Legal Ethics Digest

LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION

1. Banogan v. Zerna2. Ledesma v. Climaco3. Cui v. Cui4. Alawi v. Alauya

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the lawsof the land and promote respect for law and legal process.

5. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho6. Chua v. Mesina7. Soriano v. Dizon8. Stemmerik v. Mas9. De Ysasi III v. NLRC10. Cordon v. Balicanta

CANON 2 – A lawyer shall make his legal services available inan efficient and convenient manner compatible with theindependence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.

CANON 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal services shall useonly true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information orstatement of facts.

11. In re Tagorda12. Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo13. Canoy v. Ortiz14. Linsangan v. Tolentino

CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in development of thelegal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reformand in the improvement of the administration of justice.

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,participate in continuing legal education programs, support

efforts to achieve highest standards in law schools as well asin the practical training of law students and assist indisseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

CANON 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in governmentservice in the discharge of their official duties.

15. Suarez v. Platon16. Ramos v. Imbang17. Catu v. Rellosa18. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity anddignity of the legal profession and support t he activities ofthe integrated bar.

19. In re Galang20. In re Arthur M. Cuevas21. Samaniego v. Ferrer22. Arnobit v. Arnobit23. St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz24. Advincula v. Macabata

CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues andshall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

25. Reyes v. Chiong26. Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro27. Alcantara v. Pefianco28. Camacho v. Pagulayan29. Torres v. Javier30. Linsangan v. Tolentino

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist inthe unauthorized practice of law.

31. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.

1 | Block C 2012Justice Hofilena


32. Cayetano v. Monsod33. Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio34. Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. CIR35. Aguirre v. Rama36. Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana

CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to thecourt.

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect dueto the courts and judicial officers and should insist onsimilar conduct by others.

37. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon38. Rivera v. Corral39. Johnny Ng v. Alar40. Fudot v. Cattleya Land41. Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan

CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider ithis duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administrationof justice.

42. Berbano v. Barcelona43. Sebastian v. Bajar44. Hegna v. Paderanga45. Plus Builders v. Revilla46. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez

CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause andrefrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or givesthe appearance of influencing the court.

CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.

47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio48. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao

CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyaltyin all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

49. Hilado v. David50. Nakpil v. Valdes51. Hornilla v. Salunat52. Northwestern University v. Arquillo53. Quiambao v. Bamba54. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio55. Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez

CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys andproperties of his client that may come into his possession.

56. Licuanan v. Melo57. Posidio v. Vitan58. Lemoine v. Balon59. Re: Atty. Maquera60. Reddi v. Sersbio61. De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag62. Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya63. Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his clientand he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence anddiligence.

64. Hernandez v. Go65. PANELCO v. Montemayor66. Sps. Adecer v. Akut67. Belleza v. Macasa68. Overgaard v. Valdez69. Angalan v. Delante70. Santon-Tan v. Robino71. Somosot v. Lara



CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal withinthe bounds of law.

72. Briones v. Jimenez73. Pena v. Aparicio

AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER

74. Manalang v. Angeles 75. Garcia v. CA76. Santiago v. De los Santos

CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

77. Sesbreno v. CA78. Bautista v. Gonzales79. Gamilla v. Marino80. Pineda v. De Jesus81. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui 82. Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA

CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secretsof his client even after the attorney-client relationship isterminated.

83. Regala v. Sandiganbayan84. Pfleider v. Palanca85. Mercado v. Vitriolo86. Genato v. Silapan87. Hadjula v. Madianda88. Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.

Canon 22 – A lawyer may withdraw his services only for goodcause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.

89. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA90. Venterez v. Cosme91. Santero v. Vance

92. Francisco v. Portugal93. Metrobank v. CA94. Doronila-Tioseco v. CA95. Sesbreno v. CA

SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT

96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza97. Santos v. Llamas98. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo99. Vda. de Barrera v. Laput100. Barrientos v. Daarol101. Berbano v. Beltran102. Tabas v. Malicden103. Sesbreno v. CA

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

CANON 1 – Independence

104. Libarios v. Dablos105. Go v. CA106. Sabitsana v. Villamor107. Tan v. Rosete108. Dimatulac v. Villon

CANON 2 – Integrity

109. Fernandez v. Hamoy110. Dawa v. De Asa111. In re judge Marcos112. Lachica v. Flordeliza113. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana114. Olga v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero

CANON 3 – Impartiality

115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan



116. Pimentel v. Salanga117. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.118. Oktubre v. Velasco119. Sandoval v. CA120. The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican, etc.

CANON 4 – Propriety

121. J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas122. Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp v. Katalbas-

Moscardon123. Rizalina v. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante124. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay v. Judge Elias

Lelina, Jr.125. Concerned lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge

Pornillos, RTC Br. 10 Malolos City126. Venancio Ino, Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay, etc. Judge

Alejandro Canda127. In Re: Undated Letter of Louis Biraogo

CANON 5 – Equality

CANON 6 – Competence and diligence

128. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S.Caguioa, etc.

129. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc v. Judge William Simon P.Peralta

130. Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi v. Judge Medel ArnaldoB. Belen

131. Danilo David S. Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional132. Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez133. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag



CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION

BANOGAN V. ZERNA

Facts:The original decision in this case was rendered by the

cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. Amotion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirtyone years later. This was followed by an amended petition forreview of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an oppositionthereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteenyears, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petitionwas dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion forreconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. Thepetitioners then came to us on certiorari to question theorders of the respondent judge. The respondent court dismissedthe petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on theground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty oneyears too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against thepetitioners.

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had notyet become final and executory because the land in dispute hadnot yet been registered in favor of the private respondents.The said judgment would become so only “after one year from theissuance of the decree of registration.” If anyone was guiltyof laches, it was the private respondents who had failed toenforce the judgment by having the land registered in their thepursuant thereto.

For their part, the private respondents argue that thedecision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitionersduring that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one yearsbefore it occurred to them to question the judgment of thecadastral court.

It is shown that it is against their contentions andthat under this doctrine they should not have delayed in

asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only forthirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars theirpetition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law andlogic and to even ordinary common sense.

Issue:W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.

Held:YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and

lawyers alike that litigation must end and terminate sometimeand somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective andefficient administration of justice that, once a judgment hasbecome final, the winning party be not, through a meresubterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts musttherefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring aboutthat result. Constituted as they are to put an end tocontroversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolongthem. There should be a greater awareness on the part oflitigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of thisCourt, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away byefforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of adecision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown inthis case, the clear and manifest absence of any right callingfor vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust forlawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to thepoint of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve theirpurposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice andat the same time lessen popular faith in the legal professionas the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to saythat every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned,as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court mustexpress its disapproval of the adroit and intentionalmisreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it. Asofficers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assistin the proper administration of justice. They do not dischargethis duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the



workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which isburdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts andthe law should advise them when a case, such as this, shouldnot be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the alreadycongested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause oflaw or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheerlack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

LEDESMA V. CLIMACO

Facts: Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the

cases pending before the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed amotion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied themotion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two morecases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw becausehe was appointed as election registrar, which was still denied.

Issue: Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?

Held: No. The respondent judge’s denial was proper. It was

observed that there is no real conflict between his duties aselection registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of alawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteranlawyers in fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to rendertheir services for free. In the same way, all lawyers shouldtreat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the communitythat the proper performance of his profession is not contingentupon the payment of his fees.

CUI V. CUI

Facts:The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable

institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DonaBenigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of

indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” Itacquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239).Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the foundersjointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “suchpersons as they may nominate or designate, in the orderprescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed ofdonation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cuiare brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephewsof the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, thethen incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favorof Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into betweenthem that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui,however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of hisbrother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote aletter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office beturned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesusfiled this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUEWho is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.Jesus is the older of the two and under equal

circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deedof donation. However, before the test of age may be, appliedthe deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimatedescendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulode abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or apharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should bethe one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwisequalified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws butis not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations.Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar andalthough disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about



two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator ofthe Hospicio.

The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possessionof the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership inthe Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for thepractice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a lawschool upon completion of certain academic requirements, doesnot entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. Byitself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance withthe requirements that an applicant to the examinations has“successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a lawschool or university, officially approved by the Secretary ofEducation.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer,first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator,it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license topractice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is notentitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator.Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio wasdisbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However,it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed theoffice of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition ofhis moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that requiredfor his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, whendefendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictionsand disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment werewiped out.

ALAWI V. ALAUYA

Facts:Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B.

Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate andhousing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executiveclerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in MarawiCity, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for thepurchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing unitsof Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted toAlauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation(NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to thePresident of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of hiscontract with the company. He claimed that his consent wasvitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation,deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He lasowrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa andthe Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed anadministrative complaint against him. One of her grounds wasAlauya’s usurpation of the title of "attorney," which onlyregular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," bythe assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have arightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor,""konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a locallegislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not considerhimself a lawyer.

Issue:Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can

use the title of Attorney

Held:He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass

the regular Philippine bar.As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this

Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who passthe Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the PhilippineBar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. Whileone who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who hasbeen admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered



"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice ina professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." Thetitle of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtainedthe necessary degree in the study of law and successfully takenthe Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Barof the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in thisjurisdiction.

CANON 1

RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO

FACTS:The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted

an administrative case against Atty Kho, a former clerk ofcourt of an RTC, after an audit by the former found that thelatter failed to remit P60K (confiscated cash bonds) andP5K(Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho statedthat these amounts were stored in the court’s safety vaults, ashis usual practice. The audit team advised him that he shoulddeposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund accountand Atty Kho complied with the directives.

Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that AttyKho, along with his common-law wife, a stenographer, wasengaged with lending out to court employees money in hispossession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit fromthe interest earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violatingan OCA Circular because he kept the funds in a safety vault formore than a year. The OCA then recommended that its report bedocketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.

ISSUE/S: W/N Atty. Kho is liable.

HELD: YES. OCA recommendations VALID.

RATIO:Dishonesty Conduct

Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash depositedwith him. The failure to remit the funds in due timeconstitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. Itdiminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary.Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries theextreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if committedfor the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

And although Kho had restituted all his cashaccountabilities, he was nevertheless liable for failing toimmediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds.

Unlawful conductLawyers should always keep in mind that, although

upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligationimposed on every citizen, a lawyer’s responsibilities underCanon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with thelaw. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is torefrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. The presence of evilintent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order tobring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 whichspecifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawfulconduct.

CHUA V. MESINA

Facts:Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses’ legal counsel

and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. Theywere in fact lessees of a building (Burgos Property) owned byMesina’s family, and another property (Melencio Property), alsoowned by Mesina’s family where the Chua spouses constructedtheir house. These two properties were mortgaged by theregistered owner, Mesina’s mother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of thePlanters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. AsMrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty.



Mesina convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settleher obligation in consideration for which the Melencio propertywould be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m.

The spouses Chua and their business partner, MarcelinaHsia, settled Mrs. Mesina’s bank obligation in the amount ofP983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafterexecuted by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as“Felicisima M. Melencio,” in favor of complainants. Ascomplainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gainstax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of AbsoluteSale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before theeffectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gainstax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Saleantedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whosename again appears therein as “Felicisima M. Melencio,” infavor of complainants wherein the purchase price was alsoindicated to be P85,400.00.

After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses“in the redemption of the MESINA properties,” Mrs. Mesina wasfound to have “an existing balance” due the spouses in theamount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advisedrespondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit “acknowledgedsuch obligation” to be his and undertook to settle it withintwo years.

Complainants were subsequently issued on a title overthe Melencio property.

Not long after the execution of the Deed of AbsoluteSale or in February 1986, one Tecson filed an Affidavit datedcharging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and thetwo witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, forFalsification of Public Document and violation of the InternalRevenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged thathe was also a lessee of the Melencio property and was, alongwith the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but thatcontrary to their agreement, the property was sold only tocomplainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson

went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did notreflect the true value of the Melencio property and wasantedated “to evade payment of capital gains tax.” Tecsonsubmitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deedof Absolute Sale was antedated.

Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge thefalsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed tocomplainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of theMelencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs.Mesina.

Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainantsexecuted a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveyingto “Felicisima M. Melencio” the Melencio property forP85,400.00.A new title was accordingly issued in the name of“Felicisima M. Melencio,” the owner’s copy of which wasentrusted to complainants. Tecson subsequently filed anAffidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 alleging thathis filing of the criminal complaint “arose out of meremisunderstanding and difference” with herein complainants andtheir co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence againstthem.

Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses andtold them that he would borrow the owner’s copy of Mrs.Mesina’s title with the undertaking that he would, in fourmonths, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over theMelencio property in complainants’ favor. In fact, respondentgave complainants a written undertaking dated May 2, 1990.

In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died “in the early part of1991.” Despite respondent’s repeated promises “to effect” thetransfer of title in complainants’ name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property wasbeing offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua andcomplainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed a complaint againstMesina for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance ofReal Property.

ISSUEWhether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?



HELDThis Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of

gross misconduct.First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed

of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capitalgains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for lawand legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed atdefiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he diddefraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.

Second, when respondent convinced complainants toexecute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Salewherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed theMelencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his ownclients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owner’scopy of his mother’s title upon the misrepresentation that hewould, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by hismother in favor of complainants, he likewise committeddishonesty.

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with hisclient but the business transaction must be characterized withutmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith whichan attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with hisclient is a much higher standard that is required in businessdealings where the parties trade at “arms length.”

In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and,more specifically, Canon 1, Rules. 1.01 and Rules 1.02.

SORIANO V. DIZON

Facts:A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the

disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon wasconvicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violatedCanon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found tohave:

a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a

simple traffic incident;c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position

to defend himself (treachery);d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him

(dishonesty);e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the

victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga, may lakas padaw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tangamag rason si Dizon diba?);

f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy hiscivil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)

Issues:(1) Is Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a

crime involving moral turpitude(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?

Held:(1) Yes.Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to

justice, modesty, or good morals…”Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and

shot Soriano, not only because of his treachery, but also hisintent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off hisprints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simpletraffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be alawyer.

(2) Yes.His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust

refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justifydisbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR,he is bound to “obey the laws of the land.” The liabilities inquestion have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite itbeing the condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!)



Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character,which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enterinto the practice of law. Good moral character includes atleast common honesty.

Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.

STEMMERIK V. MAS

FACTS:Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine

property due to its beauty. He consulted Atty Mas about hisintention, to which the latter advised him that he couldlegally buy such properties. Atty Mas even suggested a bigpiece of property that he can buy, assuring that it isalienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted all of thenecessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in factas he went back to Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informedStemmerik that he found the owner of the big piece of propertyand stated the price of the property is P3.8M. Stemmerikagreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedlydrawing up the necessary paperwork.

When Stemmerik asked when he could have the propertyregistered in his name, Atty Mas can’t be found. He returned tothe Philippines, employed another lawyer, and to his horror,was informed that aliens couldn’t own Philippine Lands and thatthe property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed aDISBARMENT case against Atty MAS in the Commission on BarDiscipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD ruled that Atty Mas abusedthe trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommended that hebe disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted suchrecommendations.

ISSUE/S: W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.

HELD: YES! Disbarred.

RATIO:Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition

Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibitsforeigners from buying Philippine Lands. Respondent, in givingadvice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutionalpolicy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and grossignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documentsthat he knew were void and illegal.

Deceitful ConductBy advising complainant that a foreigner could legally

and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and byassuring complainant that the property was alienable,respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not givedue regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him bycomplainant.

Illegal ConductBy pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given

by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondentcommitted a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.

DE YSASI III V. NLRC

Facts:Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private

respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao inHinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farmadministrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervisionof daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm andattending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him byprivate respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm,occupying the upper floor of the house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner movedto Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. Hesuffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separateoccasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, heunderwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula,



a deep sinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months.In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and,thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 toJanuary, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses,private respondent took care of his medical expenses andpetitioner continued to receive compensation. However, inApril, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased topay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and writtendemands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of hissalary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

Issues:(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally

dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement,payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits;and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral andexemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegaldismissal.

Held:

The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent isORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceedingthree (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, inlieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1)month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) monthsbeing considered as one (1) whole year.

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityexplicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his clientto avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of afair settlement."

Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty aslawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merelypresenting their clients' respective causes in court. It isjust as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, toexert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the

direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conductlitigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advisingsettlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator forconcord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than avirtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.

Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected ofthem, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. Therecords do not show that they took pains to initiate stepsgeared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients.On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges couldnot but have exacerbated the situation even as they may havefound favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respectiveclients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter whohandled this regrettable case has been less than faithful tothe letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a laborarbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicablesettlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If heever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copiousrecords of the proceedings in this controversy are barren ofany reflection of the same.

CORDON V. BALICANTA

FACTS:Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some

properties from her husband with the help of Atty Balicanta.Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to form a corporationto develop the real properties inherited. Such corp. wasformed, and the properties were registered in the corp.’s name.Atty Balicanta was the one who single-handedly ran the corp.’saffairs, by being it’s Chairman, President, General Manager,and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number ofacts: 1) made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2) madeCordon sign a SPA to sell/mortgage properties; 3) transferredtitle of some of the properties to other people. And by usingspurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta also made the



following acts: 1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using theproperties as collateral; 2) Sold the Corp’s right to redeemthe properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestralhome of the Cordon’s and sold the lot to another person. In allof these, Atty Balicanta did not account for the proceedscoming the sales and dispositions.

The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta togive back the properties and to account the proceeds of theloan. When such demands were unheeded, The Cordons terminatedBalicanta’s services and filed a complaint for disbarmentagainst the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report,recommended for Balicanta’s disbarment as well. The IBP Boardof Governors resolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 yearsfor such conduct.

ISSUE/S: W/N Balicanta be disbarred1.

HELD: YES! Disbarred.

RATIO:Deceitful Conduct

The fraudulent acts he carried out against his clientfollowed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the corporateproperties and funds entrusted to him. He started his deviousscheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board,Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew hewas prohibited from assuming the position of President andTreasurer at the same time. He also entered into dishonesttransactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. Hismisdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporationas a means to convert for his own personal benefit propertiesleft to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.

Side Doctrine:1 By virtue of Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this resolution is automatically elevated to the SC for final action.

Good moral character is more than just the absence ofbad character. Such character expresses itself in the will todo the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not todo the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because“vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipientof unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’sproperty, reputation, his life, his all.”

CANONS 2 & 3

IN RE: TAGORDA

Facts:Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of

Isabela. Previous to the last election, he admits that he madeuse of a card written in Spanish containing the fact that hewas a candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela &offering services as notary public (such as free consultation,execution of deed of sale, etc.). He also admits that he wrotea letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his homemunicipality saying that he will continue his practice of lawand for the lieutenant to make known to the people of hisdesire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including hisservices to handle land registration cases for P3/everyregistration).

Issue: W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising

Held: Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and

is contrary to the Canons of Professional Ethics. Solicitationof business by circulars or advertisements, or by personalcommunications or interviews not warranted by personalrelations is unprofessional. His acts warrant disbarment, butbecause of the mitigating circumstance of his youth andinexperience, he is therefore suspended.



The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyermay not seek or obtain employment by himself or through othersfor to do so would be unprofessional. It is also unprofessionalfor a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly,solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidenceof the community and integrity of the members of the bar (as itresults in needless litigations and in incenting to strifeotherwise peaceful citizens).

