Labour and Europe: A Survey of MPs and MEPs

message is that the report is not the end of the story. It must not be. These great constitutional questions-f true minis- terial responsibility, of freedom of infor- mation, of an accountable and responsive Civil Service-are not and cannot be questions for a judge. The judge as inves- tigator and author can lay down quietly and clearly and in incomparable detail what has happened in the past, and where we have gone wrong. He can, in short, identify the gaps and silences that need to be filled. But the filling itself must come from another source. This is where the history and the substance of the Scott Report meet with its conse-

quences. That source is Parliament. Just as the Scott story is one of parliamentary failure, so too is it an essential reminder that only in the heat of Parliament, un- fashionable as it may be to say so, can we find the means for returning to a culture where the Government is made accountable to the Constitution, and not the other way around.

Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions, Sir Richard Scott, V-C. London: HMSO, 15 February 1996. 6 vols (incl. index and appendices), f45.00. HC (1995-96) 115. ISBN 0 10 262796 7.

Labour and Europe: A Survey of MPs and MEPs DAVID BAKER, ANDREW GAMBLE, STEVE LUDLAM and DAVID SEAWRIGHT

THE raw nerves of division within the Conservative Party over European integration, with such consequent problems for party management, are well docu- mented. Nor is there any dispute that Labour divisions over European integration exist: the conundrum relates to the extent of those divisions and the degree to which they could obstruct a future Labour Government. Tony Blair is often quick to denounce Tory claims of greater division within Labour ranks, as for example in his address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in April 1995: 'Of course, Conservatives are fond of pointing out that there are divisions in the Labour Party too. This is a glib line. First, the Labour divisions, unlike the Tory ones, are largely part of the past.'

0 The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996

And a Shadow front-bench spokesperson echoed such sentiments: 'Of course, there are differences of opinion on Europe, but I think it is important to recognise where they fall and how politically sigrulicant they are. There is no way we ever look like the bastard tendency, there is no way such views would enter into the hierar- chy of the party, into the Shadow Cabinet and so on; there is no way you will find the venomous hatred of Europe that you will find if you scratch Mr Lilley or Mr Portillo, and that is one of the real differences."

This article, which is based upon data from our recent survey of Labour MPs and MEPs conducted between November 1995 and February 1996, sets out to inves- tigate such claims. Are the divisions

REPORTS AND SURVEYS 353

within Labour largely part of the past, of such marginal political significance that an incoming Labour Government will not fear being derailed by them? Can we accept this view of a ‘rosy‘ future for Labour over Europe?

From hostility to enthusiasm

First, we should briefly review this division within Labour that Tony Blair con- fidently asserts is confined to history. Paradoxically, political scientists have seen postwar conflict over Europe as more damaging for Labour than for any other party. So bitter was the rift in the 1960s that the Tribune Group put Reg Prentice on its slate, ignoring his ’ultra- right wing’ views because he was a passionate opponent of the Common Market, even though this decision pro- voked some other Tribune Group members to resign. Europe, too, lay behind Harold Wilson’s problems of Govem- ment and party management. Wilson’s famous ‘zigzags‘ on Europe (no in 1962, qualified yes in 1966, no in 1971, yes in 1975) were largely motivated by whether the party was in or out of power at the time, while the 1975 referendum was principally designed to keep a deeply divided party from splitting. The depth of this division can be seen from the fact that sixty-nine Labour Mps defied a three-line whip to vote for the second reading of the 1971 Treaty of Accession Bill, with a further twenty abstaining. This act of defiance exceeded even the Conservative rebellion over the Maastricht Bill-on which Labour, it should be noted, had sixty-six third reading rebels. Indeed, without this revolt in 1971, the Parliamentary Labour Party and thurty-nine Tory rebels could have defeated Heath. Serious public divisions within and between the Labour Party National Executive and the Cabinet dogged the 1975 referendum campaign. Moreover, following the 1976 party con-

354 DAVID BAKER BT AL.

ference decision to oppose direct elections to the European Parliament, the Callaghan Government had to rely on Conservative support to steer the Eur- opean Assembly Elections Bill through the Commons.

Labour finally split in 1981. After the 1979 election the party conference imme- diately voted to withdraw from the Com- munity, this time without a referendum. This decision prompted the electorally damaging departure of the future leaders of the SDP, followed by many of the party’s ardent pro-marketeers-although some, like Hattersley and &dice, stayed. The high-water mark of anti-European sentiment was reached with the 1983 manifesto pledge to withdraw from the Community.

Neil Kinnock’s leadership effected a slow reversal of this position. Austin Mitchell, a Labour sceptic, summed up the process thus: ’By 1984 we were not for withdrawal any longer but for a renegotiation of the Treaty of Rome . . . The drift was quite gradual: in 1987 we were pro-Europe, by 1992 we were enthusiastic about Europe, and [in 19951 positively bubbling with enthusiasm.’ Mitchell saw the change of stance as motivated in part by a perception by the trade unions that ’Europe was a way forward for them’. Others believe that many Labour parliamentarians have become convinced that Europe is the only game in town and that the old anti-Europeanism has been shown not to be a viable posture, leaving the sceptics embittered but largely marginalised. Neil Kinnock, John Smith and now Tony Blair appear to have succeeded in turning Labour into a broadly pro-integrationist European social democratic party.

