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Francis A. Plummer,Senior Advisor, Public Health Agency of Canada and
Distinguished Professor, University of Manitoba
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Anticipating where the puck is going to be:
Using advanced technologies to keep ahead in the evolutionary struggle with the microbial world
• Emerging infections are those that are new or newly discovered in humans – mainly come from animals (H1N1, measles, plague, tuberculosis, influenza, HIV, SARS)
• Infections re-emerge when old microbial foes acquire new weapons through genetic exchange or mutation –resistance to drugs or vaccines, escape from the human immune defences
Emerging and Remerging Infectious Diseases
Bacteria
• Legionairre’s disease• E.coli H7:O157• Clostridium difficile colitis• Helicobacter pylori• Chlamydia trachomatis and C.
pneumonia• Staphylococcus toxic shock• Flesh eating disease• Methicillin resistant S. aureus• Penicillin resistant gonorrhea and
Hemophilus influenza• Extremently drug resistant
tuberculosis• Vancomycin resistant enterococcus
Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Disease Over My
Career Viruses
•Ebola virus•HTLV-I•HIV-1•HIV-2•Nipah virus•Borna virus•West Nile virus•SARS•H5N1 Avian influenza•H1N1 pandemic influenza•Hepatitis B & Hepatitis C•Delta agent•Prion disease (mad cow)•NERS
Are Infectious Diseases Threats Increasing?
• Probably “yes”• 35+ “new” diseases over the past 40 years• Of all microbial species, we have characterized
less than 1% and the unknown 99% represent constant source of new threats.
• Most new infections come from animals • Organisms mutate in response to human tactics:
drugs, vaccines, disinfectants ...
Why Is This Happening?• Ecologic changes• Human demographic/behavioural changes• Globalization• Rapid growth in technology• Microbial adaptation and change• Gaps in public health programs/infrastructure
Anticipating the Puck
The Katrina Lesson
____ _______ _________ __ _____ _______ _________ _______
Using Advanced Technology to Combat Emerging Infectious Diseases
Tactic 1:
Rapid Detection & Alerting of Infectious Disease
New Tools to Increase Speed of Detection and Alerting
• Previously: Countries reported new & emerging diseases to WHO – take weeks
• Now: advanced computer based technologies
– Canadian Network for Public Health Intelligence
– Monitors news, internet etc.
• Examples: SARS, H1N1, Listeria
Data Collection/Exchange
Surveillance/Program ‘Watches’
Alerting
Event Management
Respo
nse an
d Reso
urce M
anagem
ent
Centr
eCa
nadian
Integr
ated O
utbrea
k Surv
eillanc
e Ce
ntre
Program Management
Syndromic SurveillanceNESP
CBRN Watch WNV
Prov/TerrEpi SchoolsLabs Hospitals OTC Telehealth
DND/RCMP OthersEnvironmental Data CFIA
Manual Data Entry
FluWatch
Automated Data Collection
Public Health Alerts
GPHIN RespiratoryZoonotic
Phone Fax Email Pager
ReferencesProtocols
Training Materials Resource Inventory
Knowledge Management Resources
- Targeted alerting- Role based- Respect jurisdictional accountabilities- Program driven; configurable & flexible
- Command and control - Real-time data collection and integration- Intelligence organization, display, and decision making tools - Integration of organic and external expertise- Connectivity of external command centres and capabilities- Data recovery and long-term analysis
- Program/Businesss centres - Communication and coordination - Program driven; configurable and flexible
Inter-Jurisdiction Case Management
- Intelligence presentation using maps, charts, etc.- Supported by algorithms and other decision support tools- Program driven; configurable and flexible
- Manual and automated targeted data collection - Respects privacy issues- Program driven; configurable and flexible
CNPHI at a Glance January 1, 2005
CNISP
iPHIS/EHR
TravelNosocomial CBRN EntericSTD
Secure role-based registration system
Program Specific Surveillance
Intelligence Exchange ResourcesDiscussion Forum News Board
Document Manager SchedulerGroup Chat
Web-cast
ETEAM
Web SurveysOther
ModelingGIS
Statistics Algorithms
Decision Support Resources
Web-Data Web-Data
Copyright © 2005, Canadian Network for Public Health Intelligence. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium withoutexpress written permission is prohibited.
