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ASMARA DIGESTA CANARY OF THE HORN

VI/005/2013 – SUPPLEMENT

1) RESOURCE UTILIZATION OF RIVER NILE AND ISAIAS’ DEADPAN POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC ATTITUDE

River Nile is the longest river in the world (6700 Km). It arises from Lake Victoria (at Jinja of Uganda, as per introduced while visiting the area by the tourist guides there) and from Lake Tana of Ethiopia (I have seen and have known this part of the geography since I was a student of grade IX and secretary of the Geography Club (of the then Haile Selassie 1 st Comprehensive School now Fasiledes Comprehensive School in Gondar). Some sources indicate that “the Blue Nile is the shorter tributary; it contributes the majority of the water. Its source is in the highlands of Ethiopia, supposedly at a sacred spring near the town of Gish Abay”.

According to other sources the River Nile source is located at 2°19'35"S and 29°21'30"E and its length is 7,088 km from its source in Nyungwe National Park of Rwanda. It is the longest river of the world. According to Wikipedia the source of the River Nile is described as follows: “The source of the Nile is sometimes considered to be Lake Victoria, but the lake has Feeder Rivers of considerable size. The Kagera River, which flows into Lake Victoria near the Tanzanian town of Bukoba, is the longest feeder, although sources do not agree on which is the longest tributary of the Kagera and hence the most distant source of the Nile itself. It is either the Ruvyironza, which emerges in Bururi Province, Burundi, or the Nyabarongo, which flows from Nyungwe Forest in Rwanda. The two Feeder Rivers meet near Rusumo Falls on the Rwanda-Tanzania border. It is supplied with water from a number of tributaries”[http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Where_is_the_source_of_the_River_Nile].

An extract from FAO Report

http://www.fao.org/docrep/W4347E/w4347e0k.htm#the%20nile%20basin

“The Nile Basin

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The Nile River, with an estimated length of over 6800 km, is the longest river flowing from south to north over 35 degrees of latitude. It is fed by two main river systems: the White Nile, with its sources on the Equatorial Lake Plateau (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire and Uganda), and the Blue Nile, with its sources in the Ethiopian highlands. The sources are located in humid regions, with an average rainfall of over 1000 mm per year. The arid region starts in Sudan, the largest country of Africa, which can be divided into three rainfall zones: the extreme south of the country where rainfall ranges from 1200 to 1500 mm per year; the fertile clay-plains where 400 to 800 mm of rain falls annually; and the desert northern third of the country where rainfall averages only 20 mm per year. Further north, in Egypt, precipitation falls to less than 20 mm per year.

The total area of the Nile basin represents 10.3% of the area of the continent and spreads over ten countries (Map 4 and Table 20).

For some countries, like Zaire, the Nile basin forms only a very small part of their territory. Other countries, like Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan and Egypt, are almost completely integrated into the Nile basin.' However, all the waters in Burundi and Rwanda and more than half the waters in Uganda are produced internally, while most of the water resources of Sudan and Egypt originate outside their borders: 77% of Sudan's and more than 97% of Egypt's water resources as shown in Table 6. Moreover, these latter two countries already use nearly all of the water currently allocated to them, as shown below.

Table 20: Nile basin: areas and rainfall by country

Country Total area of the country

Area of the country within

the basin

As % of total area of basin

As % of total area of country

Average annual rainfall in the basin area

(mm)(km2) (km2) (%) (%) min. max. mean

Burundi 27 834 13 260 0.4 47.6 895 1 570 1 110Rwanda 26 340 19 876 0.6 75.5 840 1 935 1 105Tanzania 945 090 84 200 2.7 8.9 625 1 630 1 015Kenya 580 370 46 229 1.5 8.0 505 1 790 1 260Zaire 2 344 860 22 143 0.7 0.9 875 1 915 1 245Uganda 235 880 231 366 7.4 98.1 395 2 060 1 140Ethiopia 1 100 010 365 117 11.7 33.2 205 2 010 1 125Eritrea 121 890 24 921 0.8 20.4 240 665 520Sudan 2 505 810 1 978 506 63.6 79.0 0 1 610 500Egypt 1 001 450 326 751 10.5 32.6 0 120 15For Nile 3 112 369 100.0 0 2 060 615

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basin

Rivers and discharges

The most distant source from the sea is the Luvinzora River in Burundi, a tributary of the Kagera River. The Kagera River forms the border between Rwanda and Tanzania, then between Uganda and Tanzania and then flows into Lake Victora, the second-largest freshwater lake in the world with an area of about 67000 km2. Total flow into the lake is about 20 km3/year, of which 7.5 km3

from the Kagera River, 8.4 km3/year from the forest slopes in the north-east (Kenya), 3.2 km3/year from the drier Serengeti Plains in the south-east (Tanzania) and from 1 to 2 km3/year from the swamps in the north-west (Uganda).

The level of Lake Victoria is extremely sensitive to moderate changes in rainfall over the lake and its tributaries. Average lake rainfall and evaporation are the main factors affecting the lake balance and are more or less equal. As evaporation varies little from year to year, high rainfall gives rise to a disproportionate surplus and also greatly increases the tributary flows which are themselves relatively more variable than the rainfall. The rise in lake level during 1961-64 of about 2 metres seems to be the result of a higher rainfall during that period over the lake and its basin. This surplus then influences the outflow which declines only gradually over a longer period of years [41].

The only outlet of Lake Victoria is at Ripon Falls (Owen Falls Dam) in Uganda. Then begins the Victoria Nile which flows through Lake Kyoga into Lake Albert, also called Lake Mobutu Sesse Seko. This lake also receives water from the Semliki River, which originates in the Mufumbiru mountains in Zaire and flows through Lake Edward to Lake Albert. The combined waters of the Semliki and the Victoria Nile leave Lake Albert at the northern end and become the Albert Nile, which then flows into Sudan.

Uganda is a humid country with numerous lakes and wetlands and with internal renewable water resources globally estimated at 39 km3/year. However, the total annual flow into the country (at Ripon Falls and from Zaire) is about equal to the total annual outflow to Sudan, which means that a lot of water disappears within the country through evaporation and evapotranspiration from the lakes and wetland.

Entering Sudan, the Albert Nile becomes the Bahr el Jebel. It flows into the Sudd region, the great wetlands which are a maze of channels, lakes and swamps in southern Sudan, and which also receive water from the Bahr el Gazal River, originating in south-west Sudan.

The most remarkable topographic feature of the Sudd area is its flatness: for 400 km, from south to north, the slope is a mere 0.01 % and much of it is even flatter. The soils of the whole area are generally clayish and poor in nutrients. Rain falls in a single season, lasting from April to November and varying in the Sudd area from about 900 mm in the south to 800 mm in the north. As the rainy season coincides with, though is slightly shorter than, the flood seasons of the rivers, there is land of water and mud for half of the year and, away from the rivers, land of

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desert-like dryness for the other half. The main natural channels flow through a swamp area waterlogged throughout the year, and are then flanked by grasslands flooded at high river and exposed when the river level drops. Because of the important rainfall in the Equatorial Lake Plateau during the 1960s and 1970s the permanent swamp area increased from 2700 km2 in 1952 to 16200 km in 1980 [42].

Less than half of the water entering the Sudd region flows out of it into the White Nile. The rest disappears through evaporation and evapotranspiration. The quantity entering the Sudd region varies greatly over the years, mainly depending on the rainfall in the upper catchment area, and hydrological measurements have shown that the greater the flow of water into the Sudd, the greater the percentage of water 'lost' in evaporation”.

“Irrigation potential and water requirements

Both Burundi and Rwanda are characterized by a rolling topography with a continuous pattern of hills and valleys, with lakes and marshy lowlands at the bottom of the valleys. Improving the drainage network in part of the swamp areas, combined where possible with an irrigation network, would allow year-round cultivation, which is important for these small, but very densely populated countries. The total area of these valley bottoms in the Nile basin is estimated at 105000 ha for Burundi [78] and 150000 ha for Rwanda [176].

For Tanzania the irrigation potential has been estimated at 30000 ha, but this would require the construction of considerable water conveyance works [199]. In addition to this, at the beginning of the century settlers from Germany, the then colonial power in the country, proposed a plan to transfer water from Lake Victoria to the Vembere Plateau in the Manonga River basin in central Tanzania to irrigate between 88000 and 230000 ha of cotton. Though this project is still on the table, it would be very expensive. The transfer would be effected by gravity as the plateau lies below the water level of the lake [199].

The Lake Victoria basin in Kenya covers only 8.5% of the total area of the country but it contains over 50 % of the national freshwater resources. The national water master plan identified an irrigation potential of 180000 ha based on 80% dependable flow [125]. As part of the plan, dams and water transfers to other (sub) basins are proposed. At present only about 6000 ha are irrigated. Moreover, in Kenya there has been lengthy debate as to whether, given adequate technology, Lake Victoria basin water should be transferred to arid areas of the country for irrigation. It is considered that perhaps the most appropriate location for such an experiment would be the Kerio Valley (located in the Rift Valley, see section The Rift Valley), for which a special development authority has been established by the Kenyan Parliament. The feasibility of such a project is a question of engineering and several observers consider it possible. Such an undertaking would use significant quantities of water. Projects of this kind are analogous to the irrigation of the Vembere steppe proposed in Tanzania (see above).

The Nile basin in Zaire covers less than 1 % of the area of the country. The area is hilly and does not really lend itself to irrigation. This area is rather densely populated with most people

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engaged in cattle rearing and fishery activities around Lake Albert [46]. It is considered that about 10000 ha could be developed for irrigation [*].

Uganda has large swamp areas covering about 700000 ha. The irrigation potential is estimated at 202000 ha, requiring, however, major works such as storage, river regulation and large-scale drainage [209]. At present only 5550 ha are irrigated.

The irrigation potential in the Nile basin in Ethiopia has been estimated at more than 2.2 million hectares [106]. The irrigated area was about 23000 ha in 1989.

Table 23: Water resources, irrigation potential and areas under irrigation in the different Nile sub-basins in Ethiopia

Nile sub-basin Annual surface runoff (km3)

Irrigation potential (ha)

Irrigated area in 1989 (ha)

Baro-Akobo 13.4 905500 350Blue Nile (Abbey) 54.7 1001500 21010Setit-Tekeze/Atbara 12.0 312700 1800Total Nile basin 80.1 2219700 23160

The seasonality of the flows in Ethiopia is very high, as shown in Figure 14. This means that very considerable regulation would be necessary for their full utilization. The risk of rapid siltation of the reservoirs because of the steep slopes is a real problem. Construction of dams would augment the quantity of water available, because of a loss of only 3 % by evaporation as against a loss of almost 16% in the Aswan reservoir. Egypt, however, would no longer be the beneficiary of additional water in years of high flood, which would then be stored and regulated in the Blue Nile reservoirs instead of Aswan.

The irrigation potential in the Nile basin in Eritrea has been estimated at between 60000 and almost 300000 ha, though these figures are based on very limited studies [100]. Most of it would be in the Tekeze-Setit basin, which Eritrea shares with Ethiopia. The Mereb-Gash basin has mainly spate flows and its water reaches the Atbara River in Sudan only during extremely high floods. In this review the average irrigation potential has been estimated at 150000 ha [*].

Irrigation potential in Sudan has been estimated at over 4.8 million hectares [193], but this figure does not take into consideration the available water resources. The irrigated area was about 1.6 million hectares in 1979 [195] and 1.9 million hectares in 1990 [196]. There are plans to increase irrigation to about 2.8 million hectares by the year 2000, almost all to be irrigated by Nile water [195].”[Highlight added to make the reader aware of the other points raised by A. Oloo and my arguments].

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Table 28: Nile basin: irrigation potential. water requirements, water availability and areas under irrigation

Country area within

the Nile basin

Irrigation potential

Gross irrigation water requirement

Actual flows Flows after deduction for irrigation and

losses

Area already under

irrigationper ha total inflow outflow inflow outflow

(ha) (m3/ha.year) (km3/yr) (km3/yr) (km3/yr) (km3/yr) (km3/yr) (ha)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Burundi 80 000 13 000 1.04 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.46 0Rwanda 150 000 12 500 1.88 1.50 7.00 0.46 4.09 2 000Tanzania 30 000 11 000 0.33 7.00 10.70 4.09 7.46 10 000Kenya 180 000 8 500 1.53 0.00 8.40 0.00 6.87 6 000Zaire 10 000 10 000 0.10 0.00 1.50 0.00 1.40 0Uganda 202 000 8 000 1.62 28.70 37.00 23.83 30.51 9 120Ethiopia 2 220 000 9 000 19.98 0.00 80.10 0.00 60.12 23 160Eritrea 150 000 11 000 1.65 0.00 2.20 0.00 0 55 15 124Sudan 2 750000 14000 38.50 117.10 55.50 90.63 31.13 1 935 200Egypt 4 420 000 13 000 57.46 55.50 rest to

se31.13 minus

26.333 078 000

Sum of countries

10 192 000 124.08 5 078 604

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credit to: Google map; http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://outernationalist.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/nile-map.png&imgrefurl=https://greenfieldgeography.wikispaces.com/Conflicts%2Bat%2Bthe%2Binternational%2Bscale&h=400&w=624&sz=90&tbnid=jy1ArbyhzNG-8M:&tbnh=75&tbnw=117&zoom=1&usg=__Cn7pJTapIaMhk83tNsgZ3FCYp6U=&docid=ji1hlAuvOhbfAM&sa=X&ei=ri2VUcHXKe734QT4-IGYAw&ved=0CFgQ9QEwCQ&dur=102

Please look at the following map for more information about the area covered by the Nile Basin as presented by the Egyptians. Please compare and contrast the similarities and differences of the above presented map with the next map. Sourse: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Nile_New.htm

MAP OF THE NILE RIVER

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Of all the tributaries those that arise from Ethiopia contribute lots of soil eroded from the highland territorial environments of Ethiopia. Due to much soil particles carried from the mountainous region of Ethiopia the branch of the Nile River that arises from Ethiopia carries highly turbid water and hence is given the name Blue Nile. The second branch of the Nile River that arises from Lake Victoria carries relatively non-turbid water and is identified as the White Nile. These two branches converge and become one at Omdurman (Sudan). The White Nile and Blue Nile waters are of great interest to seven Sub-Saharan African countries. Now they have become eight including the newly independent nation – South Sudan, before it passes as a one River Nile across the territories of Sudan and Egypt and flows to the Mediterranean Sea forming lots of deltas at the coastal areas of Egypt.

What contribution does PFDJ’s Eriteria has to River Nile?

Why did Isaias Afeworki, the totalitarian dictator of Eriteria, become interested in inviting himself on the issues of the River Nile and the Ethiopian project to build “The Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”?

Why did he want to interfere in the issues raised by the Egyptians against Ethiopia’s project over the River Nile?

The answers to some of these questions are found in the research work of Adams Oloo (Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya). In his article, “THE QUEST FOR COOPERATION IN THE RIVER NILE WATER CONFLICT: THE CASE OF ERITREA”, he presented a comprehensive account of the part shared or not shared by Eritrea and PFDJ’s ambitious project which ended up in complete debacle. I have found Adams perception and analysis appreciable although he used some, rather easily correctable wrong information, which might be attributed to his referring to a questionable paper. He partly depended on a paper presented to the 10th Congress of International Water Resources Association held from March 12-16/2000, Melbourne, and Australia. Paper presenters were P. Geraghty and G. Temnowo.

Please note that this congress took place before the May 2000 lightening offensive of Ethiopia against the Eritrean forces after the April 2000 peace talk failed. By this time, I had no idea of the Project called “Sea Water Farm” which was started along the coast south of Gurgusum Beach (Massawa). At that particular duration of time I was under punishment for submitting a petition written in English to the President and his Cabinet of Ministers to give me permit to leave the country. I was then stationed at Mount (EMBA-in Tigrigna) TE-QE-RA. It is the second highest peak in Eriteria and the highland from where River Mereb arises.

Adams Oloo described PFDJ planned and ran project, i.e., the Sea Water Farm and the overall true picture of Eriteria in terms of its ecological features and water resources potential,

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albeit, very brief, as follows. “The agriculture of Eritrea does not produce enough food to feed its own people. Its farms in the highlands suffer from frequent and unpredictable droughts. The Eriterian government has embarked on an ambitious and unconventional program to develop sea water agriculture, silviculture and mariculture on its deserts bordering the sea [south of Gurgusum Beach]. This program is thought to be potentially more productive than conventional fresh water agriculture and is bound to lessen the ever-increasing tension around the distribution of resources on the Nile, as Eritrea is not dependent on the Nile since the river passes through a small part of its territory [? not correct, please see the maps given above] while the Blue Nile will remain an important, but potential, economic resource for Ethiopia until further shifts in riparian and international relations take place, for Eritrea, the volume of Nile water available now and in the future are negligible. Nearly 80% of water sources rely on ground water: just more than half of all water sources are hand-dug wells, and another one-quarter are boreholes, or machine dug wells; boreholes are constructed using machines and are often given covering and a protective apron around the ground opening to guard contamination…” [Emphasis added, See African Sociological Review, 11(1) at 95 to 105]. I have deliberated the debacle of PFDJ’s Sea water Farm Project in my previous issues although I have no idea whether Adams Oloo knows about it or not.

