Zambia’s Faltering Multi-Party Politics: New Wine in Old

 Wineskins?

Presented by Ndangwa Noyoo (Ph.D)Associate Professor, Department of Social Work, University of Johannesburg,

At the Workshop on Contemporary Zambian Politics, Centre for Social Science Research, 29-30 September, 2016

University of Cape Town

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Disclaimer and Background I was part of the 32 University of Zambia (UNZA) students who were detained by

the One-party state Dictatorship of Zambia’s founding president, Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP)-led government, in June 1990, for calling for Multi-party politics in the country.

We were the first group of students to ever call for regime change in Zambia (and most probably the last). To effect this, almost all UNZA students inspired a country-wide uprising against Kaunda and UNIP. Our weapons against Kaunda and UNIP were the high cost of living and the mismanaged economy, and political repression.

Subsequent to this, there was an attempted coup and the formation of a pro-democracy movement known as the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD).

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The UNZA students worked hand-in-hand with the MMD until the polls of 1991, which saw the MMD and its leader the late Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba defeat Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP after ruling Zambia for 27 years.

If it were not for the UNZA students, Zambia may not have reverted back to multi-party politics in the time it did. It is more than likely that the MMD would not have scored the success it had if it were not for the UNZA students. Probably, Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP would still be in power as is the case in Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) PF party are still in-charge of that country’s affairs.

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Arguments of the Presentation There are too many continuities between the One-party state

Dictatorship of Kaunda and the current politics in Zambia today. These are the main impediments to the consolidation of democracy in Zambia. The elections of 2016 are merely an extension of the foregoing.

The main reason for this is the reinvigoration of One-party state politics, tendencies and Kaunda by the Patriotic Front (PF) Government of first, the late and former president of Zambia, Michael Chilufya Sata, and current president, Edgar Chagwa Lungu.

In fact, the last MMD Government of Rupiah Banda (2008-2011) was responsible for bringing back one-party state political tendencies.

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Suffice it to say, the MMD of Frederick Chiluba, lost a window of opportunity to wipe the slate clean and create a new Zambian society, rather Chiluba had invested almost all his energies in ‘Bembanising’ Zambia and engaging in wanton and blatant acts of corruption whilst championing a chaotic ‘liberalisation’ agenda and privatization programme (Noyoo, 2010).

Arguably, the whole period of multi-party politics from 1991 to 2016, was and continues to be tainted by the politics of the One-party state Dictatorship of Kaunda.

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With Zambia’s population mainly concentrated in rural areas at 58.2% compared to 41.8% in urban areas, regional politics and ethnic-based politics cannot be discounted or glossed over (Central Statistical Office, 2016).

Following Raynolds and Sisk (1998), I also contend that there is good reason to be skeptical about the value of elections in African societies such as Zambia as they can exacerbate social tensions and further polarize such societies. This is true particularly when incumbent regimes manipulate election rules to their own advantage.

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The hallmarks of the One-party state Dictatorship These were: Clientelism or patron-client relations politics - with Kenneth Kaunda being the

Chief Patron, akin to the Politics of the Belly, a Cameroonian phrase which Jean-François Bayart (1993) borrowed and popularised; in French: politique du ventre. Since 1991, all Zambian presidents have been Chief Patrons.

Authoritarian and malevolent leadership.Personality cults.Blurring of lines between party and the government bureaucracy.Policy inconsistencies and incoherence.Political intolerance, violence (with vigilantes at the forefront), ethnic mobilisation,

corruption, political myopia, and so forth.

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Closing off of the spaces for contestation and civil society engagement.Manipulation and muzzling of the media.Reducing national policy developments and decision-making to one

man, Kaunda as Sandbrook (1993) rightly notes:“Kaunda was chiefly responsible for the country’s erratic and sometime wrong-headed policy directions until the multiparty elections of 1991. He made major policy decisions himself and appointed and fired all economic decision-makers. Further, the one party stifled open debate of policy alternatives” (Sandbrook, 1993, p. 32).

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Multi-Party Politics in Zambia: New Wine in Old  Wineskins! In this section, I contend that indeed politics in Zambia is a carry-over

from the One-party state Dictatorship era due to the following reasons:There was no total severance with the Dictatorship tendencies of the One

party system, as many functionaries of this system who I will refer to as “political turn-coats” simply “jumped ship”, left UNIP and hijacked our revolution.

One thing that the UNZA students wanted and were very clear about was the total transformation of the Zambian society – to date, I contend this ideal has not been realised. Due to this, two champions of the One-party state Dictatorship became presidents. These were Rupiah Banda and Michael Sata.

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‘Defections’ by people - from one political party to another or even another - not on principles and ideologies but mainly because of ‘politics of the belly’.

An ill-informed political and politically ‘illiterate’ voting population that does not focus on policies but on personalities and instant gratification.

Since 1991, more often than Political, institutional and constitutional reforms have always been effected from the position of entrenching the incumbent president or ruling party and not for genuine democratic consolidation.

