Innovation policy, national innovation
systems and economic performance: In
search of a useful theoretical framework
by
Jan Fagerberg, Aalborg University, University of Oslo and University of Lund
Email: [email protected]
Address: Jan Fagerberg, Center for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK), University of
Oslo, P.O.Box 1108 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Version of October 23, 2015
Abstract
Innovation policy has emerged as a new field of economic policy during the last few decades
and it may be time to take stock of what is learnt and consider what the challenges for the
theory and practice in this area are. The first section introduces the issue. Section 2 outlines
the development of theoretical frameworks of innovation policies and considers the
relationship between the assumptions underlying these frameworks and empirical evidence
from innovation-surveys. Based on recent advances in innovation-systems theory, section 3
presents a synthetic framework for the analysis of innovation policy. Section 4 considers so-
called “mission-oriented” innovation policies, i.e., policies aimed at solving particular social
challenges. Finally, lessons and challenges for future work in this area are discussed.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions have been presented at the symposium “Innovation policy – can it make a
difference?”, Aalborg, Denmark, 13-14 March 2014 and the 2014 EU-SPRI conference
“Science and innovation policy: Dynamics, Challenges, Responsibility and Practice”,
Manchester, UK, 18-20 June, 2014.
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1. Introduction
The popularity of the term “innovation policy” is as Figure 1 shows of relatively recent origin.
To the best of our knowledge it comes – as so much within the field of innovation studies -
from the intellectual environment that developed around the Science Policy Research Unit
(SPRU) at the University of Sussex from the late 1960s onwards (Fagerberg et al 2011). In
particular SPRU-Professor Roy Rothwell did during the 1980s much to increase the interest
for the topic (see e.g. Rothwell 1982). However, the real surge of interest had to wait until
the1990s, when international organisations such as the OECD (alongside various national
governments) started to pay attention to the phenomenon. As Figure 1 shows this growing
interest coincided with the spread of the new, systemic approach to the study of innovation
that emerged around 1990 (see e.g., Edquist 2004, Lundvall 2007).
Figure 1. The frequency of the terms “Innovation Policy” and “Innovation System” according
to Google
Source: https://books.google.com/ngrams
The term “innovation policy” may be used in different ways. For example, it may be defined
broadly as all policies that have an impact on innovation, or more narrowly as policies (or
policy instruments) created with the intent to affect innovation (Edquist 2004). Nevertheless,
if we are interested in the impacts of policy on innovation and economic performance, the
former, more comprehensive definition appears more appropriate (although it arguably
complicates life for the analyst). As pointed out by Veugelers et al (2010) in practice it may
be necessary to concentrate on the non-trivial impacts of policy (and this requires criteria for
doing so).
Different usages of the term may also reflect different understandings of innovation: Does it
refer to the entire process from the emergence of new ideas to their economic exploitation
(broad definition), or is it limited to the first occurrence of a new product, process or way do
things (narrow definition)? The choice of definition may to some extent reflect the purpose of
the analysis. Nevertheless, while innovation may be a fascinating topic in its own right, this is
not the reason why most policymakers are interested in it. Rather what they are interested in
are the beneficial economic effects that innovation is assumed to have, not only for the
innovator, but for a country or region as whole. From this perspective the broader definition
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makes most sense, since what mainly matters for the economy is not the first occurrence of an
innovation but its subsequent diffusion and use including the effects that this gives rise to
(Kline and Rosenberg 1986).
It is also important to take into account that the focus of policy, the terms used and the
theories underpinning design and implementation of policy change over time. For example,
while in the 1960s the focus was on science (and hence the term “science policy” was
popular), later it shifted to technology (and “technology policy”) and more recently
innovation (with the associated term “innovation policy”), see e.g., Lundvall and Borras
(2004) and Boekholt (2010) for further details. Thus, the fact that the notion “innovation
policy” is relatively recent does not necessarily imply that policies affecting innovation did
not exist before. Innovation is an old phenomenon, and over the years innovation activity is
likely to have been influenced by a number of policies carried out under a variety of labels,
see e.g., Box 1. Arguably, for the social scientist, history is the most relevant laboratory, and
disregarding important evidence just because terminology has shifted would make it virtually
impossible to understand how institutions, organizations and policy instruments affecting
innovation in different countries have evolved to their present stance. Hence, when studying
the evolution of innovation policies and the broader systems in which they are embedded, it
may be highly relevant – even essential - to take the effects of policies pursued under other
labels into account.