Summary of the 1929 and the 1959 River Nile water Agreement is presented as follows:-

May 7, 1929 – The Agreement between Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This agreement included:

o Egypt and Sudan utilize 48 and 4 billion cubic meters of the Nile flow per year, respectively;

o The flow of the Nile during January 20 to July 15 (dry season) would be reserved for Egypt;

o Egypt reserves the right to monitor the Nile flow in the upstream countries;o Egypt assumed the right to undertake Nile river related projects without the

consent of upper riparian states.o Egypt assumed the right to veto any construction projects that would affect her

interests adversely.

In effect, this agreement gave Egypt complete control over the Nile during the dry season when water is most needed for agricultural irrigation. It also severely limits the amount of water allotted Sudan and provides no water to any of the other riparian states.

The 1959 Nile agreement between the Sudan and Egypt for full control utilization of the Nile waters. This agreement included:

o The controversy on the quantity of average annual Nile flow was settled and agreed to be about 84 billion cubic meters measured at Aswan High Dam, in Egypt.

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o The agreement allowed the entire average annual flow of the Nile to be shared among the Sudan and Egypt at 18.5 and 55.5 billion cubic meters, respectively.

o Annual water loss due to evaporation and other factors were agreed to be about 10 billion cubic meters. This quantity would be deducted from the Nile yield before share was assigned to Egypt and Sudan.

o Sudan, in agreement with Egypt, would construct projects that would enhance the Nile flow by preventing evaporation losses in the Sudd swamps of the White Nile located in the southern Sudan. The cost and benefit of same to be divided equally between them. If claim would come from the remaining riparian countries over the Nile water resource, both the Sudan and Egypt shall, together, handle the claims.

o If the claim prevails and the Nile water has to be shared with another riparian state, that allocated amount would be deducted from the Sudan’s and Egypt’s and allocations/shares in equal parts of Nile volume measured at Aswan.

o The agreement granted Egypt the right to construct the Aswan High Dam that can store the entire annual Nile River flow of a year.

o It granted the Sudan to construct the Rosaries Dam on the Blue Nile and, to develop other irrigation and hydroelectric power generation until it fully utilizes its Nile share.

o A Permanent Joint Technical Commission to be established to secure the technical cooperation between them. (copy of the whole document is presented in this issue)

THE RIVER NILE, EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ON TENTERHOOKS AND ISAIAS AFEWORKI’S DELEGATION TO THE MB

PRESIDENT OF EGYPT

Ethiopia’s project of building the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has put Egypt to be on tenterhooks. That is why it was compelled to send “a public diplomatic delegation” to Uganda and Ethiopia long before it had a government replacing the deposed H. Mubarak in 2011. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood state is still neither with affirmed stand nor with clearly articulated diplomacy. Isaias Afeworki, who lost his former arms supplier, H. Mubarak, out of desperation and frustration, sent two of his officials to submit a message to the current, but unstable, president of Egypt M. Morsi.

Abdle Latif el-Menawy ( an Egyptian journalist) in his recent article “Egypt drowns in the Nile “water war”” recounted his trips to Ethiopia, Eriteria and Uganda starting three years back. He then went on analyzing the situation with a gloom view over the future fate of Egypt because of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In his article Para. 5 he wrote unfounded and questionable statements. He said, “ The nine countries that share the Nile with Egypt are considered unstable countries which are incapable of launching giant projects on the river or

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incapable of agricultural land reclamation. These countries also suffer from local crisies. Some of them suffer from civil wars, tribal struggles and economic problems” See his latest updated article of May 6/2013 KSA o7:51 GMT 04:51]. Please find herein attached the article of Abdel Latif el-Menawy. I have done this to give the audience the widest opportunity to read and give their own judgments on the nature of the article and its messages.

Monday, May 6, 2013, Egypt drowns in the Nile ‘water war’ , http://english.alarabiya.net , by

Abdel Latif el-Menawy

Three years ago I warned of the water crisis and the Renaissance Dam via a series of articles. I traveled to Ethiopia and Eretria and met with late Ethiopian premier Meles Zenawi and Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki in an attempt to communicate and provide the public with the opportunity to know what's going on. I have also done so out of my belief that journalism always has a role that when played properly and within the boundaries of national goals especially on foreign fronts, it can be a factor that helps achieving solutions. Back then, my concern was the crisis threatening Egypt; a war over the Nile’s water.

So I went to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan in an attempt to get a clearer picture and understand. Our problem is that we always have a prejudgment on people and certain issues, and such an attitude sometimes leads us to the wrong conclusions. My aim was to understand what is currently going on regarding the Nile water war, to understand the reason for the Ethiopian stance and to understand where we currently stand regarding this matter.

Back then, the suggested solution was that Egypt will not allow building any dams that affect its share of water. The international law actually stands on Egypt's side regarding this point. At the same time, however, as studies were conducted to establish dams on the Nile from upstream countries, Egypt showed its willingness to contribute and cooperate in establishing them as long as no harm is done to Egyptian national security interests. I believe this is right path towards resolving this crisis: cooperating, studying and negotiating at the same time.

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The nine countries that share the Nile with Egypt are considered unstable countries which are incapable of launching giant projects on the river or incapable of agricultural land reclamation. These countries also suffer from local crises. Some of them suffer from civil wars, tribal struggles and economic problems. [added by me: Does he have the info which indicate the reality on the ground of the said states?]

Huge projects also require international funding which cannot be provided without feasible studies approved by all countries that benefit from the river. Egypt's entrance to deal with this crisis comes here. This point as well brings up the probability that there is no imminent danger that threatens the Nile's flow to Egypt in the foreseeable future.Political moves

During that phase, Egypt made several political moves. The most important of them was Egypt's concern over its strong ties with the Nile countries particularly Ethiopia which is connected through the river to Egypt and Sudan. Another move was Egypt's concern that developing the resources of the water cannot be carried out without the effective participation of all three countries since most of the Nile Basin countries enjoy more than one source of water. Egypt's share of rainfall however does not exceed 20 millimeters whilst in some of the Nile Basin countries, it can reach 20,000 millimeters. This means that Egypt suffers from a water deficit that reached more than 30%. It overcomes this deficit through recycling water. On this basis, we must know that any expense, burden or effort carried out in the area of the Nile Basin countries is not a waste of resources but a form of direct colonization in the future. And therefore, cooperating and strengthening ties with these countries is an important fateful issue.

We must understand that any expense, burden or effort carried out in the area of the Nile Basin countries is not a waste of resources but a form of direct colonization in the future.

This is why the presidential initiative back then to establish a commission for the Nile Basin countries was important regardless of signing the Nile Basin Initiative now among the Nile Basin countries. Another important move was the concern not to escalate the rhetoric when addressing this issue yet emphasize that Egypt's historical rights of the Nile water are nonnegotiable. (emphasis added).

But at the same time, some of us must not be carried away with enthusiasm or with the desire to achieve fake heroic acts and end up escalating the rhetoric to reach the extent of making threats and sounding the drums of a war when there are no drums! The issue must be resolved through maintaining patience, resuming negotiations and emphasizing that the concept of cooperation is the basis to compensate what was lost and the basis to maintain

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our rights that will not be harmed.

Although it has been three years since all of this, the group ruling Egypt drowned in its failure, greed and fake renaissance and drowned us with it.

According to media reports, the Brotherhood has not yet awaken from its slumber and is still studying the experts' commission's final report on the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The report will be submitted before the end of May in order to be put before the presidents of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The report indicates that Ethiopian studies on the dam "are incomplete." This is the same conclusion drawn by the experts' commission's last progress report. A practical study has also confirmed that the expected results from establishing the dam will be "disastrous" and will lead to displacing millions of Egyptian families.Amidst all this, what is really strange and what really raises a lot of questions is that the prime minister who is supposed to be aware of the repercussions of the upcoming water crisis since he served as chief of two ministers' offices for five years and then later served minister of irrigation has in fact added salt to the wound and further drowned us in the Nile crisis.”[Highlights added], http://yemohagets.blogspot.com/2013/05/egypt-drowns-in-nile-water-war.html

Question: Did he have the authenticate information about the studies conducted by the Ethiopians? Is he sure of what he is saying when he wrote “The report indicates that Ethiopian studies on the dam "are incomplete."?

Please refer to Para. 4 of the above article:

Which of the 9 countries is unstable assuming that Abdel Latif and I understand the meaning of the term “instability” equally?

According to my observations Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, Kenya and Burundi are politically stable and economically active as well as diplomatically of the most to be relied than Egypt and Sudan. What does Abdel Latif think about AMISOM and its spectacular achievements which are unrecorded in the world by any mission similar to AMISOM whether the mission was organized by the UN or any other regional organization??? Egypt has nothing to say about this because as far as I know and understand the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt are not happy about the failure of Al-Shabaab [one of the organizations systematically funded by the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabian millioners]. On the other hand, according to my observations, analysis and evaluation, Egypt and Sudan are not not only politically non-stable, but are also with a hidden long term plan of executing “Islamic Jihad” throughout the region using modern western technology which they claim to oppose it!!!![Sic!]. This is not the only thing that we could raise as an example. I would like to remind the author of the article and all others about the behavior of M. Morsi during the Easter Holyday of the Coptic Church of Egypt. He said, that he would not be present in the celebration ceremony of the Coptic Church. I would like to invite Abdel

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Latif and all others to see the following excerpt written by Khairi Abaza ( who is an Egyptian Reformer, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and former official in the liberal Wafd Party, in his article “The Battle for control of Al-Azhar, May 15/2003” [ http://fikraforum.org/?p=3314]

His article which deliberates the controversy created by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt to control everything including Al-Azhar starts saying,

“In the wake of the crisis between radical Islamists and Copts during the Coptic Easter, another major religious crisis has been unfolding in Egypt. Al-Azhar, one of the world’s most respected institutions of religious learning for Sunni Muslims, is on a collision course with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and radical Islamists who are trying to take control of it.”

“On May 5, representing a sudden change in position, a delegation of Salafi Nour Party and other Salafi leadership visited the Grand Imam and expressed their support of al-Azhar’s leadership and independence. The Salafis may realize that an independent Azhar is better for them than one that is a MB tool that could eventually be used against them. The Salafis may be trying to avoid a repeat scenario in which the MB used them for a power grab, and then marginalized them once they fulfilled their purpose of overpowering the government.

The MB and the Salafis maintain that they seek to reform al-Azhar. Yet, the attack on the Grand Imam has ironically made the Islamist take-over more difficult. Azhari scholars and students are now becoming more vigilant toward Islamists, some seeing this as an opportunity to counter the Islamist influence that has penetrated the institution over the last three decades.

The fall of al-Azhar to MB or Islamist control would be a significant blow for moderation and tolerance in Islam. However, if it succeeds in regaining its independence, it will be a step forward for tolerance and pluralism. Last Sunday, [ this was Easter Sunday of the Coptic Church of Egypt] when Salafi and MB scholars were debating whether or not it is a sin to greet Copts on Easter, the Grand Imam went in person to greet Pope Tawadros II. When the Pope, during mass, conveyed President Morsi’s greetings, it was met by silence, but when he mentioned the Grand Imam’s visit and greetings, the Church burst into a long and enthusiastic applause. That is the genuine Azhar, a force of tolerance and progress that creates harmony in society, not a force of intolerance and darkness that will bring division and misery.”[emphasis and highlight added].

Considering Egypt’s potential of rainfall agriculture, Abdel Latif has to lament a little bit. Egypt’s potential of agriculture using rainfall, as expressed by Abdel Latif, is far below any of the seven countries. Eriteria is not better than Egypt (Please refer to the analysis given referring to Adams Oloo). Abdel Latif wrote a provokative article blaming his own country’s Musil Brotherhood. [see Para 6]. Egypt and all other Northern Arabic countries do not consider themselves Africans which is another headache of their own (See their Constitutions and their reports to the Human Rights Committee of the UN, such as those of Libya, Egypt, etc.; their “The Arab Charter on

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Human Rights; The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/ PC/62/ Add.18 (1993); Jean Allain and Andreas O’Shea, 2002, HQR, 24(1) at 86 to 125).

Two issues strike out in relation to the above deliberation.

1) Isaias Afeworki’s desperation and frustration which made him to continue serving as a conduit of black market arms dealers and training of outlaws –refer to Seleka of CAR (a separate analysis is presented of CAR and Seleka as well as the part played by different groups including the PFDJ’s Isaias Afeworki).

2) Isaias Afeworki’s desperate search for a mentor or a boss to facilitate his pouring of fuel and making fire in the region – refer to his message to M. Morsi of Egypt.

ISAIAS’ DE TROP INTERVIEWSIsaias Afeworki conducted an interview with the NRK Norwegian Television [Reported

from Asmara on June 21/2011]. During the interview a core question, concerning the Nile River and utilization of its resources by the Nile Basin countries, but specifically referring to Ethiopia’s project, was raised. By then Ethiopia’s determination to proceed with its project of building the “Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” on River Nile just 40 kms from Sudan, was public knowledge and had public backing and push.

Based on my observations and follow-up of articles published in Ethiopian Free Press print media in 1997 -1999, there were a number of articles, most of them were from scholars who have participated in research works as well as in studies to build a dam starting more than a decade back. There was a push towards building a dam with arguments supported by well organized blue prints and data. The public, especially intellectuals, didn’t accept the 1929 and 1959 agreements which excluded Ethiopia and all other Nile Basin countries which were then under colonial rules. In addition, they were suspicious of the 1994 agreements signed by the late PM Meles Zenawi and H. Mubarak. My students raised certain questions concerning this issue while I was instructing post-graduate students (M.Sc.) in Addis Ababa University, in 1996/97. The course dealt with “Problems of Conservation in Contemporary World”.

The site chosen for the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on River Nile (in Ethiopia it is called TI-KU-R A-BA-Y because of its high turbidity due to carrying lots of soil from the surrounding territories of the region). The project was planned and practically started in one of the most backward region of FDRE, the Benihangul Gumuz Administrative Region. This region belongs to the most neglected ethnic groups in Ethiopia up to the 1990s.

Let me take you back to the interview of Isaias Afeworki. Isaias Afeworki in his interview underlined, “that governments should not use the Nile River and its and its resources as a tool in view of the fact that the river and its resources are the asset of the present and future

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generations of the entire region”. (It seems that he was either told about the IUCN’s definition of Conservation or has done some homework to read about conservation and environmental management or has heard some of his people talking about this issue.

However, Isaias didn’t explicitly mention any of the governments which wanted to use the Nile River water as a “tool” for political or any other ends. Apparently, Sudan and Egypt are often times blamed for using the Nile River as a “tool” since they were offered the license from their colonizers, i.e., the British. Early time colonizers ( based on the Christian Calendar, the 7th century), these ARABS FROM SAUDI ARABIA, were colonized by the 19th century colonizers in places which do not belong to them or were not their ancestral lands (i.e, North Africa, the Middle East and some other places). The new colonizers of these Arabs were offered “unquestionable right to dominate the use of Nile River”. In short, they believe that the River Nile water is their sole property with no one to ask them about its utilization as if all the water of the River Nile arises from their own territories. Let them thank gravity and altitude. None of them would have the chance to talk about the water of River Nile were the altitudes of their territories were, as a result of natural factors, not lower than the origins of the water in the rest seven countries.

Isaias Afewori was put under a difficult situation during this interview after he said the above quoted statements and others not included, herein. He was asked to clarify the view of PFDJ “about the program of utilizing the Nile resources on the part of Ethiopia” His answer was not direct. He said, “regardless of the policy of governments”, the Ethiopian people, just like any other people, are entitled to benefit from their resources”. Isaias in his reply, implicitly divided the people and the government of Ethiopia as if they are under confrontation, especially in the use of the River Nile Water. The people and the government of Ethiopia were not and are not at opposite poles especially referring to the use of the water of their TIKUR ABAY. Unfortunate to his deliberate categorization, he forgot that the government of Ethiopia was established based on the 1994 Constitution and through popular elections. The people elected their representatives from every region and a House of Representatives is made a reality including a second House of Federation (the second included representatives of at least 22 minority groups in FDRE). Any government policy, in FDRE, is not implemented without its being deliberated by the bi-cameral parliament of the country. It is not like Isaias’ PFDJ state with no constitution and no parliament. Isaias Afeworki Abraham, the totalitarian dictator, serves as the Constitution and the parliament as well as the Minister of every ministry in his state. This was not news for the interviewer of the NRK Norwegian TV.

