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rZARAGOSA VARGAS

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

New York Oxford

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS2011

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CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era of War 81

THE SOUTHWEST ON THE EVE OF THE MEXICAN WAR

In New Mexico the ricos prospered and retained their elite legitimacy while lifewas hard for the majority of New Mexico's poor. There was an obvious rift betweenclass and national interest. The centralists defended Mexico and would instigatethe lower classes to oppose the American invasion. Because of their preferentialaccess to trade, some ricos would eventually aid the American war effort. Thosewho were liberals were disappointed at their state's mismanagement and neglectby ~exico. On May 15, 1844, showing his cowardice in a citi~ens' campaignagainst Texans, Manuel Armijo was replaced as New Mexico's governor by GeneralMariano Martinez de Lejanza, who tried but failed to enforce taxation on the NewMexicans. Martinez left New Mexico in 1846 after finishing his term, and ManuelArmijo again became governor. The ambitious Armijo manipulated his fellowcitizens for his own interests, namely remaining dependent on trade with theUnited States. New Mexico's confidence in Mexico was further weakened byrumors that it had agreed to sell the territory to the United States. A group of NewMexicans drafted a protest against Mexico's right to sell New Mexico and called forindependence.3 Nothing came of this plan.

Separatist sentiment was similarly present in California. The landowningclass was the principal social base from which California's rulers emerged. Theentrenched landowning and military elites were all interrelated through familynetworks and looked after one another's interests. Those who were liberals strug-gled against the autocratic rule of Mexican-appointed governors. They organizedthemselves behind the banner of autonomy for California, for they wanted inde-pendence from Mexico. A small minority even favored American annexation. InAugus~. 1844, they held a secret meeting in Monterey with the British counsel.They told him they were ready to drive Governor Micheltorena out of California,declare independence, and ask for British protection..

The Californios resented General Micheltorena, California's new governorand friend of Santa Anna, and his army of convict soldiers. Though at odds, north-ern and southern Californios joined forces in November 1844 and initiated arevolt. Led by Jose Castro, the northern rebels captured San Juan mission and itsammunition cache. Micheltorena forced the insurgents to withdraw to San Jose,where his soldiers defeated them. The Californios persevered. Micheltorena at thehead of four hundred soldiers marched south to Los Angeles, where several hun-dred Californios led by Juan Bautista Alvarado, representing the southern faction,waited. In February 1845, the Californios defeated Micheltorena in a bloodlessbattle at Cahuenga and forced him to leave California, taking his army with him.s

Mexico's hold on California ended. It did not appoint another governor toreplace Micheltorena. Instead, the mulatto Pio de Jesus Pico, soldier, ranchero andsenior member of the California legislature, was named governor and mad, LosAngeles the capital. Jose Castro became military governor of the territory. Heremained in the north at Monterey, where he controlled the customhouse. Califor-nios wanted to maintain their autonomy in the face of pressure from the UnitedStates. They remained fearful that Mexico would sell California to Britain,America's main rival for the Asian trade. California's ports, particularly the choiceharbor of San Francisco, would help increase America's share of the Pacific trade.

82 CRUCIBLE OF STRUGGLE

San Diego was likewise desirable because of its harbor, in addition to its centralrole in the lucrative hide and tallow trade. California's .fertile valleys were also

attractive, as was other Mexican territory.6The vast Mexican lands between newly annexed Texas and the Pacific coast

showed great promise fur the United States. Believing they should fulfill theirManifest Destiny, many Americans thought their country should settle lands westof the Mississippi claim,d by Mexico, England, and the array of Indian nations.Newspapers supported the idea of Manifest Destiny. In 1842, John L. O'SUllivan,Jacksonian editor of the Washington, DC, monthly the United States Magazine andDemocratic Review. coined the term Manifest Destiny in articulating the prevail-ing national sentiment fQr United States territorial expansion from the Atlantic tothe Pacific into Texas, Otegon, and Mexico. O'Sullivan's publication was a staunchdefender of Democratic Party positions on slavery, states' rights, Indian removal,and soon the Mexican War. The Texas rebellion set a pattern of racist attitudestoward Mexicans that later drew on cordial relationships between Anglos andMexicans in New Mexico and California to denigrate Mexicans. Political publicistsstarted to describe Me~s as racially inferior to Anglo Saxons, an idle peopleincapable of self-government.7 Other aggressive American nationalists added

their voices to that of O'$Ullivan.Territorial expansion was a contentious issue for the United States. A sec-

tional confrontation between the North and South occurred through all of theWest. Proslavery forces demanded the acquisition of new territory and had vilifiedMexico during the 18308 debate over annexing Texas. The opponents of slavery,on the other hand, were strongly against expansionism because they believed itwould add new slaveholaing states to the Union, thereby upsetting the balance of

power between North and South.In the wake of the Oregon territorial boundary dispute with Great Britain, the

American national debate over westward expansion settled on the Texas Republic.With its government and citizens committed to slavery. Texas continued to seekannexation. Through annexation, Texas would enter the Union as a slave state andgive proslavery forces an advantage in the House and the Senate. Vigorous opposi-tion by northern antislavery forces, combined with the desire to avoid conflictwith Mexico, led the United States to delay the request for Texas annexation. How-ever, as abolitionist power increased, it became imperative for the South to bringTexas into the Union as a slave state. for it represented a deterrent to any congres-sional vote to abolish slavery. For Mexico, the annexation of Texas constitUtedanother brazen act of American aggression against its sovereignty.s

An embittered Mexico still claimed Texas; it refused to recognize Texas inde-pendence. Moreover, the pretext for war between Mexico and the United Stateswas the long-standing dlispute over the international boundary between the twonations. The United St.tes supported Texas's claim of the Rio Grande as the

boundary. but Mexico raised heated objections to America's presumptUous claims,steadfastly maintaining ~at the boundary was_th_e Nueces River. The United Stateswanted the Rio Grande as the border because it would place Santa Fe with its prof-itable trade inside the United States. The Nueces strip, the one-hundred-mile areaLbetween the Nueces River and the Rio Grande extending from the Texas Gulf

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CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era of War 83

coast to eastern Colorado, was claimed by both Texas and Mexico. Texas, declaredthat its border encompassed the Nueces area, reaching to the Rio Grandej whereasMexico wanted all of Texas to the Sabine River.9

Annexation of Texas became the central campaign issue of the 184411>residen-tial election. The election of the expansionist candidate James K. Polk, a westernerand a devotee of agrarianism, was a victory for the American expansioqists whocoveted Texas and California. In Mexico, the nation's liberal wing considered theUnited States a model for Mexico's development, whereas Mexican conservativesfeared American Manifest Destiny and expansionism. Tensions rose among liber-als and conservatives alike in Mexico after Polk's election in 1844 because of hisapparent intent to make the acquisition of Mexico the primary objecti~ of war.Mexico's acting president General Jose Joaquin de Herrera faced a daunting chal-lenge. Herrera wanted conciliation with the United States. Though fearing thatMexico's loss of Texas would precipitate loss of its northern provinces, alild awarethat Mexico could not risk war with the United States, Herreras short-lived liberal

government proposed a peaceful settlement to the issue of Texas annexatipn. Brit-ain advised Herrera to recognize the independence of the Republic of Texas oncondition that Texas agreed not to be annexed by any country. However. to' appeaseMexico's ruling m$tary elite, "'tho considered him weak-willed, Herrera declaredthat any attempt to annex Texas would be considered an act of war. On February27, 1845, the U.S. Senate voted to annex the Republic of Texas, and a few ~ys laterthe U.S. Senate voted in favor of statehood for Texas. Texas entered the lJnion asthe twenty-eighth state. Mexico City learned of this in mid-March, and theresponse in Mexico was immediate hostility toward the United States and a callfor war. Mexico promptly ordered its foreign minister to tell the American ambas-sador that relations between the two nations were terminated}O InterpretingAm'erican annexation of Texas as a violation of Mexico's 1828 border treaty,Herrera went before the Mexican Congress to request mortgaging one-fci>urth ofCatholic Church property to raise four million pesos to defend Mexico's territorial

integrity.11President Polk was intent on defending the boundary claims made by Texas

and on precluding a possible invasion by Mexico before annexation of Tens couldbe completed. Americas military intrusion onto contested Mexican soil £uirnishedperfect evidence of a continued American political plot aimed at provoking Mex-ico into war and taking possession of the region. On July 1, 1845, the President.ordered 1,500 American soldiers deployed to Texaspear Corpus Christi. The nextmonth, Polk doubled the number of American troops in Texas. and he sent newlyappointed minister to Mexico John Slidell to Mexico City. Slidell was instrliicted tosettle the Texas-Mexico boundary dispute, negotiate outstanding debts o£UnitedStates citizens against Mexico. and offer Mexico four boundary adjustments in lieuof cash payments of $50 million for California and New Mexico. Slidell arrived inMexico City in December. Herrera refused to accept the American minister's cre,.dentials for fear that receiving the American diplomat would lead to a popular

uprising.12Mexican President Herrera was assailed by his nation's archconservatives.

as well as by the liberals led by Valentin Gomez Farias, for his lack of political

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leadership. Disunity provjided opportunity for Mexico's archconservatives. OnJanuary 2, 1846, General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga and his Army of the North,the largest in Mexico, ent~tedMexico City and ousted Herrera from office, claim-iIig that Herrera was co~promising Mroco's honor by "conspiring with the,enemy" concerning Texas, Paredes called his like-minded generals together, andthe junta selected him as president of Mexico. This abrupt change in governmentended work in the Mexican Congress on the proposal to mortgage Church prop-erty to defend the nation'$ northern territories. The armed demonstrations andfurther diplomatic bickeri~g between Mexico and the United States that precededopen hostilities ended as ~aredes plunged Mroco into war.13

