Coercive diplomacy, 26 11-2012 22h38

Coercive DiplomacyCoercive Diplomacy

Peace and Conflict StudiesPeace and Conflict Studies26.11.201226.11.2012

Paulina MéndezPaulina MéndezStiven TremariaStiven Tremaria

SummarySummary

1.1. Definitions and elements.Definitions and elements.

2.2. Variants of the CD.Variants of the CD.

3.3. How does CD work?How does CD work?i.i. Coercer state strategy.Coercer state strategy.ii.ii. Coercive mechanism.Coercive mechanism.iii.iii. Coercive instruments.Coercive instruments.

4.4. The adoption of coercive measures and the international law.The adoption of coercive measures and the international law.

5.5. Limitations and critics to the CD.Limitations and critics to the CD.

6.6. Case studies.Case studies.

1. Definitions and elements1. Definitions and elements

A) Definitions:A) Definitions:

““Efforts to Efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an actionpersuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action […] coercive […] coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts diplomacy is a defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary of an adversary to change a status quo situationto change a status quo situation in his own favor” (George in his own favor” (George and Simons, 1994, pp. 7-8).and Simons, 1994, pp. 7-8).

““The use of The use of threatened forcethreatened force, and at times , and at times the limited use of actual the limited use of actual force to force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to change its behavior” (Byman back up the threat, to induce an adversary to change its behavior” (Byman and Baxman, 2002, p. 1).and Baxman, 2002, p. 1).

““Coercive diplomacy is ‘Coercive diplomacy is ‘forceful persuasionforceful persuasion’: the attempt to get a target –a ’: the attempt to get a target –a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a non state actor– state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a non state actor– to change to change its objectionable behaviorits objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 6). actual use of limited force” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 6).


B) Elements:B) Elements:

- - Three basic constitutive elements: demand, threat, time pressure.Three basic constitutive elements: demand, threat, time pressure.

-- Limited and clear objectives: Limited and clear objectives: What to demand?What to demand?Defensive rather than offensive objectives. Typologies: A, B and C.Defensive rather than offensive objectives. Typologies: A, B and C.

- - Coercive but limited means: Coercive but limited means: How to comply?How to comply?““It seeks to influence, but not to deny choice to the target”.It seeks to influence, but not to deny choice to the target”.Proportionality between the demand and the threat.Proportionality between the demand and the threat.

- - Sufficiently credible threat of punishment: Sufficiently credible threat of punishment: How to convince?How to convince?Leverage + reputation/credibility + capacity.Leverage + reputation/credibility + capacity.Level of support of the public opinion.Level of support of the public opinion.


B) Elements:B) Elements:

- - “Sticks and carrots” policy: “Sticks and carrots” policy: How works the cost-benefits model?How works the cost-benefits model?

Use of positive inducements: “if you do x, I will do y”. Use of positive inducements: “if you do x, I will do y”.

C) Phases of coercion:C) Phases of coercion:

1. Threat to use force1. Threat to use force 2. Demonstrative use of force2. Demonstrative use of force 3. Full-scale use of force3. Full-scale use of force

CD depends on: CD depends on: how much destruction is done to the targethow much destruction is done to the targethow much of military power is drawn uponhow much of military power is drawn upon

Failure of CD: Failure of CD: War War


D) D) Relations and differences with other diplomatic related conceptsRelations and differences with other diplomatic related concepts::

-- Deterrence: “Not doing what it is not doing”.Deterrence: “Not doing what it is not doing”.Prevent an not initiated or not planned action from occurring.Prevent an not initiated or not planned action from occurring.

-- Compellence:Compellence:Reverse an action already taken / happened.Reverse an action already taken / happened.Overturn the status quo.Overturn the status quo.

-- Negotiation and Preventive Diplomacy:Negotiation and Preventive Diplomacy:CD as a way of conflict management (negotiation) and avoidance (PD).CD as a way of conflict management (negotiation) and avoidance (PD).

-- Full-scale force / open war:Full-scale force / open war:Use of brute military force to bludgeon an opponent.Use of brute military force to bludgeon an opponent.

2. Variants of the CD2. Variants of the CD

A) By type of participants:A) By type of participants:

Unilateral: Unilateral:

It is understood as a It is understood as a single actor holding the single actor holding the coercion.coercion.

Unilateral: Unilateral:

It is understood as a It is understood as a single actor holding the single actor holding the coercion.coercion.

Coalition: Coalition:

Collection of actors Collection of actors cooperating to achieve cooperating to achieve a common objective.a common objective.

Lack of harmony and Lack of harmony and different interest of different interest of coalition’s countries.coalition’s countries.

Coalition: Coalition:

Collection of actors Collection of actors cooperating to achieve cooperating to achieve a common objective.a common objective.

