Kennan’s Containment: lost in translation application

On February 22nd 1946, US Deputy Chief of Mission to the Soviet Union George

F. Kennan wrote The Sources of Soviet Conduct, where he suggested that American

statesmen needed to address their communist ally the USSR with firmer policies through

a policy of ‘containment’. Forty years later, he reflected on the policy and its outcome, 1

claiming it “seemed to be an approach that carried them away from the sterner

requirements of political realism and caused their statements and actions, however

impressive to the domestic political audience, to lose effectiveness in the international

arena.” Did Kennan reverse on his own policy? No. Rather, he pointed out how 2

statesmen decided to redefine his international political strategy to suit their domestic

needs.

In the document that would later be known as the Long Telegram, Kennan

advised the Truman Presidential Administration on how the US should shape its foreign

policy with regards to the communist USSR. He portrayed Soviet policies as territorially

and ideologically expansive and therefore could not see the peaceful coexistence as a

possibility. The only way the US could deal with the USSR was through a policy of 3

Containment, which would respond to “signs of encroaching upon interests of a peaceful

and stable world” with “unalterable counterforce.” As outlined by Kennan, this policy 4

was meant to avoid war at all costs through economic and diplomatic means. This

1 George F. Kennan (writing as ‘X’), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947), 566­82. 2 Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985), 205. 3 Kennan (writing as ‘X’), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 580. 4 Ibid., 581.

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document strongly influenced US policy­making for the continuation of the Cold War, as

exhibited in cases such as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan used in Europe. When

exiting the European sphere, however, this policy had a new meaning: unanticipated

American military involvement in external affairs. This paper will use the cases of the

Cuban Missile Crisis, the Korean War and the Vietnam War to argue that the US

application the Containment policy outside of Europe was flawed, as it ignored two

critical components of the policy: (a) economic and diplomatic means were to be the

primary tools used, and military involvement was meant to be avoided, and as such (b)

containment was aimed at avoiding war rather than preparing for war. These cases will

be analyzed in order of increased magnitude: first, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which never

escalated to a hot war; second, the Korean war, which was fought on multilateral fronts;

and last, the bloody and unprecedented Vietnam war, which cost the US their

international reputation as the hegemonic pacifier.

The policy of Containment can be defined as the aim to keep communism from

spreading outside the borders of the USSR. In his document, Kennan explained that the

balance of power was divided in five spheres: the US, the UK, the Rhine Valley, Japan

and the USSR. In the post war period that Kennan was writing in, the only one of these

regions that was communist was the Soviet Union. His idea of national security was

based on the idea that no one country or group of countries could endanger US security. 5

As such, he argued that as long as communism did not expand to other regions, US

national security would not be threatened. This acted as the basis of containment.

5 Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy: 1945­50 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 27.

2

Containment was applied in different ways around the world, with a particular

contrast between how it functioned in Europe and the Third World. The end of the

Second World War gave the US an opportunity to change its policy of isolationism, and

gain from the reconstruction of Europe. The Kennan Telegram was applied to Europe

immediately. In 1947, the US made a promise to protect “free peoples” from “totalitarian

regimes,” known as the Truman Doctrine. One year later, the US extended this policy in 6

the form of $13 billion in aid to most countries in Europe, named the Marshall Plan. This 7

followed Kennan’s vision of containment because it worked under the key assumptions

that economic means were to be used before military ones, and that this kind of policy

would avoid war. How then, did the policy of containment become one of military

escalation and warfare, as exhibited in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Korean War and the

Vietnam War?

Once containment was applied to the Third World, economic means and

diplomacy were neglected, with US leaders jumping to the military option. These

aggressive ‘interventions’ were part of the US taking advantage of its position as a

hegemon, and spreading its influence in a neo­imperialistic manner to countries that were

just establishing themselves. The US perceived the age of decolonization as an

opportunity to establish itself as a free and pacifying nation, with military intervention

being a tool as good as any to achieve this. This method to assure influence would not

have been plausible in Europe, a continent that had established itself as a ‘civilized

entity’ long before the United States. Under this light, young and new states were

6 President Truman’s Message to Congress; March 12, 1947. 7 European Recovery Act, April 3, 1948.

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different. It was believed that they could easily be brought under the American wing

using harsher, more aggressive means. The same way European men suffered of the

White Man’s Burden, the US publicized its responsibility to protect Third World nations

that were vulnerable to the evils of socialism. Military means would ensure this, as was

the case in Cuba, Korea and Vietnam.

