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Challenges of Reforming the Civil Service in the Post-Soviet Era: The Case of Kyrgyzstan

Author: Saltanat Liebert, Ph.D. Assistant Professor

L. Douglas Wilder School of Government & Public Affairs Virginia Commonwealth University

Scherer Hall, Office 313 PO Box 842028

923 W. Franklin Street Richmond, VA 23284-2019

Phone: (804) 828-1874 E-mail: sliebert@vcu.edu

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Author Bio: Saltanat (Salta) Liebert is Assistant Professor at the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University. Her second book, co-edited with Stephen E. Condrey and Dmitry Goncharov, is titled “Public Administration in Post-Communist Countries: Former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and Mongolia” and was published by CRC Press in 2013.

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Abstract

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan went through radical

economic reforms to transition from a command to a market-based economy. The governance

systems had to be rebuilt to reflect the country’s shift from socialist ideology to free-market,

democratic aspirations. Despite numerous reforms undertaken by the Kyrgyz Government to

restructure its civil service, these efforts have fallen short in creating such a civil service system.

In order to understand the reasons for the limited results achieved by reforms, this article

examines formal rules regulating Kyrgyzstan’s civil service and assesses how they are

implemented in practice. Key aspects of Kyrgyzstan’s civil service such as recruitment,

selection, promotion, compensation, job security, and performance appraisal are examined. The

article juxtaposes formal rules governing key elements of the civil service to the actual practices

of the government. In conclusion, I offer an assessment of why civil service reforms produced

inadequate results.

Keywords: civil service, civil service reform, Kyrgyzstan, former Soviet Union.

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Challenges of Reforming the Civil Service in the Post-Soviet Era: The Case of Kyrgyzstan

1 Introduction

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan, like all newly independent

countries in the region, went through radical economic reforms to transition from a command to

a market-based economy. In addition to economic restructuring, the governance systems had to

be rebuilt to reflect the shift from socialist ideology to free-market, democratic aspirations of

many of the countries in the region. A key component of governance reforms is creating a class

of professional, politically neutral, and honest civil servants, who are held accountable through a

transparent governance system of checks and balances. Yet, despite numerous reforms

undertaken by the Kyrgyz Government since its independence from the USSR to restructure its

civil service, most observers agree that these efforts have fallen short in creating such a civil

service system (Abazov, 2006; Bekbolotov, 2007; Bogatyrev, 2005; Engvall, 2011).

In order to understand the reasons for the limited results achieved by reforms, this article

examines formal rules regulating Kyrgyzstan’s civil service and assesses how they are

implemented in practice. More specifically, I examine key aspects of Kyrgyzstan’s civil service

such as recruitment, selection, promotion, compensation, job security, and performance

appraisal. The article juxtaposes formal rules governing key elements of the civil service to the

actual practices of the government. In conclusion, I offer an assessment of why civil service

reforms produced inadequate results. This article presents an instructive example of a post-Soviet

country, which similar to other nations that once comprised the USSR, has struggled to transition

from the Soviet bureaucratic structure that was “highly centralized and characterized by a top-

down management system” to a more democratic government form (Witesman & Wise, 2009,

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117). In a broader international context, the case study of Kyrgyzstan is illuminating because it

helps the readers understand why governance reforms fail in many countries in transition.

This article is based on in-depth interviews with 19 civil servants, political analysts, HR

specialists, and public administration scholars in Kyrgyzstan as well as officials at the World

Bank and the United Nations Development Programme who work(ed) on civil service reform

projects. Participants were identified through a combination of purposive and snowball sampling

techniques. In the former, the author contacted key stakeholders in the civil service reform

process, such as the Civil Service Agency, the World Bank, the United Nations Development

Programme, with a request for an interview. In the latter method of sampling, each interviewee

was asked to recommend additional participants with first-hand knowledge of the civil service

reforms. The first participants in the snowball sample were identified through the author’s

personal contacts at government agencies, think tanks, and universities in Kyrgyzstan. Civil

servants in the sample included current and former government employees who did not want to

be identified. Some interviewees agreed to be identified at the outset of the study, but over the

course of interviews it became apparent that identifying them might harm them professionally

and personally due to the sensitive nature of their statements. The interviews were conducted in

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and in Washington, DC between March of 2009 and January 2013. This

study also draws on public employment policies, newspaper articles, analytical reports by

political analysts in Kyrgyzstan, and studies and reports prepared by donor agencies.

