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Elections and parties in post-conflict countries

Dane Taleski Doctoral Candidate

Political Science Department Central European University (CEU), Budapest

paper prepared to be presented at the

3rd Graduate Conference

30 August – 1 September, 2010

Dublin City University

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dane Taleski, Political Science Department, Central European University (CEU), Nador ut.9, 1051 Budapest. E-mail: taleski_dane@ceu-budapest.edu

- first draft, please do not cite without permission of the author -

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Abstract

In general elections are seen as the key instrument in the democratization process even in post-conflict countries. On one hand there is the suggestion that the more repetitive and uninterrupted the electoral process is, the better are the chances for democracy to consolidate. On the other hand there is stream of literature that criticizes the “electoralism” paradigm. In that respect elections are portrayed as a gate way for further polarization in the society, and as such the electoral competition supports further instability, rather than aiding the democratization of the country. The question is then whether post-conflict elections contribute or impede the democratization in post-conflict countries? The question has been addressed by analyzing the effects of various electoral designs in post-conflict countries. Also the role of international actors in post-conflict elections and democracy building has been extensively analyzed. However, little attention is given to the political parties as the main actors in post-conflict elections. I claim that the prolongation or continuation of the conflict is function of the electoral strategy of the political parties. Parties can choose a strategy of symbolical extension of the conflict, as an efficient electoral strategy. I call this ‘electoral militarism’. However this is not necessarily detrimental for the stabilization and democratization of the country. On the contrary, it can structure the political competition making the elections and parties more stable. The paper follows case oriented research methods. The electoral process and outcomes in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Croatia are compared. This design holds constant most institutional factors, as well as historical legacies, while the main difference is the presence (Macedonia, Croatia) and absence (Bulgaria) of internal armed conflict. Also there is a differentiation in terms of sequence of events, whether the conflict preceded (Croatia) or interrupted (Macedonia) the democratization process. The paper is based on cross national comparison of electoral data (i.e volatility, patterns of party support) and a case study of Croatia, where process tracing is used in a longitudinal analysis of several election cycles.

Keywords: Elections, political parties, post-conflict countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia

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Introduction

Elections are one of the defining landmarks of a democracy. A democratic regime is not

imaginable without political pluralism and free political competition. Elections are one of the instruments for democratization – if not the main one. However the jury is out on the role of elections in post-conflict countries. On one side of the debate, there are ones that claim that with repetitive elections the democratization of a country strengthens. On the other side, some claim that after an intrastate conflict and violence elections extend the hostilities and tensions and thus impede the democratization process. So the question arises whether post-conflict elections support or impede the democratization process?

This debate is far from settled and attracts attention. Researchers have looked at the

electoral design and the role of the international community to find whether elections impede or support the democratization of a post-conflict country. In that respect it is puzzling to see how little attention is given to political parties, which are the main local actors, in post-conflict elections. Political parties practice the political pluralism and compete during the elections. To a large extent it is up to them whether post-conflict elections will be a success or a failure. While some attention is given to the transformation of guerrilla groups into political parties, the electoral strategies of parties in post-conflict is usually only sporadically mentioned.

In the paper I analyze the elections after an intrastate interethnic conflict. In such an event it is quite certain that ethnic animosities will be translated in the electoral process and that ethnic identity will be the main base for political mobilization. I claim that the containment or prolongation of the conflict is a function of the electoral strategy of political parties. Some parties symbolically extend the conflict, portraying themselves as war heroes and building support on legacies of fear. I label this ‘electoral militarism’. However it does not mean that it is necessarily detrimental for the stability of the country. On the contrary, the strategy of ‘electoral militarism’ stabilizes the electoral competition and is not detrimental for the stability of the country. In that respect, I compare the electoral volatility – as an indicator for electoral and party stability, in three most similar new democracies to find that post-conflict Croatia and Macedonia are less volatile than Bulgaria. In a in-depth longitudinal analysis of elections in Croatia – before, during and after the intrastate interethnic conflict – I show how the ‘electoral militarism’ developed as the strategy of the main political parties. In the first part of the paper I briefly survey the literature on elections and post-conflict democratization. In the second part I introduce information about elections and party competition in several post-conflict cases. In the third part I present my research design and expectations. In the fourth part I analyze the results from the electoral volatility – net and individual party volatility, from Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia. The cross case analysis shows that post-conflict Macedonia and Croatia are more stable than Bulgaria. In the fourth part I do a case study analysis of Croatia. In a longitudinal study of the elections from 1990 to 2000, I trace how ‘electoral militarism’ appeared and stabilized the electoral competition. In the conclusion I summarize my findings.

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I. Elections and post-conflict democratization

It has been said that “elections in post-conflict settings are fundamentally different from those organized under normal circumstances”, they are “designed to facilitate, or to symbolize, and end intrastate conflict” (Gaber 1998: 1). Post-conflict elections have “two distinct but interrelated goals – war termination and democratization” (Lyons 2002: 5). Post-conflict elections occur after the negotiations of peace accords and involve most, if not all, parties in the conflict; external actors play a major role (i.e. peace keeping operations or administering elections), while the post-conflict reconstruction and security concerns remain (Gaber 1998). In that manner “elections are viewed not as one-time events but as a first step toward nurturing democratic institutions after the war” (Kumar 1998: 6).

Post-conflict elections are expected “to transform a violent conflict into a nonviolent one:

[where] ballots take place of bullets”, and to “contribute to the institutionalization of a conflict resolution mechanism in the body politics” (Kumar 1998: 7). However there are divergent views whether early introduction of elections supports the consolidation of democracy by providing possibilities for practicing political pluralism (Carothers 2007) or whether the elections impede the democracy building and increase the intrastate conflict and violence (Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005). The argument of the first strand is that after repetitive electoral practices peaceful cooperation and competition will emerge. But the latter avenue of thinking posits a contrary argument. Namely that due to the pre-existing societal divisions the elections will increase the polarization and the hostilities. These opposing views have largely shaped the research agenda about elections in post-conflict countries. However regardless of which side of the debate they take, researchers are mainly interested either in the electoral design or in the role of the international actors.

