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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
Is a Mexican Drug Cartel-Al-Qaeda
relationship possible to attack Mexican or US
interests?
Francisco Javier Franco Quintero Mármol
MA. Intelligence and International Security
2007-2008
Student number.0747426
DISSERTATION
3
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
4
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
Contents
INTRODUCTION
5
I. TERRORISM IN MEXICO, AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE & AL-QAEDA PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
8 II. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
20
III. AL-QAEDA
24
IV. MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS
41
CONCLUSIONS
55
BIBLIOGRAPHY
57
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 2007 The Washington Times reported that, according to a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) report, „[i]t is very likely that any future
September 11th type of terrorist event in the United States may be facilitated,
wittingly or unwittingly, by drug traffickers operating on both sides of the United
States-Mexico border‟.1 The article was supported by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence report where it was stated that during the
last two years, Al-Qaeda had been aided by established Mexican drug cartels to
smuggle weapons of mass destruction and transport terrorist into the United
States (US) through sophisticated trafficking routes. The great concern for US
intelligence authorities, the article pointed out, is that terrorist cells have been
camouflaging their nationalities with Latin American nationalities to enter into the
US utilizing the illegal migration flow. The report concludes stating that the US
southern border is at terrorist risk, that it is vulnerable from the entry of terrorists,
weapons of mass destruction or portable conventional weapons into the United
States.
This warning is not new, after 9/11 certain US commentators have consistently
argued that the border is a serious security threat for the ease with which it can
be transgressed.2 However, even though no hard evidence has been presented
by the authorities, the US media has consistently voiced out alarm in this regard.
As a result of this concern and as an intelligence issue, the possibility of
terrorists, particularly Al-Qaeda, teaming with Mexican Drug Cartels (MDC) to
produce an attack in Mexico or in the US has motivated this dissertation.
1 „Terrorist teaming with drug cartels‟, The Washington Times, August 8, 2007
2 Leiken and Brooke (2007). In his article the authors stated that CNN is probably the most vocal of these; CNN collection
of „Broken Borders‟ reports can be accessed at www.nbpc.net/multimedia/borders/. According to them, The Washington Times is another: „„Insults from South of the Border,‟‟ The Washington Times, March 23, 2005; „„Terrorists Said to Seek Entry to U.S. via Mexico”, the Washington Times, April 7, 2003; „„Al Qaeda Seeks Tie to Local Gangs,‟‟ The Washington Times, September 28, 2004. They added that Fox News and NBC as well are repeatedly talking about the issue. Also, the authors include other reports as „„Bordering On Nukes? New Accounts from Al-Qaeda to Attack the U.S. with Weapons of Mass Destruction,‟‟ Time Magazine, November 22, 2004 by Adam Zogorin, and „„Search Underway for Six Who May Pose Terrorist Threat to Boston,‟‟ The Boston Globe, January 19, 2005 by Donovan Slack; along with the report presented by the UK paper The Telegraph: „„Arab terrorists „are getting into the US over Mexican border‟ ‟‟ on August 15, 2004.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
Historically the border has always been a motive of concerns for both countries.
After Mexico‟s independence in 1810, the Government was worried about the
continuous US illegal migration which had been placed in Texas, especially about
those bandits that running out of US territory found safe haven in Mexico.3 In
1846, without a casus-belli US soldiers crossed the border to initialize a war with
Mexico that after two years finished with Mexico‟s defeat and the loss of the
territories now known as Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and California.4 Later on
in the XX century, concerns in the frontier were focused in the increasing illegal
migration from Mexico to the US and the smuggling of drugs and goods: „[f]rom
Mexico came marijuana, heroin and, later, cocaine, whereas from the United
States came refrigerators, televisions, cars and weapons‟5.
It is a fact that the events of September 11, 2001 forced the re-examination of
Mexico-US border relations. In the post-9/11 calculus, terrorism raised new
national security concerns for both countries with the possibility of infiltration from
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction through the common frontier.
Therefore, Is a Mexican Drug Cartel-Al-Qaeda relationship possible to attack
Mexican or US interests? To answer this question the present dissertation will be
divided in four chapters. Chapter one has been divided into two sections: the first
one includes a review of terrorist attacks on Mexico and how this affected US‟
interests as well; in the second section the presence of Al-Qaeda in Latin
America will be analyzed. Chapter two deals with the importance of the analysis
of adversary intentions and capabilities to understand the level of the threat
posed. Chapter three analyzes Al-Qaeda‟s intentions and capabilities to attack
Mexico or the US and questions its intentions and capabilities to collaborate with
MDC. Chapter four discusses MDC‟ intentions and capabilities to attack Mexican
or US interests as well as its intentions and capabilities to collaborate with Al-
Qaeda. A conclusion arguing that in the short-term a collaboration between MDC
3 Vázquez and Meyer (2001).
4 Ibid
5 Pimentel (2000), p. 36
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
and Al-Qaeda to attack Mexican or US interests is not possible because
differences in both group‟s intentions will end the discussion, but warns that
intelligence communities in both countries must be alert for this possibility
because in the intelligence world adversary‟ intentions are changing all the time
and that which today seems irrational in the future might occur.
Finally, for the purposes of this dissertation, US and Mexican interests are not
defined by its strategic importance. Country‟s interests can be all those things
that formed modern national-states as its people, territory and government, even
though some interests are outside of traditional land boundaries, such as
embassies, citizens or even business enterprises. Mexico and especially the US
have worldwide interests. Thus, when this dissertation refers to either Mexican or
US interests it is talking about every single element that concerns Mexico or the
US.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
I. TERRORISM IN MEXICO, AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE & AL-QAEDA PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
TERRORISM IN MEXICO, AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
To start explaining terrorist activities in Mexico, it is useful to consider what Mark
Sedgwick stated: „the most important cause of global waves of terror is the
inspiring example for radicals everywhere of what are, or appear to be,
successful uses of terrorist strategies‟.6 In this observation, it is considered that
global influences had, and still continue to have, a big impact on terrorism
activities in the country, therefore three different waves of terrorism can be
historically distinguished in Mexico; the first one took place in the context of the
Cold War during the 70s and 80s, where leftist guerrilla groups carried out
several kidnappings and bombings on strategic targets; only during these
decades, the US and even other countries‟ interests were affected; the second
wave occurred during the 90s, where Narcoterrorist activities first appeared.
These actions were mostly inspired by the Colombian cartels of Cali and
Medellin; the third wave started after the 9/11 attacks, when apparently some
groups have been inspired by terrorist techniques of groups such as Al-Qaeda.
a) Terrorism activities in the 70s and 80s
In the context of the Cold War, several terrorist manifestations with a nationalist
and anti-American tinge appeared worldwide and Mexico was not the exception.
Terrorist activities on Mexico started in the 70s when two strongly politically
motivated organizations, the Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo
(People's Revolutionary Armed Forces) (FRAP) and La liga Comunista 23 de
Septiembre (The Twenty-third of September Communist League) carried out
6 Sedgwick (2007), p.97
9
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
kidnappings and terrorist attacks against strategic targets.7 As a result, this
period of time is considered the most intense as far as terrorist activities that
Mexico has ever dealt with.
FRAP‟s strategy consisted on kidnapping strategic targets in order to obtain
publicity and money. Those targets were either Mexican or US as happened with
the kidnapping of the US general consul, Terence G. Leonhardy, on May 4, 1973
in Guadalajara, Jalisco. The group demanded the release of thirty prisoners, a
publication of an antigovernment communiqué and the suspension of the search
for Leonhardy‟s kidnappers. The Mexican Government quickly agreed to the
demands and the diplomat was released on May 6.8 The next action was the
kidnapping of the former Governor of Jalisco, and the father-in-law of Mexican
President Luis Echeverria, José Guadalupe Zuno Hernandez, on August 28,
1974. The FRAP threatened to kill him unless the government paid a $1.6 million
ransom, released ten political prisoners and allowed them safe passage into
Cuba, and authorized a publication of a FRAP manifesto in leading newspapers.
The government refused to negotiate, and following a successfully operation the
police arrested the kidnappers and released Zuno.9
La Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre was more active in its actions and became
the first organization that utilized home-made bombs to affect US and Mexican
interests. The first attack occurred on July 17, 1972 when a panel truck
containing plastic cans filled with gasoline and attached to dynamite caps,
exploded in front of the US Consulate General in Monterrey, the capital of the
northern state of Nuevo Leon. The explosion destroyed the truck but caused no
damage to the Consulate and no injuries to any of its members.10 The second
7 In those decades the Government recognized 5 more guerrilla organizations: Armed Vanguard
of the Proletariat, Mexican People's Revolutionary Army, People's Armed Command, People's Liberation Army, United Popular Liberation Army of America; however these organizations had no criminal or terrorist activities. 8 Mickolus (1980), p.389
9 Ibid, p. 473
10 Ibid, p. 333
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
terrorist attack took place on September 16 1972, on Mexico's Independence
Day celebration, when twelve bombs exploded simultaneously in four cities
injuring one person and causing considerable property damage; seven of the
blasts damaged the offices of US owned businesses.11 The third attack occurred
on February 24, 1974, on another patriotic day in Mexico, when seven bombs
went off simultaneously during the night at the offices of US and other foreign
and national companies. In Guadalajara, for example, Pepsi-Cola and Union
Carbide plants were damaged, while Coca-Cola offices, a bakery, and federal
offices were targeted in the southern state of Oaxaca.12
However, US interests were not the only ones being attacked during the 70s or
80s by the Twenty-third of September Communist League. The organization
claimed credit for the kidnapping of the UK honorary consul, Anthony Duncan
Williams, in Guadalajara on October 10, 1973. Simultaneously, the organization
was also allegedly responsible of the homemade bombs that exploded one
month later causing considerable damage to the Bank of London branch in
Guadalajara.13 The following year, on December 5, this organization held
hostage two French diplomats at gunpoint in their embassy in Mexico City for five
hours.14 In addition on May 25, 1976, Nadine Chaval, the daughter of the Belgian
ambassador, was kidnapped after leaving her home in Mexico City when she
was going to the School, though the ambassador Andree Chaval, was the
intended victim, and after the ransom payment, she was released.15
Nonetheless, la Liga 23 de Septiembre, also affected Mexican interests as well.
