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CIVIL PROCEDURE Yao v. Perello 414 SCRA Facts: The present case arose from HLURB’s decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders and its managers including Bernardine’s Husband. Writ of execution was issued and referred the same to clerk of court for enforcement. The sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the name of Villarin and Bernardine. Bernardine filed a petition for prohibition with prayer of TRO seeking to enjoin the sheriff from proceeding with public auction. Bernardine alleged that she co-owned the property and that she and her husband’s regime is complete separation of property, she was not a party in HLURB hence the property could not be levied to answer for the separate liability of her husband. The judge granted the petition for prohibition. After more than one month, petitioner filed a motion for intervention which was denied by the RTC. On his appeal petitioner insists that in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that the party who is interested in sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. Thus as the judgment creditor in HLURB case, petitioner claims that he was indispensable party and should have been allowed to intervene in the said case. Issue: Whether intervention should be allowed. Held: Petitioner’s claim is without basis. To allow intervention it must be shown that a) movant has a legal interest in the matters in litigation or otherwise qualified and 2) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceedings or not. Manuel Rodriguez II FEU – Institute of Law

Yao v. Perello

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

Yao v. Perello

414 SCRA

Facts:

The present case arose from HLURB’s decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders and its managers including Bernardine’s Husband. Writ of execution was issued and referred the same to clerk of court for enforcement. The sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the name of Villarin and Bernardine.

Bernardine filed a petition for prohibition with prayer of TRO seeking to enjoin the sheriff from proceeding with public auction. Bernardine alleged that she co-owned the property and that she and her husband’s regime is complete separation of property, she was not a party in HLURB hence the property could not be levied to answer for the separate liability of her husband. The judge granted the petition for prohibition. After more than one month, petitioner filed a motion for intervention which was denied by the RTC. On his appeal petitioner insists that in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that the party who is interested in sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. Thus as the judgment creditor in HLURB case, petitioner claims that he was indispensable party and should have been allowed to intervene in the said case.

Issue:

Whether intervention should be allowed.

Held:

Petitioner’s claim is without basis. To allow intervention it must be shown that a) movant has a legal interest in the matters in litigation or otherwise qualified and 2) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceedings or not.

Both requirements must concur as the first is not more than the second. In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioner’s right as judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case that can be levied upon.

Granting that he has the right, he should exercise it within the prescriptive period. As provided in the Rules, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment by trial court. In the case at bar, he filed his motion fifteen days after the resolution becomes final and executor.

Manuel Rodriguez IIFEU – Institute of Law