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO

FACTSA paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer

was published which reads: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist[contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court,called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. Sheclaims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert inhandling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decreewithin 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation ofproperty and custody of children. It appears that similaradvertisements were also published.

An administrative complaint was filed which was referredto the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBPresolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note thatalthough the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in theadvertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him butargued that he should not be charged. He said that it was timeto lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement becausethe interest of the public isn’t served in any way by theprohibition.

ISSUEWhether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELDYes!The practice of law is not a business --- it is a

profession in which the primary duty is public service and

money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration whileduty to public service and administration of justice should beprimary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.

Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriagespecialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of aninstitution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in factencourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve theirmarriage bond.

Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribedbut for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignityof the legal profession. Note that the law list where thelawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only forthat purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a dailypaper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to bepublished the contents of which are likely to deceive or injurethe public or the bar.

CANOY V. ORTIZ

Facts:A complaint was filed on April 2001 by Canoy against

Atty. Ortiz, accusing him for misconduct and malpractice. It isalleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissalagainst Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counselfor Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documentsand records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the positionpaper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to theoffice of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the process of the case. OnApril 2000, Canoy was shocked to learn that his complaint wasactually dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute,the parties not having submitted their position papers. Canoyalleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about thestatus of the case.

Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly cateredto indigent and low-income clients, at considerable financialsacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the period withinwhich to file the position paper had already lapsed. Heattributes his failure to timely file the position paper to the



fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, “hewas frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a localgovernment official and as a practicing lawyer.”

Issue: W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?

Held: Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1

month.Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon

18.03, a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and mustalways be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him.He owes his entire devotion to the interest of the client. Hisnegligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.Under Canon 18.04, the relationship of a lawyer-client beingone of confidence, there is an ever present need for the clientto be adequately and fully informed of the developments of thecase and should not be left in the dark. A lawyer cannot shiftthe blame to complainant for failing to inquire the statusabout the case as this is one of the lawyer’s duties.

The adoption of additional duties due to the election ofAtty. Ortiz as councilor does not exonerate him of hisnegligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer to withdraw hislegal service if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a publicoffice since councilors are not expressly prohibited toexercise their legal profession.

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

Facts:A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan

of the Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office againstAtty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients &encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges thatTolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced hisclients to transfer legal representation by promising financialassistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To

induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called thempersistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presentedthe sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labianotried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationshipwith Linsangan. Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINOLAW OFFFICECONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICESW/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. LabianoParalegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-78206th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCETO OVERSEAS SEAMENREPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATHAND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMSABROAD.In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said calling card.

Issue: W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his

services



Held: Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03,

2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is aprofession and not a business. Thus, lawyers should notadvertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. Toallow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is acommercialization of the practice of law (degrading theprofession in the public’s estimation).

With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited fromsoliciting cases for purpose of gain, either personally orthrough an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes“ambulance chasing” (involving solicitation personally orthrough an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community frombarratry and champertry.

As a final note regarding the calling card presented asevidence by Linsangan, a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity totrust based on his character and conduct. For this reason,lawyers are only allowed to announce their services bypublication in reputable law lists or use of simpleprofessional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain thefollowing details:(a) lawyer’s name;(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;(c) address;(d) telephone number and(e) special branch of law practiced.

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “withfinancial assistance.” The phrase was clearly used to enticeclients (who already had representation) to change counselswith a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Moneywas dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers,thereby taking advantage of their financial distress andemotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the

integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legalprofession.

CANONS 4, 5 & 6

SUAREZ V. PLATON

Facts: Suarez was charged with sedition which was subsequently

dismissed. He in turn filed a case for arbitrary detentionagainst Lieutenant Orais. After the case was handed to JudgePlaton following several changes in trial judge and severalrefusals by fiscals to prosecute the case.

Issue: Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate

the case?

Held: Yes. It is unquestionable that in the proper cases, the

prosecutors must reinvestigate in order to properly dispensejustice. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that aprosecutor is the representative of a sovereignty; he isinterested only in the fact that justice is served, and thisalso includes his refusing to prosecute if the innocence of theaccused is quite clear. He is a servant of the law, and histwo-fold aim is not to let the guilty escape nor let theinnocent suffer. He is not at liberty to strike foul blowsbecause it is his duty to refrain from doing so as much as itis to use legitimate methods of prosecution.

RAMOS V. IMBANG

FACTSIn 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the

assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civiland criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita



Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees butthe latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only. The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearingsof her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent neverallowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to waitoutside. He would then come out after several hours to informher that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. Thishappened six times and for each “appearance” in court,respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainantbecame suspicious. She personally inquired about the status ofher cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna.She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any caseagainst the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed inthe Public Attorney's Office (PAO). HELD

Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken fromthe roll of attorneys.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honestyand integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government serviceare expected to be more conscientious of their actuations asthey are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only membersof the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity topublic service. Government employees are expected to devote themselvescompletely to public service. For this reason, the privatepractice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of theCode of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employeesprovides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition toacts and omissions of public officials and employees nowprescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the followingconstitute prohibited acts and transactions of any publicofficial and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto,public officials and employees during their incumbency shallnot:xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unlessauthorized by the Constitution or law, provided that suchpractice will not conflict with their official function. Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for theyare expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from thecomplainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he wasstill connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a clientestablishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent'sadmission that he accepted money from the complainant and thereceipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-clientrelationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, thereceipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while hewas still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated theprohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt ofattorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose ofproviding free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the RevisedAdministrative Code provides: Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of theGovernment in extending free legal assistance to indigentpersons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and otherquasi-judicial cases. As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have acceptedattorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistentwith the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibitionagainst accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. Thisundertaking includes the observance of the above-mentionedprohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he acceptedthe complainant's cases and received attorney's fees inconsideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's



acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of theCode of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition onthe private practice of profession disqualified him from actingas the complainant's counsel. Aside from disregarding the prohibitions againsthandling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Notonly did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses(which in the first place he should not have done), respondentalso led the complainant to believe that he really filed anaction against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear thatthe cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his“appearance fees” for hearings that never took place. Theseacts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oathnot to do any falsehood. Respondent's conduct in office fell short of theintegrity and good moral character required of all lawyers,specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in publicoffice are expected not only to refrain from any act oromission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of thecitizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of thelegal profession at all times and observe a high standard ofhonesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper ofpublic faith and is burdened with a high degree of socialresponsibility, higher than his brethren in privatepractice.

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondentguilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for thebenefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney'sfees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant(such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction ofa judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was it givento him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filingfees and bail bond). Nevertheless, respondent should returnthe P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled toattorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.

CATU V. RELLOSA

FACTS Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the

possession of one of the units in the said building byElizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignoreddemands to vacate the place. The parties went to the LuponTagapamayapa to try to settle the issue amicably. RespodentRellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the conciliationproceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and thepetitioner brought the case to court.

Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel forElizabeth and Pastor. This prompted Catu to file anadministrative complaint against Rellosa for his act ofimpropriety.

IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation,ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.032 and RA 67133. Thecommittee recommended Rellosa’s suspension from practice for 1month.

ISSUEW/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03

HELDNo.Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government

service. Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time hecommitted the act complained of.

As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA71604, which actually allows him to practice his profession.However, being a public official, he is also governed by

2 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in service3 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees4 Local Government Code of 1991



Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtaina written permission from his department head who is the Sec.of DILG. This he failed to do.

SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyer’s oath (touphold and obey law), Rule 1.01 (lawyer shall not engage inunlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall uphold integrityand dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys lawdisgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension andstrongly advised him to look up and take to heart the meaningof the word delicadeza.__________

Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession?Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says “if the constitution or law allows it” Public officers howeverare subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in privatepractice of their profession, they should first secure a written permission from theirdepartment head.

PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTSGeneral Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered

financial difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued aresolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.

Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed apetition with the then Court of First Instance praying for theassistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK'sliquidation.

After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for thepurpose of recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17,1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion,reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages againstrespondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs ofsequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationshipand influence with former President Marcos. These respondentswere represented by Mendoza.

PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza ascounsel for respondents. The motions alleged that respondentMendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank,'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which wassubsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and becameAllied Banking Corporation.

The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits formergovernment lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment inconnection with any matter in which he had intervened while insaid service.

ISSUEW/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

applies to respondent Mendoza?

HELDNO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of

respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case atbar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with thesaid bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for itsliquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolvewhether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legalprocedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the conceptof 'matter’ under Rule 6.03.

The 'matter’ where he got himself involved was ininforming Central Bank on the procedure provided by law toliquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessarypetition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is differentfrom the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is aboutthe sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.

The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include thedissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without sayingthat Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibilitycannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his allegedintervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812



is an intervention on a matter different from the matterinvolved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in theliquidation case is not significant and substantial. We notethat the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of thecourt in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of thecourt in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bankin determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.

Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza haslong been a dead issue. For a fact, the recycled motion fordisqualification in the case at bar was filed more than fouryears after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which weresubsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least,the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in thecase at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highlysuspect.

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyerswho 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carriesthe danger that former government employee may compromiseconfidential official information in the process. But thisconcern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing theCentral Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is adifferent matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondentsTan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides forthere were no sides.

CANON 7

IN RE GALANG

Doctrine:That the concealment of an attorney in his application

to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been with,

or indicted for an alleged crime, as a ground for revocation ofhis license to practice law, is well settled.

IN RE ARTHUR M. CUEVAS

FACTS Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar

examinations, but was precluded from taking the lawyer’s1996 oath, pending approval from the Supreme Court

This stems from petitioner’s participation in theinitiation rites of the Lex Talionis Fraternitas of SandBeda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a result ofhazing.

Cuevas was charged with Imprudence Resulting inHomicide.

He applied for and was granted probation, then wasdischarged on May 1995

May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take thelawyer’s oath and attached to his petitioncertifications attesting to his “righteous, peaceful andlaw abiding character.”

ISSUEMay Cuevas take the lawyer’s oath, taking in

consideration the certifications attesting to his “righteous,peaceful and law abiding character”?

HELDYes.Though his deliberate participation in the initiation

rites indicates absence of that moral fitness required foradmission into the bar, the court is willing to give thepetitioner a chance based on the various certifications: theysufficiently show that he has a righteous, peaceful and civiloriented character; and he has proven that he has taken stepsto purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atonefor the death of Raul Camaligan.



SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an

illegitimate child)

Facts:Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer and their lawyer-

client relationship became intimate, when Atty. Ferrer courtedher and she fell in love. They lived together as "husband andwife" from 96-97 and their daughter was born. The affair endedin 2000 and since then he failed to give support to theirdaughter.

Before the IBP Samaniego testified that she knew thatAtty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not think he wasalready married. Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during thehearing since he did not want to see Samaniego.

Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support theirdaughter in a position paper. He also reasoned that he found itunconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabitwith Samaniego.

IBP Board of Governors imposed upon Atty. Ferrer thepenalty of 6 months suspension for his refusal to support hisdaughter.

Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to reduce thepenalty because it will further cause extreme hardship to hisfamily of 10 children. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lackedthe degree of morality required of a member of the bar, hisprayer for reduced penalty was denied.

Held:SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of gross immorality and he

is ordered suspended for 6 months.Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair and SC

considers such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoralconduct subject to disciplinary action. Although it is truethat Samaniego was not entirely blameless for knowing aboutAtty. Ferrer’s wife, it does not make this case less serioussince it is immaterial whether both are in pari delicto.

Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon7 and Rule 7.03.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND STAFFV. ATTY. DELA CRUZ

Facts:Disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff

of the SLU-LHS against Atty. Dela Cruz, its principal, on theff grounds:

a. Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed againstthe respondent: criminal case for child abuse; admincase for unethical acts of misappropriating money forteachers; and the labor case filed by SLU-LHS Facultyfor illegal deduction of salary.Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a second

marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. He wasmarried in 1982 and they separated in-fact a year after. 7years after, he contracts another marriage, but this wasannulled for being bigamous.

Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 intotal), from 88-97 despite the expiration of his notarialcommission in 87.

Respondent denied the charges in the cases pendingagainst him, but admitted his second marriage and itssubsequent nullification. He also admitted having notarizeddocuments when his notarial commission had already expired.However, he offered defenses such as good faith, lack of maliceand noble intentions in doing the complained acts.

IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz for 1 year forhis bigamous marriage and 1 year also for notarizing withoutcommission (2 years total)

Held:SC finds respondent guilty of immoral conduct, and

suspended him from the practice of law for 2 years, and another2 years for notarizing documents.



Respondent was already a member of the Bar when hecontracted the bigamous marriage. However, after his failedfirst marriage, he remained celibate until the 2nd marriage,showed his good intentions by marrying the 2nd wife, and henever absconded in his family duties. The SC finds that penaltyof disbarment is too harsh.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarizeddocuments without the necessary commission, SC stressesnotarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Fordoing such constitutes not only malpractice but also the crimeof falsification of public documents. Respondent also violatedthe Notarial Law for so doing, and this falls squarely withinthe prohibition of Rule 1.01 and Canon 7.

The other cases against respondent are pending beforethe proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocencestill prevails in favor of the respondent.

ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT

FACTSPetitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against

her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, praying thatthe court exercise its disciplinary power over him.

Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on1942; that they bore 12 children; that she saw respondentthrough law school, continuously supporting him until he passedthe bar; that several years after their marriage, or in 1968,respondent left the conjugal home and began cohabiting withBenita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children.Because of this, Rebecca was impelled to file a complaint forlegal separation and support, and a criminal case for adultery.

Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife buthe denied having cohabited with Benita. He also stated thatRebecca was the cause of their separation alleging that she wasalways traveling for business purposes without his knowledgeand consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward herfamily. Hearings were conducted before the Office of the SolGenand subsequently, before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.

Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses:her sister, who identified a letter sent to her by respondentapologizing for the unhappiness he caused the family; and theother was Melecio Navarro, the husband of Benita, who testifiedabout how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress knowingfully well of their marriage. During the hearings, respondent,despite due notice, repeatedly absented himself when it was histurn to present evidence. He would also seek postponement,pleading illness, on the hearing dates.

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report:The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondentliable for abandonment and recommended his suspensionfrom the practice of law for 3 months. It averred thatan indefinite suspension is not recommended becauserespondent supports himself through the practice of lawand that it would be cruel deny him of this at this timewhen he is already advanced in age.

HELDThe Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled

that gross immoral conduct was sufficiently proven warrantingdisbarment of respondent.

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity ofthe legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflectson this fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behavein a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Possession of good moral character is not only acondition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuingqualification for all members of the bar.

Good moral character is more than just the absence ofbad character. It expresses itself in the will to do theunpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do thepleasant thing if it is wrong.

Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which isso willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference tothe opinion of good and respectable members of the community.



To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must notonly be immoral, but grossly immoral.

Grossly immoral meaning it must be so corrupt as tovirtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to bereprehensible to a high degree or committed under suchscandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the commonsense of decency.

Lawyers must not only be of good moral character butmust also be seen to be of good moral character and leadinglives in accordance with the highest moral standards of thecommunity.

The fact that respondent’s philandering ways are farremoved from the exercise of his profession would not save theday from him. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for anymisconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice ofhis profession, would show him to be unfit for the office andunworthy of his license.

Respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fitto remain a member of the bar. This, he failed to do. He neverattended the hearings to rebut the charges against him,irresistibly suggesting that they are true.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s act of leaving his wife and 12children to cohabit and have children with another womanconstitutes gross immoral conduct. He should therefore bedisbarred.

ADVINCULA V. MACABATA

FACTSAtty. Macabata was the counsel of Cynthia Advincula. In

two separate incidents, Atty. Macabata turnedthe head ofAdvincula and kissed her on the lips. These kissing incidentsoccurred after meetings regarding a case that Advincula wasinvolved in. in both incidents, Atty. Macabata kissed Advinculainside the car, just before dropping her off in a publicstreet. Atty. Macabata apologized to Advincula via textmessages immediately after the 2nd kissing incident.

Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty.Macabata on the ground of grossly immoral character. Atty.Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but that this wasdue to his feelings toward Advincula.

ISSUEIs Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to

merit his disbarment?

HELDThe Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT

guilty of grossly immoral character. Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to

constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to bereprehensible to a high degree or committed under suchscandalous or revolting circumstances as to show the commonsense of decency. To merit a disbarment, the act must begrossly immoral.

Atty. Macabata’s act of kissing Advincula was notgrossly immoral. The kiss was not motivated by malice. This wasproven by Atty. Macabata’s immediate apology and the fact thatit happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed toprove that Atty. Macabata lured her or took advantage of her.

While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty.Macabata was reprimanded and given a stern warning. The courtdescribed his kissing of Advincula as distasteful.

(The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso areok.)

CANON 8

REYES V. CHIONG

FACTSTwo Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered

into a business venture to set up a factory for seafoodproducts. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu discovered thatPan had not established the factory and asked for his money



back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged theservices of Atty. Reyes, who filed a complaint for estafaagainst Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The complaint wasassigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, whoissued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminaryinvestigation. For failure to appear and submit a counter-affidavit, Salanga filed a criminal complaint for estafaagainst Pan in the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant ofarrest against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a motion toquash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the RTC ofZamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum ofmoney, damages, and for the dissolution of the business ventureagainst Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed adisbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundlesssuit, alleging that it was instituted to exact vengeance. Atty.Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes was impleaded for connivingwith Xu in filing the estafa case. Salanga was impleadedbecause of the supposed irregularities in conducting theinvestigation. The SC referred the case to the IBP.

ISSUEW/N the civil complaint was groundless

W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and ProsecutorSalanga in the civil complaint

HELDYes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper

to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in said civilcomplaint.

IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtainleverage against the estafa case. There was no need to impleadAtty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they were not partiesin the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint wasimproper and highly questionable and the suit was filed toharass both of them. In filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiongviolated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension

SC: affirmed IBP’s recommendation. In addition, theCourt mentioned some alternative remedies Atty. Chiong couldhave taken if his allegations were indeed true. Chiong couldhave filed a motion for reinvestigation or motion forreconsideration of Salanga’s decision to file the informationfor estafa. Motion to Dismiss the estafa case was alsoavailable if it was indeed filed without basis.

Relevant Provisions:Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,fairness, and candor towards his professional colleagues, andshall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.Lawyer’s Oath – “not to wittingly or willingly promote or sueany groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid norconsent to the same.”

ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO

Facts:Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and

Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and VP of IBP-NuevaVizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to inquirewhether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already beenremanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of eitherparty in that case. Complainant replied that the record had not yet beentransmitted since a certified true copy of the CA decisionshould first be presented. To this respondent retorted, “Youmean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy?” Complainant replied that respondent may show instead the copysent to the party he represents. Respondent then replied thatcomplainant should’ve notified him. Complainant explained thatit is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty.Angered, respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left theoffice, banging the door so loud. He then returned to theoffice and shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!” (“Vulva of your mother,you woman!”)



Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’tappear in the hearing of the case in view of the respondent’spublic apology, and that the latter was forgiven already.

Held: Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning.Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case

No. 784. His explanation that he will enter his appearance inthe case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTCis unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record respondent hadno right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violatedRule 8.02, because this was an act of encroachment. It mattersnot that he did so in good faith. His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgarinvectives to the clerk of court was not only ill-mannered butalso unbecoming considering that he did these in front of thecomplainant’s subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03and 8.01 and Canon 8.