Other
Outbreak Summmaries Outbreak Summmaries
Inter-Jurisdiction Case Management
Canadian Integrated Outbreak Surveillance Centre (CIOSC)Public Health Alerts
Nurses
ER physicians General practitioners
Custom Officers
Veterinarians
Laboratorians
FNIHB health care
professionals
Law Enforcement
ParamedicsMilitary
Social Workers
Others
Provincial/Territorial AuthoritiesPublic Health
Agency of Canada
Other Federal
Agencies
Regional Health
Authorities
Enteric (launch Apr 2001)
Respiratory (launch Dec 2004)
Travel (launch Apr 2005)
Zoonotic (launch Apr 2005)
- Targeted alerting- Role based
- Respect jurisdictional accountabilities- Program driven
- Configurable & flexible- Secure web-technology
Phone
Fax
Pager
December 2004
General* (launch Apr 2005)
First Responder (proposed)
*General Alerts will accommodate disease areas not specifically addressed in other modules until program areas define disease specific user requirements
First Responders
Alert Modules
Epi-X
2005
Copyright © 2005, Canadian Network for Public Health Intelligence. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium withoutexpress written permission is prohibited.
Laboratory Feature of CNPHI
CASAI.0022CASAI.0014CASAI.0023CASAI.0017CASAI.0021CASAI.0013CASAI.0002CASAI.0001CASAI.0004CASAI.0011CASAI.0003CASAI.0007CASAI.0015CASAI.0016CASAI.0005CASAI.0006CASAI.0018CASAI.0010CASAI.0019CASAI.0020CASAI.0024CASAI.0012
1 0 0908 07 06 05 04 03 0
Patterns enteredinto Bionumericsand analyzed
Clusters identified Is this a new pattern? Is this a common pattern?
Each lab analyzes the image and replies to listserv:Any pattern matches?Any known sources of infection?What is known about the pattern?
PFGE tiff file Dendrogramcreated in Bionumerics
Patterns designated
Patient 3
Dice (Opt:1.50%) (Tol 1.5%-1.5%) (H>0.0% S>0.0%) [0.0%-100.0%]PFGE-AscI
100
90807060
PFGE-AscI
PNC__08-5596/#1
PNC__08-6206
PNC__08-6567
PNC__08-6568
PNC__08-6569
PNC__08-6570
PNC__08-6571
PNC__08-6573
PNC__08-5587
PNC__ID097603
PNC__08-5599/#1
PNC__08-3083
PNC__08-5374
PNC__08-5379
PNC__08-6538
PNC__08-5579
PNC__08-6506
PNC__08-2768
PNC__08-5586
PNC08228,02
PNC08260,03
PNC08287,06
PNC08287,07
PNC08287,08
PNC08287,09
PNC08287,11
PNC08287,13
PNC08224,04
QC-08-159,09
PNC08228,05
PNC08147,10
PNC08201,05
PNC08201,12
PNC08287,04
PNC08212,07
PNC08287,02
PNC08138,08
PNC08224,02
How DNA fingerprinting* was used to identify and investigate the 2008 listeriosis outbreak, example:
not outbreak strainPatient 1Patient 2
Patient 4Patient 5
Food Product 1Food Product 2
Patient 6Patient 7Patient 8Patient 9
Food Product 3Patient 10
outbreak strainoutbreak strainoutbreak strainoutbreak strainoutbreak strainoutbreak strain
not outbreak strain
not outbreak strainnot outbreak strainnot outbreak strainnot outbreak strainnot outbreak strain
Source Listeria DNA Fingerprint Result
* Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)
0
2
4
6
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24
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28
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32
01-J
un
08-J
un
15-J
un
22-J
un
29-J
un
06-J
ul
13-J
ul
20-J
ul
27-J
ul
03-A
ug
10-A
ug
17-A
ug
24-A
ug
31-A
ug
07-S
ep
14-S
ep
21-S
ep
28-S
ep
05-O
ct
12-O
ct
19-O
ct
26-O
ct
Date Results Available/Analyzed by NML
Num
ber
of L
iste
ria
Isol
ates
Listeria monocytogenes DNA fingerprints analyzed by the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML), June – October, 2008 Includes all human, food, and environmental samples from the 2008 national Listeriosis outbreak investigation
Outbreak strainLMACI.0040/LMAAI.0003
Outbreak strainLMACI.0040/LMAAI.0001
Outbreak strainLMACI.0001/LMAAI.0001
NOT Outbreak strain
Tactic 2:
Rapid Containment - Sending the Lab to the Specimen!
