Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada andComelec, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010

I.      THE FACTSPrivate respondent Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada was electedPresident of the Republic of the Philippines in the generalelections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted[“resigned” according to the decision of the Supreme Courtin Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738,  March 2, 2001] fromoffice and was not able to finish his term. He sought thepresidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010.Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Erap’s candidacyand filed a petition for the latter’s disqualification, whichwas however denied by the COMELEC 2nd Division. His motion forreconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7,2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of suchpetition would not stay the execution of the judgment, finalorder or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to bereviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for theissuance of a temporary restraining order or writ ofpreliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able toparticipate as a candidate for the position of President inthe May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highestnumber of votes.

II.    THE ISSUEWhat is the proper interpretation of the following provision ofSection 4, Article VII of the Constitution: “[t]he Presidentshall not be eligible for any re-election?”

III.   THE RULING[The petition was DENIED DUE COURSE and thereby DISMISSED bythe Supreme Court.]

Private respondent was not elected President the second time heran [in the May 2010 elections].  Since the issue on the properinterpretation of the phrase “any reelection” will be premisedon a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election asPresident, there is no case or controversy to be resolved inthis case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is inthis case no definite, concrete, real or substantialcontroversy that touches on the legal relations of partieshaving adverse legal interests. No specific relief may

conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case thatwill benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of theessential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicialreview, the existence of an actual case or controversy, issorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoingcontroversies. The Court is not empowered to decide mootquestions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles orrules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing inissue in the case before it. In other words, when a case ismoot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents ajusticiable controversy because the issues involved have becomeacademic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already beenresolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicialintervention unless the issue is likely to be raised againbetween the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolveas the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequentevents.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to theproclamation of a President who has been duly elected in theMay 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today.Following the results of that elections, private respondent wasnot elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussionof his “reelection” will simply be hypothetical andspeculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS. DESIERTOFACTS: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic ofthe Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoas his Vice President.In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, aclose friend the President, alleged that he had personallygiven Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bankaccount known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbersgame. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across thenation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13,2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachmentcomplaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate andan impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario

Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “notguilty”.The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by studentsfrom private schools and left-wing organizations. Activistsfrom the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associationsjoined in the thousands of protesters.On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the ArmedForces of the Philippines also withdrew their support forEstrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first timesince the beginning of the protests and maintains that he willnot resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial tocontinue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove himfrom office.At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for asnap presidential election to be held concurrently withcongressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He addedthat he will not run in this election.OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat ofpresidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructivelyresigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd atEDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong andserious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of herproclamation as president”, but saying he would give up hisoffice to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace,which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with aprayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought toenjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any furtherproceedings in cases filed against him not until his term aspresident ends. He also prayed for judgment "confirmingpetitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of theRepublic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge theduties of his office, and declaring respondent to have takenher oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, onlyin an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of theConstitution.”

ISSUE: 1.)    Whether or not the case at bar a political orjusticiable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitionerEstrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.2.)    Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD: The Court defines a political issue as “those questionswhich, under the Constitution, are to be decided by thepeople in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which fulldiscretionary authority has been delegated to the legislativeor executive branch of the government.  It is concerned withissues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particularmeasure.”The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency andthe Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquinogovernment was a government spawned by the direct demand of thepeople in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing theold government entirely, the Arroyo government on the otherhand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution,wherein only the office of the president was affected. In theformer, it The question of whether the previous president(president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicialreview. The Court held that the issue is legal and notpolitical.For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there mustbe an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by actsof relinquishment.  It is important to follow the succession ofevents that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace.Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angaradiaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of allthese, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgementof the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite hisquestioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving thepresidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held thatpetitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of thetotalitytest:  prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts andcircumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on theissue.As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he isimmuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longerentitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that,given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life tothe policy that a public office is a public trust, thepetitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executiveimmunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a

sitting President.  From the deliberations, the intent of theframers is clear that the immunity of the president from suitis concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which theincumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time duringwhich the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, andfixes the interval after which the several incumbents shallsucceed one another).

OTHER DIGEST:FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrongdoings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and otherforms of corruption were made against Estrada before the SenateBlue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada wasimpeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachmentproceedings were begun in the Senate during which more seriousallegations of graft and corruption against Estrada  were madeand were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damagingevidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trialwas thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panelwalked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after castinghis vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support forEstrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called fora snap presidential election to be held concurrently withcongressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He addedthat he will not run in this election. On January 20, SCdeclared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying thatEstrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyotook her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA asthe 14th President. Estrada and his family later leftMalacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition forprohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin therespondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedingsin cases filed against him not until his term as presidentends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be thelawful and incumbent President of the Republic of thePhilippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of hisoffice.

ISSUE(S): 1. WoN the petition presents a justiciablecontroversy.2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due toprejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions-  "to those questions which, under theConstitution, are to be decided by the people in theirsovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionaryauthority has been delegated to the legislative or executivebranch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependentupon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People PowerII:EDSA I EDSA II

exercise of the people power ofrevolution which overthrew thewhole government.

exercise of people power offreedom of speech and freedom ofassemblyto petition thegovernment for redress ofgrievances which only affectedthe office of the President.

extra constitutional and thelegitimacy of the new governmentthat resulted from it cannot bethe subject of judicial review

intra constitutional and theresignation of the sittingPresident that it caused and thesuccession of the Vice Presidentas President are subject tojudicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. Theprincipal issues for resolution require the properinterpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution:Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation ofgovernmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issueslikewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidentialimmunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibrationof the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and(b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when PresidentEstrada left the Palace.Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts andcircumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—

President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructiveresignation.SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could notbe doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In thepress release containing his final statement:1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent asPresident;2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake ofpeace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not saythat he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that hewas going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disabilitydisappears);3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunityto serve them as President (without doubt referring to the pastopportunity);4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challengethat may come in the same service of the country;5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of aconstructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expresslystating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President ofthe Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As VicePresident. Senate passed  HR No. 83 declaring the ImpeachmentCourts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clearis that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as thePresident. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premisethat the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as theCongress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for thisis political in nature and addressed solely to Congress byconstitutional fiat.  In fine, even if Estrada can prove thathe did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that heis a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unableto govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest byCongress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, presidentmade by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed bythis Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character.They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no

stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunderwhich carries the death penalty, be covered by the allegedmantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot citeany decision of this Court licensing the President to commitcriminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity fromliability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officialsare not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally isnot acting as such but stands in the same footing as anytrespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial andthe free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice systemdoes not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned andlegally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated bymere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did notpresent enough evidence to show that the publicity given thetrial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unableto perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases againstEstrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so thepublicity of the case would really have no permanent effect onthe judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned withjustice and less with prosecution.

BELTRAN VS. MAKASIAR167 SCRA 393 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – President’sImmunity From Suit – Must Be Invoked by the President

Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He,together with others, was charged with libel by the thenpresident Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Corycannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat herimmunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principlethat a president cannot be sued. However, if a president wouldsue then the president would allow herself to be placed underthe court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consentingto be sued back. Also, considering the functions of apresident, the president may not be able to appear in court tobe a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran,a person other than the president.

HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of theprivilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise ofPresidential duties and functions free from any hindrance ordistraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of theGovernment is a job that, aside from requiring all of theoffice-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to thePresident by virtue of the office and may be invoked only bythe holder of the office; not by any other person in thePresident’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in acriminal case in which the President is the complainant cannotraise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent thecase from proceeding against such accused.Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent thePresident from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded thePresident may shed the protection afforded by the privilege andsubmit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether toexercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’sprerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed andimposed by any other person.

GLORIA VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano wasappointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in1989. Upon recommendation of DECSSecretary Ricardo T. Gloria,Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the MarikinaInstitute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up thevacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.

Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuctionenjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The Court ofAppeals granted the petition holding that the indefinitereassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to security oftenure. 

The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case isimproper because the same attacks an act of the President, inviolation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates thepresidential immunity from suit. 2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment isviolative of his security of tenure.

Held:  1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simplereason that the petition is directed against petitioners andnot against the President. The questioned acts are those ofpetitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidentialdecisions may be questioned before the courts where there isgrave abuse of discretion or that the President acted withoutor in excess of jurisdiction.