Studies interested in the electoral design fit within the institutional approach to post-

conflict democratization. Elections in post-conflict countries reconstitute the legitimacy of the institutions. There are authors that point to the weak institutions often found in fragile or weak states that ease the escalation of violence. In that respect “weak governance is recognized as a contributor to conflict and civil war” (Brinkerhoff 2007: 2). The timing of the first elections is of crucial importance for the containment of the conflict. One should be aware that “most post-conflict reconstruction efforts take place in situations where conflict has subsided to a greater or lesser degree, but is ongoing or recurring in some parts of the country” (Brinkerhoff 2007: 3). This is why the main discussions on elections in post-conflict settings focus on “how soon to hold them and how to organize the electoral systems that lay the base for a viable political process” (Brinkerhoff 2007: 7). The electoral design also has far reaching consequence for the future of the country. That is why some researchers stress the need for a better understanding of the mechanics of the electoral system, the political environment and the voter behavior (Bjornlund et al. 2007).

Studies interested in the role of international actors in post-conflict elections are part of

the interest in the international involvement in peace and state building (Chandler 2000, 2006; Call and Cousens 2008). Some studies about elections in post-conflict countries are focused primary on the actions of the external actors (Kumar 1998). In this discussion some criticize the

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lack of fit between the local societies, history and tradition with the standardized model of post-conflict democratic transition (Call and Cook 2003). Others are skeptical about the intentional foreign design of the elections (Blaug 2002) or about the local capacities in post-conflict countries to deal with the complexities when starting a regime transition (Ottaway 2002).

Notwithstanding the importance of the international actors in facilitating the first

elections or the importance of the electoral design; the sustainability of peaceful elections and the consolidation of democracy also depend on the internal, domestic, actors. In a post-conflict conflict setting it is the process of “demilitarizing politics through the transformation of militias into political parties [that] promotes both war termination and democratization” (Lyons 2002: 26). In post-conflict countries it is not only the flawed elections that can undermine the legitimacy of the system, but also dysfunctional parties can “contribute to political stalemate and societal division, and can lead to renewed conflict and violence” (Brinkerhoff 2007: 9).

Post-conflict elections aim to “promote reconciliation between the parties that were formerly at war with each other” (Kumar 1998: 7); so they require formation of political parties, but also demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. The party formation is not necessarily divorced from the demobilization and integration of ex-combatants. More often than not, former guerilla groups transform in political parties after the intrastate conflict ends. Authors dealing with the transformation of guerrilla groups into political parties highlight the institutional requirements and strategic choices that these parties face (Manning 2007, 2008; Zeeuw 2008). However these studies say little about how parties interact with each other in post-conflict settings. In that respect they are more interested in the formation of party organization, deriving from guerrilla groups, than with the party competition.

Focusing on the guerilla-to-party transformation certainly is a step forward compared to previous studies that pay less attention to the actors that participated in the past intrastate conflicts and in the future democratic processes (Kumar 1998). However when focusing on the transformation of guerilla groups into parties, one leaves out of the scope the influence of the conflict on all political parties in post-conflict countries. In post-conflict countries some parties may be made of ex-combatants; while others not, but how do they respond to their joint institutional environment and to their socio-cultural context? In other words, once elections are instigated in a post-conflict country what structures the party competition and does it contribute or impede the stability of the country?

Having in mind the role of parties in the electoral process, it is puzzling to see their

absence in the studies of elections and democratization in post-conflict countries. Political parties deserve greater attention in the studies of elections and democratization in post-conflict countries. In order to answer whether elections aid the conflict management in post-conflict countries, one also needs to see the political parties. In that respect one can argue that the containment or the prolongation of the conflict in post-conflict countries is a function of the electoral strategy of the political parties; and not necessarily of the electoral design or the role of the international actors.

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II. Post-conflict elections and party competition

Elections are the central institution of a democratic regime. Free and fair competition for political power remains the main landmark among the various definitions or conceptualization of democracy. The introduction of free and fair elections marks the start of democracy building. Elections provide the democratic regime with legitimacy, installation of officials, selections and choice, representation and popular involvement (Katz 1997). It has been shown that the electoral system influences the development of party organizations (Katz 1980; Harmel and Janda 1982) and structures the party competition (Lijphart 1994; Norris 2004). Bearing that in mind there is a strong assumption, or expectation, that elections would have a similar influence in post-conflict countries.

However electoral changes, or the design of the electoral system for that matter, do not strongly influence the structure of competition in post-conflict countries. Arguably protracted civil wars with many casualties spread on a wider territory will have a greater impact on the post-conflict development of political parties. The dimensions of such a conflict have a long lasting effect on the cleavage structure and the electoral politics of the main parties contending for elections. In instance the political competition of Mozambique is described as "polarized for historical reasons rooted in the legacy of war" (Manning 2007: 268). Similarly in post-conflict Ghana "the parties' rival interpretations of Ghana's history and culture were more polarized than ever" as effect of the civil wars in the 1960-1970s (Pinkney 1988: 45-46). In fact where armed conflict coincides with ethnic identities, the latter usually become instrumental political identities (Simonsen 2005).

Further on, the electoral design has low potency to shape the party competition in post-conflict elections because too often it is “subject to possible changes by the political elite of the country” (Adeenze-Kangah 2009: 1). In that respect the election observers describe the competition between parties “as a ‘do and die’ attitude which obviously is a potential for violence” (Adeenze-Kangah 2009: 2). In example, elections in Banglades from1991 to 2008 were often marred by boycotts, violence and irregularities (Hashemee 2009). The changes made to the electoral system for the 2008 Parliamentary elections to some extent succeeded in overcoming the problems. However the “political parties are still at loggerheads with each other, often resorting to confrontational ways” (Hashemee 2009).

In post-conflict Ghana there are even formal requirements for registering a party that are supposed to shield from ethnic politics. Parties are required to have nationwide coverage and to have members from different communities, but despite the formal requirements the main parties are ethnically founded (Meissner 2009). The competition in Ghana is described as “winner takes it all”, zero-sum game. On one hand this is due to the past conflict experience and electoral translation of the conflict, but also due to the fact that loosing parties are left without access to state resources which effectively could mean their disappearance (Meissner 2009). Never the less, the political mobilization was identity based in the 2008 parliamentary election. But beyond that interpretation of the past conflict, memories of the violence and atrocities were invoked during the campaign. The elections were seen as a prolongation of the conflict to the extent that one party had prepared a “hit list” for assassination of some of its counterparts (Meissner 2009).

