OTD 2014, October 15, Bergen Inspecta – Overview of Integrity Engineering Services

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Contents

• Inspecta Overview

• Integrity Engineering − Definition and lifecycle perspective

• Design verification and optimization

• Revisions, Fitness-for-service evaluation, Inspection planning

• Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)

• Examples of Assignments and Projects

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Inspecta Integrity Engineering

Competence • 80 highly skilled and experienced engineers • Design optimization and design verification• In-depth damage assessments and inspection planning,

risk assessments • Structural integrity, fitness-for-service, life time extension • Welding technology • Quality assurance

Experience• Over 30 years of experience from providing independent

assessments and consultancy in the industry• Nuclear Power, Conventional Power, Pulp & Paper, Rail,

Mining, Oil & Gas and Aerospace• Contracted for method development and research

performed by experts with international leading competence

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Fast facts

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Integrity Engineering

Integrity Engineering is design, assurance, and verification to ensure that a component, process or system, meets its intended function and requirements over the lifecycle

Should minimize costs together with technical and legal risks

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Integrity Engineering

Integrity Engineering

Integrity Philosophy

HSE & Risk Engineering

Integrity processes

Fit for service

Integrity plans

Integrity analyses

Continuous improvement

Verification and audits

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New trends in a lifecycle perspective

FEASIBILITY CONSEPT EXECUTION OPERATION

Integrity Engineering

Integrity Philosophy

HSE & Risk Engineering

Integrity processes

Fit for service

Integrity plans

Integrity analyses

Continuous improvement

Verification and audits

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New trends in a lifecycle perspective

FEASIBILITY CONSEPT EXECUTION OPERATION

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Design and modification

Design optimization and verification

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Optimization and Qualification of Strength and Reliability

• Qualification and optimization of strength and reliability of mechanical components with respect to degradation

‒ Pressure vessels, piping systems, welded joints, bolts, steel structures, lifting equipment, gear boxes, shafts, polymer piping, concrete structures

•Stress analysis and assessment of failure modes ‒ Plastic collapse, ratcheting, fracture, fatigue, creep, SCC, HIC,

corrosion, seismic assessments,...‒ Design by formula and advanced FEM

• Specification of applicable load cases‒ Identification of loads (normal operation, upset, exceptional),

assessment of applicable load levels and load combination

• Design verification according to international codes ‒ EN13445, EN13480, ASME VIII Div 2 and Div 3, ASME III, …‒ NORSOK, DNV RPs, ISO, Eurocode, …‒ ProSACC, FITNET/R6, BS7910, ASME XI, API 579/ASME FFS, …

Design optimization and verification

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Optimization and Qualification of Strength and Reliability

•Residual stress analysis and optimization ‒ Weld residual stress analysis‒ Optimization of welds and surface treatments

for Residual Stress Design

Stainless steel weldInconel 82 weld

Inside back weld

Path

Design optimization and verification

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Manufacturing quality verification and documentation

•Required defect limits in manufacturing inspection‒ Use of detailed requirements for NDT in specific applications‒ Reduction of repairs - Which defects/indications require repair?

• To avoid unnecessary repairs that influence material properties, and to reach relevant costs in manufacturing inspection

• ASME III Code Case N-818 approved (nuclear components)• JIP by DNV ongoing for similar guideline for Oil & Gas

•Acceptable defect size in different components / regions ‒ Identification of possible defect types and causes during manufacturing‒ Definition of application specific loads, including fatigue loads

and residual stresses‒ Specific material properties may be applied ‒ Damage tolerance assessment of components and structures with safety

margins according to standards as API 579, ASME XI or ProSACC‒ Optimization of welding / manufacturing with respect to defects & NDT

•Quality assurance‒ Establishment of inspection and testing plans (ITP)‒ Risk methods for decreased quality deficiencies in manufacturing

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• New standards in Oil & Gas increase the need for deep knowledge in fracture mechanics, weld residual stress analysis and fatigue

• This is our core competence! ‒ We have engineers with long experience from work in the safety critical nuclear industry, within

these areas Design optimization and verification, Adapted inspection plans and Lifetime extension

‒ Good track record in contract method development, with capacity to realize useful solutions.

