Will America's Image Recover in Europe: Understanding Public Opinion Since 9/11

8/8/2019 Will America's Image Recover in Europe: Understanding Public Opinion Since 9/11

1/49

BRUSSELS FORUM PAPER SER IES

Will Americas ImageRecover in Europe?

Understanding public opinion since 9/11

John K. Glenn

Director of Foreign Policy

The German Marshall Fund of the United States


2/49

2008 Te German Marshall Fund o the United States. All rights reserved.

No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means without permission

in writing rom the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to:

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States

1744 R Street, NW

Washington, DC 20009

1 202 745 3950

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copies are also available. o request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected].

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Te GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety o transatlantic topics by sta, ellows, and partners o theGerman Marshall Fund o the United States. Te views expressed here are those o the author and do not neces-

sarily represent the view o GMF. Comments rom readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by

e-mail to [email protected].

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grant-

making institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between the United States

and Europe.

GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders

to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can

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Founded in 1972 through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF

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please visit www.brusselsorum.org.


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I 3

A G Bw E Pb E 5

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Will Americas Image Recover in Europe?


Brussels Forum Paper Series

March 2008

J K G

D F PyT G M F U S


4/49


5/49

Will Americas Image Recover in Europe? 3

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Introduction

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Percent

Chart 1: Reversal In Views

of the United States

64

45

36

39

3736

31

49

59 59

58 58

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Undesirable

Desirable


6/49

The German Marshall Fund of the United States4

Managing

expectations for

change may be

the foremost task

for policymakers

in the coming

administration.

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7/49


A gap between European

publics and elites?2

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Trends E

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8/49


9/49


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y, b Aw K B Sk America

Against the World w w

w

w U S w

w A-A, y ,

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y y

yz (F, Gy, Iy, U

K), P

w wk y w

yy w

w US y Iq R, b

y w

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Anti-Americanism?

3

Percent

Chart 3: European Views of U.S. Leadershipvs. Views of President Bush

38

30

2124

18 17

64

45

3639 37

36

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Approval of President Bush

Desirability of U.S. leadership


10/49


Europeans

continue to

distinguish

between their

views of President

Bush and their

views of the

United States

more generally.

T Transatlantic Trends E bw

w P B w

U S y W

E w P B

3% 17% 7,

19- bw

US w

(S C 3: T bw w

U S P B)

I w w , E by US

b P

B

w -B

b -A T

, w, w w

-A, ,

w w A

w y Vw U

S y by w

, b y

y E

T q , Transatlantic

Trends y k E 7

b

bw U S

E w Iq,

G By, - U S

Ky y b w, P

B E w bw

w Iq (3%)

P B (34%), w y

w

G (4%), by

A y

,

- Ky y (11%),

by b b

(S C 4: Ew )

I b wy b E w

US w Iq y

Ak 4, Transatlantic Trends y

% E w

Iq w w

k Iq Sy- E

w Iq

w T

b E b

Y E b USE

, w E w P B

ky w U S,

w w Iq y q w


11/49


Chart 4: Main Reason for Decline in U.S.European Relations

Percent

MANAGEMENT

OF THE WAR IN IRAQ

TREATMENT OF

PRISONERS AT

GUANTANAMO BAY

U.S. NOT PARTICIPATING

IN THE KYOTO TREATY

PRESIDENT BUSH

HIMSELF

0

10

20

30

40

38 38

42

11

5

34

39

Europe United States


12/49


Cumsan hendio

con vullaorem

zzrilit laorting

el do exer si tin

ulputem iure

velendrer sequat.

Ummy nissis eum

dolummy nullaor

amconsecte

exercilisl ut

vullandio odo

R w E A w , w U S y

b by ,

wy w w wy w

b T U S

E

M E, w w

y y w R

C By k M 4

L 5,

E,

w b

b w w Iq T 7 bb

k Gw, S, w

Iy

S, b b

b A

Transatlantic Trends k y y wA E w ky

x y T

A E

, y w

b b L

j 7% A

E

w

x y, ,

I , ,

b , b

w, w w C(S C 5: T 7)

O, A

E y

b w; w,

Do we see the world differently?

4

Chart 5: In the Next Ten Years, How Likely are You to bePersonally Affected by the Following Threats?

