PowerPoint Presentation

Power GridCybersecurity Webinar

Jan. 29, 2016

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Introduction & Real-Time ApplicationsThomas KirkSales EngineerOPAL-RT TechnologiesKeynote SpeakerDavid ManzCybersecurity Research ScientistPacific Northwest National Laboratory

Your Hosts

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Real-Time Simulation, Applications, & SolutionsCyber AttacksOPAL-RT UsersDavid ManzPNNL4

Question Period

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The electric power grid is evolving quickly with the introduction of new intelligent technologies, which will improve its efficiency and performance. However, these technologies have the potential to make the grid more vulnerable to cyberattacks, which has motivated a new set of standards (NERC CIP).1

OPAL-RT is dedicated to providing open power system real-time digital simulators that meets the new requirements of power system professionals as the industry focus on cybersecurity increases. Introduction

1 R. J. Campbell, Cybersecurity Issues for the Bulk Power System, Congressional Research Service, 2015

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The art of ensuring the existence and continuity of the information society of a nation, guaranteeing and protecting, in Cyberspace, its information, assets and critical infrastructure. 23 Canongia, C., & Mandarino, R. 2014. Cybersecurity: The New Challenge of the Information Society. InCrisis Management: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications:60-80. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

DEFINITIONS:

The activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and communications systems and the information contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation.12 Cybersecurity definition taken from National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS)

Introduction

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Introduction: Grid ModernizationModern power grids are Cyber-Physical System (CPS) composed of electrical and information infrastructure

The grid is becoming intelligent through:Wide deployment of new technologiesSubstation, transmission and distribution automationIncreased distributed Energy Resource (DER) integrationAdvanced two-way communication networksDevelopment of synchrophasor systems

But as newer technologies are adopted, the grid is becoming more vulnerable to cybersecurity threats both: Malicious and Accidental4

4 See NIST (http://www.nist.gov/el/smartgrid/cybersg.cfm)

Asset Management

Grid Control

Data Collection & Local Control

Communication

Sensors

Source: EPRI 2007

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Smart grid cybersecurity must address not only deliberate attacks, such as from disgruntled employees, industrial espionage, and terrorists, but also inadvertent compromises of the information infrastructure due to user errors, equipment failures, and natural disasters.-NIST (http://www.nist.gov/el/smartgrid/cybersg.cfm)

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Introduction: Threats and ScenariosDozens of industrial-level cybersecurity incidents since 1999 (Source: Lloyds):2001: Cal-ISO hacking incident (15 days)2007: Idaho National Laboratory Aurora experiment2010: Iran nuclear Stuxnet incident 2012: German utility DoS attack (5 days)

FERC analysis: The loss of 9 out of 55k+ US substations could lead to an extended (1+ year) national blackout (Source: WSJ)

2014 NESCOR failure scenarios report includes failures due to:Compromised equipment functionalityData integrity attacksCommunication failuresHuman ErrorNatural Disasters

2014 NESCOR failure scenarios report 4

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NERC CIP Standards focus largely on risk assessment and identification of:Critical AssetsCritical Cyber Assets

SGIP Cyber Security Guidelines (NISTIR 7628) are also based on risk assessment:

Simulation can be used to answer these questions and assess risk What about real-time simulation?

Introduction: Risk Assessment

From Introduction to NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security

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Critical Asset: Facilities, systems, and equipment which if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable would affect the reliability or operability of the Bulk Electric System.Critical Cyber Asset: Cyber Assets essential to the reliable operation of Critical Assets.

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Real-Time Simulation, Applications, & SolutionsCyber AttacksOPAL-RT UsersDavid ManzPNNL4

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Real-Time Simulation7

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Real-Time Cybersecurity ApplicationsRisk assessment studies including penetration testing, & cyber-critical asset and vulnerability identification

Research & development, design and testing of:Situational awareness, anomaly detection and cyber-attack mitigation systemsNetwork/communication systemsControl and monitoring systems (e.g. SCADA, DMS, EMS, WAMPAC)Synchrophasor systemsState Estimators

Meeting standards specific and related to cybersecurity, following smart grid guidelinese.g. NERC CIP, NIST SGIP-CSWG, IEEE C37.118