By now we have several decades of experience with innovation policy (if not more) and it is
time to take stock of what has been learnt and consider what the challenges for the theory and
practice may be (see, e.g., Smits et al 2010, Edler et al 2013). The next section outlines the
development of theoretical frameworks of innovation policies and considers the relationship
between the assumptions underlying these frameworks and empirical evidence from
innovation-surveys. Based on recent advances in innovation-systems theory, section 3
presents a synthetic framework for analyzing innovation policy (and its effects), while section
4 considers so- called “mission-oriented” innovation policies, i.e., policies aimed at solving
particular social challenges. Finally, section 5 discusses the lessons and challenges for future
work in this area. Historical and statistical evidence or examples are introduced at various
points to illustrate the relevance of the arguments brought up during the discussion.
4
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Box 1. Innovation policy is not a new phenomenon: The Swedish example
“The Swedish model” is often used as a short hand for the close cooperation between big
business, labor unions and the state that influenced Swedish politics and the social and
economic development of the country from the 1930s onwards. A central goal for this
cooperation was to increase productivity so that both healthy profits and increasing welfare
for the population could be achieved. Technological progress, naturally, was seen as crucial
for realizing this goal, and quickly attracted the attention of policy makers. A technical
research council (TFR), the first of research council in Sweden, was set up in 1940. It was
succeeded in 1968 by STU, literally the “board for technological development” and later, in
1991, by NUTEK (the directorate for industrial and technological change). A characteristic
feature of Swedish policy in this area was a strong emphasis on supporting university R&D in
areas which policy-makers considered to be of high political and economic importance, such
as nuclear energy or telecommunications. Moreover, a major effort was made to engage the
large, technologically advanced Swedish firms in technologically demanding, infrastructural
projects initiated by the state, of which is the cooperation between the firm Ericsson and the
Swedish telecommunication agency (Televerket) about the developments of digital switches
(the AXE system) may serve as an example. Hence, during this period, the state played a quite
proactive role in fostering innovation and the technological capabilities underpinning it
(although the term “innovation policy” was not used).
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2. Theoretical frameworks: From market failure to innovation systems
The interest for science, technology and innovation policy started in earnest in the aftermath
of World War Two. The dominating theoretical perspective was what has later been termed
“the linear model” (see Kline and Rosenberg 1986 for a critical account), which sees scientific
progress as the main causal factor behind economic progress. The main challenge, according
to this approach, is to achieve fast scientific progress, from which economic benefits can be
assumed to follow more or less automatically. Problems associated with transforming
scientific knowledge, mainly created in universities and research institutes, into innovation
and economic value in the business sector were if not ignored assumed to be of relatively
minor importance.
Market failure
However, if science is the main factor behind creation of economic value, why do private
firms not undertake the necessary investments themselves? This question was of course of
concern to economists who were brought up to believe that self-regulating markets would
create the best result for everybody. The explanation offered by them was that knowledge had
“public good” properties that markets were not designed to take into account. For example,
one actor’s use of a body of knowledge would not preclude other actors from doing the same.
However, the fact that other firms may benefit just as much or more, also implies that it may
be difficult for a firm investing in the creation of new knowledge to recoup its investment, not
5
to say earn a profit from it. Rational firms would therefore according to this reasoning tend to
stay away from such investments, even if the potential benefits for society as a whole might
be very large. Thus, in this case, a self-regulating market would fail to secure a socially
optimal allocation of resources in the economy. For economists such “market failure”
provides a justification for market interventions - or policy instruments - aiming at increasing
investments in science in the economy towards the socially “optimal” level (Nelson 1959,
Arrow 1962). Such interventions can take different forms, such as financing universities and
research institutes, subsidizing research in private firms and changing the rules of the game by,
say, strengthening intellectual property rights.