The question that followed was another challenge to Isaias. He was asked which group his state supports, “SUDAN AND EGYPT OR THE OTHER REPARIAN STATES OF THE NILE RIVER?” Isaias said, “WE HAVE NO REASON TO SUPPORT THIS SIDE OR THAT simply because

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Eritrea doesn’t believe there exists any reason for confrontation as regards the Nile issue”. [Emphasis added].

Who are, by the way, the “WE” that are referred to in his reply? Did he mean his inner circle and himself or all PFDJ members or was he including the public?

Although he attempted to coax the journalist, the journalist cornered him. He raised another publicly known fact. He told Isaias that “ERITREA IS IDENTIFIED SIDING WITH EGYPT AS OPPOSED TO ETHIOPIA”. This statement didn’t go far from the truth whether it is said to be a rumor or not.

Apparently, Isaias didn’t mistake the implication of the point raised by the journalist. He attempted to give an indirect reply taking shelter under the Eritrean people. Nevertheless, it is not a secret that the people of Eriteria have no say in any issue of the country, the region or the world. Whenever questions related to internal or external affairs are raised those who raised the issues face harassment or group punishment or arbitrary arrest or forced disappearances or else summary execution or murder. I have one of those who faced most of the inhuman tactics of PFDJ for years. I even raised why they do these when people question some of their moves or involvements in none of their affairs such as in Somalia. Recently, they have it done so in the Central African Republic (CAR) although as usual they denied it through an ambiguous Press Release attacking the wrong individual and press media.

These are the reality of present day PFDJ’s Eriteria. In spite of this, Isaias said, “THE ERITREAN PEOPLE DO NOT ENTERTAIN ILL-WILL AGAINST THE ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE. WE CANNOT TAKE SIDES WITH SUDAN AND EGYPT, AND THUS MAINTAIN AN ANTI-ETHIOPIAN STANCE SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE PREVAILING BORDER CONFLICT”. But, Isaias didn’t add “the conflict I started or I launched to teach the Ethiopians a lesson” [such a statement was said to have been said by him and other members of PFDJ although they said it not in public or loudly to be heard. In 1997 it was a sort of slogan by lots of EPLF fighters to say “we have to teach al-Bashir a lesson” while I was discussing thing with a number of them in Assab and Asmara].

Let’s ask Isaias since one question that couldn’t be raised by the journalist. What about the aggressive propaganda work using state controlled media by the PFDJ’s state? Had he forgotten it or was he sure that the journalist will not be bold enough to raise that issue because he would automatically be sent out of Eriteria? Weren’t there guerrilla fighters being trained and organized to fight against SPLA at that particular time in Sawa? Weren’t they provided military bases in the western region of the territory for those who were organized by Isaias and al-Bashir to fight against SPLA and to stop the referendum from being conducted as planned? It was not a secret that Sudan’s al-Bashir and PFDJ’s Isaias were against the referendum although they were well aware that it was not possible to block it. Was the Muslim

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Brotherhood of Egypt happy of the referendum of South Sudan? Was Egypt happy of the referendum?

The following intelligence report indicates otherwise.

“From: "Bayless Parsley" <bayless.parsley@stratfor.com>To: "Reva Bhalla" <reva.bhalla@stratfor.com>Sent: Friday, July 30, 2010 3:59:53 PMSubject: Egypt source

just let me know which are the same Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon sourcesplz, thx3/15/10:PUBLICATION: background/analysisATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR sourceSOURCE DESCRIPTION: Egyptian ambassador to LebanonSOURCE RELIABILITY: CITEM CREDIBILITY: 2SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION: analystsSOURCE HANDLER: RevaEgypt will do its utmost to prevent the southern Sudan from declaring itsindependence. He says the Egyptian government is concerned about theoutcome of next year's referendum, which will enable the southerners todetermine whether they want to stay in a united Sudan,or create their ownseparate state. TheNile water issue is so vital for Egypt that it cannotafford to deal with two separate governments in the Sudan.

Egypt played a decisive role in getting the Arab League to organize anArab conference for investment and development in southern Sudan. The aimbehind the conference is to engage Arab states in the affairs of Sudan andcreate incentives for southerners to vote against separation. He saysinvestment opportunities in southern Sudan are virtually unlimited. It isrich in minerals, water resources, and has an abundance of fertileagricultural land.

The south is not ready to create its own state. It has no experience inself-government and lacks the bureaucratic apparatus necessary for runningthe affairs of the state and serving the public. He says the best bet forboth north and south is for the Congress Party and the Sudan Popular

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Liberation Movement to work together and find a suitable mechanism forpower sharing.”

“5/24/10PUBLICATION: analysis/backgroundATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR sourcesSOURCE DESCRIPTION: 2 sources - Egyptian diplomatic source; well-connectedowner of Arab political magazineSOURCE Reliability : C ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3DISTRIBUTION: AnalystsSOURCE HANDLER: Reva

“Certainly. Umar Suleiman accompanied prime minister Ahmad Abu al-Ghaytduring his visit to Khartum last week. The Egyptians do not want to seethe southern Sudan becoming independent. They feel that the independenceof the south will increase Egypt's problems with regard to to the watersof the Nile. The Egyptians are also interested in ending darfur's crisisand stabilizing the Sudan. They see the stability of Sudan extremely vitalfor Egypt's national security. The Egyptians believe the solution of theNile crisis must be diplomatic and inculde the head water and ripariancountries. They believe joint developmental programs provide the ultimateanswer to sharing the waters of the Nile. The problem is that most ofthese countries are very unstable and are not ready for serious and longterm regional cooperation. Umar Suleiman wanted to see if Umar al=Bashirwas willing to allow Egyptian troops, including commando units, to bequietly stationed in Sudan for the unlikely possibility of surgical actionsuch as blowing up dams under construction. I might want to emphasize thatthese sources insist the Egyptian government will do all it could to avoidthis type of action to resolve the crisis. They argue that Egypt needsmore water from the Nile and less and that the only way to get more wateris through regional cooperation that includes the provision of moretechnical assistance to them by Egypt.”

Isaias, unfortunate to his calculated hoax, said, ”LOOKING THE ISSUE AS IF SUDAN AND EGYPT WERE THE BENEFICIARIES ON THE ONE HAND AND THE REST AS SUPPLIERS ON THE OTHER” is a wrong approach. [See, July 22/2011, Http://hornofafrica.de/governments]. Apparently, he didn’t want to refer to the 1929 and 1959 agreements drafted and presented for

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signatures by colonialist. These agreements excluded every other group except Sudan and Egypt.

Please see the following intelligence report included with the above quoted statements:

“<c) The most critical aspect of this issue is the fact that the Nile'sheadwaters are in the Ethiopian highlands, which gives Ethiopiasubstantial leverage. Even though Ethiopia is building a relatively smalldam right now (460 MW), the danger for Egypt is in having Ethiopia breakprecedent that would allow competitors for the Nile's resources controlthe river flow upstream to Egypt. This is the third dam that Ethiopia hasinaugurated. Are there estimates available on how much water would bediverted from Egypt and Sudan by these dams?>

These dams will have no impact on the water shares of Egypt and Sudansince the waters that will be stored behind the dams for power generationwill eventually be returned to the river. A source says Ethiopia haspledged, and submitted documents to that effect, that it would never storewater behind the dam for irrigation purposes. He also says that whenEthiopia builds all 40 dams (this will need many years before completionsince it does not have the money or the financing), the shares both ofEgypt and Sudan would be reduced by about eight billion cubic meters ofwater.

<Did Egypt respond strongly to those as well? I would think that Egyptwould have to shut this down now in order to uphold these treaties.>

Egypt cannot deny Ethipoia's right to develop and build dams for powergeneration and irrigation. This is the reason why they are playing a verycalculated diplomatic game. They do not want to make mistakes.”[Highlight added].

Why was Isaias shy of referring to the 1929 and 1959 Nile water agreements which excluded all others except Sudan and Egypt? Please note that the first was signed between Egypt and the UK. The second, in 1959, was signed between Egypt and Sudan.

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Wasn’t he aware of the Co-operative Framework Agreement (CFA) which was signed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and later Burundi with a major objective to oppose and discard the agreements drafted and signed by colonialists in 1929 and 1959? [It is undeniable that he was aware of it, but didn’t want to mention anything because he is against the CFA].

Isn’t he aware that Egypt and Sudan, now and then, refer to the British synthesized agreement as a valid instrument to defend their unhealthy claims?

Please find herein attached a copy of the document signed by Egypt and Sudan in 1959

United Arab Republic and Sudan Agreement (With Annexes) For The Full Utilization of the Nile Waters

Signed at Cairo, on 8 November 1959; in force 12 December 1959Registered by the United Arab Republic on 7 February 1963

6519 U.N.T.S. 63

As the River Nile needs projects, for its full control and for increasing its yield for the full utilization of its waters by the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic on technical working arrangements other than those now applied:

And as these works require for their execution and administration, full agreement and co--operation between the two Republics in order to regulate their benefits and utilize the Nile waters in a manner which secures the present and future requirements of the two countries:

And as the Nile waters Agreement concluded in l9292 provided only for the partial use of the Nile waters and did not extend to include a complete control of the River waters, the two Republics have agreed on the following:

FirstTHE PRESENT ACQUIRED RIGHTS

1. That the amount of the Nile waters used by the United Arab Republic until this Agreement is signed shall be her acquired right before obtaining the benefits of the Nile Control Projects and the projects which will increase its yield and which projects are referred to in this Agreement; The total of this acquired right is 48 Milliards of cubic meters per year as measured at Aswan.

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2. That the amount of the waters used at present by the Republic of Sudan shall be her acquired right before obtaining the benefits of the projects referred to above. The total amount of this acquired right is 4 Milliards of cubic meters per measured at Aswan.

SecondTHE NILE CONTROL PROJECTS AND THE DIVISION OF THEIR BENEFITS BETWEEN THE TWO

REPUBLICS

1. In order to regulate the River waters and control their flow into the sea, the two Republics agree that the United Arab Republic constructs the Sudd el Aali at Aswan as the first link of a series of projects on the Nile for over-year storage.

2. In order to enable the Sudan to utilize its share of the water, the two Republics agree that the Republic of Sudan shall construct the Roseires Darn on the Blue Nile and any other works which the Republic of the Sudan considers essential for the utilization of its share.

3. The net benefit from the Sudd el Aali Reservoir shall be calculated on the basis of the average natural River yield of water at Aswan in the years of this century, which is estimated at about 84 Milliards of cubic meters per year. The acquired rights of the two Republics referred to in Article "First" as measured at Aswan, and the average of losses of over-year storage of the Sudd El Aali Reservoir shall be deducted from this yield, and the balance shall be the net benefit which shall be divided between the two Republics.

4. The net benefit from the Sudd el Aali Reservoir mentioned in the previous item, shall be divided between the two Republics at the ratio of 14½ for the Sudan and 7½ for the United Arab Republic so long as the average river yield remains in future within the limits of the average yield referred to in the previous paragraph. This means that, if the average yield remains the same as the average of the previous years of this century which is estimated at 84 Milliards, and if the losses of over-year storage remain equal to the present estimate of 10 Milliards, the net benefit of the Sudd el Aali Reservoir shall be 22 Milliards of which the share of the Republic of the Sudan shall be 14½ Milliards and the share of the United Arab Republic shall be 7½ Milliards. By adding these shares to their acquired rights, the total share from the net yield of the Nile after the full operation of the Sudd el Aali Reservoir shall be 18½ Milliards for the Republic of the Sudan and 55½ Milliards for the United Arab Republic.

But if the average yield increases, the resulting net benefit from this increase shall be divided between the two Republics, in equal shares.

5. As the net benefit from the Sudd el Aali (referred to in item 3 Article Second) is calculated on the basis of the average natural yield of the river at Aswan in the years of this century after the deduction therefrom of the acquired rights of the two Republics and the average losses of over-year storage at the Sudd el Aali Reservoir, it is agreed that this net benefit shall be the subject of revision by the two parties at reasonable intervals to be agreed upon after starting the full operation of the Sudd el Aali Reservoir.

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6. The United Arab Republic agrees to pay to the Sudan Republic 15 Million Egyptian Pounds as full compensation for the damage resulting to the Sudanese existing properties as a result of the storage in the Sudd el Aali Reservoir up to a reduced level of 182 meters (survey datum). The payment of this compensation shall be affected in accordance with the annexed agreement between the two parties.

7. The Republic of the Sudan undertakes to arrange before July 1963, the final transfer of the population of Halfa and all other Sudanese inhabitants whose lands shall be submerged by the stored water.

8. It is understood that when the Sudd el Aali is fully operated for over-year storage, the United Arab Republic will not require storing any water at Gebel Aulia Dam. And the two contracting parties will in due course, discuss all matters related to this renunciation.

ThirdPROJECTS FOR THE UTILIZATION OF LOST WATERS IN THE NILE BASIN

In view of the fact that at present, considerable volumes of the Nile Basin Waters are lost in the swamps of Bahr El Jebel, Bahr El Zeraf, Balir el Ghazal and the Sobat River, and as it is essential that efforts should be exerted in order to prevent these losses and to increase the yield of the River for use in agricultural expansion in the two Republics, the two Republics agree to the following:

1. The Republic of the Sudan in agreement with the United Arab Republic shall construct projects for the increase of the River yield by preventing losses of waters of the Nile Basin in the swamps of Bahr El Jebel, Bahr el Zeraf, Bahr el Ghazal and its tributaries, the Sobat River and its tributaries and the White Nile Basin. The net yield of these projects shall be divided equally between the two Republics and each of them shall also contribute equally to the costs.

The Republic of the Sudan shall finance the above-mentioned projects out of its own funds and the United Arab Republic shall pay its share in the costs in the same ratio of 50% allotted for her in the yield of these projects.

2. If the United Arab Republic, on account of the progress in its planned agricultural expansion should find it necessary to start on any of the increase of the Nile yield projects, referred to in the previous paragraph, after its approval by the two Governments and at a time when the Sudan Republic does not need such project, the United Arab Republic shall notify the Sudan Republic of the time convenient for the former to start the execution of the project. And each of the two Republics shall, within two years after such notification, present a date-phased programme for the utilization of its share of the waters saved by the project, and each of the said programmes shall bind the two parties. The United Arab Republic shall at the expiry of the two years, start the execution of the projects, at its own expense. And when the Republic of Sudan is ready to utilize its share according to the agreed programme, it shall pay to the United Arab Republic a share of all the expenses in the same ratio as the Sudan's share in benefit is to

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the total benefit of the project; provided that the share of either Republic shall not exceed one half of the total benefit of the project.

FourthTECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO REPUBLICS

1. In order to ensure the technical co-operation between the Governments of the two Republics, to continue the research and study necessary for the Nile control projects and the increase of its yield and to continue the hydrological survey of its upper reaches, the two Republics agree that immediately after the signing of this Agreement a Permanent joint Technical Commission shall be formed of an equal number of members from both parties; and its functions shall be:

a. The drawing of the basic outlines of projects for the increase of the Nile yield, and for the supervision of the studies necessary for the finalising of projects, before presentation of the same to the Governments of the two Republics for approval.

b. The supervision of the execution of the projects approved by the two Governments.c. The drawing up of the working arrangements for any works to be constructed on the

Nile, within the boundaries of the Sudan, and also for those to be constructed outside the boundaries of the Sudan, by agreement with the authorities concerned in the countries in which such works are constructed.

d. The supervision of the application of all the working arrangements mentioned in (c) above in connection with works constructed within the boundaries of Sudan and also in connection with the Sudd el Aali Reservoir and Aswan Dam, through official engineers delegated for the purpose by the two Republics; and the supervision of the working of the upper Nile projects, as provided in the agreements concluded with the countries in which such projects are constructed.

e. As it is probable that a series of low years may occur, and a succession of low levels in the Sudd el Aali Reservoir may result to such an extent as not to permit in any one year the drawing of the full requirements of the two Republics, the Technical Commission is charged with the task of devising a fair arrangement for the two Republics to follow. And the recommendations of the Commission shall be presented to the two Governments for approval.

2. In order to enable the Commission to exercise the functions enumerated in the above item, and in order to ensure the continuation of the Nile gauging and to keep observations on all its upper reaches, these duties shall be carried out under the technical supervision of the Commission by the engineers of the Sudan Republic, and the engineers of the United Arab Republic in the Sudan and in the United Arab Republic and in Uganada.

3. The two Governments shall form the Joint Technical Commission, by a joint decree, and shall provide it with its necessary funds from their budgets. The Commission may, according to the requirements of work, hold its meetings in Cairo or in Khartoum. The Commission shall, subject

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to the approval of the two Governments, lay down regulations for the organisation of its meetings and its technical, administrative and financial activities.

FifthGENERAL PROVISIONS

1. If it becomes necessary to hold any negotiations concerning the Nile waters, with any riparian state, outside the boundaries of the two Republics, the Governments of the Sudan Republic and the United Arab Republic shall agree on a unified view after the subject is studied by the said Technical Commission. The said unified view shall be the basis of any negotiations by the Commission with the said states.

