Atlantic Voices - Nuclear Terrorism

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 1

- Flora Pidoux

The introduction of nuclear weapons into a state’s arsenal decisively changed the context of international relations and means of warfare. From the beginning, this new weaponry needed to be controlled and regulated, as illustrated by the number of treaties limiting the number of nuclear warheads, enriched uranium and conduct of weapon testing. Despite the various regulations, proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a major concern for most of the second half of the 20th century. This has been a particular concern on the part of the international community regarding rogue states such as North Korea, Libya, Syria and Iraq.

Perhaps more concerning is the risk posed by non-state actors who could potentially acquire nuclear and fissile materials through black market trade and/or illicit smuggling. Moreover, the threat of a terrorism organization attaining nuclear weapons is much harder to address.

This issue will analyze the implications posed to nuclear security as a result of the recent deal between Iran and the P5+1 as well as analyze the threat the Euro-Atlantic currently faces from non-state nuclear terrorism as a result of the instability throughout the Mediterranean region.

Nuclear Security Volume 5 - Issue 11 November 2015

Contents:

Implications of the Iran Nuclear Deal for NATO’s Eastern Front

Ms. Danielle Najjar analyzes how the Iran Nuclear Deal signed in July 2015

affects NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense vis-à-vis Iran but also Russia and

NATO’s Central and Eastern European Allies and Partners.

The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Amidst Crisis in the MENA Region Mr. Dean Patrick Rice, Dr. Howard Lewis Hall & Dr. Natalie

Manaeva Rice discuss how the current instability in the MENA region in-

creases the need to revise our preventative and response capabilities to cope

with the possibility of a nuclear or radiological attack.

The mushroom cloud of the first test of a hydrogen bomb is seen in a 1952 file photo (Photo: REUTERS/HANDOUT)


By Danielle Najjar

A fter years of diplomatic talks and

negotiations, the world finally saw the

completion of a nuclear deal, the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between the

P5 +1 (China, France, United Kingdom, United States,

Russia + Germany) and Iran on July 14, 2015. Since

then, there has been nonstop focus and debate over the

legitimacy of the deal and its further global implications

through congressional hearings, private briefings,

exhaustive media coverage, lobbying efforts as well as

intense public scrutiny. The intentions and layout for

the JCPOA are evident, but the implementation of the

deal may run into obstacles, namely caused by the

atmosphere of distrust surrounding Tehran.

The JCPOA is a defining moment for the world

order as it has the potential to set the precedent for

future nuclear negotiations. This deal stands on the

foundation of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and

framework announced in Switzerland on April 2, 2015

that set the requirements for the deal.

Breakdown of the Iran Deal

According to the JCPOA, Iran must agree to

measures of transparency regarding its nuclear program

while limiting its nuclear infrastructure, growth of

uranium enrichment, procurement of nuclear

technologies and nuclear research. Once the conditions

are met by Iran, the international community will, in

return, lift the sanctions which have been imposed on

the country since Iran made its nuclear ambitions public

in 2002.

The deal states that Iran must limit its development

and research for enrichment of uranium and plutonium

for the next fifteen years as well as reduce its stockpile

and capacity of low-enriched uranium by 98 percent --

hence limiting enrichment to 3.7 percent and to 660

pounds of enriched uranium. Iran agreed to make several

changes involving the transformation of its Fordo nuclear

plant to a science research center; cut down in half the

number of centrifuges used to enrich uranium at the

Natanz plant; the nuclear reactor currently in

construction in Arak will now be reconstructed in order

to prevent the plant from creating weapons-grade

plutonium which is used to create nuclear bombs. Those

changes all aim at limiting Iran’s capacity to pursue its

project of becoming a nuclear power.

It is expected that the conditions outlined in the deal

will start being implemented within the next year. Iran is

also expected to become more transparent in regards to

allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

more access to their nuclear program, and accepting

further inspections and investigation by the IAEA for any

suspicion or allegations of uranium enrichment facilities,

for as long as twenty-five years.

