It is probable that all heavy matter possesses –

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It is probable that all heavy matter possesses – latent and bound up with the structure of the atom – a similar quantity of energy to that possessed by radium. If it could be tapped and controlled what an agent it would be in shaping the world’s destiny! The man who - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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It is probable that all heavy matter possesses – latent and bound up with the structure of the atom –

a similar quantity of energy to that possessed by radium. If it could be tapped and controlled what an agent it

would be in shaping the world’s destiny! The man who put his hand on the lever by which a parsimonious nature regulates so jealously the output of this store of energy would possess a weapon by which he could destroy the

earth if he chose.

F. Soddy,1904

World Nuclear Plant Distribution

Regional Analysis

Sources: International Nuclear Safety Center and Energy Information Administration

443 Total Nuclear Generating Facilities (364.9 GW)

20542004

14

7

Billion of Tons of Carbon Emitted per Year

1954

0

Currently

projected path

Flat path

Historical emissions

1.9

2104

14 GtC/y

7 GtC/y

Seven “wedges”

Wedges

O

Nuclear Power and Global Warming

Compared to a modern coal plant, nuclear would save about 186 g C/kWh or 680 g CO2/y

Total emissions today is about 7 gigatons C/y

Business as usual to 2050 projects about 14 gigatons C/y

700 GW nuclear could save about 1 gigaton C/y

Some Countries in 1500 GW World

Algeria Pakistan

Armenia Philippines

Azerbajian Poland

Belarus Romania

Georgia Thailand

Indonesia Turkey

Iran Turkmenistan

North Korea Uzbekistan

Malaysia Venezuela

Mexico Vietnam

Gachin

Lashkar A’bad

Ardekan

Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002

Arak Heavy Water Reactor Arak Heavy Water Reactor ComplexComplex

Gachin

Lashkar A’bad

Ardekan

Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002

Natanz Gas Centrifuge Natanz Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Uranium Enrichment ComplexComplex

•Covert facility in remote location, could enrich uranium for weapons•Dummy structures to prevent detection and identification•Concealed underground, hardened, well defended

AFTER: 20 JUN 04DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite imageDigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

Dummy bldg Dummy bldg to conceal to conceal entrance rampentrance ramp

Covered electric Covered electric transformer stationtransformer station

Dummy bldgs Dummy bldgs to conceal to conceal Ventilation shaftsVentilation shafts

Concealment EffectivenessConcealment Effectiveness

→ →

→ →

→ →

Pu MOX

TWO SCHEMES FOR BACK-END

POOL

DRY CASKS

REPOSITORY

OR

REPROCESSING

MOX FABRICATION

LONG-TERM STORAGE

REACTORS U-FUEL

POOL

REPROCESSING

HLW (and SF?) REPOSITORY

REACTORS MOX-FUEL

REACTOR

POOL 1)

2)

Proposed U.S. GNEP Technology Demonstration Facilities

“Virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes … can be used to make a nuclear weapon… Reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states. Theft of separated plutonium, whether weapon-grade or reactor-grade, would pose a grave security risk.”

US Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposal Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007, Washington, D.C., January 1997.

Materials Pathways for Advanced Separations/RecyclingMaterials Pathways for Advanced Separations/Recycling

LWR Spent FuelChopping and

Nitric Acid Dissolution

UREX ProcessProduct

Conversion

CCD-PEG Process

TRUEX Process

TALSPEAK Process

Product Conversion and Interim Storage

Decay Storage of Cs & Sr

Fuel FabricationAdvanced

Burner Reactor

ABR Spent Fuel Processing

High-Level Waste Form Production

Clarified Dissolver Solution

Uranyl Nitrate Solution

Uranium Storage or Disposal as

U3O8

U3O8

Cs/Sr Aluminosilicate

Transuranics plus Remaining Fission Products

All Remaining

Fission Products except

Lanthanides

Cladding Hulls, Iodine

Technetium

Transuranics plus Lanthanide Fission Products

Lanthanide Fission Products

Transuranics in Nitrate Solution

TRUs (oxide or metal)

Fresh Fuel

Spent Fuel

Recycled Actinide

Elements

Cs/Sr Aluminosilicate

Residual Fission

Products

UREX Raffinate(>99% Tc)

(>99.9999% U)

(>99.9% Cs/Sr)

(>99.99% Pu/Am/Cm)(>99.9% Np)

(>99.99% Pu/Am/Cm)(>99.9% Np)(<0.1% lanthanides)

Note: no high-level liquid waste requiring underground tank storage

Transportation

Se

para

tion

Pla

ntR

ea

cto

r C

omp

lex

High Radiation

Moderate Radiation

Low Radiationand Storage

Receipt

SOME NEW “IRANS”?

Countries with negligible nuclear power today, but lots in 2050:

Italy, South Africa, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, Algeria, Morocco, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Thailand, North Korea, and several former Soviet republics.

GNEP would reverse 30+ years of no reprocessing in U.S. In that time no new commercial reprocessing anywhere.

SUSTAINABILITY OF A TWO-TIER WORLD?

, “I am concerned about a trend that we see reflected in the U.S.-India nuclear deal where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character of regimes and governments. Such an approach opens up divisions among the world’s nuclear powers, with each making a list of ‘friends’ who can be trusted with nuclear technology, and ‘foes’ who are dangerous risks,”

“Iran’s nuclear ambitions – a modest proposal,” Brent Scowcroft, The National Interest, Spring 2006.

A REPORT ON THEINTERNATIONAL CONTROLOF ATOMIC ENERGYPrepared forTHE SECRETARY OF STATE'S COMMITTEE ONATOMIC ENERGYby a Board of Consultants

<TR

Chester I. Barnard

Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer

Dr. Charles A. Thomas

Harry A. Winne

David E. Lilienthal, Chairman

Washington, D. C. March 16, 1946

… there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons

controlled only by a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods. The reasons supporting

this conclusion are not merely technical but primarily the inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in enforcing agreements between nations, each free

to develop atomic energy but only pledged not to use bombs. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may be carried

out by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are engendered that place so great a pressure on a system of enforcement by

police methods that no degree of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly cope with them.

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