On November 30, 1976, they were allegedly responsible for four bombs that
exploded in Mexico City on the eve of the inauguration of President-elect Jose
Lopez Portillo;16 and the bomb that exploded at a military checkpoint near the
11
Mickolus (1980), p. 345 12
Ibid, p. 439 13
Ibid, p. 419 14
Ibid, p. 493 15
Ibid. p. 610 16
Ibid, p. 662
11
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
meeting site for Mexican President Lopez Portillo and Panama's President
Torrijos on May 6, 1977.17
Another important factor that needs to be highlighted is that Mexico was utilized
during the 70s and 80s by international terrorist groups to achieve its specific
demands. These were the notorious cases of the attacks against the Cuban
regime by anti-Castro Cuban exiles. The objectives of these groups was twofold;
first, to conduct attacks on Cuban interests anywhere and everywhere where
they could be perpetrated, and second, to generate terror within Mexico in order
to affect the closest relationship that the Mexican Government had with La
Havana during the Cold War.18
In this regard the Cuban embassy in Lima, Peru, was targeted twice by bomb
packages mailed from Mexico that killed two and damaged the building. These
events occurred on February 4, 1974; and the next day, the Movimiento Armado
Nacionalista Organizado (MANO), a Peruvian terrorist group, claimed the
attacks.19 In the same fashion, the Cuban embassy in Mexico City was hit twice
on December 3, 197320 and January 20, 1974.21 Both attacks were claimed by
the Cuban National Liberation Front. In addition, there was a failed attempt to
assassinate the Cuban ambassador Fernando Lopes Muino, on November 28,
1975.22 The next day a group of Anti-Castro Cuban exiles were believed to be
responsible for planting a bomb that caused property damage on the entrance of
the Soviet embassy in Mexico City.23
The last case with regard to international groups utilizing Mexican soil to achieve
their demands occurred on April 27, 1986, when the police found and deactivated
17
Mickolus (1980), p, 697 18
Vázquez and Meyer (2001). 19
Mickolus (1980), p. 435 20
Ibid, p. 420 21
Ibid, p. 430 22
Ibid, p. 565 23
Ibid
12
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
a 15-kilogram gelignite bomb in the trunk of a stolen car, parked within 50 meters
of the US embassy in Mexico City. The next day, the unknown Simon Bolivar
Anti-Imperialist Commando claimed responsibility for the attacks and sent a
statement to the newspapers stating that the bomb was meant as a protest for
the US raid on Libya.24
b) Narcoterrorism in the 90s
As a result of international law enforcement pressure against drug traffickers in
Colombia, which started on the 80s but was intensified in the 90s, the cartels of
Cali and Medellin followed two courses of action: one, they expanded even more
their networks in order to camouflage the illegal activities and continued with their
business. Secondly, they defended themselves by carrying out an uncontrolled
war against rival cartels and also against law enforcement officials who impeded
the trade. The Cartel of Medellin was the most dangerous in this regard; Pablo
Escobar for example began a terrorist campaign under the principle of Plata o
Plomo, (Silver or Lead): a choice between accepting a job on a criminal payroll or
accepting a bullet in the head.25
While the violence in Colombia was intensifying, links between drug cartels in
Mexico and Colombia were stretched.26 In this regard, MDC probably considered
that the terrorist techniques used by the Cartel of Medellin to intimidate and kill its
opponents, as using car bombs for example, had the potential to succeed upon
the Mexican national security scenario. As a consequence, with or without direct
Colombian training, these techniques were imitated by criminal organizations in
Mexico.
In concrete, only two cases of Narcoterrorist actions were registered during the
90s‟. Both attacks occurred in North and Central Mexico, in the states of Sinaloa
24
Mickolus (1980), p. 387 25
Ibid 26
Ibid
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
and Jalisco respectively, this attacks were carried out to eliminate law
enforcement officers or as a revenge among drug lords.
The first event took place in Sinaloa on the morning of May 29, 1992 when two
car-bombs were set off simultaneously. In the first explosion the target was
Gustavo Rico Urrea, a local drug lord.27 In the second explosion the target was
Armando Barraza, a former local law enforcement official in Culiacán the capital
of the state.28The second event occurred in Jalisco, on June 11, 1994 when a
car-bomb exploded outside the Camino Real hotel in Guadalajara; the target was
Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the leader of Sinaloa Drug Cartel, who survived the
attack.29
c) Terrorism activities in the XXI century
Terrorism activities started in early 2000 and intensified in the following years
after 9/11 attacks and in the aftermath. These attacks have been carried out by
drug cartels, but most intensely and more frequently by insurgent groups; both
have completely different targets since while drug cartels still focus on
sanctioning their opponents and law enforcement officers, insurgents groups
have affected political institutions and national and international economic
interests.
Terrorist activities in the XXI century carried out by Insurgent groups
Seven attacks were attributed to leftist guerrilla organizations since 2000, and
even there is no evidence of collaboration between Insurgent groups an Al-
Qaeda in those attacks, is a fact that these guerrilla organizations have a radical
ideology and apparently are imitating Bin Laden‟s terrorist techniques to achieve
their goals. 27
„Surgió en los 90 el terrorismo del narco‟, El Universal, February 20, 2008 28
Ibid. 29
Ibid.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
The first terrorist attack occurred on March 15, 2000 when a military air force
base and a dam were hit in the Estado de Mexico, the closest state to Mexico
City. The alleged responsible group was the Ejército Popular Revolucionario
(EPR), People‟s Army Revolutionary.30 This organization, formed by ex guerrilla
fighters from the 70s and 80s, currently is the most active guerrilla group in the
country.
The second attack took place on August 8, 2001, when three home-made bombs
exploded simultaneously in three Banamex Bank branches in Mexico City. The
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP), People's Armed
Revolutionary Forces, a group that split up from EPR claimed responsibility for
the attack.31
Three years later, on May 23, 2004 the previously unknown rebel group
Comando Jaramillista Morelense 23 de Mayo was believed responsible for
setting off three bombs at Banamex, BBVA Bancomer and Santander Serfin
Bank branches in Cuernavaca, a city only 60 km from Mexico City.32 In both
attacks no injuries were reported.
In the coming years EPR‟ attacks increased in intensity and level of complexity
just as the attacks on November 6, 2006 when three explosives were set off
simultaneously in Mexico City. The first target was the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI) headquarters, the party that ruled Mexico for 71 years, and
currently the second most important political party in Mexico; the second target
was the Tribunal Federal Electoral (Federal Electoral Tribunal), the institution that
validated the controversial July 2006 presidential election; and the third target
was a Scotiabank branch.33 Those attacks took place four months after the
presidential elections against political, electoral and economic objectives and
30
„La PGR aun no aclara 11 ataques eperristas‟, El Universal, December 14, 2007 31
„Cronología de atentados en el DF‟, El Universal, February 16, 2008 32
„La PGR aun no aclara 11 ataques eperristas‟, El Universal, December 14, 2007 33
Ibid.
15
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
though no casualties were reported and the government‟s capabilities remained
intact, the EPR sent a powerful message about their opposition to political and
economic norms of the Mexican system.
The following three EPR‟s attacks were directed against PEMEX facilities
(Mexican state oil company). The first one occurred on July 5, 2007 in PEMEX
facilities in Salamanca, Celaya y Valle de Santiago, all of them in the state of
Guanajuato; the second attack occurred five days later on July 10, in PEMEX
pipelines in the state of Queretaro. The last one occurred on September 10, 2007
when oil pipelines were hit in the states of Tlaxcala and Veracruz. These attacks
represented an economic loss of more than US$ 300 million.34
Even though, some commentators consider that those attacks carried out by the
EPR arose as a response to law enforcement pressure35 the evidence suggests
that the EPR has impact a terrorist strategy to achieve its goals and is imitating
terrorist techniques such as those of Al-Qaeda against oil facilities in Saudi
Arabia and Iraq. In this regard Mexican intelligence agencies must be alert on the
networks that these groups are building up.
Terrorism activities in the XXI century carried out by drug cartels
Since 2000 only one incident has been registered. This occurred on February
15, 2008, when a bomb went off outside the building of the Secretaría de
Seguridad Pública del Distrito Federal ( Mexico City‟s Public Security
Ministry).The attack only killed the bomb-carrier and left two injured; the
34
„La PGR aun no aclara 11 ataques eperristas‟, El Universal, December 14, 2007 35
Some people consider that those attacks were in response of the „the dirty war‟ against leftist groups. In fact previously to the attacks on PEMEX facilities three EPR‟ members were disappeared in the state of Oaxaca and so far their whereabouts remain unknown. The EPR pointed out that the local government was the responsible for these disappearances.
16
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
attempted target was a top police official and the Cartel of Sinaloa was
responsible for the attack.36
MDC intentions will be discussed further below, but in short it is considered that
MDC are imitating terrorist techniques of groups such as Al-Qaeda or others to
intimidate its rivals, as occurred during the 90s with cartels in Colombia, rather
than adopting a radical ideology or a terrorist strategy.