The acceptance of all of these directives is the first

time the Iranian government has allowed for such intense

nuclear program inspections from international actors and

there is hope that it will foster a new age of cooperation

towards peace and stability throughout the region and the

international community at large.

NATO’s Commitment to Nuclear Negotiations

The Iran nuclear deal has many implications for the

security of the Euro-Atlantic region as the deal directly

affects the regional balance of the Middle East, and by

extension, that of the other side of the Mediterranean.

Moreover, this deal reinforces the legitimacy of the Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) whose credibility had been

Implications of the Iran Nuclear Deal for NATO’s Eastern Front


largely criticized for its numerous violations and the

idleness of the international community.

NATO’s commitment to preventing the spread of the

nuclear threat has always been loudly proclaimed, to this

effect the Iran nuclear deal was widely applauded. NATO

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated at the

announcement of the Iran nuclear deal: “This agreement

represents a historic breakthrough which, once fully

implemented, will strengthen international security. It is

critical for Iran to implement the provisions of today's

agreement and to fulfill all its

international obligations and advance

security in the region and beyond.”

Reassessing NATO’s Ballistic

Missile Defense

After the signing of the JCPOA,

NATO received criticism from

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei

Lavrov, who asked the United States,

in cooperation with the Alliance, to

reevaluate its ballistic missile defense

plans as announced in US President

Barack Obama’s speech in April 2009. There, the

American President stated that there would be no reason

to uphold missile defense in Europe once Iranian nuclear

threats were under control. Before the deal, Iran was

believed to have the largest and most advanced ballistic

missile system operating with ranges of 1500 to 2500 km

which had the potential to reach NATO countries like

Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. Though Obama’s speech

specifically referred to the US’s European Phased

Adaptation Approach (EPAA) as opposed to the entire

NATO BMD, the EPAA is a part of NATO’s multilateral

framework to protect the entire European NATO

territory against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).

For Russia, the opposition lies through seeing NATO's

BMD as an undermining force against Russia's strategic

deterrent and alter the strategic balance with the

Alliance. Russia views the implementation of EPAA

phases where SM-3 interceptors could potentially

destroy Russian ICBM and all ballistic missiles with the

offensive capacity of BMD interceptors.

Although Russia would like to see the elimination of

NATO’s BMD system after the JCPOA, NATO has

declared that their BMD was not directed at any

particular country and was strictly for protection

purposes against any nuclear, chemical, biological, or

conventional warfare. Despite

Russia’s demands, there seems to

be no voluntary change planned in

regards to NATO’s BMD plans.

Plus, the threat from Iran remains

as the JCPOA does not prohibit

and diminish Iran’s work or

acquisition of ballistic missiles

since they can be armed with

conventional warheads and not

necessarily by nuclear ones. It

would thus be a mistake for NATO

to change the BMD system since

there are still high risks emanating from Iran. A change

would have negative political and security implications

for NATO members and allies in Central and Eastern

Europe.

Turkey’s Role

Though Russia feels threatened by NATO’s BMD

system and its implications after the Iran nuclear deal,

the Russian threat is not the primary reason for ballistic

missile defense in the European region. If Iran had the

capability to acquire nuclear weapons before the

implementation of the JCPOA, it would have become

an immediate and imminent threat to the Alliance as

they would have had the capacity to reach neighboring

Turkey.

Russian President Putin and Security Council

Secretary Ivanov with then-Iranian chief nuclear

negotiator Rouhani during negotiations (Photo:

Reuters/Alexei Nikolsky/RIA Novosti/

Kremlin )


Turkey has played a pivotal role in establishing

NATO’s BMD system. Although official NATO policy

states that the BMD system exists for assistance to any

and all potential threats, the reason stems from

Turkey’s history of requests for NATO’s assistance in

protecting its borders, specifically with Syria. NATO

has provided the Patriot anti-missile system in 2013 to

Turkey with claims that the missiles are only means to

defend and deter threats.