If the negotiations result in an agreement to construct any works on the river, outside the boundaries of the two Republics, the joint Technical Commission shall after consulting the authorities in the Governments of the States concerned, draw all the technical execution details and the working and maintenance arrangements. And the Commission shall, after the sanction of the same by the Governments concerned, supervise the carrying out of the said technical agreements.

2. As the riparian states, other than the two Republics, claim a share in the Nile waters, the two Republics have agreed that they shall jointlv consider and reach one unified view regarding the said claims. And if the said consideration results in the acceptance of allotting an amount of the Nile water to one or the other of the said states, the accepted amount shall be deducted from the shares of the two Republics in equal parts, as calculated at Aswan.

The Technical Commission mentioned in this agreement shall make the necessary arrangements with the states concerned, in order to ensure that their water consumption shall not exceed the amounts agreed upon.

SixthTRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEFORE BENEFITING FROM THE COMPLETE SUDD EL AALI RESERVOIR

As the benefiting of the two Republics from their appointed shares in the net benefit of the Sudd el Aali Reservoir shall not start before the construction and the full utilization of the Reservoir, the two parties shall agree on their agricultural expansion programmes in the transitional period from now up to the completion of the Sudd el Aali without prejudice to their present water requirements.

Seventh

This Agreement shall come into force after its sanction by the two contracting parties, provided that either party shall notify the other party of the date of its sanction, through the diplomatic channels.

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Eighth

Annex (1) and Annex (2, A and B) attached to this Agreement shall be considered as an integral part of this Agreement.

Written in Cairo in two Arabic original copies this 7th day of Gumada El Oula 1379, the 8th day of November 1959.

For the Republic For the United Arabof Sudan: Republic:

(signed) Lewa Mohammed Talaat Farid (signed) Zakaria Mohie El Din

ANNEX 1A SPECIAL PROVISION FOR THE WATER LOAN REQUIRED

BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

The Republic of the Sudan agrees in principle to give a water loan from the Sudan's share in the Sudd el Aali waters, to the United Arab Republic, in order to enable the latter to proceed with her planned programmes for Agricultural Expansion.

The request of the United Arab Republic for this loan shall be made after it revises its programmes within five years from the date of the signing of this agreement. And if the revision by United Arab Republic reveals her need for this loan, the Republic of the Sudan shall give it out of its own share a loan not exceeding one and a half Milliards, provided that the utilisation of this loan shall cease in November, 1977.

ANNEX 2A

To the Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Sudan

With reference to Article (Second) paragraph 6 of the Agreement signed this day, concerning the full utilization of the River Nile Waters, compensation amounting to 15 Million Egyptian Pounds in sterling or in a third currency agreed upon by the two parties and calculated on the basis of a fixed rate of$2.87156 to the Egyptian Pound, shall be paid by the Government of the United Arab Republic, as agreed upon, in instalments in the following manner:

£ 3 million on the first of January, 1960£ 4 million on the first of January, 1961£ 4 million on the first of January, 1962£ 4 million on the first of January, 1963

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I shall be grateful if you confirm your agreement to the above.

With highest consideration.

Head of the United Arab Republic Delegation:(signed) Zakaria Mohie El Din

BTo the Head of United Arab Republic Delegation

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated today and stipulating the following :

[See Annex 2, A]

I have the honour to confirm the agreement of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan to the contents of the said letter.

With highest consideration.

Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Sudan:(signed) Lewa Mohamed Talaat Fari

1. Translation by the Government of the United Arab Republic.

2. League of Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. XCIII, p.43.

REACTION FROM ANOTHER CORNER OF THE ARAB PENNINSULA

Ethiopia: Rumors of Water War on the Nile? Dam War of WordsSource: http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/2013/03/10/ethiopia_rumors_of_water_war_on_the_nile

Late last month, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Defense Minister Prince Khalid Bin Sultan fired a shot across the bow from the Arab Water Council in Cairo to let the regime in Ethiopia know that his country takes a dim view of the "Grand Renaissance Dam" under “construction” on the Blue Nile (Abbay) a few miles from Sudan’s eastern border. According to Prince Khalid, “The [Grand] Renaissance dam has its capacity of flood waters reaching more than 70 billion cubic meters of water… [I]f it collapsed Khartoum will be drowned completely and the impact will even reach the Aswan Dam…” The Prince believes the Dam is being built close to the “Sudanese border for political plotting

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rather than for economic gain and constitutes a threat to Egyptian and Sudanese national security…” The Prince raised the stakes by accusing the regime in Ethiopia of being hell-bent on harming Arab peoples. “There are fingers messing with water resources of Sudan and Egypt which are rooted in the mind and body of Ethiopia. They do not forsake an opportunity to harm Arabs without taking advantage of it…”

A spokesman for the regime in power in Ethiopia sought to minimize the importance of the Prince’s statement by suggesting that the Saudi Ambassador in Addis Ababa had disavowed the Prince’s statement as official policy or a position endorsed by the Saudi government. The alleged disavowal of the statement of a member of the Saudi royal family and top defense official seems curiously disingenuous after the fact. But that is understandable since “an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.” The regime spokesman also insinuated in fuzzy diplomatese that such inflammatory statements could result in war between Arab countries and African countries in the Nile basin.

The real possibility of a water war between countries of the upper Nile basin, and in particular Ethiopia, and Egypt and Sudan over the so-called Grand Renaissance Dam is the (white) elephant in the room that no one wants to talk about openly and earnestly at this stage. But in November 2010, the late dictator Meles Zenawi in an interview with Reuters seemed to defiantly relish the possibility of war with Egypt. With taunting, dismissive and contemptuous arrogance, Meles not only insulted the Egyptian people as hopelessly backward but bragged that he will swiftly vanquish any invading Egyptian army. “I am not worried that the Egyptians will suddenly invade Ethiopia. Nobody who has tried that has lived to tell the story. I don’t think the Egyptians will be any different and I think they know that…The Egyptians have yet to make up their minds as to whether they want to live in the 21st or the 19th century.” Meles also accused Egypt of trying to destabilize Ethiopia by supporting unnamed rebel groups which he promised to crush. Meles served the Egyptians an ultimatum to engage in “civil dialogue”: “If we address the issues around which the rebel groups are mobilized then we can neutralize them and therefore make it impossible for the Egyptians to fish in troubled waters because there won’t be any… Hopefully that should convince the Egyptians that, as direct conflict will not work, and as the indirect approach is not as effective as it used to be, the only sane option will be civil dialogue.”

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit denied Meles’ allegations and expressed amusement and amazement over Meles’ braggadocio. “I'm amazed ... by the language that was used. We are not seeking war and there will not be war… The charges that Egypt… is exploiting rebel groups against the ruling regime in Ethiopia are completely devoid of truth.” Gheit may have been diplomatically deescalating the war of words, but his statement belies statements by a long line of top Egyptian leaders over the decades. President Anwar Sadat in 1978 declared, “We depend upon the Nile100 per cent in our life, so if anyone, at any moment, thinks of depriving us of our life we shall never hesitate to go to war.” Boutros Boutros Gahali, when he was the Egyptian Foreign State Minister (later U.N. Secretary General), confirmed the same sentiment when he asserted “the next war in our region will be over the water of the Nile, not politics.”

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“If it comes to a crisis, we will send a jet to bomb the dam and come back in one day, simple as that.”

What will Egypt will do if Meles’ “Grand Renaissance Dam” is in fact built? "Simple." They will use dam busters to smash and trash it.

An email from the American private security organization Stratfor released by Wikileaks citing its source as “high-level Egyptian security/intel in regular direct contact with Mubarak and Suleiman”, “If it comes to a crisis, we will send a jet to bomb the dam and come back in one day, simple as that. Or we can send our special forces in to block/sabotage the dam. But we aren't going for the military option now. This is just contingency planning. Look back to an operation Egypt did in the mid-late 1970s, I think 1976, when Ethiopia was trying to build a large dam. We blew up the equipment while it was traveling by sea to Ethiopia. A useful case study…”

The same source further indicated that Egypt is “discussing military cooperation with Sudan” and has “a strategic pact with the Sudanese since in any crisis over the Nile, Sudan gets hit first then us.” That military cooperation includes stationing Egyptian “commandos in the Sudan for ‘worst case’ scenario on the Nile issue. Sudanese president Umar al-Bashir has agreed to allow the Egyptians to build a small airbase in Kusti to accommodate Egyptian commandos who might be sent to Ethiopia to destroy water facilities on the Blue Nile…The military option is not one that the Egyptians favor. It will be their option if everything else fails.” So far Egypt has successfully lobbied the multilateral development and other investment banks and donors to deny or cut funding for the dam and to apply political and diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia and the other upstream Nile countries. The World Bank has publicly stated it will not to fund any new projects on the Nile without Egypt’s approval.

The Grand Renaissance Dam or the grand dam (de)illusion? All African dictators like to build big projects because it is part of the kleptocratic African

“Big Man” syndrome. By undertaking “white elephant” projects (wasteful vanity projects), African dictators seek to attain greatness and amass great fortunes in life and immortality in death. Kwame Nkrumah built the Akosombo Dam on the Volta River, at the time dubbed the “largest single investment in the economic development plans of Ghana”. Mobutu sought to outdo Nkrumah by building the largest dam in Africa on the Inga Dams in western Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) on the largest waterfalls in the world (Inga Falls). In the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny built the largest church in the world, The Basilica of Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro, at a cost of USD$300 million. It stands empty today. Self-appointed Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic built a 500-room Hotel Intercontinental at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars while millions of his people starved. Moamar Gadhafi launched the Great Man-Made River in Libya, dubbed the world’s largest irrigation project, and proclaimed it the “Eighth Wonder of the World.” Gamal Abdel Nasser built the Aswan High Dam which could be affected significantly if upstream Nile countries build new dams. Ugandan dictator Yuweri Museveni built the Bujagali dam which was completed in 2012. The backflow from that dam has submerged a huge area of cultivable and settled land forcing migration and resettlement of large numbers of people.

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Meles Zenawi hoped to build the “Grand Renaissance Dam” as the mother of all dams on the African continent to outdo Nkrumah, Mobutu and Gadhafi. Like all of the African white elephants, this Dam is a vanity make-believe project partly intended to glorify Meles and magnify his international prestige while diverting attention from the endemic corruption that has consumed his regime as recently documented in a 448-page World Bank report. Meles sought to cover his bloody hands and clothe his naked dictatorships with megaprojects and veneers of progress and development. The “Grand Renaissance Dam” is the temporary name for the “Grand Meles Memorial Dam”. Meles wanted to be immortalized in that largest cement monument in the history of the African continent. To be sure, he had a “dry run” on immortality when he commissioned the construction of Gilgel Gibe III Dam on the Omo River in southern Ethiopia which has been dubbed the “largest hydroelectric plant in Africa with a power output of about 1870 Megawatt.”

The Dam and the damned There is little doubt that IF the “Grand Renaissance Dam” is completed, it will have a

significant long term impact on water supply and availability to the Sudan and Egypt. The general view among the experts is that if the dam is constructed as specified by the regime in Ethiopia, it could result in significant reduction in cultivable agricultural lands and water shortages throughout Egypt. According to Mohamed Nasr El Din Allam, the former Egyptian minster of water and irrigation, if the dam is built “Millions of people would go hungry. There would be water shortages everywhere. It's huge.”

The regime in Ethiopia claims the depth of the Dam will be 150 meters and the water reservoir behind the Dam could be used to irrigate more than 500,000 hectares of new agricultural lands. Experts suggest that the water reservoir behind the dam could hold as much as 62bn cubic meters of water; and depending upon seasonal rainfall and the rate at which the reservoir is filled, there could be significant reductions in the flow of water to Egypt and Sudan. The environmental impact of the Dam in Ethiopia will be catastrophic. Experts believe such a dam if built will “flood 1,680 square kilometers of forest in northwest Ethiopia, near the Sudan border, and create a reservoir that is nearly twice as large as Lake Tana, Ethiopia’s largest natural lake….” The so-called tripartite committee of international experts is expected to issue its report on the potential environmental impacts of the Dam in May 2013.

The legal dimensions of the Nile water dispute The are many knotty legal issues surrounding the treaties and agreements concluded

between Britain as a colonial power and the countries in the Nile basin (Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, and Egypt) on the use of Nile water. Beginning in 1891, Britain concluded at least seven agreements on the use and control of the Nile. In the major treaties, the British included language which effectively prevented Ethiopia and other upstream countries from “construct[ing] any irrigation or other works which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile” or its “tributaries.” For instance, the May 15, 1902 Treaty regarding the Frontiers between the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia and British Eritrea, restrained “His Majesty the Emperor Menelik II, King of kings of Ethiopia” from “construct[ing] or allow[ing] to be constructed, any works across the Blue Nile, Lake

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Tsana or the Sobat,… except in agreement with his Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of the Sudan”.

The current legal and political controversy over the Nile water revolves around the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement (which guarantees disproportionately high volumes of Nile water (85 percent) to Egypt and gave Egypt the right to monitor the Nile flow in the upstream countries and veto powers on all Nile projects upstream) and the 1959 agreement between Britain and Egypt in regards to the use of waters of the River Nile for irrigation purposes which recognized “Egypt’s natural and historic rights in the waters of the Nile and its requirements of agricultural extension…”

A number of the upper-riparian states including Ethiopia, Tanzania and Burundi have rejected the validity of the 1929 Treaty and believe that they have the right to do whatever they choose with the water that flows through their boundaries (“Harmon Doctrine”). In 1964, the Government of Tanganyika openly disavowed the 1929 agreement (“Nyerere Doctrine” which asserts that a newly independent state has the right to “opt in” or selectively succeed to colonial treaties): “The Government of Tanganyika has come to the conclusion that the provisions of the 1929 Agreement purporting to apply to the countries ‘under British Administration’ are not binding on Tanganyika.” On similar grounds, Uganda and Kenya subsequently rejected that agreement. Even Sudan has challenged the allocation ratio of the water it got under that agreement.

Ethiopia’s legal position on the various colonial treaties is explored in full in Gebre Tasadik Degefu’s authoritative work, The Nile: Historical, Legal and Developmental Perspectives (2003). Gebre Tasadik challenges the validity of the treaties on the grounds that “while Ethiopia’s natural rights in a certain share of the waters in its own territory are undeniable…, no treaty has ever mentioned them. This fact would be sufficient for invalidating the binding force of those agreements, which have no counterpart in favor of Ethiopia.” He also points out significant technical issues in the treaties. He suggests that the “English version of the 1902 agreement obliged Ethiopia to seek prior accord with the united kingdom before initiating any works that might affect the discharge of the Blue Nile… The Amharic version does not oblige Ethiopia to request permission from the British Government…”

Others have argued that Ethiopia is not bound by the 1902 treaty with Britain because the “treaty never came into force as Britain did not ratify it and the Ethiopian government had rejected it in the 1950s”. Even if that treaty were valid, Britain is said to have violated its terms by “supporting and recognizing the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in violation of Article 60 of the 1902 agreement”. Technical interpretation of the relevant clauses of the 1902 treaty are also said to favor Ethiopia since that treaty “does not prohibit use of the Nile” but obliges Ethiopia “not to arrest of the Nile, which is interpreted to mean total blockage.”

The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan sought to give the two countries full control and utilization of Nile water by modifying certain aspects of the 1929 agreement. But that agreement completely ignored the interests of any of the upstream countries, particularly Ethiopia.

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Egypt has refused to renegotiate the 84-year-old treaty and insist on the perpetual binding authority of the colonial era treaties as legal formalizations of Egypt’s historical and natural rights over the Nile water. They also insist that the international law of state succession makes the treaties made by colonial Britain binding on successor post-independence African states.

The general consensus among informed commentators is that the Nile treaties are not binding in perpetuity. They point to the inequitable elements of the various agreements on upper riparian states and the radical change in the scope of obligations under the agreements over the past eight decades to challenge the validity of the colonial era treaties.

The paramount question is not whether the Nile water dispute can be resolved in an international court of law or other tribunal but what political accommodations can be made by the basin states to equitably benefit their nations and strengthen their bonds of friendship. Equitable sharing of Nile water is necessary not only for regional stability and amity but also to meet the growing energy and food production needs of the populations of all Nile basin countries in the coming decades. There is no shortage of predictions of doom and gloom over the looming water scarcity worldwide. Over a decade ago, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan warned, “Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.” Insisting on the eternal validity and binding nature of the Nile water treaties is untenable and unreasonable.

The Nile Basin Initiative was established in 1999 to develop a scheme for the equitable distribution of water among the Nile basin countries. Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Kenya have signed the Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (Entebbe Agreement). This agreement allows construction of projects that do not “significantly” affect the Nile water flow. Egypt has rejected the Agreement because it necessitates renegotiation of its share of the Nile water and surrender of its veto power guaranteed under the old agreements.