In addition, it is important to highlight two important facts with regard to Mexican
terrorist activities after 9/11. The first one, is that some international terrorist
organizations have increased their presence in the country as was revealed with
the discovery of FARC offices in Mexico City on April 200237 and the arrests on
July 18, 2003 of six Spaniards and three Mexicans, all of them members of the
Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA).38 Mexican officials said they were laundering
money for ETA and forging documents for its members
The other fact is that because of Mexico‟s proximity with US, after 9/11 the
country could be more frequently used as a platform to attack the US regardless
of whether the MDC or other local criminal organizations are involved. This
observation became a reality on December 2003 when terrorist alerts in the
country increased drastically as a result of US intelligence agencies warning that
Al-Qaeda plan to hijack a commercial airplane departing from Mexico City which
could be used for terrorist purposes. This warning resulted in the cancellation of
the 409 Aeromexico flight flying from Mexico City to Los Angeles for three
consecutive days December 31, 2003, January 1, 2004 and January 2, 2004.39
This intelligence information affected other countries as well; actually it was a one
week terrorist alert that had started on mid-December 2003 with the cancellation
36
„Cronología de atentados en el DF‟ El Universal, February 16, 2008 37
Mickolus and Simons (2006), p. 38 38
Ibid, p. 218 39
„Aeroméxico suspende dos vuelos a Los Angeles por exigencias de EU‟, La Jornada, January 2, 2004
17
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
of other seven flights coming from the UK and France. The first one was the 223
British Airways flight that was cancelled on January 2 and 3, 2004.40 The last
time that this Boeing 727 flew to Los Angeles was on the December 31, 2003 but
was escorted by two F-16 of the US air force. Once the airplane landed, the crew
and passengers were subject to a rigorous interrogatory.41 The six remaining
cancelled flights during those days belong to Air France and were supposed to
arrived from Paris to Los Angeles on the 2nd and 3rd of January, 2004.42
THE PRESENCE OF AL-QAEDA IN LATIN AMERICA
According to Rohan Gunaratna „[t]he arrest and interrogation of an Afghanistan-
trained member of the Islamic Group of Egypt in Uruguay on February 27, 1999
was the first suggestion of a possible Al Qaeda presence in the region‟.43 The
suggestion was based on the fact that the Egyptian group „has merged with Al
Qaeda at strategic, operational, and tactical levels and functions almost as one
organization‟.44 However, as Gunaratna recognized, even though some Al-
Qaeda allies have been identified in some Latin American countries, the truth is
that there is no consistent evidence of a permanent Al-Qaeda presence in the
region.
With regard to Al-Qaeda‟s allies, Paul Williams stated that Hezbollah was the first
Middle Eastern terrorist group that came to South America in 198345 and was
followed by Hamas from Palestine, and by Egypt‟s Al-Gama‟a al-Islamiyya
(Islamic Group) that came to the region in the mid-nineties46. All of them
established permanent base-camps in a South American jungle corner called the
40
„British Airways cancela uno de sus vuelos con destino a Washington por seguridad‟ El Mundo, January 3, 2004. 41
Ibid 42
„Pasajeros de una pesadilla de número 223‟, Pagina 12, January 3, 2004 43
Gunaratna (2002), p. 164 44
Ibid 45
Williams (2005), p.123 46
Gunaratna (2002), p.164
18
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
Tri-Border area, a place that covers the cities of Puerto Iguazu, in Argentina; Foz
do Iguazu in Brazil; and Ciudad del Este in Paraguay. Recent reports from the
Tri-Border area also include the presence of Al-Jihad from Egypt and al-
Muqawamah, which is a pro-Iran wing of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah.47
The importance of Al-Qaeda‟s allies in the zone resides on the fact that those
groups have developed an important infrastructure that might be helpful for Bin
Laden‟s intentions. These groups collude with local criminal groups and their
reach extents far beyond the Tri-Border area. These links are becoming
increasingly relevant because Al-Qaeda could connect with other groups further
north of the continent, towards the US. In this regard Paul Williams explains that:
[u]pon their arrival in the New World, the Hezbollah officials wasted little time in
establishing business ties with the drug cartels from Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and
Ecuador, along with Latin American paramilitary groups such as the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Peru‟s Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Star”). The dealers
and the revolutionaries needed guns that Hezbollah could provide though its connections
with the Chechen Mafia, and Hezbollah sought cocaine that it could sell throughout the
Middle East and Europe with the help of the Sicilian Mafia.48
Furthermore, Gunaratna concludes that „[t]he Islamist terrorist threat to Latin
America and beyond will depend to a large extent on post-9/11 Al Qaeda-
Hezbollah decision-making, two groups that hitherto have cooperated to advance
common aims and objectives‟.49 In this regard it is a fact that Islamic terrorism
might become a serious threat in Latin America in the coming years. Additionally,
either using the infrastructure developed by Hezbollah or using by their own
capabilities, Al-Qaeda could settle anywhere in Latin America without the
necessity of maintaining permanent base-camps; or attack any country without
the support of its Tri-Border‟s allies.
47
Hudson (2003), p. 1 48
Williams (2005), p.124 49
Gunaratna (2002), p.165
19
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
Nevertheless, even though the long history of Latin American terrorist events, it
must be acknowledge that there is no evidence registered as far as terrorists
attacks carried out, or supported by, Al-Qaeda in any Latin American country
before or after 9/11. Gunaratna confirm that a terrorist alarm sounded on April 6,
2001, when the US closed its diplomatic missions in Paraguay, Uruguay and
Ecuador following intelligence reports that Al-Qaeda‟s attacks were likely to
occur,50 but nothing happened. In addition, there is no solid Al-Qaeda connection
to Hezbollah‟s attacks in Argentina on March 17, 1992 and July 17, 1994.
Since the 70s onwards, it cannot be ignored that although terrorist activities in
Mexico included the increased presence of international terrorist groups in the
country, as well as the possibility of an Al-Qaeda presence in any Latin American
country, a group‟s intentions must be considered a key element to analyze even
above of those facts. The reason is that when an attack or collaboration with
another group are planned, the group‟s intentions indicate how far a group is
willing to go in implementing its terrorist activities. In this sense a further analysis
will question Al-Qaeda‟s and MDC‟ intentions to collaborate and/or attack
Mexican or US interests.
50
Gunaratna (2002) p.165
20
Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
II. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.
Every group or individual has specific characteristics that define them and allow
them to achieve their goals. In the world of intelligence an adversary‟s
characteristics —regardless of whether an adversary is a group or individual, or
state or non-state actor— are defined by his intentions and capabilities.
The adversary‟s capabilities are all those resources that he can use in order to
achieve his goals and these can be material or non-material: material capabilities
are commonly weapons or money, and non-material capabilities are „… the
quality of the organization, morale, and military doctrine‟.51 On the other hand,
the adversary‟s intentions are his plans and goals, and according to Michael
Handel, these can be political and/or military.52 As a result it is considered that a
better understanding of an adversary‟s capabilities, but specially his intentions,
might provide a close insight of his agenda and therefore be able to estimate the
level of threat posed by such adversary. In this regard, Handel pointed out that it
is equally important to address both intentions and capabilities however it is more
critical to emphasize the study of the adversary‟s intentions for two key reasons:
(A) An adversary can still decide to attack even though his capabilities are relatively weak (1) if he miscalculates the strength of the intended victim; (2) If he is more interested in applying political pressure or making political gains even at the cost of a military defeat; (3) if he gambles that his surprise attack will have a force multiplier effect sufficient to compensate for his inferior capabilities. (B) War and surprise attack are determined not by the existence of capabilities per se, but by the political intention to use them. The mere possession of superior, equal, or inferior strength is therefore less important. A corollary of this is that, while the adversary‟s intentions can be influenced at any point, it is impossible to have comparable impact on capabilities immediately before the outbreak of war.53
51
Handel (2003), p.12 52
Ibid, p. 14 53
Betts and Mahnken (2003), p. 14
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
Moreover, the study and analysis of an adversary‟s intentions and capabilities
might be helpful as well to understand why this group or individual will be
interested in cooperating with other groups.
It is truth that not every terrorist or criminal group needs to establish alliances
with others to be able to achieve its goals. However some —especially those
which have targets beyond their borders or local conflicts, that target the „far
enemy‟— apparently are looking to collaborate with groups that might have
similar intentions and/or complementary capabilities to its own in order to fulfil
their objectives.
Groups sharing similar intentions might establish a cooperative relationship to
increase either political/military goals or strengthen the image and perceptions
within their audiences. In the other hand, some groups are looking to collaborate
with other groups because they have complementary capabilities to their own, or
they want to acquire new capabilities that are useful for their purposes. Al-Qaeda
for example, forged a tactical relationship with Hezbollah in order to master the
art of bombing buildings.54 In return, Hezbollah gain access to weapons and
money that has become important for its cause.
Notwithstanding, any cooperative relationship is possible only when both parties
obtain something in return for their cooperation. The most common bonds
between criminal and terrorist groups are drugs for weapons; money for
protection; or money for weapons. According to each group‟s own intentions and
capabilities any combination may apply.
Al-Qaeda, for example, built-up networks across many countries in order to
expand its intentions and capabilities; the World Islamic Front for Jihad against
the Jews and Crusaders represents the best example. Described by Bari Atwan
as „an umbrella group for various jihadi organizations including Egyptian Islamic
54
Gunaratna (2002), p. 12.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
Jihad, Egyptian Jama‟at Islamiyah and several others from Kashmir and
Pakistan‟55 , this group of organizations has established a cooperative
relationship sharing intentions and capabilities to benefit each other and be able
to target the US and its allies everywhere and anywhere.
On the other hand, some of the MDC have built-up networks with other criminal
groups, especially in South American countries such as Colombia, Bolivia and
Peru. These relationships seek to establish safer traffic-cocaine routes to the US
and obtain mutual benefits in return of their cooperation. Colombian cartels
control the cocaine production in the region, while MDC control the routes to the
US and within. Simultaneously, the Colombians absorb the risk of producing
cocaine while the Mexicans absorb the risk of its transportation. In this sense
both organizations share risks, but also huge profits.
Following Handel‟s argument about why the study of an adversary‟s intentions
must be emphasized above its capabilities, it can be said that collaboration
between two or more groups is mostly determined by each group‟s intentions as
well.
Furthermore, using Handel‟s argument we can suggest that even a group with
relative weak capabilities will reject to collaborate with a group that has
complementary capabilities to its own if: a) it is considered that both agendas,
plans and goals are completely different; b) the group does not gain anything in
return for their collaboration; and c) he chooses to absorb the cost of a defeat in
order to save long-term intentions and goals that otherwise might be
compromised with a relationship with certain groups or individuals.