The “market failure” argument continues to be invoked as a rationale for public investments
in science in modern capitalist societies. As commonly advanced, however, it does not
provide much guidance on how much governments should spend on science (what the amount
of public investment necessary for arriving at the “optimal” allocation of resources would be).
A more serious problem may be that it is not obvious that the argument holds much beyond
basic science (and perhaps not always there either). It is particularly problematic in the case of
private firms, because it is quite evident that the underlying premises of the theory: (1) that
knowledge is very fluid (i.e., non-appropriable) and (2) that firms are omnipotent entities,
endowed with full knowledge (“perfect information”) about all potentially relevant factors
and capable of instantly processing all this information to arrive at the optimal choice, do not
hold in practice. For example, it is well established that much economically useful knowledge
is contextual in character, hard to identify, difficult to get access to and demanding and costly
to absorb. Hence, high “fluidity”/ non-appropriability of knowledge may not be such a big
hurdle for firms in most cases. In fact, the exact opposite, that knowledge is very “sticky”
(von Hippel 1994), may be a much harder problem for firms. Indeed, far from being
omnipotent, firms are as Nelson and Winter (1982) emphasized generally rather constrained
in their abilities, and this holds in particular when trying to prepare for future developments,
which tend to be clouded by genuine (or radical) uncertainty. Arguably, such uncertainty may
well prevent firms from investing in innovation, but this is something the traditional theory
would lead the analyst to not give much attention to, as it conflicts with the underlying
premises of the approach.
“Stylized facts”
Theoretical work, if it wants to be relevant for policy, has to be based on assumptions that are
broadly consistent with the empirical facts. Therefore, from the 1960s onwards, the search for
such “stylized facts” has been the “leitmotif” for a series of investigations into how firms
perceive the conditions affecting their innovative activities (which policy may influence). An
early attempt to do this, which came to have a lasting influence on how we look at innovation
processes in firms, was the SAPPHO project at SPRU (Rothwell 1974). Another important
exercise of this kind, this time in the US, was the Yale survey (Levin et al. 1987). From 1991
onwards the European Union has carried surveys of firms’ innovation activities and the
factors that influence these in their member countries (Community Innovation Survey, CIS,
see Smith 2004 for details). The results are very consistent across different surveys and over
time. In the following we are going to use some empirical results from the CIS survey to
6
illustrate some of the “stylized facts” associated with innovation at the firm level that are
relevant for discussions of innovation policy.
Figure 2 reports the answers from European firms about what the important sources of
information for innovation are.1 The most important source is to be found within the firm
itself. Among the external sources, the by far most important are customers and suppliers,
followed by other firms in the same industry or sector. Public sources, such as conferences
and journals, are also deemed to be of relevance. Universities and public research institutes
figure towards the bottom of the list. Hence, there is not much support for the “linear model”
in these data.
In Figure 3 we move from sources of information to innovation cooperation. The picture is
very much the same; the most important external partners for firms in innovation are, as for
information, customers and suppliers. Then follow other firms in the same enterprise group
and consultants/private R&D labs. Albeit less frequent they do also cooperate with
universities and public research institutes.
1 The CIS-data used in this paper can be accessed through http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/science-
technology-innovation/data/database.
7
Figure 2. Important sources of information for innovation
Source: Own calculations based on information from CIS 5 (2006)
Figure 3. Innovation Cooperation.
Source: Own calculations based on information from CIS 5 (2006)
8
Information about how firms go about to appropriate the benefits from their innovative
activities is provided in Figure 4.2 The by far most used appropriation methods are lead-time
and secrecy. Complexity of design is also listed as an important factor. Among the formal
protection methods, trademarks are assessed to be the most important. Patent protection
figures relatively low on the list, indicating that firms on average do not regard patents to be
very important means for benefitting from innovation, something that is consistent with other
research (Cohen 1995).3
Figure 4. How to appropriate the benefits from innovation?