One leading Labour Peer, Baroness Tessa Blackstone, insisted in 1994 that while Labour may have ‘its Euro-sceptics . . . they are mainly extinct volcanoes with little or no influence’. However, one of those volcanoes, the former Labour Common Market Safeguards


Committee, now the Labour Euro-Safe- guards Campaign, may be showing signs of erupting. It claimed to have just under a quarter of the parliamentary party as paid-up members in 1990; it still pub- lishes a regular newsletter and publicly acknowledges parliamentary influence both in the Lords (Jay and Stoddart) and in the Commons (Benn, Mitchell, Shore, Spearing and Davies)-and even in the European Parliament (Megahy and Seal). Moreover, as recently as March 1996 the Guardian reported that fifty MPs were warning that the ’silence and obedience are beginning to fray’ over the issue of a single currency.

In short, there appears to remain a detectable unease in Labour’s efforts to balance the role of the nation-state with that of European integration. In the remainder of this article we use our survey results to analyse the extent of this unease and division among Labour parliamentarians, both within and between frontbench MPs, backbench Mps and MEPs. We also analyse a ‘cohort effect’ which compares the attitudes of MPs elected to Parliament before the high-water mark of Labour Euro- scepticism in 1983 with the subsequent ‘slow reversal‘ periods of 1987 and 1992. These methods will together establish whether Labour really is a party ’positively bubbling with enthusiasm’ for Europe, its divisions confined largely to the past.

To leave or not to leave?

Labour policy on Europe has zigzagged between a desire for membership of the European club and a desire to withdraw. The underlying argument has concerned the sovereignty issue, the role of Parlia- ment vis-2-vis the European institutions. At the peak of Labour anti-Europeanism in 1983 the party took the view (sti l l espoused by the Euro-sceptic wing), that the European treaties strike at the


heart of British parliamentary sovereignty. They believe that not only an incoming Labour Government but any Government will now be bound by a previous Parliament’s actions, particularly those concerned with European policy: a fundamental deviation from parliamentary sovereignty. On the other hand, the enthusiasts are quite sanguine about the notion of federalism. They do not view the developments in the treaties as undermining the idea of the nation- state; for them the idea is one of disper- sing power downwards, although the term ’federalism’ itself remains a Euro- sceptical shibboleth.

In Tables 1-6 we view the responses of MPs, both backbenchers and frontbenchers, along with those of MEPs, to issue statements over Europe.

Table 1 shows just how striking the success of the slow reversal policy of the 1980s was. We see that the dumping of the 1983 manifesto commitment on withdrawal has near-unanimous support, with an overwhelming majority against withdrawal and an overwhelming majority believing that membership is even more necessary in a global economy (statements 1.1, 1.4). But this is tempered by a more cautious outlook which suggests that the parliamentarians are only just convinced of the overall historical advantages of membership (statement 1.2). On the thorny issue of sovereignty (statement 1.5) a majority do believe it can be pooled; but sigruficantly a substantial number of backbenchers are more circumspect, particularly more so than their counterparts in Europe or on the front bench. However, there appears to be little support for explicitly reasserting the legislative authority of Westmin- ster (statement 1.6).

Periodically Tony Benn has presented a Bill in the House which would provide for the establishment of a Common- wealth of Europe. He outlined its main points in July 1995. It would, he said, ’set up a European community covering


Table 1 Membership and sovereignty

Status Strongly agree or

agree Y O

Neither

YO

~~

Disagree or strongly disagree

YO

1.1 Britain should withdraw from the European Union

1.2 The disadvantages of EC membership have been outweighed by the benefits

1.3 The EU should be replaced by a Commonwealth of Europe based on sovereign nation-states

1.4 The globalisation of economic activity makes EU membership more, rather than less necessary for the UK

1.5 Sovereignty cannot be pooled

1.6 An Act of Parliament should be passed to establish explicitly the ultimate supremacy of Parliament over EU legislation

1.7 Subsidiarity reinforces the federalist tendency in the EU

M P 7 MEP 7 Back 9 Front 0 M P 52 MEP 59 Back 55 Front 38 M P 14 MEP 10 Back 19 Front 0 M P 88 MEP 86 Back 83 Front 100 M P 30 MEP 14 Back 34 Front 20 M P 18 MEP 12 Back 23 Front 0 M P 36 MEP 32 Back 40 Front 30

3 0 5 0

11 0

11 14 12 4

11 10 2 0 3 0

11 14 10 15 18 11 19 17 32 22 35 25

90 93 86 100 37 41 34 48 74 86 70 90 10 14 14 0

59 72 56 65 64 77 58 83 32 46 25 45

Source: Labour Parliamentarians and European Integration Survey, ESRC/Nottingham Trent University, 1995-6.

fifty-one countries. It would have a char- ter of rights, a council of ministers, it would have an assembly and it would harmonise by consent. It would be a mini United Nations. I think it would really work, but this [the EU institutions] won’t work.’ Unfortunately for Mr Benn, most of his colleagues do not share this view (statement 1.3).

As noted above, the term ’federalism’ has been incorporated into the pejorative lexicon of British political discourse. Col- loquially, it has been referred to as the

’dreaded F-word’. With this in mind we see that the party is evenly split over the idea that subsidiarity will reinforce the federalist tendency within the EU (statement 1.7). Forty per cent of backbenchers agree with a statement perceived to be a Euro-sceptic shibboleth.