The problem in the intelligence information gathering process is that adversary
intentions are simpler to conceal and usually change from time to time, as Handel
observed when he stated that „only a handful of leaders, and at times a single
55
Atwan (2006), p. 54.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
leader (e.g., Hitler, Stalin, Sadat) will shape the strategy of a state‟ Therefore,
since there are elements unknown for analysts, a possible collaboration between
Al-Qaeda and MDC might occur, but hopefully present analyses that will question
both groups‟ intentions to collaborate with each other might be helpful to shed
light on this issue.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
III. Al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda emerged as the worldwide most wanted terrorist organization after the
9/11 attacks, and has been described as „the first multinational terrorist group of
the twenty-first century‟ 56 with intentions and capabilities to attack the US and its
allies anywhere and everywhere.
Al-Qaeda, an organization led by Osama bin Laden, is formed by formal and
informal networks „that mobilize people to resort to terrorism‟,57 or as others
prefer to describe it, „a global umbrella for groups and individuals who share their
agenda‟.58 This decentralized organization composition gives Al-Qaeda two
special characteristics: one, the possibility to maintain worldwide presence and
support through radical Muslims living in the five continents; and two, that Al-
Qaeda‟s cells can work almost independently of the core organization, making it
irrelevant whether the main leaders are alive or not.
Moreover, the reasons for Al-Qaeda‟s global intentions are founded in Bin
Laden‟s „Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the land of the
Two Holy Places‟, a fatwa or religious opinion that according to Sageman was
the result of four events that radicalized and motivated the group to carry out a
global war against the US and its allies.
[The first event was] [t]he Gulf War in 1991 [that] established the continued presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia [the place were la Mecca ---the holiest place in Islam--- is and Bin Laden‟s home country]. [The second event was] [t]he Somali humanitarian crisis in 1993 [that] dispatch US troops to Somalia to aver widespread starvation among the population, Those with a more paranoid conspiratorial view of history saw in this twin presence the beginning of a full-scale US invasion of the Middle East through a pincer movement from the north in Saudi Arabia and from the south in Somalia. [The third event occurred when] the Algerian government cancelled the second round of elections in January 1992 [and] when it became clear that the FIS [The Islamic Salvation Front], was going to wing by landslide. The hand of the French government, another far enemy, was assumed to be behind this move. [The
56
Gunaratna (2002), p. 1 57
Sageman (2008), p. 31 58
Atwan (2006), p. 219
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four event took place when] [i]n the former Yugoslavia, Serb military forces were carrying out ethnic cleansing against an unarmed Muslim Bosnian population. To prevent the situation from escalating, Western powers established an arms embargo on the region. Muslims decried the embargo, saying it favoured the Serb forces who had access to their own weapons from the remnants of the former Yugoslav army. In 1994, the conflict between Muslim forces in Chechnya and predominantly Christian Russian forces escalated into a full-blown civil war. 59
According to Sageman, Al-Qaeda‟s terrorist activities started in 1995, when they
began to plot against far enemy targets.60 Its activities became more intense as a
result of subsequent events explained in the 1998‟ fatwa. The fact is that the
possibility of an Al-Qaeda attack on Mexico or the US in collaboration with MDC
might occur because it falls within Bin Laden‟s global strategy. However, to
confirm this statement both groups‟ intentions and capabilities must be
questioned and analyzed beforehand.
AL-QAEDA’S INTENTIONS.
According to Bari Atwan, Al-Qaeda‟s intentions are based on a long-term strategy
that has four aspects: (1) military, (2) ideological/political within the Islamic world,
(3) ideological/political within the populations of the US and its allies, and (4)
economic.61
(1) Military strategy
Following the argument of Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, Al-Qaeda‟s main
military strategist, Atwan argues that the organization has started a long-term
strategy that has five distinct stages.
59
Sageman (2008), p.42 60
Ibid, p. 58 61
Atwan (2006), p. 221
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
The first and second stage are closely related; first of all Al-Qaeda aims to
provoke „“the ponderous American elephant” into invading Muslim lands‟62 by
conducting continuous attacks on US interests. This has the objective to bring US
soldiers into Muslim soil and consequently, this leads into the second stage of the
plane, which generates the widespread hatred of America by exploiting the
religious aspect that reminds themes of the crusades that „reawaken another
“giant elephant” – the umma itself‟.63 This reaction brings potentially all Muslims
into a war against the US. The third stage consists of „expand[ing] the conflict
through the region and engage the US in a long war of attrition‟ thereby creating
a „jihad Triangle of Horror‟64 running from Afghanistan through Iran and Southern
Iraq, into Turkey, south Lebanon and Syria. The fourth stage is to „become a
global network‟65 by affiliating Muslims all over the world and giving the
organization flexibility in order to make extremely difficult to detect next terrorist
attacks. The fifth stage consists of opening war-fronts in as many places as
possible, regardless of whether these arise within the Arab world. The main
objective here is to increase US casualties, and most importantly to provoke the
bankruptcy of the American military budget.66
(2) Ideological and Political strategy within the Islamic world 67
The strategy within the Islamic world consists of demonstrating that the US and
its allies are carrying out an unending war that far from seeking an end to terrorist
groups, are seeking an attempt to kill Muslims and obtain control of oil resources
in the region. This has the aim of reinforcing Al-Qaeda‟s military strategy as well
as the reception of more support from Muslims around the world.
(3) Ideological and Political strategy with US populations and its allies
62
Atwan (2006) p 221 63
Ibid 64
Ibid, p 222 65
Ibid 66
Ibid 67
Ibid, p 223
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
The ideological and political strategy within US population and its allies,
according to Atwan, is trying to „foment a „clash of civilizations‟ with Christian
fundamentalism opposed to Islamic fundamentalism, resulting in an eventual all-
out war between the „believers‟ and the kafir‟.68
(4) Economic strategy69
Finally, Al-Qaeda‟s Economic Strategy and the so-called „terror premium‟,
consists of conducting regular attacks on oil pipelines and installations to make
an impact on oil prices and destabilize the US economy.
For the purposes of this dissertation three statements might be inferred following
Atwan‟s arguments: a) Al-Qaeda will continue with its attacks on US interests; b)
they will carry out an attack on Mexico with or without collaboration of MDC; and
c) Al-Qaeda will continue with its alleged intentions to collaborate with MDC for
its next attacks in the US. Although Atwan‟s insights with regard to Al-Qaeda‟s
intentions must be considered extremely relevant and important to be analyzed
by intelligence agencies, whether or not Al-Qaeda‟s intentions are analyzed
separately on a case by case basis, we will probably find that not all these
arguments are as evident as some consider.
Al-Qaeda‟s intentions to attack US‟ interests.
Al-Qaeda‟s intentions to continue attacking US interests are clear enough to be
explained; these targets might be either on US soil or overseas. Osama Bin
Laden has stated several times that the US would never enjoy security till „infidel
armies‟ leave the Gulf and as far as US foreign policy remains the same in the
region, Al-Qaeda‟s intentions against the US will likely probably remain exactly
the same.
68
Atwan (2006), p 225 69
Ibid, p. 227
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Al-Qaeda‟s intentions to attack Mexican interests
The Mexican case presents a different analysis than the US case when
considering Al-Qaeda‟s intentions. When the 9/11 attacks occurred, including
those that took place in US-friendly countries, it was considered that Mexico was
far from Al-Qaeda‟s eye. This statement was based on three views: A) that the
Mexican Government had no strategic (political and economic) interests neither
in Central Asia nor in the Middle East; B) that from a Military point of view,
Mexico has never participated in any conflict where Muslims had been involved,
and sometimes had been opposing US foreign military policy; C) From a Social
perspective, even when Mexico has some small Muslim communities, around
6000 thousand members,70 these ones have never been politically involved or
have carried out suspicious activities; furthermore Mexico does not maintain
close links with communities that have been related with some Al-Qaeda‟s
attacks as Pakistanis, Lebanese, Saudis, Emiratis, Egyptians, or Maghrebis.
Nevertheless, because Al-Qaeda has grown as a terrorist organization with
global intentions challenging the US and its allies everywhere, more countries are
now threatened. As Atwan pointed out, Al-Qaeda „is capable of constantly
transforming and adapting to changes in circumstances, history and strategy‟;71
and for it, differences between countries are apparently factors that do not
safeguard potential victims from other possible attacks. In this regard the
closeness of the Mexican economy with the US economy was the key factor
considered by Al-Qaeda to threaten Mexico as well.
The Al-Qaeda threat to Mexico was de facto presented on February 8, 2007 in
Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad) issue #30, an on-line Magazine; the article‟s title
was Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon and the author, Adeeb al Bassam, stated the
following:
70
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía www.inegi.gob.mx 71
Atwan (2006), p. 219.
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The American culture‟s addiction to oil will continue for at least several more decades. Therefore the United States will remain dependent on the Middle East in the near future, its oil will continue to be an easy target for all the enemies of the United States, and it will remain a weak spot for many decades to come. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the U.S. has spent a great deal on alternative energy technology, and will spend even more in and in earnest. This indicates that America might become independent of the Middle East, or at least lessen its reliance on the region in the long term, while sufficing oil from Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and several new collaborators, as well as domestic energy sources. That is why it is imperative that we strike petroleum interests in all regions that the United States benefits from, and not only in the Middle East. The goal is to cut off its imports or reduce them by all means
The targeting of oil interests includes oil production wells, export pipelines, loading platforms, tankers---and anything else that will deprive the United States of oil, force it to make decisions that it has avoided having to make for a long time, disrupt and stifle its economy, and threaten its economic and political future.
Shaykh Usama‟s [Bin Laden‟s] instructions are crystal clear with respect to the targeting of oil interests. In implementing these instructions, the mujahideen must gather information [and] select worthy targets. 72
Certainly, Mexico is the third main oil exporting country to the US, and has been
since the 80s, with 1.1 million barrels per day (mbpd), only below Canada and
Saudi Arabia with 1.8 mbpd and 1.5 mbpd respectively.73 According to the
Energy Information Administration, the top-five oil exporting countries accounted
for the US‟ 66 percent of all the crude it needs.74
Consequently, and considering Al-Qaeda‟s global strategy, Al-Qaeda could hit
any Mexican oil-installation in addition to any of the 364 oil fields, 199 offshore
platforms, 6 refineries or even any of the fifty-four thousand kilometres of onshore
pipelines or any of the two-thousand kilometres of offshore pipelines.75
Additionally, because these installations are complex and are distributed through
the whole country, Al-Qaeda‟s threat is a latent reality. The fact that the Mexican
72
The complete article can be accessed at www.globalterroralert.com 73
Energy Information Administration www.eia.doe.gov. Statistics from May 2008 74
The other two countries are Venezuela (1.030 mbpd), and Nigeria (0.851) mbpd 75
Petróleos Mexicanos www.pemex.com.mx
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
intelligence community is focused in the „war on drugs‟ makes Mexico an even
more vulnerable target for Bin Laden even when counting on US support in
helping Mexico secure its border.