2 Civil service today

Kyrgyzstan became a parliamentary democratic republic in 2011 following a 2010

constitutional referendum, in which voters endorsed a proposal to replace the presidential

system, which was in effect since 1991, with a parliamentary one. However, the parliament is

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considered to be weak and the President’s party, SDPK, formed the latest ruling coalition in

2012. The prime minister, who is also from the President’s party, is widely viewed as submissive

to the President (Sarygulova & Kolbaev, 2012). Therefore, despite the transition to the

parliamentary system of governance, the President enjoys concentrated political and economic

power. Even though Kyrgyzstan is considerably more democratic than its post-Soviet neighbors

in the region, Freedom House, a US-based democracy watchdog, classifies Kyrgyzstan’s

governance as a “consolidated authoritarian regime” (Freedom House, 2012).

The public sector in Kyrgyzstan provides civilian jobs to 321,018 individuals (or 5.9 percent

of the population) as of 2011 (tazar.kg, 2011). Public employment accounts for about two thirds

of the non-agricultural employment in the country and comprises 15.3 percent of the labor force

(tazar.kg, 2011). The World Bank argues that for a developing country of a little over 5 million

people, this is considered to be excessive (World Bank, 2004). However, in comparison, in

similarly-sized countries – the Slovak Republic and Denmark – 13.3 percent and 26.8 percent of

the labor force, respectively, work in the public sector (OECD, 2012). The OECD countries’

average for the proportion of the labor force working for the government is 15.0 percent (OECD,

2011). The size of the country alone is insufficient to determine the appropriate size of the civil

service corps. The World Bank argues that factors such as “the relative role of the state in the

economy, the level of a country's development, and the relative importance of the state as a

primary source of political patronage and social welfare” must be considered (Nunberg & Nellis,

1995, 6). The World Bank typically determines there to be a surplus in public personnel if there

are insufficient operating budgets for supplies and maintenance, which is certainly the case in

Kyrgyzstan (Nunberg & Nellis, 1995).

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There have been initiatives to reduce the number of civil servants: in 2004 it was

estimated that there were 24,000-25,000 civil servants in the country (World Bank, 2004). By

2011 the size of the civil service in Kyrgyzstan was cut to 17,829 individuals (tazar.kg, 2011),

representing more than a 25 percent reduction from 2004.

2.1 Legal Framework

The legal foundation for human resource management has been developed through a

series of reforms that began in early 1990s after Kyrgyzstan’s independence from the USSR and

comprises the following statutes and regulations: 1) the Law on Public Service (originally passed

in 2004; amendments adopted in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); 2) the Regulation on the Public

Servant Ethics ratified by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic on 9 January, 2001; 3) National

Strategy to Combat Corruption ratified on 11 March, 2009 by the Presidential Decree #155

(Toktom.kg, 2011); 4) The Labor Code of the Kyrgyz Republic; 5) Ethics Codes adopted by

various government ministries (Toktom.kg, 2011).

Government employees are classified as civil servants and political appointees. Ministers

and their first deputies are political appointees and are appointed by the President. Civil servants

comprise the following categories of public employees: holders of positions in legislative,

executive and judicial branches of government as well as in the Presidential Administration.

Advisors and consultants to political appointees, municipal employees, military personnel, as

well as public employees in education, healthcare, academia, and art and research institutions are

not classified as civil servants ("Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Public Service", 2004).

Civil servants are governed and, at least in theory, protected by the Public Service Law,

a comprehensive statute adopted in 2004 as part of World Bank-designed governance reforms.

The Law aims to “ensure a stable and independent professional civil service” and to “attract

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qualified cadre into government service” ("Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Public Service",

2004, Section I). It provides for merit-based and competitive recruitment and promotion of civil

servants and establishes their responsibilities as well as rights, including job security. To monitor

the implementation of the law and to enforce HR policies at government ministries and agencies,

the Law created the Civil Service Agency (World Bank, 2008). This law also introduced a new

position of State Secretary (comparable to chief human resource officers in western countries),

which was to be instituted in all governmental agencies and, as a highest administrative position,

should not be subject to political whims and volatility. The Civil Service Agency is responsible

for the selection of State Secretaries on a competitive basis for government agencies. State

Secretaries are responsible for streamlining personnel policy in governmental agencies and

ensuring that they are implemented in an effective and politically neutral way. Their positions

are permanent; State Secretaries cannot be terminated by the agency/ministry executive ("Law of

the Kyrgyz Republic on Public Service", 2004). In 2011, there were 26 State Secretaries across

the government ministries and agencies (Djamankulova, 2011).

Overall, the series of reforms and adopted legislation resulted in a system of public HRM

in Kyrgyzstan that has significant challenges, particularly in the areas of recruitment, promotion,

compensation, and performance management. The discussion below will address these aspects of

HRM in more detail.