For this reason, Turkey insisted NATO deny that

Iran is the source of the threat to why the BMD system

is needed in Europe. Only when NATO is sure that

Iran no longer poses a threat to Turkey, could the

BMD system potentially be revoked. However, there

seems to be no sign of

complete trust with Tehran in

the near future, and the

geopolitical necessity of

maintaining the BMD system

remains.

Russian Implications in

Central and Eastern

Europe

The Alliance’s BMD

system asserts tensions with

Russia due to its geographic

positioning near the Russian border, allegedly

threatening Moscow’s strategic arsenal, which in turn

causes political and economic effects on NATO’s

Eastern borders. Thus, in the context of the Ukraine

confrontation, there is an increase in risk management

on both sides and an overall focus on Central and

Eastern European allies. A new environment of

suspicion due to additional Russian strategic arsenal

advancements has been created with the underlying

possibility of a new arms race.

NATO expresses concerns that Russia’s use of

nuclear weapons could be enacted at a lower threshold

than before. Currently, Russia holds 1,643 warheads on

528 deployed ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs), and warheads designed for heavy

bombers along with the current total stockpile of

deployed and non-deployed strategic and tactical nuclear

weapons of approximately 8,000 warheads. Therefore,

even with a diminished threat coming from Iran,

NATO’s obligation to ensure the security of its allies in

Central and Eastern Europe remains. The most effective

way to accomplish a sense of assurance for those

countries in the range of Russian and Iranian missiles is

by maintaining the BMD system which includes radars

and interceptors.

Russia’s support was a key factor in reaching the deal

with Iran and put the

agreement forward with

intentions of fostering better

relations and cooperation with

the four NATO countries

involved to pursue their own

national interests. Russia

supported the deal because

they did not want to see Iran

with nuclear weapons, but

they were fully aware of the

complications that lifting

sanctions would have on their energy-related influence.

Future of Deal Based Tensions

NATO’s concerns over tensions with Russia stem

from an overall atmosphere and relationship of distrust

and suspicion along with Russia’s new nuclear and

missile advancements. Russia is looking for more

cooperation and engagement from the Alliance in

removing the BMD system in Central and Eastern

Europe, as well as assistance in maintaining regional

power once Iran enters the energy market. However,

Russian S-400 Triumph/SA-21 Growler medium- and long-

range surface-to-air missile systems drive during the Victory

Day parade on the Red Square, Moscow on May 9, 2015

(Photo: Ria Novosti / Host Photo Agency / Reuters)


NATO member countries must show the Central and

Eastern European countries that they are dedicated to the

security of the region. Therefore, the Alliance’s BMD must

stay in place for the security of the Alliance’s Eastern

Flank, as well as to act as a watchdog over Tehran’s

application of the JCPOA.

Additionally, more tension could arise between Iran

and Russia as once the Iran deal is fully implemented and

sanctions are lifted, Tehran could potentially transform

into an energy supplier for the Central and European

countries as an alternative to Russian services. Without

sanctions, Iran will be able to competitively engage key

markets with one of the world’s largest amounts of natural

gas and oil. Before the application of sanctions, Iran

shipped 600,000 barrels a day to Europe, which was about

17 percent of its production. Iran is also geographically

situated in a position to trade with both Asia and Europe

which makes it an even greater competitor to Russia.

Europe is responsible for consuming almost 70 percent

of Russia’s oil exports, with oil and gas sales accounting for

about half of Russia’s government revenues. The country is

already in recession to which the economic consequences

of the sanctions over Ukraine have been added. Iranian

exports can only be expected to worsen the economic

standing of Moscow. Iran’s entry into the world market

will cause a reduction in prices for Russia’s energy and take

a large piece of its quasi monopoly which could trigger a

domino effect of damages to the overall economy, decline

in military advancement and overall influence in the

Central and Eastern European region.

