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Impact of Quality in Orbital Science’s
Human Spaceflight Programs Presented at the 20th Conference on Quality in the Space and Defense Industries
Frank L. Culbertson
Senior Vice President and Deputy General Manager
Advanced Programs Group
Agenda
Orion
COTS/CRS
SRQ&A Impact on Programs
2
Orion
3
4
Orion Launch Abort System Summary
LAS is Designed to Remove the Crew during a Launch Vehicle Failure While on the Pad Up to Nominal Jettison at Approximately 200 kft
LAS Accomplishes this Mission
Using Three Solid Motors
Trajectory Optimization During the Abort
Lightweight Composite Structures
5
PA-1 Mission
PA-1 Mission: Demonstrate Pad Abort Capability
The PA-1 LAS has over 300
Instruments on It to Measure
the Flight Environments
During the Test Flight
6
PA-1 Integration Complete
7
PA-1 Flight Test May 6, 2010 – Success!
•The Launch Abort System Developed for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle
Was Successfully Tested on May 6, 2010.
•The 97-second Flight Test Was the First Fully Integrated Test of the Launch
Abort System Developed for Orion
COTS/CRS
8
9
Low Earth Orbit Transfer Operations
Drawing Upon Its 30 Years Of Satellite And Major Space Systems Development And
Operations Experience, Orbital Sciences Corporation Has Embarked On A New Venture
To Provide Low Earth Orbit Cargo Transfer Services To NASA’s ISS Program
• Under the joint NASA / Orbital
Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services (COTS) program, Orbital is
Developing the “Cygnus” Advanced
Maneuvering Space Vehicle, Which is
Designed to Meet the Stringent Safety
Requirements for International Space
Station (ISS) Operations.
• The Cygnus Spacecraft Will Provide
Cargo Resupply to the ISS Program under
the Cargo Resupply Services Contract
10
International Space Station Overview The International Space Station is the largest and most complex international
scientific project in history. Led by the United States, the International Space Station draws upon the scientific and technological resources of 16 nations: Canada, Japan, Russia, 11 nations of the European Space Agency, and Brazil
More than four times as large as the Russian Mir space station, the completed International Space Station will have a mass of about 472,000 kg. It will measure 356 feet across and 290 feet long, with almost an acre of solar panels to provide electrical power to six state-of-the-art laboratories.
The station is in an orbit with an altitude of approximately 400 km with an inclination of 51.6 degrees. The orbit provides excellent Earth observations with coverage of 85 percent of the globe and over flight of 95 percent of the population.
The ISS houses an international crew of 6.
2012 a Big Year For Cygnus and Antares
COTS Demo and CRS Orb-1 Spacecraft
in Advanced Testing
Thermal Vacuum Testing, Mechanical
Environments for COTS Demo
EMI/EMC Testing, Thermal Vacuum
Testing and Mechanical Environments for
Orb-1
Demo Software Ready for Final Joint
Testing
Antares Forging Ahead with Significant
Hardware Deliveries and Integration
Activities for Test Launch and COTS
Demo Launchers
Pad Turnover in Less Than 2 Months!
11
Currently Under Contract
to Support NASA
International Space Station
(ISS) Re-supply Missions
12
Update – Welcome Antares
STAGE 1
• Liquid Oxygen/RP-1 fueled
• Two AJ26 engines with independent
thrust vectoring
• 3.9 meter booster derived from
heritage Zenit design
STAGE 2
• ATK CASTOR® 30/30B Solid Motor with Active
Thrust Vectoring
• Orbital MACH avionics module
• Cold-gas 3-axis Attitude Control System
PAYLOAD FAIRING
• 3.9 meter diameter by 9.9 meter envelope
• Composite Construction
• Non-contaminating Separation Systems
Designed to Provide
Versatile, Cost-effective
Access to Space for
Medium-Class Payloads
Antares Hardware Progress
Booster Main Engine
System
Upper Stack
1st Four Engines
Successfully
Hot-fire Tested @
Stennis
1st Three Engines
Delivered to Wallops
Hot Fire Test Engines
Integrated into Engine
Section
Upper Stack &
Cygnus Pathfinder
Complete
Upper Stack
Integration @
Wallops
Avionics Testing
Complete