An obvious potential target could be Cantarell, the largest oil field in Mexico and
the second largest oil field in the world. Cantarell is protected by the Mexican
Army but still presents vulnerabilities because of its magnitude and also
considering the capability and complexity of Al-Qaeda‟s attacks which enable it to
hit hard targets.
Furthermore, regardless of the level of threat and the possible targets that could
be hit, do we consider this Al-Qaeda threat as a real one even though it has not
been articulated clearly by any radical fatwa or even by Bin Laden itself?
Sageman argued, that after 2004 instructions and communications to Al-Qaeda‟s
followers appear to have started to run through the internet and on-line portals or
magazines.
The Madrid bombers were inspired by a document posted on the Global Islamic Media Front website in December 2003. The Hofstad Group in the Netherlands interacted through dedicated forums and chat rooms and inspired other young Muslims to join them physically after making contact with them on the forums. The April 2005 Cairo Khan al-Khalili bombing was added by the Internet, with the perpetrators downloading bomb-making instructions from jihadi websites. One of the largest international terrorists cases of its kind---the arrest of the Toronto group in Operation Osage in June 2006---had its roots in the group‟s linkage through an online forum to a group in Copenhagen that sent some of its members to Bosnia to bomb the U.S. embassy there, to a group in London that acted as general coordinators, and to two people in the state of Georgia in the United Sates. The people who tried to plant bombs on trains in Germany in the summer of 2006 met in an Internet forum. This clearly shows the change from offline to online interaction in the evolution of the threat.76
76
Sageman (2008), p. 110
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In this sense it is clear that the threat is completely real and now Mexico is on Al-
Qaeda‟s line of fire. So should we ignore those facts previously described when
Mexico was considered far from an Al-Qaeda attack? Or should we believe in this
Al-Qaeda‟s intention of bringing different countries into conflict regardless of
whether these have been opposed to US foreign military policy in the Middle
East? Should we then consider Al-Qaeda as an organization that randomly
chooses its targets?
Many questions emerge since Al-Qaeda threatened Mexico, and there are no
simple explanations or answers on this regard. The fact is that Mexico is a close
US business partner and this factor is considered the motive behind a potential
Al-Qaeda attack. Consequently, Mexican intelligence agencies must be prepared
for an attack because in the final analysis, Al-Qaeda is an unpredictable
organization with followers capable of conducting terrorist activities anywhere
where the US might be affected.
Al-Qaeda‟s intentions when teaming with Mexican Drug Cartels
As was observed in the introduction, some US reports pointed out to an imminent
relationship between Al-Qaeda and MDC. The reason is that MDC have
operational and logistic capabilities that could be useful for Al-Qaeda‟s purposes,
such as the sophisticated trafficking routes that MDC controls and its criminal
networks within US territory. However, even though this relationship sounds
theoretically attractive and possible, in practice it is more complicated as it first
appears and as some people consider.
According to Hutchinson and O‟Malley, where cooperation between terrorist
groups and criminal organizations may exist, three types of relationships must be
expected: Temporary, Parasitic and Symbiotic.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
a) „“Temporary” is perhaps the most likely relationship and can be seen via one-
time contracts for quick profit, or sporadic and episodic cooperation over time‟.77
From this statement if follows that temporary relationships could also be either
strategic or tactical.
Temporary Strategic relationships occur when both groups cooperate because
both share intentions or have a mutual interest in carrying out together some
activities during a specific period of time. Temporary Tactical relationships arise
when, regardless of their intentions and common objectives, each group
collaborates in the sharing of capabilities or in order to acquire new ones.
A Temporary Strategic relationship will be, however, more difficult to establish
between both groups because they have completely different aims, goals and
intentions. An analysis of drug cartels‟ intentions will be further discussed to
clarify this point.
On the other hand, a Temporary Tactical relationship neither can be established
because a key element of this relationship is that both organizations obtain
something in return for their collaboration. And apparently, even Al-Qaeda has
the intention of teaming with MDC, there is nothing that Bin Laden could offer in
return to MDC for their cooperation. This point will be further discussed when
both organizations‟ capabilities are discussed.
b) The second cooperation described is the „“Parasitic” cooperation [that]
involves more enduring relationships between terrorist and criminal groups,
although it is one where terrorists are feeding off organized crime profits and
activities‟.78
Whether Al-Qaeda has the intention to take advantage of MDC capabilities by
gaining their loyalty or by coercing MDC members, it will be an error of strategic
77
Hutchinson and O‟Malley (2007), p. 1104 78
Hutchinson and O'malley (2007), p. 1104
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
calculus resulting in a probable disaster rather than constitute a strategic benefit
for Al-Qaeda‟s purposes. Gaining MDC loyalty is considered less probable
because although both groups do not share any similar intentions, MDC are
profit-oriented organizations where everything that negatively and unnecessarily
affects the business is rejected. Gaining MDC loyalty by coercion will be a
mistake for Al-Qaeda because as it will be demonstrated, MDC have more than
enough capabilities to face Al-Qaeda in Mexico. It does not, as a result, make
sense to believe that Al-Qaeda has the intention to carry out a war against MDC.
c) The third type of relationship is the „“Symbiotic” relationship‟,79 but according to
the authors „there is no available evidence of symbiotic partnerships between
terrorist groups and organized crime groups‟ making it the least probable
relationship to occur. The reason resides in each group‟s nature and intentions.
„Criminal groups do not desire media, public, and government attention, whereas
the opposite is true of most terrorist groups‟80 ; besides where one is politically
motivated, the other is profit-oriented that seek optimal business conditions.
„These and other ideological and organizational differences preclude symbiotic
cooperation between the two groups‟81 , conclude the authors.
Furthermore, regardless of the argument presented by these types of
relationships a key question remains; does Al-Qaeda really aim at collaborating
with any of the MDC?
It is obvious that Al-Qaeda is interested in MDC‟ operational capabilities but
Hutchinson and O‟Malley argue in this regard that „the degree of a terrorist
group‟s organization and need are key predictors of the types of crime they will
engage in.‟82 Following this argument Al-Qaeda was described as „a global
79
Ibid. 80
Ibid. 81
Ibid. 82
Hutchinson and O‟Malley (2007), p. 1096
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umbrella for groups and individuals who share their agenda‟83 and composed by
extremely secret and mostly autonomous cells and structures. Organizations like
Al-Qaeda, Hutchinson and O‟Malley argue, have low-profile members with few
specialized skills capable of carrying out attacks mostly with quite low financial or
material assets. Further Hutchinson and O‟Malley stated that
[f]or such groups, engagement with crime may have three key determinants:84
1. The nature of the event or the attack planned; 2. The activities, training, and material they require; and, 3. The availability of self funding, traditional types of financing, and resources on hand.
Under this argument it can be stated that Al-Qaeda desires a working
relationship. However, the problem is that MDC may compromise any secret
operation because they are constantly being infiltrated by US and Mexican
security authorities. Additionally, drug traffickers are difficult to trust because they
are profit oriented, making hard to maintain minimal levels of loyalty. Finally, most
Al-Qaeda recruits are home-grown people85 in order to blind international law
enforcement attention, and even despite the fact that many drug traffickers have
US passports most of them have traceable criminal records, a characteristic that
Al-Qaeda continuously tries to avoid.
Even with the support that MDC‟ capabilities provide, collaboration with them
implies inherent risks that may compromise any possible Al-Qaeda operation, a
risk that terrorists groups, especially, avoid being exposed to.
83
Atwan (2006), p. 219 84
Hutchinson and O‟Malley (2007), p. 1099 85
Ibid, p 1100
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
AL-QAEDA’S CAPABILITIES
Al-Qaeda‟s material capabilities
Al-Qaeda‟s material capabilities reside in three pillars: its supporters, its weapons
and training, and its financial wealth.
Members.
It is difficult to estimate the number of members that a secret organization such
as Al-Qaeda could have, however some argue that they „can draw on the support
of some 6-7 million radical Muslims worldwide, of which 120,000 are willing to
take up arms‟.86 Beyond this, it is true that „the war on terror‟ carried out by the
US and its allies, along with Al-Qaeda‟s strategy of presenting it as a war against
Muslims and to have control of the oil sources in the region has apparently aided
Al-Qaeda‟s recruitment strategy. As Atwan noted „American foreign policy is the
best recruitment officer al-Qa‟ida has ever had.‟87
Weapons and Training.
Moreover, regardless of the conventional weapons that this organization could
possess, Al-Qaeda has appropriated and mastered the tactical use of „suicide
missions‟, which have become its most effective and cheaper weapon.
Atwan stated that suicide missions are extremely difficult to detect without
previous intelligence information and are relatively easy to carry out.
In terms of logistics the suicide bomber typically pilots a vehicle with explosives into the target or detonates bombs carried on his own body, sometime in a bag o rucksack (as in the London bombings) or, more commonly, in a suicide belt or
86
Gunaratna (2002), p. 95 87
Atwan (2006), p.10
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
vest. A suicide belt is easily manufactured, and several websites give step-by-step instructions in how to customize a strip of strong fabric with pockets to hold the explosives and detonators. Worn underneath the bomber‟s normal clothing, it is very difficult to detect.88
Another key element of Al-Qaeda‟s material capabilities are its training camps,
because here is where the indoctrination and training of its followers take place.