2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of therespondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST"appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred fromthe Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramosto the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will"best fit hisqualifications and experience" being "an expert invocational and technical education." It can thus be gleanedthat subject reassignment is more than temporary as the privaterespondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job,being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in thesaidMemorandum to show that the reassignment of privaterespondent is temporary or would only last until a permanentreplacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; whichfact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners toreassign private respondent with no definite period orduration. Such feature of the reassignment in question isdefinitely violative of the security of tenure of the privaterespondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA644):

"Security of tenure is a fundamentaland constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service.The mantle of its protection extends not only to employeesremoved without cause but also to cases of unconsentedtransfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Departmentof Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra,27 SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel ispermissible even without the employee’s prior consent, itcannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step towardhis removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from hispermanentposition, or designed to indirectly terminate hisservice, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in

effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure ofoffice of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs.Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MISTto be violative of his security of tenure, the order for hisreassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T.Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Membersof the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued ExecutiveOrder No.  284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, theirundersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold othergovernment offices or positions in addition to theirprimary positionssubject to limitations set therein. The CivilLiberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such lawis unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is beingchallenged by CLU on the principal submission that it addsexceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution whichprovides:“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of theCabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unlessotherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other officeor employment during their tenure. They shall not, during saidtenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,participate in any business, or be financially interested inany contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilegegranted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, orinstrumentality thereof, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shallstrictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of theiroffice.”CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwiseprovided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions againstholding any other office or employment in Government are thoseprovided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-Presidentmay be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par.(2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants fromholding during their tenure multiple offices or employment inthe government, except in those cases specified in theConstitution itself and as above clarified with respect toposts held without additional compensation in an ex-officiocapacity as provided by law and as required by the primaryfunctions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate anddeliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointiveofficials should be considered as mere personal opinions whichcannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and thepeople’s understanding thereof.In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 inrelation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the numberof positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries orassistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primaryposition to not more than 2 positions in the government andgovernment corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to holdmultiple offices or employment in direct contravention of theexpress mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitutionprohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided inthe 1987 Constitution itself.

NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION VS. COA

Facts: NAC is a government agency composed of seven membersnamely, a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by thePresident and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense andInterior Local Government as ex officio members. The said threeex officio members turned over their responsibility to theirrepresentatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12,1994. However, on October 15, 1997. NAC resident auditor Elailadisallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to theserepresentatives for a period of December 12, 1994 to June 27,1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 which tasked theCOA “to immediately cause disallowance of any payment of anyform of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinetsecretaries xxx or their representatives, in violation of therule on multiple positions xxx (emphasis supplied)” and this

was upheld by NGAO in September 1, 1998. Meanwhile, on April28, 1999, the NAC passed AO no. 2 and was approved by PresidentEstrada allowing ex officiomembers to designate theirrepresentatives who shall be entitled to per diems, allowancesand other benefits as may be authorized by law. Petitionerinvoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COAthe rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowingpayment of honoraria to the ex officio members’representatives, to no avail.

Issue (among others): Whether the implementation of COAMemorandum No. 97-038 can be operative without the requiredpublication pursuant to Art. 2 of the Civil Code?

Held: COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal andinterpretative regulation or letter of instruction which doesnot need publication to be effective and valid. It is not animplementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directiveissued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executingprohibition imposed by the Constitution of multiple offices andreceiving double compensation of public officials.Case Dismissed.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed fromthe presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolutionand was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, hassignified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. ButPresident Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences tothe nation of his return at a time when the stability ofgovernment is threatened from various directions and theeconomy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stoodfirmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and hisfamily.Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats &following supervening events: failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986led by Marcos leaders channel 7 taken over by rebels &loyalists plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard achartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to provethat they can stir trouble from afar Honasan’s failed coupCommunist insurgency movements secessionist movements inMindanao devastated economy because of accumulated foreign debt

plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies Marcos filed for apetition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondentsto issue them their travel documents and prevent theimplementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcosfrom returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questionsAquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He alsoquestioned the claim of the President that the decision wasmade in the interest of national security, public safety andhealth. Petitioner also claimed that the President actedoutside her jurisdiction.According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of theirright to life, liberty, property without due process and equalprotection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them oftheir right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted bythe Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses fromreturning to the Philippines.Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionwhen she determined that the return of the Marcoses to thePhilippines poses a serious threat to national interest andwelfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department hasexclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it doesnot define what is meant by “executive power” although in thesame article it touches on exercise of certain powers by thePresident, i.e., the power of control over all executivedepartments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute thelaws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations andpardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitutionoutlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not statedin the Constitution which include the power to protect thegeneral welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect thepeople, promote their welfare & advance national interest.(Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers,according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President cando anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin,

supra at 153),  inevitable to vest discretionary powers on thePresident (Hyman, American President) and that the presidenthas to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on theday-to-day operation of the State.The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’reflexible depending on the circumstances. The request of theMarcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot beconsidered in the light solely of the constitutional provisionsguaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subjectto certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly nevercontemplated situations even remotely similar to the presentone. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriatelyaddressed to those residual unstated powers of the Presidentwhich are implicit in and correlative to the paramount dutyresiding in that office to safeguard and protect generalwelfare. In that context, such request or demand should submitto the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of thePresident to determine whether it must be granted or denied.For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine iswhether or not there exist factual basis for the President toconclude that it was in the national interest to bar the returnof the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there arefactual bases in her decision. The supervening events thathappened before her decision are factual. The President musttake preemptive measures for the self-preservation of thecountry & protection of the people. She has to uphold theConstitution.

 Banda v. ErmitaG.R. No. 166620  April 20, 2010 

FACTS: President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285by, inter alia,removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (NationalPrinting Office) over the printingservices requirements ofgovernment agencies and instrumentalities.Pursuant to ExecutiveOrder No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities areallowed to source their printing services from the privatesector through competitive bidding, subject to the conditionthat theservices offered by the private supplier be of superiorquality and lower in cost compared to what wasoffered by theNPO. Executive Order No. 378also limited NPO’s appropriation in the GeneralAppropriationsAct to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a

threat to their security of tenure as employees of theNPO,petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contendingthat: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyoto amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by formerPresident Aquino when thelatter still exercised legislativepowers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradualabolition of the NPO.

ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional.HELD :YES. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that thePresident has the power toreorganize the offices and agenciesin the executive department in line with the President’sconstitutionallygranted power of control over executive officesand by virtue of previous delegation of the legislativepower to reorganize executive offices under existingstatutes.Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of1987 gives the President continuing authority toreorganize andredefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section31, Chapter 10, Title III, BookIII of the said Code, isexplicit: The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order toachieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall havecontinuing authority to reorganize theadministrative structureof the Office of the President.It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part ofthe Office of the Press Secretary (which in varioustimes hasbeen an agency directly attached to the Office of the PressSecretary or as an agency under thePhilippine InformationAgency), is part of the Office of the President.To be veryclear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertainsonly to the Office of the Presidentand the departments, officesand agencies of the executive branch and does not include theJudiciary, theLegislature or the constitutionally-created ormandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that theexerciseby the President of the power to reorganize the executivedepartment must be in accordance withthe Constitution, relevantlaws and prevailing jurisprudence.J. Carpio:RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all theprocurement activities of thegovernment including theacquisition of “items, supplies, materials, and general supportservices x x x whichmay be needed in the transaction of the

public businesses or in the pursuit of any government x x xactivity”save for limited transactions. By opening government’sprocurement of standard and accountable forms tocompetitivebidding (except for documents crucial to the conduct of cleanelections which has to be printedsolely by government), EO 378merely implements RA 9184’s principle of promoting“competitiveness byextending equal opportunity to enableprivate contracting parties who are eligible and qualified toparticipatein public bidding

BIRAOGO VS. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

FACT: E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission(PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is amere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked toinvestigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,accomplices and accessories during the previous administrationand submit their findings and recommendations to the President,Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settleor render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is toinvestigate, collect and asses evidences gathered andmake recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has nopower to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannotdetermine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrantthe filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on thegrounds that it violates separation of powers asit arrogates the power of Congress to create a public officeand appropriate funds for its operation;The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of theAdministrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1because the delegated authority of the President tostructurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieveeconomy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the powerto create an entirely new office was inexistent like the TruthCommission;The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made theTruth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and evenexceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.It violates the equal protection clause 

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violativeof the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power tocreate the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.Having been constitutionally granted full control of theExecutive Department, to which respondents belong, thePresident has the obligation to ensure that all executiveofficials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.Such validity is not affected by the fact that theinvestigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, orthat the former used the offices and facilities of the latterin conducting the inquiry.