Water, water everywhere… and Meles’ "damplomacy" of brinksmanship Whether there will be an actual “Grand Renaissance Dam” is the $5bn dollar question of

the century. Because Egypt has been successful in pressuring multilateral development and investment banks not to fund the project, the regime in Ethiopia has defiantly forged ahead to fund the project itself. But is self-funding of the mother of all African dams a realistic possibility?

The regime has kept much of the details of the Dam behind smoke and mirrors. The regime claims that the dam is 14 percent complete (whatever that means) and will reach 26 percent completion by the end of 2013. When it comes online in 2015 as scheduled, the regime claims the dam will have the power generating capacity of nearly 6,000MW, much of it to be exported to the Sudan, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula.

But the whole “Grand Renaissance Dam” project is being staged in the theatre of the absurd. Is it possible to raise USD$5bn by 2015 from the people of the second poorest country in the world, the vast majority of whom live on less than USD$1? The dam is said to cost as much as the country’s total annual budget of USD$5bn. Is the largest recipient of international aid in Africa capable of raising multiple billions of dollars from

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its citizens for the Dam? Can a country which “lost US$11.7 billion to illicit financial outflows between 2000 and 2009” be able to undertake construction of a USD$5bn dam (unadjusted for cost overruns) on its own? According to the World Bank, Ethiopia’s “power sector alone would require $3.3 billion per year to develop” in the next decade. Can the regime in Ethiopia be able to build the largest dam in Africa and other energy projects resorting to such “desperate measures” as “musical concerts, a lottery and an SMS campaign to raise funds”? Can a country which the IMF describes as having “foreign reserves [that] have declined to under two months of import coverage” as of June 2012 really be able to build the largest dam in African history? Can a country whose external debt in 2012 exceeded USD$12bn be able to build a $5bn dollar project?

The regime has forged ahead to build the “Grand Renaissance Dam” by “selling bonds” domestically and in the Ethiopian Diaspora. The regime claims to have collected USD$500 million from bond sales and “contributions” of ordinary citizens. Business and institutions have been forced to buy bonds. The regime’s Diaspora bond sales effort has been a total failure. Most Ethiopians in the Diaspora have been unwilling to bet on imaginary and speculative future earnings from operations of the dam because of the regime’s morbid secrecy and lack of transparency. They have little confidence in the regime’s capacity to guarantee their bond investments. For instance, current underpricing in power tariffs which have ranged between “$0.04-0.08 per kilowatt-hour are low by regional standards and recover only 46 percent of the costs of the utility.” That does not bode well for long term bond holders.

The regime in Ethiopia also has serious problems of cost overruns and poor project management in dam construction. For instance, the Tekeze hydroelectric dam on the Tekeze River, a Nile tributary, in northern Ethiopia was initially estimated to cost USD$224 million, but when it was completed seven years later in 2008, its cost skyrocketed to USD$360 million. How much the "Grand Renaissance Dam" will eventually cost, if built, is anybody’s guess. Regime ineptitude and mismanagement of Gilgel Gibe II on the Omo River in February 2010 resulted in a “tunnel collapse [which] closed the largest hydropower plant operating in Ethiopia, only 10 days after its inauguration.”

To add insult to injury, the Meles regime has the gall to say that it intends to sell the power from the "Grand Renaissance Dam" to the Sudan, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula once construction is complete. That is not only nonsensical but downright insane! Why would Egypt or the Sudan buy power from a dam that damns them by effectively reducing their water supply for agriculture and their own production of power?

Meles and his disciples have always known that they do not have the financial capacity to complete the Dam. They also know that actually completing the constructing the dam will be dangerous for their own survival as a regime should regional war break out. But Meles has always been a peerless grandmaster of intrigue, machination, duplicity, one-upmanship and diplomatic gamesmanship. With this Dam, he was merely pushing the envelope to the outer limits. His real aim was not the construction of dam but to use the specter of the construction of a gargantuan dam on the Nile to fabricate fear of an imminent regional water war. His price for continued regional stability, avoidance of

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conflict and maintenance of the status quo would be billions in loans, aid and other concessions from the international community and downstream countries.

Meles' diplomatic strategy shrouded a clever deterrent military strategy: If Egypt goes for broke and attacks the "Grand Renaissance Dam", Ethiopia could retaliate by attacking the Aswan dam. Meles likely believed the threat of mutual assured destruction will prevent an actual war while maintaining extremely high levels of regional tensions. By playing a game of chicken with Egypt and the Sudan, Meles hoped to strong-arm donor and development banks and wealthy countries in the region into giving him financial, political and diplomatic support. There is no question Meles would have driven on a collision course with Egypt only to swerve at the last second to avoid a fatal crash had he been in power today. It is unlikely that Meles’ disciples have the intellectual candlepower (“megawattage”) or the sheer cunning and artfulness of their master to play a game of chicken with Egypt to skillfully extract concessions.

For love of white elephants and war of the damned Water is a source of life. War is a source of death. The water of the Nile has given life to

Ethiopians, Egyptians and the people of the Nile basin countries since time immemorial. If Meles prepared for war by building his dam, his disciples shall surely inherit war. But Meles should have reflected on the words of Ethiopia’s poet laureate Tsegaye Gebremedhin before embarking on his “Grand Renaissance Dam” project: “O Nile, you are the music that restores the rhythm of existence…/ You are the irrigator that cultivate peace…/ ...From my Ethiopia sacred mountains of the sun…”

Meles’ legacy could indeed be a water war of death and destruction on the Nile, but he will never have a cement monument built on the Nile to celebrate his life. Meles’ disciples would be wise to remember an old prophesy as they march headlong to build their doomsday dam on the Nile: “God gave Noah the Rainbow Sign: No more water. The fire next time!”

Professor Alemayehu G. Mariam teaches political science at California State University, San Bernardino and is a practicing defense lawyer.

Previous commentaries by the author are available at: http://open.salon.com/blog/almariam/ www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/ Amharic translations of recent commentaries by the author may be found at: http://www.ecadforum.com/Amharic/archives/category/al-mariam-amharic http://ethioforum.org/?cat=24

EGYPTIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ENDEAVOR DEBUNKED PFDJ’S STATE ATTITUDE

Egypt reiterated its opposition to Ethiopia’s plan to build a dam on the Nile River and sent a 40-member “Public diplomacy delegation” to Kampala (Uganda). Its objective was to seek cooperation from the Ugandan government to oppose Ethiopia’s plan. Meanwhile Egypt

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was opposing the CFA or commonly referred to as the Entebbe Agreement. President Museveni of Uganda received the delegation exceptionally politely and told the Egyptians that:-

a) The CFA is a valid document and Egypt is not a signatory of it. President Museveni defended the CFA (one of the signatories is Uganda). It was naivety to expect him to oppose what his nation has agreed upon.

b) He said, “All Nile basin states had the right to equally benefit from its waters”. By implication, Egypt was told that it cannot claim complete control of River Nile water and has no such valid ground, whatsoever. It is understandable that the UK, now, cannot present itself as the advocate of Egypt whether it was under its colonial rule or not. It is also true that what the British drafted and used as a legal document for their own interests is not valid for those countries that became independent after 1957.

c) President Museveni referring to the problem of energy resources and deforestation (cutting of firewood) reminded the delegation saying, “there was a dire need for electrification in the basin countries, which could discourage people from cutting trees of firewood”. According to my observation President Museveni’s primary policies include fighting HIV/AIDS, Free Primary and Secondary education for all children of Uganda, use of Uganda’s water resources for the production of cheap clear energy through electrification of all regions of the country and hence the need of constructing dams, etc.

So, he politely and diplomatically explained the region’s problems and as per requested by the delegation agreed to communicate with the late PM Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and to inform him about the interest of Egypt to send a delegation to Addis Ababa.

Simultaneously, Egypt faced another unexpected thunder blow. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries and the Nile Initiative. The objective of the memo is “to facilitate cooperation for sustainable development and efficient management of resources in the region”. The initiative deserves commendation. It attempts to fulfill what was declared in Rio Di Janero and Agenda 21. [Posted by Fdimon Tesfaye, December 21/2012, http://eidmon.wordpress.com/2012/12/21/]. Isaias Afeworki was well aware of all these initiatives and coordinated activities.

Based on the request of the Egyptian delegation President Museveni contacted the late PM Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and explained to him the questions raised by the Egyptian delegation which wanted to get the kind cooperation of Ethiopia to receive Egyptian delegation with an aim to reach an understanding on the grand project of Ethiopia. President Museveni fulfilled what he promised. Thebafter, he made a phone call to the Egyptian assistant chief of the al-Wafd Party – Mustafa El Gendi and informed him that PM

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Meles Zenawi agreed and welcomed the visit of the Egyptian delegation of Public diplomacy. Mustafa El Gendi was the coordinator of the Egyptian delegation of public diplomacy. He was also the individual who requested an unreserved cooperation from the President of Uganda [Posted by Sodere, April/2011 at 9:47].

EGYPTIAN DELEGATION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY VISIT TO ETHIOPIA

Please find a report [a sort of minute] which was prepared by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the reception and activities of the Egyptian delegation of public diplomacy. (I preferred to present the exact report of the Ethiopians about the visit so that the audience could have the chance to compare and contrast how the visit is viewed by the two sides and how people are commenting on it using social networks or the print media. I have also added the reports of the Egyptian side.

From the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Ministry

A Week in the Horn 6.5.2011

Egypt’s Public Diplomacy Delegation concludes its visit

As we noted in last week’s edition of a Week in the Horn, a high level Egyptian Public Diplomacy Delegation arrived in Ethiopia on April 29th. Their visit ended on Monday, May 2nd after what appeared to have been a most useful, valuable and rewarding visit with the delegation meeting numerous senior officials and holding an extensive exchange of views with Prime Minister Meles.

On arrival at Bole International Airport, members of delegation were welcomed by Ato Daoud Mohammed, State Minister of Culture and Tourism, accompanied by an Ethiopian traditional music group. The Egyptian delegation, led by Mr. Mustafa Al-Gendi, consist three presidential candidates, members of parliament, and intellectuals from universities, members of different political parties and of the revolutionary youth movement of January 25th. The next day they were received by the Speakers of House of People„s Representatives and the House of Federation. The Speakers underscored the benefits of people-to-people diplomacy for Egypt and for Ethiopia, and briefed the delegation on Ethiopia’s progress in general and recent achievements in the economic sector. These, of course, require massive amounts of electricity to sustain them as does the Growth and Transformation Plan. The Speakers both underlined that the building of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam would not cause problems to either Sudan and Egypt but would rather bring a number of benefits to the lower riparian states. It would protect the Sudan from catastrophic floods and ensure a continuous and sustainable flow of water. The aim of the project was not to cause any harm but to enhance the welfare and prosperity for all the Nile Basin countries.

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A jovial welcome as a 50-member Egyptian Public Diplomacy delegation arrives at the Addis Ababa Bole International Airport Friday morning.

http://www.ertagov.com/en/etv-interviews/333-egyptian-public-diplomacy-delegation-arrives-in-addis.html

The Egyptian delegation expressed its relief to see that the project would not cut the flow to downstream countries or affect Egyptian farmers. They noted that they did not agree with the agreements of 1929 and 1959 and advocated the need for a new chapter to be opened among the Nile Riparian States. They said they were confident that the Ethiopian Government would not try to improve the welfare of the people of Ethiopia at the expense of the people of Egypt.

The delegation also met with his Holiness, Abune Paulos, Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church while Ethiopian Christians were celebrating the festival of Dagmawi Tensaè. In his address to the congregation, His Holiness elaborated the historical and cultural ties between Ethiopia and Egypt. Members of the delegation, including both Muslim and Christian representatives, delivered speeches on the links between the two countries. The delegation and the congregation prayed together for both Ethiopia and Egypt. Subsequently, the delegation also met with intellectual community of the Addis Ababa University. They exchanged views on the issue of the Nile Waters. They also agreed for exchange programs and scholarships for their students and lecturers.

President Girma Woldegiorgis hosted a dinner for the delegation on Sunday. In a statement, the President expressed his confidence that the visit would consolidate and enhance relations between two countries that were, after all, indissolubly linked by the Nile River, the gift of God, of Allah, to all the communities of the Nile Basin. He said the Nile was a vital resource for survival, for development and for security with the potential to reduce poverty and realize peace among all riparian states. Past failure to co-operate meant its resources had not been

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developed as they might have been. Now the Comprehensive Cooperative Framework Agreement based on principles of an equitable and reasonable utilization of the water and, above all, the obligation not to cause harm to other riparian states, had been drawn up. He hoped all the riparian states would sign it. The President underlined Ethiopia‟s efforts to eradicate poverty, and address the impacts of climate change, recurrent drought, environmental degradation and famine. It would be a lengthy process, and that was why the "Ethiopian Renaissance Dam", a major element in the Growth and Transformation Plan was so important. The Dam would provide cheap and sustainable power to allow the full mobilization of resources and unlock economic development on a much wider level, allowing for the export of “green” power to neighbors and other states in the Nile Basin. Other benefits would include resolving problems of siltation, ensuring a continuous and sustainable flow of water and increasing the amount of water available by lowering the rate of evaporation significantly. The President emphasized that it was in the interest of all to build a solid foundation for social and economic cooperation and development. “Tied together by our river, our destinies must lie alongside each other. We must not let the past govern our actions today. Water is not a commodity to be divided but a benefit to be shared”.

The President hoped the meetings the delegation had with senior government officials and others would give them a real understanding of Ethiopia‟s struggle to address the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment, and the need for a spirit of cooperation and understanding. Genuine negotiations and collective bilateral actions could pave the way for much needed closer environmental, economic and cultural developments. The President took the opportunity to congratulate the delegation and the people of Egypt for their success in dealing with recent challenges. He expressed his confidence that their efforts would be crowned with sustainable peace, development and democracy.

The Egyptian delegation’s final round of talks was an extensive discussion with Prime Minister Meles who welcomed the delegation warmly. The delegation told the Prime Minister that Egypt was going back to its African roots which had been forgotten by the previous regime whose policies had resulted in injustice and the isolation of the Egyptian people. Members elaborated the objectives of the recent revolution in Egypt including equality, dignity and respect for the rights of people. They expressed their fervent hope that the new dispensation would usher in a new era in relations between Egypt and Africa in general and the Nile Basin countries in particular. They noted that Ethiopia had the right to use the Nile waters to develop, and expressed their hope that this effort would also consider fully the rights of the Egyptian people. The delegation expressed its belief that previous policies did not create conducive atmosphere in the Nile Basin and this should now change for the better.

After congratulating the delegation and the Egyptian people for their recent success in addressing the challenges the country had faced peacefully, the Prime Minister emphasized that the visit would open a new era in Ethiopia/Egypt relations. He noted that all Ethiopian patriarchs had been appointed from Egypt until the 1950s, and that this had sometimes created constitutional crises when delays occurred preventing the anointing of an emperor. This had even provoked empty threats of blocking the Nile. He mentioned the iniquities of the

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agreements of 1929 and 1959. The 1929 agreement, signed between the British and its colonies, for the sole benefit of the cotton farms of Egypt; the 1959 agreement, the Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan, was for full utilization of the Nile Waters without taking into consideration the interests of any other stakeholders. Ethiopia was not a party to either, and its leaders had rejected both as unjust.

The Prime Minister detailed Ethiopia’s efforts to change its relations with its neighbors including Egypt immediately after the fall of the military regime in 1991. He recalled the first bilateral agreement signed between Ethiopia and Egypt in 1902. That had included the commitment of the Emperor Minelik not to block the flow of the Nile River at Lake Tana. The more recent bilateral agreement in 1994 had stipulated the issue of equitable utilization and Ethiopia’s agreement not to cause significant harm to others in any utilization of the waters of the Nile. Unfortunately it had not proved possible to implement this.

The Prime Minister also detailed the process of negotiations for the Comprehensive Framework Agreement that has so far been signed by all but three members of the Nile Basin Initiative. He mentioned the challenges and intimidation that some of the members had faced from the previous Egyptian government. He stressed that the CFA was the best agreement to usher in a new era for the utilization of the Nile waters for the common good. No Egyptian government, he said, should have a problem to sign it. As the delegation suggested giving the process more time to allow for Egypt to elect a new government and vote for a new constitution, Prime Minister Meles said the Ethiopian government was ready to delay the legislative process of the CFA. This would not be for any renegotiation, but to allow ample time for the new reality in Egypt to look thoroughly at the Comprehensive Agreement.