• Design Optimization and Verification – new guidelines including fracture mechanics ‒ ASME VIII, Div 3 for high pressure vessels (>10 ksi / 70 MPa) and new guideline API 17TR8

‒ DNV RP-F112 – Hydrogen Induced Stress Cracking (HISC) in super duplex steel with cathodes

• FFS and Life Time Extension – guidelines from API, DNV, NORSOK, OLF, … ‒ Our experience in fatigue assessments and development of adapted inspection plans

Design optimization and verification Particular knowledge and experience valuable for Oil & Gas

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Fitness-for-service evaluation

Revision and inspection planning - ProSACC

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FFS assessments are used for evaluation of the safety margins when operating components contain flaws or damage

 – General / Local / Pitting Corrosion– Hydrogen Damage– Brittle Fracture– Crack-Like Flaws– Creep Damage– Fire Damage– Dents / Gouges– Weld Misalignment / Shell Distortion– Laminations

Fitness-For-Service assessment

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• Flaws and damage are found at revisions.

• FFS assessments for decision if continue operate, provided that a suitable inspection and monitoring programs

• Continued operation is very valuable to secure a well prepared repair or exchange  

• FFS also in processes for establishing intervals for revision/inspection, by results established for assumed defects  

• Inspecta has developed a procedure and software for engineering assessment of components with defects. o The procedure is mandatory for the Swedish nuclear industry o Has been developed an maintained by Inspecta since 1991. o Software for assessment following procedures ProSACC, R6, ASME XI and API 579/ASME-FFS.  

Fitness-For-Service assessment

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• ProSACC modules for integrity assessment of defects‒ Handbook SSM 2008:01‒ Stress intensity factor solutions and limit load solutions are provided

for a wide range of geometries, crack shapes and loads‒ FAD procedure for evaluation of brittle fracture, elastic-plastic

fracture and plastic collapse‒ According to ProSACC/R6/BS7910/FITNET and ASME XI ‒ Crack growth analysis modules for fatigue and stress corrosion

• Recently developed new functions ‒ Will be included in a new revision of handbook & software, August 2014‒ Safety evaluation system for secondary stresses at ductile failure ‒ Solutions for new geometries and crack shapes (continuously added) ‒ Estimate of fracture toughness by use of the Master curve method‒ Updated recommendations for weld residual stress profiles ‒ Evaluation of ductile tearing (J-R-evaluation)‒ Probabilistic evaluation of defects (using Monte Carlo and FORM) ‒ Module for evaluation of crack opening areas and leak rates

for LBB evaluation‒ Module for management of piping or multiple components under development;

improves piping data transfer, common data and updates‒ Use of CTOD as complement to fracture toughness (measured - for API5 79)

• Training‒ We give training courses in FFS analyses for the Swedish process

industry (usually ProSACC but also API 579-1/ASME FFS-1)

Procedure and software for FFS evaluation -- ProSACC

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Information needed for a comprehensive FFS calculation of a component/equipment is summarized below.

• Geometry and supports

 • Material specification

 • Loading conditions and process environment

 • Inspection and NDT data

 • Damage mechanism identification

• Safety margin requirements

(Conservative data can be estimated by Inspecta when data is lacking)

Data needed for a FFS assessment

Phased Array UT

Inspection Planning in the Nuclear Power IndustryExperiences and lessons from development during 1994 - 2014

1994: • New regulation that require establishment of adapted plans for

recurrent In-Service Inspection. o Previously prescribed fix inspection intervals o New regulation due to unexpected failures and damages

• Basic classification methodology developed (qualitative RBI) considering:o Damage mechanism susceptibility assessment o Simplified consequence assessment o Simplified FFS analyses

• Defects found during revisions needed more detailed FFS assessments. This frequently caused extended outages.