OTHER DIGEST:FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing PhilippineTruth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of thePresident with the primary task to investigate reports of graftand corruption committed by third-level public officers andemployees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessoriesduring the previous administration, and to submit its findingand recommendations to the President, Congress and theOmbudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. Butit is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputesbetween contending parties. All it can do is gather, collectand assess evidence of graft and corruption and makerecommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has nopower to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine fromsuch facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing ofan information in our courts of law.Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional andto enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They arguedthat:(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogatesthe power of the Congress to create a public office andappropriate funds for its operation.(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of theAdministrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1because the delegated authority of the President tostructurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve

economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the powerto create an entirely new public office which was hithertoinexistent like the “Truth Commission.”(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statuteswhen it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicialpowers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office ofthe Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJcreated under the Administrative Code of 1987.(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as itselectively targets for investigation and prosecution officialsand personnel of the previous administration as if corruptionis their peculiar species even as it excludes those of theother administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing ofpetitioners and argued that:1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress becausethe President’s executive power and power of controlnecessarily include the inherent power to conductinvestigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed andthat, in any event, the Constitution, Revised AdministrativeCode of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 andsettled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create orform such bodies.2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress toappropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mereallocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede thefunctions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions donot duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protectionclause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file thepetitions and question E. O. No. 1;2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation ofpowers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and toappropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman andthe DOJ;4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations,to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy callingfor the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challengingthe act must have the standing to question the validity of thesubject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have apersonal and substantial interest in the case such that he hassustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of itsenforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must beraised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue ofconstitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power ofthe Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To theextent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power ofeach member thereof, since his office confers a right toparticipate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that theprerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitutionin their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed toquestion the validity of any official action which, to theirmind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, oris in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injuryattributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice ona given question.” In private suits, standing is governed bythe “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “everyaction must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the realparty in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party whostands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suitor the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailingan allegedly illegal official action, does so as arepresentative of the general public. He has to show that he isentitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out asufficient interest in the vindication of the public order andthe securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “apersonal and substantial interest in the case such that he hassustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” TheCourt, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that thepetition covers matters of transcendental importance to justifythe exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There areconstitutional issues in the petition which deserve the

attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, noveltyand weight as precedentsThe Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our lawsare faithfully executed. The powers of the President are notlimited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One ofthe recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to thisconstitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoccommittees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain factsand determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thepurpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is toallow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitledto know so that he can be properly advised and guided in theperformance of his duties relative to the execution andenforcement of the laws of the land.2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment orallocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is nousurpation on the part of the Executive of the power ofCongress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify theamount to be earmarked for the operation of the commissionbecause, whatever funds the Congress has provided for theOffice of the President will be the very source of the fundsfor the commission. The amount that would be allocated to thePTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulationsso there is no impropriety in the funding.3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erodetheir respective powers. If at all, the investigative functionof the commission will complement those of the two offices. Thefunction of determining probable cause for the filing of theappropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with theDOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited toobtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the Presidentin the performance of his duties relative to the execution andenforcement of the laws of the land.4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality ofExecutive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression ofthe equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III(Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarlysituated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferredand responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies andinstitutions to treat similarly situated individuals in asimilar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause isto secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction againstintentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by

the express terms of a statue or by its improper executionthrough the state’s duly constituted authorities.There must be equality among equals as determined according toa valid classification. Equal protection clause permitsclassification. Such classification, however, to be valid mustpass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limitedto existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to allmembers of the same class.The classification will be regarded as invalid if all themembers of the class are not similarly treated, both as torights conferred and obligations imposed.Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of theequal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commissionis to investigate and find out the truth concerning thereported cases of graft and corruption during the previousadministration only. The intent to single out the previousadministration is plain, patent and manifest.Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is,a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.Not to include past administrations similarly situatedconstitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clausecannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearlyreverberates to label the commission as a vehicle forvindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficialdifferences do not make for a valid classification.The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. ThePTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all pastadministrations.The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of thenation to which all other laws must conform and in accordancewith which all private rights determined and all publicauthority administered. Laws that do not conform to theConstitution should be stricken down for beingunconstitutional.WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 ishereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative ofthe equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Bermudez vs. Torres G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999

Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the

Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec.of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, TitleIII, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shallbe appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the Secretary.” 

Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit

Held: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himselfwho is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must beunderstood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all “executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or

set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It cantherefore be inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.

The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec.9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory innature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said ashaving acted beyond the scope of his authority. 

Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison156 SCRA 549 – Political Law – Appointment of “Head of Bureaus”– Officers Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of theBureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. UlpianoSarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar,taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned theappointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’sappointment was not submitted to theCommission onAppointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insiststhat uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require theconfirmation of the COA.Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague,the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursingthe salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality ofMison’s appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus”needed confirmation bythe Commission on Appointment.

HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “headsof bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmationby the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution,there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shallappoint. These four (4) groups are:First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armedforces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and otherofficers whose appointments are vested in him in thisConstitution;Second, all other officers of the Governmentwhose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law toappoint;Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congressmay by law vest in the President alone.The first group above are the only public officers appointed bythe president which require confirmation by the COA. Thesecond, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation bythe COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau ofCustoms does not belong to the first group hence he does notneed to be confirmed by the COA.

CALDERON VS CARALE

FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 orthe Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, theDivision Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [ofthe NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject toconfirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall comefrom the nominees of the sector which nominated thepredecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al asthe Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC,the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for itsconfirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying thatw/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is inviolation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not anencroachment on the appointing power of the executive containedin Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law,require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of otherofficers appointed by the President additional to thosementioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of theConstitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, requireconfirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by thePresident to government officers additional to those expresslymentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of theConstitution whose appointments require confirmation by theCoA.

RULING: The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoAis required exclusively for the heads of executive departments,ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armedforces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and otherofficers whose appointments are vested in the President by theConstitution, such as the members of the various ConstitutionalCommissions. With respect to the other officers whoseappointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and tothose whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint,no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16,Art 7 of the Constitution1.  Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is requiredonly for presidential appointees mentioned in the firstsentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officerswhose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitutionitself in the president (like sectoral representatives toCongress and members of the constitutional commissions ofAudit, Civil Service and Election).

2.  Confirmation is not required when the President appointsother government officers whose appointments are not otherwiseprovided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorizedby law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of theCommission on Human Rights). 

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDOA. VILLARG.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointmentof Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 andduring the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villarwas designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was

nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortlythereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointmentsconfirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA,as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until theexpiration of the original term of his office as COACommissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in thisrecourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title tohis hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment asCOA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yetto lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, assuch chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckonedfrom February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from officeupon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of amoot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs MacapagalArroyo namely:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

b. The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for the exerciseof judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the courtb. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and

d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case

ISSUES: a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to courtb. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

HELD: Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has “far-reachingimplications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called “non-traditional suitors” maybe extended standing to sue, thusly:a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursementof public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in questionc. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; andd. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.On the substantive issue:Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for theunexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D)of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kindwithin the commission, the point being that a secondappointment, be it for the same position (commissioner toanother position of commissioner) or upgraded position(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment andis a nullity ab initio.