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Democracy in Zambia: A dream deferred?

For Zambia to move forward, there must be a strong historical narrative and analysis in relation to its political space, otherwise questionable individuals and practices will keep on reproducing and re-hashing themselves.

Following Rustow (1970) who aptly paraphrases Georges Clemenceau “History is far too important a topic to be left just to historians.”

Echoing Rustow (1970) the following ingredients are crucial for Zambia to move from Faltering Multi-party politics to perhaps a consolidation of democracy:

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There must be a sense of genuine national unity in Zambia not sloganeering i.e. ‘One Zambia, One Nation’.

There must be entrenched and serious contestations in Zambia (based on policies and issues).

There must be a conscious adoption of democratic rules. Both politicians and electorate must be habituated to these rules. These ingredients must be assembled one at a time.

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Barotseland and calls for total independence

I argue in my latest book: Barotseland’s amalgamation with Zambia: A political conundrum, I argue that the Barotseland question was a conundrum that was solely created by the founding Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP and then cemented by successive Zambian political administrations from 1991 to date.

This issue cannot be crushed or wished away. It is actually going to reconstitute Zambia in one way or another…Even if the Zambian Government and Zambians in general do not want this to happen…it will happen.

Zambia is an amalgamation of two former British colonial territories viz: Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia.

Zambia was consummated in May 1964 (before Zambia’s independence on 24 October 1964) when Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia merged after the signing of the now defunct Barotseland Agreement 1964.

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Despite this, the Constitution Amendment Act 3 of 1969 - a so-called Constitutional Referendum reform of Kaunda and UNIP abrogated this treaty and henceforth criminalized the Barotseland question.

Whilst relying on draconian legislation and other instruments such as the State of Emergency, Barotse nationalists were detained at will by the Kaunda regime throughout the One party state era. The largest number of Barotse nationalists detained to date was 160 in 1973, including the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the Barotse Government or Katengo, the late Hastings Ndangwa Noyoo (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1995).

For many Zambians, this issue only ‘came to light’ after 1991, when the political space was opened – much to the irritation and consternation of many Zambians.

But the quest for an autonomous Barotseland had always been sought by the Barotse or Lozi as they had negotiated for this status in Zambia via the Barotseland Agreement.

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The continuities of the past, as regards Barotseland are exemplified by, inter alia, the continuous criminalization of the Barotseland question by Zambian Governments for five decades.

But the tactics of UNIP cannot hold sway anymore as the world has changed. Information is readily available due to the Internet etc. The tactics of UNIP of

distorting and hiding information regarding the Barotseland question are obsolete.

Massive troop deployment, mass arrests and intimidation have not cowed the Barotse.

The Barotseland question can no longer be caricatured as ‘secession’ as it is a national question which Zambia has failed to answer in five decades.

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Curiously, successive Zambian governments after 1991 had employed Kaunda’s and UNIP’s tactics to crush the Barotseland issue (in a so-called democratic dispensation) with thousands of Barotse or Lozi being killed, maimed, arrested at will, on mostly trumped up charges.

The following key issues will define the Barotseland issue going forward:The MMD government of Rupiah Banda (2008-2011) will go down in Zambia’s history

as one political administration that had perpetrated the most gruesome acts of state-led violence against the people of Barotseland. The Zambian Government’s brutality had resulted in the deaths of many Barotse nationals. These acts of violence were precipitated by what are now referred to as the ‘Mongu riots’ of 14 January 2011. This massacre had resulted in the deaths of about 18 individuals even though the Zambian Government claimed that there were only two people who died.

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The Barotseland issue is no longer a ‘traditional affair’ but a nationalist struggle waged by various Barotse liberation movements whilst the current Litunga (King) of Barotseland and the so-called Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) have effectively become moribund after allegedly being bribed by the Zambian Government and taking highly puzzling stances which directly violate Barotse governance, laws, customs and traditions.

On 14 August 2013, a Transitional Government of Barotseland was set up and an ‘Administrator General,’ Afumba Mombotwa. Mombotwa, who was also the Chairperson of Linyungandambo (a Barotse nationalist movement) was ‘sworn in’ as the ‘Administrator General’ of Barotseland by the ‘Chief Justice’ in Mongu.

After this Barotseland declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) along the lines of Kosovo.

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On 27 March 2012, the people of Barotseland convened a Pizo or Barotse National Council (BNC), where they all unequivocally expressed their desire to reconstitute Barotseland into a sovereign nation (Barotseland’s ‘Brexit’ or Referendum). The BNC is the highest policy-making body in the indigenous Barotse political and governance systems. All seven districts of Barotseland were represented at the BNC through their traditional rulers with some people from the Barotse Diaspora in attendance. There were also some Zambian Government officials of Lozi origin who witnessed this occasion. Among other issues, the BNC gave notice in this manner:

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“We now inform Zambia and the international community that we finally accept the unilateral nullification and the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 by the Zambian Government, which action has freed Barotseland from being part of Zambia. In line with the Postliminium doctrine we can no longer be obliged to honour an international Agreement that the other party has nullified and abrogated, which has reverted us to our original status.”