2.2 Recruitment and Selection

The recruitment system in Kyrgyzstan is dual: there are both closed and open systems of

recruitment (Bekbolotov, 2007). If no internal candidates are selected for a position, it becomes

open to external candidates. The Public Service Law stipulates that the Civil Service Agency

must create a Personnel Reserve to provide candidates for civil service positions ("Law of the

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Kyrgyz Republic on Public Service", 2004, Article 18). The Reserve comprises two parts:

internal and national. The internal reserve of a government agency consists of civil servants who

were recommended for promotion based on the attestation results and who submitted an

application to be included in the reserve ("Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Public Service", 2004,

Article 18). The national personnel reserve can include recent graduates who passed national

competition for entry-level government positions, civil servants wishing to be promoted, and

civil servants who were dismissed due to downsizing or a health condition ("Law of the Kyrgyz

Republic on Public Service", 2004, Article 18). A national competition may be conducted by the

Civil Service Agency to develop the national personnel reserve ("Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on

Public Service", 2004, Article 25). There is no civil service exam held in Kyrgyzstan.

When a position becomes available at a government agency/ministry, the State Secretary

of the agency in question has to inform the Civil Service Agency of that vacancy in writing

within three business days. The ministry then conducts a competition to fill the vacancy.

Vacancies must be announced in official mass media and on the portal of government jobs no

later than one month before the closing date. Competition to fill the vacancy is supposed to be

held first among candidates in the internal Personnel Reserve. If the position is not filled through

this process, the competition is then open to candidates in the National Personnel Reserve ("Law

of the Kyrgyz Republic on Public Service", 2004, Article 25). If the position is not filled through

the National Personnel Reserve due to lack of qualified candidates or lack of applicants for a

position, then an open competition is held. Any citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic, including

candidates in the internal and external Personnel Reserves, are eligible to participate in the open

competition for the vacancy (Council on the Civil Service, 2009).

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In practice, however, the Personnel Reserve is rarely used. Most mid- and high-level civil

service positions are filled through personal connections that may involve bribes. As a study of

public service in Kyrgyzstan reports, “the number of vacancies filled without competition over

the period from January to November of 2005 constituted more then 60% of the total”

(Bekbolotov, 2007, p.8). On the few occasions that the Personnel Reserve is used, it is typically

to recruit for entry-level low-paying non-prestigious government positions that attract few

candidates or for positions that require specialized technical knowledge and expertise. However,

professionals with technical knowledge are usually in demand in the private sector, which offers

significantly higher pay than the public sector; thus, in limited instances when government

agencies do turn to the Personnel Reserve, they are usually unable to fill such technical positions

through this channel.

Petty and large-scale corruption among public employees is a major challenge for

Kyrgyzstan’s public administration. Transparency International, an anti-corruption watchdog,

compiles the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which measures the perceived levels of public

sector corruption in most countries in the world. Kyrgyzstan’s CPI in 2012 was 2.4 (the

maximum score is 10; 0 indicates a highly corrupt country, while 10 indicates a very clean

country), placing it 154th out of 176 countries – below Nigeria and in the company of countries

such as Yemen, Angola, and Guinea (Transparency International, 2012). Figure 1 demonstrates

the evolution of Kyrgyzstan’s CPI before and after the adoption of the Public Service Act. As the

figure shows, the passage of the Public Service Act in 2004 did not lead to a decrease in

corruption, as was expected by reform designers. To the contrary, Kyrgyzstan’s already low CPI

score fell from 2.2 in 2004 to 1.8 in 2008. The Public Service Act does not seem to have

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ameliorated corruption, despite introducing merit-based recruitment and promotion in the public

sector.

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Many government agencies go through the motions of fair recruitment, such as

advertising job openings and short-listing the candidates, as required by the Public Service Act,

but this process is often just for show; in most cases, a future position holder has already been

identified (United Nations, 2004). These candidates often have personal connections and money

to secure desired government positions. Many positions (especially higher level, more desirable

ones) in the public sector are not offered to the best candidates but are rather “sold” (Engvall,

2011; Marat, 2006). Having started in the 1990s, the sale of offices has become entrenched in

Kyrgyzstan’s human resource management system (Engvall, 2011). A Kyrgyz scholar aptly

describes the state of human resource management in the public sector:

Attaining state position turned into a bargaining game between state officials and business elites, where the state acted as a consumer of the wealthy candidates’ supply. Politically ambitious businessmen created a “free market” of bribes for government officials in order to be recruited into the state…This combination of some institutional framework in the state structure and a heavy reliance upon informal relations led to a situation where the highest echelons of the political elite could systematically allocate virtually all public positions – from judiciary to parliament – according to the prospective candidates’ financial capabilities and not political views. (Marat, 2006, 84-85)