The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the latter accepted it. Thisis not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved fromhis actuations. People are accountable for the consequences ofthe things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.

ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO

Facts:Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of

PAO in Anitque) filed a complaint against Atty. Pefianco forconduct unbecoming of the bar for using improper and offensivelanguage and threatening and attempting to assault complainant.This happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring with his clientin the PAO office when the wife of the murdered victim, intears, came and askef for a settlement. Moved by the plight ofthe woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby, scolded andshouted at Salvani to not settle the case and to have hisclient imprisoned so that he would realize his mistake. Ashead of the office, Alcantara reproached Pefianco, but this

ended up with Pefianco saying that Alcantara was an idiot forsending him out of the PAO. Also, Pefianco tried to attackAlcantara and even shouted at him, “Gago ka!”

The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefiancoviolated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue: W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8

Held:Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves

with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers.Pefianco’s meddling in a matter in which he had no right to doso caused the incident. And although Pefianco was moved by thewoman’s plight, what he thought was righteous did not give himthe right to scold Salvani and insult and berate those whotried to calm him down. Whatever moral righteousness he hadwas negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.

CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN

FACTSAMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the

RTC for expelling some students due to having publishedobjectionable features or articles in the school paper.Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelledstudents filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counselfor AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the Code of ProfessionalEthics which provides that "A lawyer should not in any waycommunicate upon the subject of controversy with a partyrepresented by counsel, much less should he undertake tonegotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should onlydeal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer mostparticularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead aparty not represented by counsel and he should not undertake toadvise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact thatAtty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelledstudents and their parents compromise agreements in which the



students waived all kinds of claims they may have against AMACCand to terminate all civil, criminal and administrativeproceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements wereprocured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledgeof Atty. Camacho given that he was already the counsel for thestudents at that time. It was averred that the acts of Atty.Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal professionwarranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice oflaw.

ISSUEWhether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the

Code of Professional Ethics

HELDYES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the

practice of law for having ciolated the Code of ProfessionalEthics.

In this case, when the compromise agreements wereformalized and effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho wasalready the retained counsel for the students in the pendingcase filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayanhad full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayanstill proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parentswithout at least communicating the matter with their lawyereven being aware that the students were being represented bycounsel.

Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design oroversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons ofprofessional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to acolleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of thedemands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such actof Atty. Pangulayan is also in violation of Canon 8.02 of theCode of Professional Responsibility which states that "A lawyershall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon theprofessional employment of another lawyer, however, it is theright of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper

advice and assistance to those seeking relief againstunfaithful or neglectful counsel."

TORRES V. JAVIER

Facts:Atty. Torres and Mrs. Celestino charge Atty. Javier for

malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney an/orviolation of the lawyer’s oath. This stemmed from the remarksmade by Javier in the pleadings he filed in a petition foraudit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Assoc.(UEFA) as counsel: 1. Motion to Expedite contained falsestatements with malicious imputation of robbery and theft ofUEFA’s funds upon their persons; and 2. In the atty.’s feescase, Javier in his Reply used abusive and improper language,and made a statement demeaning to the integrity of theprofession (“not uncommon for trial lawyers to hear notariesasking their family members to sign for them”).

Javier explained that he was angry because Torres hadbeen spreading reports and rumors implicating his clientsincluding his wife to the burglary. With respect to theatty.’s fess case, he alleged that Torres, in his Answer, didnot confront the issues but mocked and made maliciousaccusations against his wife.

The IBP found Javier guilty of violating the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.

Issue: W/N Javier is guilty of violation of the Code

Held:Yes. For reasons of public policy, utterances made in

the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds ofpleadings, petitions and motion, are absolutely privileged solong as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry,however false or malicious they may be (must be material andrelevant). This privilege does not extend to those matters notrelated to the controversy.



The allegations in the Motion to Expedite fall underthis privilege, but not those in the Reply. The SC does notcountenance Torres’ incorporation of criticisms againstJavier’s wife as past president of UEFA, but this does notjustify Javier’s retaliating statements (What kind of lawyer isTorres? He lies through his teeth).

Canon 8 instructs that a lawyer’s arguments in hispleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposingcounsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed byone gentleman to another.

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

FACTSTolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the

clients of Labiano by offering, in some instances, a 50K loan.

ISSUEIs it an encroachment on the professional practice of

Labiano, thereby violating rule 8.02 which provides that, “Alawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon theprofessional employment of another lawyer,…”?

HELDYes.Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal

another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him bya promise of better service, good result, or reduced fees forhis service. In this case, promise of a loan.

CANON 9

MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

FACTS:This is a petition praying for an order to the

respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain

advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law professionother than those allowed by law.

The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invitespotential clients to inquire about secret marriage and divorcein Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they aregiving free books on Guam Divorce.

Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical anddestructive of the confidence of the community in the integrityof lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed andoffended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, therespondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication ofthe advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in thepractice of law but is merely rendering legal support servicesthrough paralegals. It also contends that such advertisementsshould be allowed based on certain US cases decided.

ISSUE:W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of

law. W/N the same can properly be the subject of the

advertisements complained of.

HELD/RATIO: Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should

be enjoined.Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,

which requires the application of law, legal procedures,knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practiceof law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of theprofession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice orrender any kind of service that involves legal knowledge orskill.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct ofcases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and thepreparation of legal instruments and contract by which legalrights are secured, although such matter may or may not bepending in a court. When a person participates in a trial andadvertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.



One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legalrights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks thelatter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status andrights of another and the conduct with respect theretoconstitutes a practice of law. The practice of law, therefore,covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Andapplying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, asadvertised, engaged in the “practice of law”.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporationgives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. With itsattorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have toexplain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise himor her on the proper course of action to be taken as may beprovided for by said law. That is what its advertisementsrepresent and for the which services it will consequentlycharge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within thejurisprudential definition of "practice of law."

The standards of the legal profession condemn thelawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, withoutviolating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents orskill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising hisgoods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a reputablelaw list and use of an ordinary, simple professional card.

The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions.To allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used byrespondent would only serve to aggravate what is already adeteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whoseintegrity has consistently been under attack. Hence, it shouldbe enjoined.

CAYETANO V. MONSOD

FACTSRespondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then

President Aquino for the position of COMELEC Chairman in 1991.This nomination was opposed by petitioner Cayetano on theground that Monsod does not possess the required qualification

of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10years. Apparently, the Constitution requires that the COMELECChairperson be a member of the Philippine Bar who has beenengaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. DespiteCayetano’s opposition, the Commission on Appointments confirmedthe nomination. Thus, Cayetano filed an instant petition forcertiorari and prohibition, basically challenging theconfirmation by the CA of Monsod’s nomination.

ISSUEIs Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson?

HELDYES.The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of

cases in court. Practice of law under modem conditions consistsin no small part of work performed outside of any court andhaving no immediate relation to proceedings in court. Itembraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a largevariety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legalinstruments covering an extensive field of business and trustrelations and other affairs. Although these transactions mayhave no direct connection with court proceedings, they arealways subject to become involved in litigation. They requirein many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experiencewith men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation todifficult and complex situations. These customary functions ofan attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation tothe administration of justice by the courts. No validdistinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in theorder, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyerwhich involves appearance in court and that part which involvesadvice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is ofimportance to the welfare of the public that these manifoldcustomary functions be performed by persons possessed ofadequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, andacting at all times under the heavy trust obligations toclients which rests upon all attorneys.



The SC, in order to arrive at its decision,presented a brief history of Monsod’s employment. After passingthe bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of hisfather. From 1963 to 1970, he worked for the World Bank Group,where he was assigned as operations officer in Costa Rica. Hisjob involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economicand project work of the bank. In 1970, he returned to thePhilippines and worked with the Meralco Group, served as chiefexecutive of an investment bank and a business conglomerate. By1986, he rendered his services to various companies as a legaland economic consultant and he also worked as a Chief ExecutiveOfficer. He was also the Secretary-General and NationalChairman of NAMFREL in 1986-1987. His position in NAMFRELrequired his knowledge in election law. Also, he sat as amember of the Davide Commission in 1990.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions ofthe term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept oflaw practice, and taking into consideration the liberalconstruction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiatorof contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and thepoor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement— that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at leastten years.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:There are several factors determinative of whether a particularactivity constitutes "practice of law."

1. Habituality2. Compensation3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or

procedure which calls or legal knowledge, training andexperience is within the term "practice of law”.

4. Attorney-client relationship.

CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO

FACTSCabliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law

office, filed a disbarment complaint on the grounds of deceit,grossly immoral conduct and malpractice or other grossmisconduct in office.

Deceit: represented herself to be married to FelicisimoTenorio Jr, who has a prior existing marriage

Grossly immoral conduct: disseminated libellousaffidavits against a Makati City counselor.

Malpractice: allowed her husband, a non-lawyer, topractice by making him a senior partner in her law office. Thisis evidenced by 1) the law office letterhead which included thehusband as a senior partner, 2) an id wherein he signed as an“atty”, 3) appearance in court as counsel.

HELD Guilty of malpractice. Violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01Canon 9: a lawyer shall not assist in unauthorized

practice of lawRule 9.01: a lawyer shall not delated to any unqualified

person the performance of a task that may only be performed bymembers of the bar in good standing

Even though Cabliza later on withdrew her complaint, IBPstill pushed through with the investigation because such is adisciplinary proceeding. There is no private interest affectedsuch that desistance of the complainant will terminate theproceedings. The purpose is to protect the bar from those unfitto practice law.

AMALGAMATED LABORERS’ ASSOCIATION V. CIR

FACTSThis case involves a controversy over Attorney’s Fees

for legal services in the CIR.On 1956, Arceo + 47 other members of their UNION, ALA

and Javier lodged a complaint agains Binalbagan Sugar Central



Company (BISCOM) for unfair labor practices, as specified inthe Industrial Peace Act.

On Nov 1962, the CIR rendered judgement in favor of theworkers and it became final on March 1963.

On June 1963, the CIR directed the Chief Examiner to goto BISCOM to compute the backwages of the complainant workers

Atty. Fernandez filed a “Notice of Atty.’s lien”amounting to 25% of their money claim (PhP79, 755.22). Heexplained that it was supposed to be 30% but Arsenio Reyesrequested him to 25% to satisfy Atty. Carbonell’s lien of 5%.

Atty. Carbonell disputed this claim and even said thatthe verbal agreement entered into by the UNION and its officersis that the 30% Atty.’s Fees shall be divided equally by him,Atty. Fernandez & Felisberto Javier, the UNION’s president.

There are other matters in this case regardingJurisdiction but the one related to Legal Ethics is on theissue on Atty.’s Fees

ISSUEW/N IT MAY BE STIPULATED THAT THE UNION PRESIDENT MAY

SHARE IN THE ATTORNEY’S FEES.

HELDNO. The court struck down the alleged oral agreement

that the UNION President should share in the Atty.’s Fees. TheUNION President is not the attorney for the laborers. He mayseek compensation only as such president. An agreement wherebya UNION President is allowed to share in Atty.’s Fees isimmoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot bejustified. Note Rule 9.02.

AGUIRRE V. RAMA

FACTSRespondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the

2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before thescheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees asmembers of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirrefiled against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to

the Bar, charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law,grave misconduct, violation of law, and gravemisrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as amember of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the Roll of Attorneyspending the resolution of the charge against him.

Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practiceof law and grave misconduct, alleging that respondent, whilenot yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for Vice Mayoraltycandidate George Bunan in the May 2001 elections before theMunicipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon,Masbate, and filed with the MBEC a pleading as counselentitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing ofVotes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor.Respondent also signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in herpetition to be declared the winning mayoralty candidate.

On the charge of violation of law, respondent is notallowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court oradministrative body, respondent being a municipal governmentemployee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,Masbate).

The Court referred the case to the Office of the BarConfidant (“OBC”) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and RecommendationThe OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBECas counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes ofthe MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participatedin the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondentappeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took thelawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. Respondent’s misconduct casts aserious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of theBar. Such unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny hisadmission to the practice of law.

HELD



Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law andwas thus denied admission to the Philippine bar.

1. SC agreed with the finding of the OBC that respondentengaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does notdeserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

- Respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and signed as“counsel” in the pleadings - was also retained as counsel of mayoralty candidateEmily Estipona-Hao and of party REFORMA LM-PPC *all these took place before Respondent took his oath and signed the Roll ofAttorneys2. What constitutes the “practice of law”- The practice of law is not limited to the conduct ofcases or litigation in court; it embraces thepreparation of pleadings and other papers incident toactions and special proceedings, the management of suchactions and proceedings on behalf of clients beforejudges and courts- all advice to clients, and all action taken for themin matters connected with the law, incorporationservices, assessment and condemnation servicescontemplating an appearance before a judicial body, theforeclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor'sclaim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, andconducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters ofestate and guardianship have been held to constitute lawpractice, as do the preparation and drafting of legalinstruments, where the work done involves thedetermination by the trained legal mind of the legaleffect of facts and conditions. - any activity, in or out of court, which requires theapplication of law, legal procedure, knowledge, trainingand experience. - perform acts which are usually performed by members ofthe legal profession. - render any kind of service which requires the use oflegal knowledge or skill.

* respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in theproceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license todo so. 3. The right to practice law is not a natural or

constitutional right but is a privilege. - limited to persons of good moral character withspecial qualifications duly ascertained and certified. - A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practicelaw simply by passing the bar examinations. - although respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinationsand took the lawyer’s oath, it is the signing in theRoll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledgedlawyer.

LAQUINDANUM V. QUINTANA

Facts: Judge Laquindanum charged Atty. Quintana with the

offense of notarizing documents beyond the jurisdiction of hisnotarial license and with notarizing documents not known to himto be based on actual facts. It was also found that his wifesometimes notarized the documents herself.

Issue: Is Atty. Quintana guilty of violating Canon 9?

Held: Yes. He was found to have assisted in the unauthorized

practice of law by negligently letting his wife notarizedocuments herself in his absence. His contention that herectified this error by slapping his wife is of no momentbecause he did not in the first place take the necessary stepsto prevent this. He was also charged with violations of thenotarial law.

CANONS 10 & 11



FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON

FACTSThis is an administrative case filed by petitioner

Fernandez against Atty. Villalon. It started from a case filedby a certain Carlos Palacios against Fernandez to nullify aDeed of Donation. Atty. Villalon represented Palacios in theearly part of the case against Fernandez.

In 2004, Palacios, owner of a lot in Makati, sought thehelp of Fernandez to help him in a case against a land-grabbingsyndicate. Palacios won the case with the help of Fernandez.

In Sept 2005, Palacios bumped into a Mrs. Lirio whoexpressed interest in buying Palacios’ Makati property. Itturns out that it was being sold by Fernandez who allegedly hada Deed of Donation which Palacios executed in his favor. ThisDeed of Donation was registered.

Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed anaction tto nullify the Deed against Fernandez. However,Fernandez answered that the title transfer in his name wasproper, citing a Deed of Absolute Sale as basis. He furtheredalled that it was actually Palacios who forged the Deed ofDonation to cheat in taxes.

In 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarmentagainst Atty. Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01, 7.03, 10.1,10.2, 10.3. He claims that Atty. Villalon has suppressed andexcluded in the complaint filed by her knowledge about theexistence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was by the way,unregistered. He says that no mention of it was made in thepetition for the annulment of thee Deed of Donation.

Commissioner of IBP recommended the dismissal of thecase. Sustaining Atty. Villalon’s argument that she, as counselfor Palacios, was under no duty to include the fact that theDeed of Sale existed because only the client’s operative facts,and not other evidentiary facts, need to be included in thecomplaint. The Deed of Sale was a matter of a defense thatFernandez as defendant can freely point out during the trial.

Fernandez appealed the case.

ISSUE W/N there was grave abuse of discretion in dismissing

the complaint.

HELDNone. Case against Villalon is dismissed.A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the duty to be

truthful in all his dealings. However, this duty does notrequire that the lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf ofhis or her client’s opponent. She (Villalon) is not duty boundto build the case for her client’s opponent, Fernandez.

The cause of action chosen by Palacios was for theannulment of the Deed of Donation. Client Palacios informed herthat the Deed of Sale was void for lack of consideration. Also,it was not registered and was not the basis of the transfer oftitle of Palacios’ property to Fernandez. Therefore, it is nota necessary evidence/fact to their case.

RIVERA V. CORRAL

Facts:Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging

Atty. Corral with malpractice and conduct unbecoming a memberof the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case wasreceived by Atty. Corral’s secretary on February 23, 1990.Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty. Corral on March 13, 1990.Next day, he went to the clerk of court and changed the dateFebruary 23 to February 29 without the court’s prior knowledgeand permission. Atty. Corral later on filed a reply toplaintiff’s manifestation claiming that he received thedecision on February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb 29).

Issue:W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the

date when he received the decision of the court without thecourt’s prior knowledge of decision

Held:



No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correctionof date by Atty. Corral was made not to reflect the truth butto mislead the trial court in believing that the notice ofappeal was filed within the reglementary period. Because if thedecision was received on Feb 22, the notice of appeal filed onMarch 13 is filed out of time. To extricate himself from suchpredicament, Atty. Corral altered the date he received thecourt’s decision. By altering the material dates to make itappear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corralcommitted an act of dishonesty. Dishonesty constitutes gravemisconduct.

JOHNNY NG V. ALAR

FACTSThe case stemmed from a labor case filed by the

employees of the Ng Company against its employers. Theemployees alleged that they did not receive their serviceincentive leave pay from their employers due to the latter’sclaim that the employees conducted a strike at the Company’spremises which hampered its ingress and egress. The case wasreferred to the labor arbiter and the latter found that theemployees have been paid their service incentive leave pay. Theemployees appealed to NLRC but the latter affirmed the laborarbiter’s decision.In reaction to this, respondent filed a Motion forReconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI) where respondentused scandalous, offensive, and menacing languages to supporthis complaint. He said that the labor arbiter was cross-eyed inmaking his findings of fact and that Commissioner Dinopol actedin the same manner with malice thrown in when he adopted thefindings of the labor arbiter. That the retiring commissionersof NLRC circumvent the law and jurisprudence when the moneyclaim involved in the case is substantial. According torespondent, such acts constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Because of the MRMI, complainant filed a disbarment casewith IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline against respondentwherein it was alleged that the latter violated certain codesand rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Specifically, respondent allegedly violated Canons 8 and 11wherein a lawyer is prohibited from using scandalous,oppressive, offensive, and malicious language against anopposing counsel and before the courts.

In his defense, respondent argues that he did notviolate any of the canons found in the Code because 1) the NLRCis not among the courts referred to in the rules; 2) theCommissioners therein are not judges; and 3) the complainantsin labor cases are entitled to some latitude of righteousanger. Attached to respondent’s counter-complaint is anaffidavit made by the union president Batan alleging that thelawyers of the complainant are the ones who violated the Codeof Professional Responsibility when they filed multiple suitsarising from the same cause of action and when theydeliberately lessened the number of complainants in the laborcase.

The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led theIBP to conclude that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8and 11, while the lawyers of the complainant did not violateany canons of the Code. It recommended that respondent bereprimanded with a stern warning that severe penalties will beimposed in case a similar conduct will be committed again.

ISSUEW/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.

HELDYES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions erode thepublic’s perception of the legal profession. The MRMI containsinsults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both itsmoral and intellectual integrity, replete with impliedaccusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence.Respondent used improper and offensive language in hispleadings that does not admit any justification.