The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flawlies in regarding the word “reappointment” as, in context,embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is thatif a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain andfree from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attemptedinterpretation.The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairmanshall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years,and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer bereappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein,a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years wholikewise served the full term is barred from being reappointed.In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have servedthe full term of seven years, then he can no longer bereappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner.The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the presidentfrom “dominating” the Commission by allowing him to appoint anadditional or two more commissioners.On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does notprohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner tochairman as long as the commissioner has not served the fullterm of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence ofSec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancyshall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of thepredecessor.” In addition, such promotional appointment to theposition of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or thestaggering of terms in the commission membership such that theaggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said positionand the term to which he will be appointed to the position ofChairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt therotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2),Art. IX(D).In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D)that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from

Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under theaforestated circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s propositionthat his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him acompletely fresh 7- year term––from February 2008 to February2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissionerdevalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. Whilethere had been divergence of opinion as to the import of theword “reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictumthat in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman orcommissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate termof more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow acircumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation andwould be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc tothe spirit of the rotational system of succession.In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not havehad, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COAChairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitutiondecrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-yearaggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-yearterm as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to complywith said rule would also be invalid as the correspondingappointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of theConstitution of giving to every appointee so appointedsubsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term ofoffice of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner likerespondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7)years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position becamevacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of thepredecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is notvalid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed toserve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art.IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the threeconstitutional commissions, after the expiration of theuneven terms of office of the first set of

commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven(7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is voidand unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannotvalidly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in caseof the expiration of the term as this will result in thedistortion of the rotational system prescribed by theConstitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes(death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shallonly be for the unexpired portion of the term of thepredecessor, but such appointments cannot be less thanthe unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt thestaggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art.IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, whowere appointed for a full term of seven years and whoserved the entire period, are barred from reappointmentto any position in the Commission. Corollarily, thefirst appointees in the Commission under theConstitution are also covered by the prohibition againstreappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in theCommission for less than seven years is eligible for anappointment to the position of Chairman for theunexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.Such appointment is not covered by the ban onreappointment, provided that the aggregate period of thelength of service as commissioner and the unexpiredperiod of the term of the predecessor will not exceedseven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy inthe position of Chairman resulted from death,resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. TheCourt clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2),Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman).On the other hand, an appointment involving a movementto a different position or office (Commissioner toChairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence,not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barredunder the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed ordesignated in a temporary or acting capacity.

6.

GONZALES III VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTCASE 2012-0070: EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THEPRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL. (G.R. No. 196231) WENDELLBARRERAS-SULIT VS. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA ET AL. (G.R. NO.196232) (04 SEPTEMBER 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) SUBJECT/S:DISMISSAL OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR BY THEOFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  (BRIEF TITLES: GONZALES VS. OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT; SULIT VS. OCHOA)  DISPOSITIVE:       WHEREFORE,  in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of theOffice of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio  A. Gonzales IIIis orderedREINSTATED with payment of backwages  correspondingto the period of suspension effective immediately) even as theOffice of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed  with theinvestigation in connection with the above case againstpetitioner.In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC CaseNo. 11-1 B-003 against  Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpableviolation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust,in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of theOmbudsman  Act is hereby DENIED.         SO ORDERED.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST DOES THE OFFICE OF THE  PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVEJURISDICTION OVER THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIALPROSECUTOR?

 YES. THE OMBUDSMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER ADEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE.SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) GRANTS THEPRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THESPECIAL PROSECUTOR FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS.Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989,provides thatSection 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —x x x x(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed fromoffice by the President for any of the grounds provided for theremoval of the Ombudsman, and after due process. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXWAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICEOF THE PRESIDENT CORRECT?NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THEREMOVAL OF THE OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OFPUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN HIS CASE.PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE WHERE THEQUESTIONED ACTS, FALLING SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DONOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Congress laid down two restrictions on the President’s exerciseof such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1)that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of thegrounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) thatthere must be observance of due process.

Aquilino Larin vs The Executive SecretaryLaw on Public Officers – Career Service Appointees Must Be Removed for ValidReasons 

Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau ofInternal Revenue (BIR). He was in charge of the office of theExcise Tax Service. In 1992, the Sandiganbayan convicted Larinfor grave misconduct. His conviction was reported to the Officeof the President, at the same time, an administrative complaintwas filed with the same office. The President then, based onthe Sandiganbayan conviction, created a committee toinvestigate Larin. Eventually, Larin’s removal was recommended.The President dismissed Larin.

ISSUE: Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly.HELD: No. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to thecareer service of the Civil Service. Although it is a generalrule that the power to remove is inherent in the power toappoint, such power to remove I with limitations. In the caseat bar, the limitation can be found in the fact that Larin is acareer service officer and under the Administrative Code of1987, such officers who fall under career service arecharacterized by the existence of security of tenure, ascontra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure isco-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject tohis pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to theduration of a particular project for which purpose theemployment was made. As a career service officer, Larin enjoysthe right to security of tenure. He can only be removed fromhis office on grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code of1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his removal was hisconviction in the Sandiganbayan – this is not one of thosegrounds enumerated in the Administrative Code. Further, theSupreme Court notes that when Larin’s conviction was appealedto the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court actually absolvedLarin.

Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998

Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 whichgranted each official and employee of the government theproductivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalentto 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but whichamount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that theproductivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for theyear 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, includinggovernment boards of government-owned or controlledcorporations and financial institutions, are strictlyprohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits forthe year 1992 and future years pending the result of acomprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of thePres. 

The petitioners, who are officials and employees ofseveralgovernment departments and agencies, were paid incentivebenefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity

incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximumamount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec.7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentivebenefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO29 directed all departments, offices and agencies whichauthorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year1992 in excess ofP1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund ofthe excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of thedepartments or agencies of the government concerned caused thededuction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of theamounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the validexercise of presidential control over the executivedepartments 

Held: The Pres. is the head of thegovernment. Governmentalpower and authority are exercised andimplemented through him. His power includes the control ofexecutive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII ofthe Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or setaside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance ofhis duties and to substitute the judgment of the former forthat of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power ofcontrol, review, modify, alter or nullify any action ordecision of his subordinate in the executive departments,bureau or offices under him. 

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentivebenefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from grantingincentive benefits without approval from him and directing therefund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. wasjust exercising his power of control over executivedepartments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant ofproductivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent,dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnelby committing limited resources of government for the equalpayment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercisinghis power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of thegovernment agencies who granted incentive benefits to their

employees without appropriateclearance from the Office of thePres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution ofgovernment resources. 

The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutionalorigin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.

 Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) v Subic BayMetropolitan AuthorityFacts•

Petition to suspend or hold in abeyance the conduct of SBMAof a rebidding. SBMA advertised an invitation offering to theprivate sector the opportunity to develop andoperate a modernmarine container terminal within Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Outof 7 bidders, 3 were declared as qualified: 1) ICTSI 2) RPSIand 3) HPPL SBMA-PBAC first awarded to HPPL. However, ICTSIfiled an appeal with SBMA and alsobefore the Office ofthe President. In a memorandum, the President ordered SBMAChairman Gordon to revaluate thefinancial bids together withthe COA. Again, the SBMA Board issued another reso declaringthat HPPL is selected as winner,since it has a realisticbusiness plan offering the greatest financial return to SBMAand themost advantageous to the government. Nothwithstandingthe SBMA’s board recommendations, then Exec Sec ReubenTorressubmitted a memorandum to the Office of Presidentrecommending another rebidding.Consequently, the Office ofPres. Issued a memorandum to conduct a rebidding. On July 7,1997, HPPL filed a complaint against SBMA before the RTC andalleged that abinding and legally enforeceable contract hadbeen established between HPPL and SBMAunder Article 1305 of thecivil code, considering that SBMA had repeatedly declaredandconfirmed that HPPL was the winning bidder. During the pre-trial hearing, one of the issues raised and submitted for resowas whetheror not the Office of the President can set aside theaward made by SBMA in favor of HPPLand if so, can the Office ofthe President direct the SBMA to conduct re-bidding oftheproposed project

.Issue: Can the President set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of HPPL? If so, canthe Office of the President direct SBMAto conduct rebidding of the proposedproject?

