\n

'BITTER AND CRUEL . .Report of a mission to Guatemala by the British Parliamentary

Human Rights Group

October 1984

'It is not mere imperfection, not corruption in low quarters, notoccasional severity, that I am about to describe: it is incessant,

systematic, deliberate, violation of the law by the Power appointed towatch over and maintain It. . it is the wholesale persecution of

virtue when united with intelligence, operating upon such a scale thatentire classes may with truth he said to he its object, so that the

Government is in hitter and cruel, as well as utterly illegal, hostilityto whatever in the nation really lives and moves, and forms the

mainspring of practical progress and improvement.'

W.E. Gladstone, Letter to Lord Aberdeen, 7 April 1851, on the Bourbonregime in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

rJ LATIN AMERICA BUREAUj I AMWEU. SJ RUT. UONOON ECIR-IUL

2.2.3.4

2.2.4

2.2.4.1

2.2.4.2

2.2.4.3

3.

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

Ck)iiteiite

MAP

PREFACE

GUATEMALA IN BRIEF

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

(V)

(vi)

(vii)

(viii)

1.

1.1

1.2

INTRODUCTION

Historical background

The present context

2. THE RIGHT TO LIFE

2.1

2.1.1

2.1.2

2.1.3

2.1.4

2.2

2.2.1

2.2.2

2.2.3

2.2.3.1

2.2.3.2

2.2.3.3

Rural killings and kidnappingsThe general situation

Killings and kidnappings by the army

Killings and kidnappings by the civilianpatrols

The level of fear and the implications

for obtaining information

Urban killings and disappearances

The general climate

Forced disappearances

Urban sectors affected

Trade unionists

Students

Activists in the tolerated political

parties

Prisoners in Pav6n

The fate of the disappeared

Secret prisons

Secret cemeteries

The fate of those previously held under

the Special Tribunals

3

3

4

6

6

6

7

8

8

10

10

10

12

12

12

13

THE CONTROL OF THE

COUNTRYSIDE

Civilian patrols

Model villages and development poles

Food within the counterinsurgency

model

Disruption of the rural economy

14

14

15

18

20

4. THE DISPLACED INGUATEMALA CITY

1

2

3

4

5

22

5. non-governmentalSECTORS

5.1 Trade unions

5.2 The work of the church

5.3 Human rights organisations

24

24

' 25

27

6. TORTURE

7. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

28

29

32

APPENDICES

Alleged killings and kidnappings by thearmy in 1984Disappearances in 1984

Trade unionists killed or kidnappedsince November 1983

Students killed or kidnapped in 1984Catechists from one group of 40families killed in Guatemala City sinceJuly 1984

UN resolution, December 1984Statement of Guatemalan bishops*conference, June 1984

33

34

36

37

37

38

39

m

FURTHER READING 40

.. V',:, ■'

MEXICO

,>■'>- f'>■•»-. <N. .•"•■ ,'•.•! • •• ^

HuehuetenangtKEl Quichd

El Pet6n

-<S^

i"'V ' -V ■' ■ . .•

^ ' ,1 • , ■.... ,^ .,V\ / 1 ^

Alta Verapaz

Pom6s*i

•.K- I

- j

•'i}! ./.' wmmf

BELIZE

GULF OFHONDURAS

m fr ^

Baja Verapaz

El Progreso

^ Solola j >A Guatemala, ( J-" JJ- Gity*Retalhuleu ( ^ —

Zacapa

Chlqulmula

HONDURAS

PACIFIC OCBAN

Esquintia Santa RosaJutlapa

EL SALVADOR ir:

Preface

This report was compiled on the basis of a private visit by two membersof the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group the (PHRG), I^rdAvebury (member of the House of Lords and Chairman of the PHRG)and Anthony Lloyd (Labour Member of Parliament for Stretford,Manchester, and member of PHRG). They visited Guatemala 15-21October 1984 and Mexico 21-24 October. The information they receivedis supplemented by testimonies taken by two researchers working forthe PHRG in the month of October 1984. Apart from meeting high-ranking government officials, members of the army and poUtical partyleaders, the delegation received a total of 70 personal testimonies insideGuatemala, a further ten in Mexico and a number of 'grouptestimonies' from trade union representatives, the Grupo de ApoyoMutuo (Mutual Support Group) and representatives of human nghtsorganisations. The witnesses came from different regions of Guatem^aand from different sectors of Guatemalan society. They include therelatives of the victims, trade unionists, catechists, peasants, socialworkers, nuns, priests, journalists and displaced people. In most CMestheir names do not appear in the text for fear of reprisals against theirfamilies or themselves. Although the delegation received testimony ofcases of human rights violations in 1983 and before, the focus of thereport is on 1984, and where possible, the period after the ConstituentAssembly elections of 1 July 1984. Much of the information containedin the report is hitherto unpublished. u j

It is in the nature of all human rights investigations that first-handevidence is rare — many of the victims have perished, have left thecountry or are terrified of reprisals. In Guatemala, too, we have had torely partly on indirect evidence. However, we draw firm conclusionsfrom the cumulative weight of testimony from the oppressed, thebereaved and the relatives of the disappeared, as well as those who havesuffered directly at the hands of a vicious militant dictatorship. Webelieve that, confronted with this vast mass of misery and despair, itwould be morally incorrect to demand the standards of proof in everyindividual case that would be required in a court of law.

London, November 1984

The Parliamentary Human Rights Group consists of more than 100 membersof both Houses of Parliament. They have published reports on El Salvador,the Philippines, Zimbabwe, Guyana and Uganda.

vi

Guatemala in Brief

AREA

POPULATION

LANGUAGE

RELIGION

ECONOMY

LAND DISTRIBUTION

LITERACY

HEALTH

GOVERNMENT

42,000 sq. miles (approx. half the size of Britain).

7.5 million. Ladino (mixed Spanish and IndianDescent): 40Vo. Indigenous Indians: 60Vo. Ruralinhabitants: 61% of total.

Official language Spanish, but four mainindigenous groups (Quich6, Kekchi, Mam andCakchiquel) speak 22 languages wi^ over 100dialects.

80% nominally Roman Catholic. 20% Protestantand Evangeiical.

ON? p.c. (1980) $1,080.5% of the population receive 59% of thenational income, while the poorest 50% receive7%.

75% of the population receive a p.c. income ofless than $300.Main exports: Coffee, cotton, sugar, bananas,meat.

Employment: 34% of the active labour forceunemployed. 52% underemployed. Less than 2%of workers belong to ofilci^iy recognised unions.

65% of land is in iarge commercial farms (30%of which is uncuitivated). 18% family-sizedfarms. 16% is in small peasant plots too small tosupport a family. 9 out of 10 inhabitants of thehighland departments live on such plots. 2% ofthe population own 70% of the land. 91% own22%.

64% of the population cannot read.

Life expectancy: 56 (45 in rural areas). (73 inUK).Infant mortaiity: 77 per 1,000 births (13 per1,000 in UK). 4 out of every 5 Guatemalanchildren under 5 are malnourished.Doctors: 1 per 2,560 persons (1 per 640 in UK).

Guatemala has been ruled almost withoutexception by a succession of right-wing militarydictators since a CIA-inspired coup d'6tat in 1954overthrew the reformist government of ColonelJacobo Arbenz. The latest military ruler isGeneral Mejfa Victores, who ousted General RiosMontt in August 1983.

vU

Summary of Findings

N

1. In a thirty-year war against their own people, the1 Guatemidan military have created a nation of widows andorphans. Over 100,000 people have been killed and 88,000disappeared. Throughout 1984, the killings anddisappearances have continued, and there has been nosignificant improvement in the human rights situation -

I if anything, it has worsened since 1983.

2. The Guatemalan army and the civilian patrols workingunder their authorily continue to be responsible for highnumbers of deaths and abductions of the non-combatantpopulation in the rural areas. While the number ofmassacres carried out by the army has declined since1982, the present 'stage' is one of more selective killingsand abductions — involving anything from one to fifteenpeople at a time. Particular victims continue to becatechists (unordained Christian teachers), social

[.workers, community leaders, refugees hiding in thehiountains, and real or suspected guerrilla sympathiserswiip.give ftemselves up under the government amnesty.

3. High numbers of trade unionists, teachers, studentsand other urban workers continue to be abducted or killed

j every month. Disappearances are known to be running atover 50 a month. The level of abductions actually reported

I is higher than in 1983.

4. The government and military assertion thatdisappearances are largely the work of guerrillM or

1 extortioners, or that the disappeared have gone to Cubaor the Soviet Union to receive training, is a brazen lie.The evidence points inexorably to the state securityapparatus as being responsible for these crimes.

1 5. The civilian patrol system, which now boasts 800,000members, (a) is a form of involuntary servitude, (b) forcesthe rural population to take part in morally repugnantacts such as kidnapping, beating, torture, rape andmurder, and (c) directly violates the principle of freedomof movement.

I 6. The construction of 'model villages' within the so-called 'development poles' inflicts further suffering on

I the rural population. Their basic aim of imposing militarycontrol over the highland areas entails the congregationand regfulation of the civilian population, severerestrictions on movement, strict control over the growing

and distribution of food, and the building of militarisedzones all over the rural departments firom which themilitary can coordinate counterinsurgency activities.They are justifiably compared to the strat^c hamletsdeveloped during the Vietnam and othercounterinsurgency wars.

7. Some of the most barbaric forms of torture continue tobe used systematically against political and commonprisoners in rural areas and urban centres, includmtelectric shock treatment, extraction of fingernails, an(even the amputation of various parts of the body.

8. There are severe restrictions on the so-callec'democratic opening', in which the Guatemalan mUitary ismeant to hand back power to a civilian president in 1985.The Constitutional Assembly is virtually powerless, as itsmain tasks are limited to writing a new constitution antsetting the timetable for the presidential elections. Yet inthe past Guatem^a has enjoyed excellent constitutionswhich have simply been flouted by successive milita^

1 governments. Even if a civilian president were to beelected in 1985, it is highly improbable that he would haveany control over the military. The army will keep theirhands firmly on the levers of power in the country, asthey have done for 30 years. In addition, no party of theleft or centre left can participate in the democratic

j opening without great risk to their personal safety.

9. The future of the democratic opening must remainuncertain and the prospect of any improvement in humanrights violations doubtful. Judgement must therefore besuspended until the process unfolds - if indeed it isallowed to do so. In the meantime, we recommend that (a)Britain should not restore diplomatic relations withGuatemala as this would be seen as an endorsement of theclaim by the Guatemalan militaiy that human rightsviolations have diminished significantly; (b) neitiierBritain nor the EEC should give economic aid toGuatemala for the time being; (c) no foreign governmentshould give arms nor any other type of military aid to theGuatemalan government; (d) any government gipng

1 economic aid to the Guatemalan government should betotally satisfied that any aid earmarked for ruraldevelopment would not be used by the Guatemalan armyfor its own counterinsurgency purposes.

vili

LntTBODUCim'We here are the survivors of 30 years of repression, since the best

politicians and representatives of the popular sectors have been killed, arein exile or do not participate In the process because they do not believe In

it.' (Victor Hugo Oodoy, member of the Constituent Assembly)

1.1 Historical background

In ail the controversy and press coverage surrounding theCentral American crisis, Guatemala is often regarded onlyas an addendum to the conflicts in neighbouring El Salvadorand Nicaragua. The grim statistics summarizingGuatemala's political reality — i00,0(X) killed since i960,iOO political assassinations a month in 1984, 10disappearances a week, 100,0(X) orphans, half a milliondisplaced — barely reach the North American, let alone theEuropean newspapers. Yet Guatemala is the richest andmost populous country in Central America; borderingMexico in the north and west and Belize, Honduras and ElSalvador in the north and east, it occupies a key strategicposition within the isthmus; it has rich mineral deposits,including oil and nickel; and with direct US investments of$260 million, it is of greater economic importance for anyUS administration than Nicaragua or El Salvador.

One of the major reasons for the lack of publicity isthe present low level of direct US involvement in Guatemalacompared to its commitments in Honduras, El Salvador andNicaragua. From 1977 to 1984, the US Congress repeatedlyvoted to block military and non-essential economic aid toGuatemala because of its abysmal human rights record. Atthe same time, the US administration has not 'needed' tobecome too enmeshed in the Guatemalan civil war as the

Guatemalan military has proved itself much more adeptthan its Salvadorean counterpart at containing the growthof strong and very active guerrilla forces.

But US involvement has not always been so restrained.Guatemala's last 'democratic interlude' between 1944 and1954 was brought to an end by a CIA-engineered coup thattoppled the reformist government of President JacoboArbenz. Opposition from the landowning elite and theUnited Fruit Company crystallised over Arbenz's moderateproposals for land reform. Ever since 1954 real power haslain in the hands of the army. Fraudulent elections everyfour years between 1970 and 1982 provided a plausiblefacade of democracy, as each time the army-sponsoredcandidate claimed the victory — general elections becamemerely elections for generals. Throughout the 1970s,demands for social and economic reform were ruthlesslykept in check by4it^rmy and government-linked deathsquads. Large numbek^f trade unionists, priests, students,intellectuals, leaders of Wass-roots organisations, and twoleaders of the traditionally moderate social democrat

program of political murder, thelitical centre, and the series ofinvinced many Guatemalans thatse could not be realised through the!ar organisations like the NationalUnion Unity (CNUS) and the

?easadt Unity (CUC) that had grown

parties, were killed. Thielimination of the pcfraudulent elections c(social and political chaielectoral process. J*opiCommittee for AradtCommittee of

im t ^n-i'

throughout the 1970s were Increasingly driven into a closeralliance with an emerging armed opposition.

By the beginning of 1982 the armed groups were In astrong enough position to make a serious bid for politicalpower under the banner of the Guatemalan NationalRevolutionary Unity (URNG). In the hieManj^^enq^tmentsespecially, the growing impoverishmenrofuie ind^enouspopulation and the government's brot^jroponse to theirattempts to overcome their piSlE3eim by formingcooperatives and other grass-roots organisations had ledlarge numbers of Indians to sympathise both actively andpassively with the insurgents.

In March 1982 'born-again' Chrislitm General EfrainRios Montt became president after a coup d'6tat, pledged toclean up Guatemala's electoral process and to eradicate thearmed opposition. In the months that followed heaccelerated the process of counterinsurgency sendingthousands of troops into the north-western areas, whereIndian support for the guerrillas was known to be strongest.'Scorched earth' tactics and the indiscriminate murder of

whole Indian communities were the weapons used againstthose suspected of sympathising with the insurgents^Amnesty International estimated that 2,600 people werekilled from March to October 1982, while other humaiirights organisations put the year-end figure as high as10,000. The Guatemalan bishops' conference referr^ to theslaughter of the Indian people as genocide.

Rios Montt was deposed by another coup on 8 August1983 and was replaced by his former minister of defence.General Mejia Victores. Rios Montt had alienated thebusiness community by proposing a value-added tax; he hadannoyed the upper echelons of the army by relying on aninner circle of junior officers and interfering with traditionalpatterns of army promotion; his aggressive style of 'born-again' Christianity had dismayed traditional Catholicsentiments both inside and outside Guatemala; and hisreluctance to support US regional plans for the reactivationof CONDECA (the Central American Defence Council) haddistanced him from the Reagan administration.

1.2 The present context

The government of Mejia Victores represents a return to themore traditional form of Guatemalan politics. Althoughthere are both civilians and military officers in ministerialpositions within the present cabinet, the real power in thecountry is known to be the council of senior militarycommanders. Death squads are again operating against realor suspected opposition in the cities, after a decline In theiractivities under Rios Montt. In the rural areas MejiaVictores has continued and expanded his predecessor'scounterinsurgency policy through the consolidation of 'Plan

ff\jSu t/v * c "A**"* Cvj ̂ t

General Mejia Viclores. Piers Cavendish/Reflex

Firmeza' (Stability Plan), one of a series of Vietnam-stylepacification programs. He has also committed himself to anelectoral timetable in which the military are intended towithdraw from politics after the presidential electionplanned for some time in 1985.

The first stage of this posited withdrawal were held on1 July 1984, when elections took place for the ConstituentAssembly. The parties taking part essentially spanned onlythe far to the centre right of the political spectrum. Owing tothe peculiarity of Guatemala's electoral system, theChristian Democrats (DCG — centre-right) won the highestpercentage of the vote but only 20 of the 88 seats as againstthe 23 won by the far-right MLN-CAN (National LiberationMovement — Authentic National Centre) and the 21 won bythe UCN (Union of the National Centre). The remaining 24seats were shared by six other parties. Parties advocatingsocial reform, like the PSD (Social Democrat Party) or thePGT (Guatemalan Communist Party), did not participate.Null and spoiled ballots reportedly amounted to I7.3^o ofthe vote, higher than the Christian Democrats' 15.6%. TheConstituent Assembly is empowered only to draft a newconstitution and set the timetable for presidential electionsin 1985. It is not empowered to enact legislation nor to electa provisional president.

The undeclared civil war between the URNG and thearmy continues, mostly in the rural areas. The four political-military organisations that make up the URNG — the EGP(Guerrilla Army of the Poor), the FAR (RevolutionaryArmed Forces), the ORPA (Revolutionary Organisation ofthe People in Arms) and the PGT- nucleo (the GuatemalanCommunist Party-nucleus) — are not in as strong a positionas they were in early 1982, but at the same time are far fromdefeated. Major army operations against the FAR in May1984 and the ORPA in August 1984 have not eradicatedthese organisations. From press reports, army statementsand URNG communiquis it is possible to deduce that thereis a regular and sizeable guerrilla presence at least in the

departments of Quichfe, San Marcos, El Pet6n, northernHuehuetenango, and the area south of Lake AtitlSn. Thearmy estimates the guerrilla fighting strength at 4,(K)0-5,000.

It is within this context that the government and thearmy are making every effort to emphasise the genuinenessof the 'democratic opening' and the alleged improvement inhuman rights. The present campaign to improveGuatemala's international image is closely linked to thepressing need for large amounts of economic aid andmilitary spare parts. Many observers state that the MejiaVictores government has finally discovered that the nation'sfuture depends on gaining the acceptance of the worldcommunity, especially in North America and Europe.Guatemala's agricultural economy has been badly damagedby the world recession and the shrinking demand for itsprimary products. Foreign exchange reserves are virtuallyexhausted and foreign debt stands at US$1.5 billion. Theeconomic crisis has been exacerbated by the costlycounterinsurgency program and a long-term strategy ofmilitary control over large areas of the highlanddepartments.

The government has apparently succeeded to someextent in polishing its tarnished image internationally. On 22September 1984 an official Act of Understanding was signedbetween Spain and Guatemala providing for the resumptionof diplomatic relations between the two countries. Spainhad broken off reiations in 1980 as a result of the killing of39 peasants and embassy staff in the Spanish embassy inGuatemala on 31 January. Guatemala's slated support forthe Contadora process and professed neutrality in theCentral American regional crisis has meant better relationswith Mexico, unusual praise from President Betancur ofColombia for 'its positive example for the rest of LatinAmerica', and a welcome for Mejia Victores in Costa Ricaby President Monge. The Reagan administration for its parthas set US economic aid for Guatemala at $157.8 million forfinancial year 1985 (a 40% increase over 1984), while, forthe first time since 1977, $300,000 has been earmarked forthe training of Guatemalan soldiers. There is even talk ofGreat Britain's restoring diplomatic relations withGuatemala, with a possible settlement of Guatemala's longstanding claim over part or all of the former British colonyof Belize.

