. 4551.

[70] Beevor (1999), pp. 115118.

[71] Antill (2007), p. 55.

[72] Antill (2007), pp. 5167.

[73] Glantz (1995), pp. 122123, 149.

[74] Axworthy (1995), pp. 8589.

[75] Antill (2007), pp. 7375.

[76] Glantz (1995), p. 134.

[77] Nipe (2000), p. 15.

[78] Manstein (2004), pp. 335336.

[79] Antill (2007), p. 78.

[80] Nipe (2000), pp. 1821.

[81] Schramm (1963), p. 1318.

[82] Nipe (2000), p. 33.

[83] Glantz (1995), pp. 143147.

[84] Nipe (2000), pp. 5464, 100.

[85] Vego, Milan N. Naval Strategy and Operations in NarrowSeas (MPG Books Ltd, London, 2003), p. 278.

[86] Glantz (1995), p. 141.

[87] Glantz (1995), p. 132.

[88] Antill (2007), p. 43.

[89] Antill (2007), pp. 8788.

8 Bibliography Antill, Peter (2007). Stalingrad 1942. Oxford: Os-prey Publishing. ISBN 1-84603-028-5.

Axworthy, Mark; Scafes, Cornel; Craciunoiu, Cris-tian (1995). Third Axis Fourth Ally: RomanianArmed Forces in the European War, 19411945.London: Arms & Armour Press. ISBN 1-85409-267-7.

Beevor, Antony (1999). Stalingrad: The FatefulSiege: 19421943. London: Penguin Books. ISBN0-14-028458-3.

Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Rus-sia in the Second World War. London: Pan Books.ISBN 978-0-330-48808-2.

Bergstrm, Christer (2007). Stalingrad The AirBattle: November 1942 February 1943. London:Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-85780-276-4..

Glantz, David M.; Jonathan M. House (2009). Tothe Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Op-erations, AprilAugust 1942. The Stalingrad TrilogyI. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-1630-5.

Glantz, David M. (1995). When Titans Clashed:How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS:University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-0899-0.

Hayward, Joel (1995). Too Little Too Late: An Anal-ysis of Hitlers Failure in 1942 to Damage Soviet OilProduction. Lawrence, KS: The Journal of StrategicStudies, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 94135.

Liddell Hart, Basil Henry (1948). The GermanGenerals Talk. New York: Morrow. ISBN0688060129.

Hayward, Joel (2001). Stopped at Stalingrad: TheLuftwae and Hitlers Defeat in the East, 19421943. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.ISBN 0-7006-1146-0.

Manstein, Erich (2004). Lost Victories: The WarMemoirs of Hitlers Most Brilliant General. Min-neapolis: Zenith Press. ISBN 0-7603-2054-3.

Nipe, George M. Jr. (2000). Last Victory in Rus-sia: The SS-Panzerkorps and Mansteins KharkivCounteroensiveFebruaryMarch 1943. Atglen,PA: Schier Publishing. ISBN 0-7643-1186-7.

Schramm, Percy Ernst (1963). Kriegstagebuchdes Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, 19401945Teilband II. Bonn: Bernard & Graefe Verlag frWehrwesen.

11

Holt, David (June 2009). The Slovak Army: 1939 1945 Part 2: The Russian Campaign 1940 43(PDF). Journal of The Czechoslovak Philatelic Soci-ety of Great Britain 27 (2). ISSN 0142-3525. Re-trieved 18 February 2014.

12 9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses9.1 Text Case Blue Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue?oldid=674076735 Contributors: Dimadick, Altenmann, DocWatson42,

Ezhiki, Matthead, Klemen Kocjancic, Rich Farmbrough, Rustl, JustPhil, Abel29a, Rjwilmsi, Sus scrofa, Ori Livneh, Gaius Cornelius,Chase me ladies, I'm the Cavalry, Mercenary2k, Cazemier, Nick-D,MacsBug, SmackBot, Hmains, DHN-bot~enwiki, Hongooi, Trekphiler,Valenciano, Andreas1968, The PIPE, Ugur Basak Bot~enwiki, Serein (renamed because of SUL), RASAM, Khazar, Andrwsc, Keith-264, WilliamJE, Joseph Solis in Australia, GrahamBould, Plasma Twa 2, Ehistory, WeggeBot, AndrewHowse, Danrok, Gatoclass, Lan-guagehat, Sharonlees, Thijs!bot, Wandalstouring, Shimofusa Dainagon, JAnDbot, DuncanHill, Dodo19~enwiki, Buckshot06, NadirITA,Icer CRO, Gunny847, Philg88, Adamgstang, Pinkbluty, Dapi89, CommonsDelinker, Aleksandr Grigoryev, Chrisknop, Marcusmax, Mar-coLittel, Mrg3105, MisterBee1966, Xyl 54, Gamewyzard, Je G., TXiKiBoT, Nazgul02, Mkpumphrey, Truthanado, SieBot, Njabiyeva,Mojoworker, MBK004, ClueBot, Asmaybe, NuclearWarfare, Arjayay, Central Data Bank, Sturmvogel 66, Hell Hawk, Addbot, EjsBot,Brufnus, Zorrobot, Yobot, Ptbotgourou, AnomieBOT, Citation bot, Xqbot, Eros of Fire, Adel.M.Radwan, Anotherclown, AustralianRupert,StoneProphet, FrescoBot, CaptainFugu, Math321, DrilBot, Winterst, Jonathandt, EmausBot, D2306, GoingBatty, Slawekb, The Madras,ZroBot, Taragalinas, H3llBot, Sergii.Fiot, MonoAV, Spicemix, WorldWarTwoEditor, Gunbirddriver, , Alphasinus, Helpful Pixie Bot,Sinbuster, PhnomPencil, MiG29VN, IluvatarBot, Hamish59, Peacemaker67, BattyBot, Oceanyes, Dexbot, Irondome, JamesRussels, Yunc-cha92, Monkbot, GeneralizationsAreBad and Anonymous: 85

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Axis strategyBackgroundThe oilfields

PlanningAxis forcesSoviet forces

The offensiveOpening phaseSplitting of Army Group SouthArmy Group A: CaucasusBreaking into the CaucasusOilfieldsLuftwaffe oil offensive

Army Group B: VolgaDon bendThe Battle of Stalingrad

AftermathOperation SaturnAnalysis

See alsoNotesReferencesBibliographyText and image sources, contributors, and licensesTextImagesContent license