Nuclear Fuel
• Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) <20% U235• High Enriched Uranium (HEU) 90% U235
Nuclear Fuel Transport• IAEA projects continued growth• US NRC – Protection from radiation– minimizing the time exposed to radioactive materials– maximizing the distance from the source of radiation– shielding from external exposure and inhaling radioactive
material.
Threats to Nuclear Fuel Transport• Terrorists
Crude radiological dispersion device (RDD) Fear and PanicEconomic impact/Decontamination efforts
• AccidentsImproper shielding of radioactive materialCollisionsRely on local law enforcement
• Government is responsible US NRC
Assumptions
• Modeling generic fuel rod – Everyone Produces and Consumes the same fuel rod
• Number of deliveries to each power plant is based on number of reactors. – 3 reactors : Requires 3 deliveries
• Route used is Shortest Google Map distance • Supply from the 3 Producers is based on
current market share not capacity
• Do we only care about minimizing the total distance?
NO – Lets look at a multi-commodity flow problem
Min-Route Model
Min-Route Model Min-Total Model Current0
20406080
100120140160
Total Distance (k miles)
• Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path• OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the
longest delivery
Min-Route Flow
Min-Route Model
Current0
500100015002000250030003500
Longest Route (miles)
• Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path• OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the
longest delivery
• Does the loss of a Producer increase the distance(RISK) of the multi-commodity solution?
Yes – Lets Look at the multi-commodity flow problem with the loss of a producer.
Min-Route Model: Loss of Producer• Consider: Greater Risk = Longest Single Path• OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest
delivery
W/GE W/A A/GE W/A/GE0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Comparison of Min-Route Model with loss of producer (miles)
• What if a new Producer was built in a more centralized location?– We chose Kentucky next to the enrichment plant• What better place, because you also decrease the
transport distance of the LEU to the producer
Min-Route Model – Including New Producer
• OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery
Min-Route Model Min-Route (with new producer)
Current0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Longest Route (miles)
Min-Route Model Min-Route (with new producer)
Min-Total Model Current0
20406080
100120140160
Total Distance (k miles)
Min-Route Model – Including New Producer
• OBJECTIVE: Minimize the distance of the longest delivery
• What if we had projected increases in demand for existing plants and for new plants being built through 2025?
We do, lets see the min-cost flow with the new demand and original Producers.
Min-Total Model with 2025 Projected demand
Min-Total Model Min-Total (with new demand)
Current0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Total Distance (k miles)
Min-Route Model with 2025 Projected Demand
Min-Route Model Min-Route (with new demand)
Current0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Longest Route with Projected Demand (miles)
Min-Route Model with 2025 Projected Demand
Min-Route Model Min-Total Model Min-Route (with new demand)
Current0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Total Distance (k miles)
Conclusions
• Current LEU procurement process has shows little concern for transport risk.
• “Transport of nuclear cargo is part of nuclear life cycle most vulnerable to violent, forcible theft, since it’s impossible to protect with thick walls and many minutes of delay when its is on the road” Securing the Bomb 2010 Harvard Review
• Our research shows that significant decreases in distance can be obtained which has the potential to reduce risk.– Government policy decisions
Expanding
• Detailed transportation model• Region specific model/global network model• Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route• HEU medical/other purpose transportation route• Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites• Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford
Foster (USN)• Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors
(Dimitrov)
Expanding
• Detailed transportation model• Region specific model/global network model• Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route• HEU medical/other purpose transportation route• Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites• Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford
Foster (USN)• Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors
(Dimitrov)
Expanding
• Detailed transportation model• Region specific model/global network model• Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route• LEU medical/other purpose transportation route• Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites• Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford
Foster (USN)• Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors
(Dimitrov)
Expanding
• Detailed transportation model• Region specific model/global network model• Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route• LEU medical/other purpose transportation route• Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites• Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford
Foster (USN)• Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors
(Dimitrov)
Expanding
• Detailed transportation model• Region specific model/global network model• Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route• LEU medical/other purpose transportation route• Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford
Foster (USN)• Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites• Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors
(Dimitrov)
Expanding
• Detailed transportation model• Region specific model/global network model• Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation route• LEU medical/other purpose transportation route• Route population density risk thesis – LT Bradford
Foster (USN)• Network Deployment of Radiation Detectors
(Dimitrov)• Threat of natural disasters on reactor sites