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic,it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the



dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessarylanguage is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in thecourts and trust in judicial administration.

However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warningimposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate torespondent’s violation of the Canons of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stifferpenalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against the lawyers ofcomplainant, the Court finds no reason to disturb the followingfindings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:

The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit anyposition paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficientopportunity to do so.

FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND

FACTSDe La Serna a requested for the inhibition of Associate

Justice Dante O. Tinga claiming that Justice Tinga, who was theponente of the decision, received P10 Million from Mr. JohnnyChan in exchange for a favorable decision. De la sernaalleges JOHNNY CHAN curtly told him that Chan already given out10M to JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA in exchange for a favorableDecision in the case between Fudot and Catltleya land(Mr. Chanis a representative of Cattleya land). Atty. De La Serna saidthat Justice Tinga abandoned the doctrine in the case Lim v,Jorge to accommodate Mr. Chan. He also said that the case wasprioritized for resolution and that Mr. Chan had priorknowledge of the outcome of the case before the decision waspromulgated.

However, Mr. Chan related that he approached De La Sernafor the purpose of amicably settling their case with Cattleya,and offered him to be their retainer in Bohol. However, hedenied having said to De La Serna that he had already spent somuch money for the Supreme Court

ISSUEW/N Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.

HELDAtty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by

setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience ofthe court's orders but such conduct that tends to bring theauthority of the court and the administration of law intodisrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration ofjustice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not inthe presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade,obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. Any improperconduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,or degrade the administration of justice has also beenconsidered to constitute indirect contempt.

A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of thecourt. Corollary to his duty to observe and maintain therespect due to the courts and judicial officers is to supportthe courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." His duty isto uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to whichhe owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in theadministration of justice, as it is his sworn and moral duty tohelp build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem andregard towards the courts so essential to the properadministration of justice”

As part of the machinery for the administration ofjustice, a lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregularand questionable practices of those sitting in court which tendto corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquiredreliable information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicialofficers, it is incumbent upon him to report the matter to theCourt so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission oreven a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, andthe public's trust in, the judicial system.



This is not to say, however, that as an officer of thecourt, he cannot criticize the court. It is a long recognizedand respected right of a lawyer, or any person, for thatmatter, to be critical of courts and magistrates as long asthey are made in properly respectful terms and throughlegitimate channels. But it is the cardinal condition of allsuch criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spillover the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfaircriticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect tocourts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer todisciplinary action.

In this case, Atty. De La Serna's statements bear thebadges of falsehood while the common version of the witnesseswho disputed his statements is imbued with the hallmarks oftruth. De La Serna's declarations were maliciously andirresponsibly made. They exceeded the boundaries of decency andpropriety. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibilityof Justice Tinga tend to degrade the dignity of the Court anderode public confidence that should be accorded to it.

BONDOC V. JUDGE SIMBULAN

FACTSThere was a case for corruption in the judges sala. the

private prosecutors representing the government were repeatedlyabsent or unprepared.

This led to the case being dismissed. the lawyer/privateprosecutor was unhappy with the dismissal and accused the judgeof favoritism and gross ignorance of the law.

The lawyer went to the congressman in their district andthrough him filed a case against the judge. this subsequentreached the supreme court.

HELDThe supreme court found the judge innocent and the

lawyer was found to be the one behind the case (against thejudge) not the congressman.

The lawyer was found guilty of indirect contempt andgiven a stern warning as well as fined for 2500php by thecourt.

Lesson: if you file a case against a judge file itwithin the justice system (ie office of the court administrator/ IBP) not with your congressman or other non-judicial people.

CANON 12

BERBANO V. BARCELONA

FACTSFelicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty.

Daen as their atty-in-fact for their pending casevwith theCommission on the Settlement of Land Problems (regarding theirAyala lot being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty. Daenwas subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa police. The heirs ofHilapo looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen.Berbano was recommended to Atty. Barcelona (by a certain NatySibuya). After the first visit of Atty. Barcelona in MuntinlupaCity Jail, they learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engagethe services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told Berbanothat if they could produce P50K, he will cause the release ofAtty. Daen the next day. Since it was already late in theevening, Berbano could only produce P15,700 by asking fromrelatives who were with her.

There were several subsequent meetings between Berbanoand Atty. Barcelona regarding the “grease money” to be used toallegedly bribe an SC justice. Berbano made another payment viaa “pay-to-cash” check for P24,000; and, in another occasion,went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000.Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daen’snephew while Berbano gave him P1000 for gasoline expenses whenAtty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure Atty.Daen’s because the check had not been encashed. By this time,the total amount given to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000.

For failure to deliver on his promise and due to hissudden disappearance, Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment



against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP. Commissioner Bautistafound Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breachof the Code of Professional Responsibility recommending him tobe disbarred and ordering him to return the P64,000 (Forfailure to file an answer and to appear before theCommissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board ofGovernors adopted the Commissioner’s findings but reduced thepenalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 years.

ISSUEW/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred

HELDAtty. Barcelona should be disbarred.Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the

administration of justice by protecting the court and thepublic from the misconduct of officers of the court and removefrom the profession of law persons whose disregard for theiroath of office have proved them unfit to continue dischargingthe trust reposed in them as members of the bar.

Berbano’s Affidavit-Complaint and testimony wassufficient to support the finding that respondent committed theacts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona in not filinghis answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice,emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Hence, the Courtfinds no compelling reason to overturn the InvestigatingCommissioner’s judgment.

Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7,11, and 16 (Rule 16.01). Instead of promoting respect for lawand the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned thelegal profession by taking money from a client under thepretext of having connections with a Member of the Court (tosecure the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the firsttime Atty. Barcelona has been charged and found guilty ofconduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous case also involvedmisrepresentation and Atty. Barcelona also did not appearbefore the IBP despite due notice.). Respondent has demonstrated apenchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure

the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given tosuch connections (related to Canon 12).

SEBASTIAN V. BAJAR

FACTSBajar was a lawyer or the Bureau of Agrarian Legal

Assistance of the DAR who represented Fernando Tanlioco innumerous cases which raised the same issues. Tanlioco was anagricultural lessee of a land owned by Sebastian’s spouse andsister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filedan Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversionorder of the land use from agricultural to residential. The RTCrendered judgment ordering Tanlioco’s ejectment subject to thepayment of disturbance compensation. This was affirmed by theCA and SC. Bajar, as counsel, filed another case for SpecificPerformance to produce the conversion order. RTC dismissed thisdue to res judicata and lack of cause of action. Bajar againfiled another case for Maintenance of Possession with the DARAdjudication Board which raised the same issues of conversionand disturbance compensation.

Manuel S. Sebastian filed a disbarment complaint againstAtty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for “obstructing, disobeying,resisting, rebelling, and impeding final decisions of RegionalTrial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable SupremeCourt, and also for submitting those final decisions for thereview and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, andfor contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics.”

The Court issued a resolution requiring Bajar to commenton the complaint lodged against her. After a 2nd Motion forExtension, Bajar finally submitted her Comment which wasalleged to not confront the issues raised against her. TheCourt required Bajar to submit a Rejoinder but failed, and waslater ordered to show cause why she should not be subjected todisciplinary action for such failure. The Court referred thecase to the IBP for hearing and decision. The IBP ruled thatBajar be “SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law forUnethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and



incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets andrequirements of the Code of Professional Responsibilityrendering her unfit to continue in the practice of law.”However, Bajar continued to practice law despite the decisionclaiming that she did not receive a copy of the order.

ISSUEWhether Bajar violated the Canon 12 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility

HELDYES.Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical issues

in other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed bythe Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the boundsof the law. Respondent abused her right of recourse to thecourts. Respondent, acting as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed casesfor Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despitethe finality of the decision in the Ejectment case whichinvolves the same issues. The Court held that “an importantfactor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is thevexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by thefiling of similar cases to claim substantially thesame reliefs.[72] Indeed, “while a lawyer owes fidelity to thecause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truthand administration of justice.” It is evident from the recordsthat respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution ofthe final judgment in theEjectment case. In this case,respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard courtorders. Respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying her duties asan officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Courtand the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar alawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice toaccomplish the desired end.

Bajar was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for aperiod of THREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERNWARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will bedealt with more severely.

HEGNA V. PADERANGA

FACTSHegna was the lessee of a portion of land owned by the

Baclayon spouses for 10 years but during this period thePanaguinip spouses by means of force, threat, intimidation,stealth and strategy (FISTS) entered upon the vacant portion ofthe lot and constructed a shop for which he filed a forcibleentry case.

Hegna won and the Panaguinip spouses were sentenced tovacate the leased premises and to pay complainant compensatorydamages for illegal occupation. When the MTCC of Cebu issued awrit of execution and the Sheriff levied certain properties ofthe spouses they sent a letter dated Dec 2001 to Hegna for apossible amicable settlement which he denied. Then Atty.Paderanga filed a Third Party Complaint alleging that he boughtthe lot and the vehicle during November and December of 2001which caused the failure to levy the properties by the Sheriff.

Hegna then filed a letter complaint to the Office of thebar confidant for “deliberately falsifying documents, causingdelay and a possible denial of justice.” He also filed criminalcharges against Atty. Paderanga & Atty. Madarang (notarypublic) for falsification of public documents and thePanaguinip spouses for false testimony and perjury. His groundswere (1) the lot had no record of transfer with the Register ofDeeds, (2) the registration of the vehicle didn’t reflect anychange of ownership & (3) the Notarial Register Book showedtampering and erasures.

The City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint forlack of prima facie evidence of guilt but referred theadministrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) for investigation. Atty. Paderanga’s defensealleged that for ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he intentionallyleft these properties in the name of the previous owner andthat he alleged discrepancies in the notarization were made tocorrect mistakes so that entries will speak the truth.


http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/september2007/3731%20.htm#_ftn72


The Investigating Commissioner found that the dismissalwas improper in light of the letter handwritten by Respondent’sclients, written in Cebuano, asking for mercy and forgivenessin relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter was nolonger necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE transfer ofownership of properties. In addition, there were severalinstances where Atty. Paderanga will meet with Hegna offeringsettlement and it was only when he denied them that he receivedthe Third Party Complaint.

ISSUE W/n there was indeed a genuine transfer of the lot and

vehicle to Atty. Paderanga?

HELDCommissioner is convinced that there was indeed an

anomaly which constitutes a violation of the Canons ofProfessional Responsibility so given 1 year suspension. Hisnon-registration of the sale transaction so it would notappear in the records of the BIR, the City Assessor or theRegister of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office so that hewould not pay for the expenses of the sale and transfer twice,once he decided to sell; or place them in his children’s name,and avoid paying estate and inheritance taxes upon his death.

Art. 1491 A lawyer ought to have known that he cannotacquire the property of his client which is in litigation.

violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shallnot engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitfulconduct.

violated the Lawyer’s Oath, which mandates that heshould support the Constitution, obey the laws as wellas the legal orders of the duly constituted authoritiestherein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doingof any in court. Further, he has also failed to live upto the standard set by law that he should refrain fromcounseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance ofthe law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.The act of non-registration of the deeds of sale to

avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but, as aservant of the law, a lawyer should make himself anexemplar for others to emulate.

PLUS BUILDERS V. REVILLA

FACTSIn the case of PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C.

GARCIA vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., , En Banc, A.C. No.7056, February 11, 2009, the respondent lawyer filed a motionfor reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine SupremeCourt, finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct forcommitting a willful and intentional falsehood before thecourt, misusing court procedure and processes to delay theexecution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers inthe illegal practice of law.

On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by theProvincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor ofcomplainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against thetenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al., who were theclients of respondent Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARADfound that respondent’s clients were mere tenants and notrightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case waselevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Courtsustaining complainant’s rights over the land. Continuing topursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was found to havecommitted intentional falsehood; and misused court processeswith the intention to delay the execution of the decisionthrough the filing of several motions, petitions for temporaryrestraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet titledespite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowednon-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law –holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the lawfirm.

Respondent maintains that he did not commit the actscomplained of. The courses of action he took were not meant tounduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November19, 1999, but were based on his serious study, research and



experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and onthe facts given to him by his clients in the DARAB case. Hebelieves that the courses of action he took were valid andproper legal theory designed to protect the rights andinterests of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. He stresses that hewas not the original lawyer in this case. The lawyer-clientrelationship with the former lawyer was terminated becauseLeopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel didnot explain/argue their position very well, refused to listento them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel,respondent candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told himin the course of his interview. They maintained that they hadbeen in open, adverse, continuous and notorious possession ofthe land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years.Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted toin order to determine the rights of his clients respecting thesubject property. He avers that he merely exhausted allpossible remedies and defenses to which his clients wereentitled under the law, considering that his clients weresubjected to harassment and threats of physical harm andsummary eviction by the complainant. He posited that he wasonly being protective of the interest of his clients as a goodfather would be protective of his own family, and that hisservices to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono.

HELDIt is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is

expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill andcompetence to the case, regardless of its importance andwhether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’sdevotion to his client’s cause not only requires but alsoentitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for theclient what is justly due him or to present every defenseprovided by law to enable the latter’s cause to succeed. Inthis case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On thecontrary, it is apparent that the respondent’s acts complainedof were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguideddesire to protect the interests of his clients who were poor

and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication andconviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgelsfrom the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, butrespondent should not forget his first and foremostresponsibility as an officer of the court. In support of thecause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present everyremedy or defense within the authority of the law. Thisobligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense oftruth and justice. This is the criterion that must be borne inmind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under theCode of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty toassist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice,and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impedingexecution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.

FIL-GARCIA, INC. V. HERNANDEZ

FACTFilomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after

losing his case in the CA for a sum of money, secured theserviced of Atty. Fernando Hernandez, who received the deniedresolution for Garcia as counsel, and was given 15 days toappeal.

Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for aMotion for Extension the day before the expiration of theperiod to file the appeal,, alleging that he was counsel for amayoralty candidate and a senatorial candidate, and he was alsoneeded in the canvassing of votes, so the urgency of the natureof his work will not allow him the limited time to file theappeal, thus asked for 30 days extension.

30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2nd Motion forExtension, this time, because he fell ill, and his physicalstate will not allow him to file the appeal on time, thusasking for 20 days extension.

20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed,with the grand excuse that because he fell ill the last time,his work load piled up, thus requiring him more time toconclude on the work load he missed when he was ill, plus the



appeal, hence the request for 10 days extension, to which 10days later, he did actually file the appeal. (Finally!)

Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all threeMotions for Extensions were denied by the court, and to hisdismay, received a copy of the resolution denying the appealall together. However, instead of informing his client, Fil-Garcia, he decides to forward the resolution of denial of theappeal some 7 months later, which greatly angered his client,pushing him to file for his disbarment.

ISSUEIs Hernandez liable for malpractice, gross misconduct,

tantamount to violation of his oath as a lawyer, which warranthis disbarment?

HELDYes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment.The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless

assumption that each motion will be granted by the Court, andwithout taking care of informing himself of the Court's actionthereon, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover,respondent knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition hebelatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate attempt tosalvage the appeal.

Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case,impede the execution of judgment or misuse court proceedings."While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons mayconstrain a lawyer to file a motion for extension of time tofile pleadings, he should not presume that his motion forextension of time will be granted. Motions for extension oftime to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of coursebut lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thusincumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligenceto inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action onhis motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Shouldhe neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out onhim, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame.

A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as

counsel should inform the client and ask that he be allowed towithdraw from the case to enable the client to engage theservices of another counsel who can study the situation andwork out a solution.

To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months fromthe time he received a copy of the Court's resolution to informcomplainant of the same.

He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering thatrespondent humbly admitted his fault in not immediatelyinforming complainant of the status of the case.

CANONS 13 & 14

FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO

FACTSFoodsphere, Inc. is the owner of CDO grocery products.

One day, a Mr. Cordero bought canned goods from a grocerystore, one of them being a CDO liver spread canned good. WhenMr. Cordero and his family ate the liver spread, they foundthat it tasted sour and subsequently discovered that the cannedgood was infested with a colony of worms. A complaint was filedwith the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD) and asubsequent investigation confirmed the presence of theparasites. BFAD ordered a hearing between Foodsphere and theCorderos, where the latter demanded P150k. Foodsphere refused,resulting to the Corderos threatening to bring up the matter tothe media.

Meanwhile, Atty Mauricio faxed Foodsphere a sample frontpage of a tabloid he was involved with, which containedarticles discrediting the latter, and threatened to publish itif they didn’t pay the amount the Corderos wanted. Foodsphererefused as well. Atty Mauricio thus proposed a ‘Kasunduan’between the two, where Foodsphere agreed to settle the matterfor a lower amount, but added that Foodsphere advertise inMauricio’s tabloids and tv shows, in exchange for thewithdrawal of the complaint. The Corderos withdrew theircomplaint and BFAD dismissed the complaint against Foodsphere.



Mauricio then sent Foodsphere an ‘Advertising Contract’asking the latter advertisements of various media (which were alot…and expensive!) owned by Mauricio. As a sign of goodwill,Foodsphere offered to patronize some advertisements only.Mauricio was disappointed with this and threatened to proceedwith the publications. And a few weeks later, Mauricio, in hisradio talk show (Batas ng Bayan) held a guessing contest withquestions that asked which company had worms in its liverspread. He also wrote in his columns and aired in his tv showsabout the same topic.

Foodsphere filed criminal and civil complaints againstMauricio about the discrediting remarks that he has been makingagainst the company. Foodsphere also filed the presentadministrative complaint against Mauricio to the IBP, where hewas ordered not to make any more statements on the matter.Notwithstanding the pending cases against him, Mauriciocontinued to publish articles against Foodsphere and discreditthem in his tv shows. Because of this, the IBP ordered thatMauricio be suspended for 2 years. Mauricio now challenges thevalidity of the suspension.

ISSUE/SW/N Mauricio’s suspension was valid.

HELDYES! Mauricio suspended for 3 years.Continued Attacks Despite Pending Cases = Violation Of

Rule 13.02Despite the pendency of the case against Mauricio, and

IBP’s orders that he discontinue with his actions, he stillcontinued with his attacks against Foodsphere and its products.This is a clear and conscious violation the Code ofProfessional Responsibility which is an improper conduct of amember of the bar.

NOTE: The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot beunderestimated.

SUSPENSION OF ATTY. BAGUBAYAO

FACTSAdministrative case stemmed from the events of the

proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5144: People v. Luis Plaza.Plaza was accused of murdering a policeman.

Criminal case was originally raffled to the sala ofJudge Buyser. Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence ofthe accused, declaring that evidence presented was sufficientto prove the crime of homicide but not murder.

Counsel for Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail,but Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo (who was in charge of thecase) objected thereto on the ground that the original chargeof murder was not subject to bail (Rules of Court).

Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the casebecause of the “harsh insinuation” of Bagabuyo that he “lacksthe cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate” by allegedlysuggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail.

Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amountof bail at P40k.

Instead of availing of judicial remediess, Bagabuyocaused the publication of an article regarding the Ordergranting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, “Seniorprosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.”

In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murderis non-bailable, but admitted that a judge could still opt toallow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidenceof the prosecution is weak. He claims that the former judgefound the evidence to be strong. He stated that he was notafraid to be cited for contempt because it was the only way forthe public to know that there are judges displaying judicialarrogance.

RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the writer of the article) toexplain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt ofcourt for the publication of the article which degraded thecourt with its presiding judge with its lies andmisrepresentations.



Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him incontempt of court, sentencing him to 30 days in jail (he posteda bail bond and was released).

Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself to the mediafor interviews in Radio Station DXKS and again, attacked theintegrity of Judge Tan.

In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan aliar, ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, hewas studying mahjong instead of studying the law.

RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why heshould not be held in contempt and be suspended from thepractice of law for violating the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility (Rule 11.05 and Rule 13.02).

Bagabuyo denied the charge that he sought to beinterviewed. He said that he was approached by someone whoasked him to comment on the Order. He justified his responseto the interview (at the instance of his friend) as a simpleexercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech andthat it was made without malice.

RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, andsuspended him from the practice of law for 1 year. Inaccordance with the Rules of Court, the case was transmitted tothe Office of the Bar Confidant, which recommended theimplementation of the RTC’s order of suspension.

ISSUEW/N Bagabuyo should be held in contempt and suspended

for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility – YES

HELDCanon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the

respect due to the courts and to judicial officers.Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated

that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in thepublished article and when he stated that Judge Tan wasignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he wasstudying mahjong instead of the law.

Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer shall submit grievancesagainst a judge to the proper authorities.

Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 when he caused the holdingof a press conference and submitted to a radio interview to airout his grievances against Judge Tan.

Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make publicstatements in the media regarding a pending case tending toarouse public opinion for or against a party.

Bagabuyo violated Rule 13.02 when he made statements inthe article, which were made while Criminal Case No. 5144 wasstill pending in court.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violationof his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odiousdeportment unbecoming of an attorney.

CANON 15

HILADO V. DAVID

FACTS- Mrs. Hilado filed an action against Assad to annul the

sale of several house & lot between Assad and her nowdeceased husband, during the Japanese occupation

- Assad’s counsel is Atty. Francisco- Mrs. Hilado’s counsels are the following: Delgado,

Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo - Atty. Dizon wrote Atty. Francisco to discontinue

representing Assad because Mrs. Hilado consulted herabout the case and even turned over some documents toAtty. Francisco

- Atty. Francisco even wrote a legal opinion/letteraddressed to Mrs. Hilado regarding the same case, whichstates that Atty. Francisco will not represent Mrs.Hilado in the case and he thinks that the action againstAssad will not prosper

- Mrs. Hilado’s counsel filed a motion to DISQUALIFY Atty.Francisco

- Atty. Francisco’s version of the story:



o Mrs. Hilado came to see Atty. Francisco about thecase, but he refused to become her counsel becausehe thinks that the action will not prosper

o Days later, Atty. Francisco’s assistant, Atty.Agrava, informed him that Mrs. Hilado left someexpediente in the firm. Atty. Francisco instructedAtty. Agrava to return the expediente because theywill not handle the case of Mrs. Hilado

o Later, the firm’s stenographer showed Atty.Francisco a letter allegedly dictated by Atty.Agrava which explains to Mrs. Hilado why theyrefuse to take the case

o Atty. Francisco allegedly signed the letterwithout reading it

o Later on, Assad went to Atty. Francisco’s office.Afterwards, Atty. Francisco accepted the retainerfee

- Lower Court Held: no other information was transmittedto Atty. Francisco other than those in plaintiff’scomplaint and there was no attorney-client relationshipbetween Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado. Hence, motionto disqualify is denied.

ISSUE W/N there was an attorney-client relationship between

Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado

HELD Yes, there was an attorney-client relationship because the

purpose of Mrs. Hilado was to obtain Atty. Francisco’s personalservice as a lawyer

- Retainer and frequency of consultation is not needed ,so long as the purpose is to obtain professional adviceor assistance and the attorney permits, then anattorney-client relationship is established

- Formality is not essential- Even is no secret communication was given, as long as

there is an attorney-client relationship which precludes

accepting opposite party’s retainer in the samelitigation regardless of what type of information wasreceived

- Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust theirsecrets to their attorneys which is of paramountimportance to administration of justice

- Even if the information was only received by anassistant, it is still considered as professionalservice, besides an information imparted to a member ofa firm is made available to the entire firm

- Hence, Atty. Francisco is disqualified as Assad’scounsel

Ratio: Rule 15.02 – a lawyer shall be bound by the rule onprivileged communication in respect of matters disclosed to himby a prospective client

NAKPIL V. VALDES

FACTS Valdes is Jose Nakpil’s accountant, consultant and

lawyer. Nakpil got interested in the purchase of a summer

residence in Baguio but due to lack of funds, he askedValdes to buy it for him and hold it in trust.

Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he boughtthe land and had the title issued in his name.

When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became theadministratrix of Jose’s estate. And, Valdes’ law firmfiled for the settlement of Jose’s estate.

Baguio property became an issue because the property wasnot included in Jose’s inventory of estate, but theloans used to purchase the property were charged underhis name.

The title to the property was transferred from Valdes toCaval Realty, Valdes’ family realty corp.

Valdes’ accounting firm handled the inventory of Jose’sestate but also, handled the claims of Jose’s creditors-Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC.



ISSUEw/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting

interests in violation of the code of professional ethics

HELDYes.The proscription applies no matter how slight the

adverse interest is.Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed

only upon full disclosure of the facts among all concernedparties, as to the extent of conflict and probable adverseoutcome.

The preparation of claims of the creditors against theestate is obviously improper because he had to fight for oneside, the claims he was defending against for the other side.

The defense that he had already resigned from the lawfirm was not supported by evidence. His resignation from theaccounting firm only shows that he was absent for quite sometime but returned to work during the tenure of the litigationof claims. Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case.

The test of impropriety of representation of conflictinginterests is not the certainty of such existence but mereprobability for it to exist.

Even though he could have committed such misconduct notas a lawyer but as an accountant, the court is not divested ofjurisdiction to punish a lawyer for misconduct committedoutside the legal field, as the good moral characterrequirement is not only a requisite for entrance to the bar buta continuing requirement for the practice of law.

A lawyer should always act to promote public confidenceto the legal profession.

HORNILLA V. SALUNAT

FACTSComplainants in this case are members of the Philippine

Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) who filed an intra-

corporate case against its members of the Board of Directorsfor unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of the realproperties of PPSTA corporation.

Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine PublicSchool Teachers Association (PPSTA) and at the same time thecounsel of the PPSTA Board of Directors.

Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat isguilty of conflict of interest.

ISSUECan a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members

of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit?

HELDNo, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of

representing conflicting interest and is admonished to observea higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.

The Court in this case explained the nature of aderivative suit. Where corporation directors have committed abreach, ultra vires acts, or negligence… a stockholder may sueon behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefitof the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation isthe real party in interest, while the stockholder who files asuit for the corporation’s behalf is only the nominal party.

The test of inconsistency of interest is whether theacceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from thefull discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty tohis client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance thereof.

A situation wherein a lawyer represents both thecorporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives riseto a conflict of interest.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY V. ARQUILLO

FACTSNorthwestern University filed an administrative case

against Atty. Arquillo for representing conflicting interests



in a NLRC case. The complaint alleges that Atty. Arquilloappeared as counsel for both the petitioner and the respondent(Castro) in the labor case. Atty. Arquillo, as a defense,contended that the petitioners and respondent he represented inthe labor case belonged to the same side as the latter partywas absolved from liability. Hence, there was no conflict ofinterests.

ISSUE W/N Atty. Arquillo represented conflicting interests.

HELDYES. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing

parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence ofwhich is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, inrepresentation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight foran issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it foranother client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainerwill require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriouslyaffect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation,to use against the first one any knowledge acquired throughtheir professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of anew relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorney’sduty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client orwould invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing inthe performance of that duty.

Having agreed to represent one of the opposing partiesfirst, the lawyer should have known that there was an obviousconflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief thatthey were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that thedismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases inwhich Castro was one of the respondents.

QUIAMBAO V. BAMBA

Facts: Quiambao charges Atty. Bamba with violation of CPR for

representing conflicting interests when the latter filed a case

against her while he was at that time representing her inanother case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty anddouble-dealing. Atty. Bamba is the counsel of AlliedInvestigation Bureau (AIB) and its president and managingdirector (Quiambao). Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Quaimbao inan ejectment case. Later on, Quiambao resigned from AIB. Whilethe ejectment case was still ongoing, Atty. Bamba, as thecounsel of AIB, filed a replevin case against Quiambao.

Issue:Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for

representing conflicting interests in contravention of thebasic tenets of the legal profession.

Held: Yes, Atty. Bamba is guilty. Suspended for 1 year. At the time Atty. Bamba filed the replevin case on

behalf of AIB, he was still the counsel of record of Quiambaoin the pending ejectment case. Under Rule 15.03, “a lawyershall not represent conflicting interests except by writtenconsent of all concerned given after full disclosure of thefacts.” This is founded on the principles of public policybecause it is the only way that litigants can be encouraged toentrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramountimportance in the administration of justice.

3 Tests of Conflict of Interests:1. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or

claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, tooppose that claim for the other client

2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would preventthe full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undividedfidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicionof unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performanceof that duty

3. Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the newrelation to use against a former client any confidential



information acquired through their connection orprevious employment

HEIRS OF FALAME V. BAGUIO

FACTSPlaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that

their father engaged the services of respondent Atty. Baguio torepresent him in an action for forcible entry (in which Lydioand his brother Raleigh were one of the defendants). Ascounsel, Atty. Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) Aspecial power of attorney executed by Lydio in favor of hisbrother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his attorney-in-fact; and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before therespondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned theproperty subject of the case.

Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorableruling for the defendants in the said case, Lydio stillretained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser andcounsel of his businesses until his death in 1996.However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation ofspouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, filed a compliant against theplaintiffs involving the same property that was the subjectmatter in the first case. Said complaint sought the declarationof nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in theregistry of deeds, TCT issued as a consequence of theregistration of the sale and the real estate mortgage.

Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case againstAtty. Baguio alleging that by acting as counsel for the spousesFalame in the second case, wherein they were impleaded adefendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty asan attorney. They contend that the spouses Falame’s interestsare adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.

The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adoptingand approving Investigating Commissioner Winston Abuyuan’sreport and recommendation for the dismissal of this case.

ISSUE

W/N Atty. Baguio violated Rule 15.03 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility?

HELD Yes, he violated the rule. Rule 15.03 of the Canon of

Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall notrepresent conflicting interests except by written consent ofall concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Alawyer may not, without being guilty of professionalmisconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interestconflicts with that of his present or former client.

The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is thelawyer’s duty to contest that which his duty another clientrequires him to oppose or when the possibility of suchsituation will develop. The rule covers not only cases in whichconfidential communications have been confided, but also thosein which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.

The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a clientif that representation will be directly adverse to any of hispresent or former clients. The rule is grounded in thefiduciary obligation of loyalty.

The termination of attorney-client relation provides nojustification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse toor in conflict with that of the former client. The client’sconfidence once reposed should not be divested by mereexpiration of professional employment. The protection given toa client is perpetual and does not cease with the terminationof the litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing toemploy the attorney and retaining another, or by any otherchange of relation between them. It even survives the death ofthe client.

In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointlyrepresented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civilcase. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio andrespondent was established despite the fact that it isimmaterial whether such employment was paid, promised orcharged for.



As defense counsel in the first civil case respondentadvocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the propertysubject of the case. In the second civil case involving thesame property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and hisspouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleighowned the same property in common with Lydio, withcomplainants, who inherited the property, committing acts whichdebase respondent’s rights as co-owner. The fact that theattorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio’s deathor through the completion of the specific task for whichrespondent was employed is not reason for respondent toadvocate a position opposed to the of Lydio. And whileplaintiffs have never been respondent’s clients, they derivetheir rights to the property from Lydio’s ownership of it whichrespondent maintained in the first civil case.

PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ

FACTSPacana was the Operations Director for Multitel

Communications Corporation (MCC). Multitel was besieged bydemand letters from its members and investors because of thefailure of its investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire ofMultitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority ofthe shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed astrustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos(P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changedits name to Precedent.

Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened tobe a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organizationwhere Pacana and his wife were also active members. From thenon, they constantly communicated, with the former disclosingall his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedent’srelation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana andeven helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. Insum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship wasestablished between him and Lopez although no formal document

was executed by them at that time. There was an attempt to havea formal retainer agreement signed but it didn’t push through.

After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive ademand letter from Lopez asking for the return and immediatesettlement of the funds invested by Lopez’s clients inMultitel. Lopez explained that she had to send it so that herclients – defrauded investors of Multitel – would know that shewas doing something for them and assured Pacana that there wasnothing to worry about.

Both parties continued to communicate and exchangeinformation regarding the persistent demands made by Multitelinvestors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts,first 900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even whenPacana went to the states, they continued communicating and hecontinued sending her money for the case.

Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legalproblems, Pacana was advised by his family to hire anotherlawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainantvia e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but Ihad to do it as your friend and lawyer.------------ I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking athiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwenis my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I willbe hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santoswill sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. -----------Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear.But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to workwith your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is myexpertise. TRUST me! ----Candy

When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana shehad earned P12,500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and was willing to



give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. Thisnever happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacana’s repeatedrequests for accounting. She continued to evade him.Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopez’sdisbarment. The IBP disbarred her.

ISSUEWhether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on

representing conflicting interests.

HELDYes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for

representing conflicting interests and for engaging inunlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of herLawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ratio: Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not representconflicting interests except by written consent of allconcerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

Lopez must have known that her act of constantly andactively communicating with Pacana, who, at that time, wasbeleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventuallyled to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopezcannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of heractions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered tocomplainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations,"precisely because at the time she was giving assistance tocomplainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposingparties who had been referred to her by the SEC.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thingwhich Lopez should have done was either to advise Pacana toengage the services of another lawyer since she was alreadyrepresenting the opposing parties, or to desist from acting asrepresentative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel forcomplainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because thatwould amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules onconflict of interest.

Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacana’s haplesssituation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on,

by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopezimpressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerityin helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him inorder to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously,she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients,the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doingeverything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel.

CANON 16

LICUANAN V. MELO

Facts: Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach

of professional ethics. Atty. Melo was Licuanan’s counsel in anejectment case filed against her tenant. Atty. Melo failed toremit to her the rentals collected nor did the said lawyerreport to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after ayear from actual receipt that Atty. Melo turned over hiscollections to Licuanan because a demand made by the latter.

Issue:Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for

failure to remit rentals collectedHeld:

Yes! Atty. Melo is disbarred.Ratio:

The actuations of Atty. Melo in retaining for hispersonal benefit over a 1 year period, the mount of P5,220received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan is deprivedof its use, and withholding information on the same despiteinquiries made by her, I a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath to whichhe swore observance, and an evident transgression of the CPR.Due to Atty. Melo’s professional misconduct, he has breachedthe trust reposed in him by his client. Atty. Melo’sunprofessional actuations considered, the SC find him guilty ofdeceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He hasdisplayed lack of honesty and good moral character.



POSIDIO V. VITAN

FACTSPosidio engaged the services of Vitan in a Testate

Proceeding of the deceased Nicolasa Arroyo to which she paidPhp 20,000.00 as legal fees. However, Vitan withdrew hisappearance in the said case thus, Posidio had to engage theservices of another lawyer. Six years after, Vitan contactedPosidio and told her that he has with some tax declarations andother documents purportedly forming part of the estate ofNicolasa Arroyo, but was not included in the inventory ofproperties for distribution. He convinced complainant to fileanother case to recover her share in the alleged undeclaredproperties and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees. Afterseveral months, however, respondent failed to institute anyaction. Complainant decided to forego the filing of the caseand asked for the return of the P100,000.00, but respondentrefused despite repeated demands.

The lower court ruled in favor of Posidio and orderedVitan to return the Php 100,000.00 and pay an additional Php20,000.00 as interest and damages. In compliance, Vitan issueda Prudential Bank check that was dishonored later on. Despitebeing sent a notice of dishonor and the repeated demands topay, Vitan refused to honor his obligation.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines for investigation, report and recommendation. TheInvestigating Commissioner submitted his Report finding Vitanguilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the Code ofProfessional Responsibility in defrauding his client andissuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same. TheIBP penalized Vitan with a reprimand with stern warning that asimilar misconduct will warrant a more severe penalty.

ISSUEWhether or not Vitan should be penalized?

HELD

The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the IBP.However, they find that the penalty of reprimand is notcommensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by Vitan.

In the instant case, respondent received the amount ofP100,000.00 as legal fees for filing additional claims againstthe estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failedto institute an action, thus it was imperative that heimmediately return the amount to complainant upon demand.Having received payment for services which were not rendered,respondent was unjustified in keeping complainant’s money. Hisobligation was to immediately return the said amount. Hisrefusal to do so despite complainant’s repeated demandsconstitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not todelay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with goodfidelity to his clients.

A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or propertyof his client that may come to his possession. He is a trusteeto said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of hisclient separate and apart from his own and those of others keptby him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose suchas for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deedsand for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over realproperty under the name of his client if not utilized, must bereturned immediately to his client upon demand. The lawyer’sfailure to return the money of his client upon demand gave riseto a presumption that he has misappropriated said money inviolation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by alawyer of funds entrusted to him by his client is a grossviolation of professional ethics and a betrayal of publicconfidence in the legal profession.

LEMOINE V. BALON

FACTS Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed

an insurance claim with Metropolitan Insurance. His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of

Atty. Balon’s services as his counsel



Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of theactual amount to being recovered payable upon successfulrecovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.

Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed anundated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon tobring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for thesatisfaction of Lemoine’s claim as well as to negotiate,sign, compromise, encash and receive payments

Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoine’s claimand Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer

December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a ChinaBank check payable to Lemoine in the amount of P525,000which was received by Balon

When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case,Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance was offeringP350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested thatBalon accept to avoid litigation

December 1999, Lemoine visited the office ofMetropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the caseand it answered that the case was long settled via acheck given to Balon.

Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the checkand that he is keeping the check as attorney’s lienpending Lemoine’s payment of his attorney’s feeequivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. Healso threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate tomake proper representation with the Bureau ofImmigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoinewill make any trouble to Balon and that he has goodnetwork with the mentioned agencies.

Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia onthe representation of Lemoine, however, he gave noevidence to such turnover

ISSUEW/N Atty. Balon violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility

HELDYES.According to the SC, Atty. Balon violated Canons 1, 15,

16, 17, 18 and 21. Specifically, Canon 16 which provides that“a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of hisclient that may come into his possession.”

Balon violated this and committed misconduct, when hefailed to render an account upon receipt of the money andfurther, when he failed to deliver such amount to Lemoine.

It is also the duty of the lawyer to surrender suchmoney collected when demanded upon him. Balon violated thisduty when he refuses to return the amount to Lemoine contendingthat he has a lien on the fund.

The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien,as provided for in Rule 16.03, presupposes that the clientagrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged. Incase of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarilyapply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees,but rather he can file the necessary action with the propercourt to fix the fees. And in the present case, Lemoine nevergave his consent on the proposal of Balon.

It must be noted as well that before receiving thecheck, Balon proposes a 25% attorney’s fees, after receivingthe check, he was already asking for 50%.

SC found Balon guilty of malpractice, deceit, and grossmisconduct, and ordered disbarred.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OFGUAM OF ATTY LEON G. MAQUERA

Facts: Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was

indebted to Edward Benavente who obtained judgment in a civilcase. Castro’s propery was sold at public auction to satisfythe obligation, but Castro retained the right to redemptionover said property.