Having purchased their posts, unscrupulous public servants look for avenues to recoup their

investment:

what started taking place is what we would call privatization of government positions by officials and other individuals. These individuals started to privatize government services that they provide. They started believing that they can provide the services within their authority for a fee. (personal interview, August 3, 2011)

In essence, the civil service system in Kyrgyzstan is patrimonial – characterized by “patron-

client relations in the allocation of resources and opportunities” (Morgan, 1996, 236). In the

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patrimonial civil service system there is no distinction between the officials’ public and private

domains. Not surprisingly, official positions are seen “as opportunities for accumulating wealth

and power rather than for achieving a larger public purpose” (Morgan, 1996, 236).

2.3 Promotion

The system of promotion practically mirrors the corrupt system of recruitment:

opportunities for career advancement and promotion are often granted not to the best qualified

and high-performing employees, but to those with connections and money to pay the requested

(or presumed) “price” of the new position. It is noteworthy that money alone is not enough to

“buy” a position; a candidate also needs to have the right connections to access the decision-

makers. An official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported in another study,

I was recently offered a position in the presidential administration’s law enforcement department by a friend of mine. He said that I could get the position for no more than $5,000 considering our good personal relationship. (Engvall, 2011, p.130)

For career advancement, especially to attain leadership positions, many individuals seek

advanced academic degrees, such as kandidat nauk (a degree that is between a Master’s and a

Ph.D. degree) or doktor nauk (a Ph.D.). Given that education is considered to be one of the most

corrupt sectors in Kyrgyzstan, such degrees can be bought for a specified price (Ahiyam, 2009;

Engvall, 2011; Reeves, 2005). It has been reported (and lamented) that few of today’s seekers of

Ph.D. degrees in Kyrgyzstan conduct scientific research to earn their degrees. The unscrupulous

candidates for degrees resort to hiring a ghost writer to write a dissertation, hiring a professional

editor who does a lot more than proofread, or even paying the faculty advisor to write the

dissertation for a student. In the first two instances, the resulting subpar dissertations need to be

accompanied by bribes to dissertation committees, expert committees (whose role is to peer-

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review the dissertation), the State Examination Committee, and other administrative institutions

involved in the process (Kriminalnye Khroniki Kyrgyzstana, 2011; Petrov, 2008).

2.4 Pay and Benefits

The compensation system of public servants in Kyrgyzstan is rather fractured: there are

several wage systems for various types of government employees, including law enforcement

personnel, civil servants, central bank staff, educators, etc. These wage systems are set by the

Parliament (Jumaliev, 2011) and are governed by a large number of regulations amended on a

regular basis (World Bank, 2004).

Compensation of public servants is modest at best and inadequate at worst. In 2011, an

average salary for civil servants was reported at 10,000 Kyrgyz soms, or around USD212 per

month (Dudka, 2012).1 In addition to a base salary, civil servants are eligible for various

allowances including social security, pension, vacation pay (two times the monthly salary),

bonus for academic credentials, hazardous working conditions, and annual and quarterly

bonuses2 (United Nations, 2004; World Bank, 2004). As a result, the actual compensation of

civil servants can be more than 150 percent of the base pay. In 2012 the total compensation for

civil servants was estimated to reach a maximum of 29,000 soms per month (about USD 623) at

the national level, 10,200 soms (approximately USD 219) at the regional (oblast) level and 9,000

soms (USD 193) per month at the local (rayon) level (Ibraev, 2011).

Such a fractured and non-performance based system of allowances and bonuses is

problematic, which a World Bank report aptly describes,

The sheer number of bonuses and allowances (at least 11) and the fact that each has its own criteria make administering the wage system burdensome (at the level of individual institutions, subsidiary entities, and offices) as well as making it difficult (at the republic level) to monitor implementation and ensure that funds are allocated as intended. Furthermore, the effectiveness and targeting of these payments is unclear. Several

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allowances appear to serve similar purposes and, while the criteria for certain allowances (most notably, seniority) are clear, others involve a significant degree of discretion. Such discretion can easily be abused, particularly in a country like the Kyrgyz Republic in which managerial accountability is weak. (World Bank, 2004, p.72)

One interviewee described the abuse of managerial discretion in the bonus awarding process:

Bonuses are awarded on the basis of a report submitted by a civil servant documenting the work done. Then there is an interview with the immediate supervisor. The bonuses are ultimately awarded based on the supervisor’s subjective opinion: “I don’t like this employee, so he gets a 20% bonus; someone higher-up asked to help this other employee, so he gets 70%”... There is no job description, there is no criteria for measuring performance, so it all depends on the supervisor. (personal interview, 11 January, 2013)