TUE OUTBREAK OF WAR

On January 13, 1846, Pres.dent Polk, after months of negotiations with MeXico tobuy Texas, ordered General Zachary Taylor to advance to the Rio Grande. Taylor,who had fought with distinction in the War of 1812, ordered his three-thousand-strong army of occupation ,encamped near Corpus Christi to assert Americansov-ereignty over the disputed Nuecess~rip at Laredo, near to present-day Brownsvilleopposite Matamoros, Me~co. On March 27, Taylor set his troops to building anearthen fortress named Fo~ Texas. The news of the Ainericaninvasion of MeXicoset off an intense nationalist response among MeXico's liberals and conservatives.They saw this action as an invasion of Mexican territory. President paredes refusedto meet Slidell, who was asked to leave Mexico. The MeXican president thenordered five thousand Me~can soldiers commanded by General Mariano Aristanorth to Matamoros.14

On April 23, Parede$ announced that Mexico had begun a defensive waragainst the United States. two days later, on the twenty-fifth, General Arista dis.-patched 1,600 Mexican so~diers on patrol across the Rio Grande. J:he Mexicansencountered a company of U.S. dragoons led by Captain Seth Thornton. A fire-fight broke out in which A,rneric~n soldiers rode into an ambush and were cut topieces. Sixteen Americans were killed. Greatly outnumbered by the Mexicans, theremainder of the AmericaIjlS surrendered, including Captain Thornton. The Mex-icans took the American qfficer and his men prisoner and held them in Matam-oros. The subsequent Thomton Affair. or Thornton Skirmish, became the primaryreason that President Poli<l asked for a state of war against Mexico. Taylor sent amessage to Washington th~t war with Mexico had begun... MeXico had not invadedAmerican territory; ratheri the United States had provoked an attack in territory itclaimed. IS Once on the ba1!tlefield the Americans would deliver heavy volumes of

lethal artillery fire and every time outmaneuver the numerically superior MeXicanforces.

On the morning of May 3, Mexican artillery batteries in Matamoros beganbombarding Fort Texas. The subsequentba1rles of Palo Alto north ofBrownsvilleand Resaca de la Palma opposite of Mata!fi~ros ~er_e tpe first real challenges of theAmericans and were easily won by them. At Palo Alto Taylor's huge cannons toreat the Mexican lines, cau$ing numerous casualties., and at the Battle of ResacaAmerican troops engaged Mexican soldiers in furious hand-to-hand combat and

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PCHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era ~fWar 85 1\

cavalry charges. More important, the two battles took place before $e UnitedStates officially declared war on May 13. Mexican authority was exp~lled fromTexas by the victorious Americans.16

In politically tumultuous Mexico, dissensions stirred against Paredes. OnMay 7 at the Mexican Pacific port of Mazatlan, an expeditionary force $cheduledfor duty in California had been swept up in the anti-Paredes rebellion led by lib-erals calling for a return of Santa Anna, who was in Cuba. On May 20, the prolib-eral military commander at Guadalajara joined the rebellion. Liberals alsoorganized against Paredes in the states of Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Durango, andPuebla.17

Mexico broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and PresidentPolk used this snub as a cause for war. On May 7, one day after meeting with JohnSlidell, the president received General Taylor's report that American soldiers hadbeen killed by Mexican troops near Matamoros. Polk now had his reason for war.On the eleventh, the president's message asked for a declaration of war in responseto Mexico's initiation of hostilities. "Mexico has invaded our territory and shedAmerican blood on the American soil," the president asserted. Two day$ later, onMay 13, the U.S. Congress declared war on Mexico. Antiexpansionists were out-raged at the turn of events; they believed the United States was bullying a weakneighbor and making a blatant land grab. 18 Their voices were quickly drowned out

by the overwhelming support from Americans who rallied behind Polk's war of

conquest.

THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF NEW MEXICO

The territorial claim of the United States to New Mexico was strategic; t~ade with.Mexico's interior provinces passed through it, and New Mexico also prQvided anoverland connection to California's Pacific ports. Unlike California and Texas,New Mexico had large MeJc;ican and Indian populations. Political fac1Jionalismalong conservative and liberal lines also characterized New Mexico. Because of itsdependence on American trade, money, and arms in fighting nomadic Indians,the pro-American faction at first offered little resistance to the American armieswhen they arrived in New Mexico in 1846. On the other hand, mostly poor Spanish-speaking and Indian residents made up the conservative faction who wanted noforeign intervention in New Mexico's internal affairs. This anti-American groupproduced the only organized resistance in Mexico's northern territories against theAmerican army of occupation. 19

New Mexico's sixty-five thousand Spanish-speaking and Indian populationwas concentrated along the Rio Grande. The Rio Abajo, New Mexico's ~outhernregion, was home to the ricos. These elites controlled most of the land, the live-stock, and a considerable portion of the Santa Fe trade. The inhabitants of theRio Arriba, New Mexico's northern region, were poor subsistence farnllers andciboleros-the vecinos, who traded with various Indian groups. Unlike California,the division of the more populous New Mexico into the Rio Arriba and RioAbajo and the disparities between rich and poor were based essentially on dis-tinct class differences and on a cash nexus. In any case, the American$, as did

86 .cRUCIBLE OF STRUpGLE

their national leaders, looked down on and despised all the Mexicans as an infe-riorrace, because the whole concept of Manifest Destiny rested on a foundation

of racism!OMany New Mexico ricos had become less dependent on Mexico than on

Americans for trade, of which they controlled over one-third. Their wealth wasderived from tax revenues totaling more than 70 percent of New Mexico's budget,assessed on the annual h~lf-million-dollar Santa Fe trade, or else came from theproduction of trade goods. American traders complained to Washington aboutthe import duties on goods, as well as the special taxes and forced loans. They filedclaims against the Mexican government despite the fact that some averted taxesbecause they had become Mexican citizens, formed partnerships with New Mexi-co's ricos, or married into the rico families. The ricos profited from the groWth ofAmerican trade, but that trade had eroded the economic standing of the vecinos.Beaten down by poverty, the vecinosproducedmarket goods and traded with theIndians while their wom~n worked for wealthy New Mexicans and Americanhouseholds as servants, laundresses, and seamstresses!) Moreover, although lack-ing weapons and horses, the vecinos were the main offense against Indian raids.They were alienated by the elite, who could not be entirely trusted, and bitter attheir treatment by these privileged members of New Mexican society. Pueblo

Indian resentment had likewise been growing.Upon the initiation of hostilities with Mexico, President Polk assigned General

Stephen Watts Kearny to c(>mmand the newly created Army of the West. Kearny'sorders were clear: march tCII Santa Fe, secure the territory and establish a garrisonand civil government, and then march on to California, where he was to follow thesame process. The Americans in California were "well disposed towards theUnited States," claimed Secretary of War William L. Marcy and other officialsin Washington. Their ass~rtions were based on the fact that the United Stateshelped the Americans in California to revolt (the Bear Flag Rebellion) and pro-claim themselves a republic, as the Americans had done in Texas. And, like theAmericans in Texas, manyin the California territory were there illegally, did notpartake in California's socW and political life, and as a white race believed theywere inherently superior to the California Mexicans and Indians, who soon

became targets of escalating Anglo racism!2James W. Magoffin, Kearny's civilian agent, was sent to New Mexico one week

ahead of the American troops to arrange a treaty with the ruling New Mexicans.Magoffin was accompanie~ by Lieutenant Phillip St. George Cook and a smalldragoon escort. A successful Santa Fe merchant and close friend of GovernorManuel Armijo, Magoffin hid been instructed to convince Armijo, Diego Archuleta,and other New Mexican officials to surrender. Merchant Manuel Alvarez, Ameri-can consul and commercial agent, also spoke with Armijo to persuade him tosurrender. American newspapers had started a black propaganda campaignagainst Governor Armijo aimed at persuading the American public that he wasthe typical dishonest, depraved, gutless Mexican. Magoffin offered the gov.ernor alarge sum of money as an incentive to hand over New Mexico to the United States.Armijo, waiting for Mexi<:an reinforcements from Durango and Chihuahua,

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CHAPTER 3 ..Mexican Americans in the Era of War 87

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The American occupation of New Mexico met immediate resistance rrom theNew Mexicans, as they rose up when American forces arrived. Up to fdur thou-sand Spanish -speaking and Indian volunteers) draftees, and professionat soldiershad converged on Santa Fe to fight the Yankee invaders but then sudd~nly dis-persed. The reason was that Gov~rnor Armijo stifled resistance, even tJ1ough hehad publicly declared he would meet and battle the Army of the West at ApacheCanyon, east of the capital at Santa Fe. Armijo assembled his militia, presidialtro9ps, and a squadron from Veracruz) but he lost the will to fight the AJilericans,clai~~ngthat they were too powerful and that it would be futile to enga~e them.ArIlliJo then fled to Albuquerque and from there to El Paso and on to Me~co City.Prior to his departure, the shrewd and greedy coward sold all his businessiinterestsan~d confiscated the Church'~treasury funds. General KeatI1y took possession ofSanta Fe without firing a shot!4

The Army of the West under Kearny's command marched into New Mexicounopposed and raised the stars and stripes. Kearny established a milit4ry com-mand and promised the New Mexicans to honor their civil and religiol:l:s rights.Thecgeneral proclaimed, "It is enjoined on the citizens ~fNew Mexico to.. .pursueuninterruptedly their peaceful avocations. So long as they continue in sUch pur-suits they. ..will be protected. ..in their property, their persons, and their religion:'The _United States easily took possession of territory it had wanted to buy fromMeXico. All ties between Mexico and New Mexico were now severed. M~y con-tempoFary observers complained that the American soldiers from Mis$ouri didnot make a good impression on the New Mexicans because of their publi~ drunk-ennessand violent behavior. Unruly drunken soldiers roamed the streets I of SantaFe terroriZing the panic-stricken residents.25 These experiefices were not very reas-

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suring to the New Mexicans who had jU$t come under American occupatJon.So as to diminish hpstility to United States rule, Kearny toured New M~xico

announcing to local authorities that the Army of the West had not com~ as con-querors but to protect and liberate their new subjects. Kearny, howevet, had toexert control over his men; many remembered the outrages committed £live yearsearlier on the Texans who were part of the disastrous Santa Fe expedi~ion andcontemplated inflicting vengeance on the New Mexicans. Kearny promiseki UnitedStates citizenship to aU New Mexicans but sternly warn~d that whosoeve~ took uparms would be hanged. On September 22, 1846, the American general ipstitutedthe Kearny Code to govern New Mexico and retained local New Mexidans whoswore loyalty to the United States to administer these laws. From this pro.Ameri-can faction, he appointed American trader Charles Bent as governQr, DiegoArchuleta as lieutenant governor, Antonio Jose Otero as chief justice, ~d Dona-ciano Vi~ as territorial secret~ry. To protect the New Mexicans fro$ Indianattacks, Kearny sent troops to the Apache, Navajo, and Ute tribes to itegotiatepeace. He then divided his command into three groups: one under Colqnel Ster-ling Price to occupy New Mexico, a second under Colonel Alexander WilliamDoniphan to take Chihuahua, and the third under his own command h~aded forCalifornia}6

In October 1846, Doniphan's forces headed south to link up with GeneralJohn E. Wool in Chihuahua, along the way fighting both Indians and Mexicans.