EMU taking flight or dead as a dodo? Economic and monetary union is one of the most important issues facing the

356 DAVID BAKER BT AL. 0 The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996

Table 2 Economic and monetary union

Status Strongly Neither Disagree or agree or strongly agree disagree

% % %

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

The establishment of a single EU currency would signal the end of the UK as a sovereign nation

There should be a national referendum before the UK enters a single currency

EMU is: (a) not realisable

EMU is: (b) not desirable

The UK should not seek to meet the EMU convergence criteria if the result is increased unemployment in Britain

A single currency as set out in the Maastricht Treaty will institutionalise neo-liberal economic policy in Britain

Britain should accept a common European currency but not a single currency

Britain should never permit its monetary policy to be determined by an independent European central bank

Membership of some sort of ERM is essential in the fight against currency speculation

Britain should never rejoin the E M

M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front MP MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front

21 18 28 0

50 28 56 35 24 14 28 15 16 14 23 0

78 64 81 71 29 24 31 29 26 11 32 10 42 21 44 40 66 78 64 71 12 14 15 5

5 4 6 0

10 31 10 15 12 7

11 15 18 7

17 21 16 20 13 24 33 21 37 19 39 33 38 37 20 18 22 15 13 4 9

24 7

11 8 5

74 78 66

100 40 41 34 50 64 79 61 70 66 79 60 79 6

16 6 5

38 55 32 52 35 56 30 53

61 34 45 21 18 27 5

81 75 77 90

38


Q The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996 REPORTS AND SURVEYS 357

member states of the European Union. Tony Blair has referred to it as the hard issue, there being no doubt that monetary union would be an important step on the road to integration. For Mr Blair there is only one immediate question on EMU ‘Is it inconsistent with the nation state?’ If it is, then the Labour Party would reject it, even if it were economically prudent to join. But if it is not, as Labour believes it is not, then it is important for the British Government to participate fully in the formulation of its institutions and its structures, while making the final decision on whether to join on the basis of the national economic interest. These caveats show that there is still a perceptible unease in Labour’s efforts to balance the role of the nation-state with that of Eur- opean integration. This unease is strik- ingly apparent from the equivocation practised by the leadership over the question of a national referendum on a single currency.

Of further interest are the different priorities placed upon EMU by its propo- nents and its opponents. Supporters of monetary union point to its beneficial aspects, for example, currency stability militating against currency speculation. Its opponents, on the other hand, voice acute concern over the constraints placed upon an incoming Labour administration by monetary and fiscal limits, particularly from an independent European central bank. Their argument raises the possibility of Labour not being able to legislate if it had a future opportunity comparable to that of the 1945 Attlee Government. In the words of the Safeguards Campaign‘s Summer 1995 newsletter, ’There will be no escape route out of a single currency, like there was from the ERM. Britain would be truly trapped; and the Labour Party, in any remotely socialist form, redundant. We would not be able to func- tion as a democratic socialist party.’

Judging by the results in Table 2, a majority of Labour parliamentarians, in line with Tony Blair, do not believe that

358 DAVID BAKER ET AL.

the establishment of a single currency is inconsistent with the UK as a sovereign nation-state (statement 2.1). Moreover, most regard EMU as not only feasible but desirable, as reflected in the number believing that some sort of exchange rate mechanism membership is necessary in the fight against currency speculation and the small number which ruled out any possibility of rejoining the ERM (statements 2.3, 2.8, 2.9). Although support for what some may term Peter Shore’s halfway house of a common currency (in effect John Major’s ’hard ecu’) is in a minority, it is interestingly a substantial one, with the largest group of respondents declining to agree or disagree (statement 2.6).

The acute concerns of the sceptics over monetary and fiscal powers being placed in the hands of a European central bank are plainly felt throughout the parliamentary party (statements 2.4, 2.5, 2.7). Two-fifths of MPs agree that Britain should never permit its monetary policy to be determined by an independent central bank. Interestingly, only half that proportion of MEPs take a similar line. A substantial minority of MPs, not far short of a third, believe that the Maastricht criteria for a single currency will institutionalise neo-liberal economic policy in Britain, with another third taking a neu- tral position on the statement. However, this concern is clearly not reflected on the front or European benches. A substantial majority of all parliamentarians do, however, offer the important caveat that we should not try to meet the EMU convergence criteria if the result is increased unemployment.

The equivocation over a national referendum on a single currency is readily explained by the responses to statement 2.2. There is not only a clear division between a majority of backbenchers who want a referendum and their frontbench team who don’t, but also between them and their European counterparts, who are far cooler on the proposition.


Little wonder that the leadership remains ambivalent.

The social dimension

In the social policy area some agreement across the intra-party divide on Europe

might be expected. After all, Labour parliamentarians would regard this field as part of their ’sphere of influence’, where both Euro-enthusiasts and Euro- sceptics can be equally vociferous in their support for the social dimension.

We do see from Table 3 that there is near-unanimity in their agreement on

Table 3 The social dimension

Status Strongly agree or

agree YO

Neither

%

Disagree or strongly disagree

YO

3.1 Harmonisation of social policies should not be an EU objective

3.2 Britain should support the Swedish proposal to make the pursuit of full employment an EU Treaty obligation

3.3 Convergence of working standards should be a key objective of EU integration

3.4 Reduction of social costs placed on employers is essential to job creation in the EU

3.5 Inflexibility in European labour markets is the principal cause of unemployment

3.6 Removing obstacles to workers’ freedom of movement in the single market should be a priority

3.7 Third-country nationals legally resident in an EU member state should be entitled to social benefits available wherever they work or live in the EU

through the institution of works councils is a necessary component of economic progress in the EU

3.8 The extension of ’social dialogue’

M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front Ivlr MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front

9 0 9 10 91 100 92 85 80 90 81 85 4 4 6 0 3 3 5 0 58 96 60 53 72 83 70 84 83 83 81 90

8 7 6 14 6 0 5 10 17 3 14 15 16 24 17 14 7 14 3 14 23 4 19 31 14 10 11 16 7 7 8 5

83 93 85 76 3 0 3 5 3 7 5 0 80 72 77 86 90 83 92 86 19 0 21 16 14 7 19 0 10 10 11 5


0 The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996 REPORTS AND SURVEYS 359

harmonisation of social policy in general (statement 3.1) and working standards in particular (statement 3.3), and equally widespread rejection of the supply-side notion that reducing employers’ social costs is essential to job creation (statement 3.4). These responses place the Labour Party well to the left of the current core positions of the EU employment and social policy White Papers.