Even with numerous bonuses and allowances paid on top of civil servants’ salaries, their overall

compensation is very low, which forces some civil servants to seek alternative, and sometimes

illicit, sources of income to supplement their meager pay. A statement by one observer reflects a

wide-spread sentiment in the Kyrgyz society, “Considering the extremely low level of

remuneration for government positions, and the inefficient provision of non-financial incentives,

unofficial income generated as a result of abuse of their position remains the major incentive for

people to work for the government” (Bekbolotov, 2007). Reflecting on attempts to increase the

compensation of civil servants, another expert laments,

We say that a civil servant should be paid adequately. But no matter how hard we try, we can’t introduce a normal compensation system for civil servants. All reforms that have been carried out in this area basically resulted in higher compensation for the leadership but not for most civil servants. (personal interview, 19 August, 2011)

2.5 Job security

In theory, civil servants have job security because, according to law, they cannot be fired,

demoted, or rotated when the leadership of an agency, which is comprised of political

appointees, changes ("Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Public Service", 2004, Article 29). In

reality, however, civil servants in Kyrgyzstan lack job security usually enjoyed by civil servants

in more developed democracies largely because the former are significantly influenced by

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elected officials and political appointees. There is a noticeable trend of frequent personnel

reshuffling in most government agencies. Some types of reshuffling are “routine” in that they

take place every two-three years and follow appointments of new ministers and agency heads. As

one scholar reports, “New ministers, governors or even department chiefs in state agencies

would replace most of the personnel in the workplace” (Abazov, 2006, p.1). Another scholar

notes, “Every newly appointed official in Kyrgyzstan brings along ‘his own’ people and creates a

corporate culture which favors him” (Urmanov, 2006, p.1).

Other types of reshuffling are more massive in scope and most recently took place in the

aftermath of the 2005 Tulip revolution that resulted in the ouster of President Akayev and the

2010 revolution that overthrew President Bakiyev (Bekbolotov, 2007; Bolotbekov, 2007; Marat,

2006; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2009). The entire cabinet was reshuffled after these two

events. Such reshuffling trickled down to many mid-level civil servants as well. In the words of

one observer, “The small cadre of professional civil servants which did build up in some

departments throughout the last years of the Akaev regime was summarily pushed out”

(Bekbolotov, 2007, p.2).

Provisions of the Public Service Act designed to ensure job stability and security for civil

servants irrespective of management changes are “inconvenient” for some leaders, who would

rather bring individuals loyal to them to the agency/ministry that they have been appointed to

head. In addition, unscrupulous managers can make significant profit from “selling” positions to

the highest bidder. Therefore, to dismiss a civil servant and thus create a vacancy that can be

sold, some managers engage in “creative” practices such as an unnecessary reorganization(s) of

an agency. Such reorganization allows one to circumvent the provisions of the Public Service

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Act protecting job security of civil servants because it can be used as an excuse for dismissal of

incumbents, whose positions become (or, rather, are made) redundant.

The Civil Service Agency has a mandate to protect the rights of civil servants and is the

first institution where civil servants are supposed to report on the infringement of their rights. In

reality, however, the Civil Service Agency does not seem to carry out this important mandate, as

lamented by one observer,

There is no system of protection of civil servants. There is nowhere they can turn. They can get reinstated only through the courts but only after the minister [who dismissed them] leaves the post. Good thing, they [ministers] don’t stay in their posts for long. As soon as the leader with whom he had a disagreement leaves, the dismissed civil servant can turn to courts and demonstrate that he was fired unjustly. They don’t complain to the Civil Service Agency…(personal interview, 19 August, 2011)

2.6 Performance evaluation

The Public Service Law stipulates that civil servants are subject to a qualification exam

(i.e. attestation). This exam aims to “identify their professional knowledge and skills … and to

assess the productivity of his/her work at a governmental agency” ("Law of the Kyrgyz Republic

on Public Service", 2004, Article 20). The content of exams varies depending on the agency and

typically assesses one’s knowledge of laws and administrative procedures. For instance, the

attestation of tax inspectors in 2013 involved a computerized test, a polygraph test (supposedly

to detect corrupt behavior), and an in-person interview (K-News, 2013; Moiseeva, 2013). Such

qualification exams can gauge a civil servant’s knowledge of laws and regulations pertaining to

their work, but it is unclear how a qualification exam would assess someone’s past productivity.