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In a sense the ethnicity was the base, but the legacy of fear was the driving instrument of the mobilization.

In the case of the Ivory Coast the agreement of Ouagadougou, that ended the conflict in

2007, also prescribed the conduct of the elections and integration of combatants in the political processes (Acka 2009). In the Ivory Coast ethnicity play a key role in voter mobilization, while some parties enter the political arena with “mind and behavior of gladiators…. [And] have their lips dripping only with one word: war, because they gain much profit from war to the great detriment of the whole nation” (Acka 2009: 6).

Lebanon had a protracted civil war from 1975 to 1991, and then another cycle of violence

erupted between 2005 and 2008. The institutional design, including the electoral regime, has been spelled out in the peace agreements. The Taif Agreement, the first peace agreement of 1990, “put an end to the war and set the grounds for a new political stage based on power-sharing and consensus between the major sects” (Maalouf 2009: 3). The peace agreement in 2008 introduced changes which were supposed to heighten the “rivalry within sectarian groups, rather than between sects” (Maalouf 2009: 4). In order to achieve this, the electoral districts were reduced so that the electorate would be more homogenous. The design encouraged cross-sectarian alliances and move away from blocs shaped by sectarian or clan allegiances. However the end result was that cross-religious alliances were “no longer needed and candidate are mostly seeking the votes of their co-religionists – in other words the sectarian system” (Maalouf 2009: 5). For the 2008 post-conflict elections in Lebanon the competition was between two party groupings. One was opposing Syrian influence in Lebanon and presented itself as “the guardian a liberal, pro-Western lifestyle which has paid the price of blood”, while the other was comprised of a Shiite party and Hezbolah, which was “a paramilitary force and a political party” (Maalouf 2009: 7). The elections were portrayed as a zero-sum game, and this “existential” portrayal of the competition “was most probably a pre-election mobilization maneuver used by both camps” (Maalouf 2009: 8). In the post-conflict elections in Lebanon the case was that “both camps detained strong leverage over their constituents to mitigate violence” (Maalouf 2009: 8).

Similarly the 2006 peace agreement in Nepal brought an end to decade long civil war. It

entailed a new institutional design for the country, moving from monarchy to a republic, prescribed an electoral regime and allowed the rebel Maoist to integrate in the new institutions (Raj Dahal 2009). The electoral design changed allowed for wider representation and higher inclusion of different groups. However the elections “also ethnicized, communalized and territorialized the politics of Nepal” (Raj Dahal 2009: 8). The Maoist won the 2008 post-conflict elections even though their guerrilla-to-party transformation was not completed. The goals of parties, in terms of the future institutional design, differ significantly. Some favor parliamentary democracy, while others constitutional monarchy; some want presidential form of government, while others favor prime ministerial one (Raj Dahal 2009). But the constitutional issues maybe a lesser problem in Nepal, than the 103 ethnic groups and the 109 paramilitary groups of which many have secessionist claims. Some of this groups are organized in political parties, or support political parties, which clearly have mutually exclusive views for the future to the extent that “widening rifts between major political parties have eroded common grounds for compromise for speedy constitution making, structural reforms and peace process” (Raj Dahal 2009: 13).

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To summarize, elections in post-conflict countries do not necessarily “result in cessation

of hostilities or the establishment of an environment conducive to economic, social, or even political reconstruction” (Gaber 1998: 1). It is rather the case that the elections translate the past intrastate conflict in the new democratic regime. In post-conflict countries “there is little doubt that in many instances elections left a bitter legacy, aggravating existing tensions and cleavages” (Kumar and Ottaway 1998: 231), while “political parties appealed to parochial loyalties to gain votes” (Kumar and Ottaway 1998: 230). This observation can be attached to many divided societies, not only to post-conflict ones. Divided and fragmented societies are “characterized by a diffuse and fragmented party system”, that is unstable and volatile with “low party identification” (Reilly 2001: 61). So is there a simple causal pathway where the interethnic conflict is later translated with the elections in ethnic political mobilization? In other words does ethnic heterogeneity start the conflict and later structures the political party competition? It is not quite certain whether the answer to the first question is straightforward. However it is feasible to expect that the party politics after an interethnic conflict is largely shaped by ethnic identities.

Some authors warn that “if ethnic divisions are translated into ethnically based parties,

politics tend to polarize around ascriptive identities” and “conversely, competitive elections spur ethnic mobilization in divided societies” (Moser 2005: 108). Elections in ethnically divided societies bring polarization and fragmentation of the party system. More precisely in cases where ethnic differences are the standard for political polarization and “the parties divide on communal lines, so that any one party aims to further the interests of only one community and does not seek votes outside it,” than communal divisions will exacerbate “and can make democracy unworkable” (Chapman 1991: 12). Under such conditions a violent inter-ethnic conflict only enhances the differences and embeds the ethnic identity as the main element of the political mobilization in the post-conflict period. In that view the post-conflict elections would contribute to the instability and would be detrimental for the democratization of the country. The structure of party competition would be no more than an extension of the past conflict.

There are authors that disagree with such view. They argue that societal divisions that are

expressed once liberalization and freedom of expression are introduced may contribute to the stabilization of the regime. Some posit that ethnic mobilization and ethic politics can stabilize the democratic regime and ‘jump start’ the formation of the party system. In that respect Jóhanna Birnir writes that:

if ethnic parties are institutionally promoted through very permissive electoral institutions and/or

institutions that specifically exempt ethnic groups from barrier in order to facilitate ethnic party access to the legislature, than ethnic vote will remain stably cast for the ethnic party and the long-term participation of ethnic groups in politics (including support for the ethnic party), will be determined by their long-term access to policy and other government goods” (2007: 204).

In that respect the elections after an inter-ethnic conflict would contribute to the stability

and provide necessary instruments for the consolidation of democracy. The structure of competition may be based on ethnic identities; however it will not be detrimental for the stability of the country. In other words, the elections after an interethnic conflict would create instruments for containment of the conflict rather than to prolong it.