Hot Fire and Test Flight Boosters
Being Processed @ Wallops
CRS Launch Cores Delivered
ORB-1 Launch
Booster Tankage
Complete
13
Antares WFF Launch Site Progress
Horizontal Integration
Facility
Launch Pad Infrastructure
Ramp & Flame
Trench Complete
Tanks Installed
Deluge Tower
Complete
HIF GSE
Delivered
TEL Complete
Transporters
Available
TEL Pathfinder
On-Going
Structure
Complete
Interior
Complete
Occupancy 3/11
14
Wallops Launch Pad Nearing Completion
15
TEL Pathfinder Nov 2011 Featuring Rapid Retract and 2X Load Proof Test
16
Aft Bay Mated to Core for Pad Hot Fire
17
Engine 7 Acceptance Testing - 17 Nov 2011
18
Cygnus Service Modules for Demo and Orb-1 in Test at Dulles VA
19 Orbital Proprietary Information
Orb 1 Cygnus Service Module in EMI and TVAC Testing at Dulles VA
20 Orbital Proprietary Information
Pressurized Cargo Modules at Thales Alenia, Italy
21
Demo Mission Pressurized Cargo Module at Wallops Flight Facility
22
Service Module/Pressurized Cargo Module Fit Check
Phased Safety Review
24
COTS/CRS Safety Implementation Process
Cygnus safety requirements defined in the COTS Interface Requirements Document (IRD), with specific requirements for control of Catastrophic and Critical hazards Has been overriding consideration in Cygnus design trades, from inception of the program Redundancy in critical hardware functions
Follows “phased” safety review process with JSC/ISS Safety Review Panel (SRP) 3 Phases that correlate to spacecraft design maturity
First Review (Phase I) conducted in February 2009, with 80% of the SRP’s attention
directed to the Cygnus “Collision” hazard report Cygnus Phase II safety review (for detailed design phase) was successfully
completed in November 2009
Follow-on reviews have been held to brief the SRP on design updates and testing issues
Phase III Review in progress All hazard reports but Collision have been presented to the Board Some hazard controls have been closed to the “Verification Test Log” – to be closed closer
to flight
Phase I Lessons Learned
Show top-down approach to addressing system hazards
Puts emphasis on System Engineering; de-emphasizes subsystem bottoms-up approach
Show how causes logically map to the system architecture
Show that the Nominal Mission works and is safe
End to end vehicle performance works and is safe (under nominal scenarios)
Description of mission phases, including hardware required and performance criteria
End-to-end description of sensor to effector control functions
Analysis of error budgets (e.g. Trajectory, Navigation, Guidance, Control, Etc.) during approach to control trajectory dispersions
Fault tolerant approach for each failure and error type
Avoid overreliance on heritage spacecraft hardware and software
Can provide confidence in selected units, but must verify system requirements met for ISS Visiting Vehicles
Clearly demonstrate robustness of the Control Loop architecture
Show separate, independent control paths for inhibits and controls
Bias toward simplicity and control of hazard by design, as opposed to “reactive” controls
March 2010
Slide 27
Phase I Lessons Learned (cont)
Nominal Performance = expected system performance
FDIR Threshold = trigger limit for a fault (value in SW)
Fault Dynamics = worst case vehicle motion upon hitting FDIR limit (where you really are by end of the response)
Includes uncertainties, persistence, disable, switching, initialization, & transients
Budget Allocation = budgeted performance including worst-case uncertainties and transitions
Prefer to have larger than Fault Dynamics, but might not be in all cases
Safe Abort Threshold = auto-abort
FDIR THRESHOLD
SAFE ABORT THRESHOLD
NOMINAL PERF
FAULT DYNAMICS
BUDGET ALLOC
Address Time-to-Effect
•Minimize its application
•Clarify the limited situations where we have A non-
zero time-to-effect versus where prevention is
utilized
•Show by analysis our system time-to-effect
limitations, and that we are safe with our
implementation (see next slides)
Phase I Lessons Learned (cont)
The Major Takeaways
Successful completion of the Safety process requires engagement of the entire
engineering team!