The fundamental issues therefore are whether thegeneral human rights situation has improved or simplychanged, whether the Guatemalan military is willing tosurrender real power to a civilian government within thedemocratic opening, and whether foreign economic ormilitary aid will help to bring genuine democracy to theGuatemalan people or merely serve to consolidate in powerthe alliance between the army and powerful economic elitesby supporting their attempts to suppress the continuingdemands for social change.

The Guatemalan government dismisses criticalinformation published outside Guatemala, claiming it ispart of 'the KGB's $3,000-million-a-year disinformationcampaign'. We describe in the following pages what webelieve to be the reality.

2. THE RIGHT TO LIFE'Guatemala Is now a nation of orphans.' (Guatemalan journalist,

Guatemala City, October 1984)

2.1 Rural killings and kidnappings by (he army andcivilian patrols

2.1.J The general situation

On 8 September Guatemala City was shocked by thepreliminary results of an official census of the number oforphans in Guatemala. Baudilio Navarre, Che president ofthe Supreme Court, revealed that for the departments ofQuich6, Chimaltenango and San Marcos alone the figurewas a staggering 51,000 orphans, Speculation immediatelyarose that the final figure would be well over 100,000 if theother highland departments affected by the civil war wereincluded. It was estimated that this number of orphansimplied that at least 25,000 had been killed in those areasalone. The Impression of wide-scale devastation given byofficial figures was confirmed by local religious sources,who talk of 'the help given to 2,800 widows in one town inBaja Verapaz', 'the survival of eight families in a smallvillage in southern Quichfe out of a former population of300", or 'the disappearance of 56 villages in northern AltaVerapaz'.

Over the last three years, damning reports fromhuman rights organisations and resolutions at the UN haveconsistently accused the Guatemalan army of gross andpersistent human rights violations, especially against theindigenous population, it is our firm conviction that,although the repression in general has changed in style, theGuatemalan army and the civilian patrols working undertheir authority continue to be responsible for many deathsand kidnappings of the non-combatant population in therural areas.

The pace and degree of human rights violations isrelated to the strength of the threat to those in power posedby those struggling for social change. Thus, in Guatemala'srecent history, in the periods 1966-70 and from 1980 to thepresent the violations have been massive as they havecoincided with the years when the armed opposition hasbeen at its strongest, In 1982 especially, but at other times aswell, the army has been prepared to kill large numbers ofnon-combatants, including whole villages, in order toeliminate the guerrillas' popular support. A well-known caseis the village of San Francisco Nentbn, Huehuetenango,where 300 were massacred in July 1982, A deliberate policyof massacres, destruction of villages and the burning ofsubsistence crops formed part of Rios Montt's 'Victoria1982' (Victory 1982) campaign plan, which was aimed atdealing the armed opposition a quick and decisive blow.

The present 'stage' is one of more selective killings andkidnappings — involving anything from one to fifteenpeople at a time — as the army tries to consolidate its gripon the countryside. One highly-placed church official toldus that in his department, 'the bestial repression of 1981/2

mm

^■1

iyidows at Rabinal, Baja Verapaz. Jenny Malthewt/Format

has diminished. The effect of that repression has been toterrorise the population . . . The repression is much moreselective now. Why? Because they do not need to kill.' After'Victory 1982', the present stage of consolidation is acontinuation of 'Firmeza 1983' (Stability 1983), which isessentially aimed firstly at eliminating the real and suspectedcivilian support for the guerrillas, and secondly atcontrolling the rural population and resources and isolatingit and them from the guerrillas. The first clement involveslarge numbers of selective killings and kidnappings. To saythat the repression is more selective is not to imply that thereare only isolated cases of killings. Testimony after testimonyfrom the highland regions of Quich6, Huehuetenango, SanMarcos, Sololi, the Verapaces, Chimaltenango, andTotonicapin reveal high numbers of deaths of calechists,cooperative leaders, social workers, people who refuse tojoin the civilian patrols, refugees hiding in the mountains,and people giving themselves up under the governmentamnesty.

The second element involves the forced settlement ofthe non-combatant population in refugee camps, reeducation camps, and model villages, and the promotion of'development poles', as well as the inclusion of 800,000 meninto the civilian patrols. These arc described in chapter 3 ofthe report.

While it is generally true that the number of massacres

has diminished, there is strong evidence to suggest that theyhave not ended in all departments. For example, we areaware that there have been allegations of recent armymassacres in areas where the guerrilla presence is still strong.In the area west of Nebaj, Quiche, where there have beenrecent clashes between the army and the EGP, it is assertedthat the army has carried out large-scale reprisal killings,abductions and the burning of crops as punitive measures onthe civilian population. While these violations may haveoccurred, the focus of our report is on cases where we havereceived direct and unchallenged testimony. While we werein Guatemala City, the Guatemalan press carried the storyof a mass killing of ten peasants, who were found in acommon grave on 2 October. An inhabitant of the village ofRio Bravo, Suchitepdquez, was walking home late at nightwhen he tripped over something which turned out to be thehead of a partially-buried corpse. When they started diggingaround the head, the bodies of ten victims, most of themindigenous people, were unearthed. They had been slashedwith machetes and strangled; four of them revealed signs ofhaving been buried alive. A few days earlier, 23 peasantsfrom neighbouring S0I0I& had disappeared.

As for the question of responsibility for the killingsand abductions, we have been told by very reliable sourcesliving in rural areas that the guerrillas are occasionallyresponsible for selective assassinations or ajusliciamientosof informants, farm owners or others believed to be workingclosely with the army. However, it is the firm opinion bothof these sources and of many indigenous witnesses,refugees, and displaced people that it is the army andcivilian patrols who have been, and continue to be,responsible for the overwhelming majority of the killingsand abductions.

2.1.2 Killings and kidnappings by the army

To illustrate the general trend of selective killings, we list aselection of cases from three different departments ofGuatemala and a longer testimony from a health worker inSan Marcos (see box). Others are listed in appendix 1.

ALTA VERAPAZ

San Cristobal: On 10 September 1984, Sr Policarpio ChenCol, founder and director of the savings and creditcooperative in San Cristobal, was violently kidnapped.Various witnesses saw six or seven armed men grab him andforce him into a private car. Army responsibility is knownfirstly, because, the driver of the car was recognised as aman called Sr Lara, who has a reputation of being linked toprevious abductions and assassinations in San Cristobal,and who at present works in the military zone of Cob&n.Secondly, on the previous night, some members of thecivilian patrol were looking for Sr Policarpio under theorders of Sr Ambrosio Cahuec, military comisionado forSan Cristobal. A witness heard Sr Ambrosio say to thecivilian patrol, 'Grab Sr Policarpio, but don't kill him yet!'Two days after the abduction, his body was found inanother department. El Progreso, with his eyes and genitalsmissing. Sr Policarpio was well-known for his work with therefugees in the area.

HUEHUETENANGO

Monte Cristo: On 22 August 1984, the military captured tenpeople from Monte Cristo, near Barillas, of whom nine weremen and one was a woman. Their names are Tom&s Diego,Juan Pablo Diego, Ram6n Pascual, Mateo Molera Carino,Andres Diego Andres, Francisco Alonzo, Ram6n Andr£s,Sim6n Mateo Lucas, Pablo Miguel and Maria Candalaria.Witnesses saw them being tortured before being taken away.They are now presumed dead.

San Mateo Ixtat&n: On 2 June 1984, the army picked up a

TJ6griM0P(V^.js,., .My name is Teresa XiloJ analthe department of ̂an Marcds tii ̂ h^th prdtnotef ,abd.|ga catechist. I would like to tell you bf ioma eyetits^^hich;:^wa know as daUy'^periehb^ ifi

. On U Mwch l984 afel6 ft̂ i;:tiie dMythe miiiiiclpatit^of San ̂ igUel .IktwUic&h and ^the home bf4Sf Aiejhndfd^Gdihbtt^e^da'^worker and a member oMiis local cooperatlvei andwas supposed tp- be gplttgj. tovWprk; with hta ; was:talking to ̂ hlM-ibbtlL^wofl^^^iirdvi^ "^egetables^iplanting trees, pruning peach and other fruit trees, theconservation of soil — When the. army arrived at thehouse; TherdlVere eight soldiers ~ fbuc-stayed in the--jeep and fouf^gol biiti The^- grabbed ̂;^ej^drbr ocaLl. him.ttp and took hiiri away With thenii W ^^ Wheti I t^dised what'lWas happening^ I startedscreaming, beggihg them dot to take him away,'tellingthem he was not a bad man, jthat he .was trying jto help;

^'his pedpie^ihaihe'Was a^^iN^hsetdbte jiersbnH trledv' to stniggle With the soldteflf ItHed tb help hlmi but the;soldiers kicked nie, threw hte tpihe grotind,'^ and took;,Alejandro >yith ;Uiem. ;He^as^Msb.^eaming.;:Hi8;|

I'hibthef also" was-'a'Witnela?tp5^a11ilhI8^^^^Sweeping and begging the Sdldim nbLb away^t"vbut they did anyways; Tliey;buhdied;h the jeep)'ahd We had to watchiheri^c1djig^M}Md|h^^^"tinder the seat. • ■

Three days later I went to the town of IxchiguSn.;• The very day! Was there, the arniy arrived again in their/; jeepi/fiverybhe was..{yery dpsfet beeauSM^ had .taken|bf f/Itheir i^teachet, Juah?|Mehdps4K-lieV discbSsittg" d;itH'^them''theiiCrri' Indian ianguagel: Other teachers^had been Insist^ that -We should speak only Spanish ̂ 'biit that IS not bur ;.mother tohgue,> Juan MendOSa bilingutd;-captured for saying what he did.^v^i^-^A; ̂' V

Three dayS later, on 17 March,"three bodies were:found in a ravine near the town, they Were people who.had been arrested by the police at the'sanie time as theteacher. One had no eyes, and the eyeg bf ihe others hadbeen brutally pushed in. One.bf the bodies also had notesticles and their stomachs had beeiL,tblri

:.meat hoo;k.:-;';'p'^;:;" ■; Aiejaiidrb Gbmez reappeared me months latef ib ;a mountainous regibh y^ far away,: In Alta Verapaz.'/He had; beeii'i''beaten,^lbrtUredi:;^iindfblded;Vand^handcuffed. He arrived at the heafest yiilage, dragginghimself aioiig and terribl^ WpundedK^e loCal: people

. helped him With What iitUe nspn^^fhe^^ :that hC;

..could get home. - : i ' '■ , He has gone out of-bis hiBid lr-. autistic, as the

doctors say. He just Stares into .the distance. Unable tocommunicate .Wi^ a livingisoul. SOtnetimes at night hebegins to Scream and Wail.'He SOundkUke a madman,begging Uierti to Stop b^tihglUni/JHefS Just a Vegetablettow.

bilingual teacher named Margarito Castaneda Sebasti&n,who was working on a project funded by USAID. He wastaken to a nearby cornfield and beaten up in the sight of thepeople from the village and kept there for a number ofhours. He was seen in the military base of Huehuetenango aweek later. He is now presumed dead or being kept in subhuman conditions.

■I'

CHIMALTENANGO

San Jos6 Poaquil; 24 people were abducted by the army inthe period 9-16 September 1984. The witnesses prefer not togive their names for fear of reprisals. Two people who triedto inquire about the whereabouts of the kidnapped wereseriously threatened by the colonel of the military zone, andafter being detained and interrogated, were forced to leavethe area.

It is also strongly alleged that the army on occasionsenter a village and claim to be guerrillas to test the sympathyof the inhabitants. On I October 1984, a group of soldiers,pretending to be guerrillas, entered a village inHuehuetenango (name of village withheld) and took away16 men who 'had spoken badly of the army". The 16 weretied up, beaten with rifle butts and thrown into a river at7.30 p.m. They were later taken to the local military base(names and ID numbers of the 16 are withheld). The sourcefor this account was the officer who told a religious personworking in the area that this is what they had done.

On various occasions, we heard mutually consistentallegations that those who gave themselves up to the armyunder the amnesty suffer selective abductions one, two orthree months after they have surrendered. The pattern isrepeated in the Verapaces, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango,and Quich6. At first the amnestied are treated well by thearmy, given food and medicine and offered new homes orpieces of land to build a new house in the model villages. Butafter some time, some members of the amnestied group,usually male, would be kidnapped, often by the civilianpatrols under the orders of the army. Most would notreappear.

It was also strongly asserted that real or suspectedguerrilla sympathisers who have either been captured orgiven themselves up are forced by the army to Identifyguerrilla sympathisers in the civilian population. This couldtake the form of ex-guerrillas wearing a hood or a mask andbeing told to point out other guerrilla sympathisers invillagers or even on buses. The person disguised would feelcompelled to point someone out for fear that if he did notcomply, he would himself be killed.

2.1.3 Killings and abductions by the civilian patrols

Every able-bodied man in Guatemala's highlanddepartments has been forced to carry out active service inthe civilian defence patrols. About 800,000 have now been

recruited and armed with everything from sticks andmachetes to rifles. Their main function is to be a system ofpolitical control over the rural population, as they areregularly forced to saturate the countryside with patrols,guard roads and villages, and report on anyone who resistsjoining the patrols or anyone arousing suspicion. Failure toparticipate in the civilian patrols is often assumed to be asign of sympathy for the guerrillas. The patrols operatetotally under the ultimate authority of the military. Thecivilian patrol system is described in more detail in section3.1.

A common allegation was that the civilian patrols,under the orders of the army, were forced to kill or kidnapmembers of the civilian population. In fact, in certain areaslike southern Quich6 and Baja Verapaz we were told that itwas essentially the civilian patrols who did the killing andperformed the abductions.

As an illustration, we quote the following case: 'On 9September 1984, Pedro Pferez [real name withheld) waskidnapped from his house in a village near the Pan-American highway between Chupol and Los Encuentros,QuichS. Twenty armed and masked men arrived at 9 p.m.and took away Sr P6rez and another man (who was laterreleased). The kidnappers robbed the house of 75 dollarsand other personal goods. Circumstantial evidence stronglysuggested that members of the civilian patrol from a nearbyvillage were responsible. One of the kidnappers was alsowearing military clothing. Sr Pirez was responsible for acommunity improvement scheme, and in particular forhelping widows in the area. He had also recently spoken to areligious person working in the area of the cases of one ortwo killings in each of the villages of Xepol, Pajulivoy andPanquiac near his own village. He had alleged that in thefirst or second week of August 1984, the military had calledtogether all the civilian patrols in these villages, produced alist of suspects, and made the civilian patrols kill the peopleon the list.' (Source: wife of Sr P6rez)

Denunciations to the press made by other villagerswould confirm the view that members of civilian patrols areguilty of atrocities. On 4 September 1984, the inhabitants ofChicua 11, Chichicastenango, Quich6, asserted in LaPalabra that 14 named members of a civilian patrol in thearea were guilty of rape, abduction and murder. They hadabducted Sebastian Algua Macario, Josi Algua Panjoj,Tom&s Macario Algua, and a young girl named ManuelaMacario Lindo, who had been raped by three of them. The

inhabitants alleged that the civilian patrol members hadcards saying that they were 'army specialists', which theyused to threaten those who denounced these crimes to thepolice.

2.1.4 The level offear and its implications for theobtaining of information

'We want you to know. . . but wedon't want you to know.'(Nun from one of the highland departments, October 1984)

One of the things that impressed us most strikingly was thegeneral level of sheer terror, clearly the legacy of years ofbrutal repression. A number of witnesses would describe indetail what had happened to their villages or to theirrelatives, and then would insist that the name of the victimor even the name of the village should not be included in thereport. This fear of reprisals is one of the reasons why someof the atrocities that take place in the rural areas are neverreported.

The general condition of fear had, it was felt, certainimplications for the collection of information and theverincation of alleged human rights violations. Anyone whotravels with the military, for example, is severely hamperedin obtaining an accurate picture of events by the fact thatany witness would be likely to say what she/he felt themilitary would want to hear. As one bishop explained, noindigenous person would ever speak openly under suchconditions'.

We had direct experience of this problem when wewere accompanied by the military in a region of Quichfe.Witnesses would often look towards the soldiers whileanswering questions. However, on one occasion, when themilitary were out of earshot, we received testimony that thearmy and the civilian patrols had recently been responsiblefor killings in a village in Quiche.

2.2 Urban killings and disappearances

2.2.1 The general climate

Mil] ... is indisputable that a new wave of violence isspreading across the country . . . alongside violenceorganised from common delinquency is political violenceerupting in all its intensity ... No political system canjustify itself by means of violence and disrespect for theindividual, especially when it is against the fundamentalprinciple of creation: life.' (Editorial in El Grdflco, 3September 1984).

While the majority of atrocities that occur in the rural areasgo unreported. every day the Guatemalan newspapers arefull of shocking stories of kidnappings or assassinations inGuatemala City or other urban centres, of bodies fouiidmutilated, of clandestine cemeteries accidentally discovered.The front pages carry such headlines as 'Man stoned todeath in zone 7'. 'Ten peasants found massacred in secretgrave', or 'Bloody corpse found in taxi with 17 macheteslashes'. Photos appear of firemen picking up torturedcorpses from the banks of rivers or from the sides of roads.Other photos of the recently disappeared come towards theback of the newspapers, bearing silent witness to the |suffering of the relatives.

Both newspaper editorials and high-rankingchurchmen call for an end to the violence that has escalatedsince July 1984. The situation is compared to the last fewmonths of the regime of General Lucas Garcia in 1981/82,when political violence was at its zenith in Guatemala City.A glance at individual named cases that are reported m theGuatemalan press reveals the extent of the violence. In athree-week period in October, a total of 14 killings, 12abductions and 16 disappearances were reported, themajority of them in El Grdflco or Prensa Libre.

Individual assassinations and disappearances in GuatemalaJanuary to October 1984

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. TOTAL

.'.U, 28" 147 79 100 133 31 50 79 84 n... 73128- 147 79 100 ̂ 133 31 50 79 84 n... 731

42 157 74 57 61 34 79 43 34 n... 581Monlhly toW, 70 304 ' 153 157 194 65 129 122 118 n... 1,312Monthly averages: 81 assasslnalions, 65 disappearances.Source.'OuaiemaJan Justice and Peace Committee.

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. TOTAL

individualassassinations'Forced orInvoluntarydisappearances'dhaVpMraiices'

65 105 94 103

64 157, 45 37 ■ 80 .23 25, - ; 43 , 38 34Mommy totals 129 262 " 138 131 183 87 . 86 105 . 105 112Monthly averages: 73 assassinations, 55 disappearances.

Source,'Ouatemalnn Human Rights Commission (CDHO).

1. -mn. fiioro Iwlode ilie mcgorto 'MdMppini wl.h ef .duludo nol Include itinnpied Wdiupplnp nof UdMpplnp of people ̂ 01««r rcjp^r.TiiMen|oreiiiee.UmetedtOfepfeien(citity»V»oflhereeliuimb«8ofvloUiiont - .";,v A J '

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The government and police version is that this rise inviolent crime is due to 'common delinquents' — privategangs of professional kidnappers, drug traffickers, orprivate Vendettas. However, it was the view of many otherobservers that, while there was a noticeable increase incommon criminality, the official explanation was often acover for the essentially political nature of many of the casesreported.

2.2.2 Forced disappearances

'I have spoken with government authorities, I have visitednumerous detention centres, I have placed variousadvertisements in the papers. Can you imagine how I mustfeel doing all this, not even knowing whether it is all in vain. . . my husband may already be dead.' (Wife of kidnappedteacher, Guatemala City, October 1984.)