ENERGY

DEPENDENCE

MAJOR

ECONOMIC

DOWNTURN

INTER-

NATIONAL

TERRORISM

IRAN

ACQUIRING

NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

IMMIGRANTS/

REFUGEES

ISLAMIC

FUNDAMEN-

TALISM

GLOBAL

SPREAD

OF DISEASE

EFFECTS

OF GLOBAL

WARMING

0

20

40

60

80

100

78

88

65

80

66

74

59

72

63

71

54

5957 57

85

70

Percent



13/49


k w byw A E ky

b y 7 A

ky b y by y

(%), w (%),

(74%) E

ky b y by

b w (5%), y

(7%), (66%)

W A

, E

5

16

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I , E

15 O ,

E 14 O

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Gy,

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Gy

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5) ky b y by T b G w

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Gy

I w

w y

T

b , b

b w T

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b, x

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b b

U S E,

w y

C

A w , b,

by, Transatlantic Trends y

b w w

b 6 (S C

6: E US w b)

I y, 59% b A

E

y z

A

E

y

I (54% b

A E )

b (71%

A 7% E ) Ty

b y

bk , w 5% A 5% E

By b w

, Transatlantic Trends yz

A E w

y

Threat perceptio

suggest a possib

convergence,

despite vigorous

public debate ov

how to respond.


14/49

Cumsan hendio

con vullaorem

zzrilit laorting

el do exer si tin

ulputem iure

velendrer sequat.

Ummy nissis eum

dolummy nullaor

amconsecte

exercilisl ut

vullandio odo


A b,

I q w

b

USE

T U S E U

w I

by

UN Sy C, w y

w

A b b

x I ,

B , W w,

by, b w w I 17

17 USEU S, A 3, 7, ://wwww/w//7/4/743-

Sy-w A 59%

E ky b y

by I q w W

k w ky I

q w, j

A E w

, b

M E w y

w w L j

A E w b

, b I w y

w I ,

w A E b

I w w

y (S C 7: I I w

q w, w ky )

Chart 6: European and U.S. Views on Civil Liberties

Percen

t

INSTALL SURVEILLANCE

CAMERAS

MONITOR INTERNET

COMMUNICATION

MONITOR

PHONE CALLS

MONITOR BANKING

TRANSACTIONS

0

20

40

60

80

78

71

54 54

39 39

50

39

Source: Transatlantic Trends, 2006.



15/49

Iriuscidunt verci

tinciduisi. Lis ad

elessi. Um alis

dolor si. Ing eum

dolorem nullaor

tionseq uipsum

ipsusto dolore

feum quiscil iscil

er si et vent amc

ad dio eum vel


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E y

W k w y

y w ,

j b A

b ,

b w y

b (S C : S

, w w

w y

I q w)

Fy- A

b

y b ,

w 3% w

b By , y 1% E

y b

, w 47% E

w b

R w R

C b

y A

P B U S

wk w R C,

b A1 A

E q R

1 ://wwww/w//7/6/765-

Chart 7: If Iran were to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, How Likely is it that . . . ?

Percent

OTHER COUNTRIES IN

THE MIDDLE EAST WILL

DECIDE THAT THEY SHOULD

HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IRAN WILL SUPPLY

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

TO TERRORISTS

IRAN WILL THREATEN

EUROPE WITH

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IRAN WILL ONLY USE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES

0

20

40

60

80

100

68

83

68

82

54

67

52

43



16/49

Cumsan hendio

con vullaorem

zzrilit laorting

el do exer si tin

ulputem iure

velendrer sequat.

Ummy nissis eum

dolummy nullaor

amconsecte

exercilisl ut

vullandio odo


y w R

y y E

B Jy 7,

w Uk y b I

b b US -

y P Cz Rb,

R F Dy P M S I

y w R

w E A b UN Sy C,

R C

,

I ,

K, S

Ak b R, j b

A x b

Sy- A

65% E x b

R w

M E T-q A

x b wk

y R ( w 57%

E), j E A x

b R y Sxy-

A 56% E

x b R b w

b (S C 9: C R)

Chart 8: Should Diplomatic Efforts Fail, Which of the Following StrategiesWould You Most Favor to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons?

Percent

ACCEPT THAT IRAN

MAY DEVELOP

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAINTAIN THE PRESENT

LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC

PRESSURE ON IRAN

INCREASE DIPLOMATIC

PRESSURE ON IRAN

BUT RULE OUT THE USE

OF MILITARY FORCE

INCREASE DIPLOMATIC

PRESSURE ON IRAN

AND MAINTAIN THE OPTION

OF USING MILITARY FORCE

0

20

40

60

76

19

11

47

32

18

47



17/49

Iriuscidunt verci

tinciduisi. Lis ad

elessi. Um alis

dolor si. Ing eum

dolorem nullaor

tionseq uipsum

ipsusto dolore

feum quiscil iscil

er si et vent amc

ad dio eum vel


T w E w, w

ky b R

Gy G

E ,

+19 wk

y R +11

R b w b

T z, b

w w

U S y

w w w

I w R

W ,

b wk by w Iq

Chart 9: Concerns about Developments in Russia

Percent

RUSSIAS ROLE AS

AN ENERGY PROVIDER

RUSSIAS BEHAVIOR

TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS

THE WEAKENING OF

DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA

RUSSIAS ROLE IN

PROVIDING WEAPONS

TO THE MIDDLE EAST

0

20

40

60

80

59 5856

69

57

75

65

79 Europe United States


18/49


Differences over

the use of force

can be found in

public opinion in

policy area after

policy area as well.