The Prime Minister emphasized that Ethiopia had done all the necessary studies to make that building the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile just 40kms from Sudan would not harm the interests of the lower riparian states but brings benefits to both Sudan and Egypt as well as Ethiopia. The Dam would only generate electricity, and would replace the evaporation lost from dams in the lower riparian states. He told the delegation that Egypt, in collaboration with other interested parties, could send experts to look jointly at the reality with Ethiopian experts, and confirm that the project would not harm the Egyptian people. This could close that chapter and move on. He said the Nile River should be looked at as a network within the Nile Basin that could benefit all stakeholders equitably. The new revolution in Egypt was for justice and the dignity of the Egyptian people and he hoped this would be replicated in the utilization of the Nile waters. He reassured the delegation that Ethiopia would endeavour to ensure that the Nile waters were used equitably among all riparian states; he expected all riparian states to show reciprocal policies and attitudes.

Budding Regional Cooperation in the Eastern Nile area?

The Grand Renaissance Dam has mobilized Ethiopians from all corners of the world in the manner of no other cause in recent history. It has proved a stronger bond than ethnic, religious, political or any other affiliation. It is no exaggeration to say that it is in fact further cementing

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the unity of Ethiopians in a manner to help ensure Ethiopia’s Renaissance in the shortest possible time. At the same time, developments in the last couple of weeks have also shown there is more to the Dam’s significance than the sense of unity and camaraderie it has aroused among Ethiopians of all persuasions. It also provided a source of cooperation among riparian states, and more particularly the two downstream countries that were previously impervious to the idea of cooperation over the Nile. The Grand Renaissance Dam appears to be giving a strong impetus to something that decades of negotiations have failed to do.

The attitude of many politicians in Sudan, and perhaps also the government, seems to be one of positive expectation towards the Dam. There appears to be a realization that the Dam will give many benefits to the Sudan, not just cheap power, but also irrigation as well as the prevention of flooding and siltation that have caused so much havoc. There also appears to be political will on the part of the government to give dialogue a chance on matters of mutual interest covering the Nile and other issues. This should go a long way to allay the fears and concerns of those who view any such developments with suspicion, even malice. The government of Ethiopia has also been doing its level best to avoid any misunderstandings. It has expressed its good will both by engaging Sudan on issues of cooperation and also going out of its way to explain the project in detail. This seems to be working, dialogue has been opened and both sides appear to be willing to give it a chance.

With regard to Egypt, there have been equally encouraging signs. The recent visit by an Egyptian Public Diplomacy Group (see above) has raised a number of interesting debates over the past suspicions and distrust. While not strictly a governmental delegation, it was composed of presidential candidates, representatives of many grass roots movements and political parties, intellectuals and representatives of religious groups. The level of enthusiasm they showed and the candid discussions with Ethiopian officials created a high level of pleasant surprise here in Ethiopia. We do not know how far the euphoric reaction of delegation may be shared by the Egyptian political establishment, not is it clear to what extent the delegation can influence the government’s position, but their visit certainly lays down the possibilities for a furtherance of dialogue between two peoples governments. What is important is the fact that a dialogue is opening up and there are some in Egypt who have had the audacity to challenge received wisdom when it comes to relations between our two countries. Equally important, there are now movements in Egypt that are amenable to dialogue when it comes to addressing issues of common interest such as the Nile.

At the same time, there are pitfalls to guard against. Much of the coverage of the visit by the Egyptian media was positive and accurate, but some tried to read too much into Prime Minister Meles’ assurance that Ethiopia would not ratify the CFA before Egyptians have an elected government, or before experts from both countries to come to see just how advantageous the project would be to downstream countries. There were suggestions that Ethiopia had agreed to freeze the project or to pull out of the Comprehensive Framework Agreement. This is absolutely erroneous. Ethiopia was making a goodwill gesture, involving no formal overture to the Egyptian government. Nor is it clear this involves any change in policy. It certainly doesn’t mean Ethiopia is giving up on the Dam project. Ethiopia believes that a clear understanding of

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the benefits of the Dam will further facilitate cooperation between the two countries. That’s why it has expressed its willingness to allow a team of experts to study the benefits of the project. Nor is it pulling out of the CFA. It is in fact urging both Egypt and Sudan to join. What it has done is to suspend the ratification of the CFA until Egyptians have an elected government.

Whether such suggestions come from misunderstandings or are deliberately is irrelevant. The important thing is that there is now a platform of dialogue in place. The Egyptian government can now show the political will to use this platform in a genuine spirit of cooperation. The scheduled visit of the Egyptian Prime Minister next week will hopefully pave the way for such an understanding. This will allow for the pursuit of genuine cooperation in the best interests of the peoples of the three countries straddled by the Abbai River, the Blue Nile.

Next please find some excerpts from the side of Egypt’s state information service

“The African Tours: Results and IndicationsPublic Diplomacy Tours to Africa, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=1187

The African tours and visits by the public diplomacy delegations had many results that couldn't be achieved during the former regime, which didn't pay any attention to Africa or the interests that could have been achieved in it. The most significant results of these visits are as follows:

- These visits enabled Egypt to restore its influence in Africa in general and in Sudan in particular; as the Egyptian-Sudanese historical, strategic and economic relations led to the re-establishment of their balanced relations, which leads to more bilateral coordination and cooperation.- These visits come as an attempt to rebuild confidence and relations between Egypt and these countries. Besides, they were meant to ridding Egypt of the adverse impact of the traditional foreign policy in the last period. Moreover, the delegation seeks to ease the tension with these countries to allow for official diplomatic missions.

Uganda Visit

- Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni confirmed the necessity of starting new era in the Egyptian-Ugandan relations. He also said that Uganda would not be involved in any action that may harm Egypt and added that adopting the Framework Convention will take several months.- Museveni agreed on the proposal of the public diplomacy to postpone adopting the Framework Convention for one year till electing the Egyptian parliament and president. He also promised to do his best to persuade the rest of the Nile Basin countries of doing the same and confirmed his keenness on the necessity of Egypt's participation in any Nile Basin agreement.

Ethiopia Visit

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- Ethiopian Prime Minister halted the adoption of Entebbe Agreement, signed by most of the Nile Basin countries, till ending the Egyptian presidential and parliamentary elections.- The Ethiopian authorities allowed the Egyptian experts to enter the Millennium Dam site for studying its expected effects on Egypt.- For his part, the Ethiopian President called for developing the Egyptian-Ethiopian relations in a framework of partnership and friendship. He pointed out that the Egyptian delegation's visit to Ethiopia contributed to restoring the Egyptian-Ethiopian relations completely.- After returning from Ethiopia, the delegation members said that they presented to Sharaf a number of suggestions to cooperate with the Ethiopian side, especially in the files of Nile water and economic cooperation.- In spite of the Ethiopian stance of postponing the construction of the Millennium Dam till after the Egyptian presidential and parliamentary elections, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that if, after that, Egypt remained against the building of the Dam, Ethiopia would go ahead with its construction plans out of its confirmation that building it will not harm Egypt.”

The Egyptian Al-Ashram Weekly posted the following. I have presented the whole article without mutilating it so that the audience could have complete idea and have their own judgments on the similarities and differences in the reports posted by different sides.

Source: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1119/focus.htm

The River Nile: bridge or barrier?Following a long history of conflict over water among the Nile Basin countries, Doaa El-Bey finds that popular and official diplomatic efforts are making headway

The 25 January Revolution in Egypt put the issue of the water of the River Nile back at the top of the foreign-policy agenda. Diplomatic efforts at creating common interests and boosting economic cooperation seem to be the best way of managing conflicts arising from differences over the distribution of the river's water, and the various countries involved have shown a willingness to build bridges in an effort to capitalize on mutual interests and bring about a win-win situation for all.

While popular diplomacy has proven successful in the post-revolution management of Nile water issues, popular-official diplomacy can also help improve relations between Egypt and the other Nile Basin states, building further bridges between them. As if to demonstrate this idea, last week saw the conclusion of a 10-day tour to South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia, in order to involve civil society organisations in boosting cooperation with the Nile Basin states,

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according to Magdi Amer, assistant foreign minister for Nile Basin states affairs, who headed the delegation.

"This is the first Egyptian official-popular delegation to head to the Nile Basin states," said Amr Khaled, a popular Islamic preacher and founder of Life Makers, a charity organisation, on his official website. Khaled was part of the delegation that visited the four Nile Basin states.

The warm welcome the delegation received was an indication, Khaled said, that both officials and peoples are willing to listen and be listened to. The delegation had visited the countries, he explained, as representatives of Egyptian civil society in order to address their counterparts and find out how they could work together. "The relationship between Egypt and these states cannot be summarised as a water issue alone. We inquired about how we could help build schools and hospitals, etc., in order to assist them. After all, we cannot resolve the water issue in the absence of other issues," he added.

The tour, organised by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, included representatives from charity organisations like Life Makers, Resala, the Food Bank, the Arab Doctors Union, the Children's Cancer Hospital and Masr Al-Kheir. Delegates met the ministers of education, health, youth, and information and representatives of civil society in each state.

Tarek Kotb, from the Foreign Ministry's Nile Basin States Department, said that the delegation had included 20 figures representing the government as well as 15 NGOs. A single approach could not resolve all possible conflicts, he said, but "political means, together with the efforts of NGOs and popular diplomacy, go hand-in-hand in order to improve relations and create a better ambiance among the Nile Basin states," Kotb told Al-Ahram Weekly.

The official-popular approach was accompanied by top-level official efforts to boost relations with the upstream states, President Mohamed Morsi concluding a visit to Uganda last week during which he took part in celebrating the country's independence day. The issue of the Nile's water was discussed with the other leaders of Nile Basin states who attended the celebration.

In July, Morsi visited Ethiopia to participate in the African Union summit, which was the first visit by an Egyptian president to Ethiopia since the assassination attempt on ousted former president Hosni Mubarak in 1995 by Islamist gunmen during a visit to Addis Ababa.

Prime Minister Hisham Kandil will also visit South Sudan soon, having already visited various upstream countries in June when he was minister of irrigation. These visits aim to improve bilateral relations between Egypt and these states and to discuss issues relating to the sharing of the Nile's water.

NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES: Meanwhile, Egypt and Sudan have said they will not sign the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) signed by most of the other Nile Basin states unless they are guaranteed their existing share of the river's water.

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Egypt's other reservations about the agreement include the need to give the country advance notice before construction is carried out in the Nile Basin and to adjust the future voting system set up under the agreement so that any vote will always be contingent on the approval of Egypt and Sudan.

Egypt has always had a natural and historical right to the Nile. Given that the country is dependent on the Nile for drinking water and agriculture, the river is considered to be a national-security issue. Egypt is also already struggling with water shortages, and a 2007 report by the Water Research Centre said that it would face serious shortages by 2025.

Unlike the other Nile Basin countries, which have several other sources of water, the Nile provides Egypt with 95 per cent of the country's water needs, Nader Noureddin, a professor of land and water resources at the Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University, told the Weekly.

The water resources of any country are measured according to the total amount of water resources it has, including rain and subterranean water, he explained. Ethiopia, for instance, possesses 123.5 billion cubic metres of water per year, according to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report. Tanzania has 91 billion, Uganda 44 billion, Sudan 66 billion and Kenya 33 billion. Egypt, on the other hand, has 60.5 billion cubic metres a year -- 55.5 billion from the Nile and five from subterranean sources.

"These figures show that Ethiopia has more than double the water Egypt has, and Tanzania has double what Egypt has. They also show that Egypt has the least amount of water, given its size and population," Noureddin told the Weekly.

However, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya have decided to ignore such figures, and they have asked for a larger share of Nile water regardless of other sources. The countries accordingly signed the CFA, also known as the Entebbe Agreement, in May 2010, which aims to re-allocate water distribution and increase the upstream countries' share of the Nile's water.

The agreement also aims to allow upstream countries to construct dams and related projects that may violate the 1929 and 1959 Nile Basin agreements. The Entebbe Agreement was expected to take effect in May 2011, one year after it was signed, though other upstream Nile countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, did not initially sign it. Burundi eventually signed in March 2011.

South Sudan, which seceded from North Sudan last year, has said that it will not join the agreement until all Nile Basin states agree on it.

Analysts differ on whether the death of Ethiopia's former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in August will affect the water issue. Some argue that it could provide a catalyst toward resolving the issue, while others believe that it will not lead to any major change in Ethiopian policy.

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Zenawi, prime minister from 1995, was known as an architect of Ethiopian development, and he repeatedly asked for a new agreement regarding the sharing of the Nile's water.

Initially, there were 10 states making up the Nile Basin states, becoming 11 after the division of Sudan. The seven upstream countries are Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan are considered to be downstream states. Eritrea is an observer state under the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).

EGYPT'S HISTORIC RIGHTS: In response to these developments, Egypt and Sudan have insisted on abiding by the 1929 and the 1959 treaties, though these are regarded by the upstream states as "colonial relics" that should no longer be treated as law.

The 1929 treaty was signed by the then British occupying authorities in Egypt and stated that no work could be undertaken on the Nile and its tributaries without Egypt's acceptance. It also gave Egypt the right to block any developments upstream in the River Nile, including dams, irrigation works and pumping stations. The treaty allocated Egypt 48 billion cubic metres a year and Sudan four billion cubic metres a year of Nile water as their "acquired rights".

Sudan and Egypt later renegotiated the 1929 treaty in 1959 under a new treaty that allowed for the construction of the Aswan High Dam as a major new element in the control of the Nile's water to the benefit of the two countries. The 1959 treaty also increased the two countries' share of Nile water to 55.5 and 18 billion cubic metres, respectively.

The 1929 treaty was the culmination of previous agreements made in 1889, 1891, 1902 and 1906 between the British and Italian governments and later also the Ethiopian government. All these agreements acknowledged Egypt's natural and historic right to its fair share of the Nile's water.

However, increasing energy needs among upstream states have prompted them to look for new sources of energy, among them dams to produce hydroelectric energy. The existing treaties are an obstacle to these countries' plans, and thus there have various attempts to renegotiate them and come up with a new collective agreement.

The first recent attempt towards that end was made with the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999. Although representatives of the member countries of the NBI met on a regular basis over the course of the following decade, negotiations failed to progress into an agreement that could appeal to all members.

Relationships between the NBI states deteriorated after the CFA was signed.

POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF THE RENAISSANCE DAM: Potential conflict over the water issue between the upstream and downstream countries, among them Egypt, built up in March last year when Ethiopia decided to build its "Renaissance Dam" on the Blue Nile without the endorsement of Egypt or Sudan.

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When built, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa and the tenth largest in the world. The dam's reservoir at 63 billion cubic metres will be one of Africa's largest. However, given that the dam is planned to be built on the Blue Nile, which provides Egypt with 85 per cent of its water, there are fears that it will restrict the amount of water reaching Egypt.

The Nile is fed by the White Nile, flowing from Lake Victoria, and the Blue Nile, flowing from Ethiopia.

Yet, experts differ on the effect of the dam. Some argue that it could provide Egypt with water throughout the year, not only in flood time, and generate electricity that could be used by Egypt and Sudan. Others say that it could allow Ethiopia to control the amount of water reaching Egypt and that as a result the country would no longer receive its appropriate share of water.

Mustafa Al-Guindi, an MP and coordinator of the popular diplomacy delegation that visited Ethiopia and Uganda last year, has described the situation by saying that while Egypt is concerned about the effects of the dam, Addis Ababa has repeatedly emphasised that the dam will not have any effect on the amount of water reaching Egypt. As a result, no action should be taken until the findings of the tripartite technical committee looking into the matter are released.

"My main concern now is to know from the unbiased committee that will disclose its findings to the peoples of the Nile Basin countries whether the dam will harm Egypt or not," Al-Guindi told the Weekly. "If the report states that it will, Egypt will argue that the CFA is illegal as it would deprive Egypt of one of its basic human rights, water."

Al-Guindi praised the work of the committee as the outcome of efforts made by the popular diplomacy delegation. For his part, Noureddin believes that building any dams on the Blue Nile will present a challenge to Egypt's water supply and to the country's national security.

"Egypt understood that Ethiopia needed to build the Tekeze Dam on the River Atbara three years ago and other dams before that. Now Ethiopia has a total of 12 dams, a number that is not found anywhere else in the world. Nevertheless, it now wants to build four more dams on the Blue Nile and its tributaries," Noureddin commented.

The Renaissance Dam, if built, would make the existing Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser, which stores water behind it, redundant. "The Nile's water reaching Sudan and Egypt would be coming through a small canal that receives surplus water left over after Ethiopia has generated the power it wants if this dam is built," he added.

THE BAD OLD DAYS: Egypt's relations with the African states in general and the Nile Basin states in particular saw a deterioration in recent years that was widely blamed on the pre-revolutionary regime, which neglected the country's African neighbours and left relationships to deteriorate until the upstream states decided to sign the Entebbe Agreement.

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Egypt even threatened to resort to war if its rights over the Nile's water were encroached upon. Egyptian former foreign minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit warned that Cairo's water rights were a "red line" and threatened legal action if a partial deal was reached. While Egypt and Ethiopia signed a cooperation agreement in 1993, relations deteriorated after 1995 following the assassination attempt on ousted former president Mubarak. Mubarak never visited Addis Ababa again after that, and the incident had a negative impact on Egypt's relations with Ethiopia as well as with other African states.