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III. Research design and expectations

In my analysis I will focus on the electoral outcomes in post-conflict countries. What I am interested in is whether there is pattern of stability or instability emerging after post-conflict elections. To operationalize the stability/instability dilemma I will take electoral volatility, both net and individual party volatility. Volatility is a direct outcome of the electoral process. It is also a good indicator for the fragmentation and stability of the party system. Volatility is a measure that captures the changes in the electoral support for one party or for all parties (net volatility), if the individual changes are summed up. Volatility is “always a property of the single political

party stating how electoral support develops from one election to another” (Lane and Ersson, 2007: 93). As such it is also an indication how much are parties rooted in society and how consistent is party identification and party support over several cycles of elections.

Hence my level of analysis will be the electoral cycles, but the unit of analysis is the

political party support. The main expectation is that post-conflict cases will be more volatile and less stable than new democracies that did not had an intrastate conflict. My universe of cases is compromised of all post-conflict democracies. However I will also make a control comparison with a new democracy without a conflict. The research design rests on most similar cases design. In that respect Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia are taken as cases for comparative analysis. Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia are most similar cases in the sense that they are new post-communist democracies with similar institutional environment.

The main justification for choosing these three countries is that their electoral systems are

very similar both in format and in development as seen in table 1. Notwithstanding that their electoral systems were developing with different dynamics; the electoral systems in the three countries currently are very similar. All experimented with mixed systems before settling with proportional representation (PR), and Croatia and Macedonia even started with single member districts (SMD).

TABLE 1 HERE

Bulgaria had a mixed system in the first round of elections electing 400 representatives of

which 200 in single member districts and the rest in one nationwide multimember district. Later from their 2nd elections they changed to PR where the whole country is a one constituency with electoral threshold of 4 percent rewarding 240 seats in parliament and D’Hondt divisor is used to calculate the translation of seats to votes.

Croatia started with a single member district (SMD) where 80 representatives were elected in 80 districts with absolute majority of the votes, and then they changed to a mixed system. Beside the electoral formula, the number and size of the districts changed as well from the 2nd elections in 1992 to the 3rd elections in 1995 (Kasapović 2000). In 1992 120 members of parliament were elected, 60 in single member districts and 60 in one with nationwide multimember district. In the 3rd elections 108 representatives were elected, of which 80 in one nationwide electoral district from closed party list, and 28 in single member districts with plurality vote. From the 4th elections in 2000 Croatia adopted PR, electing 140 members of

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parliament from closed party lists, in 10 electoral districts with a threshold of 5%, where D’Hondt’s formula is used for calculation of the seats won.

Macedonia in 1990 and 1994 elected 120 members of Parliament with absolute majority vote in single member districts (Skarik 2005; Siljanovska 2005). In 1998 the country experimented with a mixed system, electing 85 representatives in SMD plurality vote, and 35 from a closed party lists in one nationwide district. From 2002 Macedonia adopted PR, electing 20 representatives from 6 districts with no threshold and using D’Hondt’s formula to calculate the seats won by individual parties.

The similar development of the electoral system and similar end points, in the three countries, should control for the influence of the electoral system in terms of volatility and party stability. In that respect the results in the three countries should be quite similar. It is also quite important to note that the trends in voter turnout in Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia are roughly similar, as seen in graph 1. This indicates that the electoral outcomes are not upset in any of the three countries by variations in the turnout, as a factor on the demand side of the electoral process.

GRAPH 1 HERE On the other hand, while the electoral systems are similar, the socio-economic context is

a bit different across the countries. It would be safe to say that Croatia is most developed, among the three, then Bulgaria, and last is Macedonia. This is a conclusion observed from the results of their Human Development Index displayed in table 2.

TABLE 2 HERE The data from table 3 shows that Bulgaria is the biggest in size and in population, but all

three countries have similar population growth and literacy rate. Bulgaria and Macedonia seem quite similar in socio-economic. They have similar GDP per capita and infant mortality rates. Bulgaria and Macedonia also are more urbanized, while Croatia has a more balanced rural to urban population and is better economically and socially.

TABLE 3 HERE According to their latest census all countries are more or less ethnically diverse. The

results can be found in table 4. Macedonia is most ethnically diverse, where approximately a third of the population is made of non-majority communities. In that respect Albanians make for a quarter of the population and are a sizable non-majority ethnic community. In Bulgaria Turks make for over 9 percent of the population, while in Croatia Serbs account for over 4.5 percent. According to their ethnic and linguistic fractionalization indices the ethnic composition remained stable in Macedonia and in Bulgaria. On the other hand from the period from 1993-1998 the ethnic fractionalization in Croatia was cut in half. This was a result of the conflict in Croatia from 1991 to 1995, after which the Serbian population significantly decreased (Šiber 1997;

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Kasapović 2001). From the results in tables 5 and 6 one can conclude that Macedonia is most ethnically heterogeneous, and then comes Bulgaria, while Croatia has the least ethnic diversity.

TABLES 4, 5 AND 6 HERE

While institutionally the political parties in the three countries share the same environment, Bulgaria and Macedonia are similar in socio-economic terms. Macedonia and Croatia are both post-conflict countries. They both had experience with intrastate ethnic conflict, Croatia from 1991 to 1995 and Macedonia for several months in 2001. The conflict was in the early phases of the democracy building in Croatia, and in the later phases of the democratic development of Macedonia. The electoral system of both countries was changed in the post-conflict phase to closed list PR. Bulgaria, in absence of intrastate conflict experience acts as a control case for the post-conflict Croatia and Macedonia.

Similar to other post-conflict countries, the elections in Macedonia and Croatia are expected

to translate and embed the interethnic clashes into the political party arena. In that respect ethnic mobilization would be the main determinant of the party competition, while the legacy of fear would serve as the main instrument for mobilization.

But does this contribute to the instability of the electoral competition? If so, than electoral

volatility in Macedonia and Croatia is expected to be higher than in Bulgaria. Deriving from it political parties in Croatia and Macedonia would be less stable than in Bulgaria.

However, and counterintuitive, if the electoral translation of the conflict and ethnic

mobilization contribute to stable electoral competition, than the electoral volatility will be lower in Croatia and Macedonia than in Bulgaria. Deriving from it political parties in Croatia and Macedonia would be more stable than in Bulgaria.

IV. Results: electoral volatility and party stability in Croatia, Bulgaria and Macedonia

In the analysis I measure both the individual party volatility and the net volatility in Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia. Individual party volatility is captured through taking the electoral results of individual parties that appeared in more than two electoral cycles, calculating the mean and the standard deviation. A high standard deviation would indicate a higher individual volatility, and hence less stable political parties. The net volatility is calculated by summing the individual party volatility, calculating the mean and standard deviation. Again high standard deviation indicates more volatile electoral outcomes.