Held: Yes. HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it a has aclear and unmistakable right to be declaredthe winning bidder.Though SBMA Board of Directors may have declared themas winner,said award is not final and unassailable. The SBMABoard of Directors are subject to the control and supervisionof the President.All projects undertaken by SBMA require theapproval of the President under Letters of Instruction No. 620Letters of Instruction No. 620 mandates that the approvalof the President is required in allcontracts of thenational government offices, agencies and instrumentalitiesincludingGOCCS involving P2M and above, awarded through publicbidding or negotiation. The President may, within hisauthority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMABoardof Directors for justifiable reasons. When the President issuedthe memorandum setting a side the award previously declaredbySBMA in favor of HPPL, the same was within authority of thePresident and was a validexercise of his prerogative. Thepetition is dismissed for lack of merit.Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited vs Subic Bay MetropolitanAuthorityCommercial Law – Corporation Law – Foreign Corporation – License Requirement 

In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited  (HPPL)won apublic bidding made by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority(SBMA). The project was to develop and operate a modern marinecontainer terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The SBMABoard of Directors already declared HPPL as the winner butlater on, the Office of the President reversed the decision ofthe Board and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding however,HPPL was no longer among the qualified bidders. Eventually,HPPL filed a petition for injunction to enjoin SBMA fromconducting the rebidding.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file aninjunction case against SBMA.

HELD: No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring HPPLas the winning bidder was neither final nor unassailable. UnderLOI No. 620, all projects undertaken by the SBMA are subject tothe approval of the Office of the President. Hence, the Boardof SBMA is under the control and supervision of the Presidentof the Philippines. Therefore, the declaration made by theBoard did not vest any right in favor of HPPL.

Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreigncorporation registered under the laws of the British VirginIslands. It did not register here in the Philippines.HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolatedtransaction. The conduct of bidding is not an isolatedtransaction. It is “doing business” here in the Philippines.The Supreme Court emphasized that as a general rule, “doing” or“engaging in” or “transacting” business in the Philippines is acase to case basis. It has often been held that a single act ortransaction may be considered as “doing business” when acorporation performs acts for which it was created or exercisessome of the functions for which it was organized. The amount orvolume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular actcannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates theforeign corporation’s intention to do business.Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doingbusiness” because it shows the foreign corporation’s intentionto engage in business here. The bidding for the concessioncontract is but an exercise of the corporation’s reason forcreation or existence. Therefore, HPPL has done business herewithout license. It cannot now sue in the Philippines withoutlicense because its participation in the bidding is not merelyan isolated transaction.The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel aforeign corporation desiring to do business within thePhilippines to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courtsof the state and to enable the government to exercisejurisdiction over them for the regulation of their activitiesin this country.

Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibitionseeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372,issued by the President, insofar as it requires localgovernment units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of theirauthorized regular appropriations for non-personal services andto enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order,which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscalautonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner ofnational government intervention by way of supervision, in order

to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, areconsistent with national goals.  AO 372 is merely directory and hasbeen issued by the President consistent with his powers ofsupervision over local governments.  A directory order cannotbe characterized as an exercise of the power of control.  TheAO is intended only to advise all government agencies andinstrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures thatwill help maintain economic stability in the country.  It doesnot contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President tointerfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certainrequisites are met:  (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit ofthe national government; (2) consultations with the presidingofficers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and thepresidents of the various local leagues; (3) the correspondingrecommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and(4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be lessthan 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxesof the third fiscal year preceding the current one. 

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld.  A basic feature of localfiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUsin the national internal revenue.  This is mandated by theConstitution and the Local Government Code.  Section 4 whichorders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearlycontravenes the Constitution and the law.

IBP VS ZAMORA

FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18,Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbaldirective,  directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief tocoordinate with each other for the proper deployment andcampaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned thevalidity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines toassist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE: 1. WoN the President's factual determination of thenecessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicialreview.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibilitypatrols violate the constitutional provisions on civiliansupremacy over the military.

RULING: 1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or notthere has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government.When questions of constitutional significance are raised, theCourt can exercise its power of judicial review only if thefollowing requisites are complied with, namely: (1)  theexistence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal andsubstantial interest of the party raising the constitutionalquestion; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at theearliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question  isthe lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breachof the civilian supremacy clause.  The calling of the Marinesin this case constitutes permissible use of military assets forcivilian law enforcement.  The participation of the Marines inthe conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriatelycircumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and managethe deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty toprovide the necessary equipment to the Marines and renderlogistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing,it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supremeover civilian authority.  Moreover, the deployment of theMarines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civiliancharacter of the police force.  Neither does it amount to an“insidious incursion” of the military in the task of lawenforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of theConstitution.

Ampatuan vs Puno Case Digest Calling Out Power, Emergency Powers, Local Autonomy

Facts:  On 24 November 2009, the day after the MaguindanaoMassacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing“the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the Cityof Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFPand the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed bythe Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress allincidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three dayslater, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of theARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. Shesubsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (theterm “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”,referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG). 

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on theARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, AnsaruddinAdiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filedthis petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged thatthe President’s proclamation and orders encroached on theARMM’s autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretaryto take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the regionalgovernment’s powers. They also claimed that the President hadno factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especiallyin the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,where no critical violent incidents occurred and that thedeployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMMconstitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergencypowers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

Issues: 1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-Aviolate the principle of local autonomy under the Constitutionand The Expanded ARMM Act2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercisedemergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP toprevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence inMaguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City3.  Whether or not the President had factual bases for heractions

Held: 1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILGSecretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor ofARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the MaguindanaoMassacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed

the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule onsuccession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, ActingGovernor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM RegionalAssembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over theadministration or the operations of the ARMM. 

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergencypowers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of theConstitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictionsas it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declarednational policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powersshall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only astate of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she didnot act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorizedher to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of thearmed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in suchplaces is a power that the Constitution directly vests in thePresident. She did not need a congressional authority toexercise the same.

3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in herunder Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, whichprovides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of thePhilippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces toprevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factualbases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it wouldgenerally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Courtacknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.Zamora, it is clearly to the President that theConstitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling

out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.Unless it is shown that such determination was attendedby grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect tothe President’s judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support theassertion that the President acted without factual basis, thenthis Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyondthe pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armedforces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectivelyestablished since matters considered for satisfying the same isa combination of several factors which are not alwaysaccessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textualstandards that the court may use to judge necessity,information necessary to arrive at such judgment might alsoprove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinentinformation might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailableto the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which thePresident might decide that there is a need to call out thearmed forces may be of a nature not constituting technicalproof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has avast intelligence network to gather information, some of whichmay be classified as highly confidential or affecting thesecurity of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary inemergency situations to avert great loss of human lives andmass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call outthe military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must bedone swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect atall. x x x. 

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of astate of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, SultanKudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exerciseof the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They simplyalleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placedunder a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of theentire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the Presidentissued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had toact to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places

mentioned.  Progress reports also indicated that there wasmovement in these places of both high-powered firearms andarmed men sympathetic to the two clans.  Thus, to pacify thepeople’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President hadto take preventive action.  She called out the armed forces tocontrol the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle thearmed groups that continuously threatened the peace andsecurity in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that theproclamation of state of emergency in the subject places andthe calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Courtmust respect the President’s actions.(Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No.190259, June 7, 2011)

Sanlakas vs. Exec Sec (2004) FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners: 1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert,defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, andwelfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny having ceased. 2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert thatS18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration

a "constitutional anomaly" that misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law; presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress hasnot delegated any such power to the President 3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of theHouse of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers,such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution 4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion 

Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions standing of petitioners

ISSUES:  1. whether or not petitioners have standing2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting ofthe proclamation 3. whether or not the proclamation calling thestate of rebellion is proper 

RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas & PM have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez"… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" in the language ofSs15-16, Art13 of

the Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayermay bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out the doctrine of "transcendental importance" regardingconstitutional questions in this particular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on giving the Pres emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of the proclamation of the state of rebellion. 