In training camps, jihadi fighters obtain military training in the use of explosives,
heavy weapons and in guerrilla and assassination techniques. In addition, they
gain specialised training courses in surveillance and counter-surveillance
operations; learn how to forge and adapt identity documents, and most
importantly, assimilate elemental techniques to carry out suicide attacks in land
or sea.89
Even though some Al-Qaeda training camps were closed in Afghanistan as a
consequence of the US invasion, there are rumours that some camps are still
distributed and working worldwide. Al-Qaeda‟s training camps have been recently
founded in England, in the Lake District and in the southern counties of
Berkshire, Kent and East Sussex.90
Money
Al-Qaeda‟s financial wealth is another material capability that needs to be
considered. In this regard Gunaratna described that Bin Laden‟s business and
worldwide investments, along with state sponsors as Sudan, Afghanistan and
Iran or Islamist groups‟ contributions and clandestine money collection in some
mosques, generates significant funds for the organization. He concludes by
stating that
[v]ery few groups have acquired financial assets and independent resources to the extent that Al Qaeda has. Despite a US-led worldwide effort to close down its
88
Atwan (2006), p.100 89
Gunaratna (2002), p. 72. 90
„Top extremist recruiter is jailed‟ BBC news, February, 26, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7190323.stm
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financial networks, Al Qaeda continues to operate through the hawala, or unregulated, banking system, based on the use of promissory notes for the exchange of cash and gold. Al Qaeda also benefited from copying many of the financial models and networks devised by the disgraced Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which collapsed in 1991. It was used extensively by terrorists, state sponsors of terrorism and by various security and intelligence organisations. 91
The Internet
Moreover, alongside Al-Qaeda‟s capabilities with regard to fighters, weapons and
money described above, it is considered that Bin Laden‟s organization is using
another „weapon‟ that has been extremely helpful to recruit, organize,
communicate and train jihadi fighters: the internet.92
It is not clear whether the Internet can be described as a material capability
though it is a fact that Al-Qaeda is using the system for its own purposes. As was
described further above, some terrorist attacks were planned and organized in
on-line chat forums, and the instructions to build home-made bombs can be
found in some jihadi web-pages. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in Spain were
inspired by a web magazine and Mexico was threatened as well on-line.
In this regard, Bari Atwan adds that
The internet is a multipurpose tool and weapon. It can be used to communicate one-to-one or to millions; it can be used to convey hidden information, instructions or plans; and since computers control the majority of the developed world‟s infrastructure, it is a chink in the West‟s amour, easily penetrated by dedicated hackers. Cyber-attacks can create enormous damage at very little cost to the jiihadis, a principle they value and which we have already seen applied with devastating results in al-Qa‟ida‟s preference for suicide missions over armed combat.93
91
Gunaratna (2002), p. 70 92
Sageman (2008), p.114 93
Atwan (2006), p. 125
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Overall, despite of whether a material capability exist or not, the Internet must be
considered as a weapon that Al-Qaeda is using in order to fulfil its goals. As
Atwan declared, Al-Qaeda is „the the first Web-directed guerrilla network‟.94
Al-Qaeda non-material capabilities
As was described beforehand by Handel, non-material capabilities are the quality
of the organization, morale, and military doctrine, and in this regard Al-Qaeda‟s
strength equals that of its material capabilities.
Quality of the organization.
In terms of the quality of the organisation Al-Qaeda is extremely efficient because
it has been able to expand the organization horizontally avoiding rigid and
hierarchical forms;95 it „is structured in such a way that it can operate without a
centralised command. As a result, al-Qaeda regional bureaux functioned as the
nodal point of its oriental network outside Afghanistan and liaise with other
associate groups and Al Qaeda cells.‟ 96
As it expands horizontally, the internet becomes the most important tool within
these small and independent groups, because it provides ease of
communication, recruitment and a portal for receiving elemental instructions to
conduct attacks.97
Despite the US invasion in Afghanistan that made Al-Qaeda lose its main
organizational base, the truth is that the „war on terror‟ has not been able to
94
Ibid, p.122 95
Magouirk, Atran, and Sageman (2008). 96
Gunaratna (2002), p. 10 97
Atwan (2006).
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eradicate the organization since it has survived as by not remaining static and
consequently increasing its versatility.98
Morale
The heart of Al-Qaeda‟s high morale resides on the fact that the organization
rather than being destroyed, is still fully functioning and capable of hitting the US
and its allies.99 This fact has been exploited by Bin Laden and his associates to
increase the confidence of Al-Qaeda‟s militants and has enabled it to maintain
their loyalty and keep radicals highly active and motivated. 100
Military Doctrine
According to Rohan Gunaratna
[m]ost Al Qaeda attacks involve three distinct phases. First, intelligence teams mount surveillance, be it on a static or a moving target. Based on the target intelligence obtained, the attach team rehearses its operation in an Al Qaeda camp, often on a scale model of the building or vessel in question. Next and Al Qaeda support team arrives in the target area and organises safe houses and vehicles, bringing with it the necessary weapons and explosives. Lastly, Al Qaeda‟s strike team arrives and withdraws after completing the mission, unless it is a suicide attack. As the exfiltration of attack teams in a hostile environment is very difficult, suicide is likely to remain Al Qaeda‟s preferred tactic for the foreseeable future.101
In this sense Al-Qaeda has become a modern terrorist organization that
maintains highly standards on its operations. Firstly it is „a secret, almost virtual
organization, one that denies its own existence in order to remain in the
shadows‟102, which has allowed them to succeed in most of its attacks. Secondly,
new Al-Qaeda recruitments are not coming only from Pakistan or Afghanistan or
any other related country, these are home-grown individuals, sometimes without
98
Ibid. 99
Gunaratna (2002). 100
Ibid. 101
Ibid, p. 78 102
Ibid, p. 3
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any previous links with radical Islam.103 Thirdly, Al-Qaeda is determined to
function at a global level, as Gunaratna described: „[i]nstead of resisting
globalisation, its forces are being harnessed by contemporary Islamist groups,
constantly looking for new bases and new targets worldwide‟.104 Fourthly, it is
constantly transforming and adapting its resources available because „its
networks are intertwined in the socio-economic, political, and religious fabric of
Muslims living in at least eighty countries‟105
Al-Qaeda‟s capabilities to attack Mexican or US interests.
It is clear enough that Al-Qaeda has capabilities to hit interests in both countries.
Even though the „war on terror‟ has limited its resources available, its capabilities
have not been much eroded or eliminated, and the organization is still fully
functioning. It cannot be ignored that Al-Qaeda is the first terrorist group that was
capable to hit the US „on land (US embassies in east Africa, 1998), sea (USS
Cole, Yemen, 2000) and in the air (September 11, 2001)‟106. This reflects the
power of Al-Qaeda and it seems that there will be no changes with regard to Al-
Qaeda‟s capabilities in the coming future.
As was observed previously, Al-Qaeda has interesting capabilities that have
transformed into the most dangerous terrorist organization. Notwithstanding, the
key element still remains whether Al-Qaeda can offer MDC something in return
for their collaboration as a conduit to fulfil their objectives and strike at US
interests primarily, but also at Mexican targets. In this regard, a further analysis
about MDC‟ intentions and capabilities will answer this question.
103
Atwan (2006). 104
Gunaratna (2002), p. 11 105
Gunaratna (2002), p. 10 106
Ibid p. 7
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
IV. MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS.
The origins of drug trafficking in Mexico started with poppy cultivation in the north
of the country, in the mountains of the state of Sinaloa from where the heroin was
sent to the US during the 40s in the context of World War II. In the 50s the crisis
in the mine industry in the northern states of Chihuahua and Sonora compelled
some workers to cultivate marijuana and poppy, an activity considered legal at
that moment. As legal restrictions in the US appeared, along with an increase in
the demand of drugs during the 60s, the prices of marijuana and heroin rose and
the profits were quickly duplicated pushing illegal activity to Sinaloa‟s
neighbouring states. In the 70s the activity was concentrated in the so called
„golden quadrangle‟ a region in the mountains that acquired perfect conditions for
illegal activity: remoteness of law enforcement officials and closeness to the US
border. This zone comprehended the limits of the states of Durango, Sonora,
Chihuahua and Sinaloa. Until the end of the 70s illegal activities were controlled
by several families which became powerless in 1982 when Miguel Felix Gallardo
created the so called Cartel of Guadalajara, an organization inspired in the
Medellin Drug Cartel, which associated some of these families in order to control
the production and distribution of heroin and marijuana within the US.107 In this
fashion, and most importantly, it become a powerful organization that could face
Mexican and US authorities.
Gallardo‟s main associates Rafel Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca took care
of the drug business after he was captured in 1989, though internal leadership
problems provoked the separation of both drug lords.108 Since then, several
different drug cartels with complex organization structures were created.
Currently drug trafficking is controlled by seven cartels based in Mexico: the
Tijuana Cartel, run by Arellano Felix brothers that controls almost 3000 km in the
western part of the Mexico-US border; the Juárez Cartel, run by Amado Carrillo 107
Ibid. 108
Ibid.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
Fuentes that controls the center of the Mexico-US border corridor; the Golfo
Cartel, run by Osiel Cárdenas that controls the eastern side of the border in the
state of Tamaulipas and all drug access via the Gulf of Mexico; the Sinaloa
Cartel, run by Joaquín Guzmán that competes in drug production and distribution
with the first three in the whole Mexico-US border; the Colima Cartel, run by the
Amescua Contreras brothers, that controls drug production and distribution in
several states in the central Mexico; the Pedro Díaz Parada Cartel, that controls
drug production and distribution in some states in the south of the country
including in Oaxaca and Chiapas; the Milenio Cartel, run by Valencia brothers
which while being the smallest of the MDC, controls drug distribution in four
states.
The main differences between MDC are their geographical location and their
profits, making margins. The Tijuana, Juarez, Golfo and Sinaloa Cartels are the
most important and violent ones since they control the most important trafficking
routes and distribution markets within the US.
MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS CAPABILITIES
MDC Material Capabilities
Money & Corruption
MDC‟ main capabilities are their financial wealth. According with John Walters,
US Director of National Control Drug Policy, MDC obtain US$13 800 million
annually for their sales on US soil109 where around 85% of the profits is
distributed between the main four while 15% goes for the other three of the big
seven. In this regard, an estimation calculates the Carillo‟s family fortune on more
than US$ 25 thousand million. Consequently these huge sums of money have
109
„Ganancias por 13,800 mdd deja venta de drogas a EU: John Walters‟. La Cronica de hoy, 21 de Febrero de 2008
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
provided MDC with means to continue defying both Mexico and the US either by
killing law enforcement officials or by corrupting them. Only the Golfo Cartel pays
out around US$ 2 million per week in corruption on both sides of the border.
Weaponry
The most common weapons used by MDC are machine guns that can penetrate
armour cars, grenade launchers, and assault rifles as AR-15 and AK-47.
According to the Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora, in the last five
years the most dangerous weapons confiscated by the authorities were Barrett
rifles caliber 50 millimeters (mm); M72 rocket launchers caliber 66 mm; grenade
launchers 40 mm; Sub-machine guns FN Herstal Model PS90 caliber 5.7x28
mm; pistols FN Herstal Model Five Seven caliber 5.7x28 mm, as well as
fragmentation grenades caliber 40 and 37 mm.110 It is considered that these
weapons are extremely effective to succeed in a war against the Mexican military
and law-enforcement officials as well against rival drug cartels.
Additionally some statistics revealed that about 2000 illegal weapons coming
from the US cross daily.111 These weapons are easily obtained in more than
seventeen thousand sell-points on the US frontier cities and smuggled into
Mexico by air, sea or land.112 The US government has done little in helping
Mexican authorities stop this problem, which allows MDC to continue acquiring
the ultimate weaponry available to maintain illegal activities.
Members
MDC are formed by paid-members that work within the organization or externally
—especially in law-enforcement agencies— and meet different roles in the
organization. These members vary in their background from those who
distributed drug in the streets through experienced lawyers and economists, to
the called „gatilleros‟ (trigger-pullers), groups who protect the organization and
carry out the assassinations; these groups are considered extremely important
110
„Se arman los narcos por descuido del Gobierno‟, El Universal, 27 de Abril de 2008 111
Ibid 112
Ibid.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
within the organization because they carry the weapons. The gatilleros are
mainly conformed by ex- police officers and/or ex-militaries, including many
police and militaries working for drug cartels within law enforcement agencies.
These groups of trigger-pullers are divided in cells formed by around 10 to 50
members that work accordingly with specific instructions of their leaders and drug
lords. It is estimated that the four biggest cartels have around 1500 „gatilleros‟
each, in addition to the many police and militaries working for them within law-
enforcement agencies.
„Los Zetas‟ are one of the most famous and dangerous „gatilleros‟ formed by
around 100 militaries that were hired by the Golfo Cartel in 2002. They deserted,
from a rouge elite Mexican military unit that was trained in the US to combat drug
cartels, to join the lines of the cartel. They are experts in explosives,
communications, intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence operations, and
advanced technology weaponry manage.
Non Material Capabilities
„The Know How‟
Regardless of MDC‟ material capabilities, it is considered that they possess
something which could be attractive for groups such as Al-Qaeda. This is „the
know how‟ of the operation in the Mexico-US border. Because of thier illegal
activities they know how corruption works in both the US and Mexico. They
control sophisticated trafficking routes by air, land and sea; and they control the
human-smuggling and the weapons trafficking business. This non-material
capability increases the adversary‟s resources available in facilitating an attack
on the US or Mexico.
The importance of the Mexico-US border resides in two facts: 1) it is a door to the
US, and 2) it is the most dynamic border in the world where all along its 3200 km,
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
most of them vast an remote territory, daily legal crossings stand close to 12 000
commercial trucks and 660 000 people113 either for business, holidays or for job,
and illegally cross tons of drugs, thousands of weapons, hundreds of cars and
between 650 to 1200 undocumented people. Most of these illegal and legal
activities are controlled by MDC.
The „know how‟ is also important within the US territory. According to the
DEA114, Mexican cartels control the transportation and wholesale drug
distribution in every region of the US except the Northeast that are controlled by
Asian Cartels (primarily Vietnamese) based in Canada. This allows them to move
drugs, arms and persons through the US, which would be really appealing for Al-
Qaeda‟s intentions, with relative ease.
Organization
MDC are complex in their organization with highly defined command-and-control
structures. They are hierarchical by nature, but since most of their leaders are in
prison, they are now organized in a more decentralize form where the „gatilleros‟
have a leading role but always following direct orders of the drug lords despite of
these are in prison.
In this regard, and according with some experts, currently MDC‟ organization
opens a door for the possible collaboration of terrorist groups and criminal
groups. Chris Dishman stated that international law enforcement pressure is
forcing the breakdown of hierarchical structures in illicit organizations and
creating new opportunities for criminals and terrorist to collaborate. 115 This
argument is based on the fact that „beheading‟ MDC by imprisoning drug lords or
extraditing them to the US is weakening MDC. As a result, lower to mid-level
113
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, www.inegi.gob.mx 114
„Drug Traficking Organizations‟, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/18862/dtos.htm, June 16 , 2008 115
Dishman (2005).
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
criminals are taking advantage of their independence to form networks because
they need to find funding sources to continue with their illegal activity.
Nevertheless Mexican drug cartels are not decentralized at all even though its
main leaders are in prison. It is true that Mexican law enforcement efforts are
cornering some MDC causing many of their cells to have to work independently
or to collaborate with other groups to survive. These networks are mainly related
to drug production and distribution. However, the organization does not split up,
because after drug lords are dead or in prison the „gatilleros‟ or the family of the
drug lord takes control of the organization since they possess both the „know-
how‟ as well as the weapons. The four most important cartels continue being
managed by the same families, and have been doing so for the last two decades.
Dishman argues that „like modern terrorists, law enforcement crackdowns on
transnational criminal organizations have forced criminals to expand their use of
networks.‟116 Following this argument some reports indicate that MDC have
starting to collaborate with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC).117 However these relationships are more related with comparative
advantages in cocaine production in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia rather than
Mexican efforts to eradicate drug production. Additionally MDC also collaborate
with Colombian cartels since the mid-nineties.
MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS INTENTIONS.
Mexican Drug cartels are not political motivated, quite the opposite, their
members are profit-oriented and in order to increase the income the organization
is managed with benefit versus cost operations. Even drug activity is not based
on political, social or religious ideology is constituted by three fundamental
intentions: a) it must benefit its own community (at local level and not even
116
Dishman (2005), p. 240 117
Rodriguez and Arroyo (2008).
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
necessary pro-Mexico); b) it must maintain a relative status-quo environment
because it is more convenient for business activities; c) it is pro-US, or at least is
neutral, because it is their biggest and more important client.
Nevertheless many commentators argue that MDC‟ intentions have been
changing in recent years since levels of violence and constant threats to Mexican
institutions have increased. With regard to these new intentions, it is commented
that even drug cartels that are not fully politically oriented are seeking to
challenge and influence the Mexican state in order to intimidate government
efforts. This might be true, however a further analysis will suggest that the
reason of this changes on their strategy, rather than being related to new MDC‟
intentions, is a consequence of different events that have been happening in
Mexico in recent years.
In this regard, as an effect of the democratic process in Mexico —that started in
the 90s, running through its peak point in 2000 but which continues to this date—
this has resulted in the decentralization of responsibilities within the law-
enforcement agencies where some of the old agreements between authorities
and MDC ended. In this context MDC discovered that without protection of the
authorities, only the strongest would survive. Consequently each cartel started to
hire small armies to defend their territories against rival cartels and authorities.
They also continued buying local authorities‟ protection but now under the Pablo
Escobar‟s „silver or lead‟ principle.
Consequently, an open war between MDC and law-enforcements officials started
immediately. The disputed northern territories were transformed in battlefields
and the levels of violence increased in strategic places in Mexico, US, and even
South and Central America where selective assassinations became common
occurrences. In 2006 around 5000 deaths related with these disputes were
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
registered. In 2007 more than 2500 deaths occurred and in 2008 from January to
June 1500 deaths have been registered so far. 118
Certainly, as conflict intensified the methods used by MDC have been changing;
today it is not enough to kill an enemy in order to create and provoke terror and
uncertainty to ones enemies. Applying kidnappings, tortures, mutilation and
decapitation as methods is essential for survival.
These instances represent a clear and dangerous challenge to Mexican
authorities in their „war on drugs‟. However, far from reflecting a mutation in MDC‟
intentions, because there is no evidence of this, the purpose of this violent war is
to inflict fear to rival cartels and inhibit Mexican state efforts to combat MDC
trafficking to the US. It is evident that MDC are changing their intimidation
techniques for more dangerous ones, but they are not seeking to destroy
Mexican state institutions or generate chaos within the territory because,
assuming a rational behaviour, they realize that those conditions could cause
their own demise. As was observed by Mark Sedgwick
[a] radical ideology is indisputably an essential ingredient in producing terrorism. To state the obvious, a terrorist without ideological (or religious, or religio-ideological) motivation would, by most definitions, be either an ordinary criminal or mentally ill. And an ideology that was not radical could hardly justify terrorism.119
In this observation no religious or political motivations exist that fall under MDC
intentions.
MDC‟ intentions in teaming with Al-Qaeda
Criminal and terrorist organizations are looking to establish relations according to
their own intentions and according with the aims and goals they have. In this
118
„Ordenan a PGR dar cifra de victimas del narco desde 1970‟ El Universal July 16, 2008 119
Sedgwick (2007), p. 99
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
sense there is enough evidence about collaborations between terrorist and
criminal groups. Some insurgent groups, such as, Shining Path, in Peru and the
FARC, have relations with local drug cartels.120 The process is simple to
understand; drug-traffickers benefit from terrorists‟ military skills, weapons
supply, and access to secret organizations and terrorist get a source of income
and expertise other activities such as money laundering. Normally, terrorist
groups provide either protection or access to modern weapons, and drug cartels
share the profits.