Although this deterioration in relations has been blamed on the previous regime, Noureddin points to other reasons that have contributed to the worsening relations. The fact that the upstream states have considered building dams on the Nile as their right without giving Egypt prior notice and without respecting the treaties that ban the building of such dams on the Nile without the prior consent of Egypt are among the reasons for the deteriorating relations, he said.

The upstream countries have insisted on abiding by a principle of equal rights to the Nile's water rather than the principle of equal rights to water resources that both Egypt and Sudan support. Some countries have linked their development to the buildings of dams like that planned in Ethiopia, which is even being called the "Renaissance Dam".

"This is a great mistake," Noureddin said. "Canada which has only two per cent fresh water, is a developed country. Other desert states that do not possess water at all have also achieved development." The presence of countries like China, Korea and Israel in the Nile Basin states and their rapidly growing investment there are also dangerous signs that could lead to further differences among the states in the future.

Noureddin gave Ethiopia as an example, saying that though it had the right to open its doors to foreign investment in the field of agriculture, this could not be at the expense of Egypt's share of the Nile's water. Likewise, Ethiopia's decision to irrigate the land using river rather than rain water should be revised such that it uses non-Nile water or subterranean water sources.

Moreover an agreement had been signed earlier this year by an Israeli agency for international development to increase cooperation in the fields of food security, water management, and industrial development in African states, Noureddin said. This project was being carried out in cooperation with the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). But Egypt, which has 7,000 years of experience in agriculture, is not undertaking any similar projects.

TURNING OVER A NEW LEAF: Post-revolutionary Egypt has shown a genuine desire to reestablish good relations and boost cooperation with the Nile Basin states, as was signaled by the visit of former prime minister Essam Sharaf to Uganda and Ethiopia in a bid to boost bilateral relations and trade with particular emphasis on the appropriation of the Nile's water.

"We were in Uganda yesterday, and today we had discussions in Ethiopia. The environment is completely different from what it was during the previous period," Sharaf told journalists

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during his visit. A few months later, Zenawi met Sharaf in Cairo. During the meeting, both men highlighted the positive impact their talks had had, describing the Nile as a "bridge" rather than a "barrier" to warmer ties.

During the visit, Zenawi announced the formation of the tripartite technical committee that would review the impact of the Renaissance Dam on water distribution.

Moreover, Egypt saw a surge of diplomacy on the popular level after the revolution. A popular diplomacy delegation received a warm welcome in Uganda and Ethiopia in April and May last year, and it included political figures like Al-Guindi, Al-Sayed Al-Badawi, leader of the Wafd Party, Ghad Party leader Ayman Nour, and presidential hopeful Hisham Al-Bastawisi. Other members of the delegation included journalists like Sekina Fouad, popular figures like Mohamed Abul-Ghar and representatives from youth groups that took part in launching of the 25 January Revolution.

The delegation managed to convince the two countries to delay the ratification of the CFA until Egypt had elected a new parliament and president, and it prompted Ethiopia to allow the formation of the independent tripartite technical committee to investigate the effects of the Renaissance Dam.

"Popular diplomacy succeeded where official diplomacy failed. Ethiopia, which had repeatedly rejected the idea of the committee, accepted its formation after the visit of the delegation," Al-Guindi said, pointing to the fact that the mixed character of the delegation's members had helped the negotiations.

"All currents, including the Muslim Brotherhood before it assumed power, were represented in the delegation. That is how a proper popular delegation should be and that is why it succeeded," he added.

The warm welcome the Ethiopians gave to the delegation was shown during the delegation's visit to the cathedral in Addis Ababa, when members chanted with Ethiopian worshippers after mass: "Egypt and Ethiopia: one hand."

Nevertheless, Noureddin for one still believes that popular diplomacy alone may not resolve the water problem. Instead, it can act to pave the way for better relations in future and enhanced cooperation. Official diplomacy is more likely to resolve the root of the problem, he said. Without a resolution to the water problem, there cannot be good relations.

The formation of the tripartite technical committee was one outcome of the popular diplomatic efforts. The 10-member committee is composed of two experts from Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia and four international experts. It held its first meeting in Addis Ababa late last year, and a sixth meeting was held in the Ethiopian capital last week. It is expected to produce its report by the end of this year.

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However, according to sources at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, Ethiopia has not given the committee all the details it needs to come up with the report, which is why some, among them experts like Maghawri Shehata, president of the Arab Association for Healthy Water, have cast doubts on the outcome of the committee.

According to Shehata, Ethiopia postponed ratification of the agreement last year, and it has not changed its position since. Moreover, it began working on the foundations of the dam even before Burundi signed the agreement. While the committee has the authority to examine the impacts of building the dam, there has been no mention of what might happen should those impacts be found to be negative on the downstream states.

FUTURE PROSPECTS: The Nile, the longest river in the world, is 4,000 miles long. Some 160 million people in 11 countries depend on the river and its tributaries for their livelihoods. Within the next 25 years, the population of the Nile Basin states is expected to double, and demand for water for agricultural and industrial purposes will grow as well.

The need of the Nile Basin states to cooperate and even integrate should be growing as well, and there is an increasing need for a change in the approach of the Nile Basin states to water issues. Egypt has argued that it needs the Nile's water for its survival and for agriculture, while the upstream states argue that they need to use the Nile water for their own rapidly increasing development needs, famine prevention, and poverty reduction.

All the states concerned should work on the principle of "don't harm anybody, and don't allow anybody to harm you," according to Al-Guindi. It would not be acceptable for Egypt to live under a "water poverty line", he said. However, it would also be unacceptable for Ethiopia to suffer from a shortage of electricity.

"If the Nile Basin states, especially Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, become genuine partners in joint projects, they could provide food and electricity for all the Basin states," Al-Guindi said. Egypt has the manpower and Sudan has the fertile land to do so. Cooperation could produce food for everyone as a result.

Building bridges of understanding among the peoples of the different states is also essential. Khaled said that people in the African states he visited sometimes regarded Egyptians as "selfish", since they could come across as wanting to deprive other states of their right to develop their countries.

In the meantime, the picture that the media has drawn of the African states, especially Ethiopia, is one of their trying to deprive Egypt of its share of water and expose it to a water crisis. In this atmosphere, hostile feelings can thrive.

"We need to sit down with them and to understand them. The Renaissance Dam to the Ethiopians is like the High Dam to us. We can sit down with them and reach a compromise that

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would not harm Egypt and would not deprive Addis Ababa of its hope of development either," Khaled said.

In the hope of building such bridges, Life Makers decided to organise workshops for 50 people from each of the four states Khaled visited in Alexandria in order to boost understanding within these states. The organisation is also planning to build an international school in each country.

Other areas of cooperation suggested by experts include Egyptian assistance to upstream states in irrigation techniques, increasing agricultural imports from these states, the purchase of electricity from the hydroelectric power stations that the Ethiopian and Ugandan governments wish to build, and cooperation in both the public and private sectors in order to build a network of interests that will outweigh any conflicts regarding the Nile's water.

Other prospects for better relations in the future include the use of "soft power" through sending different official-popular delegations like the one that visited four African states last week. "When the people in these states see that Egyptian NGOs are willing to visit them to find out how they can help these countries, they will be more willing to understand and compromise," Kotb said.

In the same context, the Egyptian government launched an "Egyptian initiative for the development of the Nile Basin countries" in January this year. The initiative includes the establishment of regional training centres in the Nile Basin states. It aims to establish integrated development projects and programmes in the states in strategic fields in order to reinforce Egypt's relations with these countries in a way that helps them to achieve their development goals.

Egypt is also participating in efforts to modernise the postal sector in Africa through providing technical assistance to these countries and the training of human resources. In this effort, it is able to draw on Egypt's experience in such fields, as well as on its proven ability to develop systems in the field.

Other more technical suggestions that water experts have come up with to help save water include reviving plans for the construction of the Gongli Canal in South Sudan. This canal, first proposed in 1903, has now been revived in the form of a 500-metre canal linking the White Nile and the Congo River. When built, it will channel swamp water back into the Nile, amounting to an annual increase of Nile water availability of roughly 40 billion cubic metres.

There are various ways for African countries to achieve prosperity through establishing a network of solid relationships and creating common channels and aims. However, more efforts are needed, and these can best be done on the official as well as on the popular levels.”

Copy of a picture included in the Egyptian weekly is presented as follows.

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Isaias Afeworki, in his extensive interview of 2011 with local media, emphasized on the “supposed” contribution of “his invisible and exceptionally precious compass”. His compass DIDN’T SAVE THE LIVES AND LED TO INDEPENDENCE of Eriterians and Eriteria, but the LIFE OF ISAIAS AND HIS LIEUTENANTS.

Please see the following blog from an independent source

‘A Return to African roots’ – Egyptian delegation in Addis Ababa [News Roundup]

Posted by Daniel Berhane on Sunday, May 1, 2011 @ 10:27 pm

A 48 person delegation named “Egyptian People’s Diplomatic Delegation” arrived in Addis Ababa on Friday morning to discuss Nile water issues.

The composition and itinerary of this landmark visit is nowhere to be found. Typically of the poor transparency, perhaps also media, in Egypt and Ethiopia.

Duration of the visit: four or five days [4 days, acc. to ETV, five days, acc. to Walta]

Composition: The delegation is headed by Moustafa El Gendy and comprises three presidential candidates, independent political activists, representatives of different political parties and movements, members of parliament, politicians, jurists, public figures, members of the academia, media representatives and members of the Youth Movement of the Egyptians Revolution former parliament members, community leaders, journalists from Egypt and other Arab countries and other public figures from Egypt.

The delegation is expected to meet with several Ethiopian officials, including Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Foreign Affairs Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn and religious leaders.

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According to one source, this is the ‘same team’ that went to Uganda last month shortly after Ethiopia launched the Grand Renaissance dam.

Purpose of the visit:

‘The arrival of the delegation will only aim to strengthen relations between the two countries’, Spokesperson of   Ministry of Foreign Affairs , Ambassador Dina Mufti, told Walta on Friday .

On the other hand, said, ‘the main objective of the visit is to facilitate Egypt’s return to its African root’, as this is ‘the only way to secure Egypt’s interests’, said   Moustafa El Gendy, head of the delegation, and Dr. Sally Moore(Moore), who is member of the Youth Revolution, according to ETV.

On Friday

Note: This photo shows the Egyptian delegation of public diplomacy with FDRE’s president Girma Woldegiorgis in the palace during the dinner party organized for the delegation.

Members of the delegation made statements to the media in the VIP lobby of Bole international Airport where a music band performed traditional dances in their honor.

Members of the delegation said there should be a ‘joint utilization’ of Nile, ETV reported. They also noted the need for a ‘new cooperation’ on the use of Nile.

A footage on ETV showed two youth members of the delegation speaking against the ‘historic right’ argument and emphasizing equitable utilization is a human right issue – which is the cause of Egyptian revolution.

According to Ethiopian-reporter, Mustafa El-Gendy said ‘the right of upper-riparian countries to use Nile should be seen in the context of human rights’. He added, ‘Egyptians are opposed to the 1929 and 1959 treaties as they excluded the upper-riparian countries’. The news didn’t specify where and to whom Mustafa El-Gendy made the statement.

On Saturday

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The delegation met first with President Girma Woldegiorgis, then with Abadula Gemeda, Spokesperson of the House of Peoples’ representatives, later with Kassa Tekleberhan, Spokesperson of House of Federation, on Saturday.

It is reported that President Grima called for renewing relations between Egypt and Ethiopia “within partnership, friendship, and without aggression.” He reassured that “the Ethiopians are peaceful people” and “love peace and respect Egyptians,” during his meeting with the delegates.____________________________________________________________________________

PFDJ’S DELEGATION TO EGYPT – ISAIAS’ SECRECY AND DECEPTION

Abdel Latif el-Menay (see above) posted his article 21 days after a two man delegation was sent from Isaias Afeworki to present a message to the MB Egyptian president M. Morsi. Osman Saleh (Isaias’ Foreign Affairs Minister) and Yemane gebreab (member of the inner circle of Isaias; PO of PFDJ; Political advisor of Isaias Afeworki) held a meeting with M. Morsi of Egypt on Monday April 15/2013. During this meeting Osman Saleh presented a message from Isaias to M. Morsi. Osman saleh and Yemane Gebreab were also received by the Egyptian FA Minister Mohammed Kamel Amr.

President M. Morsi of Egypt and Osman Saleh of PFDJ’s FA Minister in Cairo

Source: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/16/morsi-holds-talks-with-eritrea-and-sudan/

The Egyptian Daily News reported on the meetings held between the PFDJ delegation , a delegation from Sudan and the Egyptian President M. Morsi.. The content and focus of attention of Isaias’ message to M. Moersi is not made public. However, according to the spokesperson of the FM of Egypt, Amr Roshydy, the PFDJ delegation and M. Morsi discussed about:

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a) The file on utilization of River Nile mainly focusing on the “Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”b) The problem of human trafficking in Egypt [which is rather too late for the two groups to

raise the issue. It appears they wanted a diplomatic acceptance to raise this question which was repeatedly raised by International NGOs, Eriterian NGOs outside Eriteria (there is no NGO in Eriteria), as well as the media including CNN, Al-Jazeera, BBC, and others starting four years back. To my knowledge lots of petitions were sent to authorities of Egypt and Sudan from different directions including me.

There was no interest and/or commitment to tackle this problem from all sides. Rather there are implicit agreements between the said parties to work against Eriterian asylum seekers and refugees. Incarceration, torture, rape and systematic killing in the prisons of Egypt, and Sudan as well as the Sinai are no news to us and the other world. Forced repatriation stimulated reactions from International NGOs and Eriterians from abroad since the people on the mainland have no right to raise such sort of issues. Those who did faced arbitrary detention or forced disappearances never to be seen or heard again.

Blackguards of Isaias Afeworki have been identified as part of the overall inhuman mission against Eriterian asylum seekers and refugees,. Still, to my perception and data since 2008, Isaias and the Egyptians are more interested in striking deals outside the bounds of International and regional legal norms. Please refer to the Egyptian ship and its crew which was under PFDJ’s control for nine months until a business deal was reached.

c) Isaias Afeworki, contrary to what he said in 2011, has made an unethical promise and conducted deceptive move in declaring his support of “THE EGYPTIAN HISTORICAL RIGHTS IN RIVER NILE WATER”. It is reported that the Egyptian president M. Morsi extolled Isaias Afeworki and aired out his ambition “TO HOLDING A MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE” WITH PFDJ’S TOTALITARIAN DICTATOR”. Little wonder, a fanatic Muslim eager to form alliance with a totalitarian dictator who got solace from the Egyptian MB.

It is also no wonder since Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’s standing policy is to ally with Eriteria and fight against Ethiopia in any conceivable and approachable means using any available arena. Arming Isaias was not and is not meant to be “a heavenly act” for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. To MB Isaias is a mere useful fool “infidel”. It is unfortunate to them that their deal, friendship and flirtation are with a small group led by Isaias Afeworki Abraham. The people of Eriteria including the majority of the armed forces do not support Egypt’s ambition, political moves and diplomatic endeavors which are spearheaded against Ethiopia.

WHOSE HISTORY? WHOSE HISTORIC RIGHT?

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Abdel Latif el-Menaway, M. Morsi and Isaias either went out of their mental norms or have gone down deep into the abyss of politics and diplomacy when they argue in terms of “EGYPT’S HISTORIC RIGHT”.

o Whose history are they referring to? o Who codified this “historic right”? o When was it codified? o How was it codified?

History tells us that Egyptian Arabs and Muslims are colonizers of Egypt’s indigenous people. Egypt’s pyramids, hieroglyphics, Cleopatra, the Pharaohs, Coptic Churches, Coptic Monasteries, scroll of more than 3000 years and other material evidences which could take us back to 4,000 years of history or more are not Arabic or Islamic in nature, in origin, in their emergence, in culture, and existence. Egyptians were used “to pay taxes to the Kings of Abyssinia” is a historic record which would send waves upon waves of headaches to Isaias and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, including their president. By and large, one might argue that, Isaias and M. Morsi are bent to wrench the minds of the peace loving peoples of the River Nile Basin which could extend up to or including armed confrontation. For this they needed the help of the criminal Al-Bashir of Sudan. With the same tempo, Isaias and his lieutenants prepared themselves to make Eriteria a springboard for Egypt’s Muslim brotherhood’s “JIHAD” [Refer to the 5th volume of their leader from 1996 to 2002, Mustafa Mashhur’s “JIHAD IS THE WAY”. In his book he included Eriteria as one of those Islamic nations which need to execute Islamic Jihad.

