Davide Miozzo Marco Altamura – Luca Ferraris – Davide Amato

Chambery, 27.05.2015

Outcomes of meetings with civil protection officers and judges in Italy

Index Overcriminalization • Science in complex systems •  “defensive Civil Protection” • Science at the bar

Case Studies • Vibo Valentia • Aosta

Accountability of scientists • Systemic risk • The performance paradox

Conslucions

Now

20 Years Ago

30 Years ago

•  Diffused use of scientific means

•  Monitoring •  Real time

• Prevention • Planning

• Response • Mass

casualties

Predictions & Early Warning

Rapid contrast

Disaster forecasting and

nowcasting

Monitoring & active disaster

assessment

0  

2  

4  

6  

8  

10  

12  

14  

2003   2006   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014  

Num

ber  o

f  tria

ls  

Year  

Almost 50 trials regarding the CP

System

More than 160 victims (without

L’Aquila and Emilia’s earthquake)

More than 100 indicted

operators of CP

16 regional administrations

involved

Regione Processi

Sardegna 7

Liguria 7

Toscana 6

Campania 4

Emilia Romagna 4

Veneto 4

Puglia 3

Sicilia 2

Calabria 2

Marche 2

Lazio 2

Val D'Aosta 2

Molise 1

Abruzzo 1

Piemonte 1

Basilicata 0

Umbria 0

Friuli 0

Lombardia 0

Trentino 0

Questions from the Italian CP asked, through the European Council, to National CPs:

1) Existence of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

2)  Are those SOPs mandatory? 3) In case of infringement of SOPs (if they exist) do Operators have to undergo trials?

4) Are there SOPs that the operator is bound to follow in communicating the alert to other institutions (i.e. Regional and Municipial entities) and to the population? 5) Are there SOPs that the operator is bound to follow in monitoring meteorological events? If yes, which ones? 6) Are there SOPs on the behavioural conduct of operators during the event?

7) If the abovementioned rules were infringed, has an operator ever been prosecuted by the Judicial Authority? If yes, which was the result of the legal action?

No No!

The above mentioned rules were never infringed The rules mentioned in items 1-6 have been respected so that no operator has been prosecuted in this respect. There has been no such situation.

Yes, in one case, but it was not a court case. In 2006 a disciplinary procedure was introduced against a duty officer because he broke the above mentioned internal rules in relation to a meteorological event. The procedure was closed down and the duty officer was disciplined.

155 Million € damage bill 4 deaths

July 3, 2006 09:00 UTC: 73mm 10:00 UTC: 115mm 11:00 UTC: 10 mm

198mm/3hrs 15 Km2

200 mm 20 mm

The Prosecutor calls upon an expert asking him to answer

these questions:

1) Was the meteorological paroxysm foreseeable? 2) Was the alert quickly

dispatched? 3) Were landslides and

flooding directly connected with the

behavior of the accused?

The Expert, by use, ex post, of a different

NWP model: The event was not foreseeable locally

but…

…the data in possession of

the system should have induced the

CP to (pre)alert the entire region

The Hindsight bias – procedural problems

• The “experts” of the prosecutor • Questions asked to the experts • The hindsight bias • The Model Operator: a superhuman figure abstractedly configured ed ex post • Blame games

Formal charges against indicted persons (2006)

•  CP should have given the alert; •  By not doing so they were formally charged of

having caused floods (offense foreseen in the Italian Criminal Code and punishable with 5 years in custody);

•  Had he given the alert, according to the prosecutor, the communication flow amidst CP HQ and the population would have avoided the deaths.

The decision of the court (2009): Acquitted from charges

• I f a p h e n o m e n o n i s n o t foreseeable there cannot be responsibility;

• Floods and landslides that have occurred cannot be connected with the behavior of the accused persons.

• Increased number of alerts; • Alerts of higher level; • Adoption of precautionary

m e a s u r e s a n d m e a s u r e s a f f e c t i n g f r e e d o m ( e . g . evacuations or movement limitations);

• Preventive shutdown of public, private and industrial buildings.

Active “defensive behaviors”:

• Resignations from office of highly qualified personnel;

• Fragmentation of mandates; • Suppression of services.

Passive “defensive behaviors”:

• Fears of the officials; • Inflexibility of the system.

No lessons learned:

Corr

ect

Fals

e M

isse

d N

o-ev

ent

Precautionary Regionà 38% Correct; 61% False; 1% Missed

Performant Regionà 87% Correct; 9% False; 4% Missedà meaning a probability 4% higher to end up in court!!!

0  

5  

10  

15  

20  

25  

30  

0%  

10%  

20%  

30%  

40%  

50%  

60%  

70%  

80%  

90%  

100%  

2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013  

Trials  

 Pe

rforman

ce  

 

Year  

Trials   False   Correct   Missed  

Homus oeconomicus Homus Juridicus

Local emergency plans

Develop new ways of planning

Participatory approaches •  Recognize, accept and manage

risk along with the population

EU Flood Directive •  Methodologies, prevention,

preparedness and participation

Internal enquiries •  Study of what has been done and

its evaluations need to be transparent and shared for a systemic enhancement

From a model operator to a model system

Jurists, prosecutors, c i v i l p r o t e c t i o n operators, legislators (national, regional, local), citizens and the media should confront each other, exchange views, problems and potential solutions with a common project:

Identification of GOOD practices

Implementation of GOOD practices

Testing and validation of GOOD Practices

Dissemination

Adoption of a Model System

Final reccomendations

Davide Miozzo Davide.miozzo@cimafoundation.org Davide Amato Marco Altamura Luca Ferraris CIMA FOUNDATION Via Armando Magliotto, 2 – 17100 Savona | ITALIA Phone: +39 019230271 Fax: +39 01923027240 Email: info@cimafoundation.org Web: www.cimafoundation.org