O w U S y

AA ,

E k

(K Sk, 6) T

y y z A

, w E ;

A , w E

y-; A b

k k, w E

b y w T

w, w z,

y y U

S E O

b Rb K

w

, , w,

U S y y

w y w

y E, k

y (K, 4)

O k Transatlantic

Trends ( by K

Sk, K) E A

w k w y w

w w : U

, w y b

j Rkby, 74% A

w , w 3%

E 7 (S C 1: U

, w y b j)

D b

b y y w I , w b

A E w

w I, w A

E k

b T

w

A A y E

b I Sy

A F NATO, b

w k

w I w

C Mk Gy

C k U K Dk

y A w y

Iq T E w

, w w

b w Iq,

w A,

k w UN Sy

C y

Pb w ,

, j E (64%)

A (64%) b

A A , E

A b

b Tb, w

6% A

y 3% E A

E,

Difference in values?

5

Chart 10: Under Some Conditions,War is Necessary to Obtain Justice

Percent

AGREE DISAGREE

0

20

40

60


32

74

65

23


19/49


Americans and

Europeans

have multiple

values that at

times compete

with each other

for priority.

U K (51%), N (45%), F (36%) T

b

A z

b

(S C 11: A A)

T

Y, by

w Iq, A

E w wk

W k E A 4, y w Iq, y

U S E U

b b

b 6%

E 71% A

w (S

C 1: T US EU

b)

T , A E

w

y F

x, ,

3% E 7% A

w w

y w Ey-

E 9% A ,

w y y

, w

Fy- E

w EU k by 7

w

U S, y

Dy b by

U S E U

y

T w y

P

ercent

Chart 11: Approval of Troops

in Afghanistan

TO CONTRIBUTE TO

INTERNATIONAL

RECONSTRUCTION

EFFORTS

TO CONDUCT COMBAT

OPERATIONS AGAINST

THE TALIBAN

0

20

40

60

80

64 64

30

68


Chart 12: The U.S. and EU Share

Enough Values to Cooperate onInternational Problems

P

ercent

ENOUGH COMMON

VALUES TO BE ABLE TO

COOPERATE

SUCH DIFFERENT

VALUES THAT

COOPERATING

IS IMPOSSIBLE

0

20

40

60

80

60

71

34

21




20/49

Cumsan hendio

con vullaorem

zzrilit laorting

el do exer si tin

ulputem iure

velendrer sequat.

Ummy nissis eum

dolummy nullaor

amconsecte

exercilisl ut

vullandio odo


y W Bk

K,

B,

S Y M E

H-

P Lb

Hzb q b w

U S E y b

Iy,

E A y

Transatlantic Trends k E

b E U

b y

A b U

S , kby, E

A y

Sy- E

, w 37% A 7 (S C 13: Dy )

O x A

by A E

by y ,

b Transatlantic Trends w

Ak w y w y y, A

E w

, ,

S w k b

,

, ,

, y , w

w A (34%)

E (4%) (O w , C

14: Hw w y)

T U S w

Rb

D, b

y b ,

U S w w y

b y

by by M E

T b

w U S y

y ,

w w

y w

K, w

bk Of Paradise and Power,

y, w, y b

(4:1)

T q y w U

S , b w S

U N k

b Transatlantic Trends w j

b A (61% A

71% E) w U Nby Ty , w, y

U N y

y W k j

by U N w

y , 59% A

, w 44% E 4

Chart 13: Democracy Promotion

Percent

EUROPE UNITED STATES

0

20

40

60

80

71

23

37

56

Support

Do not support


21/49

Iriuscidunt verci

tinciduisi. Lis ad

elessi. Um alis

dolor si. Ing eum

dolorem nullaor

tionseq uipsum

ipsusto dolore

feum quiscil iscil

er si et vent amc

ad dio eum vel


Chart 14: How Should We Promote Democracy?

Percent

MONITORING

ELECTIONS

SUPPORT

INDEPENDENT

GROUPS

ECONOMIC

SANCTIONS

POLITICAL

SANCTIONS

SUPPORT

POLITICAL

DISSIDENTS

MILITARY

FORCE

0

20

40

60

80

79

67

77

71

54

61

51 51

53

39

24

34




22/49


The transatlantic

agenda has

become a global

agenda on which

the United States

and Europe

are working

together to deal

with a range of

international

threats and global

challenges, even

if by bracketing

the war in Iraq.