S&MA, Systems, Subsystem leads
Safety design fully integrated into the System architecture
Strong review role by Chief Engineer, Program Management and independent senior
staff
Technical leadership must come from within the project
Consultants and Engineering Support contractors can provide an important support
and/or review role, but leadership must be within the project
Successful Safety program requires total
integration of the S&MA and Engineering
teams
SRP Phase III Progress to Date
Date Event Products
July 20
2011
Data Drop: SRP Phase III Part 1 HRs • CYG-03, -04, -05, -09, -11, -14
• Supporting Evidence
August 12
2011
Data Drop: CBCS Analysis / FDIR Design • CBCS Analysis
• CBCS Hardware Analysis
• CBCS Timing Analysis
• FDIR Design Documents
August 24-26
2011
SRP TIM: CBCS Analysis / FDIR Review • Summary Presentation (dropped Aug 15)
September 1
2011
SRP III Part 1: Review of 6 HRs
• Summary Presentation (dropped Aug 31)
• July 20 Data Drop
September 30
2011
Data Drop: SRP Phase III Part 2 HRs • CYG-02, -06, -07, -08, -10, -12, -13, -15
• Supporting Evidence
October 18-20
2011
SRP III Part 2: Review of 8 HRs • Summary Presentation (dropped Oct 14)
• Vol 3 – Evidence Index (dropped Oct 14)
• September 30 Data Drop
November 8-9
2011
SRP TIM: FDIR Design / CBCS Analysis Part 2 • Action Item Closure from Aug 24-26 Mtg
• System Timeline and Operability Analysis
• CBCS Analysis
April 2012 Data Drop: SRP Phase III Part 3 HR • CYG-01 Collision
• Supporting Evidence
May 2012 SRP III Part 3: Review of 1 HR • Summary Presentation
• Data Drop
Status of Cygnus SRP III Hazard Reports
HR ID HR Title Meeting Status Notes
CYG-01 Collision SRP III Part 3 Not yet Submitted Planned to submit for SRP in 2012
CYG-02 Battery Explosion SRP III Part 2 Open
Pending Orbital incorporation of
comments from Battery Specialist
and her approval voiced to the SRP
CYG-03 Impact with Detached Equipment SRP III Part 1 Approved 2 verifications on VTL
CYG-04 Impact with Moving Equipment SRP III Part 1 Approved 2 verifications on VTL
CYG-05 Depressurization of ISS SRP III Part 1 Approved 9 verifications on VTL
CYG-06 PCM Fire Event SRP III Part 2 Approved 8 verifications on VTL
CYG-07 Propulsion Explosion SRP III Part 2 Approved 9 verifications on VTL
CYG-08 Contamination, Toxicity, or Irrespirable Atmosphere SRP III Part 2 Approved 13 verifications on VTL
CYG-09 External ISS Contamination SRP III Part 1 Approved 0 verifications on VTL
CYG-10 Structural Failure SRP III Part 2 Open Pending NASA review of Fracture
Control Plan, Report, and MUAs
CYG-11 PCM Hull Fracture or Damage SRP III Part 1 Approved 4 verifications on VTL
CYG-12 EVA Crew Hazards SRP III Part 2 Approved 8 verifications on VTL
CYG-13 IVA Hazards to Crew SRP III Part 2 Open Pending NASA approval of a NASA
generated NCR for acoustic noise
CYG-14 Impact or Collision with Meteoroid or Debris SRP III Part 1 Approved 0 verifications on VTL
CYG-15 Radiation from Natural or Induced Environments SRP III Part 2 Open Pending Orbital’s completion of SM
EMI/EMC testing
CYG-16 Ground Hazards during Integrated Operations SRP III Part 2 Approved 49 verifications on VTL
Reliability Lab
31
Background
76 Pressure Transducers (PT) have flown on similar Orbital Propulsion Subsystems
3 instances of PT output signal drift with PTs using pressure caps from Steel HT
3PX1
Root Cause for both confirmed failures attributed to material defects within the 304L
Pressure Cap Steel
Defects (Stringers) allowed leaks to propagate through pressure cap and into body cavity,
which resulted in output signal drift
No external leaks observed [postulated to be due to bar rolling orientation]
Leak
Location
Defect Details – Star-2 Unit Testing
Drifting unit removed from Star-2 and sent to Taber for evaluation/testing
Testing included leak visual inspection, baseline characterization, leak and snoop
– Leak testing confirmed an internal leak via presence of helium in the transducer evacuated chamber
– Snoop/IPA bath testing grossly located the leak location in the pressure cap
– Leak rate determined to be 5X10-6 scc/s GHe leak r
Unit was then shipped back for DPA in Orbital’s Reliability Analysis Lab
Leak
location
Bubble Traces
Defect Details – Star-2 Unit Testing Orbital Testing
Unit was received at Orbital and a “pie section” taken, centered around the suspected failure area
Cross sectioning of the pie section proceeded very slowly to ensure that any “smoking gun” stringer was not bypassed
Though no stringer was found to be planar and linearly continuous through the entire thickness, the suspected failure site had a high density of stringers that could have joined 3 dimensionally to traverse the entire thickness
As described by Orbital’s RAL: “These images capture what would seem to be the most likely leakage path for this failure. In addition to the MnS stringers imaged, there is a rather long, contiguous silicate stringer that was persistent during sectioning in this area (can be seen to the lower right image) and was probably a contributor to the leakage path.”
Summary
35
Summary
Orbital has demonstrated its commitment to Quality in its Human Space Flight
Programs
Successful LAS Test
COTS and CRS Progress
Orbital Continues to Make Progress Toward Antares Test Launch and COTS
Demonstration Mission
Facilities at Wallops Nearing Completion
Antares Hardware for First 3 Missions Either Integrated or Available for Integration
Cygnus Spacecraft for First 2 Missions Completing Testing and Ready for Integration
at Launch Site in May 2012
Schedule for Major Mission Milestones Firming Up
Pad Turnover in Early April
Pad First Stage Hot Fire in May
Test Flight in June
COTS Demo in September (Dependant on NASA approval)
36
Questions?
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