The data on electoral volatility was gathered from various chapters and articles dealing

with the political parties in Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia. This data was then cross checked with the electoral results from the archives of the Parties and Elections web site. For data on net volatility I rely mainly on calculations done by Lane and Errson (2007), Bochsler (2009) and my own calculations.

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Looking at the results in table 7 for the net volatility one can see that on average Bulgaria has the highest volatility (30.6), but almost the same as Macedonia (29.4), while Croatia is substantively lower (18). However the standard deviation in Bulgaria (15.6) is twice higher than compared to Macedonia (8.7) and Croatia (8.5). The electoral systems were changing in the various cycles, and for a better comparison one should see the volatility when the electoral systems were the same. At some point all three countries switched to closed list PR. In that respect the calculations for the net volatility under closed list PR show again that Bulgaria has higher net volatility than Macedonia and Croatia.

TABLE 7 HERE As a matter of fact once Macedonia and Croatia switched to closed list PR the net

volatility drops. The average volatility under closed list PR in Croatia (16.8) and in Macedonia (23.4) is lower than in previous single member district or mixed electoral systems. Also the standard deviation under closed list PR both in Croatia (5.9) and in Macedonia (4.2) is lower than under the previous electoral systems. In short, post-conflict Croatia and Macedonia are more stable than Bulgaria. What is also puzzling is how volatility in Croatia and Macedonia decreases under closed list PR, while in Bulgaria it increases.

This is contradictory to studies explaining the effects of various electoral designs on

electoral volatility (LeDuc et al 1996; Lijphart 1994; Katz 1997; Norris 2004; Lane and Errson 2007; Rose and Munro 2009). It is usually assumed that when the electoral design changes from majortitarian to proportional than the electoral volatility increases. It is worthwhile pointing here that both Macedonia and Croatia introduced closed list PR after their intrastate conflict was resolved. Hence the first post-conflict elections were held under PR. One of the outcomes was that net volatility decreased, and it seems that Macedonia and Croatia became more stable afterwards when compared to Bulgaria.

This finding is again confirmed when looking at the individual party volatility per

country. The individual party volatility in Croatia is given in table 8. It shows that only HDZ and SDP, the only two parties that appeared on all elections, have a high individual volatility. HDZ on averages received 37.4 percent of the votes, with a standard deviation of 7.72. In the same time SDP received on average 23.9 percent of votes during elections, with a standard deviation of 14.2. The average of all party means is 11.44 with a standard deviation of 4.63, as a crude measure of the individual party stability in Croatia. This means that a single party on average in Croatia would receive about 11 percent, a result that could vary by 4.6.

TABLE 8 HERE The results for individual party volatility in Macedonia are given in table 9. They show

that the two parties that appear in all elections are quite stable. In that respect VMRO-DPMNE on average wins 29.42 percent of the electorate with a standard deviation of 10.6. In the same time SDSM wins 28.1 percent of the votes, with a standard deviation of 6.6. The other parties are even more resilient showing even less variance in their electoral results. The average of all party means is 11 with a standard deviation of 4.8. Again, as a crude measure of party stability, it

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signifies that on average a party in Macedonia would receive about 11 percent, which could vary up to 4.8. These results are very similar as in Croatia can be found in table 9.

TABLE 9 HERE The results for individual party volatility in Bulgaria are given in table 10. They show

that the parties are more volatile and less stable than in Croatia and in Macedonia. In that respect there are three parties that appear in all elections. SDS on average received 25.6 of the votes, with a standard deviation of 16.5, while BSP on average received 30.2 percent of the votes with a deviation of 16.5. Only the DPS has a greater consistency of electoral support. On average DPS received 8.7 percent of the votes, with a deviation of 3.4. This is probably due to the fact that the DPS is a party that represents ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and thus has a solid voter base (Karasimeonov 1999, 2005, 2007; Birnir 2007: 114-148). In any event the average of all party means in Bulgaria is 12.9 with a standard deviation of 7.6. As a crude measure of individual party stability, it shows that individual parties in Bulgaria are less stable than in Croatia and in Macedonia.

TABLE 10 HERE This is an interesting finding as Bulgaria is a new post-communist democracy, same as

Croatia and Macedonia, but which did not experience an intrastate conflict. In that respect one would expect lower electoral volatility and higher party stability in Bulgaria than in Croatia and Macedonia. It is even more interesting, and counterintuitive, that the electoral volatility decreased in Croatia and in Macedonia in the post-conflict period. To see how electoral competition evolves in post-conflict settings I will take Croatia for a case study.

Croatia had a far more intense interethnic conflict than Macedonia. In the same time

Croatia is a crucial case to study the intertwining of intrastate conflict and electoral competition. The country held elections before, during and after conflict. In the next part I will try to show that the interethnic conflict to a large extent was embedded in the electoral competition. To some extent it can be seen in the changes of the electoral design, but even more in the content and structuring of the competition. However these effects have not been detrimental for the stabilization and democratization of the country.

V. Case study: Elections and parties in Croatia

Croatia is an interesting and a complex case of a democratizing country. It did not just have a regime transition. The country also gained national independence while having an intrastate ethnic conflict and being involved in another interethnic conflict in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatian political scientists are very cautious to point to the complexity of the early period of the countries’ democratization process (Kasapović and Zakošek 1997; Šiber 1997, 2007; Kasapović 2001; Zakošek 2001). Notwithstanding that for Croatian academics there seems to be little doubt that the intrastate conflict was an important episode in the electoral competition and party stability, up today there are still confronting views among Serbs and Croats as to why did the conflict started and who is to blame (Belajac and Zunec 2009). It is

14

important to note that the conflict significantly changed the demographic composition of Croatia. Namely before the conflict Serbs made around 12 percent of the population, while after the conflict their share dropped to 4.5 percent (Šedo 2010: 83).