There is strong support for the controversial works council directive (statement 3.8) and a strong rejection of the view that labour market inflexibility is the main cause of joblessness (statement 3.5)-paradoxically, in view of strong support for the CBI’s demand to remove national obstacles to a competi- tive market in labour (statement 3.6). Moreover, the Labour Party supports the controversial position taken by the employment White Paper that non-EU nationals should enjoy full social benefit rights wherever they work or live in the EU (statement 3.7). Not surprisingly, and in line with their European Parliament leader’s call at the 1995 party conference, the Labour Party strongly supports the Swedish Government’s proposal to make full employment a treaty obligation (statement 3.2).

A dirigiste project?

The extent of support for an active social dimension, as outlined above, would suggest a broader adherence to an interventionist position. However, the dis- quiet within the party is bred not only of the fear of European institutions entrapping Labour and making it super- fluous in any remotely socialist form but, more importantly of Labour imbibing free market mores to such an extent that it decouples itself from its social ideology. For instance, we saw above that Labour parliamentarians support the removal of obstacles to workers’ freedom of movement in the single market (statement 3.6).

360 DAVID BAKER ET AL.

In a speech to the German Friedrich- Ebert Stiftung on 30 May 1995 Tony Blair, similarly supporting greater com- petition, stated: ‘The Union needs to remove barriers which hold back the living standards of citizens.’ He then proceeded to use the example of airlines in Europe to advocate the removal of government subsidies and greater com- petition, which would facilitate access to cheaper fares and in turn benefit the mobility of workers. For some, this is just Thatcherite glorification of competi- tion: the bike may now be replaced in the new refrain, ’get on your plane’, but nevertheless it is the same sentiment. Tony Benn, for one, has reservations: ’The story the newspapers won’t print is that the Labour movement hasn’t changed at all, but we have a leadership that is not Labour, not just socialist, but not Labour. It has abandoned its pride in its own history and it has abandoned its vision for its own future and it is now committed to run capitalism.’ Other MPs, like Austin Mitchell, are more relaxed about the leadership’s advocacy of com- petition but question whether national economic management is redundant. So where does Labour now stand in relation to an interventionist project?

Judging by the findings shown in Table 4, there stil l appears to be a certain ambiguity over the level of intervention- ism that should be applied by a social democratic government. Most parliamentarians agree that EU membership is not incompatible with national economic management (statement 4.1). However, sizeable minorities both on the backbenches and, more surprisingly, in the European Parliament, do believe that membership is now incompatible with national economic management. Labour parliamentarians favour strategic economic intervention at the EU level on a wide range of matters, covering ‘infrastructure’, ’training’ and ’industrial investment‘. Although we do see a dip in such enthusiasm when it comes to

Q The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996

Table 4 Dirigisme

Status Strongly Neither Disagree or agree or strongly

agree disagree % % %

4.1 People who believe in national economic management cannot support the EU as it has tumed out

4.2 Public ownership remains crucial to the achievement of social justice

4.3 In principle there should be Union strategies on: (a) infrastructure

(c) industrial investment

(d) deregulation

(e) privatisation

4.4 The following forms of taxation should be harmonised within the E U (a) company

CD) VAT

(c) personal

0 The Political Quarterly hblishing Co. Ltd. 1996

M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front

M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front

M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front

34 39 38 25 68 76 69 70

88 92 92 81 77 96 84 62 82 84 85 70 61 48 64 57 42 40 46 33

32 50 31 42 24 50 24 28 17 12 16 22

16 7

17 15 9

14 9

10

7 4 3

14 13 0 8

24 8 8 7

15 10 8 7

14 13 12 11 15

22 15 24 16 26 11 27 22 26 12 29 17

50 54 45 60 23 10 22 20

5 4 5 5

10 4 8

14 10 8 8

15 29 44 29 29 45 48 43 52

46 35 45 42 50 39 49 50 57 76 55 61


Table 4 (continued) ~~


agree disagree % YO %

(d) environmental

(e) customs and excise

4.5 EU regional funds should be paid to the regions

4.6 The EU’s budget should be enlarged

4.7 An increase in Cohesion Funds is essential for enlargement of the EU

4.8 The Labour Party’s association with the Party of European Socialists is more of a political liability than an asset

M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front

47 69 45 58 49 73 49 53 70 76 70 67 34 78 41 15 84 82 82 86 12 17 16 0

20 4 21 21 18 12 19 16 12 10 13 9 25 11 23 25 8 7 11 0 10 0 12 5

33 27 34 21 33 15 32 31 18 14 17 24 41 11 36 60 8 11 7 14 78 83 72 95

~~ ~~ ~ ~~

Source: Labour Parliamentarians and European Integration Survey, FSRC/Nottingham Trent University, 1995-6.

‘deregulation‘, MEPs are about evenly split on this; the marked exception is on a Union strategy on ‘privatisation’, where only the front bench clearly disapproves of the statement, all other groups being evenly split (statements 4.3(a)-(e) ).