88 CRUCIBLE OF STRUGGLE

On reaching Brazito on C~istmas Day 1846, Doniphan's Missouri troops engageda Mexican battalion and ~tia se~t from EI Paso del Norte to sto~ their advance.

Although outnumbered, tpe AIr1encans soundly defeated the MeXlcans. The half-hour battle won by the ~ericans gave the United States legal claini to NewMexico. Doniphan's troop~ took EI Paso del Norte and the rest of Chihuahua andthen joined forces with G~neral Wool!7

Kearny set out for C~ifornia, leaving Colonel Doniphan in charge in NewMexico to maintain the i1eace until the arrival of Colonel Price. On October 6,1846, Kearny met up with Kit Carson, who informed the general that Californiahad already fallen with li~e opposition to American forces commanded by RobertF. Stockton and aided by John C. fremont's Volunteer Battalion. Ordering twohundred of his men back t~ Santa Fe, Kearny pushed on to California. On Novem-ber 23, he learned that a reJ\'olt had broken out in California in which Los Angeles,Santa Barbara, San Diego, Santa Ines, and San Luis Obispo had fallen to the Mexi-can Californio rebels, who once more were in control of the whole of southernCalifornia. Unfazed by the news, Kearny pushed on. He believed the Californiosnot to be determined adversaries but poor fighters.28

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THE 1847 TApS REVOLT AGAINST AMERICAN" OCCUPATION OF NEW MEXICO

Despite their apparent apathy, native New Mexicans and Indians of the Rio Arribaarea, resentful of the AmeIjican occupation and the loss of sovereignty and contactwith Mexico, began holdmg secret meetings to resist the invaders through a gen-era! uprising that took shape on December 12, 1'846. The conspirators were led byPablo Montoya and the IIidian Tomas Romero. These northern New Mexicans,many who had fought nin~ years earlier against Mexican governor Albino Perez tomaintain their autonomy, *egretted that nothing had been done to stop the Amer-ican advance. At the core <If the unrest was the fear of the insurgents that the reg-istrationofland titles woul~ result in further taxation and eventual confIScation oftheir lands. Moreover, the!merican merchants Charles Bent and Carlos Beaubienhad antagonized the Taos Pueblo Indians ~th the settlement and development ofthe Pueblos' communal grazing and hunting lands along the Santa Fe Trail-theBeaubien-Miranda grant-+and by trading with the Pueblos' enemies, the Utes,who raided the Pueblos fqr plunder. Believing the two forei~ers, who had pur-chased large parcels of lan<ll, would check their power and privileges, the Catholicclergy urged the rebels to cfirry out their revolt. December 19 was set as the date tokill Charles Bent and Coldnel Sterling Price and drive the Americans from NewMexico. Seizing the artille~ at Santa Fe would be the signal for the general revolt.Delays m communication to the outlying areas pushed the day of the revolt toChristmas Eve!9

However, New MexiCQ Secretary Donaciano Vigil, a pro-American, foiled thisplan to kill Governor Benti Conservatives Diego Archuleta and Tomas Ortiz werediscovered as the plotters qf the murder plan. Archuleta was a milit3:ry officer andson of Juan Andres ArchQIeta, the former military commander of New Mexico;

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Ortiz was the brother of the vicar of Santa Fe.. Father Juan Felipe Ortiz, and aformer mayor of the town. Both men escaped.. but the Pinobrothers ~d ManuelChavez.. part of the anti-American cabal, were arrested and later release4l On Janu-ary 5.. 1847.. Governor Bent issued a proclamation condemning Ar~uleta andOrtiz and warned residents against further treasonous acts. Bent carefully explainedto New Mexicans that private lands were not going to be taxed, stress~g that theland registration was intended to make titles more secure.. not to rob owners oftheir property. To emphasize that resistance was futile.. the governor ~ouncedthat Colonel Doniphan had defeated Mexican troops at Brazito. The ~lotters hadbeen ~ounting on rumors of Mexican victories in ChIhuahua, which t1IjeythOUghtwould bring a sizable force of Mexican soldiers north to New Mexico.30

Though Bent quelled the initial revolt, he ignored the growing anti~Americansentiment. Unaccompanied by American soldiers.. the governor left for Taos,where he met resistance that soon proved fatal to him. Area New Mexicans orga-nized a secret revolt on January19, 1847, to kill Americans and anyo~e who col-laborated with the occupying forces. The previous night the rebels had murderedand then scalped sheriff Stephen Luis Lee.. judge Cornelio Vigil.. attorneiy James WLeal, and Carlos Beaubien's son Narciso. "It appeared;" wrote Colonel P~ice, "to bethe object of the insurrectionists to put to death every American and every Mexi-can who had accepted office under the American government:' The Itebel~ thencame after Governor Bent. Lead by Tomas Romero, they went to the governor"shouse and pounded on the door. Bent asked the angry men what they wanted.They responded: "We want your head, gringo. We do not want for any of you grin-gos to govern us, as we have come to kill you:' Bent begged the insurgeIj1ts to leavebut they ignored his pleas.. The rebels wounded Bent, threw him td the floor..scalped him alive in front of his wife and children, and then cut off~shead. Byringing the mission church bell at the Taos pueblo, the revolutionis~s withoutknowing alerted the Americans to their location.31

The four-day open revolt against American occupation spread t<) longtimeresident Simon Turley's distillery near Arroyo Hondo, twelve-miles north of Taos,and it would eventually engulf all of northern New Mexico. Violence b,tween thecontending groups of vecinos and Indians and the Americans turned th~ country-side into a war zone. Fighting commenced on January 20, whemhe rebels seizedthe distillery and killed several Americans, including Turley. Terrified, the survi-vors .of the massacre fled and took refuge at the house of the Catholic pJtiest Anto-nio Jose Martinez.32 The report that 1,500 armed New Mexicans and Indians,determined to force a showdown, were advancing on Santa Fe trigger~d a call toaction by the American army and its sympathizers. However, very few Americantroops were in Santa Fe. Colonel Price, .in command of Santa Fe, sent for reinforce-ments from Albuquerque, calling on Captain Witham Angney"s Miss~ri battal-ion and a company of New Mexico volunteers led by Colonel Ceran St. :Yrain.33

By now.. Colonel Price had information on the insurgents' movemfnts. Pricequickly left Santa Fe with four howitzers, the 1st U. S. Dragoons, the 2n<il MissouriInfantry, and the company of New Mexico volunteers to attack Taos, Only thevolunteers had mounts. Eighty American troops under the command cpf CaptainIsrael R. Hendley defeated two hundred of the popular insurrectioni$ts, led by

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local vecino Manuel Cortez at Mora. Hendley was killed in the three-hour battlethat claimed the liv~s or twenty-five insurgents. About two hundred Americansoldiers, armed with ~o howitzers under Captain Jesse I. Morms command,returned to Mora on Fe~ruary 1. In retaliation for rebelling against the new gov-ernment, the American !officer ordered his troops to destroy the viIIageof Moraand burn the surround~g wheat fields. According to the Niles' National Registel;"Capt. Mor[n] ...burn~ to ashes every house town, and rancho in his path. Theinhabitants fled to the $ountains. ..." Another battle took place at La Canada,where American soldier$killed thirty-siX rebels and drove the rest before them to.Embudo, twenty-three ~iles south of Taos. At Embudo the insurgents madeanother stand but were driven out; sustaining many casualties, including the deathof one of their leaders. Between siX hundred and seven hundred rebels were con-centrated at TaQs Pueblq in the mission church, where they fortUled thems~lvesagainst attack. 34

Meanwhile, the reinforced American assault force arrived at Taos and imme-diately launched an atta4k to break the siege. The American troops cornered therebels in the Mission Ch4rch of San Geronimo. On February 3. nearly two weeksinto the rebellion, artilletY pieces opened fire on the mission. The New Mexicanspushed the Americans b~ck. After two hours of shelling, taunted and jeer~d at bythe rebels, the Americ~s rested and regrouped. Early the next morning, theyadvanted again.35

Colonel Price poste4 Captain John Burgwin's dragoons about 260 yards fromthe western flank of the {:hurch. Next, Price ordered the New Mexican volunteersto the opposite side of Thos to prevent the rebels from escaping. The rest of the

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American troops took pqsitions about three hundred yards from the north wall ofthe church.36 The artillery batteries pounded away at the enemy. Price orderedthe men commanded by Captains Burgwin and Samuel H. McMillan to storm thebuilding. Advancing ag~st heayY fIre, the American soldiers climbed onto thechurch roof and set it on fire. Leading a small team of soldiers, Captain Burgwinentered the corral in froilt of the church, -attempte<;i to force the door open, andwas mortallywounded.37

In the meantime, tqe Americans cut small holes in the western wall of thechurch and rolled in bo~bs. Undaunted, the rebels kept up their fire on the Amer-icans. Following art artill~ry barrag~ American soldiers stormed into the smoke-filled building. Therebel$ were gone. Fifty insurgents who tried to escape capturewere shot dead.38

The fighting was constant for a day and a half. Finally on February 5 the guer-rilla force broke up and s4attered in all directions. One hundred and fifty rebels laydead and an untold num~er had been wounded. Fifty-one rebels who attempted toescape were run down fud killed by Ceran St. Vrain's "emergency brigade" infierce, hand-to-hand toI1lbat. Price's troops suffered fIfty-two casualties. Of therebel leaders, Tomas Romero and Pablo Montoya were later tried by the Americanmilitary court for bearing arms against .the United States. They were found guiltyof treason and received ~e sentence of death by Iiangingin-accordance with mar-tial law. One of the defen4ants, Antonio Maria Trujillo, argued at trial that ColonelSterling Price had no ri~ht to prosecute the insurgents for treason because they

~

I i; .,

THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF CALIFORNIA

The United States had long been interested in acquiring California. Thi~ attentiontook the form of a diplomatic campaign to negotiate purchase of the territory fromMexico to prevent it from selling California to Britain. The sea otter trade, whal-ing, fine ocean ports, and fertile land generated much American interest in Cali-fornia. In addition, there was the lucrative hide and tallow industry. The yearsbetween 1826 and 1848 were exceptionally profitable ones. Six million hides andseven thousand tons of tallow were shipped from California to Boston. The hidetrade was centered at San Diego, so its choice harbor was particularly desirable.American interest in California thus rested in its potential to help American mer-chants gain a greater foothold in the Asian Pacific trade, and this became a pri-mary impetus for California's contribution to the start of the Mexican War.Settlement of California by Americans was key to its conquest by the United States.These American arrivals began calling for United States intervention to take Cali-fornia away from the indolent Mexicans.