The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Quasi War

Cuba was a quintessential part of America helping the Third World with the, as

said by Kennan, “mystical, messianic movement” of communism. Furthermore, this 8

small island was many times named the US’ backyard because it was bound with

geographical contiguity in both the sense of location and distance. Communism so close 9

to home was seen as a threat to national security, justifying several CIA­led attempted

coups to overthrow the seemingly immortal Castro. Funnily enough, the Cuban missile

crisis barely involved Castro, at least insofar as this paper will analyze it. In fact,

President John F. Kennedy made no mention of the Cuban leader in his speech informing

the American people of the existence of Soviet missiles on their way to the island.

Instead, he told the “captive people of Cuba” how he had “watched with deep sorrow

how [their] nationalist revolution was betrayed and … fell under foreign domination.” 10

Castro’s administration was neglected, and the established regime was portrayed as being

forced by a foreign Soviet Union. This was significant in the context of the ‘X’ telegram,

8 Jerry F. Hough, “The ‘X’ Article and Contemporary Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in Vol. 2 of Containment: Concept and Policy, ed. Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1986), 290. 9 Louis A. Perez, Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and its Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 28. 10 John F. Kennedy, Speech to the American People, 22 October, 1962.

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as Soviet missiles in Cuba acted as the sphere of the USSR expanding into that of the

USA. Prior to the missile dispatch, the president had made it clear that a Cuban Soviet

socialist dictatorship would not be tolerated, having already “reverted to a policy of

containment against Cuban Communism.” In the light of the Soviet missiles on island, 11

the US had no choice but to deal with Russian presence in the American sphere of

influence.

Upon confirmation that a range of Soviet missiles were miles away from the

shores of Florida, with more being brought in, President Kennedy called for the

Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) to decide on how the

US should react. This committee met for 13 days, considering different approaches to the

crisis. The chosen path was to blockade the Soviet ships carrying missiles that were on

their way to Cuba. It is important to note that when the President announced US response

on television, on the 22nd of October, he called this intervention a quarantine instead of a

blockade. Despite being the same thing in practice, a blockade would have been 12

perceived as an act of war, hence against international law. 13

This kind of act was against the definition of containment that Kennan had

predicted because it was acted upon by military means without considering diplomacy

first. Though this conflict did not turn into a hot war, diplomatic solutions came

secondary as a foreign policy tool. The two leaders came to an agreement whereby the

11 Roscoe Drunmond, “Kennedy and Cuba … ‘Containment’ Is Not Enough,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, May 22, 1961. 12 David R. Gibson, “Decisions at the Brink,” Nature 487 (July 2012), 28. 13 Larman C. Wilson, “International Law and the United States Cuban Quarantine of 1962,” Journal of Inter­American Studies 7 (1965), 486.

5

USSR would remove missiles from Cuba, as long as the US removed theirs from Turkey.

It was thus resolved by diplomatic means. Nonetheless, this solution has often been 14

argued as resulting from the pressure of the possibility of a nuclear war. It took a US 15

blockade in international waters for the two leaders to reach an understanding.

Soviet missiles in Cuba did not threaten national security, meaning that

application of containment was not necessary in this case. “There is no military problem

in Cuba, this is a domestic, political problem,” was McNamara’s comment on the issue. 16

ExComm discussions had a generally understood that involvement in Cuba was for fear

of impeachment both by the American people and the international community. It was 17

for this reason that Kennedy felt the need to act in a manner that historian Gaddis has

termed strangelovian. While the Cuban blockade was filed under a policy of 18

containment, it fell far from Kennan’s original plan of how the policy should be applied.

Containment was meant to protect national security by maintaining an international

equilibrium, thus only to be implemented when a break in the equilibrium would threaten

the US. Soviet missiles in Cuba were not perceived as a danger, and therefore should not

have involved the US.

The Korean War: A Multilateral Preparation

14 Barton J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Perilous Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Later,” Arms Control Today 42 (October 2012), 42. 15 Richard M. Pious, “The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Limits of Crisis Management,” Political Science Quarterly 116 (Spring 2001), 89. 16 Richard M. Pious, “The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Limits of Crisis Management,” 84. 17 Ibid. 18 John Lewis Gaddis, Now We Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1997), 270.