The Guatemalan bishops stated in September that 38,000Guatemalans had disappeared in the last 30 years. Of these,500 have been added since the beginning of 1984. Humanrights organisations put the figure for the first eight monthsof 1984 at 511 forced disappearances (GuatemalanCommission for Human Rights) or 581 (Justice and PeaceCommittee), giving a monthly average of approximately 60a month. As the table shows, the figures for bothilisBppeRrances and assasslaallyiis mm\\\ faiily mm\\\except for a drop in June, which was the month precedingthe elections on 1 July, when Guatemala City was inundatedby foreign journalists. We were also informed by a highnon-governmental source that the flgure for reported casesin 1984 had gone up compared with the same period in 1983.

A number of explanations are given by the governmentfor the large number of disappeared Guatemalans: (1)emigration to Mexico and the USA for economic reasons;(2) voluntary disappearances by people who join theguerrillas or go to Nicaragua and Cuba to receive training;(3) ordinary criminal kidnappings; (4) kidnappings byguerrilias. We asked the government if we could meet aCuban-trained guerrilla, but although they said that 8,000former guerrilla sympathisers had come forward under theamnesty in 1984, they could produce no one who hadreceived training abroad. There may be some 'ordinary'kidnappings, but they are not of poor peasants, catechists,trade unionists, or students. The guerrillas have been knownto kidnap prominent figures like a newspaper editor,industrialists, farm managers or reiatives of high militaryofficers, but in most of these cases the kidnapped have laterbeen released, after a ransom has been paid or acommunique has been published.

One official did admit the existence of right-wingparamilitary groups 'who might be working against tradeunionists', but no government spokesman conceded thepossible responsibility of the government security forces. Instriking contrast, at a packed meeting of more than 100relatives of the disappeared, witness after witness ascribedblame to the agencies of the state; they described theabduction of their relatives from their homes or from thestreet, generally by heavily-armed men in civilian clothes,often using cars with no number plates. Very strongcircumstantial evidence convinced the relatives that in everysingle case the government security forces were responsible.

Over 250 families have joined the Grupo de ApoyoMutuo par el aparecimiento con vida de nuestros hijos,esposos, padres y hermanos (Mutual Support Group for theappearance, alive, of our children, spouses, parents andbrothers and sisters) since its formation on 5 June 1984. Ofthese 250, 58 are relatives of people who have disappeared in1984, representing, as they said, 'the tip of the iceberg'. Wewere able to receive personally the details of 25 of the 1984cases. It is our firm belief that the apparatus of state security

, TESTlMokvJSIf^^^My namft ' '

respectively. My husbdnd, Hdgd de tedn PaiactoSpi'||; teacher ill the urban'primary edticatbniiyjtt(ihA/an^ninth-semester laW'student at the UniversHy'dftrSah'CarloSi He was

■— Where Was he kldnap]ied?r4^J7:^ He was on his :way 4o the. schoolWhere he works* -I'Abotlt 30 his pUpiis fi-bm the third yeahWere with himJ ~ ail about 9 or'lO years oldi' Stiddenly a white twhmsab

vehicle stopped'hiid' lily hiisbahd''was grabbed' from: amongst the children and pushed into the vehicIe.>The

children are young so they couldn't really give^moreinformation about ' the incident vsince" theyjf'werescreaming, crying and shouting to the kidnappers not to

. take away their teacheri, Hoiyf^er iy ;%e imow that;there were foUr meii in civilian/dressi'heavUy'luined i^always* i have had no>news Of him Since then.'iiUp to

, ̂ In m\ opinion! who wm' iisponslWi lof ihi.kldhuppthg? '— I believe that;;; welli I'll tell you the truth. Theymust be very cruel people because they have left raydaughters without the affectiOrt Of theirvfhtherfahdiwithout economic support. When my husband wastaken away we lost practically eve^thin^3 hot only his:love but also oUr ecOhomic Wellbeing* This especiallyhas been a real problem for rae.C-. .' -'"v 'tt- >,

; — How has it affected your daughters?— I ask God not to let this affect them badty. 'What I::most want is thatj in spite ofioUr? Mtuatioh* theycontinue along the straight path* that they be Uprightand honest. Because they have had the Seeds of hatesown in them at sUch a young age, I am very afraid thatthis hate is all they must feel for the people who carriedoff their father* even if they don't knOw Who they arei 'For example, the eider One imagines that every'inan She'passes is the cause of her father's absence from home/

- Sr'i- - -J- "

— Have you taken any steps or made any complaints tobring about the reappearance Of your husband?■— I have placed advertisements in. the newspapers;; at yleast the odes of biggest circulation in Guatemala.

■ How many ads? ' ^—-Approximately 15 or 20: times. I' have alsoapproached the government asking: forf .the/

^ investigations to be Speeded up. I have, appealed to the .' kidnappers to soften theii- hearti a litilfand let hlni gci;free. Also I have personally approached the head of thegovernment and the general director of the police, and Iam going to have art irtteryleW ; With the head of :Technical Investigations. The third in command of thepolice has shown me innumerable sheets of paper whichsay that the case is being looked intoiibut nothirtg/

i concrete* All they tell me is, 'Look* here is all this. This 'is a report of sUch and such U plaee* here is U report of:another place, and here's another * . but I don't even:know what these reports mean. What is worst is not,having anything concrete. There are no clues, there's no,,hope. It's as if people .who,,are kidnapped are invisible*:

liffiATOWMUOraiMIENTO CON TO DE NUETO5 Pli®

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PAorcv 0/ rte mism; relatives of the Mutual Support Group. Piers Cavendish/Reriex

is responsible for these crimes, and that the policy ofarbitrary forced disappearances remains an institutionalisedand systematic instrument for removing persons consideredto be opponents of the regime.

Here is just one example: 'Carlos Guillermo Ramirez,a nineteen-year-old student, was kidnapped from his home(34 Av. 'B' 8-33, zone 21, Colonia Justo Rufino Barrios,Guatemala City) by eight plain-clothed heavily-armed menin two cars — one with number plates, one without. Severalof the eight wore boots used by the army.' A full list of 1984cases of which we were informed is included in appendix 2,with dates of arrest and other details where possible.

Government responsibility is also confirmed bystatements made by Licenciado Ricardo SagustumeVidaurre, ex-president of the Supreme Court, as reported in£/ Grd/ico, 4 May 1984 (Lie. Sagustume was sacked byGeneral Mejia Victores for upholding the arrests ofparamilitary personnel charged with human rightsviolations): 'With the passing of time, it was necessary . . .to bring to light abuses committed against the inhabitants ofthe Republic and against judicial authorities; the majority ofthese abuses originated from (and unfortunately continue tooriginate from) elements linked to the police authorities andmilitary circles, abuses which range from making employeesof the courts join civil patrols ... to imprisoning peoplewithout any previous order of a competent judicialauthority, thus violating fundamental guarantees at presentin existence.'

The relatives who refuse to be intimidated try by everymeans to trace their loved ones. They place advertisementsin the press, present writs of habeas corptis, visit highgovernment and military authorities, celebrate masses andtirelessly go round the hospitals, morgues and detentioncentres. The official response they receive is usually that thedisappeared are out of the country or with the guerrillas.The unofficial response is often threats or warnings from

anonymous telephone callers or even from high militaryofficials not to proceed with their inquiries. The sense offrustration is enormous. Not one of the relatives of theMutual Support Group has reappeared.

Yet, we were told, if the police really wanted to findthe kidnappers, it was within their power. In some cases, thepolice are present at the time of an abduction in the street,but stand by and do nothing. In the recent widely publicisedcase of Claudia Lorena Nunez, the police were able to findthe kidnappers within three days. Claudia, aged 14 and thedaughter of a Methodist pastor, was kidnapped on 2October 1984 by four men and a ransom of 50,(W dollarsdemanded. Three hundred policemen were involved in thesearch for the kidnappers, and they were soon traced andClaudia returned to her family. As one mother said, 'Whydidn't they mobilise 300 policemen for my son?'

Despite the constant declarations of independenthuman rights organisations like Amnesty International,Americas Watch, the Inleramerican Human RightsCommission, and the International Commission for Jurists,accusing the security forces and the military, no member ofthe armed forces or the security forces, as far as we areaware, has been charged with political crimes in 1984. Thisfact alone strongly suggests government complicity in thepractice of forced disappearances.

2.2.3 Urban sectors affected

2.2.3.1 Trade unionists'On 28 July 1984, Julio Morales (aged 12) was kidnapped bya group of armed men who had come looking for hisbrother, who was a worker at the Pantaledn sugar mill.Twenty days later, he was released. The little fingernail onhis right hand had been removed.' (Testimony of worker,Guatemala City, October 1984)

We were informed that there are about 30 known cases of

fXESTIMONY "'v • • ; •

viAIvaro Reoi Sosa Ramos, ex-geoeral secretary of the^ unloa at the Diana sweets factory, was captured on 11: March 1984. On 13 March, he managed to escape Into,-the Belgian embassy, and later went abroad under; diplomatic protection. His testimony is unique In thathe Is one of the very few kidnapped people who are alive

: to tell their stories, . r

;-;'0n Sunday, 11 March, at about 9 a.m., I wasV kidnapped as I was walking in the vicinity of theRoosevelt soccer field, in zone li of Guatemala City.. As I walked past a man, he called out to me, and

?when I turned to iook, he took out a gun. I thought:;about running, but eight men had already got out of. three cars. These cars had polarised glass windows.They grabbed me and covered my face with a jacket,then forced me into a van.

They took me to a house. I was left sitting there'-for over two hours, and I could hear people screamingin other rooms.

I was handcuffed and forced to undress, They tiedmy feet together and hung me upside down. Then, theyhit me with an axe handle, while accusing me of

- belonging to a revolutionary organisation.From the beginning, the torturers identlHed

themselves as kaibiles (special troops trained in counter-insurgency). They told me that with the treatment I

' would tell them everything 1 knew. They took turnsbeating me and if they were smoking, they would put

' out their cigarettes on my body. They would leave mealone for a few minutes and then the next one would

• come in. .

After a few hours, they hurig jnc up by my feet. again, and a kaibU came in especially to kick me in the•. face. Then they took me down to show me another manwho was hanging by his feet, in the same position as Ihad been in. They asked me if I knew him. He wasdisfigured from the torture he had received, but Irecognised him as Silvio Matricardi Salam, who I had' met when he was president of the National Teachers'Union. I was shocked to see his body so mutilated and 1immediately said that i didn't know him. They took me. back and hung me up again, this time to give me electricuShocks. . ,... The violent cQatractions of one's body (during

electric shocks] and the way it bangs against the wall are

incredible. I tried to get my head to hit the wall in such a ;way that 1 would black out, but I couldn't. After theelectric shocks, they kept asking me if I would talk, if I '

- would point people out to them. I told them that theremight be people I would know in Motafur Street in zone;'9. I remembered that there was an embassy on this

; street.

At around noon on 13 March, they took me toMontafur Street, which is situated between 7th Avenue,;and Avenue Reforma in zone 9, on the same block as ;the Belgian embassy. When we arrived there, four of the V-.men got out to grab two young women who were :passing by. While they were distracted, 1 jumped out of;.;the van and ran to the Belgian embassy and jumped over!^the gate. As I was running to the embassy Inside the^'grounds, I heard the first round of gunfire and felt aj^bullet In my calf. Then 1 felt another bullet very near by^;.heart and I lost control of my arm. A third bullet hit me^<in the liver. ■ ' M-

I managed to reach the door and begged the^ambassador and the embassy personnel not to turn me^-In. They had seen what had happened, and had heard^.the shots fired against the embassy. Several bullets had fhit the wall, narrowly missing the windows of tbe^>embassy... :0

Later they took me to the Bella Aurora private^!hospital. There, I could hardly sleep, watting for the'.^moment they would do something to me, even though^^the Belgian and Venezuelan ambassadors tried to calm^ime. ' ' ̂

I was constantly thinking of those who were being^tortured in the house where 1 had been held,remembered that I had seen another trade unionist,^Samuel Amancio Vlllatoro, former secretary-general of^the union at the Adams factory. In the torture centrehad seen at least eight people, most of them hanging by vtheir feet, and those who were sitting were covered with*!^ 'hoods. 1 don't know what has happened to Samuel 'Vlllatoro since ... :

EPILOGUE: On 21 March, Sosa Ramos left Gualemalaunder the protection of the Belgian embassy. Silvio.Matricardi Salam, whom Sosa Ramos saw tortured in

, the prison, was found dead on the outskirts of thesouthern city of Escninlla on 14 March,^ The ̂whereabouts of Samuel Villatoro remains unknown,

trade union leaders who have been kidnapped fromNovember 1983 until the present. We were given details of23 of these cases, which are listed in appendix 3. Eleven ofthese we were able to check personally with their relatives orwork colleagues. Union leaders have continued to beharassed by direct forms of physical repression throughout1984. Other violations of trade union rights are described insection 6.1. Those who have suffered especially in 1984 are:

(i) former leaders of the CNT (National Centre ofWorkers) (the CNT was virtually destroyed in June1980 when 26 trade union leaders were kidnappedfrom their headquarters);

(ii) those unions who are attempting to resurrect the oldumbrella organisation of unions, CNUS (the NationalCommittee for Trade Union Unity) into CONUS (theCoordinating Committee of National Organisations ofTrade Union Unity);

(iii) some workers attempting to form unions or who are in

dispute with the owners (for example, at the sugar millat Pantaledn and the Tejidos Universales factory inGualemala City);

(iv) those offering support to the Coca-Cola workers whohave been on strike since 17 February 1984;

(v) the employees' union at USAC (National University ofSan Carlos) who have been in dispute with themanagement board of the university.The relatives and colleagues of these workers are in no

doubt that those responsible for these acts of physicalrepression are either the government security forces orparamilitary groups working with the factory bosses. Thewidely publicised case of Alvaro Ren^ Sosa Ramos (tradeunionist captured 11 March 1984) would support their view.In his testimony (see box) he describes his capture andtorture at the hands of the kaibiles (the government's specialcounterinsurgency troops). His case is unique in that hemanaged to escape to the Belgian embassy on 13 March 1984and thence to Canada.

2.2.3.2 Students

The National University of San Carlos (USAC) hascontinued to be a focus of disappearances and killings at thehands of the security forces in 1984. This is not a newdevelopment: in 1979/80,15,000 students had been killed ordisappeared. As recently as November 1983 an ex-rector ofthe university, Dr Reeves Carrillo, was kilied whiie gettingout of his car.

In a press statement of 12 August 1984, the AEU(Association of University Students) declared that 64students had been the victims of disappearances and killingsthis year, throughout the country. According to an article inThe New York Times, 12 July, in May 'death squadskidnapped the entire 11-member leadership of the universitystudent government. Only one of the victims has reappeared— severeiy tortured and ciose to death.' Although we wereunable to meet with representatives of the AEU, the wife ofone of the leaders of the AEU asserted that more than 60

students had been kidnapped in 1984, the majority of themin the spring. A high official in USAC confirmed that 12students from the university had disappeared this year, andtwo professors have also been kidnapped who were iaterreleased and left the country.

We personally received details of 13 cases of studentsor professors who had been kidnapped in 1984 (see appendix4). We spoke with relatives of ten of these cases and it wastheir opinion that it was the security forces and especialiythe DIT (Department of Technical Investigations) who wereresponsibie for the disappearances.

Six days after our visit, it was reported in theinternational press that the Dean of the Faculty ofEconomics at USAC, Vitalicio Gir6n Coronado, and aprofessor from the university, Carios de Le6n, were kiiiedon 26/7 October 1984.

2.2.3.3 Activists of toierated poiitical parties'The army and the police impede political parties' efforts toattract members,' protested Jorge Carpio Nicolle, UCNpresidential candidate, on 15 October. He noted that oneUCN activist had been killed and another kidnappedrecently and that military authorities are harassing UCNorganisers all over Guatemala. 'We are centrists; we are notradicals,' insisted Carpio Nicolle. (Enfoprensa NewsAgency, 26 October 1984)

Even leaders and activists of the tolerated political partiesrisk assassination or kidnapping. As we have remarked, thefact that the perpetrators are rarely brought to justicesuggests that the criminals operate under the protection ofthe security forces. On occasions, there is evidence thatorgans of the state are directly responsible. On 11 OctoberDomingo Ochoa, branch secretary of the UCN in ElJocotillo, was violently seized from his home by threeofficers of the DIT (Department of TechnicalInvestigations). The three officers were identified by SraOchoa, and were also known to be activists in the MLN(National Liberation Movement). Jorge Carpio Nicolle,leader of the UCN and owner of Ei Grdfico, had personallyintervened at the highest ievel to seek Sr Ochoa's reiease, butwithout success. If well-known public figures cannotintervene successfully for the law to be applied, there is littlehope for the relatives of poor campesinos who have beenkidnapped.

In another incident, on 11 August, Elder AnibalSesam, son of Elder Gabriel Sesam L6pez, ChristianDemocrat member of the Constituent Assembly, waskidnapped aiong with three other companions from LaFlorida, zone 19, Guatemala City, by four policemen fromthe substation of the colonia Primero de Julio. One of

Anibal Sesam's three companions escaped and was able totestify as to the responsibiiity of the four officers. On 17

10

August the bodies of Anibai Sesam and one of hiscompanions were found on the banks of Las Guacamayas,already putrefied, with signs of having been tortured andhooded. The father, Gabriel Sesam, who had publiclyaccused the police, stated on 30 August that he had receiveda number of death threats.

On 12 September, the Christian Democrat partydenounced the illegal detention of Henry Cabet Castillo bythe security forces. Sr Cabet was a witness of the kidnappingof Elder Anibal Sesam. While this case may not be apolitical crime (the official response was that Anibal Sesamwas involved in drug trafflcking), it clearly proves theresponsibility of the police in the kidnapping and torturingof two young men.

2.2.3.4 Prisoners in PavAn

There have been several killings of both common andpolitical prisoners in 1984. The evidence for this is pressreports and the personal testimony of a prisoner who was inPavdn and was released in July.

On 18 February 1984, Byron Roberto Luna M6ndez, a24-year-old prisoner who had been given a 20-year sentenceunder the Special Tribunals, was found murdered with 37stab wounds and his throat cut in the grounds of one of themain Guatemalan prisons, the Pav6n prison farm. Arelative of his, who had recently been makingrepresentations on his behalf, had been warned by a highmilitary official not to continue with inquiries as it would bedangerous for Roberto. (The names of the relative and theofficial are withheld.)

Lt.-Col. Oscar Recinos Portillo had recently beenappointed as Director of Pav6n at the time of the murder ofSr Luna M6ndez. Colonel Portillo had previously beendirector of the prison in Escuintla, where it is alleged that 12murders had taken place in less than a month while he wasdirector. It is also alleged that before his appointment therehad been no murders in Pavdn.

On the night of 3 July 1984, three prisoners, aninfantry sub-lieutenant, and two INDE (National ElectricityBoard) security police who had been accused of kidnappingthe industrialist Angel S&nchez were taken to the judicialdepartment of the prison. Colonel Portillo Is said to havebeen present at the prison that evening when normally hewould have gone home. It is also alleged that militaryvehicles and plain-clothed men arrived the same night. Thebodies of the three prisoners were found next morningbehind the church in the prison, with their throats cut andwith signs of having been tortured and handcuffed. On thesame day (4 July), there was a protest by the prisoners on thediscovery of the bodies. Colonel Portillo is said to haveordered the prison wardens to open fire on the prisonerswith machine guns and carbines. The result was that oneprisoner (Alvaro Garcia Ramirez) was killed and two orthree others wounded.