On September 5, 1842, U.S. Naval Captain Thomas C. Jones, stationed off-shore at Callao, Peru, received a false message that war with Mexico over Texashad broken out. Jones learned that Mexico had ceded California to England for $7million, in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, to keep it out of American hands.Concerned that the British would occupy Mexico if rumors about war proved true,Jones sailed for Monterey to stop such an incident. The U.S. naval officer took hisfleet north to California, sailing into Monterey Harbor on October 19. Marchingto the tunes of "Yankee Doodle" and "The Star Spangled Banner," the men underJones's command seized the presidio and customhouse and took occupation ofMonterey, summoning acting civil governor Jose Alvarado to surrender. Jones'scapture of Monterey was the first action taken to apply the Monroe Doctrine. Thenext day, Thomas Oliver Larkin, a longtime American resident of Monterey and afuture U.S. agent, convinced Captain Jones that the United States and Mexico werenot at war. Jones hauled down the U.S. flag, apologized to Mexican authorities, anddeparted.41 The fiasco broke up talks between Mexico. the United States, and Eng-land concerning California's international boundaries.

Larkin was under orders from President Polk to encourage the Californios tolook to the United States rather than to England and France to best serve their inter-ests. The Yankee merchant and former American consul in California easily won

~'"~,

92 CRUCIBLE OF STRUGpLE

The Taking of Monterey, 1842.CREDIT: Courtesy of the Bancroft Library- University of California;~rkeley.California.

over Mariano Vallejo and G~neral Jose Maria Castro to his cause of making Califor-nia an American protectora~. California's ranching aristocracy concurred that theirfuture rested with theUnite4 States, and together they plotted to make California anindependent republic mana! ed by it. This change in Californio sentiment came inresponse to the activities of] hn C~ Fremont, who was leading an armedtopograph-ical corps into California, nd to the short -lived Bear Flag Rebellion. Fremont'sfather-in-law was the powerful senator Thomas Hart Benton of Indiana, an outspo-ken western expansionist. F~mont had been instructed by President Polk that if warbroke out with Mexico he w~s supposed to secure California for the United States.42

News that the United ~tates had declared war with Mexico arrived late inCalifornia, but already th~e was apprehension that open armed conflict wasimminent. In April 1846 ajrumor spread among Americans in the SacramentoValley that several hundrediMexican soldiers were pushing through the area, lay-ing waste to homes, de$trorlng crops, and scattering cattle. On June 10, Americansettlers from Sutter's Fort r~volted against the Mexican government of California.The Bear Flag Rebellion wa.$ an attempt tp repeat the 1836 Texas revolt andsubse-quently gain American anpexation. Fremont, who had returned to Californiafrom Oregon, had organiz~d the rebellion. The Americans invaded the home ofMariano Vallejo, the comniandant at Sonoma. The wealthy grantee of the Peta-luma and Suscol ranche$ th~t took up muchcof the land betWeen the San FranciscoBay and So~oma, General Vallejo wanted to break with Mexico. He immediatelyoffered his services to the ~ericans,but they took him and three other Californioofficials to Sutter'$ Fort, whd;re fheywere imprisoned for several months under verypoor conditions. The ramp*ging Americans then s.eized 150 h~r~es from G~neralCastro and proceeded to t~e town of Sonoma. Jomed by addlt~onal AmerIcans,

I"~~

~~¥

CHA PT~ R 3 .Mexican Mlericans in the Era of War 93

~

the rebels tookfuorethan a dozeniMabitants prisoner and cQnfiscated i8 can-

nons, 750 arms, and 250 horses, all the while ransacking the homes of California

Mexicans and killing some of them. Then, hoisting th~ir makeshift flag with a

crudely drawn bear and a star, the Americans proclaimed the "Bear Flag Rtpublic

of Independent California:'43 i

Desperately needing money to finance the war against the United States, ~ exico a~thoriz:~ Governor Pio de Jesus Pico to ?orr~w $14,000 fro~ the Sp~ar ~ulo-

gIO de CellS of Los Angeles. Although Califormos such as MarIano Vallejo ctively

supp.orted the Ameri~s, ~any C~fornios considered. themselves

1 tri~tic MeXIcans and cast theIr lot WIth MeXIco. One of these patrIots was Andr s PICO,

who would lead the fight against the Americans ii1 California. In July 18 6, Fico

asked the California deputy chamber to give him permission to take co~ and of forces to fight the American ii1vaders. The chamber refused. Issuing orde s from

Sant"a Barbara that all citizens ii1the territory take up arms, Fico raised aIm st one

hundred men and met Castro and his army north of San Luis Obispo. Putt. g their

regional differences aside, the Californios, most notably Jose Maria Flo es and

Andres Fico, led the resistance against superior American forces.44

~

Pablo de la Guerra, Salvador Vallejo, and Andres Pico, n.d.CREDIT: Original daguerreotype in possession of Mrs. McGethigan, S.F. (ourtesy of the Bancroft librav,

University of California, Berkeley, California.

94 CRUCIBLE OF STRUGpLE

After Mexico broke 0 diplomatic relations With the United States, severalAmerican naval ships und r the command of Commodore John D. Sloat arrivedoff the coast of California, nding Fremont's Bear Flag Revolt. Sloat's orders wereto seize and blockade Caliti mia's ports once war between Mexico and the UnitedStates commenced. On July, Sloat led his five warships into Monterey Bay. Learningthat the Bear Flag Republic ad been declared with likely authority from Washington,on July 6 Sloat ordered sail rs and Marines from his warships to land onshore at-Monterey. Meeting no resi ance, the landing p~ raised the American flag overthe customhouse. In decl ing the American occupation of California, Sloatpromised protection for ~e rights of the Californios. Two days later, seventyMarines and sailors from. ~e U:S.s, Portsmouth marched north to Sonoma anddeclared the annexation

~! f California. The men raised the Am~rican flag

and then hiked. t~ Sutt~r's oft. ~loat sent a .messa~e to.Gov:r~or Pio .Pic.o in ,~~sAngeles.. Descnbmg hl1nse as the best friend of CalifornIa, Sloat ffiVlted hISExcellency" to meet him inIMonterey.45

Taking over comman4 from Sloat, Commodore Stockton's naval squadrondropped anchor at othe~ ocations off California's coast. On August 17, afterreceiving news of war betw en the United States and Mexico, Stockton claimed thetowns of San Diego, Los geles, and Santa Barbara for the United States.46

THE BATTLES ~T MONTERREY AND BUENA VISTA

On July 6 and 7, 1846, ~ American forces landed in California, U.S. Agent

Alexander M~cKenzie plet with Antonio Lopez Santa Anna in Cuba. Ma~Kenzie

told the MeXIcan general at the United States wanted to buy New MeXIco and

California. Santa Anna, ~ consummate dealmaker, said he wanted peace but

added that if the United S tes helped him return to power in Mexico he would

agree to the sale. President olk ordered the U.S. Navy to allow Santa Anna, aboard

the British steamer Arab, !to cross the blockade and enter Mexico. Veracruz

received Santa Anna as a h~ro, and the savior of the nation proceeded to MexicoC 'tv47 i

1.J'

Meanwhile, as Americ~ troops were advancing on Monterrey, Mexico, polit-

ical chaos broke out once ~ore in Mexico City. In August 1846, President Paredes

was overthrown and replafed by a coalition of liberals and moderates awaiting

Santa Anna's arrival.48

On September 14, 18; ' Santa Anna entered Mexico City. One week later,

General Zachary Taylor's ar y of occupation took contro[ofMonterrey. The taking

of this Mexican city resoun ed with the evil of massacre as Texas Rangers system-

atically slaughtered its Me 'cans. Following the American army's victory, volun-

teer Texas Rangers went rough the city and murdered.more than one hundred

innocent civilians in cold lood. On the heels of this serial massacre and terror,

more Ranger atrocities to k place. A group of Texans rode into Rancho de San

Francisco and selected and bound thi~-siX men~ and-the killing squads executed

them with shots through ell heads. The Texans enjoyed the Violence that they

would never consider doqg to whites because racism played an integral part in

-A

CHAPTER 3 .MeXican Americans in the Era oflWar 95

these actions. Notwithstanding this ruthless Texas Ranger conduct, Taylor nowheld Monterrey and SaltiIlo, and Mexico's northern region was under Americancontrol.49 When Mexico did not sue for peace after the American victory at Mon-terrey, Polk responded with a plan for an invasion of Mexico to be led by GeneralWinfield Scott, the great strategist and field commander who had been general inchief of the u.S. Army in 1841. In contrast, although commanding numericallysuperior forces, Santa Anna was no military strategist and i~ored the advice ofothers. The Mexican general consequently woUld be outmaneuvered and out-fought by the Americans. Santa Anna organized an army, and on September 28 heled 2,500 troops on a 327-mile forced march to San Luis Potosi, where four thou-sand other Mexican troops were staged. The poorly trained Mexican soldiers hadno uniforms, possessed inferior weapons, and had little food. Nearly one-fourth ofthe Mexican troops had died of hunger, thirst, and exhaustion during their marchto Saltillo. Santa Annas starving and bedraggled army reached San Luis P(>tosi onOctober 8 to face Taylor's 5,OOO-man army that arrived nine days later near Saltillo.Santa Annas plan was to confront Taylor's force near Saltillo.50