Lack of harmony and Lack of harmony and different interest of different interest of coalition’s countries.coalition’s countries.

Humanitarian Humanitarian coercion: coercion:

Use of force for Use of force for humanitarian humanitarian objectivesobjectives

Difficult to identify Difficult to identify between military and between military and civilians.civilians.

Humanitarian Humanitarian coercion: coercion:

Use of force for Use of force for humanitarian humanitarian objectivesobjectives

Difficult to identify Difficult to identify between military and between military and civilians.civilians.

USA - CubaUSA - CubaUSA - CubaUSA - Cuba Word War IIWord War IIWord War IIWord War II • To reconstitute a viable To reconstitute a viable central government in central government in SomaliaSomalia

• To reconstitute a viable To reconstitute a viable central government in central government in SomaliaSomalia

B) Level of pressure:B) Level of pressure:

The UltimatumUltimatum, explicit or tacit, in which a deadline is given for compliance backed by a credible threat of strong punishment.

The UltimatumUltimatum, explicit or tacit, in which a deadline is given for compliance backed by a credible threat of strong punishment.

The weakerThe weaker, , gradual turning of the screwgradual turning of the screw, , in which a sense of in which a sense of urgency for compliance is diluted and backed only with the threat of urgency for compliance is diluted and backed only with the threat of

incrementally severe punishment over timeincrementally severe punishment over time..

The weakerThe weaker, , gradual turning of the screwgradual turning of the screw, , in which a sense of in which a sense of urgency for compliance is diluted and backed only with the threat of urgency for compliance is diluted and backed only with the threat of

incrementally severe punishment over timeincrementally severe punishment over time..

The even weaker The even weaker try and seetry and see, variant of the strategy that lacks both urgency for compliance and a clear threat of strong punishment.

The even weaker The even weaker try and seetry and see, variant of the strategy that lacks both urgency for compliance and a clear threat of strong punishment.

2. Variants of the CD2. Variants of the CD

3. 3. How does CD work?How does CD work?

Strategy:

It constitutes the creative element in the search for the optimum relationship between political ends and the means available for

achieving them.

A) A) Coercer state strategy :Coercer state strategy :

International, regional and local actors

To support the strategy with diplomatic weight and economic capacity.

LibyaLibya

Western Europe

United Nations

Siria

Role of the leverage

A mediator who pressure the parties to make concessions and to ensure that disputants adhere to the agreements they have entered

into. Not necessary a country even institutions

USAMalvinas IslandsMalvinas Islands

Argentina - UKArgentina - UK

B) B) Commonly used mechanismsCommonly used mechanisms::



C) C) Coercive instruments:Coercive instruments:

1. Economic sanctions and international isolation:1. Economic sanctions and international isolation:

SanctionsSanctions: place economic pressure on an adversary.: place economic pressure on an adversary.

Political isolationPolitical isolation: breaking-off of diplomatic relations and/or adoption of : breaking-off of diplomatic relations and/or adoption of multilateral resolutions that condemn adversary's behavior.multilateral resolutions that condemn adversary's behavior.

2.2. Support for an insurgency:Support for an insurgency:

Create internal war environment by providing money, training and weapons Create internal war environment by providing money, training and weapons to insurgence forces.to insurgence forces.

Goals and limitations.Goals and limitations.


3.3. Air strikes: Air strikes: Attacks by air of a few, selected targets.Attacks by air of a few, selected targets.

4.4. Invasions and land grabs:Invasions and land grabs:The use of threat of ground troops by the occupation and devastation The use of threat of ground troops by the occupation and devastation of valuable territory.of valuable territory.Useful when the coercer's demand involves withdrawal from disputed Useful when the coercer's demand involves withdrawal from disputed geographic areas.geographic areas.

5.5. The threat of nuclear attacks:The threat of nuclear attacks:Potentially powerful coercive tool, with very limited applicability.Potentially powerful coercive tool, with very limited applicability.Not recommended with nuclear-armed adversaries: risk of escalation.Not recommended with nuclear-armed adversaries: risk of escalation.


D) D) Coercing / target state approachCoercing / target state approach::

Counter-coercive strategies:Counter-coercive strategies:

-- Negotiations designed to fracture coalition support.Negotiations designed to fracture coalition support.

-- Take advantage of domestic constraints in the coercer state.Take advantage of domestic constraints in the coercer state.

- - Tight control over media and internal propaganda.Tight control over media and internal propaganda.

- - Create counter-alliances.Create counter-alliances.

-- Create actual or prospective coercer’s casualties.Create actual or prospective coercer’s casualties.

- - Use peacekeepers or aid workers as hostages.Use peacekeepers or aid workers as hostages.