T US y U S

b

J Ny, Ky S

G H Uy R

A, US y y ,

y U S

, ,

w

z w b

y w

A w, E

yk y

B T

b b w

U S E are wk

w

b , by bk w

Iq T q w w

w E b

w U S A-B b -

A, b w

U S b

w ky

W w U S

b, b

w by b y b

y w y I w

y b k z by

w US T w- by k

W kw w U

S w

w U S w

V 197 y

P E 19 W

b , b

I

Scenarios for the future

6

Percent

Chart 15: Is NATO Still Essential?

1969

1971

1973

1976

1977

1978

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

63

73

61

67

64

67 67

64

57

8182

64

69

5658

64 64

67

70

74

6563

59

69

65

69

72

6465

6159

50

60

70

80

90

Average for Britain, France, and Germany

Source: Data provided by Professor Richard Eichenberg, Tufts University.


23/49


These findings

suggest likely

improvement

in views of the

United States

among some

Europeans, but

not a dramatic

upswing based

on expectations

of change.

W Transatlantic Trends y

w , b

b NATO,

k w

S

, Transatlantic Trends

E w

NATO y y,

69% 5% 7 C 15

q

: Gy, F, Iy, U

K19 (S C 15: I NATO )

A , E

w NATO P

191, w

199, w Bk -

199 B , E

b, y y

19 D by P R Eb, T Uy

Pb

E

x T

E (46%)

w y w

US

w , w 35% w

w 6% w

w w (S C 16: P

US )

T w

w w F (51%),

w

w w Gy (54%)

S (5%) T jy E

b w

b , w y 1% w

y b

T w

P (33%), S (9%), P (7%)

Chart 16: Prospects for Transatlantic Relations After the 2008 U.S. Elections

Perce

nt

WILL IMPROVE WILL GET WORSEWILL STAY THE SAME

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

35

42

67

46

37



24/49


T ky w U S E, b

w b x

T b

b by

y E b w A Dq

M, I F

R I P, ,

I y , x

w b y T

E, ,

b

w Iq, , w w x y w US

y b w

W H, w

w w US

w M E Tw b y, y

W E ky

j w Iq

, y

w- w US

, b

B T

, R, I,

A I , by z

w , b w

A E b

b, w


25/49

Iriuscidunt verci

tinciduisi. Lis ad

elessi. Um alis

dolor si. Ing eum

dolorem nullaor

tionseq uipsum

ipsusto dolore

feum quiscil iscil

er si et vent amc

ad dio eum vel


European Elite Survey Ky F R(67), Uy S, b

www //_w

E, P (5), I US

T -A,

W Pw: A

Sy Py P, Ww

W I C S,

W, DC, Fby 1415, 5

H, R (7), T A b

w, Financial Times, Db 1

Hkb, M D (), A P

W T: I, Iq, I,

Pk, Foreign Affairs, Jy/Fby

I, P (6), A-A

E b , America

Contested: The limits and future of American

unilaterialism, S Fbb,

Nw Yk: R, 1315

J, Ty L, D (7),

With Us or Against Us: Studies in globalanti-Americanism , P M

K, Rb (4), Of Paradise and

Power: America and Europe in the new

world order, Nw Yk: V Bk

References

7

K, Rb Kz, P J (6)Anti-Americanism in World Politics,

I, NY: C Uy P

K, Aw Sk, B (6),America

Against the World: How we are different and

why we are disliked Nw Yk: Hy H

MC, J (7), A E P B

F: S A F,

Foreign Affairs, Nb/Db

M, Dq (7), Bk Ob

A R, Pj Sy, wwwj-y/y/5

Ny, J A, R (7),

S G M, A, G S,

Washington Post, Db 1

Pw Gb A Pj (7), Global

Unease with Major World Powers: 47-Nation

Pew Global Attitudes Survey, J 7

Sk, K (7), T US E: T

x, Centre

for European Reform Essays, Nb

Transatlantic Trends Ky F R

(7), G M F

U S, b

www


26/49


27/49

Itdt 3

A G Btw E Pb d Et 5

At-A 7

D W S t Wd Dffty 1

Dff V 16

S f t Ft

Rf 3

Will Americas Image Recover in Europe?