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POLL after this slideWhich of these cybersecurity applications have you used or plan on using?11

To & From Virtual DevicesCommands, Status

Typical Real-Time Simulation Setup

GPS ClockPMU

Antenna

C37.118

Analog outTime syncRFTime sync

RelayIEC61850 SV, GOOSEVirtual Devices

Analog out

Digital Comm

Phasor Data Concentrator(PDC)Control Center: Control, Applications and HMI

Controller

Modbus, DNP3, etc.Analog, Digital IOCommunication Network

Synchropasors

Power Amplifier

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Detailed Large-Scale Power System software developed by Hydro-Qubec

Automated testing with TestView (supports Python)

Based on MATLAB/Simulink & SimPowerSystems

Open API (Python, C++, Java)Automate studies, link to external systemsPhasor-based real-time simulation software for very large networksImport PSSE, CYME, DIgSILENT PowerFactory networks

Software Solutions ePHASORsim Real-Time Transient Stability Simulator 10 ms time step HYPERsim Large Scale Power System Simulation for Utilities & Manufacturers 25 s to 100 s time step

1 s(1 Hz)10,0002,0001,00050010010010 ms(100 Hz)50 s(20 KHz)10 s(100 KHz)20,000Period (frequency) of transient phenomena simulatedNumber of 3-Phase Buses eMEGAsim Power System & Power Electronics Simulation 10 s to 100 s time step

C37.118 PDCModel Predictive Controller

EmulatedPMUsC37.118 Systems Under Test10

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Protocol support for smart grid applications:IEC61850-8-1 GOOSEIEC61850-9-2 Sampled ValuesC37.118MODBUSDNP3IRIG-B and 1 PPS Sync

Permits for some attacks/faults to be emulated directly within a model

Communication Protocols

IEC 60870-5-104OPC UA ServerTCP/IPUDPRS-232, RS-422, RS-485IEEE 1588

Signals from model11

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Communication becoming critical component of grid along with new considerations (NISTIR 7628):CybersecurityPerformance: Latency, Bandwith, Processing SpeedAdded cost

Network simulators have been used towards real-time co-simulation of power and communication systems

Network SimulatorsCommercialFree-for-useNetSimQualnetRiverbed Modeler (formerly OPNET)NS2, NS3OMNeT++Kali LinuxJ-Sim

Network Simulation Tools with Real-Time Capabilities

Source: NISTIR 110012

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Cyber AttacksOPAL-RT UsersDavid ManzPNNL4

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Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks can render a service unavailable either through a direct or indirect attackIEC61850 Goose identified as susceptible due to status numbers (Skopik & Smith 2015)Also refers to physical attacks on communication infrastructureCutting wiresWireless jamming

Cyberattacks: DoS

Reference: Skopik F., Smith P.: Smart Grid Security - Innovative Solutions for a Modernized Grid, Elsevier Science Publishing, 2015, ISBN: 978-0-12-802122-4.

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Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks impersonate two communication nodes by making them believe that they are talking together (Skopik & Smith 2015):Packet injection/spoofing (IEC61850 Goose, DNP3, MODBUS),Packet suppression,Recording, replaying and modification of recorded packets

Cyberattacks : Man-in-the-Middle

Reference: Skopik F., Smith P.: Smart Grid Security - Innovative Solutions for a Modernized Grid, Elsevier Science Publishing, 2015, ISBN: 978-0-12-802122-4.

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GNSS spoofing/meaconing is a threat to PMUs and synchrophasor systems, heavily reliant on time synchronizationFor 60 Hz networks, IEEE C37.118-2014 Standard allows max 26.53 s pure timing error

Cyberattacks : GNSS Spoofing/Meaconing

Source: http://rnl.ae.utexas.edu/images/stories/files/papers/spoofSMUCIP2012.pdf

Spoof lockedC37.118StandardBrokenSpoofer removed

D. P. Shepard, T. E. Humphreys, and A. A. Fansler, Evaluation of the vulnerability of phasor measurement units to GPS spoofing attacks, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, vol. 5, no. 34, pp. 146153, 2012.