It is interesting, in view of the recent controversy over Clause Four, that there is a large majority in support of public ownership to ensure social justice (statement 4.2). On this evidence our ’rosy hue’ appears a deeper shade of red. MEPs are slightly more enthusiastically in favour of what one may term the Clause Four dimension of public ownership, but this is hardly surprising given the events of


1995. On 10 January the Guardian pub- lished a letter from thrrty-two ’disaf- fected’ MEPs over the proposals to omit the term ’common ownership’ from the Labour Party’s constitution. A rash of abusive rhetoric then followed from all sides. Mr Ken Coates fired a broadside which included expression of his ’con- tempt for shits’ of modernisers who were advocating the omission of Clause Four, and wrote an article for the Daily Tele- graph of 13 January. The following day Glenys Kinnock MEP responded thus, in the same paper: ’It seems odd then that, having recognised some of the major changes since Clause Four was written

Q The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 19%

77 years ago, [Mr Coates] glibly asserts any change to our constitution is unac- ceptable. And it is equally odd that, if “common ownership” is the phrase that is critical to any definition of socialism, none of our fellow socialist parties in the EU is committed to it.’ None of the socialist parties may now be committed to it, but our data certainly suggest that Labour MPs and MEPs strongly support it. Yet the fact that Labour parliamentarians happen to be out of kilter with their own, and their European socialist colleagues’, constitution appears to have no adverse effect on their relationship with those colleagues (statement 4.8).

The Westminster members are far more reticent then their European colleagues on the potentially damaging and electorally sensitive subject of taxation. There is a clear division between the PLP and the EPLP on harmonisation of ’company tax’ and VAT within the EU (statement 4.4(a) and (b)): MPs do not agree with harmonisation, while the MEPs do. Interestingly, the frontbenchers are far more strongly inclined to accept such harmonisation in the case of company tax than for VAT. Both PLP and EPLP object to having personal taxation harmonised within the EU (statement 4.4(c)). Majorities in both camps, however, do favour harmonisation of environmental tax and customs and excise; although, once again, Westminster MPs are not as supportive of the statements as their European colleagues (statement 4.4(d) and (e)). Attitudes to EU fiscal policy in general appear contradictory, with a majority of the PLP opposed to enlargement of the EU budget (but an overwhelming majority of the EPLP in favour of such enlargement) but-along with the European members-in favour of enlargement of Cohesion Funds (statements 4.6, 4.7).

The IGC and the democratic deficit

Some in the EPLP may wish to put a red sea between their Euro-enthusiastic selves and what they perceive as Tory scepticism, but their Westminster leadership consistently warns against rushing headlong into federalism. In fact, Labour’s 1995 conference report on the 1996 intergovernmental conference (IGC) stated:

Labour believes that to succeed in addressing the serious challenges that confront us the European Union must be more than a free trade area. That does not mean that we will sign up to a European federal superstate . . . Labour in government will adopt a pragmatic approach. We will act to defend and advance our national interests in Europe. We will seek to reform the institutions of Europe where we consider that to be necessary. But unlike the Tories we will act in accordance with our positive vision of Europe.

Evidence from Table 5 suggests that some backbench MPs are even more cautious than their senior colleagues. MPs are split right down the middle on being prepared to see the IGC increase the supranational powers of EU institutions, but backbenchers are far less inclined than their frontbench colleagues to accept such a development, while the EPLP is strongly in favour (statement 5.1). Again, only among frontbench MPs and their European counterparts is there a majority against holding a referendum should any proposals from this year‘s IGC have constitutional implications for the UK (statement 5.2). This is a highly sigruficant finding given Labour’s view that insufficient accountability is built into the existing decision-making structures of the EU and that their level of transparency is too low. This judgement has major implications for the legitimacy of EU governance, and Mr Blair has repeatedly stressed that what the Maas- tricht process revealed across Europe was

REPORTS AND SURVEYS 363 Q The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996

Table 5 The IGC and democratic deficit


agree disagree % YO YO

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.6

5.7

5.8

5.9

The 1996 IGC should not increase the supranational powers of EU institutions

There should be a referendum on any proposals from the forthcoming IGC that change the constitutional position of UK citizens The Commission should lose the right to initiate legislation

The European Parliament should be given the right to initiate EU legislation

All proposed EU legislation should be voted on by the European Parliament

The European Parliament should share control with the Commission over policy areas subject to QMV

The Council of Ministers should be the supreme institution of the EU

The 1996 IGC should abolish QMV

Britain should block the use of QMV in the areas of foreign and defence policy

M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front MI? MEP Back Front

5.10 A single European m y would undermine M P rather than underpin the security of the UK MEP

Back Front

5.11 Britain should not participate in the lifting M P of border controls as specified in the MEP Schengen agreement Back

Front

38 18 42 28 47 30 51 30 25 31 27 20 78 82 75 85 71 93 70 70 55 75 53 60 16 10 14 20 14 7

16 10 44 31 34 65

24 11 22 24 16 26 16 20 14 10 18 0 8 4 8

10 13 0

11 20 27 18 29 20 16 7

16 20 18 0

19 16 13 10 15 10

27 24 30 22 31 19 16 37 26 21 14 4 25 21 30 15

38 71 36 48 37 44 33 50 61 59 55 80 14 14 17 5

16 7

19 10 18 7

18 20 68 83 70 60 68 93 65 74 43 59 51 25 49 48 50 47 53 82 54 55

364 DAVID BAKER ET AL. 8 The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996



5.12

5.13

5.14

5.15

5.16

The UK should incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into law

The continental system of jurisprudence as practised by the European Court of Justice is a threat to liberty in Britain

The strength of national identities rules out parliamentary democracy on a European scale for the foreseeable future

The key to closing the ‘democratic deficit’ is strengthening the scrutiny by national parliaments of the EU legislative process

Regional devolution offers the best way to close the ‘democratic deficit’ in an integrated Europe

M P MEP Back Front MP MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front M P MEP Back Front

89 97 86

100 7 4

10 0

35 22 34 40 73 29 74 67 63 57 62 62

8 3

11 0

22 4

26 10 8 0 7

15 16 25 15 19 24 18 24 29

3 0 3 0

71 92 64 90 57 78 59 45 11 46 11 14 13 25 14 9


that the decision-makers, the European elites, were moving too far ahead of opinion in the member states. Is, then, the corollary of such an argument the need to offer the people the chance to decide directly?