The first multiparty elections were held in 1990 when the country was still part of

Yugoslavia. Therefore some researchers treat these elections as pre-founding (Kasapović 2001). The electoral system was single member district, with an absolute majority needed for victory. The main political and voter divisions were about the future status of the country, whether Croatia should stay within Yugoslavia or become independent (Šiber 1997, 2007; Šiber and Welzel 1997; Kasapović 2001). In that respect the electoral competition may be described as between anticommunist and communist or between Croatian nationalism and Croatian Yugoslavism. HDZ was the main proponent of the first view, while the reform communist SKH-PDP (latter transformed to SDP) were the main proponents of the second.

HDZ mainly appealed to ethnic Croats demanding state independence, while SDP appeal

to voters to stay in some form as part of the Yugoslavian federation. In the 1990 parliamentary elections HDZ was mainly favored by Croats, while the SDP both by Croats and Serbs (Šiber and Welzel 1997). HDZ won with 41 percent of the vote, but SDP came strong in second place with 35 percent of the vote. It also had strong support in Serb municipalities and had many Serbs among its elected officials. Shortly after that Croatia declared independence and the intrastate conflict started. Not going into the details of why and how, the conflict can be describe as an interethnic conflict between the Croatian majority and the Serb minority. The Serbs had also the backing of Belgrade and the Yugoslavian army, which in the beginning of the conflict tried to act as a peacekeeper.

Political parties were not immune to the conflict. HDZ started to build the Croatian army

and invited all political parties in a government of national unity, which lasted from 1991 to the 1992 elections. In the same time the radical right HSP started to form paramilitary units which were involved in the fighting in Croatia, and later on in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the conflict was increasing the second parliamentary elections were held in 1992. The conflict “turned the first election into a pre-war election and the second into a post-war election; neither can be considered independent of the war” (Kasapović 1997: 77).

Actually the parliamentary elections in 1992 were held “after a ceasefire between

Croatian authorities and representatives of Serbian insurgents and after the arrival of international peacekeeping forces” (Kasapović 1997: 58). In the electoral campaign the opposition could not attack the government, as it was claimed that this would hurt the vital national interests. The electoral system from single member districts was changed to a mixed system “for political reasons” (Kasapović 1997: 61). The governing HDZ expected that the changes would increase their chances to win. The changes include gerrymandering of the voting districts as well. “Districts were formed in such way that they comprised a mixed electoral body of miscellaneous national composition, partiČularly of Croats and Serbs and also in such a way that no district had an absolute Serb majority” (Kasapović 1997: 63).

15

Further changes in the electoral system allowed the Croatian diaspora to vote, which mainly meant the Croats leaving in Bosnia and Herzegovina. HDZ expected the strong voter support from the diaspora for two reasons. First, it had a party branch in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1990, and second the HDZ led government and military forces got involved in the interethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the side of the ethnic Croats.

The election held during the intrastate conflict practically had no significant political divisions. Even though the government of national unity was dissolved there was a strong political consensus between the parties to support the government in the evolving civil war. The threat and high insecurity galvanized the support for the ruling HDZ. It portrayed itself as the only defender of the newly independent Croatia to the point that some claim that it look more as a national movement during these elections than a political party (Kasapović 1997, 2001; Čular 2001). Other also point that HDZ significantly referred to its war achievements and victories during the electoral campaign (Zakošek 1997). It is no surprise that it received 43 percent of the vote, while the second party at these election HSLS won 17.7 percent and the third HSP got 7.1 percent of the votes. Both parties were more similar to HDZ than opposition to it, in terms that there were no politically significant differences between them. On the other hand the support for SDP plummeted to 5.5 percent, which is a drop of almost 30 percent in a two year period! The main reason that SDP was supported by Serbs and included Serb candidates among its elected officials, as the interethnic conflict between Croats and Serbs was dramatically increasing. SDP had 11 elected candidates of which eight were Serbs and three Croats. At the start of the interethnic conflict SPD was a party representing Serbs. However as the ethnic hostilities and ethnic polarization was increasing the party leadership of SDP come out with a public statement “that it had no electoral mandate to be the chief political representative of the Serbs in Parliament and that it wanted its Serbian candidates to renounce their seats in Parliament or leave the party” (Kasapović 1997: 70). This request was not well received by the Serbian candidates; they kept their seats in Parliament and left the party. The parliamentary elections in 1995 were held after the military actions “Bljesak” (Flash) and “Oluja” (Storm). In these actions in several days the Croatian military forces practically destroyed the Serbian military forces in Croatia. Thanks to that military victory the government could control the whole territory of the country and claim full sovereignty. However after the two operations the ethnic Serbs massively left the country. The electoral design was marginally changed, the two tier system and electoral district were kept, but the distribution of seats between the majoritarian and proportional tier of the election was equalized.

Some claim that the election were rushed after the military operation because the ruling HDZ wanted to capitalize its military success in an electoral victory (Zakošek 2001; Čular 2001). HDZ also was supportive of civil organizations that were organized by the war veteran’s, families of victims and displaced people. The ruling party to a large extent built a wide network of clientelism and patronage to aid these groups, but also to have them as their strong voter base (Kasapović 2001). As President of Croatia Mr Franjo Tudzman, leader of HDZ, had the power to place ex-officio representatives in the second Chamber of the Parliament. In doing so he placed representatives of veteran’s groups, families of victims and displaced people in order to show the

16

government and party backing of these categories of victims from the conflict. Further on HDZ was deeply involved in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina backing the Croats there, which were the main electorate of the diaspora. Hence it is no wonder that it received 45 percent of the vote in the 1995 elections, while SDP got 8.9 percent.

The conflict ended in 1995 in Croatia; however the country had UN troops on its soil until 1998. The Serbs started slowly to return in 1997 and organize new political parties that would support their demands for reintegration and reinstutionalization in Croatia. There were also other Serbian parties which existed prior and during the conflict, however until 1997-1998 the Serbian minority was mobilized more military than politically. Therefore if one takes the end of the armed fighting as an end point, than the 1995 parliamentary elections are the first post-conflict elections. But if the stabilization and peaceful reintegration is taken as a start point then the 2000 parliamentary elections are the first post-conflict elections.

In these elections the electoral design was changed to full proportional. The governing HDZ as well as the opposition though that such a change would be to their advantage. There were several elements that characterize the elections. First, Tudjman was deceased which meant that HDZ was without its strong leader. Second, the opposition was united in a pre-electoral coalition and last but far from least the peace and stability was undisturbed. The conflict was finished in Croatia, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and while ethnic tensions and animosities were still high, there were no perceptions of threat or insecurity. The Serbs and other ethnic minorities voted for their own candidates in special districts, while the main electoral competition was between parties appealing mainly to ethnic Croats.