Brussels Forum Paper Series

March 2008

J K G

Dt f F PyT G M Fd f t Utd Stt


28/49


A 2003, y

2004, w 58% E w w w US

w b

36% w w b7 (S C 1:

R w U S)

O , b b b

A w w

CIA E,

Iq, b US

G By y Cb T

bby w US 2004 Hw

w

U S H

Iq ,

w U S W

y w US 2009

7 A , w , byTransatlantic Trends, 2007

Introduction

1

M A w b y

US 2008

O D , US S Hy

C wb ,

T x k w b

A w

, y,

1 US S Bk Ob

y

A 2

US S J Ew b: O

w b by y A b

k w3

T y D A

Rb , US S J MC

w

, y USE

y A ,

y y w b

z 4 F

Ak G Mk Hkb

B bky b

b5 A Nw Yk Cy My

Ry G 12

w6

Pb w

U S w

w w Iq

F x, 64% E w US

w b 2002,

w 31% w w b

1 ://wwwy//y

2 ://wwwbkb// y

3 ://wwwjw//

4 MC, 2007

5 Hkb, 2008

6 ://wwwjy2008//w/16

Percent

Chart 1: Reversal In Views

of the United States

64

45

36

39

3736

31

49

59 59

58 58

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Undesirable

Desirable


29/49


Managing

expectations for

change may be

the foremost task

for policymakers

in the coming

administration.

U S E by G M F U S

20029 T

w b

b -A,

x w

x A E b

b w USE

,

b y

W b

, A

E w , R, I y k w

y T w US w y

, b b z

b

x y

9 Transatlantic Trends j G MF U S C S P,w F L-A,F BBVA, T P F T x y b b 1,000 U S 12 E: B, F, Gy, Iy, N,P, P, R, Sk, S, Tky, U K T y w J 4-23,2007 T by y , TNS O, C-A T I-w (CATI) x B, P, Sk,R, Tky, w w - -- w F b 13 y, y w 95% -bb F b E, E-w w b z y

W y w , y b w

qk y

U S R H,

C F R,

ky

b w w b b

b w A q

by: , k, b,

H w B y

ky b y w

by ,

w wy y (H, 2007)

O w x

K

Sk, w H

I, w , D

Rb, ky x w

, x

W E ky x

U S, A

ky x E b

b, xy b T

w b , w

M x y b

k yk

E

US

w , b

, Gy Ob8 T

by yz

b Transatlantic Trends, y y

8 N K, ://by/2008/01/06/y-----b


30/49


A gap between European

publics and elites?2

I bby w U S b, US

E z

y

B C

bw U S E

U ( by F, Gy, U

K) I

w x

y ,

b U S E U

y y

w Lb, U N K Bk,

B, k

S

US Sy S Czz R

P Fby 2005

w E,

P B E

x H b

A y

E U, B, T

E N A y10 E C

P J M B b 2006,

EUUS by

y, w wk

yy ,

, 11 I

2007, U S USEU

S W, DC, w A

E

wk w

P B , T U S E U b,

10 Fby, 2005, k by US P B B,B b

11 EU-US S, V 2006 :////x_//06_06/x

b b12

GC A Mk b y

, y y

13

M w E yk

b by b

A y Transatlantic

Trends E

b EU y

b U S

E b w

Sy- MEP 77% EU US

b, w y 36%

E b Sy MEP

78% EU b NATO

y,

w 55% E b M

w y MEP (35%) E

(34%) b USE

y, w

E b (16%)14 (S C 2: Vw

E )

Nby, E b

y w

w U

S Mk G S

b Gy 2005,

S

Iq w N

Skzy w F

U S

E U K, w

b b y B

12 ://wwww///2007/x

13 A 30, 2007, k US Cb C

14 E E Sy, 2007 S ://www//_w y


31/49


Iq, P M Ty B

w - 2006

, G Bw,

y USB

Y , E b w

U S Ak J 2005,

E b by

B

, w 52% E w

y A ,

w 50% y y 15

15 Transatlantic Trends, 2005

Chart 2: Views of European Elites on Transatlantic Relations

Percent

U.S. LEADERSHIP IS DESIRABLE NATO IS ESSENTIAL U.S.-EU RELATIONSHIPS

IMPROVED OVER THE LAST YEAR

0

20

40

60

80

100

EU Public MEPs EU Officials

36

7477

55

70

78

16

35 34

Source: European Elite Survey


32/49


T b B DailyMirror, Hw 59,054,087 b

b y P B -

2004 b w

E B - w

w y b -B

-A R y

w y

b -A (

by J L, 2007; K

Kz, 2006) D b

,

b y M y

-A

x

w D

,

q

-A y

y (K Kz, 2006:273)

Pb yz k

w U S

y, b Aw K B Sk America

Against the World w w

w

w U S w

w A-A, y ,

by

T k A

y, b U S yb

bz, by A

b,

MD Sbk Uk

-A, K Sk -A b

T 2007 Pw Gb A

Pj : I

w b k

A b bk

A

D , P E, b w

U S Y

- -A, ,

x wy

b

(2007:18) Ayz bw

w US y Iq

, I , P

I,

b w -

A w

bw E US A-A, by

w U S,

y y

yz (F, Gy, Iy, U

K), P

w wk y w

yy w

w US y Iq R, b

y w

P B

Anti-Americanism?