It is important, therefore, for Labour to address what it sees as the democratic deficit of European structures. With regard to this dilemma we see that a majority of parliamentarians support the European Parliament gaining legislative authority at the expense of the Com- mission (statements 5.3, 5.4, 5.5). This is in line with the Party of European Socia- lists’ suggestion that EU governance should move closer to the norm of a liberal democracy with the Council as executive and the Parliament as a scruti- nising legislature. It appears that such views have permeated the party to such

an extent that a majority neither believe that the strength of national identity rules it out on a European scale for the foreseeable future nor accept the idea that the ministers of the national governments should be the supreme institution of the EU (statements 5.14,5.7). However, there remain certain ambiguities. The PLP overwhelmingly view the strengthening of their legislature as being the key to closing the democratic deficit; in this they are opposed, not surprisingly, by the EPLP, while all believe that sub-national government is the best way (statements 5.15 and 5.16).

Such sentiments on accountability and legitimacy encroach upon the extremely contentious area of qualified majority voting (QMV). All parliamentarians accept that the European Parliament should share control with the Commission


over policy areas subject to QMV, though the sentiment is held more strongly in the EPLP (statement 5.6). Which new policy areas should be subject to QMV in decision-making is possibly the most contentious area at the IGC. Labour is fond of criticising the Conservatives on what it sees as their intransigence on the issue. In his speech at Chatham House in April 1995, Tony Blair jibed: ’The Prime Minister said on the Frost programme that we will veto any changes at all at the IGC. Can he really mean that?’ And yet half a dozen sentences later in the same speech he declared: ’We will main- tain the veto vigorously in areas such as security and immigration.’ This cautious ambivalence from the leader is reflected in official policy. The 1995 conference report on the IGC picks its way with care:

Whereas decisions under the first pillar are often taken by qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers and are strongly influ- enced by European institutions, such as the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice, decisions under the second and third pillars are taken by unanimous agreement between governments in the Council of Min- isters. Although Labour shares the objectives of making the existing structure more effi- cient and democratic, we oppose proposals to merge the second and third pillars into the first. Issues relating to foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs touch on some of the most sensitive areas of national policy. Although priority should be given to improving co-operation in these fields, policy must continue to be determined by nabonal governments.

From our data we see that a majority of all parliamentarians support the retention of the principle of QMV (statement 5.8); but in the light of Labour’s official policy to protect the national veto in respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), our data offer extremely interesting results. The PLP is split in half over the issue but, importantly, a majority of backbenchers do not follow the official


party line, appearing to accept the appli- cation of QMV to the CFSP sphere. As one might expect, the shadow front bench overwhelmingly supports the retention of Britain’s veto in this area (statement 5.9). The fact that the EPLP does not accept official party policy in this field should arouse little surprise considering the machinations of May 1995, when a revolt by the EPLP resulted in fourteen MEPs, including Pauline Green, the leader of the socialist group, voting in favour of a resolution limiting the veto rights of national governments in face of a frontbench directive. Many others, including Glenys Kinnock, abstained.

Our data suggest that QMV is not the only area of contention between parliamentarians‘ attitude and the official line. We find that Labour parliamentarians are not hostile to a single European army and favour participation in the Schengen agreement (statements 5.10, 5.11). But the official line, as expressed in Labour’s 1995 conference report on the IGC, is that the party ’does not support the establishment of a European army or proposals to give the European Union a military com- petence . . . [and] . . . Partly because of our island geography and historical patterns of migration and border controls, and partly because of its secretive nature, Labour does not believe that Britain should participate in the Schengen Agreement.’

We find, though, that views on the judicial arena are near-unanimous with overall support for the incorporation into law of the European Convention on Human Rights (statement 5.12) and no apparent concern that the European Court of Justice’s continental jurisprudence might threaten British liberties (statement 5.13).

Environmental concern

The environment, as a political issue, has come to resemble motherhood and apple

Q The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996

Table 6 The environment

Status Strongly Neither Disagree or agree or strongly agree disagree

YO YO %

6.1

6.2

In future all EU agricultural subsidies M P should be dependent on farmers satisfying MEP environmental criteria Back

Front Environmental costs should be M P incorporated in market prices MEP

Back Front

85 78 88 81 73 68 78 65

9 18 8 9

22 25 17 30

6 4 4

10 5 7 5 5


pie, in that no one can really be against it. But the reality of tackling environmental concerns is of course somewhat different. No one, let alone government, is over- joyed at the prospect of loading produc- tion with the potentially crippling real costs of environmental protection. There- fore, environmental policies linked to actual proposals which apportion costs to other sectors of the economy are by their very nature contentious.