Source: Own calculations based on information from CIS 3 (2000)
These observations are consistent with the view that in most cases innovative firms do not
regard fluidity (non-appropriability) of knowledge as a big problem, probably because many
aspects of the technological capabilities they draw on are not so easily copied. To be first in
the market with their new innovative solutions - keeping their competitive edge - is what
matters most to them. The data also show that firms do not try to insulate themselves from
their environments, jealously guarding their secrets, but on the contrary interact closely with
external partners, among which customers and suppliers tend to be the most important. Hence,
the central role of users for innovation, emphasized by several studies (Rothwell et al. 1974,
Lundvall 1985, von Hippel 1988), is also confirmed by the CIS. Arguably, there are good
reasons for this: Users are an important part of the selection environment for innovations and
2 The questions included in the European Union’s Community Innovation Survey differ somewhat across
different waves of the survey. The particular question underlying Figure 4 was not included in later surveys.
3 However, it may be noted that use of appropriation methods differs a lot across industries (patenting is for
instance much more important in pharmaceuticals than the above average pattern would suggest).
9
have intimate knowledge about the requirements that an innovation need to satisfy. Moreover,
in some instances users, being highly competent and sophisticated, may play a proactive role
in innovation (von Hippel 2005).
National innovation systems
It is evident from the preceding discussion that innovation is an interactive phenomenon, and
for a theory to be helpful in shaping policy, it needs to take this into account. From the very
beginning the contributors to the literature on national innovation systems that emerged
around 1990, e.g., Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1988, 1992), Nelson (1988, 1993) and others,
made such interaction the hallmark of their approach.4 Basing itself on Schumpeterian and
evolutionary perspectives, the approach left little room for the idea of an “optimal” state
towards which the system should be assumed to converge if only appropriate policies were
applied. Rather the national innovation system is seen as the result of a long historical process
characterized by coevolution between a country’s industrial structure and its political system
(Smits and Kuhlman 2004, Fagerberg et al. 2009). Such processes, through which one part of
the system influences the other and vice versa, are also likely to be path dependent, meaning
that established policies – and the organizations carrying them out – may be remarkably
persistent in spite of changes in the environment (Pierson 2000). As a result national systems
of innovation may differ greatly, see Box 2, and a policy mix that works in one context may
not be adequate in another (Flanegan et al 2011, Borras and Edquist 2013).
The first empirical analyses of national innovation systems were descriptive in nature and
focused on what the authors of the studies considered to be the main actors and their
interrelationships (Nelson 1993). As a consequence, these studies often had a static
perspective, focusing on the structure of the system at a particular point of time, rather than on
its dynamics. Since, as pointed out above, differences in structure are the results of long run
historical processes (reflecting the coevolution between industrial structures and political
systems), it became challenging to draw policy-relevant conclusions from the comparative
work that emerged.
4 Sharif (2006) and Fagerberg and Sapprasert (2011) trace the emergence of the innovation system approach.
10
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Box 2 History matters
The Nordic countries are often considered to be similar, as epitomized in the concept “the
Nordic model”. Nevertheless, their national innovation systems differ in important respects,
and this has to do with differences in the historical origins of these systems (which influenced
how innovation policies subsequently developed). For example, the countries with well-
developed nation states and university systems over a century ago, i.e., Denmark and Sweden,
have developed innovation systems in which universities play a very central role. This is still
the situation today. In contrast, in Finland and Norway - younger nation states with less-well
developed university systems a century ago – public research organizations outside
universities (the “institutes”) developed in close interaction with important industries and
firms and eventually became large and powerful actors in the innovation system. This
continues to be the case. For example, Finland’s leading PRO – VTT – has around 3000
employees, and prides itself in its website of being “the biggest multitechnological applied
research organization in Northern Europe”. The Norwegian parallel – SINTEF – has around
2000 employees, and in Norway the “institutes” collectively get more funding through the
research council than the universities do. Hence, for historical reasons innovation systems
differ a lot, and this needs to be taken into account when designing and implementing policy.
Arguably, a mechanical transfer of so-called “best practice” from one system to another may
easily do more harm than good.