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The Korean War was a different story, as the spreading of communism outside the

USSR’s sphere of influence was in fact viewed as a danger to US national security.

Kennan himself deemed the Far East to be an area of threatening instability. The 19

post­war established order had set a border between North and South Korea, known as

the 38th parallel. The North was led by Kim Il­sung, a Korean communist, and the South

by Syngman Rhee, a man who had rebelled against the Japanese during WWII who had

spent most of his life in exile. As a result of mutual raids across the parallel, tensions 20

grew. In July 1949, Kim attacked the South in the hopes of reunification. Influences of 21 22

the USSR in the North and the US in the South were subtle, but still there through their

approval of each side’s leader. Gaddis contributes to this view, arguing that it was the

sheer presence of one side that convinced the other to be there as well. Under the idea 23

that Soviet influence was spreading outside of its sphere of influence, the US had to

contain Korea. This was done through an increase in the amount of troops in Korea. 24

As follows, US policy sought military measures rather than diplomacy to restrain

the spread of communism. For this reason, as historian Akira Iriye furthers, containment

in Korea failed. The Long Telegram argued that neither the US nor the USSR could 25

continue fighting along truce lines of the Second World War, suggesting that ultimately

19 Kennan, “Resume of the World Situation,” in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, ed. Etzold and Gaddis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 95. 20 Gaddis, Now We Know, 70. 21 Ibid., 71. 22 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2011), 209. 23 Gaddis, Now We Know, 71. 24 Ibid. 25 Akira Iriye, “Asian Perspectives on Containment,” in Containment: Concept and Policy, 488.

7

some sort of withdrawal was necessary. This element was ignored, as the war was 26

fought on the 38th parallel, a border set by peace negotiations of WWII. Looking back on

the war, Kennan stated that he had only accepted forced arms in South Korea in June of

1950 because he thought it was for a limited purpose. Their prolonged stay went against 27

the original strategy of containment, which promoted the use of economic tools.

The best solution to containing communism in Korea was to use diplomatic or

economic means. In his telegram, Kennan explained that the US had a special ability to

operate overseas without the need of military involvement, and that the most effective

influence was done through economic power. In the context of Korea, Secretary of State 28

Dean Acheson very much agreed with Kennan. He believed that a revived Japanese

economy would link together nations that were suffering from socialist state­controlled

economies. However this kind of policy was interrupted by the perceived necessity to 29

intervene in the invasion by a communist North. This kind of response was in a way

condemned by the inventor of containment. In his memoirs, Kennan writes his opinion on

the Korean War, signaling the dangers in letting national policy be decided upon by

military considerations alone. He stressed that if the US had reached an understanding 30

with the USSR on the security of the Northwest Pacific Area, American troops in Korea

would have been unnecessary. 31

26 Ibid. 27 Kennan, Memoirs 1923­1963, (Boston Little: Brown, 1967), 23. 28 Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 30. 29 Cumings, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947­1950, vol. 2 of The Origins of the Korean War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 49. 30 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1923­1963, 38. 31 Ibid., 39.

8

Contrasting containment in Europe with that in Korea through the war reveals

outstanding inconsistency in American foreign policy. The numerous communist party

movements that were on the rise in Europe were contained through economic measures.

The Marshall Plan aimed to reconstruct post war Europe under the capitalist model,

believing that conflict was best avoided through economic growth. However it was only 32

after the Korean War that the US decided to follow this kind of policy­making in the

region. Bruce Cumings, a historian specializing in the Korean War, furthers this by

arguing that the war prevented American plans to “restitch … Japanese economic

relations with other parts of East Asia.” Containment by Kennan’s definition would 33

have applied the same tactic of the Marshall Plan to Korea, thus facilitating Korean and

Japanese trade links. In establishing economic growth, political (pro­capitalist) stability

would be achieved. This was done following the war, as the US economic aid to Korea in

the 1960s combined with Japanese economic influence pushed the economic growth to be

the most rapid in the world. This goes to show that Kennan’s containment was not 34

forgotten completely outside of Europe, but instead redefined. The strategy that

containment would focus on economic means rather than military ones was reversed in

the Third World.

The Vietnam War: Counter­insurgent Containment

In his memoirs, Kennan concludes his thoughts on the Korean War will a telling

statement, “little did I realize, in penning these passages, that I was defining, 15 years

32 Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, April 3, 1948. 33 Cumings, 220. 34 Ibid.