GNSS Simulator

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Real-Time Simulation, Applications, & Solutions

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Cyber Attacks

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Almas, M.S.; Baudette, M.; Vanfretti, L; Lovlund, S; Synchrophasor network, laboratory and software applications developed in the STRONg2rid project, 2014 PES General Meeting & Conference & Exposition, Wahsinton, USA, 27-31 July 2014

Comprehensive WAMPAC Test Bench

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Virginia Tech University

D. Bian, M. Kuzlu, M. Pipattanasomporn, S. Rahman, Y. Wu, Real-time co-simulation platform using OPAL-RT and OPNET for analyzing smart grid Performance, Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2015 IEEE, 1-5

Smart grid communication system performance testing OPNET uses to simulate smart grid traffic

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Ohio State University

F. Guo, L. Herrara, R. Murawski, E. Inoa, C. Wang, P. Beauchamp, E. Ekici, J. Wang. Comprehensive Real-Time Simulation of the Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on Industry Applicatio, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2013

Microgrid power and communication systems co-simulation Results show that communications have a significant effect on system dynamics

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University of South Florida

Smart Grid Power Systems Lab (SPS) uses OPAL-RT to model power grid and PMUs in SCADA Testbed for research validation:Cybersecurity,Communication,Grid visualization,Power system control and optimization

Simulator connects to OSIsoft PI Server IEEE-C37.118 to PI Server to send data and receive commands

H.G. Aghamolki, Z. Miao, L. Fan. A Hardware-in-the-Loop SCADA Testbed, North American Power Symposium (NAPS), 2015

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123Introduction

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Real-Time Simulation, Applications, & Solutions

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Cyber Attacks

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OPAL-RT Users

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David ManzPNNL

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23Cyber-Physical Security Research, Experimentation and ApplicationsDavid Manz, PhDPacific Northwest National Laboratory Richland, WA

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24powerNETWhat is it?Multi-user power system testbedSandbox environmentExperiment basedAccess controls by project/userAuto-configurationBuilt upon cloud technologyRemote accessScalableEmulation and simulationUser friendlyConfiguration/monitoring portalCommon library of scenarios

25What is it?Modular and extendableSupport for multiple cyber physical industriesFederation with internal and external testbeds and resourcesCurrent capacity2-3 projects at onceVisionNational user facility

26FacilitiesCloud technology based orchestration with web based user portalNetwork EmulationEmulate LAN/WAN communication characteristics. Examples:Dedicated LineDial-upWirelessSCADA environmentsReal equipment to model ~2 substationsSoftware simulation of dozens of SCADA equipmentSupport for legacy communications

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27Facilities Cont.Physical Process Emulation OPAL-RTHardware-in-the-loop modelingLarge scale simulationSynchrophasors9 PMU from variety of vendors1 PMU Development Platform1 Hardware PDC (Many software PDC possible) Up to ~1000 general purpose virtual nodes possibleXenServer hypervisorEnergy Management System

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28Testbed UsesValidation and verificationTechnology assessment and prototypingSimulation and modelingTraining and educationDemonstration (with PNNL EIOC)

Annual Review 201229Research TopicsCyber securityCyber-physical systemCyber impact/interaction on physical processesDistributed applicationsSmart GridInteroperability testingApplication prototyping

30powerNET Usage ExamplesGridlab-D Analysis ProjectFPGI: A Distributed Systems Architecture for the Power Grid CEDS Digital Ants IEC 61850/62351 Interoperability TestingSCADA network determinismCyber-Physical TrainingDHS Cyber-Physical Federation Demonstration

31powerNET Testbed BenefitsMulti-user shared facility and equipmentTime and resource efficientDynamically configurableRemote accessTest wide scale federation of testbeds and understand associated management and security concernsUser benefits:Researchers: Efficiency, Realistic SandboxIndustry: Conformance and Interoperability testingAcademia: Hands-on Education

32cyberNETPeer CapabilityModel and emulation enterprise environmentsEnterprise servicesUser modeling and simulationFederate resources for bigger experimentsIT and OT joint experiments

33powerNET Video

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Thomas Kirk514-935-2323thomas.Kirk@opal-rt.com

David Manz509-372-5995david@pnnl.gov

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Our new Cybersecurity webpage is now online:http://www.opal-rt.com/cybersecurity

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