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3. Innovation systems, technological dynamics and policy: A synthesis
After the turn of the millennium the scholarly work on national innovation system took a new
twist with a sharper focus on the relationship between the output of the innovation system (its
technological dynamics) and the factors influencing it (Liu and White 2001, Edquist 2004,
Bergek et al. 2008). If the dynamics is deemed unsatisfactory by e.g., policymakers, the
approach may then be used to identify the factors – or “problems” - behind the result and
discuss what can be done about it (Edquist 2011). In the literature the factors influencing
innovation have invariably been called (fundamental) activities, processes, functions and sub-
functions. However, in this paper the more generic term processes will be preferred. Although
the number and definitions of these processes differ somewhat across the various studies,
these differences may arguably be seen as minor (and may to some extent be explained by
differences in focus).
In Figure 5 below we illustrate the dynamics of a national innovation system. The output of
the system, i.e., innovation, diffusion and use of technology, is labelled “technological
dynamics”. It is a result of influences from abroad (“foreign”), activities within the business
sector and interaction with actors in other parts of society. The former activity, i.e., interaction
with knowledge holders in other countries, is of course of paramount importance
economically (see Fagerberg et al 2010 for an overview), but we will in this paper concentrate
on the latter, because policy - the topic under scrutiny here – has more of a say in that case.
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Figure 5. The National Innovation System: Dynamics, processes and policy
In the figure technological dynamics is depicted as influenced by five generic processes in the
national innovation system, labelled knowledge, skills, demand, finance and institutions. The
influences on the technological dynamics from these processes are indicated with solid arrows,
while the possible feedbacks from technological dynamics on the generic processes are
represented by dotted arrows. Policy makers may influence the technological dynamics by
helping to shape the processes that impact it. To do so they need to have access to an adequate
supporting knowledge base and they may, as argued below, need to coordinate policies across
different domains. Their actions will also be motivated by strategic choices they make and
their “visions” for the development of society. Therefore we have labelled this process
“strategic innovation system management”.5 Their incentives to do so may also be affected by
how vibrant (or lacklustre) the technological dynamics are conceived to be, giving rise to a
feedback from performance on policy.
The five generic processes included in the figure may be described as follows:
- Knowledge: Knowledge may for example be provided by public R&D organizations
(universities etc.) that complement firms’ own capabilities and through schemes that
promote interaction between firms and other actors (f.i. cooperative R&D). Such
processes are influenced by various layers within government, particularly the Ministry
5 The choice of this term is inspired by the literature on strategic “niche” or “transition” management (Kemp et
al. 1998, Rotmans et al. 2001).
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for Research, but also other ministries, such as those for industry, regional development,
health, defence, etc.
- Skills: Skills, both specialized and more general, are essential for firms’ abilities to
generate technological dynamics, and the provision of these is normally the responsibility
of the Ministry of Education but other ministries may also influence aspects of this
process (such as supporting vocational training for example, which may fall under the
Ministry of Industry).
- Demand: Without demand for new, innovative solutions, innovative firms get nowhere.
The government can help to relieve such constraints by supporting the creation of markets
for innovative solutions, changing standards and regulations and using public
procurement proactively to foster innovation (Edler and Georghiou 2007, Edquist and
Zabala 2012). Such policies often fall under the Ministry of Industry but other ministries,
such as those for defence, energy, environment and health may also have say.
- Finance: Finance is necessary for innovation to persevere. Some innovative initiatives,
particularly from small firms, entrepreneurs, etc., or in cases characterized by high
uncertainty, may have difficulties in raising the necessary finance in ordinary financial
markets, and in such cases the public sector may play an important role. This would
normally fall under the responsibility the Ministry of Industry or the Ministry of Regional
Development. However, the design of the tax system, which is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Finance, may also matter.