On 12 July, a letter was published, signed by 1,500prisoners from Pavdn, demanding the sacking of ColonelPortillo and Higinio Laz (the warden of the prison) forbeing 'the inteilectual authors of what had happened on 3July'. On 18 July, Sr Camilo Dedet Rosa, the directorgeneral of all Guatemalan prisons, admitted that 18prisoners had been held in a secret cellar in sub-humanconditions in Pavdn and said that they had now been freed.A second statement signed by 700 prisoners asserted thatthese 18 were being held with the aim of eliminating them inthe same way as the three killed on 3 July. According tosome reports, the cellar was also used as a torture centre. SrDedet Rosa stated that he had been told about the secret

prison not by the officials but by the prisoners themselves.He added that the 18 had been treated sub-humanly not bythe authorities but by fellow prisoners. His commentsaroused speculation that a death squad had been operating

EiWlPlSli|tfierw9rds api

■„ -- -— Can you say how many people were kidnapped? .— On that occasion there, were flve, but afterwards

prapie who'^disappearedcorpses in the str^ts,^';^

I am^ah'TMigehpur '^^^^ one of the5. highland departments,: My name is Domingo. Ail my'^iife i have jmiep only beans and tpirtillgs. 1 spent most of^. piy childhood gnd adolescence on tii^ cogstai p|a|n near;'Escuihtla, !r|l neYeV;forg^ live Witli your'^od^ niea^r^lpuf. ypuj, iit^bd! gjVei!^

linnnnriil nf hWrfc fnr hrAnVfinet ̂ tiinnh tinH ciinnAr ~nnH

,'n^er be gble to forget his death. He was working on the'; hot coastal plain and caught typhoid — there was no

hospital there, notiting. You know, I didn't mourn the c

V understand why it was rogysr ^wlietber it wgs aitpther "i;member who named pie td-tbe authoridt^ or soroeonbwho didn't like me, I had actually bcep warnied by an^

iSw^fWhy^werd ydufgr^^ run, taking shelter one tiind |ifre,'anotiieti.t|ni? tbere,-?asking people to take me in^^ gnd blde mej It was'ap'b^agse of die ^iay I had to live, the way so . ; . indescribable sensat|oh^ ypu cQuldn't kpPW if iY'ithbut

l^mapy pf us Opgt^alans^faaye; to:J^^ tried to solve v /; . experiencing it for ypufseli^^ypuibgn't fd^;;'our . probiOTs iby^^^^^ cooperative these r you think that maybe you dnly haVp g few days }eft to\^^mutdal heip^iip^^we try fo help eacb piher ;^,that's k live, or maybe only minutesi^^att'dl frying IQ,say is^

■ what we feeicobperativism is abbutfl'velearnt that our - . . . . ,that there comes a mbtnem when you are compietefy^^obperativism is abbuf/I've learnt that ourimmobilised; you can do nothing more to improve your,social conditions,, apd ̂ ypu are just trjdpg tP Jlc^p/yourself alive, nothing more, I was finally cappefi^ thisl

i:tmapagra jsilarget>Ianfat^

; ancestors the Mayans alsb worked together .iike this, T5' and created iplpe^ lihe/Tlkai r- though migny of us have p'^':never beCp there^ Seyeral bf us arranged to dp the hard ;;;^worh together^ But we'ye had biffer experiences within t year [19841 in Ouafemala City by thC T^agury Police,>f .fbe cpppi|raiiy|m.pyemenf, Qu |hepps wlip hand ' ■ ■ -•:]certainly: ■bencirited^, fr0id;|'the;= pieasb^ .fpf.forking' rf''I'together ■ aS'^tpthwI.' But'; then ̂ wp ;Cam

22 days in a clandestine prisonv If cpuld beihep for a schopi^hir a hipoitifgctptylis from what; htdei l^bpuld- sef^

j - ordinary-looking prisphi deflhiteiy a secre| onc.vTheyi?lii took me severai times inVcarswhich-lopked just-U^I :|bread delivery vaps; ;It,yifa|a dfcadfui fd ber S

i^ i iri that prisbnV when'th|^ ;ppeh' thf dp? I know 'What they are'; going fp dp; tb; ypuf^^' handcuffed on the floor for seyeral daya and th^'Weref

S;j^!WhemWas'ypur cpbp^

. sniall farmerS:farmi

r^diempspUal^pj^^htigu^^ idea was thafinpersfwhb jiyed inyhe yi^nity of the hospitaluld work its laiid^-ahd With'tlme we would hopeTirr • T"" TT. T'TTZt — 'r "7" ""'"T ^ -7—«

j: : to buy: it and pay hack its value to the hospital,^rr?: Sp what happened?' Oj ; j ><

; torturing me hprribly, I was bleeding. frpm everyWh^te:;!I f — from the eyes, from the pose,; everywhere;.*^l the*'

mre;actually having g meeting about how,to-^,44 should giye^uP WY armsiiSut what-arihSl^!^^^^ :Qur,%op$;and produce mPre,' wheii we were^.^'| telling me to copperatey^th;tHemvJQipe.C^^^

:^|8urrpupded by a.group pffinore than 200 soldiers. Jhls';/ | i me what was in it fpr mC to be suppprtlpg.a gerta^^ was f8s4Y^^983J,:ahd|he leaders pf the cpbperative Sy| j organlsatlpn, And of cbuf^ jtyj'ash'ifrhe.pieY^ Werd kidnapped,^flaht-hlpthes coordinate | ;4hat the situation in .Nicaragua wm bp' thCjyerge of|^th^'(aprt;.p^dperailbn^ fbr^thf arniy, so .that; it's^not ^ 4 1 xohepse because the Americans were; ai^rea^ipc.. _v.j-;.:. 1. i. n-t;^ - | filial Offensive;'and. ;hpw^:Useld^, if^ wasj?tp-.VtruitgleS

pr; Sp what happened?

|hbvipm whP^;ig4^ppn$ibl(^:fpr.it army radips forpolice suppbri,. who arrive in private cars, hoping thiswill. fool .witnesscsr;.Then they. make, out that the ',

'^perpetratprs pf theic cHnfes lafe guerrillas. But the truth '.!;'ils'that I saw jp^iyahd iam-absoiutel^ abput what .'

^ W it)|ie,d;r~,dpehad hisWs te^^ and i

against such odds. He wanted me to betray my friendsand cooperative leaders to him, And so 1 said to him, 'Itwould be a pleasure to.cppperate with yPUi^bUf lmuytjltell you sincerely ?. and ■ Capdldly;! that "ThV^^^guerrillas -r- they are simply ff|endSi^;ThfP'fb^^^me a Ipad'pf ptheciphcifipdgi^fyingf^^^^with plectric shpcifsyhreili by^

^aboutynndb^dlljl^^f^^ ppt^Qf the

— Maledi 8oenVia«iiffas^f| hflSVel^hgel ;iiThese'were

.—.Yes, 22 days. TcanstiU,rcmemher,SpmcfpftCp.f^^^they gave me, spmc mbnltiY inee, and they held a gUP fPmy peck while I was if;: Eating. bfcau?e,ihad^

j^lfiyio|gfi^p|m

11

*— And were there other people in that jail?

Yes, there were, but you couldn't see them, only heartheir noises, or rather their sobs. Yes, of course therewere others. But it appears not to suit them at times forus to see each other, and at other times, yes, becausesometimes we were taken to another room to see whatawful things were being done to the other prisoners, tomake you afraid.

— Were you kept blindfolded all the time?

— Only when they take you outside so you get no clueas to where you are. They made a bandage out ofnewspapers fixed on with insulating tape. Oolng alonglike that in a car, you can only guess whether you're onan asphalt or a dirt road, judging by the bumpiness ofthe road.

— So you couldn't Identify the location of the prison?

— When you are in a secret jail you don't know whereyou are or how long you are going to be there. Youdon't know anything, whether they'll kill you with abuUet or leave your body in a ravine. This is whathappens when you fall into their hands — you are atotal prisoner.

Later I was taken to one of the police stations.After what I'd been through, that was quite animprovement. At least someone may discover where youare and you can make contact again with the reality youwere once familiar with. Someone could find out

something about my fate. If they had killed me, peoplewould have known who had done 1(1

— Were you tortured by the police?

— Physically no, but psychologically yes. When thepolice arrive they are always ordering you about — getup, do this, do that, hands up and so on. They tell youthat you're here to be reformed because you didn't imanage to be better outside. The truth is that I was not aprisoner in need of reform. I knew I had done nothingwrong, so what was I supposed to be reformed into?.When I was a prisoner I used to think that 1 might justas well be where 1 was, because you arc not free in your.villages, in your fields, in the city. In other words, theGuatemalan people have always been prisoners. Theonly difference for me was that I was a prisoner in asmaller place than usual. Truly, our people have beenprisoners since the time of the Spanish conquisladoresand we are still prisoners in the strategic villages. ..Perhaps my experience had helped me to realise justwhat our basic situation is like — and what it means to

be a prisoner.

within the prison.On 4 August, a second disturbance took place in the

prison, as a result of which one prisoner died and threeothers were wounded. At the time of writing. ColonelPortillo, the warden of Pav6n, and a number of prisonguards are reported to be awaiting triai for their allegedinvolvement in the killings.

2.2.4 The fate of the disappeared

2.2.4.1 Secret prisons

Many of those who have disappeared and whose bodies havenot turned up by the banks of some river or by the side of

12

some road are thought to be held in secret prisons. Thewives of four men who disappeared this year told us thatthey had received information from an ex-prisoner who hadleft Guatemala that he had seen their husbands alive in asecret prison. Another wife had been told by a member ofthe army that her husband had also been seen alive in asecret prison.

Another example is provided by the case of Sra LeticiaCh&vez Castillo de Rodriguez and her efforts to find herson, Jos6 Antonio Rodriguez Chivez. He had beenkidnapped on 18 February 1982 two blocks away from the4th Police Corps in San Juan Street, Guatemala City. SraRodriguez had had to leave Guatemala when she receiveddeath threats soon after making inquiries about thedisappearance of her son. Six months later, she heard froma man who had escaped from the old Army PolytechnicSchool that he had been with her son in a secret prison in (hesame building. He had brought the neck chain belonging toher son to prove that he had indeed been with him. We wereshown a copy of a photo of her son wearing the chain andthe chain itself. Sra Rodriguez returned to Guatemala, butafter exhaustive inquiries she was still unable to locale herson.

A paid advertisement appeared in El Grifico of 3January 1984, placed by the relatives of liana Del Rosario,which stated that Maria Cruz L6pez Rodriguez, beforebeing ascribed to the Special Tribunals, had said that shehad been in the same secret prison as liana.

The Guatemalan Commission for Human Rights(CDHG) believe that secret prisons exist in the followinglocations: (1) the old building of the Army PolytechnicSchool, Guatemala City; (2) the main barracks of the army,Matamorros Castle, zone 6, Guatemala City; (3) the militarybase, Mariscal Zavala, Guatemala City; (4) the Casa Cremaarmy head office, Av. La Reforma and 2a Calle, zone 10,Guatemala City; the military bases at (S) Mazatenango, (6)Quezaltenango, (7) Santa Ana Berlin, Coatepeque, and (8)Huehuetanango. Of these, the delegation received personaltestimony which would strongly support the existence of (4),(6), (7), and (8) supra. In addition, secondary evidencewould suggest the existence of prisoners in the military basesat RabinnI, Bajn Verapaz, and Nebaj and San Juan Cotzalin the ixil triangle, Qulch6 (see map 11, p.17). Other secretprisons were said to be in the buildings of the AgrupamientoT^ctico, zone 13, Guatemala City, and in private houses inGuatemala City.

It is widely believed that the old Polytechnic buildinghad been closed down after the denunciations made by DrGarcia Borrajo, vice-president of the InternationalFederation for the Rights of Man. in Guatemala City inNovember 1983. Dr Borrajo had had to leave the countryafter receiving death threats. At a press conference he hadpublicly named those responsible for the disappearance ofagronomist Jorge Alberto Rosa! Paz in August 1983, andhad announced the existence of eight secret prisons indifferent parts of Guatemala.

2.2.4.2 Secret cemeteries

There are regular reports in the press of secret cemeteriesbeing found, where (he bodies of people previouslydisappeared are discovered. For example, since thebeginning of August:

On 3 August, a clandestine cemetery was discovered atthe bottom of a ravine near the town of San Josi Pinula, 31kilometres east of Guatemala City. The bodies of four menwere found with their throats cut and with signs of havingbeen tortured.

On 28 August, another clandestine cemetery wasdiscovered containing several human skeletons near Av.Hincapi6, in the southern part of Guatemala City.

On 2 October, ten bodies were found on Rio Bravo

mii

farm, near Mazatenango, Suchitepiquez. They werediscovered when an inhabitant of the area tripped oversomething which turned out to be a partially-buried head.Four of the victims may have been buried alive, as theautopsy revealed dirt up the nostrils. The bodies were ofindigenous peasants from S0I0I&. Twenty-five people hadbeen reported kidnapped from that area a few days before.

2.2.4.3 The fate of those previously held under the SpecialTribunals

Under decree law no.74-84, on 18 July General MejiaVictores offlcially pardoned all prisoners convicted of anycrimes by the Special Tribunals. When Minister of Defenceunder Rios Montt, Mejia Victores had spoken of 458 peoplebeing held under decree law no.46-82 referring to the SpecialTribunals. Fifty-six were released under decree law 74-84 onor around 20 July 1984, and IS were known to have beenexecuted after their appearance before the SpecialTribunals. Another was killed in the Pav6n prison inFebruary 1984. A substantial number therefore are stillunaccounted for.

13

S.THBCQNTIHH.Oi'THEcommmaDE

'[The people] live in slavery. They perceive absolutely no alternative andevery day they get hungrier.' (Guatemalan priest speaking of the civilian

patrols, quoted in The Times, 30 July 1984)

1981-3 were the years of mass carnage and burning of cropsand homes in the conflict areas, as the army sought to wipeout the civilian support for the armed opposition. After themilitary offensives that drove over 100,000 refugees intoMexico and left between a half and one million internallydisplaced, the army forced many of the survivors to joincivilian patrols and to construct and repair villages, roadsand bridges that had been destroyed in the war. 'Civicaction' schemes were initiated under General Rios Monttwith slogans such as 'Fusiles y Frijoles' ('Beans and Bullets')and 'Techo, Tortilla y Trabajo' ('Roof, Work and Food'),which in effect amounted to forced labour as the survivorsreceived food and some degree of 'security* in exchange forwork. Such schemes were always seen within the frameworkof a counterinsurgency model aimed at winning the 'heartsand minds' of the civilian population, controlling theirmovements and their food supplies, and using their forcedlabour to rebuild the devastated areas and improve themilitary infrastructure in the conflict areas.

While the civilian patrol system has been consolidatedand expanded, the major emphasis in 1984 has been on'reconstruction'. At the beginning of July 1984, GeneralMejia Victores passed law no.6S-84, which established a'plan of action' for relocating all the displaced undermilitary control and attracting back the refugees fromMexico. The key element of this plan is the creation of fourso-called 'poles of development' at the centre of thedevastated areas. Within these poles of development thearmy is putting huge amounts of resources into theconstruction of at least 40 'model villages' for the use of thedisplaced, the refugees returning from Mexico, the refugeeshiding in the mountains, and former guerrillas or guerrillasympathisers who have been captured or given themselvesup under the terms of the amnesty law. Political education ispart and parcel of the new life-style that awaits them in theprison-like conditions of the model villages. At the sametime, 'inter-institutional coordinators' have been set upthroughout the country under the direction of the Ministryof Defence. Their function is to coordinate the work of stateagencies and non-governmental organisations towards thedistribution of food and supplies, especially in thedevelopment poles.

Fundamentally, the system of development poles andmodel villages appears to be complementary to the civilianpatrol system in that its basic aim is one of tighter militarycontrol within the general counterinsurgency model. It existsto congregate and regulate the rural population, to checkand hinder their movements, as well as to build compositeareas, in which military facilities are installed side by sidewith the model villages, from which the army can coordinateits own activities and conduct its counterinsurgencyoffensives. Witnesses justifiably compare the Guatemalanmodel to the strategic hamlet strategy used during theVietnam and other counterinsurgency wars.

14

3.1 Civilian patrols

'They're voluntary — but you're dead if you don't joini'(Roman Catholic priest, Guatemala, October 1984)

The civilian patrol system, initiated in its present form in1981, has expanded continually since then. By the time ofour visit, there were an estimated 800,000 adult malesbetween the ages of IS and 65 performing regular patrolservice. Once a fortnight, once a week or on rare occasionseven more frequently than that — exactly how oftendepended on the size of the adult population in each village— villagers had to patrol throughout the night, checking forsigns of unusual or 'subversive' activity, and reporting onany unknown individuals who entered the neighbourhood.In addition, if a guerrilla presence was detected in theregion, they might have to comb the surrounding hillside fordays on end, often acting as 'shock troops' patrolling infront of the regular soldiers.

The civilian patrol system is not used exclusively formonitoring local movements of the population. We weretold of many instances where the patrols are still used formultifarious tasks on the army's behalf, especially theconstruction of roads and buildings. They would sometimesreceive food in return for their labour, but very rarelymoney.

The very suggestion that participation might be'voluntary' was treated as laughable by our informants. Thepatterns of coercion were described, with some variations,as follows. Individuals who failed to show up might bemerely reported to the military base for a first 'offence'.After that the reprisals would become harsher. Offenderscould be kept for days in the infamous pozos de agua(water-filled wells) or hoyos (pits) near to, or within,military compounds. For more outspoken resistance, thereprisals were severer still — as in the case of an elderly manwho spoke out against the patrol system at a public meeting,and disappeared without trace after that. Then there are therare cases of entire communities, such as Cantel inQuezaltenango department, which have refused altogetherto participate in the patrol system. These have beensubjected first to the soft arm of persuasion — in the formof army officers urging them to defend themselves againstthe guerrilla threat; then to the more predictable harder arm— in the form of an increasing number of abductions andkillings that the villagers themselves attribute to the army.

The notion that the Indian population had joined thecivilian patrols out of political conviction was also regardedas ludicrous. They are faced with virtually no other option.As The Times reported on 20 July 1984, quoting a priestfrom the Western highlands, 'Failure to participate isassumed to be a sign of sympathy for the guerrillas ... If apatrol out in the countryside decided to go up to the hills oneday with the guerrillas, they would do so in the full

a

avilian patrol drilling on National Day, Solata'. Jenny Maiihews/Formai

knowledge that their families would be killed and, probably,their whole village razed.'

The whole system is implanted by means of terror, andis designed also to sow terror. In section 2.1.3 we havedescribed atrocities committed by civilian patrol members(reportedly acting under army instructions) against theirfellow villagers. Above all in the southern Quiche region, asseveral informed persons told us, a pattern has emergedsince late 1983 in which the killing of suspects is carried outby the civilian patrols rather than by the army itself. Norwas this true for Quich6 alone. Informants from Cobdn,Alta Verapaz, for example, also stated that in recent times itis the civilian patrols that have done the army's 'dirty work'.People who go out at night, who purchase more than thecustomary amount of food, who refuse to do patrol service,in short people who do anything out of the ordinary, comeunder immediate suspicion and are taken by the patrols tothe army's nearest base. Interrogation will be done by thearmy, but the killing of murdered suspects often by thecivilian patrols.

In the words of many of our informants, the civilianpatrol system, and the forced labour exacted from the

inhabitants of the model villages, can be compared withslavery. These practices are certainly in violation ofinternational law to which Guatemala is a signatory.Guatemala has ratified convention lOS of the InternationalLabour Organisation on the abolition of forced labour. Allstates party to this convention undertake not to make use ofany form of forced or compulsory labour which is (a) ameans of political coercion or education or a punishmentfor holding or expressing political views or viewsIdeologically opposed to the established political, social oreconomic system, (b) a method of mobilising and usinglabour for purposes of economic development, (cj a meansof racial, social, national or religious discrimination. Themethods utilised by the Guatemalan army in its counter-insurgency campaign violate at least the last two — andarguably also the first — of the clauses of this convention.