However according to MDC‟ intentions and capabilities it seems that they are not
looking for modern weaponry, military skills or new drug markets. Possibly,
protection provided by Al-Qaeda might be considered as an intention in teaming
up with them, but it cannot be ignored that MDC are continuously being joined by
ex-militaries that are well-trained and possess knowledge of the Mexican
territory. How effective will be a jihadi fighter in Mexico when compared to a
Mexican soldier trained specifically for this „war on drugs‟?
So what can Al-Qaeda offer to MDC in return for their cooperation? Is there
something useful Al-Qaeda can offer that can benefit MDC in their war?
Apparently no, and in any event this collaboration might be prejudicial for drug
cartels intentions; so why they would like to collaborate with Bin Laden?
It is important to consider that MDC networks are based on their intentions and
are guided by specific needs such as „risk reduction (joining with locals to exploit
local conditions or access corrupt officials), market extension (new products or
outlets), or product exchange (such as guns for drugs).121 In this regard, Al-
Qaeda cannot offer anything to MDC. Firstly, MDC have the best comparative
advantages for drug production within the Mexican territory including in some
South American countries because of their proximity to the US. Secondly,
120
Williams (2005), p,124 121
Sullivan and Bunker (2002), p. 41
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
besides Europe, why would any MDC want to extend its market if the US is the
most important one? And thirdly, why would any MDC purchase any weaponry in
elsewhere considering the US is the biggest weapon manufacturer in the world?
With regard to the collaboration between criminal organizations and terrorists,
Hutchinson and O‟malley pointed out that:
the potential for convergence of two existing groups would seem to depend on the possibility that they would both gain from combined operations, yet at the same time be able to maintain their own operational security—and this seems unlikely over the long term. Organized criminal groups, for example, do not desire media, public, and government attention, where the opposite is true of most terrorist groups. Where terrorists seek political inclusion and legitimation (as in the case of some revolutionary movements) and/or political dominance (as in the case of most religious terrorist organizations), organized crime groups seek optimal “business environments.” Such distinctions curtail any cooperation between these groups at the sporadic level: the risks to security far outweigh the benefits of cooperation.122
In this observation it is accepted that lacking a mutually beneficial relationship will
lead MDC to reject cooperation with Al-Qaeda, and so far there is nothing that
Bin Laden can offer MDC to gain their loyalty.
MDC‟ intentions to attack Mexican or US interests
Regardless of whether collaboration between MDC and Al-Qaeda materializes,
another question is whether MDC hold the intent to attack Mexican or US
interests.
According to MDCs‟ intentions, no obvious reasons exist to attack US interests
since MDC are not interested in changing the balance of power within the US.
Most importantly the US is MDC best client, so any attack will be considered
prejudicial for their ends. Moreover, only one assassination case pends against
MDC in the US; that of a US law-enforcement official. This was the famous case
122
Hutchinson and O'malley (2007), p.1100
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
of Enrique Camarena an undercover agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) that was tortured and killed in 1985 by the extinct Cartel of Guadalajara.
The immediate consequences of this assassination were the capture of three
drug lords that were extradited to the US; more DEA agents in Mexico and more
US support to the Mexican government to carry out this „war on drugs‟.123 After
this incident, no DEA agent has been killed.
MDC‟ intentions in attacking Mexican interest are different. Traditionally MDC‟
war is against rival cartels and law enforcement officers who impede their trade.
In this regard several police officers have been killed since the origins of drug
trafficking problems. Historically drug lords had been cautious and have avoided
attacking top-officials, politicians, civil society and any other target that might
cause media attention or a large scale retaliation by Mexican authorities.
However, as a consequence of historical events described above, along with law
enforcement pressure over MDC, the level of violence has escalated significantly.
This leads us to consider the possibility of MDC being interested in attacking
critical Mexican interests in response of this pressure. The failed terrorist attack
of February 2008 in Mexico City against a top law-enforcement official is a first
warning and demonstrates how far MDC are willing to go to maintain their
independence.
This attack may be more related to the imitation of a terrorist technique rather
than as a means of demonstrating changes in MDC intentions. In this regard,
Mark Sedgwick argues that terrorism may be „contagious‟ because in the context
of global waves of terrorism, some groups, regardless of whether they have
previous terrorist activities, are influenced „by recent actual or apparent success
of a terrorist or similar violent strategy anywhere in the world‟124 . He additionally
comment that
123
Ibid 124
Sedgwick (2007), p. 101
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
“[c]ontagion” is possible at two levels, and can happen in two ways. On one level, a group might copy a particular terrorist technique, and on another level a group might copy a general terrorist strategy. Either of these might happen directly or indirectly. Direct contagion might occur when a member of one established terrorist group personally assists in training members of another group in a particular technique, or personally assists in establishing a distinct, new terrorist group. Alternatively, there might be no direct contact; contagion might be indirect, when a group observes the apparent success elsewhere of either a technique or a general strategy.125
In this analysis, the possibility of collaboration between MDC and Al-Qaeda is
unlikely to occur at this moment. Consequently the best explanation found for the
February attack was that MDC are copying terrorist techniques. This is extremely
worrying for Mexican intelligence agencies because it reinforce suspicions that
suggest MDC are changing their intimidation techniques. Nonetheless, we must
consider what Sedgwick concludes that „[a] particular terrorist technique in only of
interest to a group that has already made the decision to adopt a terrorist
strategy; [but] a technique cannot on its own cause a resort to terrorism‟126
Finally, even though the so called „Colombianization of “Mexico”‟ is far from
coming to pass, there are several security warnings Mexican intelligence
agencies must guard against because otherwise the country could plunge into an
unprecedented escalation of violence.
MDC‟ intentions to facilitate an Al-Qaeda attack on Mexico or US
Even though it is considered that MDC intentions in attacking US interests are
improbable, it could be feasible for them to facilitate, wittingly or unwittingly, an
Al-Qaeda attack on Mexico or US.
As was observed throughout this study, any collaboration with Al-Qaeda would
be prejudicial for MDC‟ own ends with immediate consequences. Unwittingly,
125
Ibid, p. 102 126
Sedgwick (2007).
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
collaboration might be possible, though we cannot ignore that within MDC‟s
organization almost everything is controlled for their leaders.
Nevertheless this statement relates more with concerns about undocumented
migration to the US, where US intelligence authorities are worried about the
possibility of terrorist cells using migration routes to enter into the US.
Despite US media alarms and disinformation, undocumented migration coming
from Mexico is not related to terrorist activity so far. There is no single hard
evidence that confirms the opposite. Furthermore, some experts have argued
that the real US open corridor is Canada through where many of the 9/11
attackers entered the US. 127
In this regard, using a data base created from the biographical data of 373
terrorist, Leiken and Brooke found out that
[i]n light of the public attention to the specter of illegal terrorist entry through the U.S. southern border, we conducted an extensive search but found not a single entrant from Mexico. In contrast, we found 26 subjects with Canada as a host country, three of whom, including the Millennium Bomber Ahmed Ressam, entered or attempted to enter the U.S.
Forty-six percent of those in Canada became naturalized Canadian citizens. Sixty two percent of the Canadian-hosted sample came originally from North Africa: 10 Algerians, three Moroccans, and three Tunisians. This high correlation between the Maghreb and Canada again echoes immigration channels. Many Maghrebis possess at least a working knowledge of French, and immigration networks bridge France and the Maghreb, as we have shown above. At least seven of the Canadian-hosted individuals in our chart, such as Ressam and other members of the „„Fateh Kamel network,‟‟ spent time in France before arriving in Canada, where they settled in and around French-speaking Montreal.
Forty-two percent of the subjects hosted in Canada entered via asylum claims. Fifty-four percent of those claiming asylum saw their claim denied yet remained in the country. Canada‟s asylum system provides claimants with „„generous welfare and social assistance programs,‟‟ into which Ressam and his cohorts dipped while they plotted their attack. These conditions have attracted notice in jihadi circles. A senior FBI official says that Canada is the most worrisome
127
Leiken and Brooke (2006), p. 511
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
terrorist point of entry, and Al Qaeda training manuals advise agents to enter the U.S. through Canada rather than through France.128
Thus, though the Mexico-US border might still pose a terrorist threat to the US, it
seems there is currently no direct relationship between migration and terrorism.
Additionally any potential collaboration between MDC and Al-Qaeda analyzed
throughout this study leads us to conclude that for the moment such collaboration
is unlikely to occur.
128
Ibid, p.513
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
CONCLUSIONS
Mexico and the US have a difficult history regarding of their common frontier. In
the XXI century new problems have complicated even more the relationship
between both countries when terrorist issues and adversaries with intentions and
capabilities to hit interests in both sides of the border need to be faced.
In this regard, it cannot be ignored some facts: a) Mexico has terrorist activities
where leftist guerrilla groups and Drug Cartels organizations, that currently have
the monopoly of the violence, are imitating terrorist techniques to defy the state;
b) Mexico has previous experiences where the country was utilized by
international terrorist groups to achieve objectives of its agenda against foreign
countries; c) MDC and Al-Qaeda have complementary capabilities that makes
attractive any collaboration between both organizations; d) Al-Qaeda has a global
strategy to hit US interests anywhere and everywhere, in this observe the
possibility of an Al-Qaeda attack specifically in Mexico is likely to occur.
Nevertheless, those are not enough factors to consider a collaboration between
both groups to attack both Mexican or US interests, because when an attack or
collaboration with another group are planned, the group‟s intentions indicate how
far a group is willing to go in implementing its terrorist activities. Is in this regard
that the adversary‟ intentions required to be deeply studied and analyzed to
provide a close insight of his agenda and therefore be able to estimate the level
of threat posed by such adversary.
Consequently at this moment it seems that some are exaggerating the link
between Mexican drug cartels and Al-Qaeda. Both have different aims, goals and
its networks are originated by different motives. Nonetheless, even in the short-
term this collaboration seems improbable, intelligence agencies must be
prepared to monitor closely both groups‟ intentions because these may change
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
from time to time, and those things that today are considered unreasonable by
intelligence analysts, could probably become the opposite in the near future.
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Francisco Franco MA. Intelligence and International Security
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