3

Percent

Chart 3: European Views of U.S. Leadershipvs. Views of President Bush

38

30

2124

18 17

64

45

3639 37

36

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Approval of President Bush

Desirability of U.S. leadership


33/49


Europeans

continue to

distinguish

between their

views of President

Bush and their

views of the

United States

more generally.

T Transatlantic Trends E bw

w P B w

U S y W

E w P B

38% 2002 17% 2007,

19- bw

US w

(S C 3: T bw w

U S P B)

I w w , E by US

b P

B

w -B

b -A T

, w, w w

-A, ,

w w A

w y Vw U

S y by w

, b y

y E

T q , Transatlantic

Trends y k E 2007

b

bw U S

E w Iq,

G By, - U S

Ky y b w, P

B E w bw

w Iq (38%)

P B (34%), w y

w

G (4%), by

A y

,

- Ky y (11%),

by b b

(S C 4: Ew )

I b wy b E w

US w Iq y

Ak 2004, Transatlantic Trends y

80% E w

Iq w w

k Iq Sy- E

w Iq

w T

b E b

Y E b USE

, w E w P B

ky w U S,

w w Iq y q w


34/49


Chart 4: Main Reason for Decline in U.S.European Relations

Percent

MANAGEMENT

OF THE WAR IN IRAQ

TREATMENT OF

PRISONERS AT

GUANTANAMO BAY

U.S. NOT PARTICIPATING

IN THE KYOTO TREATY

PRESIDENT BUSH

HIMSELF

0

10

20

30

40

38 38

42

11

5

34

39



35/49


36/49


k w byw A E ky

b y 2007 A

ky b y by y

(88%), w (80%),

(74%) E

ky b y by

b w (85%), y

(78%), (66%)

W A

, E

2005

16

O , E 16 O

I , E

15 O ,

E 14 O

b w, E

12 T

Gy,

w b

Gy

w Iq F

k bb 2006

2007, w,k b b

w

G M I W

Sb k y by w

y w k

y

I 2007, 70% G (+32

2005) ky b y

by Fy-

G (+28 2005)

ky b y by I, 74% (+26

16 T y w 2005 2006 b y w q w k y O y k b b

2005) ky b y by T b G w

E 2005, w

Gy

I w

w y

T

b , b

b w T

q b w , y

b, x

, , I

b b

U S E,

w y

C

A w , b,

by, Transatlantic Trends y

b w w

b 2006 (S C

6: E US w b)

I y, 59% b A

E

y z

A

E

y

I (54% b

A E )

b (71%

A 78% E ) Ty

b y

bk , w 58% A 50% E

By b w

, Transatlantic Trends yz

A E w

y

Threat perceptio

suggest a possib

convergence,

despite vigorous

public debate ov

how to respond.


37/49

Cumsan hendio

con vullaorem

zzrilit laorting

el do exer si tin

ulputem iure

velendrer sequat.

Ummy nissis eum

dolummy nullaor

amconsecte

exercilisl ut

vullandio odo


A b,

I q w

b

USE

T U S E U

w I

by

UN Sy C, w y

w

A b b

x I ,

B , W w,

by, b w w I 17

17 USEU S, A 30, 2007, ://wwww/w//2007/04/20070430-2

Sy-w A 59%

E ky b y

by I q w W

k w ky I

q w, j

A E w

, b

M E w y

w w L j

A E w b

, b I w y

w I ,

w A E b

I w w

y (S C 7: I I w

q w, w ky )

Chart 6: European and U.S. Views on Civil Liberties

Percen

t

INSTALL SURVEILLANCE

CAMERAS

MONITOR INTERNET

COMMUNICATION

MONITOR

PHONE CALLS

MONITOR BANKING

TRANSACTIONS

0

20

40

60

80

78

71

54 54

39 39

50

39




38/49

Iriuscidunt verci

tinciduisi. Lis ad

elessi. Um alis

dolor si. Ing eum

dolorem nullaor

tionseq uipsum

ipsusto dolore

feum quiscil iscil

er si et vent amc

ad dio eum vel


Ow j A

E y

W k w y

y w ,

j b A

b ,

b w y

b (S C 8: S

, w w

w y

I q w)

Fy- A

b

y b ,

w 32% w

b By , y 18% E

y b

, w 47% E

w b

R w R

C b

y A

P B U S

wk w R C,

b A18 A

E q R

18 ://wwww/w//2007/06/20070605-8

Chart 7: If Iran were to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, How Likely is it that . . . ?