A civil servant cannot be subjected to attestation more often than once every three years ("Law

of the Kyrgyz Republic on Public Service", 2004, Article 20). The regularity of qualification

exams among public employees seems to be spotty: a World Bank survey conducted among civil

servants in 2002 found that 41 percent of respondents had been through the attestation process

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(World Bank, 2002). More recently, in 2013, Kyrgyzstan’s traffic police officers underwent

attestation, for the first time since 2007 (Toktonaliev, 2013).

The Public Service Law stipulates that the qualification exams are to be administered by

Attestation Committees, which in theory are independent and impartial. The relevant regulation

supplementing the law specifically states that the commission is to be composed “in a way that

prevents a conflict of interest that could influence the decisions of the commission.”

("Temporary Provision on the Process for Conducting Attestation of Civil Servants in the

Kyrgyz Republic", 2005, Article II). However, it has been reported during author interviews that

some members of Attestation Committees can be bribed to certify that an examinee possesses the

necessary knowledge to perform their duties.

Aside from attestation, a regular, systematic performance evaluation of public servants is not

conducted. The existing evaluation, if at all conducted, draws on the Soviet practice in which a

“completion of a task or project was considered an indicator of success” (Bekbolotov, 2007,

p.12). Evaluating a civil servant’s performance is challenging because there are no adequate job

descriptions and no objective mechanisms for performance measurement, as lamented by one

expert:

Assessment of performance is very subjective. There is no job description, there is no criteria for measuring performance, so it all depends on the supervisor. There is no definition of “good” performance. An employee might receive a bonus for “good work” but in reality he might not have been doing anything but went to his supervisor’s office on a regular basis to bring him papers/documents developed by someone else – the workhorses of the department. (personal interview, 11 January, 2013)

3 Discussion

The most significant and comprehensive piece of legislation that resulted from civil

service reforms undertaken in Kyrgyzstan since 1991 is the Public Service Act of 2004. It

regulates most aspects of civil service including recruitment, selection, promotion, job security,

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and performance appraisal. Perhaps largely due to World Bank pressure3 and assistance in

drafting it, the Public Service Law is quite sophisticated, at least on paper. The reality and

implementation of the law, however, are in stark contrast with what is on paper. Table 1 below

juxtaposes codified rules regulating key elements of Kyrgyzstan’s civil service system to the

actual practices.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

This table demonstrates that statutory rules and policies governing Kyrgyzstan’s civil service

system are largely ineffective and widely undermined. Recruitment, selection, and promotion

practices are corrupt and benefit not “the best and the brightest” but the well-connected and

moneyed candidates for civil service jobs. “Sale of office” practice is widespread and has

resulted in a civil service corps where many are not qualified for positions they hold and do not

have a public service ethos. Having invested significant sums of money to purchase their posts,

such government employees focus on recouping their investment during their tenure in office

rather than serving the public. Such corruption is further exacerbated by low compensation of

public servants, which forces some to seek alternative, and sometimes illicit, sources of income.

One might argue that compensation is not what draws individuals to the public sector

career and thus, it should not be a key intervention in ameliorating corruption. Indeed, public

service motivation research in industrialized countries shows that individuals are drawn to the

public sector not because of compensation (which is often significantly lower than in the private

sector) but primarily because of their desire to serve the public (Andersen, Pallesen, & Pedersen,

2011; Feeney & Boardman, 2011; Light, 1999; Naff & Crum, 1999; Perry & Wise, 1990). The

public sector pay in these countries, however, allows civil servants to lead a decent, if modest,

lifestyle typically expressed by their ability to rent or own appropriate housing, own a personal

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vehicle, buy school supplies for their children, go on family vacation, etc. In contrast, the

compensation of civil servants in Kyrgyzstan, and in many other developing countries, does not

meet subsistence levels: it is so low that they cannot afford to even buy lunch at a cafeteria on a

regular basis, let alone own a home or go on vacation. During fieldwork the author frequently

observed public servants having a lunch of tea and plain bread at their desks. As an IMF paper

states, “unrealistically low wages always invite corruption and, at times, lead society to condone

acts of corruption” (Tanzi, 1994, 16-17). Another IMF study of pay reforms in developing

countries found that there is a significant statistical relationship between civil-service pay and

corruption. Specifically, the authors conclude that “paying wages that ensure low corruption may

not necessarily be very costly…, and paying wages that ensure an honest civil service may be

cost-effective” (Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001, p.324).

Despite provisions of the Public Service Act that guarantee job security for civil servants,

new leaders often reshuffle or force career civil servants out to replace them with their own

loyalists. The only exception are the State Secretaries, who are granted stronger protection under

the law compared to most civil servants, and have thus enjoyed a greater degree of job security.