- Institutions: Institutions refer to the “rules of the game” that influence entrepreneurial
actions. They range from law and regulations, the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice,
to informal norms and rules. Examples of relevant institutions include IPRs, requirements
for setting up or close down businesses, regulations regarding hiring or firing personnel
and the prevalence of corruption. Institutions are often considered to be relatively stable,
but laws and regulations of relevance for business activities do sometimes change, often
related to “voice” on the part of the business community.6
As Figure 5 illustrates there is a broad range of processes that influence the technological
dynamics of a nation, and these processes are affected by a large number of policies and
actors. Most of these policies are not dubbed “innovation policies” and have traditionally not
been regarded as such either. Nevertheless, their effects on innovation may be much more
important than those of more narrowly defined “innovation policies”. What matters from an
innovation system perspective is not the name of a policy, but its impact.
An important feature that increasingly has come into focus is the strong complementarities
that commonly exist between the different parts of an innovation system or policy
instruments (Mohnen and Röller 2005). If, in a dynamic system, one critical, complementary
factor is lacking, or fails to progress, this may block or slow down the growth of the entire
6 Even attitudes and values change in response to technological and economic changes, albeit very slowly, from
one generation to the next (Inglehart 1977, 2008).
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system. For example, it is of little help to have superior knowledge, if you don’t have the
skills necessary for its exploitation, or if finance or demand is lacking. Thus the processes
that policies may influence are to a large extent complementary, and from this follows that
the effect of a specific policy cannot be assessed in isolation, i.e., independent of other
relevant policies (Flanagan et al. 2011). The innovation system perspective therefore leads to
a holistic perspective on policy (Boekholt 2010).
This “holism” follows logical from the underlying theory but is arguably challenging for
policy makers. First, calculating the total effects of a broad set of interacting policies
(processes) requires a larger (and more sophisticated) analytical capacity in public
administration than what has been common. In some countries deliberate steps have been
taken to generate such capacities, for example the creation of the “Swedish Governmental
Agency for Innovation Systems” in 2005 (Carlsson et al. 2010), but in most countries such
capacity building is probably still in its infancy. A further complicating factor is that applying
the innovation system perspective to policy would mean that policy makers from different
domains (ministries, sectors, administrative levels etc.) have to work together and coordinate
their activities (policies). This is something that is known to be difficult to achieve, as it tends
to conflict with the established structures, practices and routines in public administration
(Flanagan et al. 2011). Successfully applying the innovation system approach to policy may
therefore require the development of new “systemic instruments” (Smits and Kuhlman 2004)
facilitating the creation, adaptation and coordination of policy (Braun 2008), what we above
called “strategic innovation systems management”. The Finnish example (see Box 3) is
perhaps the most ambitious attempt to date of doing so (Pelkonen 2006).
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Box 3: Finland: A system perspective on governance
Finnish policy makers were quick to embrace the new, holistic understanding of innovation
which emerged around 1990 under the label “national innovation systems”. An important
vehicle for the diffusion of the NIS approach became the “Science and Technology Policy
Council of Finland”, renamed “Research and Innovation Council” in 2009 as part of the
adoption of “Finland’s Innovation Strategy” that year. The council, chaired by the Prime
Minister, is an advisory and coordinating body for research, technology and innovation policy,
consisting of representatives from relevant ministries, public innovation actors, major firms,
business associations etc., and meets regularly. It develops plans for the development and
implementation of innovation policy in Finland and publishes every 3-4 year a “review”
devoted to these issues. An analysis of these reviews (Miettinen 2012) shows that in the 1990s
the focus was primarily on increasing national investments in R&D while more recently the
perspective has broadened with respect to what it is about (including so-called social
innovation for example), where it takes place (not only in “high-tech”), how innovation may
be encouraged (including demand- and user- driven innovation) and what it is relevant for (for
instance the public sector as well).
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4. Coping with societal challenges
Up to now we have mainly concentrated on the general effects of innovation for society,
related to phenomena such as welfare, standards of living, productivity, etc., and the role of
policy in this context. However, innovation policy may also have more specific aims, such as
developing a solution to a particular societal challenge, so-called “mission-oriented” policies
(Ergas 1986), of which there for instance have been many examples in the US (Mowery 2011).
In fact, this is something governments have been engaged in long before the term innovation
policy was invented (e.g., the Manhattan project during the Second World War).
However, much has happened in innovation research since the Manhattan project, and we
now have a much more elaborate understanding of how new technologies develop and diffuse.