3.2 Model villages and development poles

While the civilian patrol system is not a new development, asit has already been in operation for over three years, theconstruction of development poles and model villages hasbeen a major new army project during 1984. As with thecivilian patrols, the essential objective is the desire to control

Model village at Acui, Quiche.

the highland departments. The four main development polesare situated in the Ixil triangle in Quich6, Chisec in AltaVerapaz, Playa Grande in Quiche and Chacaj in northernHuehuetenango (see map 1). Their specific objectives varyslightly according to their location. Chacaj is specificallydesigned for resettling the refugees who are presently acrossthe border in Mexican territory, while Playa Grande isaimed at those Indians who are still fighting with, orsympathetic to, the guerrillas in IxcSn and the refugees fromthe zone of Marques de Comillas in the south of Mexico.Chisec is meant to accommodate the internal refugees inAlta Verapaz, while the Ixil triangle is to resettle the

Map IThe Development Poles

MEXICC

Et P&t€nLas Margarlcas

El chupKj^ CHACAJ^ PLAYA GRANDE

tCHISEC

Ruefiueteitaunc

rj

ACta Venapaz

IXIL TRIANGLE

"X

QiUcki

"N.

RaluSMcampf In Mtxlco.

J Oawtlopment pol«

Source: Bulletin of the Guatemalan Church In Exile (IGE), Sept.-Oct. 1984.

^ Nibaj2 Chajut3 Cotzat

displaced and attract the population stiil resisting in thesurrounding areas. However, all four of the poles share thecommon purpose of consolidating army control over areaspreviously regarded as 'insurgent territory', and of creatingan infrastructure from which to launch military raids oroffensives.

Within these development poles, various modelvillages have been built, are planned, or are underconstruction, usually by the civilian population under theorders of the army. Six have already been inaugurated in theIxil triangle — Acul in December 1983, Tzalbal in May1984, and Juil, Rio Azul, Xolcuay and Pulay in August 1984(see map II). At least another 40 are planned for the nearfuture — including another IS in the Ixil triangle, eight inPlaya Grande, and five in Chisec. Other villages havealready been established at Acamal and Las Pacayas in AltaVerapaz, and Yanchi near the Mexican border in El Pet6n.

The new villages have been inaugurated with a fanfareof publicity. The president, or other leading army andgovernment offlcials, make highly publicised visitsaccompanied by a retinue of journalists and photographers.The army is depicted as the benefactor, providing newhousing and extensive facilities for those indigenouspeasants who have sought its protection and escaped theclutches of the guerrillas. Some of this publicity is clearlyintended to improve the international image of the country.As the pro-government newspaper Diario de CentraAmerica reported on 29 June 1984, in an article entitled'The army contributes to the development and progress ofGuatemala',

'The Guatemalan army is rebuilding 44 towns which weredestroyed by subversive groups, is attending to 11,700displaced persons, as well as 832 refugees who havereturned from Mexico; it is preparing to receivethousands of peasants who were obliged to emigrate

through the criminal persecution of which they werevictims through the extremist armed groups. Thispatriotic and humanitarian work is carried out by theInstitutional Coordinators that function under the civilaffairs directorate of the Chief of Staff of the Ministry ofDefence . . .'

The army is certainly devoting immense resources tothis new system. The state and parastate developmentagencies (the national housing bank, agricultural credit andloan institutions, and the rest) now find their developmentactivities subordinated directly to the Ministry of Defencethrough the coordinadoras institucionales. Nongovernmental agencies too can only operate with militarypermission, and in most cases have to channel theirresources as and where it suits the army's strategic interests.

While official propaganda speaks of the help andsupport the army is giving to the previously neglectedIndians, most other observers talk of the slave-like existencein the model villages, the coercion of the inhabitants, theexcessive monitoring of their movements and the breaking-down of the traditional Indian life-style. Indian villages thathad enjoyed strong community and ethnic identity arestrongly encouraged by the army to identify with the'Guatemalan nation', as they regularly emphasise atceremonies the importance of the Guatemalan national flag,national Independence Day, the national flower and thenational anthem. The army also organises civiiian patrolrallies on what were traditionally Indian feast days, whileIndian women are encouraged to take part In beautycontests with titles such as 'Miss Civilian Patrol' or 'MissMilitary Zone'. Indian community elders and elected leadersare no longer the local chiefs, but have been replaced by thearmy or army appointees. One journalist told us that the'de-Indianisation' was an essential part of the counter-

16

Map IIThe Ixll Triangle Development Pole Qulch6

to lxG4n

to Ixcdn

Chscalts

Sslqull Grand*

Chemal

XapUTuI \

CHAJUL

TkftlbalXolcuov

y^'Ajtxunub'alBle»ibaU

'*/ //f

Santa Aballna

XelalvintA

ChanU' San Francisco

p Pulay

Rio AsulI .■ nebajOjo da Aouato Huenuotananoo

to Cobin

Aguacatan

CUNEN

SACAPULAS

USPANTAN

to Sonta Crui« Quichd

oo

X

model villagedevelopment pole

extension of development polemilitary barracksmilitary postprison camp (these are referred to as 'refugee' or're-education' camps)military airstrip

Source: BuUstIn of the Guatemalan Church in Exile (IGE), Sept.-Oct. 1984.

17

The civilian population work under army surveillance. Tzalbal model village, Quiche. Joe Fish/Peop!es Pictures

insurgency plan. Replacing identily with the Indian ? , -T-T-.- . -rcommunity or ethnic group with identity with the'nation', ; ' 3 ;! •,the army and central government argue, will make the ' vIndians more 'manageable*.

We paid brief visits to one of the model villages in thepresence of the army, and had little expectation that peoplecould talk freely of their conditions. Elsewhere, we receivedaccounts of rigorous work schedules, followed bycompulsory drill and then patrolling at night; of compulsorypolitical education; of serious food shortages and miserablehealth conditions, including widespread malnutrition. Oneperson, recently arrived at the camp of Chacaj, had fled aregime where work began at 6 a.m., followed by drillbetween 4 and 6 p.m. and then regular patrol duty at night.We were also particularly concerned by the extremeinsecurity facing those peasants who have handedthemselves over to the protection of the army (see box). As V talready mentioned, we heard mutually consistent accounts " ' 'jjlft (' 'Jthat persons who surrendered to the army might at first be Munmolested and in some ca.ses given new houses in one of the ^model villages, but then the abductions and disappearances .Z"'would begin. So widespread had these become at the time of 3our visit that many people expressed a real fear that theultimate policy of the government would be to eliminate all 3 svthose persons who had surrendered under the amnesty law. ^gSr • 5The fears may turn out to be exaggerated, but in the light of ^'3' >' 0recent events they are certainly understandable. WWSw

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I AveU'VA[iau*Po winr/vuVco

3.3 Food within the counterinsurgency model

Food shortages, control of food and the ensuing seriousmalnutrition are a very major problem in Guatemala today.As in so many conflicts of this kind, food has become a vitalweapon. When the civil war was at its most intense two yearsago, and large areas of the alliplano were under guerrillacontrol, subsistence plots were regularly burned as part ofthe government's scorched earth strategy. As some peoplefled to the mountains, others left their country and tens ofthousands more were killed, subsistence plots wereprogressively abandoned, and serious food deficits werecertain to occur sooner or later. Late last year one NorthAmerican agency, under contract to AID to examine needsin the conflict areas, warned that 50,000 people could beseriously at risk and widespread hunger could break outunless a multi-million-dollar aid package was madeavailable to finance tools and seeds for the next harvest

venue of the Guatemalan soldier', Acul model village. Quichi

Hunger and malnutrition, it may be said, will be a sadfact of life for the Guatemalan peasant for as long as theappalling misuse of land prevails. Land distribution is at theroot of Guatemala's problems. In recent years, tens ofthousands of indigenous peasants have been evicted fromtheir subsistence plots, to make way for the increasedcultivation of agro-export crops. Land under subsistencecrop cultivation declined markedly from the early 1970s, asthe acreage under export crops rose by some 50%. Part ofthe problem lies in food shortages, but another part in thedistribution of available foodstuffs. The structuralproblems have been compounded by the army's tendency tosuspect anyone who attempts to purchase food stocks overand above immediate subsistence requirements. Thedetermination of the army to control food supplies, so as todistribute to those peasants under its direct control and denythe means of subsistence to those presently outside itscontrol, could ultimately lead to famine. The problem ismade worse by the location of many of the plots of landwhere the Indians have traditionally grown their corn andbeans. These are often situated above the villages on the

|:;TESTIMONY •

. .^ — What's your nameV-— Isabel.

' — Where did you use to live?

j 1 am from a village in the municipality of UspantAn,j; Quichi.1 ; How did you come to leave your home?

— The truth is that we left our homes where we had

always lived because the army began arriving and killingour people, and we refused to let that happen to us. 1

, remember the first ones who were taken away. One was; called Santos Castro, he was just a boy of eighteen, andr then they grabbed my cousin. They were never found.They say the soldiers cremated them. After that came

1. the massacres — more than a hundred people from our• ;village, some disappeared, some shot, and then thearmy destroyed the crops in our fields — so how could

j'^the people stay there if there was nothing to eat? Theytook away our animals and ate them. They burnt our

/ houses. That's why we left and went to the mountains.I: .

Do you remember the date?

V.'T, We left our villages In 1982.—Ip which month?

~ It must have been in May.

— And how many people fled to the mountains?

— Where we were we must have been at least 800families. ..,

— And were you all from Uspantdn, or from all overthe place?

— Yes, from Uspant4n, and from Cotzal. We were in alarge area.

— Eight hundred families — that would be three orfour thousand people?

— Yes, and from Chajul too. When we started to' replant our crops, the army bombed us, and strafed the^ mountainside with machine-gun fire.

—r In which month would that have been?

.— That would have been in September 1982. They werebombing all over and people were dying of starvation

' - because we couldn't find anything to eat, not even cornhusks from the cobs the soldiers had harvested. Manypeople died of hunger, others were wounded or' kidnapped. ;;

, —» How many people died of hunger?

— i couldn't say, but it seemed like about half of us. -

— Children?

^ — bh yes, "children. Because most of us had no food.'z. Imagine It. At one stage we lived eight months withoutZ tasting a tortilla or salt. Only wild plants and no salt. NoJ,.;fruits, as the soldiers had taken everything. When we

were wandering in the mountains, we used to collect asponge-like substance from the trees from which we

I" could squeeze water — all black — but what could weg do for our children? And where could we find them? food? We'd give them banana roots. We would eat-^;them. From sheer starvation. We would cat anythingi; ■ ■ --..--t-v ■

Military surveillance lower ovp-Acainal 're-education centre'. AliaVerapaz. Joe Fish/Peoples Piciures

edible. For that reason we are still alive — otherwise wewould all be dead.

— But doesn't the government say that there Is anamnesty for all the people who will come down from the' mountains?

— Yes. We gave ourselves up to the army on 27 August1983. We did it because we had nothing to eat. Mymother and father had died of pure starvation. Andthen we had no strength even to bury them. We wereJust bone. We had absolutely nothing. People wouldfaint and die. And the army could catch us more easilybecause we couldn't manage to run away to themountains.

When we were hiding in the mountains the armyplanned how to trap us. They wait where there arewatering places, and when one of us goes down todrink, they catch us there. So no one else follows, weJust flee further on. The children cry from hunger andunder no circumstances can we cook for them. They'rethirsty and hungry, if it rains they suffer from the cold;if it doesn't rain, from thirst. And we can't draw waterat the usual places, because the army is always watchingnear drinkable water.

— And what happened when you gave yourselves upunder the amnesty?

— We had only been three days In the armyencampment [at San Juan Cotzal, Quichi] when theydetained my cousin and kept him for 15 days, no, amonth exactly. They tortured him for 15 days, keepinghim in a hole under the earth. Just a few tiny pieces oftortilla they gave him and a drop of water. For 15 days .they kept him tortured. At 5 in the morning the soldiersgot up and started to kick him around and do otherawful things. There were 10 of them; I don't know thenames of the others who were inside. After 15 days theysent them off to split logs and do other hard'work.

— How many people gave themselves up to the amnestywhen you did?

— We were about 12 families and we were all taken to

the coffee plantation {finca) called Sw Francisco. I'mabout the only one who managed to get away fromthere. It was more possible for me as I'm alone. I haveno father or mother or anyone else to be concerned for ̂

me. So I got the mayor to help me with my papers so 1could get out of there and come here to the city. Thosewho have children would find it much more difficult toget away. And without papers you can't move. You justhave to put up with all that hard work in the finca.Those 12 families are still there. Of course some of themhave already died. They were sent to do the work anddidn't have enough strength for it. I remember one whodied was called Mariana Sahuin, and another wasLorenzo Sahuin. That would have been In November of1983. They died of illness. They got sick from the food.When they were able to eat tortillas again, It didn'tagree with them and they swelled up. There was no oneto cure them. They died there.

V

— And did any people have problems there, likekidnapping or anything?

~ Oh yes. We saw everything they did to people. WhenI was there it seemed that a young boy had given himselfup and was coming to the farm. Well, they saw histracks and followed them, so he must have hidden fromfear in amongst the coffee trees, which Is where theycaught him. He had no strength left and was weak fromlack of food. We all ran to see and felt so terriblebecause he was in exactly the same situation as all of us.People began to cry when they could see what washappening. The ones who had got hold of him wererelatives of the owner. One was Don Pedro, theadministrator there. Another was Raul and Ben^ictowas another. There were no soldiers around at the time(they would call in, but not every day). Between four ofthem they made a fire and burnt him there — just likethat.

—• Would you know his name or remember when thishappened?

— No, we didn't know the lad, nor even where he wasfrom. It must have been in September. They burnt himall up. Those administrators of the finca did It, becausethe soldiers were in their base at the time. They sent theorder, though, to put him to death by fire.

— Who gave the order?

— It was the captain. But you never get to know thenames of people in the army. They would never tell youthe truth. Oh yes, we witnessed such dreadful things as aresult of what the army was sent to do to us —massacres, death by starvation or by the bullet. Some ofus are still in the mountains and others came to thefincas. But of all the people who originally left ourvillage, most have died. And those in the finca aresuffering as slaves. And there are still people trying tosurvive in the mountains. Still maybe some 400 families.

rM

Model village under constrvction by displaced refugee, Ojo de Agua,Quichhi. Joe Fish/Peoples Pictures

— Some 2,000 people?

— Yes.

— What did the army say to you when you gaveyourselves up?

— The soldiers told us we had done right to come, butimmediately started asking about the ones who hadstayed behind. They asked us so many things, why wewere fleeing from them. The real reason was that weweren't prepared to die just like that without a struggle,where they were massacring the people. Theyannounced the amnesty, but even afterwards, theykilled many thousands of us. We were not running awaybecause we had any crime to answer for. We simply hadto do something about our situation, as we lived in suchdegradation, suffered such discrimination, exploitation.Yes, it's true all we suffered. We lived miserably — noschools, no health centres, nothing. It was hard to livelike that. And then, as I told you, all the prices rose —the things we needed every day to live, not the prices ofour handicrafts. We had no right to increase thoseprices. But yes, they could do so; for things likevegetables, animal products that we had to sell theywanted them free, even though they have money. Andwe were not able to sell our goods in the small shopseven though we are poor and have no money. Theydiscriminate a lot against us for our race, or clothingand our customs. We are always discriminated againstand live miserably. And when we wake up to oursituation and we want to try to obtain improvementslike schools, health centres, the making of access roads,then the government doesn't like it. They don't like itbecause they know we are the majority, we poor people.They started to repress and massacre us to keep usdown. They sent their troops to kill all the poor people,the peasants.

mountainsides, and permission to work them is frequentlydenied by the military because they fear that the people willtry to make contact with the guerrillas or give food to them.

Food aid, from the World Food Programme and otherInternational agencies, has served the army's strategicInterests in the immediate past and may continue to do so inthe short-term future. But it cannot alleviate the majorproblems, which are now reaching such grave dimensions.In addition, there have been recent reports that new'associative peasant farms' have been set up by the army topromote the growing of non-traditional products for theexport market like broccoli, asparagus, potatoes, rice and

20

other vegetables. Not only would this be destroying theIndians' traditional spiritual relationship, based on theirreligious beliefs, with the growing of maize, but also it is notobvious how growing these new crops would help toalleviate the shortages of basic foodstuffs. Unless thepeasant has the freedom to sow and work his land andmarket his produce, subsistence crop production willcontinue to suffer.

3.4 Disruption of (he rural economyFor several reasons, the majority of indigenous peasants in

Inmaies of Acamal 're-educallon cenire', Aha Verapaz. Joe Fish/Peoples PicturesSI

XI

Guatemala have been unable to provide for their basic needsby farming their increasingly small plots. As the size of theirminifundia has declined and the proportion of theabsolutely landless rural population has increased, up tohalf a million peasants have had to undertake regularseasonal migrant labour on the coffee, cotton and sugarplantations. The rural wage has been derisory, just over onedollar per day until 1980, and under three dollars per daynow, but it has enabled the peasant family to survive themonths of greatest food scarcity.

Since 1982, this pattern has been seriously disrupted.In 1982/3, we were told, peasants in the conflict zones weregenerally unable to secure permits to leave their villages forthe coast. Now, such permits are more frequently obtainable— but at great cost. The military commissioner has the rightto grant or withhold a permit for temporary absence fromthe village. Permits are given for a short period, perhaps onemonth rather than for the three to four months of the

harvest season. Moreover, prospective seasonal migrantshave to find, and pay for, replacements for their civilianpatrol duty.

^ ^bIeNVENIOOS A'^ , ALOEA 030 DE AGUA - .EO

OQNDES&HA-mGHO-HO : iSUBYEgSWNconUHlSTh

'Welcome to Ojode Agua where w say "no to communist subwnionModel Village at Ojo de Agua, Qtichi.' Joe Fish/Peoplcs Pictures

4. THE DISPLACED IN6DATEMALA CITY

'Simple Indigenous campesinos, people from our own villages, travel downfrom the altiplano to Guatemala City to kidnap us or kill us. They work

closely with the army, and they have lists of 'targets'. Eight catechists fromour group of families have been killed or kidnapped since July 1984.'

(Refugee community leader, Guatemala City, October 1984)

X

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Army checkpoint on road between Quezalienango and Son Marcos. Section day, I July 1984. Piers Cavendish/Reflex

One of the most visible effects of the repression in thehighland regions has been the massive migration ofindigenous peasants to the capital. It is impossible toquantify the number now living in Guatemala City, becausethe displaced are constantly forced to move from barrio tobarrio, either to find work and housing or to avoiddetection. The figure probably lies somewhere between100,000 and 300,000.

Those who make it to the city encounter enormousproblems on arrival, not only in terms of the social andeconomic conditions, but also the threat of physicalelimination by groups of 'hit men' who travel down fromthe altiplano to pursue and kill or kidnap those regarded assympathetic to the guerrillas.

In many cases, the displaced arrive without documentseither because they have been lost or because documentationwould immediately reveal the area from which they came.Lack of documentation automatically arouses suspicion,and makes it even more difficult to find work in a city whereunemployment is already estimated to be 40%. Thedisplaced are forced to beg, sell cheap goods like cigarettes,fruit or brushes on the street, or produce and sell

handicrafts, merely to survive. Often the men have to stayinside while the women, who arouse less suspicion, seekwork. The women are also forced to change their traditionalclothing (either for western dress or for dress from otherdepartments of Guatemala) for fear that their original dresswould reveal their municipality or even village.