In that respect the main contenders for power in 2000 were HDZ and SDP. HDZ was still

hooked on symbolism of the conflict; again portraying its self more as a national movement capable to preserve the state. On the other hand SDP showed more interested in corruption and economical development. After 10 years of HDZ’s dominance the voters were ready for a change. SDP won the election with 40.8 percent, while HDZ received 24.4 percent of the vote. In a way HDZ did not lose as much as SDP won. From 1995 to 2000 SDP increased its support for over 30 percent of the electorate.

The intertwining of elections with the interethnic conflict had several implications for the

political parties. On one hand party politics and voter mobilization became ethnicized after the conflict (Zakošek 1997, 2001; Čular 2001). On the other hand, some parties had direct support for military formations during the conflicts and organization of victims after the conflict. In that respect HSP during the conflict was a political party with a military wing. HDZ organized the Croatian armed forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the conflict it provided material support and kept close cooperation with organizations of veterans, family of victims and displaced people. These organizations in a way became a flank of the party, and served as a strong voter base. The key of HDZ success in the 1992 and 1995 elections was that the party “presented itself as a key force in the fight gaining and sustaining the independence of Croatia” (Šedo 2010: 78).

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In the same time the conflict “contributed to the long term political and moral delegitimization of the left, which historically had been the chief promoter of Yugoslavism in Croatia. When Yugoslavism proved to be ideological and political source of the opposition to Croatian sovereignty, and the Yugoslavian central government the main instigator of military aggression on Croatia, the Croatian left was blamed as an accomplice and was constantly suspected of opposing nation-building” (Kasapović and Zakošek 1997: 30). Due to that SDP, as a communist successor party, had a very low voter support in 1992 and 1995. But the other parties (HSLS, HSS, HSP) that received more votes in those elections had similar policy positions as the ruling HDZ. Hence, SDP was the real alternative to HDZ, but was delegitimized due to its pre-conflict Serb support. Once peace was restored, the country was stable and secure SDP emerged as the main contender for power.

HDZ main strategy for attracting voters was to ethnically galvanize support during the conflict, for independence of Croatia, defense of the Fatherland and revoke memories of the NDH and “ustasha symbolism” (Zakošek 1997: 39).1 Today supporters of HDZ are still concerned about “the Croats in BiH and the protection of the dignity of the Patriotic War” (Stojarova 2010: 44). Hence due to the conflict the party adopted an electoral strategy to keep the military symbolism. However their electoral contenders were not the Serbs, but the other parties representing the Croats. SDP adopted the same tactic, but choose another theme. SDP answered with preserving the symbolism with the Partisans movement. During the Second World War the proponents of NDH and Ustasha were in conflict with the proponents of the Partisans. During the Second World War it was an armed intra-ethnic conflict between Croats.

Researches find that in Croatia family allegiance to one or the other armed movements

from the Second World War influences the contemporary voter choice. Namely family allegiance to the Ustasha and Domobran armed movements are more likely to vote for parties of the right namely HDZ and HSP, while family allegiance to the Partisans military movement are more likely to vote for left parties namely SDP (Šiber 2007; Stojarova 2010). Due to the interethnic conflict in Croatia HDZ electoral strategy was to portray themselves as war heroes, and in that respect their main competitor could only be another war hero which SDP provided with the Partisans symbolism.

Even today the electoral competition in Croatia is portrayed as ‘black’ – traditional color

of NDH and Ustasha, versus ‘red’ – traditional color of the Communists and Partisans. During the interethnic conflict HDZ adopted an ‘electoral militarism’ as the most profitable electoral strategy. Parties that finish second (HSLS) or third (HSP) did not differ significantly from HDZ. Only SDP had an alternative symbolic version of ‘electoral militarism’ which put the party as the main alternative to HDZ. Hence the structure of the electoral competition that developed during the conflict was also preserved after the conflict.

1 NDH was an independent Croatian state during the Second World War, allied to Italy and Germany. Domobrans were the armed forces that served as regular army of this state, while Ustasha were paramilitary forces made of ethnic Croats that fought for NDH committing atrocities against non-Croatian civilian population.

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VI. Conclusion

The electoral design in a post-conflict country does not shape the competition between the parties or better said it has the least influence on the structure of competition. The social heterogeneity that was relevant for the conflict has far more potential to be influential in the party competition. In that respect interethnic conflicts easily transfer into ethnic mobilization, often despite the institutional incentives to overcome such outcomes.

Whether post-conflict elections contribute to the containment or prolongation of the conflict is a function of the strategy of the political parties. HDZ used the conflict to increase its voter support. Ethnic mobilization, military victories and legacies of fear were the most profitable electoral strategies during the interethnic conflict and soon after its finish. However the legacies of those strategies remained. For the purposes of electoral competition parties symbolically present themselves as warring parties. It does not necessarily mean that the conflict is prolonged. Rather the continuation is symbolically preserved as an efficient strategy of the political party for voter mobilization.

In post-conflict Croatia the most successful strategies of the political parties was to cloak the elections as a prolongation of the conflict. This strategy shaped the party competition. It was the political parties’ strategy to structure the competition using the interpretations of the past conflict. In that respect the elections are not fought between two contenders aspiring to come to power; but the elections are fought between two warring sides, war heroes. Therefore the electoral appeal of the parties is not based on policy proposals, but on emotions and identities.

The voter support in Croatia is built on legacies of fear deriving from the conflict. And

the projection of the fear is not necessarily against the significantly “other” from the interethnic conflict, but against the significant “other” from the political conflict – which in reality is no more than an electoral competitor. The main political competitors come from the same ethnic group, hence the intra-ethnic competition increases. Actors and issues are defined during the conflict. Parties symbolically use ‘electoral militarism’ as an efficient and successful electoral strategy. This stabilizes the electoral competition and is not detrimental for the future of the country. At least this was the case in Croatia.

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Appendix. Tables and graphs.