Additional Mexican troops arrived at San Luis Potosi as part of Santa Annasplan to capture Taylor's army provisions. On February 22 the Battle of BuenaVista began, and by the end of the second day of intense fighting, Taylor hadannihilated Santa Annas army, forcing them to withdraw in defeat aftet losingabout 2,100 men. Taylor lost 678 men and had 1,500 desertions. In the marchback to San Luis Potosi, Santa Anna lost most of his army of 20,000 troops. AMexican victory at Buena Vista woUld have allowed the Mexican general to pushon to the Rio Grande and perhaps even to the Nueces River, thereby nullifying allAmerican gains of the war. Northern Mexico was now in the possession ofAmerican forces.51

On August 7, 1846, Mexican commandant Jose Castro wrote CommodoreStockton expressing his desire to hold a conference to end hostilities in California.Stockton agreed on the condition that Castro raise the American flag over LosAngeles, declaring the territory under American protection and thus in~epen-dent of Mexico. Castro refused and ordered the evacuation of the pueblo. Then,on the tenth, Castro and Pio Pico fled for Mexico to get money, reinforcements,and weapons to return California to Mexico. Los Angeles was in the hand$ of theAmericans. Stockton declared martial law and appointed Captain ArdhibaldH. Gillespie military commandant of Los Angeles. Gillespie did not like theCalifornios; the American officer, who had been with Fremont in ndrthernCalifornia, deemed them inferior and cowardly. Gillespie conducted housesearches, seized goods, detained residents, and arrested many others for iminoroffenses. The town's Mexicans quickly grew to dislike Gillespie's harsh measuresin carrying out martial law in the region. Fremont's California Battalion of Vol un-teers' pillaging as they made their way down to southern California also outragedthe Californios.52

The United States had committed only a few men to the occupation of ~outh-ern California; a forty;'eight-man American garrison was stationed at Los Ahgeles,and there were nineteen American soldiers at San Diego. On September 23, asmall force of twenty California Mexicans attacked the American barracksiat Los

96 CRUCIBLE OF STRUQGLE

Angeles. The Mexicans were driven off, but the attack inspired other Mexicans atranches away from the towns to join the patriotic cause with some fighting on itsbehalf. The next day a proclamation was issued and signed in Los Angeles by threehundred residents charging that Americans subjugated and oppressed them"worse than slaves:' The proclamation was a call for Californios to take up arms,which they did; they chose Serbulo Varela and Captain Jose Maria Flores as theirleaders. The Californios rebelled in the last week of September, forcing Gillespie'stroops to surrender and abandon Los Angeles. A group of Mexican womenwho had witnessed their f~es and community repeatedly humiliated by theAmerican soldiers presented the departing and defeated Gillespie with a basketof peaches rolled in cactus needles. The women not only hurled insults at theAmericans but also showered them with rage at being abused by the intruders. Ascommander in chief and governor of California, Flores issued a procl~ation call-ing on all male citizens between the ages of fifteen and sixty to appear for militaryduty. For their part, women hid Californio soldiers or refused to gi~e informationto the American enemy abopt the whereabouts of others.53

In San Pedro, Gillespie, with a combined force of sailors, Marines, and volun-teers, marched back to retake Los Angeles. The Mexican C.I.lifornios under JoseMaria Flores and Jose Antonio Carrillo constantly harassed the American forces.They killed four Americans and wounded several others in what became known asthe Battle of San Pedro. The Americans gave way to the Californios. Meanwhile inSanta Barbara, a band of California Mexicans drove a nine-man American forceout of the town.54

The Battle of DomingQez Ranch took place on October 8-9, 1846, when asmall force of Californio troops led by Jose Maria Flores held off the invasion ofLos Angeles by American Marines commanded by Captain William Mervine. TheAmerican forces were without artillery or horses and lacked the means for resup-ply. By running horses across the dusty hills out of gun range and dragging a singlesmall cannon to various sites, Flores and his troops fooled the Americans intothinking they had encountered a large enemy force. The Californios engaged theAmericans and killed four and wounded ten others.55

On November 16, American and Mexican forces clashed near Salinas tenmiles inland from Monterey Bay, and other small battles broke out elsewhere innorthern California. All were won by the Americans. Meanwhile, Kearny's forces,guided by Kit Carson, arrived in California and took command of the territory.56

The United States had so far encountered relatively little opposition inCalifornia. However, the badly outmanned California Mexicans were bent ondefending their homeland. On December 6, Andres Pico's Presidial Lancers foughtKearny's tired, unprepared First Dragoons at the Indian village of San Pasqual. TheCalifornios had a small number of fIrearms acquired from the British; however, itwas their famed skills as lal1cers and their superior horsemanship that helpedthem defeat the Americans in hand-to-hand combat in the biggest battle of thewar in California. 57

Kearny dispatched thre~ dragoons to- scout Pieo's- position in an Indian-village in the San Pasqual Valley, led by Lieutenant Thomas C. Hammond andGillespie's guide Rafael Machado, a Californio deserter. An Indian approached the

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CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era of).var 97

Americ~san~.told them the wher~ab(jutsof A.ndres P~c?and~is me.n..

~ rted to the AmerICans presence by an Indian sentry, PICO mobilized hIS PresIdIa! ancers

for battle. The next day, Kearny headed for the San Pasqua! Valley to en age the

Californios, who by now numbered 160 men. 58 1

Moving his men to the valley's south rim and aligned with Captain B njamin

D. Moore's squad, Gillespie engaged the Californios. The.-latter pushed ack the

American d,ragoons, captured one of the American artillery pieces, and efeated

the Americaps in the Battle of San Pasqua!. They killed seventeen Ameri an sol-

diers, officers Moore and Hanlmond, and wounded eighteen others,' uding

Kearny,and Gillespie. The Californiossuffered eleven wounded and n dead.

Rea!izing that more Americans would soon arrive, Pico quickly moved his men to

the western end of the Pasqua! Valley. 59 :

The next day, Kearny led his men west along the hillsides to avoid a ack by

the CaliforI:lios. In the afternoon the Americans came upoQsevera! Indi s, who

told Kearny that theCalifornios had just left with their wounded. As Ke ny and

his men rode away, between thirty and forty of Andres Pico's men attacke them,

but the Americans escaped. On December 8, the Ca!ifornios agreed on truce.

Pico wanted to exchange an American prisoner for a captured Californi ,Pablo

Vejar, and Kearny agreed.60

With the Ca!ifornios cutting off Kearny's path from Stockton's force at San

Diego, Kit C~son and another American volunteered to go to San Diego or aid.

Meanwhile, Kearny was in a standoff with the Californios and planned to soot his

way out. As the haggard Americans prepared for battle, they heard Stockto 's army

approaching and shouting "Americans!" The Californios also heard the reO force-

ments arrive, and, firing one last shot, they disappeared. This symbolized e end

Night at San Pascual. I

CREDIT: William Meyers. "Night at San Pasqua!." (ourtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Libra~.

98 CRUCIBLE OF ST~UGGLE

of the battle, the worst I defeat for American forces during the Mexican-AmericanWar. Kearny, in hisrepprt to the army adjutant general in Washington, praised theCalifornios as "well ~ unted and among the best horsemen in the world. ..."Kearny and his troops arched to San Diego and entered the town on December12, 1846. Without del , Kearny and Stockton began planning the reconquest ofCalifornia.61

American forces ~ft San Diego on December 29, 1846, and marched onLos Angeles to end thl revolt. U.s. naval vessels blockaded Mexican ports. On

January 8 and 9, 1847, ommodore Stockton, with six hundred sailors, Marines,

and volunteers that in uded General Kearny's men, fought five hundred Califor-nia Mexicans at the Sap Gabriel River twelve miles south of Los Angeles. Afterni.nety minutes of in~ffective artillery fire and several unsuccessful cavalryattacks against lethal 4merican artillery, Flores conceded the battle and with-drew. The Californios ~ad killed or wounded sixty Americans while losing onlyseven men.62 :

On January 9, C~ornia Mexicans led by Flores fought the Americans in theBattle of La Mesa. The Mexicans, armed only with lances, almost managed to sur-round the American fqrce; however, Flores's cavalry attacks and artillery onceagain could not stop tqe advance, arid he gave up Los Angeles. Stockton's com-bined force of soldiers, IMarines, and sailors entered Los Angeles on Jan~ 10.Aware of the outcome, I a deputation of California Mexicans from Los Angelesapproached Stockton's c\m1p the next morning. The group told Stockton that theywould surrender the tOF to the Americans if Californio property and personswould be respected.63

Flores learned that ~erican forces commanded by Fremont were marchingsouthward to link up ~th Stockton and Kearny. On January 11, the Americansarrived in the San Fernando Valley and occupied Mission San Fernando. Fremontdispatched Jesus Fico, ~ cousin of Andres Fico, to persuade Flores and ManuelCastro to surrender. Th~ two Mexicans responded by turning over command ofabout one hundred mep to Andres Fico and fle.eing to Sonora, Mexico.64 TheAmericans were now in Fontrol of California and all of northern Mexico.