For the future of BMD in Europe, NATO and Russia

should be focused on the Iranian threat. Though countries

like the United States have downplayed the severity of the

threat it still remains a huge priority for the security of

Eurasia. Realistically, NATO’s BMD has the concrete

capability to deal with a threat from Tehran, and even

though it could quickly adapt to a Russian threat, that case

is far less likely. The Alliance’s BMD in Europe must

remain unchanged in order to complete its responsibility

to the security of the NATO member countries and

allies whose safety is being jeopardized by Russia.

However, it must also be made sure that the building of

new stages, implementing new technology, radars and

interceptors are not misinterpreted by Tehran in that

NATO does not trust them to abide by the JCPOA.

Reinforcing the Alliance’s BMD to counteract the

Russian threat could potentially trigger a security

dilemma for Iran, which would have negative

consequences for the security of Europe and the MENA

region as well as for the future of nuclear deals.

Danielle Najjar is an intern at the Atlantic Treaty

Association. Danielle is currently a student at American

University in Washington, D.C. where she is pursuing a

bachelor degree in International Relations. Her

academic and research focus are the global economy and

comparative governance.

"Ballistic Missile Defence." NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Association, 5 Nov. 2015.

Bermant, Azriel. "The Russian and Iranian Missile Threats: Implications for NATO Missile Defense." The Institute for National Security Studies, Nov. 2014.

Bermant, Azriel. "What Will the Iran Deal Mean for NATO Missile Defense?" INSS Insight 734 (2011): n. pag. The Institute for National Security Studies, 17 Aug. 2015.

Broad, William J., and Sergio PeÇanha. "The Iran Nuclear Deal – A Simple Guide." The New York Times. The New York Times, 30 Mar. 2015.

Khrennikova, Dina. "Russia's Oil Rivalry With Saudis Masks the Bigger Iranian Threat." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 12 Nov. 2015.

"NATO’s Nuclear Policy." NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Association, 20 Nov. 2015.

"Profile for Russia." NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, July 2015. Web. 23 Nov. 2015.

"Statement on Iran Nuclear Agreement." NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Association, 14 July 2015.

About the author

Bibliography


By Dean Patrick Rice, Howard Lewis Hall & Natalie Manaeva Rice

T he four-and-a-half-years of Syrian civil

war has resulted in more than half of

the Syrian population (11+ million)

being forced to flee their homes. More than four

million civilians have sought refuge in the border

countries of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Hundreds

of thousands are now seeking asylum in Europe,

creating what is quickly becoming an unprecedented

refugee crisis in Europe.

The flow of asylum seekers has dramatically

increased since Russia began its bombing campaign in

Syria in October 2015 and it is unlikely that the

migration will slow in the foreseeable future.

According to the International Organization for

Migration, the Greek island of Chios was receiving an

average of 300 refugees per day prior to the Russian

campaign and is now receiving up to 2,000 per day.

Greece as a whole took in over 27,000 fleeing Syrians

between October 17 and 21, 2015.

The Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear

Terrorism

The refugees are not necessarily a threat to

European countries. They are people who are

legitimately fleeing violence and death, and are

desperate for basic human needs. The flow of

legitimate asylum seekers, however, has also shown to

be the vehicle by which ISIS is moving individuals into

Europe to carry out acts of terror.

Even before the tragic terrorist attacks that took

place in Paris on the night of November 13, 2015, ISIS

stated that it intended to inflict acts of terror on

Western targets. As recently as August, 2015 two

German nationals, Abu Amar al-Almani and Abu Usama

al-Gharib who joined ISIS in Syria reportedly produced a

video calling on fellow Germans to either join them in

Syria or carry out terrorist attacks in Germany to avenge

the deaths of Muslims killed by coalition actions in

Afghanistan. This is only one example of ISIS’ proclaimed

intention of bringing terrorist attacks to Europe.