2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since prior events(the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitutionrequires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced the evolution of executive power in

the US (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effortto show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough asit is and become more so when taken together with the provisionon executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State." This, plusMarcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards the validity ofthe proclamation. However, the Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any legal significance for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of theConstitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writof habeas corpus,61 then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about theseconditions. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based onthe declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In other words, aperson may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantlessarrest are present. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and,therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions donot cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executiveor as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely

exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSIONFACTS: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crimeof subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFPcreated a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34,to try criminal case against petitioners. Petitioners were thenconvicted and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty.Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the militarytribunal from taking further action on their case for thetribunal should be considered null and void. Respondentsinvoked that the creation of Military Commission isconstitutional as ruled upon in a previous case –Aquino v. MilitaryCommission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However,petitioners contend that such ruling must be overturned becausethe ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law has alreadybeen lifted. ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. MilitaryCommission be abandoned and/or modified in so far as the caseat bar is concerned? HELD: Yes.REASONING: First, the Court considered that since the martiallaw has been lifted during the held void already since the lawitself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissentingviews of some justices in AQUINO V. MILCOMM, stating that ‘…Civilians like the petitioner placed on tiral for civil offenses under general law areentited o trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process…xxx..Judicialpower exist only in courts’.1Moreover, the Court emphasizedthat“Reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail whenconstitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine whichshould be abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly.after all, more important than anything else is that this Court should be right.’

NAVALES VS. ABAYA

Facts: Only July 27, 2003 at around 1:00am, more than 300heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP

entered the premises of Oakwood Apartments in Makati. They thenannounced their grievances against the Arroyo Administration,corruption in the Military; illegal sale of arms andammunitions to the enemies; they demanded for the resignationof the President, the Cabinet and AFP and PNP top brass. ThePresident issued G.O. No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion.Negotiates were sent to the place and the soldiers finally laidtheir arms. After investigation, they were charged with coup d’etat penalized under Article 134-A, RPC. They were likewisecharged under the Articles of War, specifically Article 96 forconduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. They filed amotion with the RTC where the coup d’etat case was pending totake over jurisdiction over all the cases pending with themilitary tribunal following the doctrine of absorption. The RTCruled that the cases before the military tribunal were notservice-connected but rather absorbed in furtherance of thecrime of coup d’etat. When they were charged under Art. 96 ofthe Articles of War, they filed a petition for prohibitionpraying that the respondents be ordered to desist from chargingthem with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War. Theymaintained that Article 96 is not service connected, hence,absorbed by coup d’etat, thus, within the jurisdiction of theRTC. The OSG contended that under RA 7055, violation of Art. 96is service-connected, hence, within the jurisdiction of themilitary tribunal. They further contended that the offense hasalready prescribed since they were not arraigned within 2 yearsfrom the date of the commission of the offense.**SCRIBD IPAD*

Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R.No. 190293, March 20, 2012 (and other consolidated cases)

I.      THE FACTS. On November 23, 2009, heavily armed menbelieved led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanaogunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocentcivilians.  In response to this carnage, President Arroyoissued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state ofemergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writof habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of

the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009,President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review thevalidity of the President’s action.  But two days later, or onDecember 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the Presidentissued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilegeof the writ of habeas corpus.

II.    THE ISSUES. Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martiallaw and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,render the issues moot and academic?

III.   THE RULING. [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on theground that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]

YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the[privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of thegovernment dictate that the Court should be cautious inentertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of theacts of the Executive or the Legislative department.  The issueof constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine TruthCommission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that theresolution of such issue is unavoidable.            

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959is not unavoidable for two reasons:          

One.  President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation ofmartial law and suspension of the privilege of the writof habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress couldfulfill their automatic duty to review and validate orinvalidate the same. xxx.

                        xxx                             xxx                              xxx

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and theCongress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaimmartial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus.  They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but ina sense jointly since, after the President has initiated theproclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain

the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on theground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to theSupreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of thefactual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a propersuit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress toexercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather thaninitiated.  Only when Congress defaults in its express duty todefend the Constitution through such review should the SupremeCourt step in as its final rampart.  The constitutionalvalidity of the President’s proclamation of martial law orsuspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a politicalquestion in the hands of Congress before it becomes ajusticiable one in the hands of the Court.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 beforethe joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, couldact on the same.  Consequently, the petitions in these caseshave become moot and the Court has nothing to review.  Thelifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event thatobliterated any justiciable controversy.

Two.  Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamationof martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writof habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not beenmeaningfully implemented.  The military did not take over theoperation and control of local government units inMaguindanao.  The President did not issue any law or decreeaffecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted byCongress.  No indiscriminate mass arrest had beenreported.  Those who were arrested during the period wereeither released or promptly charged in court.  Indeed, nopetition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Courtrespecting arrests made in those eight days.  The point is thatthe President intended by her action to address an uprising ina relatively small and sparsely populated province.  In herjudgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegratedin the face of a determined and amply armed governmentpresence. 

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and thesuspension never took off.  The Congress itself adjournedwithout touching the matter, it having become moot andacademic.

Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs FernandezAmnesty Compared w/ Pardon – Admission Not Needed in Amnesty

Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for thekillings they made during the war. The case was proceededagainst Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found.Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before theperiod for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendantJimenez became aware of  Proclamation No. 8, which grantsamnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an actpenalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to theenemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of theenemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and hesurfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However,Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused toprocess the amnesty request of the two accused because the tworefused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez &Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the onewho committed the crime being charged to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary inamnesty.

HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is aprivate act which must be pleaded and proved by the personpardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; whileamnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrenceof Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts shouldtake judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one afterconviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons orcommunities who may be guilty of political offenses, generallybefore or after the institution of the criminal prosecution andsometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves

the offender from the consequences of an offense of which hehas been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives thepunishment, and for that reason it does “nor work therestoration of the rights to hold public office, or the rightof suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by theterms of the pardon,” and it “in no case exempts the culpritfrom the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by thesentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward andabolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it sooverlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is chargedthat the person released by amnesty stands before the lawprecisely as though he had committed no offense.In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the AmnestyProclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as acondition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed thecriminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allegethe amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence,either of the complainant or the accused, shows that theoffense committed comes within the terms of said AmnestyProclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocationof the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea ofconfession and avoidance.” Although the accused does notconfess the imputation against him, he may be declared by thecourts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits ofthe amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses havingcommitted the offense with which he is charged, the Commissionsshould, if necessary or requested by the interested party,conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for thecomplainants and the accused, on whether he has committed theoffense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, oragainst persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, anddecide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and tobe “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluableservices to the nation,” or not, in accordance with the termsof the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation isa public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissionscreated thereby should take notice of the terms of saidProclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to casescoming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleadedor claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, ifthe evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled tosaid benefits.

Gaudencio Vera et al vs People of the PhilippinesAmnesty – Reversal of the Doctrine Held in the Barrioquinto Case

Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime ofkidnapping with murder done against a certain Lozaňes. The saidcrime was committed allegedly to aid the Japanese occupation.During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admittedhaving committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera,the only defendant who took the witness stand, instead ofadmitting the killing of the deceased Lozañes, categoricallydenied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held that it could nottake cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits ofthe Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendantsin a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime,plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistancemovement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemyduring the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commissionordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin fortrial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail of amnestysans admission of guilt.

HELD: It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act,or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he hasnot committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime,and when an accused maintains that he has not committed acrime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnestyproclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it isincumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of suchconditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of aplea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleaderadmits the allegations against him but disclaims liabilitytherefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved,would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnestyproclamation. The present rule requires a previous admission ofguilt since a person would not need the benefit of amnestyunless he was, to begin with, guilty of the offense covered bythe proclamation.

Miguel Cristobal vs Alejo Labrador & Teofilo SantosPardon – Restoration of Civil & Political Rights

Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was givenpardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he wasalready holding the position as the municipality president ofMalabon notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on the otherhand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list ofelectors in Malabon because he was already convicted of finaljudgment “for any crime against property”. This is pursuant toCA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided byLabrador ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of thelaw by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his“full civil and political rights, except that with respect tothe right to hold public office or employment, he will beeligible for appointment only to positions which are clericalor manual in nature and involving no money or propertyresponsibility.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as anelector.

HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations uponthe exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the ChiefExecutive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised afterconviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases ofimpeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by theConstitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted orcontrolled by legislative action. It must remain where thesovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by thehighest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardonnot only blots out the crime committed, but removes alldisabilities resulting from the conviction. In the presentcase, the disability is the result of conviction without whichthere would be no basis for disqualification from voting.Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposesupon those who violate its command. There are accessory andresultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewiseextends to such disabilities. When granted after the term ofimprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that isleft of the consequences f conviction. In the present case,while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditionalin the sense that “he will be eligible for appointment only topositions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving nomoney or property responsibility,” it is absolute insofar as it“restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification

imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall withinthe purview of the pardoning power of the president, would leadto the impairment of the pardoning power of the president, notcontemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore tothe result that there would be no way of restoring thepolitical privilege in a case of this nature except throughlegislative action.

Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio FactoranPardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective

Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She wascharged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of PublicDocuments. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. Shewas however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letterto the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to herformer position since it was still vacant. She was alsorequesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred theissue to the Office of the President and Factoran deniedMonsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seekappointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her formerposition. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon,she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civilliabilities brought about by her acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to herformer post.

HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. Itmakes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what hasbeen suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon thegovernment any obligation to make reparation for what has beensuffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicialproceedings, that which has been done or suffered while theywere in force is presumed to have been rightfully done andjustly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot beentitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. Onthe other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governedby the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, orfor any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty orcommutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may onlybe extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil

Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of thedebt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensationand novation.

Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales152 SCRA 272 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Pardon – Not Subject to JudicialReview/Scrutiny

In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, hewas pardoned by the president with the condition that he shallnot violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was chargedwith multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of theBoard of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for thecancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelledthe pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Courtaverring that the Executive Department erred in convicting himfor violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafacharges against him were not yet final and executory as theywere still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not  conviction of a crime by final judgmentof a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrestedand recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditionalpardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his originalsentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms andconditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive actswhich are not subject to judicial scrutiny.2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of acondition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of suchbreach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject tojudicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the RevisedAdministrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting oftrial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardonunder Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where thePresident opts toproceed under Section 64 (i) of the RevisedAdministrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of asubsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor byfinal judgment of a court, in order that a convict may berecommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3.  Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process,and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already beenaccorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction forthe offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with aconstitutional vice.In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionallypardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions ofhis pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i)to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the RevisedAdministrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him underArticle 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prisioncorreccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having beengranted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shallviolate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, thePresident has chosen to proceed against the petitioner underSection 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choiceis an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and isnot subject to judicial scrutiny. 

Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Facts: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner LeoEchegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-olddaughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon himof the death penalty for the said crime.He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the firsttime the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied bothmotions.In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode ofexecution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethalinjection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATINGDEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITALPUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THEREVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACTNO. 7659.The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying outthe lethal injection against him under the grounds that itconstituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, beingviolative of due process, a violation of the Philippines'obligations under international covenants,  an undue delegationof legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise

byrespondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and anunlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary ofJustice to respondent Director.In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equalprotection as a ground.The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court hasalready upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is notcruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution bylethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and thequestioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being themost modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier toapply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does notexpressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the deathpenalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative powerto respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers thepower to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary ofJustice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave ofCourt to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with theattached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae.They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments.The court gave due course to the petition.Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and itsimplementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a)violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of ourinternational treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegationof legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue: 1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscriptionagainst cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held: No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.Ratio: 1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injectionconstitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment consideringthat (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to beused in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drugto be administered, and the procedure in administering said

drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementingrules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time ofnotification, the court which will fix the date of execution,which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering forthe convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" ormistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injectioninherently cruel.Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penaltyper se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when theyinvolve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment ofdeath is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used inthe constitution.  It implies there something inhuman andbarbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment oflife."  Would the lack in particularity then as to the detailsinvolved in the execution by lethal injection render said law"cruel, degrading or inhuman"?  The Court believes not.  Forreasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177are matters which are properly left to the competence andexpertise of administrative officials.Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertainas to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution,and the date of execution and time of notification of the deathconvict.  As petitioner already knows, the "court" whichdesignates the date of execution is the trial court whichconvicted the accused.  The procedure is that the "judgment isentered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 daysthereafter, the records are remanded to the court belowincluding a certified copy of the judgment for execution.Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of executionnor the time of notification.  As to the date of execution,Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read inconjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No.8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carriedout "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18)months from the time the judgment imposing the death penaltybecame final and executory, without prejudice to the exerciseby the President of his executive clemency powers at alltimes." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured ofeighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing thedeath penalty became final and executor wherein he can seekexecutive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritualaffairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wantonpain" in case of possible complications in the intravenousinjection that respondent Director is an untrained and untestedperson insofar as the choice and administration of lethalinjection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,degrading and inhuman punishment.  This is unsubstantiated.First.  Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidencethat lethal injection required the expertise only ofphlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs tobe administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simplycites situations in the United States wherein execution bylethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizingdeath for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.Second.  Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph ofR.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in theexecution proceedings should be trained prior to theperformance of such task.  We must presume that the publicofficials entrusted with the implementation of the deathpenalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.Third.  Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merelyincidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty anddoes not fall within the constitutional proscription againstcruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.  "In a limited sense,anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress,and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict,it may be said that all punishments are cruel.  But of coursethe Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, isto go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitutionprotects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method ofpunishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any methodemployed to extinguish life humanely.What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete butmay acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by ahumane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolvingstandards of decency that mark the progress of a maturingsociety."2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,sentence of death may be imposed only for the most seriouscrimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of thecommission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions ofthe present Covenant and to the Convention on the Preventionand Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  This penalty can only

be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by acompetent court."The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposedfor the "most serious crimes".Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocolto the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by theGeneral Assembly on December 15, 1989.  The Philippines neithersigned nor ratified said document.3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which definethe legislative policy, mark its limits, map out itsboundaries, and specify the public agencies which will applyit.  It indicates the circumstances under which the legislativepurpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requiresthat "the death sentence shall be executed under the authorityof the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring sofar as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person underthe sentence during the lethal injection as well as during theproceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director ofthe Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that thelethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause theinstantaneous death of the convict." The legislature alsomandated that "all personnel involved in the administration oflethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance ofsuch task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose wouldbe served by requiring greater detail. The question raised isnot the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, butthe mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by theCourts.  In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definiteand the exercise of discretion by the administrative officialsconcerned is, canalized within banks that keep it fromoverflowing.However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic ActNo. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked.  Tobegin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 ofthe implementing rules which provides a manual for theexecution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of theimplementing rules a vacuum.  The Secretary of Justice haspractically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on theexecution procedure to the Director of the Bureau ofCorrections, by not providing for a mode of review andapproval.  Being a mere constituent unit of the Department ofJustice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a

manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrativesuperior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authorityunder R.A. No. 8177.  Such apparent abdication of departmentalresponsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the ImplementingRules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well asfor being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate byrespondent Secretary.  Petitioner insists that Section 17amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended,without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised PenalCode, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659."SEC. 17.  SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon awoman within the three years next following the date of thesentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person overseventy (70) years of age.  In this latter case, the deathpenalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetuawith the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of theRevised Penal Code."Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional forbeing discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exerciseof the power to legislate by respondent Secretary.  Petitionerinsists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethalinjection may be suspended, without an express amendment ofArticle 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not beinflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1)year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years ofage.While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended bySection 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends theimplementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnantor within  one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of theimplementing rules omits the one (1) year period followingdelivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended,and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer foundunder Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which isthe three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced.  Thisaddition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-baseddiscrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is animpermissible contravention of the applicable law.Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited mustnot override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony withthe law it seeks to apply and implement. 

Suzette Nicolas vs Alberto Romul578 SCRA 438 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Ratification of a Treaty – Validityof the Visiting Forces Agreement

**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith &BAYAN vs Gloria ArroyoOn the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime ofrape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and wasordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a USserviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and thecrime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. Butpursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines,the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, togetherwith the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing thevalidity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was notratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratifiedthe VFA.

ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not itis self-executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the partiesintend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because theVFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings underthe RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFAhas been implemented and executed, with the US faithfullycomplying with its obligation to produce Smith before the courtduring the trial.The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as itis the very purpose and intent of the US Congress thatexecutive agreements registered under this Act within 60 daysfrom their ratification be immediately implemented. The SCnoted that the VFA is not like other treaties that needimplementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. Asregards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,military aid or assistance has been given under it and this canonly be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itselfis another form of implementation of its provisions.

Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading (G.R. No. L-14279)

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importationfrom Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956,the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeitureof the import goods because EST was not able to comply withCentral Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars werepursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation ofsuch non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade andFinancial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). ESTquestioned the validity of the said EO averring that the saidEO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue waselevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled infavor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence ofat least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which aresubject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members ofthe Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fallshort of treaties are commonly referred to as executiveagreements and are no less common in our scheme of governmentthan are the more formal instruments — treaties andconventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notesand at other times that of more formal documents denominated‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinarycorrespondence between this and other governments ends andagreements — whether denominated executive agreements orexchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes bedifficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless toundertake to discuss here the large variety of executiveagreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds ofexecutive agreements, other than those entered into under thetrade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreigngovernments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order toshow that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are notanomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and thatthey have abundant precedent in our history, to refer tocertain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by theExecutive without the approval of the Senate. They cover suchsubjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, incometax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft,customs matters, and commercial relations generally,international claims, postal matters, the registration of

trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concludednot by specific congressional authorization but in conformitywith policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to thegeneral subject matter, such as tariff acts; while stillothers, particularly those with respect to the settlement ofclaims against foreign governments, were concludedindependently of any legislation.

Go Tek vs. Deportation Board | Aquino

FACTS On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation

Board filed a complaint against Go Tek, a chinaman, prayingthat the board recommend his immediate deportation to thePresident because he was an undesirable alien on the basisof these allegations:o Go Tek was a sector commander and intelligence and

record officer of a guerilla unit of the “EmergencyIntelligence Section, Army of the United States;”

o And he was in possession of fake dollar checks inviolation of Art. 168 of the RPC.

Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss.o The complaint was premature as he had a pending case in

the city fiscal’s office for violation of Art. 168.o The board had no jurisdiction over the case because the

board may only deport aliens on the grounds expresslyspecified by law citing an obiter in Qua Chee Gan.

The Board denied the motion ruling that a conviction is notrequired before the State may deport an undesirable alienand that the Board is only a fact finding body whosefunction is to make a report and recommendation to thePresident.

Go Tek filed an action for prohibition with the CFI. The CFI granted the petition by upholding the obiter in the

Qua Chee Gan case. It held that Sec. 37(3) of theImmigration Law requires conviction of a crime involvingmoral turpitude and, thus, the complaint was premature sincemere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground fordeportation under the Immigration Law.

The Board appealed the decision to the SC.

ISSUES/HELD Can the Deportation Board entertain a deportation proceeding

based on a ground which is not specified in section 37 ofthe Immigration Law? – YES.

Is prior conviction of the offense imputed to Go Teknecessary to allow the board to continue its investigation?– NO.

RATIONALE Under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien

may be effected (1) by order of the President, after dueinvestigation, pursuant to section 691 of the RevisedAdministrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner ofImmigration upon recommendation of the Board ofCommissioners of the existence of the ground fordeportation, as charged against the alien, under Sec. 37 ofthe Immigration Law.

When deportation is effected by the President in theexercise of his powers, it need not be under any groundspecified in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law; such arequirement is relevant only when the deportation is effectby the Commissioner of Immigration.o Sec. 69 of the RAC and E.O. No. 398, creating the

Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds fordeportation

o There is no legal nor constitutional provision definingthe power to deport aliens because the intention of thelaw is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion todetermine whether an alien's residence in the country isso undesirable as to affect or injure the securitywelfare or interest of the state.

o The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge ofthe existence of facts which warrant the deportation ofaliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted inaccordance with Sec. 69 of the RAC.

o After all, the inherent right of a country to expel ordeport aliens because their continued presence is rentalto public welfare is absolute and unqualified.

As the President is granted full discretion as regardsdeportation, it is fundamental that an executive order fordeportation is not dependent on a prior judicial convictionin a case.

1

ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE

Facts: o   September 26, 2007 – Romulo Neri appeared beforerespondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hourson matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a projectawarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").

o   Neri disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalosoffered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of theNBN Project. He further narrated that he informed PresidentGloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that sheinstructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probedfurther on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussionsrelating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitionerrefused to answer questions on:a.     whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBNProject,b.     whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, andc.      whether or not she directed him to approve it

o   November 20, 2007 - Neri did not appear before respondentCommittees upon orders of the President invoking executiveprivilege.o   January 30, 2008 - Respondent Committees issued an Orderciting petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees andordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the SenateSergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and givehis testimony.

ISSUES1.     whether or not there is a recognized presumptivepresidential communications privilege in our legal system;2.     whether or not there is factual or legal basis to holdthat the communications elicited by the three (3) questions arecovered by executive privilege;3.     whether or not respondent Committees have shown that thecommunications elicited by the three (3) questions are criticalto the exercise of their functions; and4.     whether or not respondent Committees committed graveabuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.

HELD

1.     YES. There is a presidential communications privilege.

In Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment (PCGG), and Chavez v. PEA, the Court articulated inthese cases that "there are certain types of information whichthe government may withhold from the public, " that there is a"governmental privilege against public disclosure with respectto state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and othernational security matters"; and that "the right to informationdoes not extend to matters recognized as ‘privilegedinformation’ under the separation of powers, by which the Courtmeant Presidential conversations, correspondences, anddiscussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege,the Court finds it essential to limit to the President thepower to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize theExecutive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, inwhich case the Executive Secretary must state that theauthority is "By order of the President", which means that hepersonally consulted with her. The privilege being anextraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highestofficial in the executive hierarchy. In other words, thePresident may not authorize her subordinates to exercise suchpower. There is even less reason to uphold such authorizationin the instant case where the authorization is not explicit butby mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), isfurther invalid on this score.

In this case, it was the President herself, through ExecutiveSecretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specificmatter involving an executive agreement between the Philippinesand China, which was the subject of the three (3) questionspropounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the SenateCommittees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of thiscase markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v.Ermita.

2.     YES. The three (3) questions are covered by executiveprivilege

The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down preciselyto limit the scope of the presidential communications privilegebut, in any case, it is not conclusive. In the case at bar, the

danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of theexecutive branch" (a fear apparently entertained byrespondents) is absent because the official involved here is amember of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor"of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of herofficial family.

Also, it must be stressed that the President’s claim ofexecutive privilege is not merely founded on her generalizedinterest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidentialcommunications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economicrelations with another sovereign nation as the bases for theclaim.

In upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3)specific questions, it did not in any way curb the public’sright to information or diminish the importance of publicaccountability and transparency.

This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power toinvestigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There isnothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondentCommittees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They couldcontinue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri totestify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed hiswillingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from thescope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questionsthat elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rulesthat petitioner cannot be compelled to appear beforerespondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed thereasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege.That there is a recognized public interest in theconfidentiality of such information is a recognized principlein other democratic States. To put it simply, the right toinformation is not an absolute right.

3.     NO. The three (3) questions are not critical to theLegislature’s function.

In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s needfor facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case butrather with the Senate’s need for information in relation toits legislative functions. This leads us to consider once again

just how critical is the subject information in the dischargeof respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to show this ison the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude intothe sphere of competence of the President in order to gatherinformation which, according to said respondents, would "aid"them in crafting legislation.

Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must bestressed that respondent Committees’ need for information inthe exercise of this function is not as compelling as ininstances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative innature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merelyan oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primaryobjective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3)questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict theirclaim that their purpose is legislative in nature and notoversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft andcorruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress,respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress boundsset by the Constitution.

Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency.Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end initself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, alegitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatoryevidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible.There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake ofexposure.

5.     YES. The Senate committed grave abuse of discretion inissuing the contempt order.

The deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to theissuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of beingsubmitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondentCommittees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafterpresented to the other members for signing. As a result, thecontempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not afaithful representation of the proceedings that took place onsaid date. Records clearly show that not all of those whosigned the contempt order were present during the January 30,2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.