Our survey data reveals that the Labour Party believes Europe has a crucial role to play in protecting and improving the environment of its peo- ples. In his Bonn address of May 1995, Tony Blair spoke of the EU cleaning up the toxic legacy of Communism in east- ern Europe. But, significantly, Labour appears willing to bite the bullet of such costs. Its conference document on the IGC states: 'This [environmental policy] should go beyond simply setting mini- mum standards and include the development of a comprehensive strategy to link environmental concerns with economic and industrial policy.' The parliamentarians are in full agreement with this sentiment. By a large majority they

believe that agricultural subsidies should be linked to good environmental practice by farmers (statement 6.1) and that environmental costs should be incorporated into market prices (statement 6.2).

They'll do it my way!

In this section we are particularly concerned to establish whether a cohort effect is evident within the PLP. Our survey allowed for this analysis by iden- tdymg when an M P first entered Parlia- ment (for cohort distribution see appendix). We could therefore analyse the data by looking separately at Mps elected before and on the high-water mark of Euro-scepticism in 1983 and then comparing their views with those of a cohort from our 'slow reversal period' of 1987-92.

In his May 1995 speech to the Fried- rich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn, Mr Blair, while once again stressing that divisions were largely part of the past, added: 'But the centre of gravity in the Labour Party is moving convincingly in my direction' on Europe. Judging by our results shown in Table 7, he may well be right. It

REPORTS AND SURVEYS 367 0 The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996

Table 7 The cohort effect

Status Strongly Neither Disagreeor agree or strongly


7.1

7.2

7.3

7.4

7.5

7.6

7.7

7.8

7.9

7.10

7.11

7.12

7.13

Britain should withdraw from the European Union The establishment of a single EU currency would signal the end of the UK as a sovereign nation Sovereignty cannot be pooled

Subsidiarity reinforces the federalist tendency in the EU The globalisation of economic activity makes EU membership more, rather than less necessary for the UK EMU is: (a) not realisable

(b) not desirable

The EU should be replaced by a Commonwealth of Europe based on sovereign nation states An Act of Parliament should be passed to establish explicitly the ultimate supremacy of Parliament over EU legislation The European Parliament should be given the right to initiate EU legislation A single European army would undermine rather than underpin the security of the UK Britain should not participate in the lifting of border controls as specified in the Schengen agreement Britain should block the use of QMV in the areas of foreign and defence policy The Labour Party’s association with the Party of European Socialists is more of a political liability than an asset

1950-83

1950-83 1987-92

1987-92

1950-83

1950-83

1950-83

1987-92

1987-92

1987-92

1950-83

1950-83

1950-83

1987-92

1987-92

1987-92

1950-83 1987-92

1950-83

1950-83

1950-83

1987-92

1987-92

1987-92

1950-83

1950-83 1987-92

1987-92

15 0

33 11

36 27 43 33 79 98

35 13 26 9

24 4

29 7

68 89 38 16 35 22

56 37 20 2

0 4 3 6

3 13 24 36 0 2

12 13 16 17 9 13

6 25

6 9

18 31 21 20

10 15 12 11

85 96 64 83

61 60 33 31 21 0

53 74 58 74 67 83

65 68

26 2 44 53 44 58

54 48 68 87


certainly does appear that MPs elected found in the previous tables shown after 1983 are far more inclined to be above. enthusiastic about Europe than their col- For example, we found no MP from the leagues elected in or before 1983, with all 1987-92 cohort who would contemplate figures for our ‘sceptical indicators’ being withdrawal (statement 7.1); and of those far more pronounced for 1950-83 than for elected in or before 1983, twice as many 1987-92 and usually double for those as among those elected thereafter believe

368 DAVID BAKER BT AL. 0 The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996

a single currency heralds the end of the UK as a sovereign nation-state (statement 7.2). The 1950-83 cohort are more sceptical on the notion of sovereignty being pooled; more inclined towards the belief that subsidiarity would reinforce the federalist tendency in the EU; more inclined to suggest that EMU is not realisable and even more that it is not desirable; and less likely to believe that a global market necessitates our membership .of the EU (statements 7.3, 7.4, 7.6 and 7.5).

Tony Benn receives greater support for his Commonwealth idea from the earlier cohorts, who also express greater support for reasserting the legislative authority of Westminster; not surprisingly, therefore, they are less than enamoured about the

idea of allowing the European Parlia- ment to initiate legislation (statements 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9). There is also greater scepticism towards the European army proposal and signing up to the Schengen agreement, and a majority advocating the blocking of QMV (statements 7.10, 7.11 and 7.12). We also find more circumspection in this cohort about the benefits of association with the Party of European Socialists (statement 7.13).

However, it should be reiterated that this table in most respects shows more scepticism across cohorts rather than within cohorts. It begs a summary of just where the divisions within the Labour Party actually remain on the issue of European integration.

Table 8 Clear divisions?

Issue statement MPs seriously Backbench and M P and MEP divided frontbench opposite opposite

(30+ v. 30+) majorities majorities

1.2 Impact of EU membership 1.5 Sovereignty not pooled 1.7 Subsidiarity/feder&sm 2.2 EMU/referendum 2.6 Common currency 2.7 European central bank

power 4.1 National economic

management 4.3 Unionstrategy/privatisation 4.4 Tax harmonisation 4.6 EU's budget enlargement 5.1 No supranational powers

for 1996 IGC 5.2 Referendum on IGC 5.9 Britain to block use of QMV 5.14 National identity/

democracy 5.15 National parliaments key to

democratic deficit

Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes

Yes

Yes Yes" Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

No

Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes

No

Yes No Yes Yes

Yes Yes No

No

No No Yes Yes No Yes

No

No Yesb Yes Yes'

Yes Yes No

Yes

Company, environment, customs. Company, VAT. Mps evenly divided.

Source: Labour Parliamentarians and European Integration Survey, ESRC/Nottingham Trent University, 199$-6.