Percent

OTHER COUNTRIES IN

THE MIDDLE EAST WILL

DECIDE THAT THEY SHOULD

HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IRAN WILL SUPPLY

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

TO TERRORISTS

IRAN WILL THREATEN

EUROPE WITH

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IRAN WILL ONLY USE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES

0

20

40

60

80

100

68

83

68

82

54

67

52

43



39/49

Cumsan hendio

con vullaorem

zzrilit laorting

el do exer si tin

ulputem iure

velendrer sequat.

Ummy nissis eum

dolummy nullaor

amconsecte

exercilisl ut

vullandio odo


y w R

y y E

B Jy 2007,

w Uk y b I

b b US -

y P Cz Rb,

R F Dy P M S I

y w R

w E A b UN Sy C,

R C

,

I ,

K, S

Ak b R, j b

A x b

Sy- A

65% E x b

R w

M E T-q A

x b wk

y R ( w 57%

E), j E A x

b R y Sxy-

A 56% E

x b R b w

b (S C 9: C R)

Chart 8: Should Diplomatic Efforts Fail, Which of the Following StrategiesWould You Most Favor to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons?

Percent

ACCEPT THAT IRAN

MAY DEVELOP

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAINTAIN THE PRESENT

LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC

PRESSURE ON IRAN

INCREASE DIPLOMATIC

PRESSURE ON IRAN

BUT RULE OUT THE USE

OF MILITARY FORCE

INCREASE DIPLOMATIC

PRESSURE ON IRAN

AND MAINTAIN THE OPTION

OF USING MILITARY FORCE

0

20

40

60

76

19

11

47

32

18

47



40/49

Iriuscidunt verci

tinciduisi. Lis ad

elessi. Um alis

dolor si. Ing eum

dolorem nullaor

tionseq uipsum

ipsusto dolore

feum quiscil iscil

er si et vent amc

ad dio eum vel


T w E w, w

ky b R

Gy G

E ,

+19 wk

y R +11

R b w b

T z, b

w w

U S y

w w w

I w R

W ,

b wk by w Iq

Chart 9: Concerns about Developments in Russia

Percent

RUSSIAS ROLE AS

AN ENERGY PROVIDER

RUSSIAS BEHAVIOR

TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS

THE WEAKENING OF

DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA

RUSSIAS ROLE IN

PROVIDING WEAPONS

TO THE MIDDLE EAST

0

20

40

60

80

59 5856

69

57

75

65



41/49


Differences over

the use of force

can be found in

public opinion in

policy area after

policy area as well.

O w U S y

AA ,

E k

(K Sk, 2006) T

y y z A

, w E ;

A , w E

y-; A b

k k, w E

b y w T

w, w z,

y y U

S E O

b Rb K

w

, , w,

U S y y

w y w

y E, k

y (K, 2004)

O k Transatlantic

Trends ( by K

Sk, K) E A

w k w y w

w w : U

, w y b

j Rkby, 74% A

w , w 32%

E 2007 (S C 10: U

, w y b j)

D b

b y y w I , w b

A E w

w I, w A

E k

b T

w

A A y E

b I Sy

A F NATO, b

w k

w I w

C Mk Gy

C k U K Dk

y A w y

Iq T E w

, w w

b w Iq,

w A,

k w UN Sy

C y

Pb w ,

, j E (64%)

A (64%) b

A A , E

A b

b Tb, w

68% A

y 30% E A

E,

Difference in values?

5

Chart 10: Under Some Conditions,War is Necessary to Obtain Justice

Percent

AGREE DISAGREE

0

20

40

60


32

74

65

23


42/49


Americans and

Europeans

have multiple

values that at

times compete

with each other

for priority.

U K (51%), N (45%), F (36%) T

b

A z

b

(S C 11: A A)

T

Y, by

w Iq, A

E w wk

W k E A 2004, y w Iq, y

U S E U

b b

b 60%

E 71% A

w (S

C 12: T US EU

b)

T , A E

w

y F

x, ,

83% E 72% A

w w

y w Ey-

E 89% A ,

w y y

, w

Fy- E

w EU k by 2007

w

U S, y

Dy b by

U S E U

y

T w y

P

ercent

Chart 11: Approval of Troops

in Afghanistan

TO CONTRIBUTE TO

INTERNATIONAL

RECONSTRUCTION

EFFORTS

TO CONDUCT COMBAT

OPERATIONS AGAINST

THE TALIBAN

0

20

40

60

80

64 64

30

68


Chart 12: The U.S. and EU Share

Enough Values to Cooperate onInternational Problems

P

ercent

ENOUGH COMMON

VALUES TO BE ABLE TO

COOPERATE

SUCH DIFFERENT

VALUES THAT

COOPERATING

IS IMPOSSIBLE

0

20

40

60

80

60

71

34

21




43/49

Cumsan hendio

con vullaorem

zzrilit laorting

el do exer si tin

ulputem iure

velendrer sequat.