This, seen within the context of the current refugee

crisis, presents a significant challenge to European

nations in terms of increased risk of a radiological,

chemical and nuclear terrorist attacks. ISIS has acquired

radioactive material, including uranium, through its

seizure of lands in Iraq and especially the University of

Mosul. A story published in International Business Times

in August 2015 described how the FBI thwarted a

planned sale of the highly radioactive isotope cesium-137

in Moldova. The smuggler was reportedly seeking to sell

the cesium to ISIS. Although the use of non-fissile

uranium in any amount does not necessarily need to be

associated to a terrorist device, cesium-137 is a very

attractive isotope for anyone seeking to make what is

termed a “dirty bomb,” which designates a simple

explosive device which disperses radiological material

with the purpose of creating public hysteria.

Today, all the conditions for a nuclear/radiological

attack in Europe seem to be met: ISIS and Al Qaeda have

stated their intention to carry out attacks in Europe;

second, we know these organizations either possess or

can likely acquire radiological and/or chemical materials

as demonstrated by the seizing of the terrorists’ hideouts

The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Amidst Crisis in

the MENA Region


in Paris following the attacks earlier this month; third,

these organizations now have the mechanism, i.e. the

chaotic flow of immigrants to move material and/or

actors to almost any European country. Even if the

probability of a radiological terrorist attack may be

low, this devastating impact of even a small incident of

the kind demands careful consideration of the risks and

safeguarding measures that must be put into place.

French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has said

that the possibility of a chemical or biological terrorist

attack by ISIS was among the risks for which Europe

must prepare itself. It is not unreasonable to extend

this logic to a radiological/nuclear attack.

Bomb vs. Materials

When considering the risk of

a nuclear terrorist attack, it is

important to distinguish between

an actual nuclear weapon and a

radiological dispersal device

(RDD). The likelihood of a

terrorist organization acquiring

or constructing a functioning

nuclear weapon is extremely small, but not

impossible. A very troubling analysis by the Center for

Public Integrity published on November 12, 2015,

based on the presence of identical fissile materials in

three smuggling incidents, indicated that a substantial

cache of nuclear-weapons-usable highly enriched

uranium may be “in the wild” and its unidentified

sellers are seeking buyers among international terrorist

organizations. Whether this assessment is accurate or

not, this risk exists and demands continued

transnational cooperation. This includes robust

safeguards and security efforts, such as the ones

established by NATO, the European Union and the

International Atomic Energy Agency. On the other

hand, the threat of a non-fissile radiological dispersal

device or “dirty bomb” is far greater due to the higher

availability (and lower protection) of radiological

material and the rudimentary nature of such a weapon.

During the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held in

Washington, DC, the final Communiqué listed

acquiring nuclear materials as one of the greatest threats

to global security: “Nuclear terrorism is one of the most

challenging threats to international security, and strong

nuclear security measures are the most effective means

to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized

actors from acquiring nuclear materials.”

The materials suitable for a nuclear weapon are

generally well secured and unlikely to fall into the hands

of terrorists. However, cesium-

137, cobalt-60, and a number of

other isotopes are widely used

in various industries, including

healthcare. Hospitals,

construction sites, and

universities do not share the

same commitment to security

that nuclear weapons facilities

do – hence making them “softer

targets” that are more readily prone to be acquisition

targets for terrorist actors seeking to build a dirty

bomb.

Short-Term Strategy

Short-term strategies designed by the Transatlantic

Alliance and the European Union to address the

increasing threat of nuclear terrorism should include a

combination of immediate actions which are detailed

below.

Ensuring Border Protection/Control and Preventing Nuclear

Smuggling

According to the National Nuclear Security

Administration’s (NNSA) Defense Nuclear

Nonproliferation (DNN) Program, securing

Syrian children at the Zaatari refugee camp in

Jordan (Photo: Dean Rice)


international land borders, seaports and airports is the

cornerstone of successful efforts to prevent illicit

trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials. Securing

the borders of the European Union from possible nuclear

smuggling related to a current inflow of refugees should

include the following steps:

Equipping border cross points with appropriate

detection architecture, including radiation detection

equipment;

Training radiation detection equipment operators;

Securing the perimeter of the land border to prevent

unlawful crossing outside of the authorized crossing

points;

Training and workshops for the border and customs

personnel on preventing smuggling of materials.