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Inspection Planning in the Nuclear Power IndustryExperiences and lessons from development during 1994 - 2014

2004: • Two different methodologies for quantitative RBI applied (and developed)

o Extensive work load to implement these detailed methods

• Decision to start work for having complete FFS analyses for all critical equipment, finalized before the revision o Previously a history of many extended revisions due to the need for detailed

analysis of defects after they were found

• …

2014: • Approved FFS analyses in advance to revisions for all critical equipment

o for decision if can wait to repair; for better preparation, and at best opportunity

• Conclusion that semi-quantitative RBI methodology may be most efficient o Supporting documents developed by probabilistic analyses o Systematic assessment of the effect of different POD for NDT

• …

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Example - Recertification process for used equipment in DNV RP E101:

Processes and guidelines for recertification, revisions and life time extension -- fundamental steps

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Acceptance criteria - cover both fabrication defects and operational related defects- the basis for acceptance criteria shall be documented - acceptance criteria for highly stressed areas and less severe areas ¨

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• Implementation of Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)

Development

Development of process for implementation of NII

Development of work process for pre-analyses and performing NII• Well connected process, from preparatory analyses, to

performing the NDT, to evaluation of the findings • Sufficient safety margins according to standards and codes

Basis for developing the process for NII: • DNV’s Recommended Practice G103 for NII, with modifications

for improvement: o Increased use of quantitative values in parts of the process o Integration with Fitness For Service analysis API 579/ProSACC o In-depth corrosion and degradation assessment process o Improved connection between the adjustment of intervals and

the nature of degradation mechanism and uncertaintieso Efforts for NDT performance demonstration and training in the

process Inspecta’s work with similar challenges in the nuclear industry

and the pulp industry

Degradation analysis • General corrosion • Pitting, Crevice corrosion • CO2

and H2S corrosion • Galvanic corrosion • Bacterial corrosion • Erosion corrosion • Stress Corrosion Cracking

o Chloride o Sulphide o …

• Fatigue • Creep• …

Main steps in the process: – Systematic and detailed assessment per region in vessels

– Corrosion and degradation assessment Identify damage mechanism based on materials, media, temperatures,… Growth rate assessment, from inspection history and findings for thinning, and

otherwise by expert assessments and monitoring of corrosion conditions

– Assessment of acceptable defect size Considering materials, defect type, pressure, temperature, load cycles, … FFS assessment with safety margins according to API 579 or proSACC Interval by growth assessment for corrosion and other degradation

– Assessment of NDT performance Selection of inspection method(s) and coverage related to defect type and size Technical motivation of detection capabilities and limitations (following ASME V

Article 14 and ENIQ QMD) Validation/test of NDT performance - connected to acceptable defect size

– NDT of vessel and assessment of results • Standard NII plan, including o degradation type, NDT method(s), detection limit, areas, etc. o scaffolding, removal of insulation, opening, empting, cleaning, etc

• Evaluation of findings and feedback, documentation of inspection history

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Kr

Lr

Lr

max

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Critical region (failure)

Non-critical region (safe)

Development of process for implementation of NII

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Examples of

• Assignments• Projects

CASE: Fitness-For-Service assessment for oil & gas separator

• At the turnaround for a platform in 2012 defects were detected in the first stage separator.

• Inspecta was commissioned to carry out fitness-for-service evaluation to assess which nozzles that needed to be repaired.

• 23 reportable indications were found in 8 out of 12 welds between nozzles and the vessel.

• Stress analyses were performed for the vessel including detailed modelling of the 8 nozzles and interacting equipment.

• The most probable root cause for the defects was determined to be lack of fusion.

• Safety margins with respect to fracture and plastic collapse were evaluated in accordance to Level 3 in API 579‑1 and ProSACC.

• The conclusion from the FFS analyses of the 23 defects was that only one nozzle needed to be repaired.

• An extended outage was avoided.

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Challenges in Subsea Integrity Engineering

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Causes for incidents in the North Sea based on a survey performed by DNV and reported in its Recommended Practice for Integrity Management of Subsea Pipeline Systems.

Equipment/Issue Threat

Rigid Risers Corrosion, Fatigue, Damage

Flexible Risers Water ingress/corrosionEnd fitting failureCarcass failure

Unpiggable Pipelines Corrosion

Moorings Fatigue / wear

Manifolds Fatigue , Damage

Wells / Xmas trees/BOP

Seal, mechanical damage

Valves Mechanical failure

Maintain information overview

Loss of containment due to missed integrity issue

Align best practice for Asset Integrity subsea

Loss of containment due to poor integrity practice

Information gathered during meetings with BP and Shell. Loss of hydro carbon containment is the key threat for all operators.

27%

5%

11%

18%

24%

5%

10%

Threats to Subsea Production North Sea

Corrosion

Natuarl Hazard

Other

Anchor

Impact

structual

Material