Table 1. Electoral formula and ballot structures in Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia

ELECTIONS CYCLES

Electoral Formula and

Ballot structure 1 2 3 4 5 6 N

SMD, Candidate

Croatia 1990; Macedonia

1990 Macedonia

1994

3

Mixed (SMD/PR),

Candidate/Closed party

list Bulgaria 1990; Croatia 1992

Croatia 1995; Macedonia

1998

4

PR, Closed party list

Bulgaria 1991 Bulgaria 1994

Bulgaria 1997; Croatia 2000; Macedonia

2002

Bulgaria 2001; Croatia 2003; Macedonia

2006

Bulgaria 2005; Croatia 2007; Macedonia

2008 11

SMD – single member districts; PR – proportional representation, sources: Stojarova et al. (2007); Karasimeonov (2004, 2005, 2007) and Savkova (2006) for Bulgaria; Kasapović (2000) and Čular (2005) for Croatia; Skarik (2005), Siljanovska (2005) and Georgiev (2007) for Macedonia.

Graph 1. Voter turnout in last 6 cycles of elections in Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia

Sources: Stojarova et al. (2007) and Parties and elections web site (www.parties-and-elections.de) (accessed on February 22, 2010)

20

Table 2. Human development index in Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia

Human Development Index

1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007

Croatia 0.817 0.811 0.837 0.862 0.867 0.871

Macedonia

0.782 0.8 0.81 0.813 0.817

Bulgaria

0.803 0.829 0.835 0.84

Source: United Nations Statistics Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/statistics.htm (accessed on February 18, 2010)

Table 3. Economic and social indicators for Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia

GDP per capita in US $ (2008)

Infant mortality (2005-2010)

Urban rate (2009)

Rural rate (2009)

Literacy rate (2009)

Population in '000 (2009)

Annual population growth

Unemployment (2008)

Croatia 15,677 6 57 43 99 4,416.20 -0.2 8

Bulgaria 6,573 12 71 29 98 7,544.60 -0.6 6

Macedonia 4,407 15 67 33 97 2,042.50 0.1 34

Source: United Nations Statistics Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/statistics.htm)

Table 4. Comparison of the ethnic composition

Bulgaria 2001 census Croatia 2001 census Macedonia 2002 census

Bulgarians 83.9 Croats 89.6 Macedonians 64.2

Turks 9.4 Serbs 4.5 Albanians 25.2

Roma 4.7 Bosniaks 0.5 Turks 3.9

Other 2 Hungarian 0.4 Roma 2.7

Slovene 0.3 Serb 1.8

Other 5.9 Other 2.2

Table 5. Comparison of ethnic fractionalization indices

1989-93 1993-98 1999-2002 2003-07

Croatia 0.3657 0.1848 0.1912 0.1917

Bulgaria 0.2548 0.2658 0.2821 0.2828

Macedonia 0.5303 0.5012 0.5074 0.5183 Source: Campos, Nauro, Saleh, Ahmad and Vitaliy Kuzeyev, "Dynamic Ethnic Fractionalization and Economic Growth," mimeo, October 2009

21

Table 6. Comparison of linguistic fractionalization indices

1989-93 1993-98 1999-2002 2003-07

Croatia 0.0763 0.0779 0.0763 0.0763

Bulgaria 0.2622 0.2985 0.3030 0.3130

Macedonia 0.4703 0.5024 0.5019 0.5028 Source: Campos, Nauro, Saleh, Ahmad and Vitaliy Kuzeyev, "Dynamic Ethnic Fractionalization and Economic Growth," mimeo, October 2009

Table 7. Electoral volatility in Croatia, Bulgaria and Macedonia

Volatility 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean all Std Dev Mean PR Std Dev PR

Bulgaria 14.3 21.1 23.1 47.9 46.8 30.64 15.60 30.64 15.60

Croatia 30.1 9.5 23.5 14.5 12.4 18.00 8.55 16.80 5.90

Macedonia 39.4 37.3 25.3 26.5 18.65 29.43 8.71 23.48 4.23

Sources: Lane and Ersson (2007), Bochsler (2009) and own calculations

Table 8. Individual party volatility in Croatia, 1990 – 2007

1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 2007 Mean Std Dev

HDZ 41.9 43.2 45.2 24.4 33.9 36 37.43 7.72

SDP 35 5.5 8.9 40.8 22.6 30.8 23.93 14.29

HSLS 17.7 11.6 4.1 6.4 9.95 6.04

HSP 7.1 5 5.3 6.4 3.4 5.44 1.42

ZL 18.3 15.6

8.48 9.85

HSS 4.3 7.2 5.75 2.05

HNS 6.7 8 6.7 7.13 0.75

IDS 3.2 1.5 2.35 1.20

HSU 1.9 4 4 3.30 1.21

Others 7.8 10.8 11 12 12.8 9.4 10.63 1.80

AVERAGE

11.44 4.63

22

Table 9. Individual party volatility in Macedonia, 1990 – 2008

1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2008 Mean Std Dev

VMRO-DPMNE 24.8 17.9 28.1 24.4 32.5 48.8 29.42 10.64

SDSM 25.3 30.8 25.1 40.5 23.3 23.6 28.10 6.65

BDI 11.9 12.1 12.8 12.27 0.47

PDSH 5.2 7.5 8.3 7.00 1.61

PEI 1.2 1.5 1.35 0.21

PPD 23.5 8.3 19.3 2.3 0.5 10.78 10.22

SPM 4.7 4.7 2.1 3.83 1.50

DA 10.1 1.4 5.75 6.15

PDP 0.4 2.8 1.60 1.70

Others 3.2 27.4 5.1 10.1 9.4 4.5 9.95 8.98

AVERAGE

11.00 4.81

Table 10. Individual party volatility in Bulgaria, 1990 – 2009

1990 1991 1994 1997 2001 2005 2009 Mean Std Dev

NDSV 42.7 19.9 3 21.87 19.92

SDS 36.2 34.4 24.2 52.3 18.2 7.7 6.8 25.69 16.50

BSP 47.2 33.1 43.5 22 17.1 31 17.7 30.23 12.04

DPS 6 7.6 5.4 7.6 7.5 12.8 14.5 8.77 3.48

BE 5.5 1

2.17 2.93

BBB 1.3 4.7 4.9

2.73 2.46

BZNS 8 3.9

5.95 4.00

ATAKA 8.1 9.4 8.75 0.92

Others 1.3 19.7 15.7 7.7 13.5 8.9 4.8 10.23 6.43

AVERAGE

12.93 7.63

23

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