Contemporary attempts to use innovation policy to cope with particular challenges may build
on this understanding. For example we now know that there are many hurdles during the early
phase of the development of a new technology, such as uncertainties with respect to a
technology’s potential, market, costs, etc., that may easily kill the embryonic project.
Moreover, although there is a possibility that the new technology will yield substantial
benefits, it may also fail to do so for reasons that were not (and in many cases could not) be
properly understood ex ante. To learn more about the technology’s potential, real life
experiments may sometimes be necessary, and failures will occur (and need to be tolerated).
The challenges for policy makers in this context may for example be (1) to help mobilize the
necessary support so that the experiment can get going, (2) avoid that it is aborted too early
(for reasons that policy makers can influence) and (3) not to draw premature conclusions
about the superiority/potential of the new technology before a sufficient knowledge base
about the focal technology and alternatives has been accumulated.
To assist policy makers in mobilizing innovation in the solution of specific challenges,
process perspectives of the type discussed in the previous section have been applied and
further developed based on the experiences, sometimes in interaction with the policy makers
themselves. An example of the latter is the “technological system” approach, mentioned
earlier, which was developed and improved through interaction between researchers and
policy makers in Sweden (see Carlson et al. 2010). This approach consists of studying the
processes that influence the development, diffusion and use of a specific new technology,
with particular emphasis on identifying so called “blocking mechanisms” that hamper the
development of one or more of these processes (or their interaction) and hence the dynamics
of the system as a whole (see Bergek et al. 2008 for an overview). The implication is that
policy makers’ attention may fruitfully be directed towards removal of the “blocking
mechanisms”.
A related approach, particularly (but not exclusively) motivated by the climate-crisis and the
need for a transition to a more sustainable economic system,7 has been developed in the
Netherlands under the label “multi-level perspective” (MLP). Multi-level perspectives are
well known from evolutionary theorizing, which has been a source of inspiration for the MLP
7 For a recent analysis of this aspect of innovation policy with a focus on sustainability, see Nill and Kemp (2009).
15
approach as well as other types of innovation research (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982) on
which the MLP approach also draws (see Rip and Kemp 1998). In the case of the MLP
approach, three levels are highlighted in the analysis: the macro-level (labelled “landscape”)
which is assumed to change slowly and for reasons that may be seen as “exogenous”; the
meso-level, which following Nelson and Winter (1982) is dubbed the “technological regime”
and the micro-level, which is termed “niche”. The niches are where the development of
radical new technologies - the experimentation - is assumed to occur. However, such
experimentation is fraught with difficulties of various sorts, and may require political support
to persist long enough so that reliable conclusions can be reached. Moreover, a new, radical
technology, even if successful in a narrow technological sense, also needs to be accepted by
the broader technological regime8 structuring the relevant part of the economy, which is seen
as challenging since such regimes are perceived as rooted in the past and resistant to change
(Rip and Kemp 1998). Much work in this area has therefore focused on the role of policy in
nurturing technological experimentation and identifying areas in which the new, radical
technologies can be applied so that they can develop further and eventually be more broadly
accepted, so-called “strategic niche management” or “transition management” (Kemp et al.
1998, Rotmans et al. 2001).
In the MLP approach much of the focus has been on the interaction between the meso and
micro levels, or between regimes and niches. However, more recently attention has turned to
the interaction between the regime and the landscape levels, e.g., how differences in the
pressure for change at the macro level may influence regimes and, depending also on the
underlying technological dynamics, open up for different “transition pathways” (Geels and
Schot 2007). The integration of the macro (or “landscape”) dimension into the analysis
appears as a fruitful avenue for future work in this area. Take the climate change (global
warming) issue, for example, which underlies much contemporary research. In reality, climate
change is not an exogenous phenomenon, but a result of economic and technological
dynamics, past and present. What appears to be needed in order to avoid the detrimental
consequences of global warming is a change in the very factors that underpin the current
unsustainable trajectory. These factors may have as much to do with the policy choices of
politicians at the national level as with experimentation with new solutions at the micro level,
or inertia among incumbent firms, organizations or “regimes”. Moreover, as for other types of
innovation policy, policies aiming at mobilizing innovation to combat the problems associated
with global warming may be much more effective if better coordinated across different policy
domains and levels (i.e., what we above called “strategic innovation system management”).