In consideration for Maquera’s legal fees, Castro andAtty Maquera entered into an oral agreement that he wouldassign his right of redemption to Maquera.

Maquera purchased the property from Benavente for$525.00 then sold it for $320,000.

He was suspended in the practice of law in Guam for twoyears for

Obtaining an unreasonably high fee for hisservices

Did not comply with Guam’s “Model Rules” byentering into a business transaction with a client or knowinglyacquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless thetransaction and the terms governing the lawyer's acquisition ofsuch interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fullydisclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing”

Issue: May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or

suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdictionwhere he has also be admitted as an attorney be meted the samesanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the sameinfraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction?

Ruling: It is not automatic suspension or disbarment, but is

prima facie evidence only. The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer for

acts an omission committed in a foreign jurisdiction is foundin Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court:

“[…]The disbarment or suspension of a member of thePhilippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatoryagency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also beenadmitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if thebasis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court ordisciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground fordisbarment or suspension.”

Also, he violated Article 1492 in relation to 1491 ofthe civil code which prohibits a lawyer from acquiring byassignment the client’s property which is the subject oflitigation. It extends to legal redemption.

Most particularly, Canon 17 which states that a lawyerowes fidelity to the cause of his client and be mindful of thetrust and confidence In him; and rule 1.01, which prohibits alawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral ordeceitful conduct.

HOWEVER, there is a need to ascertain Maquera has theright to explain why he should and should not besuspended/disbarred on those grounds. Suspension/disbarment isNOT automatic

NEVERTHELESS, the Court rules that Maquera should besuspended from the practice of law for the non-payment of hisIBP dues from 1977.

REDDI V. SERBIO, JR.

Facts: Reddi, an Indian national, is a philanthropist. She

decided to put up a hospital in the Philippines and acquired,with the help of Atty. Serbio, some properties to help speed upgeneration of funds. It was later found out that some of theproperties did not in fact belong to the ‘owners’ she paid.

Issue: Is respondent guilty of violating Canon 16?

Held: Yes. Said canon requires that a lawyer should properly

account for all amounts in his custody which pertain to theclient and return the same upon demand. This the respondentplainly failed to do even after repeated demands made by Reddi.

DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY.EUGENIA J. MUÑOZ V. ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR.



FACTS:This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed

by complainant de Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty.Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.

Complainant and her husband was a resident of USA. Theyboth owned parcels of land in Quezon City, registered incomplainant’s name. Complainant authorized respondent Atty.Lumasag [being the 1st cousin of her husband] to sell the lands.

Complainant was informed by respondent that he had soldonly one lot and remitted the proceeds to complainant.Respondent further told complainant that the other lotsremained unsold due to the presence of squatters.

After few years, complainant discovered that more thanone lot was sold. Complainant then sent a demand letter torespondent directing him to remit and turn over to her theentire proceeds of the sale of the properties. Complainant alsoaverred that the Special Power of Attorney, which respondenthad used to sell the lots is a forgery and a falsifieddocument, as the signature therein were not the real signaturesof complainant and her spouse.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Lumasag, Jr. is guilty

of deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.

HELD: Yes. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice

of law for a period of six (6) months. A lawyer may bedisciplined for any conduct, in his professional or privatecapacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officerof the court. Canon 1 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at all times thedignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically,Rule 1.01 thereof provides:

Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent committed dishonesty and abused theconfidence reposed in him by the complainant and her spouse.Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent asevidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent, however,taking advantage of the absence of complainant and her spousefrom the Philippines and their complete trust in him,deceitfully informed them in a letter that he had sold onlyone. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may besuspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules ofCourt, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys bySupreme Court, grounds therefor.— A member of the bar may bedisbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by theSupreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other grossmisconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or byreason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,or for any violation of the oath which he is required to takebefore the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedienceappearing as attorney for a party to a case without authorityto so do.

WILSON CHAM V. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA

FACTS:This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant

Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya.Complainant Cham alleges that Atty. Paita-Moya committed deceitin occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter, vacatingthe same without paying the rentals due. Respondent stayed atthe leased premises up without paying her rentals. She alsofailed to settle her electric bills. Later on, a report reachedcomplainant's office that respondent had secretly vacated theapartment unit, bringing along with her the door keys.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Paita-MOya is guilty of gross

misconduct.



HELD: Yes. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross

misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one month. A review ofthe records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty ofwillful failure to pay just debt. Complainant is able to fullysubstantiate that respondent has existing obligations that shefailed to settle. Hence, when respondent backtracked on herduty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a groundfor administrative sanction.

Respondent's abandonment of the leased premises to avoidher obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutesdeceitful conduct violative of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof,which explicitly state:

"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obeythe laws of the land and promote

respect for law and legal processes."Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

JERRY T. WONG V. ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II

FACTSJerry Wong as owner of a business selling agricultural

and veterinary products retained the services of Atty. Moya forthe purpose of collecting due and demandable debts in favor ofthe company. Sometimes also, Atty. Moya handled personal casesof Wong and his wife.

Later, Atty. Moya asked financial help from Wong for theconstruction of his house and the purchase of a car. Wongpurchased a car on installment basis for Atty. Moya. Wongissued postdated checks to cover the payment of the car whileAtty. Moya issued checks in favor of Wong to reimburse him forpurchasing the car. The checks issued by Wong were encashed byTransfarm (car seller) however, the checks issued by Atty. Moyain favor of Wong were dishonored for the reason “accountclosed”. Despite repeated demands, Atty. Moya refused toreplace the dishonored checks.

Atty. Moya also introduced Wong to Quirino Tomlin fromwhom the construction materials for his house was obtained. Hebought this on credit but Atty. Moya filed to pay thisindebtedness causing embarrassment to Wong. Atty. Moya alsohandled a case of the Wong spouses against Berting Diwa.Judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses and assatisfaction of the judgment, Diwa paid P15, 680.50. Atty. Moyaas the counsel of the spouses received the payment but did notinform them. The Wongs only found out about the payment ofmoney when they got hold of the Manifestation with Prayer toTerminate Proceedings.

The IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Moya to file his answer to thecomplaint for disbarment filed by Wong. Atty. Moya filed3motions for extensions (after the 1st motion was granted andthe time had elapsed, he filed another one and so on and soforth). Subsequently, he filed a Motion to Dismiss.

The IBP-CBD denied the motion to dismiss and requiredhim to file an answer. Atty. Moya filed a motion forreconsideration which was denied. He then filed for anextension to file his answer which was granted but with awarning that no further extension requests will be entertained.When the time to elapse was near he filed a Very Urgent Motionfor Extension to File Answer but the IBP-CBD did not acceptthis hence he was declared in default after failing to file hisanswer.

The IBP-CBD ordered both parties to file their positionpapers because a complaint for disbarment, suspension ordiscipline of attorneys prescribes in 2years from the date ofthe professional misconduct which in this case occurred in 2002and that it was already 2005. Atty. Moya did not file anypleadings at all.

The IBP recommended that Atty. Moya be suspended for1year. The IBP Board of Governors modified this and suspendedAtty. Moya for 2years.

ISSUEWhether or not the suspension of 2years is justifiable?



HELDYes!

1) Atty. Moya was charged for having failed to pay his debtsand for issuing worthless checks. He did not deny theseallegations. Rule1.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility provides that a lawyers shall not engage inunlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It hasbeen held that the issuance of worthless checks as aviolation of this rule and constitutes a gross misconduct.

2) The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficientfunds to cover the same constitutes such willful dishonestyand immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence inthe legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuingworthless checks by his dire financial conditions. Heshould not have contracted debts which are beyond hisfinancial capacity to pay. If he suffered financial reverseshe should have explained this with particularity and notthough generalized and unsubstantiated allegations.

3) Atty. Moya is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum ofmoney due to his client. His failure to explain such delaycannot be excused by his bare allegation that the same hadalready been transmitted to the complainant.

4) His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in thiscase is also a matter of serious concern. He submitted amotion to dismiss after requesting several extensions oftime to file his answer. His failure to attend the hearingsand belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to thecontrary, show a callous disregard of the lawful orderswhich caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding. Thisconduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility and violates the lawyer's oathwhich imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delayno man for money or malice.

5) It is stressed that membership in the legal profession is aprivilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigidstandards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highestdegree of morality and faithful compliance with the Rules ofthe Legal Profession are the conditions required for

remaining a member of good standing of the bar and forenjoying the privilege to practice law.

6) As to the penalty, failure to pay debts and issuance ofworthless checks constitutes gross misconduct for which alawyer may be sanctioned with 1year suspension. However, inthis case, Atty. Moya is suspended for 2years because asidefrom issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts,he also seriously breached his client's trust and confidenceto his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregardof the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings.

CANONS 17 & 18

HERNANDEZ V. GO

FACTS Sometime in 1961, Hernandez’s husband abandoned her and

her son Shortly thereafter, creditors of Hernandez ‘s husband

demanded payment of his loans Hernandez, fearful of mortgage foreclosures and aware of

a impending claim suit, engaged the legal services ofAtty. Go

Atty. Go advised Hernandez to give him land titlescovering three lots in Zamboanga City belonging to her,so that he may sell them to enable her to pay thecreditors

Also, Atty. Go persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds ofsale in his favor without any monetary or valuableconsideration

Hernandez owns three more lots in Zamboanga City whichwere mortgaged to creditors. When the mortgages felldue, Atty. Go redeemed the lots and persuaded Hernandezto execute deeds of sale in his favor covering the saidlots

Atty. Go became the registered owner of all the lotsbelonging to Hernandez



In 1974, Hernandez came to know that Atty. Go did notsell her lots as agreed upon, but instead he paid hercreditors with his own funds and had her land titlesregistered in his name, depriving her of real propertyworth millions

Hernandez filed a complaint with the IBP IBP: Atty. Go violated Canon 17 and should be suspended

for 3 years

ISSUEW/N Atty. GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED

HELDYES, for violating Canons 16 and 17Atty. Go violated Canon 16His acts acquiring for himself Hernandez’s lots

entrusted to him are acts constituting gross misconduct, agrievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willfulin character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere errorin judgment

Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degradeshimself but also the honor of the legal professionAtty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that “a lawyer owesfidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful ofthe trust and confidence reposed in him.”

Records show that Hernandez reposed high degree of trustand confidence in Atty. Go and when she engaged his services,she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sellthe same

Atty. Go, however, abused this trust and confidence whenhe did not sell her properties to others but to himself withoutgiving any monetary consideration to Hernandez, thus deprivingHernandez the real worth of her properties

Atty. Go is duty bound to render a detailed report toHernandez on how much he sold the lots and the amounts paid toher creditors but failed to do so

In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelledlawyers from the practice of law in similar circumstances,thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is too light

Atty. Go was ordered disbarred.

PANELCO V. ATTY. JUAN AYAR MONTEMAYOR

FACTS:This is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan

Electric Cooperative I (PANELCO I) charging Atty. Juan AyarMontemayor with negligence.

Some of the omissions of Atty Montemayor were: Atty. Montemayor failed to serve and file the required

Appellant's Brief despite the lapse of the two extensions oftime granted, hence the Court of Appeals considered the appealAbandoned

The records also show that respondent Atty. Juan AyarMontemayor did not even bother to answer the complaint norpresent his defense

Hence, PANELCO I prays that the court impose sanctionson Atty. Montemayor’s gross negligence as counsel forcomplainant which resulted [in] the damage of PANELCO I.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or

misconduct in mishandling complainant’s cases on appeal, whicheventually led to their dismissal, to the prejudice of thecomplainant.

HELD: Yes. WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED

from the practice of law. As counsel for complainant,respondent had the duty to present every remedy or defenseauthorized by law to protect his client. When he undertook hisclient’s cause, he made a covenant that he will exert allefforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion.Heshould undertake the task with dedication and care.



CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT ANDCONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENTADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtainingextensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, letthe period lapse without submitting the same or offering anexplanation for his failure to do so.

CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HISCLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCEREPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITHCOMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matterentrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewithshall render him liable.

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEALWITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

ADECER V. AKUT

FACTS:Originally, there was a Criminal Case in which

complainants were charged with committing a crime (Otherdeceits) punishable under the Revised Penal Code (OtherDeceits). Respondent, Atty. Akut was their legal counsel in thecriminal case. Complainant accuses Atty. Akut for beingnegligent.

First, despite Atty. Akut’s receipt of a copy of theDecision and the consequent running of the fifteen (15)-dayperiod to file a petition for probation, respondent went out oftown without contacting complainants to give them proper legaladvice. Furthermore, Atty. Akut’s admission that complainantswere [1] under the impression that they first had to pay offtheir civil liabilities prior to filing a petition forprobation and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) daysfrom their counsel’s receipt of a copy of the decision to filetheir petition, proves that Atty. Akut failed to givecomplainants timely legal advise.

Atty. Akut explained that he was out of his office mostof the time because, he and his wife were always out of townlooking for faith healers to cure the malignant brain tumor ofhis wife, who eventually succumbed to the cancer. Allegedly,after attending the "important" hearings, he immediately wentout of town seeking faith healers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Akut is guilty of negligence.

HELD: Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Emmanuel

A. Akut is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six(6) months. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his fullattention, skill and competence, regardless of his impressionthat one case or hearing is more important than the other. Wecommiserate with respondent for the loss of his wife, however,failure of an attorney to file a timely motion forreconsideration or an appeal renders him liable for negligence.

By agreeing to be his client’s counsel, he representsthat he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonabledegree of care and skill having reference to the character ofthe business he undertakes to do, to protect the client’sinterests and take all steps or do all acts necessary

BELLEZA V. MACASA

FACTSOn November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent

on referral of their mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainantwanted to avail of respondent’s legal services in connectionwith the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who wasarrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day foralleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreedto handle the case for P30,000.

The following day, complainant made a partial paymentof P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. OnNovember 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid



the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments werealso made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did notissue any receipt.

On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 fromcomplainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure theprovisional liberty of her (complainant’s) son. Again,respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went tothe court the next day, she found out that respondent did notremit the amount to the court.

Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 fromrespondent on several occasions but respondent ignored her.Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainant’sson and complainant was forced to avail of the services of thePublic Attorney’s Office for her son’s defense.

Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint fordisbarment against respondent in the Negros Occidental chapterof the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

In an order dated July 13, 2005, the CBD requiredrespondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receiptthereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of timeto file an answer dated August 10, 2005, simply brushed asidethe complaint for being "baseless, groundless and malicious"without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed thathe be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.

Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for secondand third extensions of time praying to be given until November4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.

HELDRespondent Grossly Neglected The Cause of His Client,

Atty. Macasa is disbarredRespondent undertook to defend the criminal case against

complainant’s son. Such undertaking imposed upon him thefollowing duties:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HISCLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST ANDCONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITHCOMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.x x x x x x x x xRule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matterentrusted to him, and his negligence in connectiontherewith shall render him liable.x x x x x x x x xCANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEALWITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to

devote himself (particularly his time, knowledge, skills andeffort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust andconfidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthythereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest ofhis client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of hisclient’s rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skilland ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheldfrom his client, save by the rules of law legally applied.

A lawyer who accepts professional employment from aclient undertakes to serve his client with competence anddiligence. He must conscientiously perform his duty arisingfrom such relationship. He must bear in mind that by acceptinga retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations:that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill andability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he willexert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of thelitigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonablecare and diligence in the use of his skill and in theapplication of his knowledge to his client’s cause; and that hewill take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard hisclient’s interest.

A lawyer’s negligence in the discharge of hisobligations arising from the relationship of counsel and clientmay cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudicethe rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, fromthe perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, alawyer’s lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client isboth unprofessional and unethical.



If his client’s case is already pending in court, alawyer must actively represent his client by promptly filingthe necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending thescheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyerwho represents an accused in a criminal case.The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under theConstitution. However, this right can only be meaningful if theaccused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer:

The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamentalprinciple of due process which basically means that a personmust be heard before being condemned. The due processrequirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not amere formality that may be dispensed with or performedperfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presenceof a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding ofstandard questions and objections. The right to counsel meansthat the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended bya counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense andacts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement bythe lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of thecase, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of theaccused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing thefundamental procedures, essential laws and existingjurisprudence.

The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question afundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trialitself would be of little consequence, for it is throughcounsel that the accused secures his other rights. In otherwords, the right to counsel is the right to effectiveassistance of counsel.

The right of an accused to counsel finds substance inthe performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity tohis client. Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient andtruly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctoryrepresentation.In this case, after accepting the criminal case againstcomplainant’s son and receiving his attorney’s fees, respondent

did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficientlegal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondentabandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account ofrespondent’s continued inaction, complainant was compelled toseek the services of the Public Attorney’s Office. Respondent’slackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainant’s sonwas reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainant’s son,it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel.Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him forposting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client,respondent unduly impeded the latter’s constitutional right tobail.

OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ

FACTSOvergaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services

of Atty. Valdez. They entered into a retainer agreement,providing that for 900K, Valdez would represent Overgaard ascounsel in 2 cases filed by him (Estafa and a mandamus case)and 2 cases filed against him (Other Light threats andviolation of the Anti-Violation against women and theirchildren act).

Overgaard sent $16, 854 to Atty. Valdez via telegraphicbank transfer. 4 months after, Overgaard demanded for a reporton the status of his cases. In spite of many phone calls andemails, Valdez couldn’t be reached. Hence, Overgaard inquiredon his own, and discovered that Valdez didn’t file his entry ofappearance in any of the cases, that a counter-affidavit wasrequired from him, and that the criminal cases against him havealready been arraigned and warrants were issued for his arrest.He was constrained to find a new lawyer.

Overgaard then wrote again and tried to locate Valdez todemand the return of documents entrusted to the latter, as wellas the $16K payment. No word was heard from Valdez. Overgaardfiled a case with the IBP for Valdez’s dismissal for grossmalpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitfulconduct.



The IBP required Valdez to file an answer, but he didnot comply. He also failed to attend the hearing and wasdeclared in default. Later, a clarificatory hearing was set,but Valdez never showed. IBP found him guilty of violatingcanons 1, 15, 16, 17, and 18 and his penalty was a 3-yearsuspension and he was ordered to return Overgaard’s money.

HELDSC agrees with the findings of IBP, but declared that

Valdez be disbarred for falling below the standards required oflawyers.

Canon 18 provides that a lawyer must serve his clientwith competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 requires a lawyer tonot neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligencewill make him liable. Valdez should indeed be liable becausehe was not just incompetent, he was useless; not justnegligent, he was indolent; and rather than helping his client,he prejudiced him. He abandoned his client and left himwithout any recourse. It was a clear evasion of duty. Also,his failure to act on the disbarment case against him, withoutany explanation, is a clear evidence of negligence on his part.

Rule 18.04 requires that a lawyer keep his clientinformed of the status of his case and to respond withinreasonable time to the client’s request for information.Despite Overgaard’s efforts, Valdez avoided his client andnever bothered to reply. Clearly, the rule was violated.

ANGALAN V. DELANTE

FACTSThis is a complaint filed by the heirs of an illiterate

couple belonging to the Samal Tribe against Atty. Delante forgross violation of professional responsibility particularlyCanons 16 and 17.