-- Increase nationalism at home.Increase nationalism at home.

-- Threat to use WMD against coercer’s troops and civilian targets.Threat to use WMD against coercer’s troops and civilian targets.

Charter of the United Nations:Charter of the United Nations:Limitations and concessions.Limitations and concessions.

4. The adoption of coercive measures 4. The adoption of coercive measures and the international lawand the international law

Chapter IChapter IArticle 2.Article 2.4. All Members 4. All Members shall refrain shall refrain in their international relations in their international relations from the threat or from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any stateof any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United , or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.Nations.

Chapter VIIChapter VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHESACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES

OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Articles 39 - 42Articles 39 - 42

The Security Council shall The Security Council shall determinedetermine the existence of any threat to the existence of any threat to

the peace and shall make recommendations or the peace and shall make recommendations or decide what decide what measures shall be taken.measures shall be taken.

The Security Council may decideThe Security Council may decide what measures not involving the what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.

Chapter VIIIChapter VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTSREGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 53Article 53

• No enforcement action shall be taken No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/44/215,

which called upon the developed countries to refrain from to refrain from

exercising political coercion through the application of exercising political coercion through the application of

economic instrumentseconomic instruments with the purpose of inducing changes in

the economic or social systems, as well as in the domestic or

foreign policies of other countries

5. 5. Limitations and critics to the CDLimitations and critics to the CD

A) Critics:A) Critics:

-- CD as interference in internal affairs: Sovereignty-related issues.CD as interference in internal affairs: Sovereignty-related issues.

-- CD as status quo strategy:CD as status quo strategy:““The coercer defends the status quo because of the benefits it confers, The coercer defends the status quo because of the benefits it confers, the target tries to overthrow the status quo because of the injury it the target tries to overthrow the status quo because of the injury it inflicts” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 8).inflicts” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 8).Reluctance of super powers to adopt revisions of “unfair” situations or Reluctance of super powers to adopt revisions of “unfair” situations or attend “rightful” demands.attend “rightful” demands.

-- Differences between “genuine” CD vs. “disingenuous” CD.Differences between “genuine” CD vs. “disingenuous” CD.

-- The question of lawfulness of CD measures and human rights.The question of lawfulness of CD measures and human rights.


B) Limitations and challenges:B) Limitations and challenges:

- - The question of effectiveness of CD: The question of effectiveness of CD: why is CD difficult?why is CD difficult?

Credibility and power are at stake.Credibility and power are at stake.

Will this be the coercer’s last demand, or is it only the first in a series of demands?Will this be the coercer’s last demand, or is it only the first in a series of demands?

Multiple coercers and multiple targets.Multiple coercers and multiple targets.

Boomerang and domino effects: Escalation.Boomerang and domino effects: Escalation.

The role of positive inducements or “carrots”.The role of positive inducements or “carrots”.

Military superiority is not guarantee of success.Military superiority is not guarantee of success.

Si vis pacem, para bellum.Si vis pacem, para bellum.

CD case reportsCD case reports SuccessSuccess Failure Failure AmbiguousAmbiguous

1945-1990 data: 7 cases.1945-1990 data: 7 cases.George (1994)George (1994) 29%29% 43%43% 28%28%

1990-2001 data: 8 cases. 1990-2001 data: 8 cases. Art and Cronin (2003)Art and Cronin (2003) 25%25% 63%63% 12%12%

Combined cases (average)Combined cases (average) 27%27% 53%53% 20%20%


B) Limitations and challenges:B) Limitations and challenges:

-- What are the prerequisites for success?What are the prerequisites for success?

1. Clarity about the objectives.1. Clarity about the objectives.

2. Sufficient domestic and international support.2. Sufficient domestic and international support.

3. Strong leadership and motivation: accept cost and risks.3. Strong leadership and motivation: accept cost and risks.

4. Dissuasion: Target’s fear of unacceptable escalation.4. Dissuasion: Target’s fear of unacceptable escalation.

5. Effectiveness of instruments and mechanisms.5. Effectiveness of instruments and mechanisms.

Source: Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 387.Source: Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 387.

6. 6. Case studies:Case studies:

A) By the United States: A) By the United States: Iraq (1990-1991):Iraq (1990-1991):

GoalGoal Withdrawal Iraqi forces of Kuwait (in the scope of the Gulf War, 1990-1991).Withdrawal Iraqi forces of Kuwait (in the scope of the Gulf War, 1990-1991).

MechanismsMechanisms 1) Diplomatic pressure:1) Diplomatic pressure:

Build a strong UN supported international coalition: 10 + 29 country members.Build a strong UN supported international coalition: 10 + 29 country members.