5. Lessons
Innovation policy is a relatively recent term. Its emergence as a field of politics is related to
the increasing emphasis on innovation as an important source of economic prosperity and
8 Rip and Kemp (1998, p. 338) provide the following definition of a technological regime: “A technological
regime is the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering practices, production process
technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling relevant artefacts and persons,
ways of defining problems - all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures”.
16
welfare and as a way to cope with grand challenges. The increasing attention to innovation
policy has gone hand in hand with the development of new theoretical frameworks, most
importantly the national innovation systems approach.
One important lesson concerns the importance of having a broad definition of innovation
policy. Rather than just policies explicitly aimed at affecting innovation, all policy
instruments that influence innovation in a non-trivial way need to be taken into account.
Moreover, a broad definition of innovation is required, including not only the first occurrence
of a new product or process but the entire process from the creation of new products,
processes and way to do things to their diffusion and use. These definitional choices follow
logically from the premise that the purpose of innovation policy is to contribute to economic
prosperity and welfare.
With respect to theoretical frameworks for innovation policy, and particularly the national
innovation system approach, an important lesson is that a distinction needs to be made
between the characteristics – or “structure” – of a national system and its dynamics. National
innovation systems have evolved through interaction between the economic and political
system of a country. Since countries differ industrially, industries (or sectors) have different
innovation dynamics (and requirements) and political systems differ in their origins and
characteristics, national innovation systems may end up as looking rather different. Such
differences are not necessarily a problem, however, as much policy-advice based on so-called
“benchmarking” seems to take for granted. Arguably, an unsatisfactory state or “problem”
cannot be revealed by studying a single component of a system. What is required is an
analysis of the technological dynamics of the national innovation system as whole. Only on
this basis can it be possible to identify the processes (and policies) that prevent the system
from developing satisfactory.
While the characteristics – or structures – of national innovation system may differ a lot, there
may still be common features related to the technological dynamics occurring within these
systems. This has to do with the fact that innovation and diffusion follow certain regularities,
which have been extensively analyzed and documented by innovation research (see Fagerberg
et al 2004 for an overview). Guided by recent advances in innovation systems research a
synthetic framework for analyzing what shapes the technological dynamics of a country has
been suggested. The framework illustrates how the technological dynamics of a country is the
result of interaction between a number of different processes that are influenced by a range of
policies, many of which do not carry the “innovation” label and primarily have other goals.
An effective innovation policy, therefore, requires close coordination of policies across a
number of different domains, and the development of new forms of governance and
supporting knowledge bases that makes this possible. Researchers studying innovation policy
would be well advised to pay greater attention to the policy experiments that have been
attempted in various countries to achieve some of these aims.
In recent years a lot of attention has been devoted to the evaluation of single innovation policy
instruments in various countries. However, such evaluations may be of little value if
interactions between different policies, as well as system-wide effects and feedbacks, are not
17
taken properly into account. What is needed are system-level evaluations, and the OECD
should be credited for attempting to develop their evaluations of national innovation policies
in this direction, see for example the evaluation of Swedish innovation policy (OECD 2013).
There has been little discussion, though, about the methodologies for carrying out such
analyses, a topic on which the research community in this area should be well placed to
contribute.
This may also hold for the question of who might profitably be involved at various stages of
shaping and evaluating policy. For example, there appears to be a tendency for national policy
makers to keep the cards close to their chests and for evaluators to go along with this. 9 It is
highly questionable, however, if restricting information, discussion and broad participation is
a good strategy for creating effective innovation policy in modern, knowledge-based societies.
Eric von Hippel has in another context argued that in such societies “democratic innovation”,
i.e., involving the expertise of the broader public, is not only more democratic but also more
effective (von Hippel 2005). Arguably, this may apply to innovation policy as well.
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