Microbiologic Emergency
Response Teams• use of portable CL3 units to create safe work environment• isolator for basic microbiology• isolator for specialized techniques• equipment needed to perform testing
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Arrival In Uige
Mobile Laboratory Equipment
Uige Airfield
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Operations for Ebola in DRC 2007
Second team to newlocation –> breakdown laband transport, second teamsets up again.
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High Containment in the Bush
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Perfectly Functional Laboratory
Tactic 3:
Using Viruses to Fight Viruses!
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
Scary Viruses !
• Ebola• Marburg• Lassa• CCHF• Machupo
Why Feared?
• Zoonotic• Mortality as high as 80%• No treatment, no vaccines• “A list” of bioterrorism
threats
Ebola Vaccine Development• Uses a Vesicular
Stomatitis Virus to fool the immune system into thinking it’s Ebola.
• Effective in non-human primates, seemingly proved effective for human use in West Africa
These Vaccines Could Help Save the Great Apes
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Article published on the 2009-05-05 Latest update 2009-05-05 11:34 TU
Tactic 4:
Using High Throughput Machines To Understand
Genetics
H1N1
Mexican Health Officials Request Assistance from NML
April 17
PHAC-NML
MX16 H1
MX21 H1
MX10 H1
MX39 H1
MX24 H1
MX17 H1
MX47 H1
MX49 H1
MX25 H1
MX26 H1
MX2 H1
MX51 H1
MX9 H1
MX29 H1
A-California-04-2009 HA EPI176470
MX4 H1
A-Brisbane-59-07 CY030230.seq
A-Solomon Islands-3-06 ISDN220951.seq
87
99
49
39
27
0.01
April 24
NML determines outbreak in Mexico is H1N1 Influenza A (human swine flu)
North AmericanSwine Origin
Eurasian Swine Origin
North America (A/Mexico/ /2009 [H1N1]), Influenza A virus, April 2009:- Reassortment H1N1: An unusual mix of genetic sequences- 4 unique virus sources
North American Avian Origin
North American Human Origin
R. Cordero
April 29200 clinical samples
Mexico City direct to Winnipeg
Tactic 5:
Using Systems Biology to Understand Infectious
Disease
Solutions for the HIV Pandemic
HIV Prevention With The Old Science
Finding Time Lag to General Acceptance
Women were readily infected with HIV through sex
2 years
Other STD promote HIV transmission 5 yearsBreast feeding is a major route of mother to child HIV transmission
5 years
Male circumcision reduces HIV susceptibility 19 yearsHormonal contraception enhances susceptibility to HIV
?
Behavioural interventions targettedat “core groups” reduced HIV in the general population
?
Highly-exposed persistently seronegative.
3 years follow, HIV-1 serology and PCR negative, Active in sex work.
10% of highly exposed sex workers resistant to HIV-1.
Years of Followup
2 01 81 61 41 21 086420
Surv
ival
Pro
babi
lity
1 .0
.8
.6
.4
.2
0 .0 Decline in HIV-1 Incidence with follow up in the Pumwani Cohort. Adapted from Fowke et al Lancet 1996; 348: 1347–51
Resistance to HIV-1 Infection
Nature of HIV Resistance
Res Negs
CD4 T cellsGene expression profiling in HIV Resistant
WomenResNeg
Whole Blood
The Human Genome Project• Two efforts, one publically funded and one
privately funded, resulted in publication first full draft human genome sequence in 2003.
• 13 year efforts costing $100 M.• 1 genome generates 1.5 Gbytes of data.• Related fields of proteomics and
transcriptomic are advancing apace.
Towards New Technologies for HIV Prevention
Frank Plummer, May 1, 2015Objective: To undertake an exhaustive analysis of mucosal factors involved in protection against HIV
infection
The Future of Genomics• Within two years ability to generate whole
human genome for around $100 dollars.• Using a device the size of a memory stick.• Our ability to understand the enormous
amount of data produced has lagged the ability to produce it.
Analyzing the Data• Conventional statistical analysis has
yet to yield the ability to fully exploit these very powerful tools.
• Does machine learning offer the solution to this and other big data problems?
What Is Machine Learning?– A type of artificial intelligence that provides
computers with the ability to learn from data without specific programming.
How Will This Be Disruptive?• New diagnostics, new disease markers.• New treatments.• Personalized medicine.• New products.• New businesses with tremendous
economic potential.• Huge societal implications.
Conclusion
• Microbial threats are growing and ever changing
• In the evolutionary standoff with the microbial world we are like the Red Queen: needing to run faster to keep pace with the threats
• Advanced technologies help us to anticipate where they are going to be and be ready for them
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