State Secretaries, however, are widely viewed as ineffective in carrying out their key mandate –

to perform the functions of chief human resource executives. Their statutory mission is to ensure

that personnel policies are implemented in an effective and politically neutral way and defend

career civil servants’ rights. In reality, however, State Secretaries are often and mostly engaged

in the operational work of a ministry, such as road construction at the Ministry of Transport or

agricultural projects at the Ministry of Agriculture, serving in effect as deputy ministers (Orlova,

2012). The reason is explained by a local expert:

An important part of the [Public Service] law was the introduction of the institute of the State Secretary. However, it was positioned [in the law] incorrectly. The law says that the

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status of the State Secretary is equal to that of the first deputy minister. This introduced a monumental dissonance into the understanding of the concept of State Secretary. Ministers interpret that provision to mean that a State Secretary is their first deputy and, accordingly, inundate him with operational tasks. (personal interview, 19 August, 2011). The performance of civil servants is not evaluated in a regular or effective manner.

Quarterly and yearly bonuses they receive are not performance based but are rather designed to

supplement their meager salary. Supervisors have almost unlimited (and often misused)

discretion in awarding bonuses. Without an effective performance appraisal system, there is no

systematic way to promote, reward, and develop the top performing public employees.

In sum, almost two decades of civil service reforms in Kyrgyzstan resulted in limited

progress. Poor implementation, including institutional problems and lack of capacity; corruption;

insufficient funding; intentional sabotage, and lack of buy-in from the leadership or the

implementing partners can explain why the numerous reforms have had little success.

A major problem with the Public Service Law is that the mechanisms for its

implementation are not specified, nor are any funds allocated explicitly for its implementation.

One expert aptly describes this deficiency:

In reality, this law has many weaknesses. I believe the law should include, or at least provide for, a mechanism of its implementation. Unfortunately, we have a practice of writing laws that are declarative in nature, just like the Declaration on Human Rights. The law says that a civil servant has a right to this and that, the he must do this and that, that he should be provided with this and that, but there is no mechanism to implement it. It’s all just a declaration. (personal interview, 19 August, 2011).

Civil service reforms also failed because actors involved in the process undermine or

sabotage the implementation for their own personal or institutional interests. As one interviewee

noted, “the problem is that at mid-level and at the level of ministers and deputy ministers, many

rules are not implemented. There is also a lot of blatant, deliberate sabotage.” (personal

interview, 5 August, 2011). Another observer reported that some public servants are engaged in a

21

“quiet, guerilla war” against the leadership of his/her ministry (personal interview, 19 August,

2011).

Many civil service reforms in Kyrgyzstan have been driven and designed by foreign

donors frequently resulting in a situation where the implementing parties (Government agencies)

did not have ownership of or even buy into specific reforms. The Asian Development Bank

(ADB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union/TACIS are

among the major multilateral organizations that proposed and funded civil service reform

projects in Kyrgyzstan. The largest donor, by far, has been the World Bank, with its Governance

Structural Adjustment Credit loan totaling $27.7 million4 (World Bank, 2008). During the

author interview, a World Bank official described how the reform process leading to the 2004

Public Service Act was initiated: in early 2000s there was a lot of donor pressure on the Kyrgyz

government to combat corruption. The government was told that unless something was done to

tackle it, foreign aid would dry up. The World Bank had just conducted a survey in Kyrgyzstan

(World Bank, 2002) that demonstrated the pervasive nature and significant level of corruption

among government officials. During one of the meetings between the World Bank and the

Kyrgyz government, the government representative requested assistance in developing measures

to fight corruption, largely because it affected how much foreign aid the Government could get.

The World Bank suggested that a civil service reform would be a good measure to reduce

corruption. It appears that without fully understanding what such a civil service reform would

involve, the Kyrgyz government agreed to it and thus the reform project was initiated. It is not

surprising that the Kyrgyz government did not have ownership of, and genuine commitment to,

reforms, which ultimately (combined with other factors) undermined their success.

22

Given such external origination of reforms, while well intentioned, they did not always

address key challenges facing the Kyrgyz government or meet its immediate governance needs

but were rather devised to meet the agenda of sponsor organizations. As a scholar of governance

notes, “Many programs were run more for the needs of those international organizations than for

the needs of the Kyrgyz civil service, and duplication became the norm” (Abazov, 2006, p. 1). A

prominent political analyst in Kyrgyzstan used blunt language challenging the effectiveness of

donor-funded reform projects,

This is all international bureaucracy, all of these projects – a typical bureaucracy, which divides the resources… You know, there is a system: half of the funds go to representatives of that [funding] country – to experts from there; another half goes to the locals to do something. Reports are written, but nothing happens as a result. Because it’s unclear what these reports are for. (personal interview, 18 May, 2012) The World Bank acknowledges that governance reforms in Kyrgyzstan (with the

exception of public finance and health sector reforms) “would often only be introduced into the

legal framework or by the creation of a new institution with an unclear mandate. Capacity and

willingness to follow through and ensure implementation of those wider reforms was low”

(World Bank, 2008, p. 3).