Please see the following paragraph from his book entitled “JIHAD IS THE WAY”, VOLUME 5,

“And the youth should know that the problems of the Islamic world, such as Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria, Eritrea, or the Philippines, are not issues of territories and nations, but of faith and religion. They are problems of Islam and the Muslims, and they can be resolved neither by negotiation nor by recognizing the enemy's right to the Islamic land he stole. Rather, the only option is Jihad for Allah, and this is why Jihad is the way...”[Highlight added, The Laws of Da'wa (Islamic missionary activity) (Part 5), “Jihad is the Way”, by Mustafa Mashhur, [Mustafa Mashhur was the fifth Supreme Guide, the official leader, of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from 1996 until his death in 2002.]

There are lots of points that need intensive and extensive deliberation. It would be hasty for me to forward finalized recommendations since I am still composing data and information,. However, I would like to forward the following to be used as a bridge.

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1) The best possible and approachable means is to collaborate with all concerned nations of the region.

2) Egypt and other North African Arab states need to dig out their roots; to accept who they are; and to decide whether to live, act and remain as Africans or to declare their being non-Africans and go back to their ancestral land of the 7th century. The ambition of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic organizations in Pakistan, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, etc. to dominate the whole world as al-Bana said and HAMAS has put it in its program 1988 is not healthy.(Further points will be raised in the future).

3) Egypt’s MB has flexed its Muscle implicitly for long and explicitly for the last few years. The ambition of MB of al-Bana was first to take state power and then to impose Islam from above. Its ambition doesn’t emanate from sane minded followers of Prophet Mohammed and the Holy Qur’an. Let them remember, day and night, that one who lives by the sword dies by the sword. They have to accept the fact that Egypt was not and is not the root of their religion.

To be one group of people that utilize the Nile water resources they, willy-nilly, need to accept the humanity, dignity, and integrity of Africans of the Nile Basin region. They have to accept the priority of the origins of the water. What Allah/God gave the Ethiopians, the Kenyans, the Ugandans, the Rwandans, the Burundians, the Tanzanians, and the Congolese no MB has the right or mandate to deny their own property. Even the UN has no right to decide against this, unless and otherwise it has the gut to rescind its own resolutions and invite direct armed confrontations.

ANNEX IHere is one of the documents which show the betrayal of the EPLF and

sabotage on Independence of Eriteria which changed it to a colony of EPLF.

Proclamation number 37/1993 of Eritrea

GovernmentThe Eritrean people gained control of the country on May 24, 1991, after thirty years of armed struggle for the right to self-determination. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)

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formed the Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE) to run the country's affairs until an internationally monitored referendum scheduled for April 1993.

The Referendum

98.5% of registered voters turned out for the referendum. The result was a resounding vote for independence: 99.8% said 'yes" for independence. Samir Sanbar, head of the United Nations observer mission said the referendum was "free and fair at every stage." Other observer groups confirmed this.

The Transition

On May 19, 1993, the PGE issued Proclamation No. 37/1993 regarding a reorganization of the government. During a four year transition period, and if possible sooner, the following goals should be achieved:

¥ drafting a constitution and then carrying out the process of ratification;¥ preparing a law on political parties;¥ preparing a press law; and¥ carrying out elections for a constitutional government.

The new government is known as the Government of Eritrea and includes legislative, executive and judicial bodies.

The judicial body operates independently of both the legislative and executive bodies with a court system extending from the village through district, provincial and national levels.

The legislative body, the National Assembly, includes the 75 members of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice's (PFDJ - the name adopted by the EPLF at its February 1994 congress to address the new needs of the transitional period) Central Council and 75 additional representatives elected by the population. The National Assembly has the highest legal power in the government until a democratic constitutional government is established. The legislative body outlines the internal and external policies of the government, regulates their implementation, approves the budget and elects a president for the country.

The president nominates individual to head the various ministries, authorities, commissions and offices, and the legislative body ratifies the nominations. The Cabinet is the country's executive branch. It is made up of the sixteen ministers and chaired by the president. It implements the policies, resolutions and laws of the government and is accountable to the National Assembly.

Government Offcials

President - Isaias AfwerkiMinisters:

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Mahmud Ahmed Mahmud (Sherifo) - Local GovernmentMesfin Hagos - DefenseAli Said "Abdella - Internal Affairs Petros Solomon - Foreign Affairs Haile Woldense - Finance & Development Beraki Gebreselasie- Information and Culture Oqbe Abraha - Trade and IndustryTesfai Ghemlazien - Agriculture Saleh Meki - Marine Resources Tesfai Gebreselassie - Energy, Mining & Water ResourcesOsman Saleh - Education Sebhat Ephrem - HealthGorgis Teklemikael - Transportation Fozia Hashim (Ms.) - JusticeAbraha Asfaha - ConstructionWorku Tesfamikael (Ms.) - Tourism

Governors of Provinces:¥ Saleh Ahmed Iyai - Akele Guzai¥ Sebhat Ephrem - Asmara (provisional)¥ Alamin Sheikh Saleh - Barka Humed Mohammed Karikari - Denkalia¥ Germano Nati - Gash-Setit¥ Berhane Gebregzabher - Hamasien¥ Mohammed Said Nawud - Sahel¥ Ibrahim Idris Totil - Semhar¥ Asmerom Gerezgiher- Senhit¥ Adhanom Gebremariam - Seraye

Director Generals of Authorities and Offices, and Commissioners:¥ ... - Social Affairs Authority Luul Gebreab (Ms.) - Communication & Postal Authority¥ Woldemichael Gebremariam - Housing Commission Gebretensae Kelati - Commission for Eritrean Refugee Affairs¥ Hiwet Zemichael (Ms.) - Central Personnel Office¥ Berhane Habtemariam - Auditor GeneralThe Future:

The government is committed to the development of a democratic constitution and political pluralism. The right to vote should be extended to every adult regardless of ethnic background, religion or sex. Political parties themselves must recognize these basic ground rules of equality for all citizens. For such a system to work, people must be guaranteed basic rights such as free speech, free press, free movement and free association. A judicial system that upholds due process of law is necessary to ensure that these freedoms exist in practice as well as on paper.

During the first years of liberation, Eritreans have been participating in a continuing process of electing governing councils for their village or city, district and province. For some it is a totally new experience. In areas which were long under EPLF control, people have been electing local and district level councils for many years. The EPLFs leadership itself was voted into office at

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congresses of elected representatives of EPLF fighters, the members of the EPLF mass organizations from both EPLF and Derg controlled areas and from abroad, and the general population in the EPLF controlled areas. On the other hand, residents of the areas liberated from the Derg in 1991 had little experience with democratic elections and open participation in political processes. These elections give people the opportunity to learn about the technicalities of elections as well as the far more important process of defining issues and judging candidates. From this experience, Eritreans will be able to move forward to the ratification of a constitution and the election of a democratic government.

In Eritrea, the referendum, elections at all levels, and a constitution are not the routine issues that they are for much of the world. They are a new experience. Eritreans are just beginning to establish the framework for their future as a state in the international community. While the process may be time consuming, care and thoughtful discussion now will ensure that the Eritrean people establish a government which will serve the best interests of many generations to come.

For more information, contact:Research and Information SectionEmbassy of Eritrea910 17th Street NW, Suite 400Washington DC 20006Tel: (202) 429 1991Fax: (202) 429 9004

ANNEX II

BETRAYAL AND ONE OF THE VALID EVIDENCES OF FAILURE TO MEET WHAT EPLF PROMISED TO THE PEOPLES OF ERITERIA, THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY AND THE REGIONAL UNION (AU)

A recent rating of Press Freedom (total number of countries considered 179), Extract.

Please read the following evaluation given by the Reporters without Borders (RWP),

“From top to bottom

The Nordic countries have again demonstrated their ability to maintain an optimal environment for news providers. Finland (1st, 0), Netherlands (2nd, +1) and Norway (3rd, -2) have held on to the first three places. Canada (20th, -10) only just avoided dropping out of the top 20. Andorra (5th) and Liechtenstein (7th) have entered the index for the first time just behind the three leaders.

At the other end of the index, the same three countries as ever – Turkmenistan, North Korea and Eritrea – occupy the last three places in the index. Kim Jong-un’s arrival at the head of the Hermit Kingdom has not in any way changed the regime’s absolute control of news and information. Eritrea (179th, 0), which was recently shaken by a brief mutiny by soldiers at the information ministry,

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continues to be a vast open prison for its people and lets journalists die in detention. Despite its reformist discourse, the Turkmen regime has not yielded an inch of its totalitarian control of the media.

For the second year running, the bottom three countries are immediately preceded by Syria (176th, 0), where a deadly information war is being waged, and Somalia (175th, -11), which has had a deadly year for journalists. Iran (174th, +1), China (173rd, +1), Vietnam (172nd, 0), Cuba (171st, -4), Sudan (170th, 0) and Yemen (169th, +2) complete the list of the ten countries that respect media freedom least. Not content with imprisoning journalists and netizens, Iran also harasses the relatives of journalists, including the relatives of those who are abroad.”[Source: http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html?lang=en&utm_source=emailinguschapter&utm_campaign=post3may&utm_medium=email, Para. 10 -12].

PRESS FREEDOM INDEX OF 2013 BY rwp

Rank Country Note Differential___________________________________________

1 Finland 6,38 0 (1)2 Netherlands 6,48 +1 (3)3 Norway 6,52 -2 (1)4 Luxembourg 6,68 +2 (6)5 Andorra 6,82 -6 Denmark 7,08 +4 (10)7 Liechtenstein 7,35 -8 New Zealand 8,38 +5 (13)9 Iceland 8,49 -3 (6)10 Sweden 9,23 +2 (12)11 Estonia 9,26 -8 (3)12 Austria 9,40 -7 (5)13 Jamaica 9,88 +3 (16)14 Switzerland 9,94 -6 (8)15 Ireland 10,06 0 (15)16 Czech Republic 10,17 -2 (14)17 Germany 10,24 -1 (16)18 Costa Rica 12,08 +1 (19)19 Namibia 12,50 +1 (20)20 Canada 12,69 -10 (10)21 Belgium 12,94 -1 (20)22 Poland 13,11 +2 (24)23 Slovakia 13,25 +2 (25)24 Cyprus 13,83 -8 (16)25 Cape Verde 14,33 -16 (9)

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26 Australia 15,24 +4 (30)27 Uruguay 15,92 +5 (32)28 Portugal 16,75 +5 (33)29 United Kingdom 16,89 -1 (28)30 Ghana 17,27 +11 (41)31 Suriname 18,19 -9 (22)32 United States 18,22 +15 (47)33 Lithuania 18,24 -3 (30)34 OECS 19,72 -9 (25)35 Slovenia 20,49 +1 (36)36 Spain 20,50 +3 (39)37 France 21,60 +1 (38)38 El Salvador 22,86 -1 (37)39 Latvia 22,89 +11 (50)40 Botswana 22,91 +2 (42)

41 Papua New Guinea 22,97 -6 (35)

42 Romania 23,05 +5 (47)43 Niger 23,08 -14 (29)

44 Trinidad and Tobago 23,12 +6 (50)

45 Malta 23,30 +13 (58)46 Burkina Faso 23,70 +22 (68)47 Taiwan 23,82 -2 (45)48 Samoa 23,84 +6 (54)49 Haiti 24,09 +3 (52)50 South Korea 24,48 -6 (44)51 Comoros 24,52 -6 (45)52 South Africa 24,56 -10 (42)53 Japan 25,17 -31 (22)54 Argentina 25,67 -7 (47)55 Moldova 26,01 -2 (53)56 Hungary 26,09 -16 (40)57 Italy 26,11 +4 (61)58 Hong Kong 26,16 -4 (54)59 Senegal 26,19 +16 (75)60 Chile 26,24 +20 (80)61 Sierra Leone 26,35 +2 (63)62 Mauritius 26,47 -8 (54)63 Serbia 26,59 +17 (80)64 Croatia 26,61 +4 (68)65 Central African 26,61 -3 (62)

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Republic66 Tonga 26,70 -3 (63)67 Mauritania 26,76 0 (67)

68 Bosnia and Herzegovina 26,86 -10 (58)

69 Guyana 27,08 -11 (58)70 Tanzania 27,34 -36 (34)71 Kenya 27,80 +13 (84)72 Zambia 27,93 +14 (86)73 Mozambique 28,01 -7 (66)74 Armenia 28,04 +3 (77)75 Malawi 28,18 +71 (146)

76 Republic of the Congo 28,20 +14 (90)

77 Kuwait 28,28 +1 (78)78 Nicaragua 28,31 -6 (72)79 Benin 28,33 +12 (91)

80 Dominican Republic 28,34 +15 (95)

81 Lesotho 28,36 -18 (63)82 Bhutan 28,42 -12 (70)83 Togo 28,45 -4 (79)84 Greece 28,46 -14 (70)85 Kosovo 28,47 +1 (86)86 Guinea 28,49 0 (86)87 Bulgaria 28,58 -7 (80)88 Madagascar 28,62 -4 (84)89 Gabon 28,69 +12 (101)90 East Timor 28,72 -4 (86)91 Paraguay 28,78 -11 (80)92 Guinea-Bissau 28,94 -17 (75)93 Seychelles 29,19 -20 (73)94 Northern Cyprus 29,34 +8 (102)95 Guatemala 29,39 +2 (97)96 Ivory Coast 29,77 +63 (159)97 Liberia 29,89 +13 (110)98 Mongolia 29,93 +2 (100)99 Mali 30,03 -74 (25)100 Georgia 30,09 +4 (104)101 Lebanon 30,15 -8 (93)102 Albania 30,88 -6 (96)103 Maldives 31,10 -30 (73)

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104 Uganda 31,69 +35 (139)105 Peru 31,87 +10 (115)106 Kyrgyzstan 32,20 +2 (108)107 Fiji 32,69 +10 (117)108 Brazil 32,75 -9 (99)109 Bolivia 32,80 -1 (108)110 Qatar 32,86 +4 (114)111 Panama 32,95 +2 (113)112 Israel 32,97 -20 (92)113 Montenegro 32,97 -6 (107)

114 United Arab Emirates 33,49 -2 (112)

115 Nigeria 34,11 +11 (126)

116 Republic of Macedonia 34,27 -22 (94)

117 Venezuela 34,44 0 (117)118 Nepal 34,61 -12 (106)119 Ecuador 34,69 -15 (104)120 Cameroon 34,78 -23 (97)121 Chad 34,87 -18 (103)122 Brunei 35,45 +3 (125)123 Tajikistan 35,71 -1 (122)124 South Sudan 36,20 -13 (111)125 Algeria 36,54 -3 (122)126 Ukraine 36,79 -10 (116)127 Honduras 36,92 +8 (135)128 Afghanistan 37,36 +22 (150)129 Colombia 37,48 +14 (143)130 Angola 37,80 +2 (132)131 Libya 37,86 +23 (154)132 Burundi 38,02 -2 (130)133 Zimbabwe 38,12 -16 (117)134 Jordan 38,47 -6 (128)135 Thailand 38,60 +2 (137)136 Morocco 39,04 +2 (138)137 Ethiopia 39,57 -10 (127)138 Tunisia 39,93 -4 (134)139 Indonesia 41,05 +7 (146)140 India 41,22 -9 (131)141 Oman 41,51 -24 (117)142 DR Congo 41,66 +3 (145)143 Cambodia 41,81 -26 (117)

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144 Bangladesh 42,01 -15 (129)145 Malaysia 42,73 -23 (122)146 Palestine 43,09 +7 (153)147 Philippines 43,11 -7 (140)148 Russia 43,42 -6 (142)149 Singapore 43,43 -14 (135)150 Iraq 44,67 +2 (152)151 Burma 44,71 +18 (169)152 Gambia 45,09 -11 (141)153 Mexico 45,30 -4 (149)154 Turkey 46,56 -6 (148)155 Swaziland 46,76 -11 (144)156 Azerbaijan 47,73 +6 (162)157 Belarus 48,35 +11 (168)158 Egypt 48,66 +8 (166)159 Pakistan 51,31 -8 (151)160 Kazakhstan 55,08 -6 (154)161 Rwanda 55,46 -5 (156)162 Sri Lanka 56,59 +1 (163)163 Saudi Arabia 56,88 -5 (158)164 Uzbekistan 60,39 -7 (157)165 Bahrain 62,75 +8 (173)

166 Equatorial Guinea 67,20 -5 (161)

167 Djibouti 67,40 -8 (159)168 Laos 67,99 -3 (165)169 Yemen 69,22 +2 (171)170 Sudan 70,06 0 (170)171 Cuba 71,64 -4 (167)172 Vietnam 71,78 0 (172)173 China 73,07 +1 (174)174 Iran 73,40 +1 (175)175 Somalia 73,59 -11 (164)176 Syria 78,53 0 (176)177 Turkmenistan 79,14 0 (177)178 North Korea 83,90 0 (178)179 Eritrea 84,83 0 (179)

Please note that according to this rating Eritrea is found at the bottom of all the rest. Is it something to boast about?????

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Kiflemariam Melake Negassi,

P. O. Box 72522, Clock Tower,

Kampala, Uganda.