Political isolation: UNSC Res. 660 (Aug. 2).Political isolation: UNSC Res. 660 (Aug. 2).

2) Economic pressure:2) Economic pressure:

Economic sanctions: UNSC Res. 661 (Aug.6): Economic sanctions: UNSC Res. 661 (Aug.6): full trade embargofull trade embargo..

3) Military pressure:3) Military pressure:

Air strikes: UNSC Res. 670 (Sep. 25): civil aviation sanctions + aerial attacks.Air strikes: UNSC Res. 670 (Sep. 25): civil aviation sanctions + aerial attacks.

Ground troops invasion: Operation Desert Storm (open war): ~956.600 men.Ground troops invasion: Operation Desert Storm (open war): ~956.600 men.

LimitationsLimitations Saddam Hussein as a complex target for CD: individual interests.Saddam Hussein as a complex target for CD: individual interests.

Impossibility to manage Iraqi internal situation (Kurdish und Shiite’s uprisings) Impossibility to manage Iraqi internal situation (Kurdish und Shiite’s uprisings) as a mean of coercion.as a mean of coercion.

““US decision makers wanted Iraq weakened but not destroyed” (Alterman, US decision makers wanted Iraq weakened but not destroyed” (Alterman, 2003, p.283).2003, p.283).


A) By the United States: A) By the United States: Iraq (1990-1991):Iraq (1990-1991):

Desired Desired outcomesoutcomes

Iraq removed forces from Kuwait.Iraq removed forces from Kuwait.

No spread of the conflict, ex. to Saudi Arabia.No spread of the conflict, ex. to Saudi Arabia.

Blockade Iraq’s possibilities for counter-coercion.Blockade Iraq’s possibilities for counter-coercion.

Undesired Undesired outcomesoutcomes

Requirement of direct use of force.Requirement of direct use of force.

High number casualties: High number casualties:

- Coalition: 482 men / Iraq: ~35.000 men, ~75.000 wounded, ~3.664 civilians.- Coalition: 482 men / Iraq: ~35.000 men, ~75.000 wounded, ~3.664 civilians.

Negative socio and economical consequences for the Iraqi population.Negative socio and economical consequences for the Iraqi population.

Iraq’s defiance of cease-fire resolutions: Iraq’s defiance of cease-fire resolutions: chemical and biological weapons.chemical and biological weapons.

Conflictive relations between US and Iraq → US-led invasion in 2003.Conflictive relations between US and Iraq → US-led invasion in 2003.

Final Final outcomeoutcome

FAILUREFAILURE


B) By the European Union and USA:B) By the European Union and USA: Iran (2003- until now): Iran (2003- until now):

GoalGoal Contain the Iranian nuclear program. Contain the Iranian nuclear program.

MechanismsMechanisms The EU-3 adopted a coercive diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Iran.The EU-3 adopted a coercive diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Iran.

Sticks and carrots strategy.Sticks and carrots strategy.

- Agreements- Agreements

WeakeningWeakening

Economic pressure:Economic pressure:

- Seizure of assets- Seizure of assets

- Sanctions on exports to Iran (the energy, shipping and insurance)- Sanctions on exports to Iran (the energy, shipping and insurance)

LimitationsLimitations -The first military intervention of the European Union. The first military intervention of the European Union. - Asymmetry of motivation. Asymmetry of motivation. - The EU had the additional problem of being the spokesperson for the rest of The EU had the additional problem of being the spokesperson for the rest of the world, including the USA, and sometimes Russia and China as well.the world, including the USA, and sometimes Russia and China as well.

Desired Desired outcomesoutcomes

Iran continues reporting in a irregular way to IAEA about the nuclear Iran continues reporting in a irregular way to IAEA about the nuclear activities.activities.

Undesired Undesired outcomesoutcomes

Iran declares itself to be a nuclear stateIran declares itself to be a nuclear state

Avoid uranium enrichment and ensure that uranium is exported to other Avoid uranium enrichment and ensure that uranium is exported to other countries reachedcountries reached

Final Final outcomeoutcome

-The first session of fresh negotiations in April went well (April 2012)-The first session of fresh negotiations in April went well (April 2012)

- United States toughens economic sanctions against Iran- United States toughens economic sanctions against Iran


B) By the European Union and USA:B) By the European Union and USA: Iran (2003- until now): Iran (2003- until now):

• Are all countries able to exercise coercive diplomacy?Are all countries able to exercise coercive diplomacy?

• Have they succeed in its coercive diplomacy efforts? Have they succeed in its coercive diplomacy efforts?

• What have the difficulties been?What have the difficulties been?

• What lessons can be drawn?What lessons can be drawn?

Thanks for your attentionThanks for your attention

Education

Coercive diplomacy, 26 11-2012 22h38