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before the event, my own position with relation to the Vietnam War.” The Vietnam War 35

was undoubtedly a mistake in policymaking on more than one level. Particularly in the

light of the original definition of containment, US strategy was completely inadequate. In

response to the French needing support to re­conquer Vietnam as a colony, the US

stepped in by creating an artificial nation, South Vietnam. Further, military personnel 36

was sent to train the South Vietnamese armed forces, which Assistant Chief of Staff for

Operations Lieutenant General James M. Gavin believed was relieved: they had avoided

ground troop commitment. As historian Spencer Tucker points out, it did the very 37

opposite. Sending troops to train an army for war is an act to prepare for war, rather than

avoid it. This was a blatant overlooking of Kennan’s definition of containment, as instead

of containing a communist North Vietnam through economic or diplomatic means, the

US reacted using its military resources. The way the US contained Vietnam was flawed

before the war had even started.

In fact, intervention in the Vietnam War was not much different from the war in

Korea, in the sense that Kennan’s original method to contain communism was reversed.

Military tactics preceded economic and diplomatic ones. In a review of historian’s

perspectives on US involvement in the region, historian George W. Hopkins argues that

military intervention was caused by a fear that successful communist regimes in

Southeast Asia would deny their resources and markets to both Japan and US. Similarly 38

35 Kennan, Memoirs 1925­1963, 59. 36 George W. Hopkins, “Historians and the Vietnam War: The Conflict Over Interpretations Continues,” Studies in popular Culture 23 (2000), 99. 37 Spencer Tucker, Vietnam (London: UCL Press, 1999), 82. 38 George W. Hopkins, “Historians and the Vietnam War: The Conflict Over Interpretations Continues,” 99.

10

to the case of South Korea, the US saw economic union of Vietnam with capitalist Japan

as beneficial to contain communism. However it was this very principle that pushed

military involvement. Rather than allocating funds to ensure a stable economy, hence a

population that would not stray towards communism, the US “Americanized” the war by

sending large troops to fight against the communist Viet Cong. 39

Diplomatic and economic solutions were essentially entirely ignored once the

commitment of troops was made. Operation Rolling Thunder, the sustained bombing of

North Vietnam beginning midway through the war, exemplified this. The US used

counterinsurgency tactics in the hopes that by killing off enough Viet Cong men, their

leader Ho Chi Minh would agree to negotiations. This logic followed the idea that in 40

having the lesser amount of deaths, the US would be able to negotiate from a position of

power, hence win the war. It was a fear of settling prematurely that caused President

Lyndon Johnson’s Secretary of State Dean Rusk to think that military action was needed

before political solutions could be considered. Once again, diplomacy was used after 41

military tools – the very opposite of Kennan’s original idea of containment.

This tactic of counterinsurgency was so ineffective that it caused the US to lose

most of its allies’ support in the second half of the war. In reviewing Fredrik Logevall’s

book, historian Richard Ned Lebow explains that key allies opposed Johnson’s escalation

of the war because firstly, they doubted how relevant South Vietnam was to Western

39 Ibid., 100. 40 Tucker, Vietnam, 113. 41 Richard Ned Lebow, “Choosing War: The Lost Change for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam,” review of Choosing War: The Lost Change for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, by Fredrik Logevall, Political Science Quarterly 114 (Winter 1999/2000), 605.

11

security, and secondly, they misread how military force would salvage a corrupt regime

and worsening political situation for the US. Britain, in particular, advised the US to 42

reach a peace settlement with the Viet Cong on the basis that “the Southeast Asian

conflict could lead to a world war.” This lack of support shows that the Vietnam War 43

did not follow a policy of containment, but rather fed off a hunger for a greater US

prestige in the international community. Now we know that this was counterproductive.

Once President Johnson had inherited the Vietnam War, national security was no

longer the leading factor for involvement. As such, the war was never in line with the

policy of containment as Kennan had originally created this strategy in order to protect

US national security. Following the failure of Operation Rolling Thunder, McNamara

had doubts about military intervention, as he understood that US involvement was not

based on protecting national security but rather the idea that Johnson was not willing to

lose in Vietnam. Similarly to Kennedy’s need to act on Soviet missiles in Cuba for 44

domestic politics, Johnson was basing the Vietnam War on public opinion. When

deliberating for how long Rolling Thunder should be paused, he argued, “If we hold off

this bombing any longer, people are going to say, ‘What in the world is happening?’ –

Why aren’t you hitting North Vietnam harder, Mr. President?” Johnson carried the 45

weight of the next elections on his shoulders, which affected his handling of the war.