Such efforts should be a joint action between

participating countries, EU and NATO regulatory and

law enforcement agencies as well as organizations and

associations specializing in nuclear and chemical issues.

The efforts aimed at enhancing border protection and

control should be implemented across the European

Union and NATO countries, with special focus on those

countries that serve as the crossing point for the refugees

and immigrants, namely the Balkans. Taking into

consideration the lack of border control at the internal

borders of the Schengen Area, it is critical to ensure the

protection of the perimeter borders against nuclear

smuggling.

In addition to preventing illicit trafficking of materials

across borders, the joint efforts should include training

sessions, workshops and providing detection technologies

for internal law enforcement personnel of the

participating countries, such as police, ministries of

internal affairs, and other agencies.

Although this measure goes beyond the prevention of

smuggling materials, border authorities of the European

Union should be engaged in close cooperation with

governments of countries currently hosting refugees,

such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, with the goal of

refusing the entry to the EU to people who have been

suspected of any involvement with radical groups or

activities. Sharing information on radicalized individuals

and groups between law enforcement agencies of the

European Union and countries with a large number of

displaced individuals is crucial to prevent radicalized

people from entering the EU territory. Eurojust and

Europol, which were created to support the member

states in their fight against organized cross-border crime,

are well-suited to take a leading role in such efforts.

Securing Nuclear and Radiological Materials

In order to prevent the theft of nuclear and

radiological materials by terrorist groups or individuals,

all possible sources of such materials in EU countries

should be safe and secure. The sources of radioactive

materials include not only the nuclear industry, but also

other operations such as universities, research

laboratories, hospitals and medical research institutions,

and certain construction operations where soil

measurement density systems are used.

Enhancing safety and security of such operations

should include nuclear security training of officials and

private sector employees responsible for the physical

protection of nuclear and radiological material and

facilities through workshops, training sessions, and

exchanging security best practices. In addition,

promoting nuclear security should include allocating

special funds available for public and private sectors for

upgrading security in critical industries and facilities.

Protection Against Insider Threats in Nuclear and Other

Critical Industries

According to Bunn and Glynn, nearly all of the

documented cases of theft of weapon-ready materials,

such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium,

have been perpetrated by insiders, that is to say people


with direct access to the components. For example, in

1993, Russian naval officers conspired to steal

approximately 4.5 kg of highly enriched uranium

from a naval facility in Murmansk. In post-Soviet

Russia, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

concluded that “potatoes were better protected” than

fissile materials. Protection against insider threat

should be a critical measure to keep radioactive and

other dangerous materials from the reach of

terrorists. A broad range of measures to protect

against this problem are required in national

regulations for operations with weapon-usable

materials. Such measures, according to Bunn and

Glynn, include

implementing a

two-person or

three person rule,

the storage of

materials in secured vaults when not in use, the use of

unique identifiable tamper-indicating devices,

accurate and sufficient accounting of materials,

continued surveillance of materials operations,

vigorous background checks, etc.

While many of these measures are already in place

in operations using weapons-grade materials, they

should also be applied to operations that produce or

employ other radioactive materials, such as research

laboratories, universities, hospitals, and other

industries. A set of recommendations and best

practices have been developed by the International

Atomic Energy Agency (see “Preventive and

protective measures against insider threat, 2008”) and

the World Institute for Nuclear Security (see

“Managing internal threats: A WINS international best

practice guide for your organization,” 2010).

Reaction to the Use of a Dirty Bomb

As the United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s fact sheet on dirty bombs states, the

threat of the use of a radiological dispersal device by

terrorists lies in the actual harm caused by the release

of radiation, as well as in the spread of fear and panic

among the population. In order to manage public

reaction and prevent mass panic in a possible case of

terrorist acts involving nuclear weapons, it is necessary

to develop robust crisis communication plans and

educational strategies targeting the general public.

Shapiro et al. argued that in order to effectively

deal with the aftermath of terrorist attacks, public

authorities need a counter-terrorism communication

strategy designed to give the population security and

reassurance at the

local, national,

regional and

international levels.