Conclusions: clear divisions? It is evident that Labour has indeed moved some considerable way along the road of European integration since 1983, and that Mr Blair may feel confident that the centre of gravity is moving in his direction, that of a man 'who voted for Britain to remain inside the EEC in 1975 and who fought to persuade his Party to become a party of Europe', as he told his Bonn audience. But our data also reveal that it would be a serious mistake for Mr Blair to feel over- confident. The statements on the social dimension (Table 3) reveal that Labour remain a party with strong collectivist and interventionist values. In fact, this was the only dimension where we found near unanimity on attitude statements. There is therefore potential for conflict between a party leadership accepting (either willingly or under duress) free market policy emanating from Europe and party retaining a distinctly red tint.

This potential cleavage is evident in Table 8 which, summarising responses to statements from previous tables, demonstrates that there are several issues that are, or will become, central to the debate on European integration, and over which both the PLP as a whole, its back and front benches, and the EPLP, are divided. We see this in the statements (4.1, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6) on interventionist policy. MPs are seriously divided, with 30 per cent or more supporting each side of the issue. On two of the statements (4.1 and 4.4) there is a clear division between frontbench and backbench attitudes, with even further confusion added with opposite majorities for MPs and MEPs on statements 4.1 and 4.3. This potential for division is clearly evident when looking at the responses to the call for a Union strategy on the neo-liberal clarion call of privatisation (statement 4.1). On this the parliamentarians are divided almost straight down the middle.

We see this ambivalence reflected in

attitudes to membership and sovereignty (statements 1.2, 1.5 and 1.7). We find a slight majority of MPs supporting the view that subsidiarity reinforces federalism-a view identified as a core sceptic position. More importantly, we find the divisions reflected in the potentially explosive electoral issues of EMU and the consequences of the 1996 IGC. For example, there are divisions in all three cells over a referendum on EMU, with similar findings for the statements on a referendum for any proposals from the forthcoming IGC which had constitutional implications and on the issue of blocking the use of QMV in foreign and defence policy (statements 2.2, 5.2,5.9).

It is therefore evident that Mr Blair may still face party fissures on the issue of European integration. The recent open letter signed by fifty Labour MPs demanding a single currency referendum may be only the beginning, even if some of these particular fdty are among the older cohorts who will leave Parliament at the next election.

Appendix The survey questionnaire contained fifty-nine questions on European integration framed to reflect a variety of standpoints on the issues to which questions were directed. The survey was conducted by four mailings between 10 November 1995 and 27 February 1996. The questionnaire was sent to all Labour

Table 9 Representativeness in terms of cohorts

% PLP % respondents

1950 1964/66 1970 1974/I/II 1979 1983 1987 1992

1 1 7 8 6 2 9 5

10 12 14 12 23 21 30 39

370 DAVID BAKER ET AL. 8 The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 1996

MI'S and MEPs. Excluding non-respondents to identification questions, 33 per cent of backbench MPs and 29 per cent of the shadow front bench responded, giving an overall response rate of 33 per cent for MPs and 47 per cent for MEPs. At a time when power for Labour was a tangible proposition and with the whips 'suggesting' non-coopera- lion with any questionnaire not 'approved' by John Smith House, this must be considered a good response rate? However, we also ana- lysed respondents in terms of their cohort, i.e. which general election brought them into Parliament or followed their entry in a by- election, and were reassured by this criterion of representativeness (see Table 9).

We further tested our known respondents by two measures of parliamentary behaviour over Europe. Questionnaires were anony- mous but four-fifths of MPs also returned a separate identity-coded postcard, enabling such tests. We know that Labour had sixty- six third reading rebels on the Maastricht Bill; the remaining sixty-three of these 'rebels' now in the House of Commons make up 23 per cent of the PLP and 21 per cent of our known respondents. Moreover, the remaining ninety Labour signatories to Peter Mandelson's 'enthusiastic' early day motion of 16 December 1992 now constitute 33 per cent of the PLP and 24 per cent of our known respondents. Furthermore, we tested for ideo- logical bias with the known members of the most active left-leaning group of Labour MPs, the Campaign Group. Campaign Group members constitute 11 per cent of the PLP and 12 per cent of our known respondents. All in all, taking into account the extent of the Labour whips' circumspection over the controversial nature of the issues covered, we obtained a satisfactory degree of representativeness from the tests we applied.

Acknowledgement This paper is based upon data from the authors' recent survey of Labour MPs and MEPs, sponsored by the ESRC (Award No. R000221560). A version of it was presented to the meeting 'Britain in Europe, Panel 2' at the annual conference of the Political Studies Association, Glasgow, April 1995.

Notes 1 Interviewed as part of a series of interviews

carried out at the Palace of Westminster in the summer of 1995. Some interviewees expressed a wish that their comments be non-attributable and of course we respect their wishes. Where appropriate we name those whose responses are attributable.

2 Apart from the usual questionnaire fatigue experienced by parliamentarians, we were informed by some MPs that both MPs and MEPs were advised not to reply to our questionnaire. This is not unprecedented. Tribune notes of its tax survey of 24 Novem- ber 1995: 'Tribune has since learnt that the questionnaire succeeded in stirring anxi- eties in the Labour leadership and all Labour MPs were ordered to have nothing to do with it by the Whips' Office.' Simi- larly, the lndependenf noted of its survey on the future of the monarchy, on 18 February 1996: 'The majority of Labour MPs were silent. Of the 183 we spoke to, 120 refused to answer any questions. Several said that the party whips had ordered them not to take part.'


Documents

Labour and Europe: A Survey of MPs and MEPs