42 Ibid. 43 “Vietnam: Britain seeks peace talks,” The Globe and Mail, November 27, 1965. 44 Fredrik Longevall, Choosing War: The Lost Change for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999), 127. 45 Brian Vandemark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Oxford: University Press, 1995), 140.

12

When confronted with British pressure to reach a settlement, Johnson responded

claiming that North Vietnam had not shown any interest in negotiations, and that despite

the US being eager for “an honorable settlement” bombing in the region would continue.

This aggressive stance was based on a desire to seem courageous and firm in 46

negotiations, especially given the US was dealing with a smaller country in the Third

World. Any other position would have seemed humiliating to Johnson hence stopping

him from being re­elected. This is made clear in his speech on March 31st, 1968. He

announced that the US would limit the war as well as his decision not to seek re­election.

As soon as Johnson stopped pursuing further re­election, his foreign policy strategy 47

changed. While the entire war was not sponsored in order for the president to be

re­elected, the hostile bombing tactic was. This went against the principles of

containment because firstly, it was a military act in itself, and secondly, it was not done

to achieve national security but rather a supportive public opinion.

Containment?

US involvement in Cuba, Korea and Vietnam fell far from following Kennan’s

idea of Containment. First, containment was based on the idea of that it would protect

national security, the cases of Cuba and Vietnam failed. Particularly in Cuba, national

security was a secondary priority. In Vietnam, though a threatened national security may

have begun the war, it was Lyndon’s concern for re­election that caused for its

unprecedented escalation. Second, Kennan stressed that economic and diplomatic means

46 United States – Vietnam Relations 1945­1967. Settlement of the Conflict. Negotiations, 1965­67: The Public Record. Found in Pentagon Papers, Part VI. A., 5. 47 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968­9. Volume I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), 469­476.

13

were to precede military intervention. All three cases failed in this regard, considering the

Cuban Missile Crisis saw a blockade before negotiations ever started; the communist

threat in Korea was met with forces rather than economic aid to ensure trade and stability

with a neighboring Japan; and the Vietnam War was based on the concept that with

unparalleled military action by the US would cause for the Viet Cong’s surrender, hence

reach diplomatic negotiations. The third and last idea of Kennan’s policy that was largely

ignored by US policy in these cases was that containment was meant to prevent war

rather than prepare for war. Though the Cuban conflict did not escalate into a war, this

was not because of US foreign policy being preventative in respects of tensions with the

Soviet Union. The wars of Korea and Vietnam, on the other hand, saw US foreign policy

preparing for war, with troops being sent to South Korea at the roots of the internal

conflict, and military personnel arriving in Vietnam to train the South Vietnamese army.

The definition of containment shifted significantly from its inception to its largest

campaign, the Vietnam War, ending in 1975. In its early days, containment, and most of

US foreign policy, focused primarily on Europe. The ‘X’ Telegram was still fresh out of

the oven, with Kennan’s ideas resting clearly in policymakers’ minds. Containment was

meant to protect national security in preventing war, hence seeking economic and

military means. When communism began to grow outside the Soviet Union, US policy

had to involve itself in ex­colonial regions. This was a different ball game, as there would

have been more flexibility and opportunity to establish liberal democracies. The US

started a number of campaigns that would save young, still developing, nations from the

evils of communism. A perfect example of this was Kennedy’s message in the height of

14

the October Crisis to the Cuban people, said to have fallen under “foreign domination.” 48

Containment was different. White gloves were taken off: communism was to be fought

without compromise and from a position of power, which could only be achieved through

military means.

It is important to note that the world order did shift significantly since Kennan

originally coined the policy of containment. The five ‘regions’ he had expressed in 1947,

the United States, the United Kingdom, the Rhine valley, the Soviet Union and Japan,

were no longer applicable to the international arena in the 1960s or 1970s. Nonetheless,

Kennan’s views remained the same forty years later. He explain that the US had misused

the policy, redefined it to suit each president’s international and domestic prestige. The 49

Cuban Missile Crisis, the Korean War and the Vietnam War were pursued as a policy of

containment, consequentially tainting the original definition of US foreign policy.

However the flaw was not in Kennan’s policy, but rather how future statesmen decided to

apply and redefine his policy.

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