The couple owned a property in Samal, Davao del Norte.On 15 April 1971, Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000from Spouses Eustaquio. To secure the loan, Angalan and

complainants mortgaged their property and surrendered thetitle to the Spouses Eustaquio.

When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover thetitle from the Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquiorefused. Complainants learned that the document which theSpouses Eustaquio prepared, and which complainants signed, wasa deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. Theyalso learned that Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) hadtransferred the title over the property to his name.

Complainants engaged the services of respondent for thepurpose of recovering their property.Respondent lawyer filed a complaint for the reconveyance of theproperty. Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered intoan amicable settlement. In the amicable settlement, thecomplainants offered the spouses the sum of P30K as repurchaseprice which the spouses accepted.

However, complainants did not have the P30,000repurchase price for the property. Respondent Delante advancedthe P30,000 and, in return, complainants allowed respondent topossess the property and gather its produce until he is paid.

When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchaseprice and recover the property from respondent, respondentrefused. Complainants learned that respondent transferred thetitle of the property to his name.

Complainants filed a complaint praying that (1) the deedof absolute sale prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signedby the complainants be declared void, (2) title issued in thename of Atty. Delante be declared void, and (3) respondent bemade to pay damages.

As defense, respondent alleges that:1. The complainants only borrowed money from him without

any intention to pay him back or at least offer anexplanation as to how they would be able to repay him

2. That the couple did not really engage his services ascounsel for an annulment suit against NavarroEustaquio

3. The sale between Eustaquio and the complainants was avalid sale and not a mortgage



4. The actual buyer of the property was Atty. Delante’sformer client who is now residing in New York. Butafter 11 years, the buyer did not return to thePhilippines anymore so he authorized Atty. Delante tohave the property in his name upon refund of thepurchase price.

Complainants filed a complaint dated with the Courtcharging respondent with gross violation of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.

In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababagof the IBP found that respondent violated the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. IBP Board of governors approvedbut increased the penalty from a 6-month suspension to 1-year.

ISSUE Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of

[the] Code of Professional Responsibility when he bought theproperty of his client[s] without their knowledge, consent andagainst their will?

HELDYES.The Court is not impressed with Atty. Delante’s

defenses. Angalan and complainants went to respondent’s officenot to seek advice about borrowing money but to engage hisservices for the purpose of recovering their property.

First, after Angalan and complainants went torespondent’s office, respondent filed a complaint withthe CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey theproperty to Angalan and complainants.

Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, "byreason of unwarranted refusal on the part of thedefendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, thelatter have been constrained to engage, and in fact haveengaged, the services of counsel."

Third, respondent issued a receipt to complainantsstating that he "RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL andFRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO

HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment ofprofessional services in regard to the recovery ofOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name ofAngalan (Samal)."

Fourth, in respondent’s letter dated 10 January 1979 andaddressed to the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal, Davaodel Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer ofcomplainants.

As to his claim regarding his former client purchasingthe property

1. Amicable settlement there was an agreed repurchaseprice to which both parties agreed to

2. Letter to the barrio captain the lawyer stated thatcomplainants repurchased the property from the SpousesEustaquio. (This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal havealready redeemed their property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquiosince September, 1978.)

3. Insufficient proof Respondent did not give any detailor proof to substantiate his story — the name of thealleged client, an affidavit of the alleged client, theold passport of the alleged client showing immigrationstamps, or any form of correspondence between him andthe alleged client. The Court agrees with theobservation of Commissioner Hababag that respondent’s"vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts [is] tooflimsy to gain belief and acceptance."

Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of thetrust and confidence reposed in them. Respondent should havebeen mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposedin him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and thatthe Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainantsengaged the services of respondent in the hope that he wouldhelp them recover their property. Instead of protecting theinterests of complainants, respondent took advantage ofcomplainants and transferred the title of the property to hisname.



Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, theCourt finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation ofCanons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar maybe disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by theCourt for gross misconduct.

A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of hisilliterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth isunfit to be a lawyer.

The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY ofviolating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from thepractice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from theRoll of Attorneys.

SANTOS-TAN V. ATTY. ROMEO R. ROBISO

FACTSComplainant Santos-Tan charged respondent with

malpractice for grossly neglecting his duties andresponsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing abouncing check.

Complainant found out that her case had not progressedand that the only pleading that respondent had filed was hisnotice of appearance.

ISSUES: (1) Whether respondent was negligent in handlingcomplainant’s case (NO); and (2) Whether respondent should be disciplined forissuing a bouncing check (YES).

RATIO:On the issue of negligence on the part of respondent in

handling complainant’s case, the Court agrees that based on thefacts presented there was nothing that he could have done toexpedite the resolution of the motion for reconsideration thenpending before the RTC. The RTC had already ordered that the

motion for reconsideration be submitted for resolution.Respondent could not be faulted if the acting presiding judgedid not want to act on the motion until the regular presidingjudge return.

Regarding the other issues, as a lawyer, respondent isdeemed to know the law, especially Bouncing Check Law. Byissuing a check in violation of the provisions of this law,respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. The act of a lawyerin issuing a check which is drawn against insufficient fundsconstitutes deceitful conduct or conduct unbecoming an officerof the court. The Court has held that the issuance of checkswhich were later dishonored for having been drawn against aclosed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust andconfidence reposed on him. It shows a lack of personal honestyand good moral character as to render him unworthy of publicconfidence. As such, we have held that deliberate failure topay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitutegross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned withsuspension from the practice of law. Respondent violated theAttorney’s Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws. TheCode of Professional Responsibility specifically provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEYTHE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGALPROCESSES.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Romeo R. Robiso isORDERED SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE(1) month.

SOMOSOT V. LARA

FACTS Atty Gerardo Lara represented Ofelia Somosot in a

collections case against Golden Collections MarkettingCorp.

Golden Collections filed “interrogatories and requestfor Admission”

Atty Lara objected, stating that such interrogatoriesand admission should be sent directly to Mrs. Somosot



At this point, we should take note that Atty Lara isalready sensitive about the P27,000 in unpaid atty’sfees

Nov. 2001, Atty Lara was appointed as a consultant inthe Board of Investment, a government position

Lara tried to locate Somosot about the fees in heroffice in Greenhills; office was locked and according tothe security guard, they had moved office withoutleaving a forwarding address. Lara also attempted tocall Mr and Mrs Somosot, but they couldn’t be reached

Lara filed his Withdrawal of Appearance in court, withoutthe required conformity of his client, Somosot, becauseshe could be located. This was denied.

Dec. 2001, upon learning that Somosot’s new office wasin Pasig, he called her where he advised that she shouldfind another Lawyer. She informed her that she alreadydid.

September, 2005. Lara receives a letter from Somosotgiving him “one last chance to give her a reason not toinstigate a disbarment suit” against him.

ISSUEW/N Atty Lara, from the facts stated, is deemed

incompetent in his services to Mrs. Ofelia Somosot.

HELDYes.Atty Lara’s services were insufficient. His neglect (or

refusal) to reply to the Interrogatories and Request forAdmissions himself eventually caused the court to rule againstMrs. Somosot. Records do not show how exactly he tried toaddress the Interrogatories issue or whether he appealed thecase or not.

He did not mention how he tried to locate Mrs. Somosotto inform her about the Interrogatories and Request forAdmission. He only took the initiative when he learned that hehad been appointed into a government position.

Lara was very much sensitive about his unpaid billings,and this shouldn’t be a reason for him not to inform his clientabout the case’s development

He had two valid reasons for withdrawing as her Atty.One, his appointment in a government office; and two, Somosot’srefusal to pay his fees. He could have secured her “conformity”to the withdrawal of appearance when they talked on December2001, but because he failed to do so, he remain as counsel ofrecord.

CANON 19

ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

FACTS:The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty.

Briones. The respondent is Atty. Jimenez. Complainant Brionesis the Special Administrator of the Henson Estate, whilerespondent Jimenez is the counsel for Heirs of Henson.

The root of herein administrative complaint forDisbarment is an RTC Order (2002). The RTC Order directedcomplainant Briones to deliver the residue of the estate to theHeirs in proportion to their shares. Complainant Briones didnot reply to the demand, so respondent Jimenez opted to file acriminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obeythe lawful order of the court.

Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenezis guilty of violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code ofProfessional responsibility by filing the unfounded criminalcomplaint against complainant to obtain an improper advantage:

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honestmeans to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shallnot present, participate in presenting or threaten to presentunfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage inany case of proceeding.

ISSUE:



Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should beadministratively liable.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and

REPRIMANDED [since no evidence of malice or bad faith] forviolation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility Fair play demands that respondent should havefiled the proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal ofhaving the residue of the estate delivered to his clients andnot subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityenjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal. However,the same Canon provides that a lawyer’s performance of hisduties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law.Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that alawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain thelawful objectives of his client. To permit lawyers to resort tounscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposedrights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of thestate – the administration of justice. While lawyers owe theirentire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal inthe defense of their client’s right, they should not forgetthat they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, boundto exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficientadministration of justice.

PENA V. APARICIO

FACTSAtty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in

an alleged dismissal case before the NLRC against Pena,President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that his clientbe given separation pay. Peña rejected the claim. Thereafter,Peña sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicioreplied with a letter reiterating the claim of his client. Theletter also contained threats against the company stating thatif the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file

multiple charges such as, criminal charges for tax evasion,falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of thecompany’s business license.

Peña filed an administrative complaint against Atty.Aparicio with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP forviolating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims forthe defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed thecomplaint because Peña had allegedly failed to file hisposition paper and the certification against forum shopping.The IBP transmitted the records of the case to the SC.

Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating hisclaim for damages against Peña in the amount of P400M forfiling false, malicious, defamatory, fraudulent suit againsthim. Peña likewise filed this Petition for Review alleging thathe submitted his position paper and that the dismissal deniedhim of due process.

ISSUEW/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?

HELDYup!First of all, the SC found that Peña actually submitted

his position paper. In addition, disbarment proceedings are suigeneris, hence, the requirement of a certification of forumshopping is not to be strictly complied with in such a case. Atany rate, Peña actually submitted a certification against forumshopping after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss,curing the supposed defect in the original complaint.

Now to the merits… Canon 19, “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal

within the bounds of the law,” this shows that a lawyer’s dutyto his client is subordinate to his duty in the administrationof justice.

Rule 19.01, “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honestmeans to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shallnot present, participate in presenting or threaten to present



unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage inany case or proceeding.” Under such Rule, a lawyer should notfile or threaten to file baseless criminal cases against theadversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel theadversaries to yield to the claims of the lawyer’s client. Thisis exactly what Atty. Aparicio did in this case.

Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, butthey amounted to blackmail – extortion of money by threats ofaccusation or exposure in the public prints. Blackmail andextortion would not only entail disbarment but also possiblecriminal prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio actuallyadmitted and even found it his obligation to tell the truth ofthe offenses he imputed against Peña. He also stated that thewriting of demand letters is standard practice.

SC ruled that Atty. Aparicio’s assertions are misleadingbecause the fact of the matter is, he used such threats to gainleverage against Peña and force the latter to accede to hisclient’s claims. The letter even implied a promise to “keepsilent” about the said violations if the claim is met.

While it is true that writing demand letters is standardpractice in the profession of law, such letters must notcontain threats such as those found in this case.

Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe apenalty considering that Atty. Aparicio wrote the letter out ofhis overzealousness to protect his client’s interests.Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a stern warning.



POST MIDTERM CASES

AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER: CONDUCT OF LITIGATION

MANALANG V. ANGELES

FACTS:Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the

complainants in a case for overtime and separation pay filedagainst their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant,before the National Labor Relations. Respondent was theircounsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount ofP6,500. After the decision became final, a writ of executionissued. However, without authority from his clients, respondentcompromised the award and was able to collect P5,500 only.

Complainants said they made several demands uponrespondent to turn over to them the amount collected minus theagreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but Atty.Angeles refused and offered to give them only the sum ofP2,650.

Respondent counsel stated that he offered to givecomplainants their money, but they insisted that he "deductfrom this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000, representingthe amount discounted by the counsel of the Philippine RacingClub Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees and otheradministrative expenses." Respondent claimed that to acceptcomplainants' proposition meant that he "would not becompensated for prosecuting and handling, the case.”ISSUE:

Whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should besuspended from the practice of law because of grave misconductrelated to his clients' funds.HELD

Where a member of the bar stands charged withmalpractice, the proceedings are not meant solely to rule onhis culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concernedis possessed of that good moral character, which is a condition

precedent to the privilege of practicing law and continuing inthe practice thereof.

Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be theobject of settlement or compromise effected by counsel withoutthe consent of the workers concerned . A client has every rightto expect from his counsel that nothing will be taken orwithheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied. Bycompromising the judgment without the consent of his clients,respondent not only went against the stream of judicial dicta,he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interestof his clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance anddefense of their rights. In so doing, he violated Canon 17 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility.

A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and propertiesof his client that may come into his possession. In the instantcase, the records clearly and abundantly point to respondent'sreceipt of and failure to deliver upon demand, the amount ofP4,550 intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of Rule16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Moreover, his excuse in his answer, that he should beallowed to deduct sheriff's fees and other administrativeexpenses before delivering the money due his clients, isunsatisfactory. Respondent clearly failed to comply with theRules of Court in the enforcement of an attorney's liens. Therecords of this case are barren of any statement ofrespondent's claims for lien or payment of his allegeddisbursements. Nor did respondent present any showing that hecaused written notices of his lien on the money judgment to beserved upon his clients and to the losing party

His act of holding on to his clients' money withouttheir acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrityand propriety. He was clinging to something which was not his,and to which he had no right. He appears oblivious of theadmonition that a member of the legal fraternity should refrainfrom any act or omission which might lessen the trust andconfidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, andintegrity of the legal profession.



This is the first case on record against him, a factwhich could be taken into account by way of mitigation.Considering further the amount involved, the penalty of six (6)months suspension appears to us in order.

GARCIA V. CA

FACTS:

Guevara spouse seeks recovery of a lady's diamond ringwhich they bought from Rebullida. Guevara claims that while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia,owner of La Bulakeña restaurant, she recognized her ring in thefinger of Mrs. Garcia and asked where she bought it, whichGarcia answered from her comadre.

Guevarra told Garcia that a ring was stolen from herhouse in February, 1952. Garcia handed the ring to Guevara andit fitted her finger. Two or three days later, at the requestof Guevarra, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementinaof Pasay PD, Garcia and her attorney proceeded to the store ofMr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in question.

Mr. Rebullida examined the ring and after consulting thestock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring thatplaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned toGarcia who despite a written request failed to deliver the ringto Guevara.

Garcia refused to deliver the ring which had beenexamined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost.

Garcias’s defense was that they denied having made anyadmission before Guevara or Mr. Rebullida or the sheriff. Herevidence tends to show that the ring was purchased by her fromMrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turngot it from the owner, Aling Petring, who was boarding in herhouse; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but notthe same ring plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida which wasstolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond wasnever dismantled. When dismantled, defendant's diamond was

found to weigh 2.57 cts, unlike the one claimed by Guevaraspouse.

Apparently Garcia’s own counsel admitted through ananswer that the ring in question was the same ring, which isbeing claimed by the Guevara spouse.

ISSUE:Whether or not a lawyer needs an SPA to admit the truth

of certain facts

HELD: NO. Garcia is contradicted by her own extra-judicial

admissions, although made by her counsel. For an attorney whoacts as counsel of record and is permitted to act such, has theauthority to manage the cause, and this includes the authorityto make admission for the purpose of the litigation... Garcia’sproffered explanation that her counsel misunderstood her isfutile because the liability to error as to the identity of thevendor and the exchange of the ring with another ring of thesame value, was rather remote.

The ring’s identification was confirmed by Mr. RafaelRebullida, whose testimony is entitled to great weight, withhis 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry business Indeed, Garcia made no comment when in her presence Rebullidaafter examining the ring and stock card told Guevara that thatwas her ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter ofdemand,asserting ownership.

None of the people whom she mentioned, was able tocorroborate the story of how she bought the ring.

SANTIAGO V. DELOS SANTOS

Facts:Plaintiff, now appellant, applied for registration of a

parcel of land. In a motion to set the case for hearing, heattached documents indicative of the land being public incharacter, thus lending support to the opposition of theDirector of Forestry, the Director of Lands, and a certain



Pacita V. de los Santos. The then Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma,now an Associate Justice of this Court, dismissed the suit. Itsreversal is sought in this appeal.

Issue:Was the counsel negligent in the preparation of the

pleadings? Yes.

Held:Attached to such pleading were the documents, which, in

the language of the then Judge Palma, "show that the landobject of this registration proceeding is part of the publicdomain ... ." Former counsel ought to have realized the fataleffect on his client's case of such an admission. If it werehis intention to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiffto the claim that he had been in open, public, uninterrupted,peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner fromJuly 26, 1894 up to the present, he could not have succeededany better. What was so categorically therein set forth as tosuch parcel of land being a part of a public forest, althoughthereafter released by the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources for agricultural purposes, is conclusive and binding.

How did the present counsel for plaintiff, the law firmof Luna and Manalo, seek to extricate him from a predicament ofhis own making? It would rely on certain procedural doctrines;more specifically, it would insist on the motion to dismiss ofoppositor Pacita V. de los Santos as not being entitled torecognition as there was a general order of default except asto the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, not liftedas to her, and that she had no interest to oppose theapplication of the registration of her land, althoughadmittedly there was a claim on her part under a pasture leaseagreement in her favor. Hence the plea for the order ofdismissal being set aside and plaintiff being allowed topresent evidence. What purpose, it may pertinently be asked,would be served thereby if, after the time-consuming effort, itwould clearly appear that plaintiff could not in truth showthat there was such an open, uninterrupted, peaceful and

adverse possession in the concept of owner? Nor is it to beforgotten that in the motion to dismiss of oppositor de losSantos, it was stated: "That the son of applicant LuisSantiago, namely Juanito S. Santiago, was one time the Lesseeof the aforesaid timber area sought to be registered by himunder Pasture Lease Agreement No. 182 on April 18, 1955, whichLease Agreement was cancelled by the Government on August 18,1958 for failure of Lessee Santiago to make the improvementsand comply otherwise with the terms and conditions of the LeaseContract; ... ." There was no denial of such allegation.

An admission made in the pleadings cannot becontroverted by the party making such admission and areconclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by himcontrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored,whether objection is interposed by the party or not.

CANON 20

SESBRENO V. CA

Facts:Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued

the province of Cebu for reinstatement and back wages. Theysigned 2 documents whereby the employees agreed to pay Atty.Sesbreno 30% as attorney’s fees and 20% expenses to be takenfrom their back salaries. The trial court rendered a decisionin favor the employees and fixed Atty. Sesbreno’s attorney’sfees at 40% of back salaries, terminal leave, gratuity pay andretirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total of 60% ofall monies paid to the employees. The court later on modifiedthe attorney’s fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the CA,which decided that the attorney’s fees should be reduced to 20%of the back salaries awarded to the employees. Atty. Sesbrenoappeals to the SC on the ground that attorney’s fees amountingto 50% of all monies awarded to his clients as contingent feesshould be upheld for being consistent with prevailing case lawand the contract of professional services between the parties.