The living conditions which the displaced have toendure in the barrios or limonadas (shanty towns) aredeplorable. Housing, food and sanitation are all scarcelyadequate. Even if they are able to find a house or a room,rents may well be more than they can afford. They areusually in poor health and severely traumatised both bywhat they have suffered and witnessed in their home townsand villages, but also by the culturally different life-stylesand surroundings in the city. Without properdocumentation, the children are unable to attend school.The general situation of the displaced was described bychurch sources working with them as one of'institutionalised violence'. They are regarded by officialsnot as people desperately in need of assistance but as'subversives' or common criminals.

Such attitudes mean in practice that frequent 'dragnet'

operations are carried out by the police and army in theareas where the displaced live, and especially In the marketsand bus terminals. The stated objective is to catch commoncriminals, but the real aim is to control the migrantpopulation. As many as 500 can be picked up at one time.The result is that many families are regularly on the move.living in constant fear of arrest — 'nomadic terror' as oneobserver put it. For example, one group of seven familiesfrom the region of Santa Cruz del Quiche, who fled to thecapital in January 1983 after their village had been burntdown by the army, had had to move four times since theirarrival.

This fear of arrest (and therefore of disappearance ordeath) is not unfounded. Of the above group of sevenfamilies, eight members, all of them catechists, had beenkilled this year. Of another group of about 40 families fromthe area of San Pedro Jocopilas, Santa Cruz and SanBartolomi Jocotenango (ail in Quich6), eight members,again all of them catechists, had been killed since July 1984.For a list of the latter eight, see appendix 5.

Those responsible for these kidnappings and killingsare groups of 'hit men' led by indigenous peasants from thesame home towns and villages as these displaced families.These 'hit men' work closely with the army and, it is alleged,receive money from the army. They have the specific job ofseeking out and then killing or kidnapping selected 'targets'

fy'-\ •

m-

from lists of names they have in their possession of peoplesuspected of being 'subversives'. They come down from thealtiplano, sometimes rob cars to perform the kidnapping,and then return to their villages. They also carry out theirwork in broad daylight and can show excessive brutality indealing with their victims, as with the case of Cruz SantiagoVicente (case 5, appendix 5).

The leaders of these groups are said to be:1. PEDRO COS (from San Pedro Jocopilas):2. PASCUAL (also known as BONAFACIO orMAXIMILIANO) SAPETA (from Panajxit);

3. VENANCIO BENITO (from 4" Centro, Xesic);4. MATEO TAMUP COS, cousin of Pedro Cos (from San

Pedro Jocopilas);5. ANTONIO OSORIO and PEDRO VELASQUEZ TZOY(from 2" Centro, Xesic).

Of these, Pedro Cos and Pascual Sapeta wererepeatedly mentioned by different sources. Pedro Cos isreported to be a comisionado militar, and also to have ahouse in zone 12 of the capital where the kidnapped aretaken.

According to the families we spoke to, the saddestaspect for them was the fact that indigenous peasants fromtheir own villages could work with the army to kidnap or killtheir own people in such a planned and calculated manner.

23

S. NQN-OOVERNMENIEALSECTORS

'Trade union freedom of associailon and liberty do not exist in Guatemala.There are threats of dismissal and plant closures when trade unions try toorganise unions and continuing persecution, torture, assassination and

abduction of trade union activists.' (1 May 1984 statement byConrederation of Trade Union Unity of Guatemala (CUSG))

5.1 Trade Unions

Officially, there are 645 trade unions legally inscribed inGuatemala. Of this number, only some are active (264according to US embassy figures, 75 according to workers inGuatemala City). Estimates of the percentage of the BAP(economically active population) unionised vary from lessthan 10*70 to less than 1% according to the same sources.With the repression severely affecting CUC (Committee ofPeasant Unity) in the period 1980 to the present, mostobservers agree that there is virtually no peasant trade unionorganisation in the rural areas.

THE COCA-COLA DISPUTE

On 17 February, 1984 the management of the Coca-Cola bottling plant in Guatemala City declared itself'bankrupt, shut down the factory and dismissed theentire workforce. The 400 workers immediately met anddecided to occupy the plant, in the fuli knowledge thatthey risked the same fate as eight former members oftheir union (STEGAC) who were killed or disappearedby the death squads In the years 1978-80. The dispute at

. that time was only resolved when the InternationalUnion of Foodworkers (lUF — of which STEGAC Is anaffiliate) and an international campaign forced theAtlanta-based Coke company to remove the previousmanager and install two replacements.

Throughout 1984, the workers have continued tooccupy the plant, keeping watch every day and night,organising cleaning and maintenance rotas, and holdingactivities to keep up morale. Food and support havebeen given by other trade unionists and individualstravelling to the plant from the rural areas. During thefirst three months of the occupation plain-clothed policepatrolled outside the factory, and the army set up roadblocks and occasionally fired shots. At the same time,the management put pressure on the workers to acceptseverance pay. Most refused, as to accept would meanrunning the risk of not being re-hired when the planteventually reopened.

On 27 May, after four months of occupation, ameeting was held in Costa Rica between the Coca-Colahead office, the lUF and STEGAC. The managementpledged to find a new franchise owner, and to recognisethe union and the current collective bargainingagreement. They also agreed to pay each worker a lumpsum amounting to two and a half months' pay asreimbursement for the work they had done inmaintaining the plant, and set up a 512,000 trust fundfor the relatives of those killed in 1978-80.

On 18 July, the Guatemalan courts found that theprevious owners had violated numerous regulations laid

-.out in the Labour Code and in Guatemalan law — one

These very low numbers of unionised workers are theresult of a number of factors including the high level ofphysical repression and intimidation carried out undersuccessive military regimes (especially that of Lucas Garcia,1978-82), the high levels of under- and unemployment in thepresent severe economic recession, but also the systematicviolation of the basic right to form a trade union.Guatemala is a signatory to the International LabourOrganisation (ILO) conventions no. 87 on freedom ofassociation and no. 98 on the right to collective bargaining.

Makeshift shelterfor Oualemalon workers occupying the Coca Colaplant. Jenny Mauhews/Format

of the few occasions that the courts have ruled in favour

of a union. The declaration of bankruptcy was found tobe illegal, and it was recommended that the plant shouldbe reopened and the workers awarded back pay fromthe dale of closure.

The latest development came at the end ofNovember 1984 when, according to a statement by thelUF, the Coca-Cola company had at last found newGuatemalan owners to take over the franchise of the

plant. The new group is led by Mr Porras, who Is said tobe trying to renegotiate the original 27 May agreement. 'The Issues in dispute remain the levels of employment Inthe plant and the recognition of the collectiveagreement. The plant Is scheduled to reopen In February(1985), if the new owners respect the May agreement.

Although the Coca-Cola workers have not beenvictims of direct physical repression, the various illegalmethods used to break their occupation — police andarmy surveillance of the plant. Intimidation of theworkers, the cutting of the telephone line, and theinniiration of the workers at the plant — are seen as aclear attempt to break a strong and well-organisedunion by methods other than straight killing orkidnapping.

■W:. Vt.; ■

In addition, articles 206-9 of the Guatemalan Labour Coderecognise workers' rights to organise trade unions (althoughthe code prohibits union participation in party politics,except on an individual basis). The present government ofGeneral Mejia Victores has also publicly expressed its policyof guaranteeing trade union rights under Guatemalan law.

However, both the ILO conventions and theGuatemalan law are frequently and systematically violatedby owners of factories and businesses. Apart from theoutright physical forms of repression outlined in section2.2.3.1 and appendix 3, trade unionists and those trying toform trade unions suffer a variety of union-breaking tacticssuch as:

• the arbitrary dismissal of unionised workers;• the closure of factories, the dismissal of workers and the

reopening of the factory with new, non-unionisedworkers;

• the taking on of casual labour or new workers oncondition that they do not join a union;

• the forming of unions under the instigation of factoryowners to counter the formation of workers' unions;

• the persecution, surveillance and threatening of unionleaders and members.

It is also alleged by Guatemalan trade unionists that thesetactics are employed regularly with the full backing ofgovernment labour authorities.

To illustrate the problem, we quote the followingexamples:

1. Union at Pantale6n sugar mill, Santa Lucia, Escuintla:The union, with a 40-year history behind it, was effectivelydestroyed in November 1983 after the kidnapping of two ofits leaders by paramilitary groups working with the ownersof the factory (see cases 2 and 3, appendix 3). After threatsto other union members and as a result of the kidnappings,the union had to stop functioning, as no one dared toreplace the leaders.

2. Union at Tejidos Universales textile plant, zone 8,Guatemala City: The union was destroyed when the plantwas closed in February 1984 and a number of workers wereforced to resign. Two members of the trade union wereassassinated (one of them was case 12, appendix 3). Thefactory was later reopened and new, non-unionised workersemployed.

3. Union at Molinos Central, Guatemala City: The union,eight years old, was in effect destroyed when its leadersdemanded that a collective agreement previously signed wasadhered to. As a result, the general secretary of the unionwas kidnapped and forced to leave the plant in June (case23, appendix 3).

4. Union, at Nesbits' factory, Guatemala City: When inearly February the workers tried to form a union, theowners closed down the factory for the period 3-6 February,and when the factory reopened eight members of theworkers' committee were sacked and the management triedto form a 'boss's union'.

5. Union at COINSA (Computacidn de Datos): InSeptember 1984 the workers tried to organise a union, butmore than 20 workers were sacked and within a very shortperiod of time the company had found a new name(Servicios Profesionales S.A.).

6. Union at Industria Centroamericana, CAVISA: Therecording secretary of the 400-member glass workers' union,Fernando Garcia, was kidnapped on the streets ofGuatemala City on 18 February at the time he wasnegotiating a new collective agreement (see case 14,appendix 3).

7. Union at ALINSA (Aluminios Industriales), Amitlin:The union was broken when 12 members of the union andfive members of the executive committee were sacked inJune, reducing the workforce to only 19. Under Guatemalanlaw, a union must have at least 20 members.

5.2 The work of the church

According to CONFREGUA (the Confederation ofReligious of Guatemala), 16 priests and religious personshave been killed since 1976 — 13 priests, one religiousbrother, one seminarian and one sister. The latest victim wasthe Franciscan priest Father Augusto Ramirez Monasterioin November 1983. Although there have been no priestskilled in 1984 (as far as we are aware), many catechists havebeen murdered both in Guatemala City and in the ruralareas (see appendices 1 and S).

At the same time, the social and pastoral work of theRoman Catholic church has been severely restricted, andmuch of it has to be conducted in a semi-clandestinemanner.

The social programs of the church have in the pastbeen the object of severe repression particularly in the poorhighland areas, especially in the period 1980 to the present.The efforts of many religious people to help to improve thepoor living conditions of the indigenous population havebeen interpreted by the Guatemalan military as equivalent to'Marxist subversion'. High-ranking military officials willsay privately that the priests were often to blame for 'raisingthe consciousness of the people'. The practical effects ofsuch attitudes still impose serious limitations on the work ofthe church. In the highland areas especially, many villagesremain without Catholic priests, and the restricted pastoralwork that the church is still allowed to perform is closelymonitored by the military. In many areas, even to beidentified as a catechist is extremely dangerous.

In contrast, the recently-arrived Protestantfundamentalist sects have a much freer role in the highlandareas. It is said that this is a function of the political andsocial effect of their religious teaching, which is consideredto be much more conservative. Most have an 'individualist'conception of personal faith, accept to a greater degreepoverty as 'God's will', and, it is asserted, frequently workagainst the essentially community-based Indian identity.

One cannot fail to notice the ubiquity of evangelicalchurches in most towns and villages. For example, in onetownship in Quezaltenango with a population of 20,000there were 28 evangelical churches. Similarly, in the modelvillage of Acul, Quich6, we were told that there were fourdifferent evangelical sects present but no Catholic priest,despite the fact that the villagers had asked for one. To be amember of a Protestant sect was said to give a certainamount of protection and security, and was even in somecases a means of getting preference in the allocation of foodhanded out by state organisations.

The general attitude of the Catholic hierarchy isreflected in their powerful statement of 9 June, 1984 on thepresent situation in the country (see appendix 7 forexcerpts). Amongst other observations they mentioned thepractice of forced participation in the civilian patrols; theinstitutionalised or structural violence, which manifestsitself in the social and economic differences between diversesectors of Guatemalan society; and the repressive violence inwhich death squads, paramilitary groups and the securityforces have participated. Such public statements have beenwarmly applauded by those struggling for the observance ofbasic human rights. However, it remains doubtful howmuch the bishops can achieve; some have taken upparticular cases of disappearances with the military

25

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Iautfaorilies, but as they admit, 'these have rarely beensuccessful'.

5.3 Human rights organisations

'Who would dare to occupy a human rights office inGuatemala?' (Guatemalan bishop, October 1984)

Unlike El Salvador, Guatemala has no human rightsorganisation which dares to operate openly in the country.There is no equivalent of the Salvadorean Socorro Juridicoor Tutela Legal to monitor and receive information on thepresent situation. The two main human rights organisations,the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission (CDHG) andthe Justice and Peace Committee, are forced to work fromoutside the country.

However, there is a human rights group called theMutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo), formedin June 1984 by relatives of the disappeared (see section2.2.2). The group has expanded its membership to morethan 250 families, mostly from urban, professional andstudent sectors, although it does include amongst itsmembers a number of indigenas. It has no office nor paidstaff, but is kept going by the courage and resolution of therelatives involved. In the face of continued threats, thegroup has been brave enough to hold a number of pressconferences, to meet with government officials, to placepaid advertisements in the press, to celebrate three publicmasses for the disappeared and to organise a 30-kilometre'March for Peace' on 12 October. This march was the first

public demonstration in Guatemala since 1 May 1980, when90 people were reported to have been killed or disappearedthe same day. The group's sense of frustration is self-evident: as Nineth Montenegro de Garcia stated on behalf ofthe group in a September press conference, 'Not one of ourrelatives has appeared — still. We have requested anaudience with the governing authorities, we have sought theaid of the archbishop, our petitions and activities have beenendless, but they have not elicited the slightest positiveresult.'

The Constituent Assembly's subcommission onhuman rights consists of a number of delegates fromdifferent political parties whose task is to draw uplegislation within the new constitution, but not to monitorhuman rights violations nor find relief for the victims. It wasunclear what their role would be after the scheduled

presidential elections in 1985. As a group, they were verycritical of the present human rights situation, and stressedthat the future observance of human rights would bedetermined not by what they wrote in the new constitutionbut whether the historical obstacles to the implementationof the law would be removed.

The government-created Peace Commission, whichconsists of a number of academics, lawyers, church andgovernment officials, became virtually defunct whenArchbishop Penados and Dr Eduardo Meyer (rector ofUSAC) resigned earlier in the year, saying the commissionwas 'inoperative in the face of the wave of official violence'.We personally received confirmation of the reason for therector's resignation. He added that every day he had met thewives of the disappeared, but felt that he could do nothingfor them.

As regards the possibility of a human rightsorganisation working under the protection of the church inthe future, the outlook was far from promising. One bishopexplained that no one would dare to work in a human rightsorganisation within Guatemala, while another claimed thatanyone who did 'would be eliminated'.

6.miUBE•Mario P6rez [real name withheld), a student aged 19, was kidnapped on 14

February 1984 from his house in Guatemala City by eight plain-clothedmen, some wearing boots of the kind worn by the police. Before he wastaken away, a wet rag was stuffed In his mouth, and electric shocks wereadministered in front of his parents and younger brother and sisters.'(Source; Relative of Mario Pirez, Guatemala City, October 1984)

There can be no doubt that some of the most barbaric formsof torture are used systematically against political andcommon prisoners both in rural areas and urban centres.Primary and secondary evidence comes from differentsources: those few prisoners who have escaped, bribed theirway out of prison or have been released; regular pressreports of bodies turning up by the sides of rivers or roads,bearing horrific signs of mutilation or torture — sometimesso^ badly disfigured that they cannot be recognised;neighbours living next to buildings where torture is carriedout who complain of being disturbed or kept awake at nightby the screams of the tortured; soldiers who boast of their'exploits' to frighten rural communities.

We call this a systematic policy because the. cases oftorture are not confined to one prison, nor one military basenor one department. Both the frequent press reports ofmutilated bodies being found in various regions ofGuatemala and the testimonies received from differentdepartments bear witness to the ubiquity of torture cases.

Those mainly responsible are either members of thestate security forces, the intelligence services or paramilitarygroups, either linked to the security forces or unofficiallytolerated by the government. Their motives have beenvariously described as 'pure sadism', 'punishment' forpeople suspected of having sympathy for the left, or, mostcommonly, 'to extract information'. Ghastly mutilation ofbodies is clearly intended to terrorise the population.

Torture centres specifically mentioned by witnesseswere; the Casa Crema army head office, Guatemala City;the military base at Nebaj, Quich6; the military base at SanJuan Cotzal, Quich6; the military base at Coatepeque,Quezaltenango; the military base at Huehuetenango,Huehuetenango; the military base at Rabinal, Baja Verapaz.In addition, it was frequently asserted that torture wasinflicted in most other military bases throughout the countryon prisoners held by the military.

Forms of torture described include electric shocks;rubber masks put over the face to suffocate (sometimes withchemicals inside the masks); the extraction of finger nails;the suspension of bodies upside down for long periods oftime; and the amputation of parts of the body includingfingers, hands, testicles and even the removal of arms andeyes.

It was also stated that indigenous prisoners held In the

28

Casa Crema would be treated far worse than ladinos.Whereas the latter might be tortured for three days to aweek, the former would be kept tied up and tortured forthree weeks to a month.

The following are examples of some of the casesreceived, all of which clearly implicate the security forces:

1. MARIO TEJADA SAENZ: Arrested 18 May 1983 byG-2 (army intelligence branch), and taken to Casa Crema,main ofHce of the army in Guatemala City, where he wastied up, blindfolded and beaten up. He was also drivenaround in a car, blindfolded and kept under the seat —every so often the car would stop and he would be told,'This is your last chance to talk.'

2. POLICARPIO CHEN COL: Kidnapped in SanCristobal, Alta Verapaz, at 9.15 a.m. on 10 September 1984by six or seven armed men (see section 2.1.2). Two days laterhis body was found horribly mutilated in El Progreso withhis eyes and genitals missing.

3. ANDRES JOSE FRANCISCO: (Carnet no. M13 3479).On 3 June 1984 he was beaten up by members of the army inSan Maleo Ixtat&n, Huehuetenango at 6.30 a.m. At 10 a.m.he was taken away from the local army barracks in an armyvehicle. On 9 June his body was found in Puj,Huehuetenango, with both legs broken.

4. ROBERTO XUJ (real name withheld): On 20 April 1984(Good Friday), he was one of nine catechists who presentedthemselves at the military post in a village near Cun6n,Quich6 (name of village withheld). He is reported to havehad his fingers, then his hand and Hnally his arm amputatedin stages by members of the Guatemalan army. He is alsorepqrted to be still alive. The soldiers had boasted of thecase as a warning to others. (Source: son of the victim and areligious working in the area)

5. Example of press report (Prensa Libre, 2 September1984): 'The body of a man, aged approximately 25, wasfound yesterday in the bushes next to the road to ElEncimal, Mixco. The man . . . showed signs of having beensubmitted to torture.'