Ummy nissis eum

dolummy nullaor

amconsecte

exercilisl ut

vullandio odo


y W Bk

K,

B,

S Y M E

H-

P Lb

Hzb q b w

U S E y b

Iy,

E A y

Transatlantic Trends k E

b E U

b y

A b U

S , kby, E

A y

Sy- E

, w 37% A 2007 (S C 13: Dy )

O x A

by A E

by y ,

b Transatlantic Trends w

Ak w y w y y, A

E w

, ,

S w k b

,

, ,

, y , w

w A (34%)

E (24%) (O w , C

14: Hw w y)

T U S w

Rb

D, b

y b ,

U S w w y

b y

by by M E

T b

w U S y

y ,

w w

y w

K, w

bk Of Paradise and Power,

y, w, y b

(2004:108)

T q y w U

S , b w S

U N k

b Transatlantic Trends w j

b A (61% A

71% E) w U Nby Ty , w, y

U N y

y W k j

by U N w

y , 59% A

, w 44% E 2004

Chart 13: Democracy Promotion

Percent

EUROPE UNITED STATES

0

20

40

60

80

71

23

37

56

Support

Do not support


44/49

Iriuscidunt verci

tinciduisi. Lis ad

elessi. Um alis

dolor si. Ing eum

dolorem nullaor

tionseq uipsum

ipsusto dolore

feum quiscil iscil

er si et vent amc

ad dio eum vel


Chart 14: How Should We Promote Democracy?

Percent

MONITORING

ELECTIONS

SUPPORT

INDEPENDENT

GROUPS

ECONOMIC

SANCTIONS

POLITICAL

SANCTIONS

SUPPORT

POLITICAL

DISSIDENTS

MILITARY

FORCE

0

20

40

60

80

79

67

77

71

54

61

51 51

53

39

24

34




45/49


46/49


These findings

suggest likely

improvement

in views of the

United States

among some

Europeans, but

not a dramatic

upswing based

on expectations

of change.

W Transatlantic Trends y

w 2002, b

b NATO,

k w

S

2002, Transatlantic Trends

E w

NATO y y,

69% 2002 52% 2007 C 15

q

: Gy, F, Iy, U

K19 (S C 15: I NATO )

A , E

w NATO P

1981, w

1989, w Bk -

1990 B , E

b, y y

19 D by P R Eb, T Uy

Pb

E

x T

E (46%)

w y w

2008 US

w , w 35% w

w 6% w

w w (S C 16: P

2008 US )

T w

w w F (51%),

w

w w Gy (54%)

S (52%) T jy E

b w

b , w y 21% w

y b

T w

P (33%), S (29%), P (27%)

Chart 16: Prospects for Transatlantic Relations After the 2008 U.S. Elections

Perce

nt

WILL IMPROVE WILL GET WORSEWILL STAY THE SAME

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

35

42

67

46

37



47/49


T ky w U S E, b

w b x

T b

b by

y E b w A Dq

M, I F

R I P, ,

I y , x

w b y T

E, ,

b

w Iq, , w w x y w US

y b w

W H, w

w w US

w M E Tw b y, y

W E ky

j w Iq

, y

w- w US

, b

B T

, R, I,

A I , by z

w , b w

A E b

b, w


48/49

Iriuscidunt verci

tinciduisi. Lis ad

elessi. Um alis

dolor si. Ing eum

dolorem nullaor

tionseq uipsum

ipsusto dolore

feum quiscil iscil

er si et vent amc

ad dio eum vel


European Elite Survey Ky F R(20062007), Uy S, b

www //_w

E, P (2005), I US

T -A,

W Pw: A

Sy Py P, Ww

W I C S,

W, DC, Fby 1415, 2005

H, R (2007), T A b

w, Financial Times, Db 18

Hkb, M D (2008), A P

W T: I, Iq, I,

Pk, Foreign Affairs, Jy/Fby

I, P (2006), A-A

E b , America

Contested: The limits and future of American

unilaterialism, S Fbb,

Nw Yk: R, 130158

J, Ty L, D (2007),

With Us or Against Us: Studies in globalanti-Americanism , P M

K, Rb (2004), Of Paradise and

Power: America and Europe in the new

world order, Nw Yk: V Bk

References

7

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I, NY: C Uy P

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