The co-ordination of

the various institutions and authorities is critical to

reduce the impact of an attack and prevent the loss of

confidence and image for the public authorities.

Research on crisis communication, according to

Sandman, has pointed out two important elements of

public reaction to such critical events. First, release of

health-related information is one of the most critical

parts of the national response in case of terrorist attack

and other public health emergency. Second,

information seeking behavior and reaction to

information in emergencies substantially differ from

behavior in normal circumstances. Such strategy should

be based on previous research on crisis communication

in cases of disasters and other public health

emergencies in order to put in place the most effective

response possible.

Long-Term Strategy

Implementing the above-mentioned short-term

strategies alone, however, is not sufficient. A

The threat of the use of a radiological dispersal device by terrorists lies in the actual harm caused by the release of

radiation as well as in the spread of fear and panic among the population


comprehensive strategy of long-term measures

addressing the underlying dynamics of the radicalized

Islamic threat should also be developed. Such a

strategy should be two-fold and include actions aimed

at preventing radicalization within the refugee

population in the long term, as well as addressing the

reasons behind the Syrian refugee crisis.

For example, previous research on radicalization

of the Muslim diaspora communities in Europe

demonstrated that failed assimilation and integration

in the host country is one of the primary reasons for

radicalization of both first and second-generations

migrants. The reasons are both internal and external

to that community, and include failure of the

immigrant population to

adapt and integrate to

the societies of the host

country, as well as the

local population’s unwillingness to accept immigrants.

Those problems were clearly visible in the interviews

of members of the Muslim diaspora in the U.K. after

the 2005 terrorist attacks in London. According to

the interviews described by Hoffman et al., while

Muslim immigrants were not always willing to

integrate into British society, the Britons were “not

necessarily ready to integrate with the Muslim

population either.”

The threat of radicalization of both newly arriving

refugees and second-generation immigrants should be

addressed by implementing a number of measures

focusing on incorporating the migrant population into

the fabric of the host society. Previous successful

strategies of preventing radicalization in the diaspora

communities in the European Union should serve as

guidelines for such efforts.

The examples of the Netherlands and Germany

demonstrate that successful assimilation requires a

comprehensive strategy implemented by cooperative

efforts between all levels of national governments and

various non-governmental organizations. In addition to

engaging the immigrant community, long-term efforts

should incorporate ongoing efforts of strategic

communication with the local populations to prevent

backlash against the incoming refugees and existing

immigrant diaspora. Existing structures of the

Transatlantic Alliance, such as the NATO Strategic

Communications Centre of Excellence, could be used to

implement such effort in cooperation with national

governments and non-governmental organizations.

Long-Term Actions

The threat of nuclear terrorism will continue as long

as terrorists thrive, plan and

prepare in the chaos of the

Syrian civil war. This simple

fact cannot be ignored, and

a holistic approach to ensuring security is required. The

most effective mean of reducing the threat of a terrorist

organization using the chaos of the migration crisis as a

cover for conducting a radiological attack on Western

targets is the cessation of the fighting in Syria.

According to the Deutsche Welle report, a recent

survey conducted by the Berlin Social Science Center,

which interviewed over 900 Syrians in displacement

centers around Germany, found that only 8 percent of

refugees want to remain in Europe. In addition, the

survey showed that over 70% of those questioned were

fleeing because of the military actions of the Syrian

government. While this was not a scientifically

representative sample, it provides insights into the mind

of the fleeing migrant.

NATO countries, in cooperation with the EU and

Arab countries, must therefore continue to push all

parties toward a resolution to the fighting in Syria while

also continue to work toward eliminating the ability of

The threat of nuclear terrorism will continue as long as terrorists thrive, plan and prepare in

the chaos of the Syrian civil war.


ISIS, Al Qaeda and like-minded organizations to pose a

threat to the West and the MENA region.