On January 13, Andres Fico met with Fremont at a ranch in Cahuenga Pass,discussed the terms for Isurrender, and signed the Articles of Capitulation. TheTreaty of Cahuenga endtd the war in California, surrendered all of California tothe United States, and promised to protect the property rights of the CaliforniaMexicans. The treaty forgave past hostilities and allowed all the Mexicans to returnhome on surrendering their arms. It also bestowed American citizenship on theCalifornia Mexicans on~e a treaty of peace was signed by both countries andgranted permission to le~ve to those who wished to go to Mexico. Kearny estab-lished a provisional government in California. The Americans were now in pos-session of all its vital baY$ and harbors.65

In December 1846, Alexander Doniphan and over eight hundred soldiers leftSanta Fe for Chihuahu~, Mexico. On February 28, 1847, Doniphan's soldiersfought and,..defeated a ¥exican force of eight hundred men and the next daymarched into Chihuahu~ unopposed and formally took over the city. In late May,Doniphan's men joined ~eneral Taylor's forces. Fighting was unduly brutal because

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CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Eraof~ 99

of the criminal conduct of the Texas Rangers, who also hit at the city's iIihal:)itantsand torched and plundered their homes. The pillaging had no purpose other thanpunishment and terror; it afforded Texans the opportunity to avenge the A,Iamoand Goliad and to release other' strong feelings of resentment against Mexico.Contemptuous of the Mexicans, the Texas Rangers, called 105 diablos tejanos (Texasdevils) by the Mexicans, used vicious guerrilla tactics that showed little regard forcivilian lives or property. Commenting on the relentless butchery comrni~d bythe Texas Rangers, a contemporary observer noted: "the bushes, skirting th~ roadfrom Monterrey southward, are strewed with the skeletons of Mexicans sacrificedby these desperadoes."66

Desperately short of money, Mexico could not continue the war effort withoutfmancial help from the Catholic Church. Amid protests from priests and lay peo-ple, the Mexican Congress passed two laws to seize Church property. With the

I

support of the Church, creole regiments revolted in what became known ¥ thePolka Rebellion, which was put down by acting president Valentin G6mez F\lrias.The Polkas refused orders to go to Veracruz to prepare for its defense against aUnited States invasi9n. Moderates joined the opposition, but the governmentimprisoned its leader, Gomez Pedraza. Santa Anna, who had returned to M~xicoCity, ordered an end to the hostilities. Farias resigned, and Pedro Anaya, ohe ofSanta Ana's henchmen, replaced him as Mexico's provisional president. The ([;ath-olic <;:;hurch gave Santa Anna twenty million pesos in exchange for the repeal ofthe two anticlericallaws.67 '

By now the storm center of the war had shifted from Mexico's northern prov-inces to an invasion of Mexico from the east at Veracruz. On March 9, twelvethousand American troops commanded by General Winfield Scott landed sputhof Veracruz City unopposed. The United States pulverized Veracruz with ,fourdays of artillery barrages, and on March 29 the Mexicans surrendered the batteredcity to the Americans. Mexico gave no sign of a desire for peace, however. News ofthe American invasion reached Mexico City and triggered a wave of patriOtismand calls for national unity. The focus of the war was now on Mexico City andentered its final phase. Santa Anna, the self-styled Napoleon of the West, massedhis forces for the defense of the capital.68 -

Skillfully executing his Mexico City campaign, General Scott mar{hedhis army toward the capital. On April 17, the Americans met the careless I andoverconfident Santa Anna and his sick and exhausted army at a narrow pass br the.town ofCerro Gordo. The Battle ofCerro Gordo, the quick but messy fin~e ofSanta Anna's ignominious defeat, saw some of the most destructive fighting of thewar. The Americans delivered withering fire into' the ranks of the Mexicans, whosustained heavy casualtieS; Scott's army killed or wounded about one thousandMexicans and took three thousand others prisoner. The remainder of Santa Anna'smauled army fled in disorder, abandoning the dead and wounded. Sixty-threeAmericans were killed and 353 were wounded. Returning to Mexico City, SantaAna learned that Mexican forces had been soundly defeated at the Battle Of~ ena Vista. The Americans tightened the noose on Santa Anna. As the U.S. my

marched toward Mexico City, its residents grew alarmed at the government's 'ail-

ure to protect the city.69

100 CRUCIBLE OF~TRUGGLE'

,.,C'I:: f:: 'f;'1

i'f,:jr~;,,;;j:ft

iNEli

,i~'I.'~i\'! " "!

il!,'"

'If.

diII"Ii,

il.!,

IIi June, a Britit delegation arrived at General Scott's headquarters and

announced that Sant Anna agreed to surrender and bring an end tdthe war on

the condition .that the United States halt its advance on MeXico City and send him$10,000 to brIbe me bers of the MeXican government. Santa Anna decided todupe ,the Americans. the opportunist and wilY. Mexican general received themoney but had other lans.7O

On August 7, Ge eral Scott started for Mexico City with 10,700 men, half ofwhom were untraine volunteers. Santa Anna, leading a tattered army of 7,000soldiers and voluntee , marched to a fortified hill seven miles east of MeXico City.On August 20, a majo battle unfolded. Scott launched his attack, and the vic;tori-ous Americans inflict d heavy losses on the Mexicans; they killed 700 and tookmore than 800 priso ers, including four generals, while losing only 60 dead orwounded.71 !

Flush with victE ' General Scott's army reached Chapultepec Castle two

miles southwest ofM .co City on Sept~ber 12 and began shelling it. The next

day ~e fierc~ artillery bo~bardment r~sumed, followe~ by an assault to drive theMeXIcans from the s t. The Amencans poured fire mto the Castle. More ~aneight hundred Mexican soldiers, joined by forty.,three young academy cadets,made a valiant stand. ather than surrender, the cadetS, in hand-to-hand combat,fought to their deaths This disasti-ous defeat put Mexico firri:1ly under Americancontrol. The MeXico C ty Councu.summoned General Scott to parlay for the safetyof the city's residents After Mexico surrendered on September 13, the peoplestaged a popular upri ing against the American occupiers. Outraged MeXicansarmed mostly with sto es attacked American forces as they entered the city, whichwas captured on Sept mber 15. Sixteen months after the: United States declaredwar on MeXico, the erican army occupied MeXico City. The army remainedthere for nine month during the peace negotiations between the United Statesand MeXico. In a fin act of defiance, General Santa Anna opened all the jailsupon leaving Mexico ity, resulting in total chaos and pillaging. Following thegovernment's abando entof Mexico City, many of its populace began to see theAmerican occupation orce as a protector. Some Mexic~ns cursed Santa Anna withalmost as much vehe ence as they had damned the Americans With?

Santa Anna, at th head of an army of around 5,700 men, fled Mexico City.His exhausted and fri htened army disintegrated before he reached Puebla, andSanta Anna took up esidence in the town of Tehuacan. On January 23, 1848,Texas Rangers arrived to capture the Mexican general, but he had slipped awaytwo hours earlier. The United States gave Santa Anna safe passage to Jamaica andexile. The two-year w rbetween the United States and MeXico was over. MeXicosuffered tremendous asualties, an estimated 20,000 soldiers killed. The UnitedStates lost 1,721 men. edin combat and tallied 11,550 deaths from other causes,mainly disease. A peac treaty was signed by Nicolas P. Trist with MeXican officialsat the town of Guadal e Hidalgo outside MeXico City on February 2, 1848. HoW-ev~r,the last confront tion betw~n_AmeJic:g,n_a!ldMe]dl;an forces took pla!::e onMarch 16, 1848. Disr arding reports of the signing of the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo as insufficien evidence that the Mexican War had ended, General Ster-ling Price moved his issouriVolunteerstoSanta Cruz de Rosales in Chihuahua,

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CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era of War 101

i

M~xico. Her~, American soldiers ~isobeyed Price's order to cease their fite and,drIven by raCIsm, savaged the Mexrcans.73 ,

THE ENDURING PARADOX: THE TREATY I

OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO

With the war ended, Mexico established a provisional government at Qu~etaro.Many Mexicans wanted to continue fighting the United States so as to destroy theMexican army. discredit the Catholic Church, and thereby institute social reforms.In November, Mexico's goyernment had enough support to establish its legitimacy.Receiving word that the United States was p~oposing a total annexation of Mexico,the Mexican nation's newly elected president. Pedro Maria Anaya, commenced

negotiations with the UnitedStates.74Since the summer of 1847, the debate in the United States had centered on

how much of Mexico to annex. An unbounded jingoism by journalists and politi-cians underscored a strong "all Mexico" movement, demanding the annexation ofall of Mexico. Abolitionists fought for the exclusion of slavery from any territory.The Wilmot Proviso stipulated that none of the territory acquired from Mexicoshould be open to slavery or involuntary servitude. A late attempt to add theWilmot Proviso to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was bloded, however.American racism saved Mexico. Senate members responded to aroused racistpassions: the United States should not admit more Indians or mixed-race Mexi-can Catholics into the American body politic.' "Ours is the government of theWhite man;' JohnC. Calhoun told the Congress. Calhoun, a state's-rights cham-pion and ardent expansionist who as U.S. Secretary of State in 1845 helped securethe annexation of Texas, added that to place nonwhites on an equal footing withwhite Americans would be a "fatal error." Congress backed the call for the UnitedStates to take over Mexico's northern territories because of their sparse popula-tion of nonwhites. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo would be ratified withoutcalling for the annexation of additional Mexican territory populated by PFopledeemed a mongrel race.75

Negotiations between the United States and Mexico took place from February1847 to February 1848. The two countries agreed that the international boundarywould follow the course of the Rio Grande from the Gulf of Mexico to prFsentEI Paso. From EI Paso the boundary would go up to the Gila River and then fu theColorado River. From that point the international boundary ran straight acr~ss tothe Pacific Ocean at the thirty-second' parallel.76 The United States agreed t~ payMexico $15 million for New Mexico and California, to assume responsibility for$3 million dollars in claims by U.S. citizens against Mexico. and to relieve Metico'sdebt to the United States. Mexico turned over 55 percent of its land and was givena guarantee of rights for its citizens who ha.d been living in these areas and asrredthat the United States would prevent IndIan attacks ;lcross the new border mtoMexico. It was the largest land grab since the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. ~resi-dent Polk received the treaty on February 19, 1848, which the U.S. Senate ratftfledon March 10 after considerable contentious debate. Mexico's Congres~ ratifieC(i thetreaty on March 30, though after much deliberation; no Mexican officIal wanttd to

CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era 4fWar 103

:\\11:

n"..:

104 CRUCIBLE OF SjrRUGGLE

In April 1851, un4er the Compromise of 1850, the New Mexico an.d Utah ter-ritories were formed from the rest of the Mexican cession. Because the Spanish-speaking New Mexicans were residents of a United States territory, they weredenied full citizenship rights: they could not vote for their governor or for thePresident of the United States, decisions by the elected officials required federalapproval, and they ladked an independent judiciary. Texas gained thi!ty-threethousand square rnile~of New Mexico territory and gave up its claims to NewMexico in exchange f~r the payme~t of its national debt by the United Statesgovernment.87 i

A mapping error r~sulted in a dispute between the United States and Mexicoover the location of the porder between New Mexico and Mexico. President Frank-fu'1 Pierce, an expansiopist who favored southern interests, had secretly instructedU.S. Minister to Mexicb James Gadsden, a South Carolina railroad president, tobuy enough territory from Mexico for a railroad to the Gulf of California. Underthe tr~a~ provis~ons a j9~t Mexican -American commiss~on undertook the task ofestablishing an international boundary for the two natIons. John B. Weller waschief U.S. delegate to the boundary commission. Before meeting with Mexicanboundary officials in Stn Diego, Weller collected information on the metals andflora and fauna in the disputed territory. He had also been instructed to map andrecommend future sitesl for a railroad; road, or canal United States topographicalengineers adVised GadsFien that the most direct route for a transcontinental rail-road line would be sou~ of the United States boundary. Gadsden beg~n to plan tohave the federal goverrunent acquire title to the necessary territory from Mexico.88

After the war the Mexicans of the Southwest experienced an increase in vio-lence as Comanches, Kil!>was,Apaches, and other Indians attacked Mexican settle-ments in cross-border raids. For example, in 1850, eight hundred Comanchesraided Laredo, Texas. Rtids claimed thousands of lives and depopulated much ofthe countryside. Despite diplomacy and the stationing of two thousand Americansoldiers in the Southwes~, Indian marauding could not be controlled. Texas even-tually drove all the Indians into the Oklahoma Indian Territory; In New Mexicoand Arizona, the Navajo, Apache, and other Indian groups survived, whereas inCalifornia, disease, battles, and genocide eliminated most of the Indian popula-tion. Those California Indians who survived faced Virtual enslavement becausethey were bound to conipulsory labor through the 1850 Act for the Governmentand Protection of Indi;ins. Contributing to the instability of Indian-MexicanAmerican relations was t~emigration to Indian lands of Americans, many of themavowed Indian haters.89

The difficult task or regulating the hostile Indian frontier was a matter ofimportance. Many Mexifans in the north had favored annexation to the UnitedStates because Americ~ forces were protecting their properties from the incur-sion of Apaches, Comandhes, and Navajos. Long and bloody warfare between NewMexicans and Indians in~ e territory marked the nineteenth 'century. The IndiansJ:1ad taken advantage of e chaos caused by the Mexican-War -and the transferafterward of New Mexic territory to the United States to once more savage theirold enemies and enjoy e spoils of raiding. Despite U.S. protection, native NewMexicans succumbed to ~he increased Indian raiding that extended into Mexico.

,';~;

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CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era ofW* 105

CONCLUSIONi!In the 1840s, sectionalism between slave and free states dominated Ame .can

politics, as did an overriding ideology of expansionism. The United States cl' edto be destined-by divine Providence itself: The presumption of Manifest De- .-.y-was the orienting principle of American foreign policy; The United States w uId

employ military aggression against Mexico, a nation of darker breeds that d edOppose its territorial imperial design. As one historian noted, the Mexican"provided America with a venue to confront their own internal conflicts asfought a war. ..in the name of white, Anglo-:Saxoil supremacy:'93

Mexico did not enthusiastica11y support th,e war because its citizenry see edmore concerned with state versus national citizenship. Lacking a sense of natio al-ism made it difficult to raise military troops. Mexicans eventually fought £; r anation that was weak and whose government was riven by factional intri e.Moreover, regions most distant from Mexico City, such as Alta California ndNew Mexico, offeredlittIe opposition to the American invading forces during ewar. Some lost faith that Mexico's leadership would ever be able to govern dbelieved that the United States was stronger and hence more likely to prov desecurity. The reason was that regional economies by now were dependent on

106 CRUCIBLE OF$TRUGGLE

international trade. New Mexico was a by-product of a quarter century of tradewith Americans. Local elites such as New Mexico's Manuel Armij6 sought tomaintain trade with Vnited States markets. Armijo and other ricos collabor~tedwith the Americans and rejected attempts at popular resistance.94

American immigration accounted for population growth in the newlyacquired territory, The military conquest of sparsely settled New Mexico andCalifornia was easily'accomplished. 1n California, there was little resistance toAmerican conquest and eventual annexation, becaUse the general belief was thatnothing would be lost" in severing ties with Mexico. Moreover, many Californioelites thought positively of the American democratic form of government. Ulti-mately, the Californios failed to stop American immigration to California, to takeGOntrol of the Indians; or to secure money, arms, and troops from Mexico to fightthe war against the qnited States. the gold rush was the first real contest forCalifornia. A northerp and southern phase of land dispossession took place inthe breakup of the California ranches. The Mexicans of California were broughtunder the heel of Yankee power, prejudice, and vigilantism and ultimately fellinto "legislative and political decline."95 Texas withdrew its claims to the RioGrande as its western Iboundary in return for the United States assuming its $10

million debt.The end of the Mexican War and implementation of the Treaty of Guadalupe

Hidalgo in 1848 ended the era of the Spanish and MeXican frontier. The Americanconquest of the Southwest produced local, regional, and nation~ patterns ofchange and developm~nt, but it took the United States a long time to consolidateits victory. Control over Texas and California had to be affirmed; there was the

,

question of settling th, deepening sectional controversy; and the numerous war-ring Indian nations had to be subdued. California was admitted as a free state tooffsetthe earlier anneXiation of Texas, a slave sta~, whereas the New Mexico Terri-tory soon became embiroiled in the sectional controversy.96

California and Texas developed rapidly, whereas New Mexico and Arizonawould remain territories for a longer period owing to the large Mexican Amer-ican and Indian populations deemed unfit for American citizenship. New formsof government were put in place in the former Mexican territories, and newpatterns of commerce replaced the older ones. The Southwest was remade inprofound ways after the Mexican War's end. The war had disrupted old ways oflife and replaced them with new social relationships. One thing was certain.The Mexican Americflns of the Southwest found themselves strangers in astrange land, a minoritY struggling for social acceptance in a sea of Americans.

NOTESi

1. Richard V. Francaviglf and Douglas w: Richmond, eds., Dueling Eagles: Reinterpreting

the U:S.-Mexican W~ 1846-1848 (Forth Worth: Texas Christian University Press,

-2~00), 6_O. i 2. Resendez, Changing Nptional Identities, 265-267. -

3. Ibid., 243-244, 249; ~eber. Mexican Frontier, 272. The secessionists named their sepa-

rate nation La republir;a mexicana delnorte (the Mexican Republic of the North). Its

-"--'

CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era ofWa.- 107

108 CRUCIBLE OF STRtVGGLE

.~ ,:

i:: [i1'1'

f~ir Iii

Kfr~ll::'t

i!:'\!J11.,.1

and other Officers of the! Government; The Mexican War, 30m Cong., lit sess.; House

Executive Document 60 (Washington, DC: Wendell and Van Benthusyen, 1848), 154;

Eisenhower, So Far from IGod, 105; Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912:

A Territorial History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966),51-52,55.

23. Resendez, Changing National Identities, 249-251; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 208;

Lamar, Far Southwest, 1846-1912,53-55; De Lay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 255.

24. Resendez, Changing Natidnal Identities, 239,251-252; Richard Bruce Winders, Crisis in

the Southwest: The UnitediStates, Mexico, and the Struggle over Texas (Wilmington, DE:

Scholarly Resources, 2004)' 102; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 209; Lamar, Far South-

west, 1846-1912, 54-55; ~mmons, Little Lion of the Southwest, 91-93.

25. Resendez, Changing Natlbnal Identities, 238, 253; Gonzalez, Refusing the Favor, 20;

DIi.Imm, The Diary of Susan Shelby Magoffin, 114; Bernard De Voto, The Year ofDeci-

sion, 1846 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), 17; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 207-208;

Lamar, Far Southwest, 184f:-19l2,53-55.

26. Haas, "War in California, 344; Resendez, Changing National Identities, 250; Wmders,

Crisis in the Southwest, Id2; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 209-210, 233-234; Lamar,

The Far Southwest, 1846-1912, 56-58.

27. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 234-235; De Lay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 257. On the

battle of Brazito, see Neil c. Mangum, "The Battle of Brazit~: Reappraising a Lost and

Forgotten Episode in the Mexican American War; New Mexico Historical Review 72,

no. 3 (1997): 217-228. I

28. Haas, "War in California, "1333, 342-343; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 219-221; Neal

Harlow, Califor~ia Conquered: The Annexation of a Mexican Province, 1~40-1850

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 175-177.

29. Resendez, Changing National Identities, 239, 254-257; Lamar, Far Southwest, 1846-

1912, 59; Simmons, Little [.ion of the Southwest, 97. See also E. Bennett Burton, "The

Taos Rebellion," Old Santa I Fe Journal 1, no. 2 (1913): 1?6-192.

30. Resendez, Changing Natiqnal1dentities, 255-256; Lamar, Far Southwest, 1846-1912,

59; Simmons, Little Lion ofi the Southwest, 98, 101.

31. Resendez, Changing Natioral Identities, 239; Burton, "The Taos Rebellion," 176-202;

Lamar, The Far Southwest, 11846-1912, 60.

32. Resendez, Changing Natio"al Identities, 254; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 237; Lamar,

Far Southwest, 1846-1912,rO.