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7. THE FQUTKAL CQHTBXT'In the periods when there has been a Constitution in force, a regime basedon iegality has not prevaiied, because those governing did not respect theorder of the iaw.' (Arturo Archilia, President of the Coiiege of Lawyers,

May 1984)

Despite the human rights record of the Guatemaian miiitarygovernments of previous years, and despite the flagrantabuses stiii continuing, there has been some hope attachedto the recent elections and the 'democratic opening' in whichthe miiitary are meant to withdraw from politics after theplanned presidential elections in 1985. However, there was awide gulf between the optimistic and glowing picturepainted by the government and army officials, and theapathy and mistrust expressed by everybody we spoke toother than the active members or leaders of the toleratedpolitical parties. This scepticism was especially common inthe rural areas and among the trade union movement, it wasoften pointed out that none of the political parties presentlyallowed to operate had raised the issue of land reform,which has been at the heart of the conflict in the rural areas.In a country where land distribution is highly skewed andwhere a high percentage of the rural population live on plotsof land too small to support them, it seems clear that thepresent political instability and violence will continue unlessthe agrarian problem is urgently addressed. It was alsostressed that no political party has proposed a change in thedistribution of wealth and income in the country; that nopolitical party has questioned the methods or effects of thearmy's counterinsurgency program; and that no politicalparty has proposed the trial of any military officers for pasthuman rights violations or administrative corruption.

Of the four main parties competing in the ConstituentAssembly elections, the MLN and CAN are two extremeright-wing parties, the former internationally notorious forits fascist roots and its alleged links with death squads. (In aprivate meeting we held with the vice-president of the MLN,Sr Arag6n Quindnez, he categorically denied such links.However, later in the conversation he dismissed the presentround of talks taking place between the FDR/FMLN andPresident Duarte in El Salvador as 'discussions between twosets of leftist guerrillas'). The centre-right UCN is lead byJorge Carpio Nlcolle, the owner of two major newspapers inGuatemala. It's political program is one of 'modernisation',and it is said to have the support of sectors of the army andpowerful elements of the business community. It has alsomade strong statements against the Sandinistas in Nicaraguaand in favour of increased economic aid from the US. TheChristian Democrats, who are to the right of theircounterparts in Ei Salvador, have vowed not to touch theprivate sector and recently rejected agrarian reform as

'/inesponsible*. Their statements seems to have reassured the■rights—. 300 of their activists were killed or kidnapped;betw^ 1979 and 1982, where as the figure for 1984 is three.: None of the parties was proposing a change in the structure."Of power In the country. The political choice available in the^ demons of July 1984 was therefore severely limited, and the' Guatonaian people could not have been said to have had a. free choice.

Although the July elections were reasonably soundtechnically, the government claim that 'for the first time,vast numbers of Guatemalans voted in the elections becausethey believed In them' has to be weighed against the widelyexpressed view, especially in the rural areas, that if peopledid not vote and receive the proper stamp on their papers,they would immediately become suspect, or receive a finefor not voting, or encounter problems when wanting totravel. International press reports also suggest that theunusually high turn-out in some highland areas undermilitary control was the result of duress.

In the climate of state-sponsored violence thatsurrounded the elections, no party of the left or centre-leftcould have put up candidates without running the risk ofassassination. As the voters went to the polls, the foreignpress quoted US embassy figures that 42 people on averagewere kidnapped every month and 124 murdered. The viewof most Guatemalan government officials and politicalparty leaders was that leftist parties, including those ofMarxist orientation, should and must be allowed toparticipate in the electoral process in the future. Theseelements may be allowed to participate, but they will notenjoy physical security nor any genuine space to organise.Unless they do, the Guatemalan people will have no genuinefreedom to choose between all political viewpoints.

As for the future, there are severe restrictions on thelikelihood of a genuine improvement in the human rightssituation within the 'democratic opening'. One of the maintasks of the newly-elected Constituent Assembly is to write anew constitution, which will Include full guarantees for thedue observance of human rights. However, it was frequentlypointed out to us by Guatemalan politicians that in the pastGuatemala had enjoyed excellent laws and had signednumerous international conventions, but they had beensystematically flouted by a succession of militarygovernments. 'The problem is not one of drafting,' onemember of the Constituent Assembly told us, 'but ofimplementation.'

The other main task of the Constituent Assembly is toset the timetable for presidential elections some time in1985. By October 1984 five main candidates had put theirnames forward, all of them from the four main toleratedpolitical parties (MLN, CAN, DCG and the UCN) or fromsmaller centre-right parties. They are Jorge Carpio Nicolle(UCN), Vinicio Cerezo (DCG), Mario Sandoval Alarcdn(MLN-CAN-PID (Institutional Democratic Party)),Maldonado Aguirre (PNR — Party of NationalRenovation) and Jorge Serrano Ellas (PDCN — DemocraticParty of National Cooperation). Even if any of these wereto be elected in 1985, it is highly improbable that he wouldever have any control over the Guatemaian military. Thearmy will keep their hands firmly on the levers of power inthe country, as they have done for the last 30 years.

29

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Holding identity cards In queuefor ConsHtuent Assembly elections inSon Juan Osiiincalco, Quezallenango. Piers Cavendish/Reflex

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Electorpi policf check ID cards of voters at Constituent Assemblyelections. Piers Cavendish/Reflex

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: ̂ In general, the elections and the 'democratic opening'seemed more designed for the consumption of US Congressand world opinion than for the Guatemalan people. The

; elections on 1 July achieved a notable success when the team^ of US Congressmen who travelled to observe theproceedings returned to Washington saying that they wouldrecommend an endorsement of President Reagan'sproposed increase in aid for Guatemala. One month later, itwas conflrmed that another USSI7.3 million of economicaid was being given to the Guatemalan government(bringing the total for the year to over $117 million), andthat the Reagan administration was seeking Congressionalapproval for $10.3 million in military aid for Guatemala in1983. Guatemala has received no ofHcial military aid fromthe US since 1977, apart from a $2-million shipment ofhelicopter spare parts which was approved by theadministration in January 1984. Also planned for 1983 are$138 million in economic aid, and for the flrst time in eightyears. $300,000 in military training funds for Guatemalansoldiers.

The improved relations between the US andGuatemala stem from the US administration's desire formore leverage over the Guatemalan military for anincreased, or at least more pliant, role in the regional crisis,and from the Guatemalan government's need to improve itsinternational image and receive much-needed economic andmilitary aid. Given such attempts to improve relations notjust with the US government but with other countries inEurope, it becomes doubly important to have an accuratepicture of the present human rights situation and politicalcontext. It is our firm belief that firstly, the general humanrights situation has not fundamentally improved in 1984(nor is it likely to change in 1983), and secondly, the presentdemocratic opening, while to be welcomed if genuine, ismore of a formal gesture than a real commitment by themilitary to surrender genuine power to a civiliangovernment.

Given the previous history of Guatemala, whereadmirable constitutions have been regularly and persistentlyviolated, and where only a narrow political choice has beenavailable for thirty years, none of the social and politicalconditions which lie at the root of the human rightsviolations, and which have led many to opt for armedstruggle, are likely to change in the neat future.

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31

8. RECOMHENBATIQNS

On the basis of our visit to Guatemala, we would like to recommend that:

1. Britain should not for the present restore diplomatic relations withGuatemala, since this would be seen as an endorsement of the claim by theGuatemalan government and army that human rights violations haveimproved significantly.

2. Foreign governments should not provide arms or other types of military aidto the Guatemalan government as long as human rights violations continue tooccur at the present unacceptable levels.

3. Britain and the EEC should not for the present give any aid to theGuatemalan government, unless certain improvements in the human rightssituation can be demonstrated.

4. Any government giving economic aid to the Guatemalan governmentshould be totally satisfied that any aid earmarked for rural development wouldnot be used by the Guatemalan army for its own counterinsurgency purposes.

5. The Guatemalan government should make every effort to allow animpartial and authorised body to operate within Guatemala to monitor andinvestigate alleged human rights violations, and especially to clarify the fate ofthe disappeared, including those who were held under the Special Tribunals.

6. The Guatemalan government should make every effort to bring to swift andeffective trial those responsible for human rights violations.

7. The Guatemalan government should take effective measures to ensure thatall its authorities and institutions, and especially its security forces, practisefull respect for human rights and basic freedoms.

32

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' WHIand

i^endix 1Alleged killings and kidnappings by the army in 1984

1. HUEHUETENANGO(a) 1 October: a number of soldiers arrived at a viiiage (namewithheld), pretending to be guerrillas, and took away 16 men. Theywere first tied and beaten up with rifle butts. At 7.30 p.m. theywere thrown into the river, and then at 10 p.m. taken to the nearbymilitary base. Names and ID numbers withheld. See section 2.1.2.

(b) 22 August: 10 people taken from Monte Cristo near Barrillas.Case described in section 2.1.2.

(c) 3 June: ANDRES JOSE FRANCISCO (carnet number M133479), a catechist and a government road worker from Yoch, SantaEulalia, taken away by the army from San Mateo Ixtat&n — bodyfound six days later in Fuj with legs broken. See case 3, section 6 ofreport.

(d) 2 June: MARGARITO CASTANEDA SEBASTIAN, bilingualteacher from San Mateo Ixtatdn, picked up by army. Casedescribed in section 2.1.2.

(e) 18 May: three people (two leaders of the civilian patrols and themayor) were taken from Yaca by the army and tortured in themllitaiy base of Huehuetenango. Village of Yaca also robbed ofcash and other personal possessions by the army on the same day.On 16 June the three released on the condition that the villagerswould not make any claims on the army for the stolen possessions.

(0 2 May: the civilian patrols from Chanquejelve had to turn InLUIS ROBERTO JIMENES (aged 17) and CATARINAFASCUAL DOMINGO (aged 15) to the military commander inYalisjao, Nent6n. They were later taken to the military base atHuehuetenango. They have not reappeared.

2. ALTA VERAFAZ(a) 10 September: Sr FOLICARFIO CHEN COL was kidnappedfrom San Cristobal, and two days later his body was found In ElFrogreso. Case described in section 2.1.2.

(b)8-13 August: San Cristobal, seven people were kidnapped,among them a father and his son, and also the sacristan in theCatholic church In San Cristobal, Sr EMILIO CAAL, who hadpreviously been arrested three times before by paramilitary groupsworking with the military zone in Cob&n, but had been releasedshortly afterwards. On this occasion, he was arrested by unknownmen, heavily-armed, in the centre of San Cristobal, but he has notreappeared.

(c) 28 May (approx.): near Chama, Sachal, a group of soldiers on a,sweep operation came across a group of women. One woman and°ber child gave themselves up, while the others fled. Eight werekilled by the soldiers, some of them children.

{sfcHlMALTENANGO(a) 9-16 September: San Jo$6 Foaquil, Tecpan, Chimaitenango,witnesses saw 24 people carried away by the army. See section

■ ;2.1,2._.^.,^'jiime: Fatzun, an old Indigenous man was tortured and then

taken away by the army. A civilian patrol member witnessed how a• Ueutenant of the national police, a sublieutenant and sergeant inthe army and a commander of the special operations unit, torturedthe man by kicking him, putting his head in a container of water

gtabbing him by the throat, all the time threatening him.

(c) 7 April: Chuchuca, some 150 soldiers under the command of alieutenant arrived In three trucks and two other army vehicles. Theytook away ten people (JUAN CANU (62), LEON CANU (26),ISABEL CANU (22), JOSE MARIA CHEVEN (52), MARCELOCHEVEN (28), ELADIO CHEVEN (22), LUCIANO SAGUACH(49), LINO CHACON (29), BONIFACIO SAGUACH (24),LAZARI EJCALCON (48)) to Chimaitenango. Feople whoexpressed interest In their whereabouts received anonymous notessaying 'Don't get involved with affairs of the guerrillas, or you'llpersonally pay the pricel'

(d) 7 April: Xeatzan Bajo, soldiers arrived and took away threepeople, one of them LEONA YOS, aged 22, mother of a one-month-old child, who was left in the arms of her grandparents.Another was named RAIMUNDO ESFITAL.

(e) 29 February: Fatzun, two teachers, JOSE MAZARIEGO andARNOLDO SANTIZO, abducted by the army and remaindisappeared.

4. SAN MARCOS(a) 12 March: San Miguel Ixtahuac&n, ALEJANDRO GOMEZwas kidnapped by the army — he turned up five months later. Seesection 2.1.2, box.

(b) 13 March: San Miguel Ixtahuacdn, six catechists also takenaway by the army, SEBASTIAN MENDEZ, TORIBIOGONZALEZ, MIGUEL MERIDA, FETRONA DOMINGO,EUGENIO DOMINGO, EUSTRQUIA MERIDA.

(c) 11 March (approx.): Ixchigufin, bilingual teacher JUANMENDOZA taken away by the army along with a number of others— three bodies turned up later. See section 2.1.2, box.

5. QUiCHk(a) 10 August: three cantons of San Antonio Ilotenango, fourcatechists killed by the army. They had been violently taken out oftheir homes, and had been strung up on a tree by a noose and thenkilled.

(b) 7 August: the army called together the Inhabitants of threecantons of San Fedro Jocopllas, and in front of all the populationtortured a man who had been abducted. Under torture, the mangave the names of about twenty others present who werecollaborators with the guerrillas. The twenty were there and thentaken and tortured. They were freed but as a result of the torturereceived four later died.

(c) Good Friday (20 April): village near Cun6n (name withheld),SO-ycar-old (approx.) catechist abducted, gave the names of nineother cuiccliisis. The nine presented themselves at the niililary base.One of them was reported to have been horriftcally tortured (seecase 4, section 6). Of the eight others three have turned up dead,and the flve others are presumed dead.

(d) 9 September: Chupol, FEDRO fEREZ (real name withheld)abducted. See section 2.1.3.

(e) Easter Monday (23 April): San Juan Cotzal, JUAN FACHECOCRUZ, catechist, killed under the orders of the mayor, JuanRodriguez Aguilar.(0 February: Sacualpa, person with position of responsibility in theMethodist church killed.

33

i^pendixSDisappearances In 1984

These cases represent only the disappeared whose relatives formpart of the Mutual Support Group. They do not include all thecases of disappearances in 1984. The Mutual Support Group alsoincludes relatives of people disappeared in 1983 (53 cases), 1982 (56cases), 1980 (6 cases), and 1978 (1 case). Some of the names thatappear in this list also appear in appendices 3 and 4.

January

(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)

(8)

JORGE HIRAM MURALLES: 3/1/84.DARIO INOCENTE ROLDAN GOMEZ: 3/1/84.JOSE RICARDO BORER BAR: 3/1/84.OCTAVIO RENE GUZMAN CASTASEDA: 17/1/84.MARIO ROLANDO COLINDRO ESTRADA: 23/1/84.JORGE MAURICIO RIVERA AREVALO: 27/1/84.SEGUNpO GOMEZ LOPEZ: Aged 55, taken from his homein Caserio San Miguel Pajapa, Municipio Pajapita, SanMarcos, by about 8 plain-clothed armed men driving a greyToyota. 27/1/84.ALFONSO ALVARADO PALENCIA: Aged 44, marriedwith three children, ex-leader of the CNT. Kidnapped 31/1/84near Roosevelt Hospital, Guatemala City by 4 armed men inplain clothes in a white van. DIT considered to be responsible.

February

(10) ALFREDO FERNANDO AGUILAR TZEC: 3/2/84.(11) HAROL RIGEL SOZA RIOS: 5/2/84.(12) JOSE LUIS VILLAGRAN DIAZ: Aged 27, member of

consultative council of union at the Universales textile plant.Arrested by police. 11/2/84.

(13) JOSE JULIO HERRERA PEREZ: 11/2/84.(14) CARLOS GUILLERMO RAMIREZ GALVEZ: Aged 19,

student of INTECAP. Kidnapped from 34 Av. 'B' 8-33, zone21, Guatemala City by 8 plain-clothed armed men in twovehicles, one a panel truck, the other a jeep, one with numberplates, the other without. 14/2/84.

(15) MANUEL ISMAEL SALANIC CHIOUIL: Aged 18, student.20 armed men broke into house, tied up his family, robbedsome possessions and took him away. 14/2/84.

(16) NATAEL ISAIAS FUENTES MONZON: 16/2/84.(17) EDGAR FERNANDO GARCIA: Aged 25. Recording

secretary of the union at Industria Centroamericana,CAVISA. Kidnapped in the street by BROE SpecialOperations Brigades 18/2/84, during a police check.

(18) VICTOR HUGO QUINTANILLA ORDONEZ: Law student.Kidnapped 19/2/84.

(19) ALMA LIVIA SAMAYOA de QUINTANILLA: Wife of case18. Kidnapped 19/2/84.

(20) MARIO LEONEL LOPEZ BARRIOS: 21/2/84.(21) OSCAR DAVID HERNANDEZ QUIROA: Voluntary

fireman. 23/2/84.(22) SERGIO SAUL LINARES MORALES: Civil engineer and

ex-lecturer at USAC, aged 30, kidnapped from 47 C. 12-39,zone 12, Guatemala City at 5 p.m. by 6 heavily armed men inplain clothes carrying machine guns. Before his abduction mencame to his mother's house, blindfolded her and tied her up.23/2/84.

(23) JOSE ARNOLDO SANTIZO ROSALES: 29/2/84.(24) JOSE ALFREDO MAZARIEGOS MONROY: 29/2/84.

March

(25) LUZ HAYDEE MENDEZ de SANTIZO: Aged 36, wife ofuniversity professor of mathematics, Marco Antonio SantizoVelfcquez. Kidnapped 8/3/84 at II a.m. from 3 Av. 22-16,zone 19, Colonia San Frandsco, by armed men in cars withnumber plates P-228418 (darkened windows, make Hiace'Lux') and P-23360 (dark blue Volvo). Husband had to fleethe country.

(26) HUGO de LEON PALACIOS: Aged 36, married with twodaughters, teacher at 'La Brigada' primary school, zone 7.Kidnapped by 4 heavily-armed men at 1 p.m. and forced intowhile, four-seater car. Also a part-time student of law atUSAC. 9/3/84.

(27) EDGAR LEONEL DOMINGUEZ IZAS: Doctor in Cantel,Quezaltenango. 28/3/84.

April

(28) JOSE ARNALDO: 3/4/84.(29) ISMAEL RECINOS MEJIA: 5/4/84.(30) CESAR AUGUSTO HERRERA CASTILLO: 5/4/84.(31) GEOVANNI ORTIZ VASQUEZ: 5/4/84.(32) OSWALD ELIESER CRUZ FUENTES: Aged 18, student,

kidnapped 6/4/84 from 12 Av. IOC, zone 11 by 4 plain-clothed men carrying arms in a red 4-door car.

(33) EDY AMILCAR MARIDA PERALTA: Aged 26, ID no.206034, graduate of USAC in Science and Literature, andemployee of Government Bureau of Post andTelecommunications. Disappeared after leaving his home inAv. 28 21-51, zone 5. Police also came looking for his wife.Previously released in September 1983, when consigned to theSpecial Tribunals. Disappeared 7/4/84.

(34) EDGAR GERARDO RIVERA AREVALO; 23/4/84.(35) CARMEN MORALES de MORALES: 27/4/84.(36) JUAN CARLOS MORALES CASTILLO: 27/4/84.

May

(37) HECTOR TOMAS CANAS MARQUEZ: 8/5/84.(38) HUMBERTO ARENALES MOLINA: 8/5/84.(39) GABRIEL PEREN MISA: 8/5/84.(40) JORGE HUMBERTO GRANADOS HERNANDEZ: Aged

27. Disappeared 9/5/84. At 9 p.m. agents of BROE searchedhis house. Wife interrogated, son blindfolded. 300 dollarsrobbed.

(42) ALEJANDRO HERNANDEZ GONZALEZ: Aged 27, legalhelper to the Municipal Workers Union. Disappeared in 'ElSauce' park, zone 2. 13/5/84.