Finally, the ultimate goal of all parties should be the

creation of a clear path toward a sustainable, free and

democratic civil society in Syria. Until this goal is

reached, the dangers that rise from the instability and

chaos of this civil war will remain. The Transatlantic

Alliance must therefore demand prudent vigilance in

matters of nuclear security with a constant recognition of

the humanitarian demand for compassion in all short and

long-term strategies.

The threat of nuclear terrorism is not, however,

limited to ISIS or any specific group, but rather is a global

threat, which will continue to demand active safeguard

measures and monitoring long after the Syrian crisis is

resolved.

Dean Rice is a Global Security Fellow with the UT

Institute for Nuclear Security. He has published articles

related to global security in a number of academic

journals and mass media outlets. He recently visited the

Syrian/Jordanian border, and interviewed numerous

Syrian refugees living in Zaatari camp, the largest Syrian

refugee camp in Jordan.

Howard Hall is the University of Tennessee and Oak

Ridge National Laboratory Governor’s Chair in Nuclear

Security. He is a Senior Fellow in Global Security Policy

at the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy,

where he directs the Global Security Policy Program. He

also directs the UT Institute for Nuclear Security.

Natalie Manaeva Rice is a Research Assistant at the

University of Tennessee's Institute for Nuclear Security,

and just finished her PhD focused on the rise of anti-

Americanism in Russia. She has published articles in peer

reviewed journals on issues related to global security and

public policy, with a special focus on nuclear security,

mass media and public opinion.

Bunn, M. G., & Glynn, K. M. (2013). Preventing Insider

Theft: Lessons from the Casino and Pharmaceutical Industries. Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, 41(3), p. 4-16.

Butler, D., & Ghirda, V. (2015, October 7). Nuclear black market seeks IS extremists. Associated Press. Retrieved from http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:publicid:ap.org:6fd1d202f40c4bb4939bd99c3f80ac2b

Deutsche Welle. (2015, October 11). Survey leaves no doubt: Syrians are fleeing Assad. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/survey-leaves-no-doubt-syrians-are-fleeing-assad/a-18775789

Diehl, C., & Blohm, M. (2003). Rights or identity? Naturalization processes among “labor migrants” in Germany. International Migration Review, 37(1), p. 133-162.

Fahim, K., & Samaan, M. (2015, October 26). Violence in Syria Spurs a Huge Surge in Civilian Flight. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/world/middleeast/syria-russian-air-strike-refugees.html?_r=1

Fischhoff, B., Gonzalez, R., Small, D., & Lerner, J. (2003). Evaluating the success of terror risk communications. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 1, 255–258. http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/ pdf/10.1089/153871303771861450.

Hoffman, B. (2007). The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (Vol. 229). Rand Corporation.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2002). Detection of radioactive materials at borders. Retrieved from: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1312_web.pdf

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2008). Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats. Retrieved from: http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/security-series-drafts/implem-guides/nst041.pdf

International Organization for Migration. (2015, October 23). Greece Records Highest Weekly Migration Inflows in 2015 So Far. Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/news/greece-records-highest-weekly-migration-inflows-2015-so-far

Kaplan, M. (2015, August 6). ISIS Threatens Germany: Islamic State Jihadists Vow Attacks On European Soil For “Spilling The Blood Of Muslims” In Afghanistan. International Business Times. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-threatens-germany-islamic-state-jihadists-vow-attacks-european-soil-spilling-2041662

National Nuclear Security Administration. (2011). Preventing Proliferation of Nuclear Materials and Technology. Retrieved from: http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/dnnfactsheet2011

Sandman, P. (2005). Risk communications during a terrorist attack or other public health emergency. In Terrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies: A Reference Guide for the Media. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health & Human Services

Shpiro, S., Frimark, A., Abelmann, A., Nomikos, J., Fernández, A. M. D., Frey, K., ... & Mallon, S. (2011). The SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual. Retrieved from: http://www.ulster.ac.uk/comm/files/2014/10/SAFE-COMMS-Manual-final_en.pdf

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2012). Dirty Bombs Fact Sheet. Retrieved from: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.pdf

About the authors

Bibliography

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