33. Eisenhower, So Far from 90d, 237; U.S. Congress, Message from the President of the

United States to the Two flouses of Congress. With Accompanying Documents, 30th

Cong., 2d sess., House EJa-ecutive Document 1 (Washington, DC: Wendell and Van

Benthusyen, 1848); 521; ~ar, Far Southwest, 1846-1912,60; Simmons, Little Lion ofI

the Southwest, 101-102. .

34. Niles' National Register; April 10, 1847; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 231-238; U.S.

Congress. Message from the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress,

521-522; Lamar, Far SoutJlwest, 1846-1912, 60; Simmons, Little Lion of the Southwest,

104-105.35. Eisenhower, So Far from Gbd, 238; Simmons, Little Lion of the Southwest, 105.

36. Eis~nl:I°wer, So Far fr~m Gb~ 23~. ~ ~ 37 .Ibid., 238-239; Simmons, Jjittle Lion of the Southwest, 105.

38. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 239.

39. Resendez, Changing National Identities, 39-40; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 239-240;

Michael McNierey, Taos, ~847: The Revolt in Contemporary Accounts (Boulder, CO:

i

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CHAPTER 3 .Mexican Americans in the Era o~War 109

I

Johnson, 1980),5; Lamar, Far Southwest, 1846-1912, 60-61; De Lay, War of 4 ThousandDeserts, 279. .I

I40. Lamar, Far Southwest, 1846-1912, 60; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 240; Simmons,Little Lion of the Southwest, 108. i

41. Haas, "War in California," 334-336; Eisenhower, So Far from God. 203; Harlow,lCaliforniaConquered, 4-9; Pitt, Decline of the Californios, 4,21. 1

42. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 203-204; Harlow, California Conquered. 30; P~, Decline

of the Californios, 4, 21.43. Haas, "War in California," 338-340; Eisenhower, So Far from God. 213-211; Harlow,

California Conquered. 96,97-114. The rebels marched under a flag with a sin~e red starand the crude figure of a bear that gave the incident its name. !

44. Haas, "War in California," 341-342; Monroy, Thrown Among Strangers, 17~; Harlow,California Conquered, 143. The previous year, Andres Pico and Juan Manso \had been

granted a nine-year lease for the San Fernando Valley. Harlow, California Cpnquered.143-144. i

45. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 214-215; Harlow, California Conquered, 121-1~6.

46. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 215-216. \47. Ibid., 115. i48. Ibid., 114. i49. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 163; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 116, 131; De ~y, War

ofa ThousandDeserts, 280. :50. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, p.164; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 153. \ .

51. Henderson, GloriouS Defeat, 16~165; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 179-191.\52. Haas, "War in California,8 333, 342; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 216-217; Harlow,

California Conquered, 147, 159-161; Monroy, Thrown Among Strangers. f77-178;Albert Hurtado, Indian Survival on the California Frontier (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1988), 82. "

53. Haas, "W~ in California;' 343; William David Estrada, The Los Angeles Plaza: Sacred and

Contested Space (Austin: University of Texas Press.2008), 53; Eisenhower, So Far ftom God,

217; Harlow, California Conquered, 161-163; Monroy, Thrown Among Strangers, 178-179.54. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 218; Harlow, California Conquered, 162, ~67-168,

170.55. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 218.56. Ibid., 222; Harlow, California Conquered, 179, 225. i57. Haas, "War in California," 344; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 223; Harlow, C~liforniaConquered, 185. -.i -

58. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 223; Harlow, California Conquered, 182-185. "

59. Haas, "War in California," 344; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 223-224; ~arlow,California Conquered. 187. i. -

60. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 224-225; Harlow, California Conquered, 188-189r61. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 225-226; !:farlow, California Conquered, 185, 1~9-i91,

227-228. i.,

62. Haas, "War in Califorrua," 344; Eisenhower, :So Far from God, 228; Harlow. C~lifornia

Conquered. 211-213.63. Haas, "War in California," 344; Eisenhower, So Far from God. 228-229; ~arlow,

California Conquered. 215-217. !64. Haas, "War in California," 345; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 229-230; ¥arlow,

California Conquered. 231.

110 CRUCIBLE OF STRUGGLE

65. Haas, "War in CalifOrnia; 334, 345; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 230; Harlow,

California Conquered,: 232.66. Frank S. Edwards, A Campaign in New Mexico with CoL Doniphan (Philadelphia: Carey

and Hart, 1847), 154-156; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 246-247. The Texans were "toolicentious to do mucil good," complained General Taylor, and they needed discipline.Robert Walter Johannsen, To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in theAmerican Imagination' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 38. See also StephenB. Oates, "Los Diablof Tejanos: The Texas Rang~rs," in The Mexican War: Changing

Interpretations, 2nd eq., ed. Odie B. Faulk and Joseph A. Stout, Jr. (Chicago: Swallow

Press, 1973), 120-136.!67. Henderson, Glorious [jefeat, 162; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 270-271.

68, Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 1 i5; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 259,271-272. Mexico-issued a decree that arty Mexican who sought peace with American forces would be

charged with treason. Douglas w: Richmond, ed., Essays on the Mexican War (CollegeStation: Texas A & M University Press, 1986),97-99.

69. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 166-167; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 272.,.283.70. Henderson, Gprious Defeat, 169.71. Ibid., 165-170. With Santa Anna's forces were 204 deserters from the U.S. army. The desert-

ers were mostly Irish Catholics who had decided that the war with Mexico was in part areligious war of Catholics against Protestants. The Irish formed the Batall6n San Patricio

(Saint Patrick's Battalion). Among the prisoners taken at the Battle of Chapultepec weremen of the St. Patrick's Battalion. Military trials were held, and fifty of them were sentenced

to death. General Scott pardoned five of the Irish recruits and reduced the .sentences offifteen others to fifty lashes and the letter D (for desertion) branded on the cheek. The

remaining thirty were hanged on September 12. Eisenhower, So Far from God, 341-342.72. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 171; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 339-342, 345-346.73. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 171, 177, 179; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 347,363,368.

Negotiations for peace actually began before the last battles of the Mexican War werefought See William Gqrenfeld, "The Cowpen Slaughter: Was There a Massacre ofMexican Soldiers at the ~attle of Santa Cruz de Rosales? ," New Mexico Historical Review

81,.no.4 (2006): 413-44G.74. Henderson, Glorious Do/eat, 175; Zoraida Vasquez, "The Colonization and Loss of

Texas," 121; Eisenhower, ;So Far from God, 359-360.75. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 175-176; Zoraida Vasquez, "Colonization and Loss of

Texas," 119-120; EisenhoWer, So Far from God, 286-287.76. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 177; Manuel Ceballos-Ramirez and Oscar J. Martinez,

"Conflict and Accommodation on the U.S. Mexican Border, 1848-1911," in Myths,

Misdeeds, and Misunderstandings: The Roots of Conflict in r;:S.-Mexican Relations, ed.Jaime E. Rodriguez O. aPd Kathryn Vmcent (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources,

1997), 136, 138; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 363.77; Henderson, Gloriou~ Def~at, 177-178; Eisenhower, So Far from God, 363, 367, 369.78. Henderson, Glorious Dtlfeat, 182; Ceballos-Ramirez and Martinez, "Conflict and

Accommodation," 147. ,79. ZoraidaVasquez, "ColoniZation and Loss of Texas," 122. .80. H~nder~on-, GIol:ious Deftiat, 182; RichaJ:dGriswold-del Castillo; T-heTreaty of Guadal-

upeHidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 73.In 1869, New Mexico territorial governor William Pile sold a large portion of the

Spanish colonial and Me~can archival records as wastepaper.

~

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CHAPTER 3. Mexican.Americans in the Era of War 111

81. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 182. IIi 1904, the Court of Private Larid Claims approved onlyI

2 million of the more than 35 million acres of land Mexicans claimed under land titles.I

82. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 182; Griswold del Castillo, Treaty of Guadalupe ¥idalgo,67-68; Pitt, Decline of the Californios, 50; Harlow, California Conquered, 28~; JohnBoessenecker, Gold Dust and Gunsmoke (Hoboken. NJ: Wiley. 1999).22. In 1849, sevenhundred Chinese were in California. By 1850 this number had grown to three thousand,and to ten thousand two years later.

83. Griswold del Castillo, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 73-75; Monroy, Thrown fAmongStrangers, 180.

84. The U.S. Congress failed to provide a civil government for California, following the endof the Mexican War. A longer period of military government ensued in California beforea civil administration,could assume control.

85. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 180; Griswold del Castillo, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,66-67; Harlow, California Conquered, 317-318, 338, 342, 351; Lamar, Far SoUthwest, '1846.,1912,69; Robert J. Chandler, "An Uncertain Future: The Role of the Federal Gov-ernment in California, 1846-1880," California History 81, nos. 3-4 (2003): 224-271.

86. Harlow, California Conquered, 318.87. Griswold del Castillo, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 70-71; Robert W. Larson, New Mex-

icos,Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,1968), 19. I

88. Ceballos-Ramirez and Martinez, ".Conflict and Accommodation," 138-139; Lam~, FarSo~thwest, 1846-1912, 98. .

89. Michael Magliari, "Free Soil, Unfree Labor: Cave Johnson Couts and the Binding ofIndian Workers in California, 1850-1867," Pacific Historil;alReview 73, no. 3 (August2004): 349; be Lay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 301-302. "

90. Ceballos-Ramirez and Martinez, "Conflict and Accommodation," 143; Truett, F¥gitiveLandscapes, 47-48; Hall, Social Change in the Southwest, 215.217; Simmons, Litt1:e Lionof the Southwest, 111-112. Americans didn't like Article XI of the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, which held the United States financially liable for Indian raids in Mexicq.

91. Henderson, Glorious Defeat, 173-174. I92. Ceb3IIos-Ramirez and Martinez, "Conflict arid Accommodation," 139; Paul NeffGfPrber.

The Gadsden Treaty (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1923), cha~ters 4and 5.

-93. Paul Foos, A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Soclar Conflict during the Mexi-can-American War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2001), 4.

94. Francaviglia and Richmond, Dueling Eagles, 99. 195. Haas, "War in California," 341, 344; Pitt, Decline of the Californios, 197. !96. Pitt, Decline of the Californios, 66-67.