(43) CARLOS ERNESTO CUEVAS MOLINA; Aged 24, studentleader of ABU. Kidnapped near the church of 'UiRecoleccidn', zone 1, at 10.15 a.m., 15/5/84, by heavilyarmed men (thought to belong to DIT).

(44) OTTO RENE ESTRADA ILLESCAS: Graduate student ofeconomics at USAC. Aged 31, married. ID no. A-1 434503.Kidnapped by armed men (DIT). 15/5/84.

(45) RUBEN AMILCAR FARFAN: Aged 40, ex-leader of USACemployees' union. Kidnapped by armed men in the park 'ElSauce', zone 2. 15/5/84.

34

(46) SERGIO LEONEL ALVARADO AREVALO: Aged 20.economics student at USAC, Disappeared 19/5/84 by plain-clothed heavily-armed men in the Avenida Bolivar, GuatemalaCity, in a white-coloured car.

(47) GUSTAVO ADOLFO CASTANON FUENTES: Aged 25,student of economics at USAC and a leader of the AEU. IDno. 1-9 56,200. Kidnapped by heavily-armed men in plainclothes while walking along Av. 3a and C. 8a, zone 1. 21/5/84.

(48) HECTOR ALIRIO INTERIANO ORTIZ: Economics studentat USAC. Kidnapped 21/5/84.

(48) IRMA MARILU HICHO RAMOS: Aged 23. Economicsstudent at USAC. Kidnapped by a number of heavily-armedmen in plain clothes from grounds of university. 21/5/84.

(50) IVAN ESTUARDO VELASQUEZ MENDOZA: 23/5/84.(51) JORGE EDUARDO AGUILAR GRIJALVA: 23/5/84.(52) SANTIAGO RIVERA ZULU: Aged 38. Disappeared

6.30 p.m. on 26/5/84 in Retalhuleu.

(53) JULIO EDUARDO SANDOVAL VELASQUEZ: Aged 22.Kidnapped by police. 22/6/84.

(54) MARCO JULIO VELASQUEZ: 29/6/84.

(55) EULOOIO FELICIANO JUAREZ VELASQUEZ: Aged 65.Taken from home in Caserio San Miguel Pajapa, MunicipioPajapita, San Marcos, on 13/7/84 at 8.45 a.m. by unknownpersons carrying weapons and driving blue car.

(56) FRANCISCO JAVIER JUAREZ RAMIREZ: Aged 19. son ofcase 55. Taken away at same time.

August

(57) JOSE ELICEO HERNANDEZ OBREGON: 19/8/84

October

(58) EDGAR ORLANDO RAMAZZINI HERRERA: Aged 25.2nd year student of journalism at USAC. Kidnapped 13/10/84at 7 a.m. from the park of the United Nations by severalarmed men in civilian clothes, driving a black car.

B,- ' '

itopendixSTrade unionists kiiled or kidnapped since November1983

(1) JOSE JULIO CERMENO: Ex-lender of the CNT and legaladviser of the union at the sugar mill at Pantaledn. Kidnapi^17/11/83.

(2) JOSE LOPEZ BRAN: General secretary of the union atPantaledn, Kidnapped 22/11/83.

(3) MIGUEL ANGEL COMEZ: Minutes secretary of the union atPantale6n. Kidnapped 22/11/83.

(4) CARLOS ROLANDO PEN ADOS: Labour lawyer-Kidnapped 1/2/84.

(5) JULIA GRACIELA ALAVARADO DE GOM^Z: Generalsecretary of the Union of Theatre Artists and Allied Workersof Guatemala, killed 8/12/83.

(6) JOSE GULLERMO GARCIA: Union leader, Mirandillasugar mill. Kidnapped 26/1/84.

(7) AMANCIO SAMUEL VILLATORO: CNT leader and ex-general secretary of Adams factory. Kidnapped 30/1/84.

(8) ALFONSO ALVARADO PALENCIA: CNT leader.Kidnapped 1/2/84,

(9) MILQUICEDET MIRANDA: Ex-CNT leader. Kidnapped31/1/84.

(10) SERGIO MANFREDO BELTETON: Labour adviser.Kidnapped 4/2/84. (Appeared 15 days later.)

(11) SERGIO ALDANA GALVIN: General secretary of union atPrensa Libre. Kidnapped 11/2/84. (Released one week later.)

(12) JOSE LUIS VILLAGRIN: Member of Consultative Councilof union at Universales textile plant. Kidnapped 11/2/84.

(13) SANTIAGO LUIS AGUILAR: Labour lawyer. Kidnapped17/2/84. Tortured body found 22/2/84.

(14) EDGAR FERNANDO GARCIA: Recording secretary atCAVISA union. Kidnapped 18/2/84.

(15) VICTOR MANUEL QUINTANILLA ORDONEZ: Ubouradviser at law student. Kidnapped 19/2/84.

(16) ALMA LIVIA SAMAYOA: Wife of case 15. Kidnapped19/2/84.

(17) ALVARO RENE SOSA RAMOS: Ex-general secretary of theunion at Diana sweets factory. Kidnapped 11/3/84, butescaped to Belgian embassy on 13/3/84.

(18) SILVIO MATRICARDI: Leader of the teachers' union.Found dead 16/3/84.

(19) JORGE VELASQUEZ: Brother of Valerio Velksquez, unionleader at Universales textile plant. Kidnapped 12/5/84.

(20) ALEJANDRO HERNANDEZ GONZALEZ: Legal adviser tothe Municipal Workers union. Kidnapped 13/5/84.

(21) RUBEN AMILCAR FARFAN: Ex-member of thedirectorship of the union of employees at USAC. Kidnapped15/5/84.

(22) ANTONIO PEREZ GARCIA: Ex-employee of USAC.Kidnapped 19/5/84.

(23) MANUEL PIMENTEL: General secretary of the union ofMolinos Central, Guatemala City. Kidnapped 24/6/84, andput in car with no number plates. Later appeared tortured butalive in San Juan Sacalep6quez.

(24) JULIO MORALES: Brother of worker at PantaieOn sugermill. Aged 12. Kidnapped 28/7/84 and turned up 20 days laterin Escuintla. The little fingernail on his right hand had beenremoved.

36

Appendix 4Students, lecturers and others still connected withUSAC kidnapped in 1984

(1) SERGIO SAUL LINARES MORALES: Ex-lecturer atUSAC. Kidnapped 23/2/84.

(2) LUZ HAYDEE MENDEZ DE SANTIZO: Wfe of MarcoAntonio Santizo Velasquez, professor of mathematics atUSAC. Kidnapped 8/3/84.

(3) HUGO DE LEON PALACIOS: Part-time student of law atUSAC. Kidnapped 9/3/84.

(4) EDY AMILCAR MERIDA PERALTA: 4 years a student inLaw faculty of USAC. Kidnapped 9/4/84.

(5) EDUARDO VILLATORO TOLEDO: Economics student atUSAC. Kidnapped 2/S/84.

(6) IRMA JOHN: Psychology student at USAC. Kidnapped2/S/84.

(7) CARLOS ERNESTO CUEVAS MOLINA: Leader of AEU.Kidnapped IS/S/84.

(8) OTTO RENE ESTRADA ILLESCAS: Graduate student ofEconomics at USAC. Kidnapped 15/S/84.SERGIO LIONEL ALVARADO: Economics student atUSAC. Kidnapped 19/5/84.

(10) GUSTAVO ADOLFO CASTANON FUENTES: Economicsstudent at USAC and leader of AEU. Kidnapped 21/5/84.

(11) HECTOR ALIRIOINTERIANO ORTIZ: Economics studentat USAC. Kidnapped 21/5/84.

(12) IRMA MARILU HICHO RAMOS: Economics student atUSAC. Kidnapped 21/5/84.

03) EDGAR ORLANDO RAMAZZINI HERRERA: Student ofjournalism at USAC. Kidnapped 13/10/84.

(14) VITALICIO GIRON CORONADO: Dean of the Faculty of. Economics. KiUed 27/10/84.

SAj ' !

.'.ip'

1.-'-

■'A ■ •

i''-

Appendix 8Catechists from one group of 40 families killed inGuatemala City since July 1984

0)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)(8)

SR MARTIN (real name withheld): catechist and refugeeleader from Xesic, Quich6. Kidnapped from COlonia LaBrigada, Guatemala City, at the beginning of July.ROSARIO TENl: Tailor and catechist from Quich6.23 yearsold. Kidnapped 26 July 1984 at 9 a.m. from 26 C. 0-13, zone 1,by heavily-armed men in white pick-up.- Later same daypushed out of pick-up, shot in broad daylight and his body leftin street.SILVERIO SACARIN SAJBIN CHIQUIN: 25, from SantaCruz del Quich6.MANUEL SACARIN: Brother of above, both tailors andcatechists. Kidnapped at the same time as case 2 from samelocation. Neither has reappeared.CRUZ SANTIAGO VICENTE: 23, street vendor of applesand catechist from Quich6. Killed same day as case 2 by samegroup in 12 Av. and 5a C., zone 12. Wounded first and despitebegging for mercy, shot dead and left in street.LUCIANO VELASQUEZ: Ggarette seller and catechist fromChajbal, Quichi. Kidnapped from Avenida Helena,Guatemala Qty, on 26 August 1984.JOSE LUCAS.ALEJANDRO LUCAS: Cbusin of above, catechists fromQuichi. Kidnapped from La Ciudad Real on 14 September1984.

37

^peiidix6UN Resolution, December 1984

Resolution of the United Nations General Assembiy, Thirty-NinthSession

REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCILAustria. Canada. Denmark. Friince. Greece. Ireland. Netherlands.Norway. Spain. Sweden:

Situation ofhuman rights and fundamentalfreedoms in Guatemala

The General Assembly.Reiterating that the Governments of aii Member States have anobligation to promote and protect human rights and fundamentalfreedoms,

Recalling its resoiutions 37/184 of 17 December 1982 and38/100 of 16 December 1983,

Noting Commission on Human Rights resoiution 1984/S3 of14 March 1984 in which the Commission expressed its profoundconcern at the continued massive violations of human rights inGuatemaia.

Mindftd of resolution 1984/23 of the Sub-Commission onthe Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, inwhich the Sub-Commission recognizes, inter alia, that inGuatemala there exists an armed conflict of a non-internationalcharacter, which stems from economic, social and political factorsof a structurai nature.

Noting the elections to the Constituent Assembiy held in July1984, thus fulfilling the first stage of the eiectoral process for theinstitution of a new constitutional Government according to thetimetable proposed by the Government of Guatemala, andaffirming the importance of creating conditions in which theelectoral process can be purchased in a climate free fromintimidation and terror.

Alarmed at the continuation of politically motivated violencein the form of killings and kidnappings.

Alarmed also at the large number of persons who havecontinued to disappear and the unclear fate of those reported tohave been tried by the special tribunals now abolished,

Welcoming the co-operation of the Government ofGuatemala with the Special Rapporteur in the fulfiiiment of hismandate, and notes with satisfaction that a list of cases having beendealt with by the special tribunal has now been handed over to theSpecial Rapporteur,

1. Takes note of the interim report by the Special Rapporteur onthe situation of human rights in Guatemala submitted inaccordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1984/53of 14 March 1984;2. Reiterates its deep concern at the continuing grave andwidespread violations of human rights in Guatemaia, particularlythe violence against non-combatants, the disappearances andkillings and the widespread repression, including the practice of.torture, the displacement of rural and indigenous people, theirconfinement in development centers and forced participation incivilian patrols, organized and controlled by the armed forces;3. Urges once again the Government of Guatemala to take effectivemeasures to ensure that all its authorities and agencies, including its

security forces, fully respect human rights and fundamentalfreedoms;4. Renews its call upon the Government of Guatemala to refrainfrom the forceful displacement of people belonging to rural andindigenous populations and from the practice of coerciveparticipation in civilian patrols, leading to human rights violations;5. Welcomes the fact that many of the persons who were tried bythe special tribunals have now been released and invites theGovernment of Guatemaia to publish the list of cases having beendealt with by the special tribunals;6. Requests the Government of Guatemala to investigate andclarify the fate of all persons who have been subjected toinvoluntary or forced disappearances and are still unaccounted forand to put an end to arbitrary detention and imprisonment in secretplaces;7. Urges the Government of Guatemala to establish the necessaryconditions to ensure the independence of the judicial system and toenable the judiciary to uphold the rule of law, including the right ofhabeas corpus, and to prosecute and punish speedily and effectivelythose, including members of the military and security forces, foundresponsible for violations of human rights;8. Calls upon the Government of Guatemaia to allow anindependent and impartial body to function in the country tomonitor and investigate alleged human rights violations;9. Reiterates its appeal to ail parties concerned in Guatemaia toensure the application of the relevant norms of internationalhumanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts of a non-international character, to protect the civilian population and toseek an end to all acts of violence;10 Appeals to the Government of Guatemala to allow internationalhumanitarian organizations to render their assistance ininvestigating the fate of persons who have disappeared with a viewto informing their relatives of their whereabouts, to visit detaineesor prisoners and to bring assistance to the civilian population inareas of conflict;11. OiUs upon Governments to refrain from supplying arms andother military assistance to Guatemala as long as serious humanrights violations in that country continue;12. Urges the Government of Guatemala to ensure a climate freefrom intimidation and terror which would allow the freeparticipation of ail in the political process;13. Invites the Government of Guatemaia and other partiesconcerned to continue co-operating with the Special Rapporteur ofthe Commission on Human Rights;14. Requests the Commission on Human Rights to study carefullythe report of the Special Rapporteur as well as other informationpertaining to the human rights situation in Guatemaia and toconsider further steps for securing effective respect for humanrights and fundamental freedoms for all in that country;15. Decides to continue its examination of the situation of humanrights and fundamental freedoms in Guatemaia at Its fortiethsession.

The resolution was passed with 85 votes In favour, 11 against and47 abstentions. AH the Western European countries voted In favourof the resolution. Including Britain. The US voted against theresolution.

38

Appendix 7To build peace: Excerpts from a collective pastoralletter by the Guatemalan Bishops' Conference

1.1.6 [The] tragic picture we bishops described in 1976 not onlycontinues, but has deteriorated even further due to internal andexternal factors that have arisen to the detriment of our socialpeace.

Violence, in its different forms, has taken over inGuatemala. We are all witnesses to it and we have endured it. Weall know that, for several years now, mourning, terror, anguish andpain have come to countless Guatemalan homes which are shakenby the growing waves of violence unleashed at every level and inevery social class, striking particularly at peasants and the Indianpeople.

A synthesis of the acts of violence which are a daily scourgeand punishment to our people is frightening:

kidnapping, disappearances, arrests without warrant;irrational use of torture;massacres of entire families and groups, above all Indians andpeaswts, including children, pregnant women and the elderly;massive displacement of families and populations searching forrafety after losing home and belongings, giving rise to theincrease in refugees abroad, in danger of enduring the mostinhumane levels of misery and uncertainty;a growth in informers, the raiding of homes, interception ofcorrespondence and private communication, and the violationof every norm which forms the context of human rights in anycivilised country.

I.I.I1 To the multiple sufferings, which in such a dramatic formoin people have endured, has been added in the last two years theexistence of the civil defence patrols ... In effect, having toperform unpaid these services, which are incompatible with thedemands of their work, represents for the peasants and the Indiancommunities a new sacrifice that makes their sufferings evenharsher...

n.2.1 In studying recent political constitutions in Guatemala, wemust recognize that, theoretically, they have proclaimed the dignityof the human being and recognised his/her rights. However,egotistical or political interests have converted these fine principlesinto dead letters, into a permanent travesty or into emptydeclaration which have divested of credibility the authoritiescharged with safeguarding effectively the dignity of individuals.

11.2.2 The new political constitution of Guatemala must findadequate mechanisms for the promotion, defence and monitoring.of these (human) rights. This will have to be one of the most.-important goals of the next national constituent assembly. If theseI mechanisms are not found, no solemn proclamation of human|ri^ts will be of any use, for we will return to the continued^mockery of constitutional principles, as has happened in recent' ̂Guatemalan history...

One of the greatest riches of Guatemala, one which givesr^her her spe^ features among the nations, is the plurality of

indigenous cultures evident in the different ethnic groups whichmake up her population. Descended from the immortal Mayas, ourIndian population merits every respect and admiration.IJnfortunately they have not received it, for several centuries, eversince the time of the conquest. On the contrary, the entireGuatemalan socio-economic structure has rested upon thefoundation of a subjugated and impoverished Indian people. Itcannot be forgotten that the Indians form the majority of theGuatemalan people, and that they have inalienable rights ...

ill.5.2.1 Practices involving coercion, intimidation, and othermethods frequently used to prevent citizens from expressing theirown thoughts and demands and from receiving through the mediaobjective and true information, should be abolished completely.

lil.S.2.2 It is unacceptable, though it presently occurs in someparts of Guatemala, that inhabitants should have to get permissionfrom military authorities or paramilitaries in order to go from oneplace to another . . .

III.7.4 We all know the history of trade unions in Guatemala andhow their inembers have been decimated, their main leadersmurdered, disappeared or forced to seek refugee in neighbouringcountries. This situation must end and the constitution must fullyguarantee uade union rights . . .

IIi.9.2 . . . When authority declines into criminal activity, asunfortunately has happened and continues to happen inGuatemala, it loses all its strength and in imposing itself, hasnothing to rely on but the brute force of its weapons. Illegaldetentions under the guise of kidnappings, disappearances and theabominable practice of torture, among other despicable actions,have placed the Guatemalan forces of order in a seriouspredicament.

Guatemala de la Asuncidn, 9 June 1984, Pentecost Sunday.

(Unofficial translation)

39

Farther Reading'I . . . Rigoberta', ed. Elizabeth Burgos-Debray, 1984. Verso

Books, 15 Greek Street, London WIV 5LF. £4.9Sp.

Garrison Guatemala, by George Black, 1984. Zed Press, 57Caledonian Road, London N1 9BU. £5.95p.

Guatemala — Comment, Catholic Institute for InternationalRelations, 1985. Catholic Institute for International Reiations,22 Coleman Fields, London N1 7AF. 40p.

Central America Report, bi-monthiy from the GuatemalaCommittee for Human Rights, 20 Compton Terrace, LondonN1 2UN. 40p.

All the above are available from the Guatemala Committee forHuman Rights, 20 Compton Terrace, London N1 2UN.

40

'BZTIEB&CBDIiL...'Yet the outcome of Central America's 'unknown war'hafnHo?h " g'^eater impact than theL the r3 '?""*'• -""ss carnageas the Guatemalan army sought to wipe out the civiliansupport for the guerrillas In the highlands. 1984 sees the same

through a program of selective assassinations andkidnappings, the forced participation of 800,000 Guatemalans

villageJ- Ihfi' of over 40 'modelhJ^P. - »he modern equivalent of Vietnam's strategichamlets — in the key conflict areas. In the cities, the

d~»3rare bLk"'"''"''''''"' ° """hMmrn*'-*;?" Guatemalan and US government claims that thetheTitCh Par « ? has improved in 1984, two members ofme British Parliamentary Human Rights Group. Liberal nearLord Avebury and Labour MP Tony Lloyd, travelled toGuatemala in October 1984. Bitter and Cruel describes theSoimdaf"" '* 'hrough meetings with' ?e°ativls of officials and more than 100

batf e 5L fh h focuses on the grimbattle for the hearts and minds of the civilian population inthe rural areas and the government practice of the forced

Po»<icnl opponents. The conclusion issimple: throughout 1984 there has been no significantimprovement in the human rights situation — If anything Ithas worsened since 1983. "■•yimng, a

£1.50ISBN 0 9510 238 0 2