Dr Robert Foley

The German Army, 1914-18:

Strategic Perspectives

Dr. Robert T. Foley

Strategic Leadership

Strategic Leadership

Strategic Assumptions 1914

Rapid and decisive victory brought about by defeat of French in West, followed by redeployment East (if need be)

Naval power superfluous

Diplomacy superfluous

Strategic Assumptions 1914

Heavily fortified Franco-German border

Lightly fortified Belgian-German-French borders

Good rail and road communications through Belgium

Strategic Plans 1914

Westaufmarsch 1914

Outflank French fortress line from north

But also potential for encirclement with southern wing

Active defence in East

Strategic Plans 1914-1916

Convinced war could not be won on battlefield alone

Enemy alliance would have to be split

West or East?


Verdun 1916

Attempt to use battlefield success to political ends

Goal was to influence French public opinion through battlefield attrition


Decisive battlefield victory still possible

Weapons should take the place of men

East then West


Hindenburg Programme

Triple production of artillery

Triple production of machineguns

Double output of munitions


Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

Aimed to knock Britain out of war within 5 months


Kaiserschlacht 1918

New tactics & concentration of forces would allow British to be decisively defeated in West

Failures of Strategy

Manpower

Lost by 31 July 1918:

126,500 killed

527,000 wounded

‘Exempted’ men Aug 1918:

2.4 million

1.1 million k.v.

Failures of Strategy

Lack of cross-governmental organizations for strategy formulation

Competing strategic visions

Army officers lacked knowledge necessary to perform all strategic roles

Questions?

Presentations & Public Speaking

Dr Robert Foley