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Afumba Mombotwa, Likando Pelekelo and Sylvester Inambao Kalima were arrested on ‘treason’ charges and subsequently sentenced to 10 years.

The Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA) another Barotse nationalist movement recruited international Lawyers at the Dugué & Kirtley International Law Firm to take this matter to the International Court of Justice at the Hague.

It also launched an online petition for all nationals of Barotseland and those in the Diaspora to electronically sign a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) which would allow for Barotseland’s legal status to be determined peacefully and in accordance with international law.

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The late and immediate past president of Zambia, Michael Sata refused to sign the submission. More than 10, 000 Barotse signed the petition and more are still signing it. The international lawyers also sent through the PCA to the new Zambian president Edgar Chagwa Lungu. Thus far Lungu has not signed the PCA.

To its credit the BRE through the Ngambela or Prime Minister, launched a case against the Zambian Government at the African Union’s (AU’s) African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). After months of delay, the Zambian Government had responded and requested the case to be thrown out. However, the people of Barotseland through the Office of the Ngambela countered and added more evidence to their case. This process has not been concluded.

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The Youth Factor: The struggle for Barotseland’s sovereignty has been taken up by the youth and in my opinion, they will decide the conclusion of this saga. They are more radical, many are incorruptible and resolute.

A case-in-point is that of the Barotse Youth League (BYL) leaders namely, Nayoto Mwenda, Boris Muziba and Sikwibele ‘Skwiz’ Wasilota who were arrested on trumped up charges. They were subsequently each sentenced to three years in prison with hard labour by Magistrate Malata of Kaoma Magistrate Court for “publication of false news with intent to cause fear or alarm to the public contrary to the laws of Zambia.”

The Magistrate also noted when passing sentence, that the trio’s “conduct during the court process was not good.” The young militants had contended throughout the trial that they could not be tried by a Zambian court as they were citizens of Barotseland.

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The trio argue that Zambian courts were partial when it came to cases involving people from Barotseland. Incidentally, one of the accused, Mwenda, is a qualified lawyer. They then asked that their case be transferred to the Commonwealth Court which they said would impartially adjudicate the matter.

They defiantly went on to serve their three-year jail terms unshaken and not compromising on this held position. They were later released by Edgar Lungu through a presidential pardon.

As we speak five Barotse youth freedom fighters who were freed on 28 June 2016 by Kaoma Magistrate Chingumbe, who found them not guilty, over ‘seditious practices’ will be back on trial in Zambia’s higher court after the Zambia Government appealed the verdict. These youths were arrested for merely carrying and displaying an Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) Flag. Barotseland is now registered with this organisation.

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The Barotse intelligentsia factor: Previously this group was instrumental in propelling the UNIP nationalist struggle against colonial rule and ironically undermining Barotseland.

These were notably the Wina brothers Sikota and the Arthur (deceased), Kabeleke Konoso and Munukayumbwa Sipalo (who the Barotse Youths refer to as ‘sell-outs’).

Other Barotse intellectuals were more pro-Zambia or simply disinterested. However, things are now different as the Barotse intelligentsia is playing a critical role in this struggle.

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Concluding Points Elections – if sequenced, structured, and conducted properly – are appropriate

instruments of conflict management through democratisation (Raynolds & Sisk, 1998).

Zambia can benefit from such a dividend if genuine and progressive institutional political reforms are undertaken in the country.

Civic education is an important factor and should be institutionalised in Zambia for democracy to be consolidated.

Old bad habits of the One-party state Dictatorship have been maintained, sustained and replicated after the fall of Kaunda by successive governments since 1991 by the former functionaries of the One-party state era. These same people have ‘schooled’ the younger generation in such retrogressive politics.

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Until the time when Zambians realise that politics is about public service and not about self-interest, the prevailing political scenario in Zambia will not change.

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References Bayart, J-F. (1993). The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. New York, NY: Longman Publishing. Central Statistical Office (COS). (2016). 2015 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Key Findings.

Lusaka: COS. Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ). (1995). Report of the Human Rights Commission of

Inquiry. Lusaka: GRZ. Noyoo, N. (2010). Social Policy and Human Development in Zambia. London: Adonis and Abbey. Noyoo, N. (2016). Barotseland’s amalgamation with Zambia: A political conundrum. Pretoria: Kwarts. Raynolds, A., & Sisk, T. D. (1998). Introduction. In A. Raynolds, & T. D. Sisk (Eds.), Elections and Conflict

Management in Africa. (pp. 1-9). Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace. Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative Politics, 2(3),

337-363. Sandbrook, R. (1993). The Politics of Africa’s Economic Recovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.