Factors resulting in failure of civil service reforms are not unique to Kyrgyzstan:

Polidano notes that most government reforms in developing countries fail because they are put

into effect “only in tokenistic, half-hearted fashion” (Polidano, 2001, p. 346); the scope of

reforms is overambitious due to pressure from donor agencies; and donor agencies “take centre

stage in the selection and definition of reform projects” (Polidano, 2001, 349), thus leading to

lack of ownership by host countries. It is unfortunate that these key lessons and warnings from

scholars and practitioners alike, certainly applicable in the case of Kyrgyzstan, were not

considered in designing and implementing its civil service reforms.

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4 Conclusion

Upon Kyrgyzstan’s independence from the USSR, the new government vowed to build a

professional civil service system in place of the Soviet nomenklatura5. The Soviet rules and

policies were indeed destroyed but the new system, however well-designed, was never

institutionalized. Numerous civil service reforms undertaken since 1991 have not created a

professional, meritocratic, politically neutral civil service. If Kyrgyzstan is to achieve effective

governance, it needs to recruit and promote civil servants based on their knowledge, skills, and

competence; ensure decent salaries in order to eliminate impetus for corrupt behavior, coupled

with higher probability of detection and punishment of corruption; increase capacity of the civil

service corps by providing access to meaningful training and educational opportunities; and

guarantee job security and shield them from political influence. The legal framework for much of

this already exists. The time has come to implement it. Public administration cannot be effective,

democratic, and citizen-oriented in the absence of a professional and competent civil service. It is

incumbent upon the Kyrgyz government and international donors involved in the effort to learn

from past experiences and take a more nuanced and thought-out approach to building a

professional civil service corps in Kyrgyzstan.

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Notes:

1 To give the reader an idea of the cost of living in Kyrgyzstan and the context on whether civil servants are paid a living wage: a gallon of gas cost an equivalent of USD 3, while a gallon of pasteurized milk cost approximately USD 5 in 2012. 2 Interestingly, such “bonuses” are not performance-related but are considered an entitlement. 3The following excerpt from a World Bank project document illustrates the active role played by the organization in the law-making process: the Public Service Law “was substantially compliant with the original intent, although in Parliament amendments were introduced that potentially weakened the independence of the Civil Service Agency and strengthened the relative powers of ministers. For this reason the law was initially deemed unsatisfactory to IDA and changes were requested.” [emphasis added] (World Bank, 2008, p. 2). 4 Aside from civil service reform, this initiative included various other components, such as strengthening public expenditure management and internal/external audit capacity. 5 Nomenklatura was the power of the Communist party to appoint individuals to key governmental positions. Members of nomenklatura were beholden to their “patrons” – Party leaders who appointed them – and were expected to loyally serve them.

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Figure 1. Kyrgyzstan’s Corruption Perception Index (2003-2012)

Source: Based on the data from Transparency International, (http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview)

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Table 1. Codified rules and prevailing practices in the civil service system

Elements of the civil service system

Codified rules/policies Prevailing practices

Recruitment • Dual: closed and open systems

• Recruitment through Personnel reserves and (in the absence of qualified candidates) through open, external competition

• Closed system ineffective: Personnel reserves rarely used

• Open system ineffective: competitive hiring process is often for show

Selection Merit-based through personnel reserves and external competition

• Patronage appointments • “sale of office”

Promotion Merit-based through personnel reserves and external competition

• Patronage and sale of office • Advanced academic degrees

often viewed as advantageous for some leadership positions, so some job-seekers obtain the desired credentials through bribes and other illegal means.

Compensation • Fractured and highly centralized, based on numerous regulations issued by the Parliament

• Classification rank adds to total compensation

• Includes bonuses that are not tied to performance

Very low and serves as impetus for corruption

Job security • Guaranteed job and security unless there is cause for termination

• Civil Service Agency has a mandate to protect civil servants’ rights

• Civil servants often reshuffled or fired when new leadership comes

• Job security exists only for State secretaries

• Civil Service Agency ineffective in protecting civil servants’ rights

Performance appraisal • No regular performance appraisal

• Regular qualification exams

• No effective and objective way to evaluate performance

• Qualification exams do not measure performance but rather knowledge of laws and procedures