Issue:Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to

reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Atty. Sesbreno,notwithstanding the contract for professional services signedby the client

Held: Yes! The CA has the authority to reduce the amount of

attorney’s fees. A lawyer may charge and receive as attorney’sfees is always subject to judicial control. In the case at bar,the parties entered into a contingent fee contract, whereinAtty. Sesbreno will get 50% from the employees money claims ifthey will win the case. However, the court finds the 50% fee asunconscionable. Stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionablewhenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared tothe value of the services rendered as to amount to fraudperpetrated upon the client. Contingent fee contracts are underthe supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order thatclients may be protected from unjust charges. The court heldthat a fee of 20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement.

BAUTISTA V. GONZALES

Facts:Atty. Gonzales is the lawyer of the Fortunados in a

civil case wherein Atty. Gonzales agreed to pay all expenses,including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the valueof the property in litigation.

Issue:Whether or not the contingent fee agreement between

Atty. Gonzales and the Forunados is valid

Held:No. There was no impropriety in entering into a contingent feecontract with the Fortunados. However, the agreement betweenAtty. Gonzales and the Fortunados is contrary to the Code ofProfessional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer may

not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses oflitigation. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance theexpenses of litigation, the same should be subject toreimbursement. The agreement between Atty. Gonzales andFortunados does not provide for reimbursement to Atty. Gonzalesof litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby anattorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce theclient’s rights is champertous. Such agreements are againstpublic policy. The execution of these contracts violates thefiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, forwhich the former must incur administrative sanctions.

GAMILLA V. MARINO

Facts:Atty. Eduardo Marino Jr. was the president of the UST

Faculty Union. There’s a long history of collective bargainingagreement between UST and UST Faculty Union. During the seriesof agreements between UST and the UST Faculty Union, Atty.Marino was removed from his position but continued to serve asa lawyer for the UST Faculty Union. In the end, the UST Facultywon and was awarded 42 million pesos for back wages, salaries,additional compensations, etc. Complainants are members of theUST Faculty Union questioning the lack of transparency in thedisbursement of the monetary benefits (42M) for the facultymembers, and prays for the expulsion of Atty. Marino forfailure to account for the balance of 42M ceded to them by USTand the attorney’s fees amounting to 4.2M which he deductedfrom the benefits allotted to faculty members.

Issue:Whether or not the 4.2M attorney’s fees is proportionate

to the legal services rendered by Atty. Marino

Held: No. The record does not show any justification for such

huge amount of compensation nor any clear differentiationbetween his legal services and his tasks union president



comprising in all probity the same duties for which he hascollected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union.Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in Atty.Marino’s dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty Unionwhen he obtained 4.2M as attorney’s fees. A simple accountingof the money that he and others concerned received from UST, aswell as an explanation on the details of the agreements, wouldhave enlightened the faculty members about the probability ofconflict of interests on respondent’s part and guided them tolook for alternative actions to protect their own interests.The objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punishthe individual attorney as to protect the dispensation ofjustice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from themisconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type ofproceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more sternmeasure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would besufficient disciplinary action. Hence, Atty. Mariño isadmonished to refrain from all appearances and acts ofimpropriety including circumstances indicating conflict ofinterests, and to behave at all times with circumspection anddedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observingcandor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with hisclient.

VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY.MARIANO

Facts:Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of

marriage against Vinson Pineda. Aurora proposed a settlementregarding visitation rights and the separation of propertieswhich was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved by thetrial court and their marriage was declared null and void.

Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels werecompensated but they still billed petitioner additional legalfees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to pay theadditional fees but instead paid P1.2M.

Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA

reduced the amount to a total of P2M.

Issues:W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for

additional legal fees?W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?

Held:A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the

petition as an incident of the main action. RTC hasjurisdiction.

The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was10% of the value of the properties awarded to Vinson. Whatrespondents were demanding was additional payment for servicerendered in the same case.

The professional engagement between petitioner andrespondents was governed by quantum meruit.

Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityadvises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerningtheir compensation and to resort to judicial action only toprevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect feesshould be avoided and should be filed only when circumstancesforce lawyers to resort to it.In this case, there was no justification for the additionallegal fees sought by respondents. It was an act ofunconscionable greed!

ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR

Facts:The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys.

Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in thecase. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement, wherein it wascontained that the attorneys would endeavor to secure justcompensation with the NHA and other government agencies at aprice of 11pesos or more per square meter, and that any lower



amount shall not entitle them to any atty’s fees. They alsostipulated that in the event they get it for 11pesos per squaremeter, their contingent fee shall be 30% of the justcompensation. They also stipulated that their lawyer’s feesshall be in proportion to the cash/bonds ratio of the justcompensation.

[…]A Compromise Agreement was executed between the

Zuzuarreguis and the NHA. The Compromise Agreement, stipulatedamong other things, that the just compensation of theZuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per square meterpayable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, theRTC, approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by theparties.

The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G.Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00.Out of this amount, the records show that the amount turnedover to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted toP30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just compensation,although this amount is bigger) in NHA bonds.

Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated ata total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released bythe NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.

On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor,demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yieldcorresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/orcriminal action.

Issue:The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a

question of law in holding that the letter-agreement re:contingent fees cannot be allowed to stand as the law betweenthe parties

Held:A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons

whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to givesomething or to render some service. Contracts shall beobligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into,provided all the essential requisites for their validity arepresent. The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it wasthem (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys.Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matterswhich they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely noevidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into theLetter-Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution andcontents were admitted by the Zuzuarreguis themselves.

In the presence of a contract for professional servicesduly executed by the parties thereto, the same becomes the lawbetween the said parties is not absolute but admits anexception – that the stipulations therein are not contrary tolaw, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.

Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastorare to receive contingent fees for their professional services.It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per seprohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of theCanons of Professional Ethics.

A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law,should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the caseincluding the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, butshould always be subject to the supervision of a court, as toits reasonableness.

Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to chargeonly reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce theamount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive andunconscionable.

Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’ssense of justice, decency or reasonableness. It becomesaxiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonablenessor the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated



by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatoryprerogative of the courts.

In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received anamount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the justcompensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHAto the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blownhearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in aCompromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionableand excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is,therefore, in order.

It is imperative that the contingent fees received byAttys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced. In theopinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to thepercentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per squaremeter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned byAttys. Roxas and Pastor.The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. Thisamount must therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, onthe one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. Thedivision must be pro rata. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in theopinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their effortsfor they would still be earning or actually earned attorney’sfees in the amount of P6,987,078.75

On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannotaward the same for there was no direct showing of bad faith onthe part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier,contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is onlynecessary that it be reduced when excessive and unconscionable,which we have already done.

LAW FIRM OF TUNGOL & TIBAYAN V. CA AND SPOUSES INGCO

Facts:Ingcos hired the petitioner law firm to enforce delivery

of a land title. Complaint was filed by the law firm in behalfof the Ingcos before the HLURB against Villa Crista allegingthat the Ingcos had paid P5.1M for a lot but Villa Crista

failed to deliver the title thereto. The Ingcos and VillaCrista entered into a compromise whereby the latter was boundto refund P4.8M provided that in case of breach of suchobligation, an additional P200k would be paid by way ofliquidated damages.Villa Crista failed to pay. Writ of execution issued. Sherifflevied and auctioned 10 lots belonging to Villa Crista. TheIngcos bought 3 lots, the payment of which includes P5.1Mcontract price for the initial lot they primarily bought,P1.35M attorney’s fees and other expenses. The Ingcos thenterminated the services of the law firm.

The law firm filed with the HLURB to recover 25% of theexcess of the existing prevailing selling price or the fairmarket value of the 3 lots. It also filed for damages in theRTC.

The law firm argued that the spouses still owed P4.5M;that in their contract the law firm was entitled to 25% of theexcess of the total bid price.HLURB arbiter ruled for the law firm. HLURHB Board reversed.The Office of the President reversed, affirming the HLURBarbiter’s decision. CA reversed the OP.

Held:SC ruled that the lawyers are not entitled to additional

fees. The spouses acquired the 3 lots as the highest bidder atthe auction sale. It can be said that the lots had beenacquired not through the recovery efforts of the law firm.

Moreover, during the negotiations with Villa Crista, itwas Renato Ingco who was actually negotiating, not the lawyers.

When the auction sale was made, the attorney-clientrelationship no longer existed, hence the lawyers are notentitled to the additional fees.

CANON 21

REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:



The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaintbefore the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the PresidentialCommission on Good Gov’t (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery ofalleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks inthe named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RPvs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."

Among the defendants named in the case are hereinpetitioners and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who allwere then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion,Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performedlegal services for its clients and in the performance of theseservices, the members of the law firm delivered to its clientdocuments which substantiate the client's equity holdings.

In the course of their dealings with their clients, themembers of the law firm acquire information relative to theassets of clients as well as their personal and businesscircumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitionersand private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted inthe organization and acquisition of the companies included inCC No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRAlawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporationsinvolved in sequestration proceedings.

PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" &"3rd Amended Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the complaint inPCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant, Roco having promised he’llreveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted asnominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case #33.

Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint forhaving plotted, devised, schemed, conspired & confederatedw/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levyfunds, the financial & corporate framework & structures thatled to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC,& more than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including theacquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & itsinstitutionalization through presidential directives of thecoconut monopoly. Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA

Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly 3.3% of thetotal outstanding capital stock of UCPB.

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,petitioners alleged that their participation in the acts w/ w/ctheir co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance oflegitimate lawyering

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRAlaw firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations inthe complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.

Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition"w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG exclude them as parties-defendantslike Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion ofpetitioners: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-clientrelationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitionersexecuted in favor of its clients covering their respectiveshareholdings.

Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof tosubstantiate compliance by Roco of the same conditionsprecedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco didn’t refutepetitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal theidentity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had heundertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom heacted as nominee-stockholder.

In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners,for their refusal to comply w/ the conditions required by PCGG.It held, “ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from theconsequences of their acts until they have begun to establishthe basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence andidentity of the client.”

ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRAlawyers filed the petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini,likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also denied thus, he fileda separate petition for certiorari, assailing SB’s resolutionon essentially same grounds averred by petitioners, namely:



SB gravely abused its discretion in subjectingpetitioners to the strict application of the law of agency.

SB gravely abused its discretion in not consideringpetitioners & Roco similarly situated &, thus, deserving equaltreatment

SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that,under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilegeprohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of theirclient(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring thatdropping of partydefendants be based on reasonable & justgrounds, w/ due consideration to constitutional rts ofpetitioners

PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners'contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of theclient is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-clientconfidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence ofnominee status.

RULING (pulled out only the pertinent sections ):

WON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS PETITIONERS FROMREVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR CLIENT(S) & THE OTHERINFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE PCGG

YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised onthe Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contractof lease of services) where one person lets his services andanother hires them without reference to the object of which theservices are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may becompensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract ofagency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makesa contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by thecontract to the person who requested him. But the lawyer-clientrelationship is more than that of the principal-agent andlessor-lessee

An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant,because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence

reposed on him by his client. An attorney occupies a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court &exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to betaken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship,there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe lifeinto it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which isof a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, thatis required by reason of necessity and public interest based onthe hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in agood cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration ofjustice.

Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court,Rule 130:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privilegedcommunication. The following persons cannot testify as tomatters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx Anattorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examinedas to any communication made by the client to him, or hisadvice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,professional employment, can an attorney's secretary,stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of theclient and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge ofwhich has been acquired in such capacity.

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20.It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate theconfidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve thesecrets of his client, and to accept no compensation inconnection with his client's business except from him or withhis knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (“Alawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall bemindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.”) Canon 15,CPE also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.

An effective lawyer-client relationship is largelydependent upon the degree of confidence which exists betweenlawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which



encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow ofinformation. Thus, the Court held that this duty may beasserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners'client(s) in the case at bar.

The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke theprivilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of hisclient.

Reasons advanced for the general rule: Court has a right to know that the client whose

privileged information is sought to be protected isflesh and blood.

Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-clientrelationship has been established.

Privilege generally pertains to subject matter ofrelationship

Due process considerations require that the opposingparty should, as a general rule, know his adversary.

Exceptions to the gen. rule: Client identity is privileged where a strong probability

exists that revealing the client's name would implicate thatclient in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer'sadvice.

Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter ofthe relationship was so closely related to the issue of theclient's identity that the privilege actually attached to both.

Where disclosure would open the client to civilliability, his identity is privileged.

Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldn’t reveal name of hisclient as this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: “We feel sure that undersuch conditions no case has ever gone to the length ofcompelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant,to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of thetransactions to w/c it related, when such information could bemade the basis of a suit against his client.”

Where the government's lawyers have no case against anattorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, thesaid name would furnish the only link that would form the chainof testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, theclient's name is privileged.

Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal thenames of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to gov’tvoluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsuedon, & w/ no gov’t audit or investigation into that client'sincome tax liability pending

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist othersituations which could qualify as exceptions to the generalrule:

if the content of any client communication to a lawyeris relevant to the subject matter of the legal problemon which the client seeks legal assistance

where the nature of the attorney-client relationship hasbeen previously disclosed & it is the identity w/c isintended to be confidential, the identity of the clienthas been held to be privileged, since such revelationwould otherwise result in disclosure of the entiretransaction.

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to theidentity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilegewhen the client's name itself has an independent significance,such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to thegeneral rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's namewould lead to establish said client's connection with the veryfact in issue of the case, which is privileged information,because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subjectmatter or the substance (without which there would be noattorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and thelegal advice or legal service sought was duly established inthe case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself as can be seenin the 3 specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which



constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should theyaccede thereto.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we canreadily deduce that the clients indeed consulted thepetitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding thefinancial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of thecorporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave theirprofessional advice in the form of, among others, theaforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client'sshareholdings.

Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifyingtheir clients would implicate them in the very activity forwhich legal advice had been sought, i.e., the allegedaccumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementionedcorporations.

Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation ofthe client's name would obviously provide the necessary linkfor the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwiseexists.

While the privilege may not be invoked for illegalpurposes such as in a case where a client takes on the servicesof an attorney, for illicit purposes, it may be invoked in acase where a client thinks he might have previously committedsomething illegal and consults his attorney. Whether or not theact for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal,his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads toevidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which mightlead to possible action against him.

The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, isconsonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e.,that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation oflegal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosurefrom attorneys must be eliminated. What is sought to be avoidedthen is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amountto a fishing expedition by the prosecution.

In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimatelyhinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a caseagainst their clients, the latter's case should be built upon

evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sourcesand not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal thename of their clients, information which unavoidably revealsmuch about the nature of the transaction which may or may notbe illegal.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of thelawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty tohis client is evident in the duration of the protection, whichexists not only during the relationship, but extends even afterthe termination of the relationship.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right notto reveal the identity of their clients under pain of thebreach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the factsof the instant case clearly fall w/in recognized exceptions tothe rule that the client's name is not privileged information.Otherwise, it would expose the lawyers themselves to possiblelitigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciaryresponsibility imposed on them in exercise of their duties.

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OFATTORNEY PALANCA:

WILLIAM PFLEIDER VS. ATTORNEY PALANCA

Facts:Palanca was the legal counsel of Pfleider. Pfleider

leased an agricultural land to Palanca known as Hacienda Asia.Pfleider filed a civil suit against Palanca for rescission ofthe lease contract for defaulting in rental payments. He alsofiled this administrative complaint of gross misconduct againstPalanca. Pfleider alleged that in a criminal case for estafafiled against him in which Palanca was his counsel, the lattersought to negotiate the dismissal of the complaint. Pfleideralleged that Palanca informed him through letters that he hadsuccessfully negotiated the dismissal of the complaint and thathe had deposited P5k with the court.

Issue:W/N Palanca was guilty of gross misconduct?



W/N the filing of the civil suit for the rescission ofthe lease contract terminated the attorney-client relationship?

Held:Palanca was not guilty of gross misconduct. The letters

relied upon by Pfleider did not show that Palanca stated thathe had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the criminalcomplaint against Pfleider.

The civil suit for rescission terminated the attorney-client relationship. While the object of the suit was therescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interestbecame incompatible with the mutual confidence and trustessential to every attorney-client relationship.

MERCADO V. ATTY. VITRIOLO

Facts:Atty. Vitriolo was the counsel of Mercado in a case for

annulment of marriage filed by the latter’s husband. Vitriolofiled a criminal action for falsification of public documentsagainst Mercado alleging that the latter made false entries inthe certificates of live birth of her children which werepresented in the annulment case.Mercado filed this complaint alleging that due to the criminalcase filed against her by Vitriolo, information relating to hercivil case for annulment was divulged. Hence, Vitriolo breachedthe privilege and confidence reposed within a lawyer-clientrelationship. Mercado prayed the Vitriolo be disbarred.

Issue:W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged

communication between attorney and client when he filed acriminal case against his former client?

Held:SC provided the factors which are essential to establish

the existence of the communication privilege between anattorney and his client.

There exists an attorney-client relationship, or aprospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reasonof this relationship that the client made the communication.

The client made the communication in confidence.The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his

professional capacity.SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence

on record fails to substantiate Mercado’s allegations. Mercadodid not even specify the alleged communication. all her claimswere couched in general terms and lacked specificity.

GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN

Facts:Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genato’s

building. Atty. Silapan handled some of Genato’s cases. After awhile, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a car.Atty. Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check toGenato. The check was dishonored.

Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22.In his defense, he alleged that Genato was in the business of“buying an selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loansand other shady deals” and that he was also involved in briberycases.

Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breakingtheir confidential lawyer-client relationship.

Issue: Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?

Held: No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be

mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him, especiallywith privileged communication – the protection is only limitedto communications which are legitimately and properly withinthe scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does notextend to those made in contemplation of a crime orperpetration of a fraud. Thus, here, the attorney-client



privilege does not attach, there being no professionalemployment in the strictest sense.

However, the disclosures were not indispensable toprotect Atty. Silapan’s rights as they were not pertinent tothe case. It was improper for him to disclose those informationas they were not the subject matter of litigation at hand. Hisprofessional competence and legal advice were not beingattacked in the said case. A lawyer must conduct himself withintegrity.

He is therefore suspended for 6 months.

HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA

Facts:Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her

friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed confidential informationduring that period. However, after the confidential informationwas given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to anotherlawyer.

Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda becauseof this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets.In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a countercomplaint against Hadjula for falsification of public documentsand immorality – using the disclosures as basis for thecharges. Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?

Held: Reprimanded.The moment complainant approached the then receptive

respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-clientrelationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda shouldhave kept the information secret and confidential, under theattorney-client privilege rule.

However, the seriousness of the respondent’s offensenotwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room forcompassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty.Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she was actuated

by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that in theprocess of giving bent to a negative sentiment, she wasviolating the rule of confidentiality.

PALM V. ATTY. ILEDAN

Facts:Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty.

Iledan as its retained counsel. She filed a case of disbarmentagainst Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-clientprivilege and conflict of interests.

The basis of the claim of breach occurred during ameeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders’ meetingcannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet toamend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode ofcommunications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.

The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed fromAtty. Iledan being the counsel of Soledad who was filed withan estafa case by Comtech.

Issue: Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of

interests?

Held:No. Although the information about the necessity to

amend the corporate by-laws may have been given to respondent,it could not be considered a confidential information. Theamendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by“the board of directors or trustees, by a majority votethereof, and the owners of at least a majority of theoutstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members ofa non-stock corporation.”It means the stockholders are aware ofthe proposed amendments to the by-laws. Further, whenever anyamendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the



amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities andExchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articlesof incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public recordsand could not be considered confidential. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney andclient does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. Theclient must intend the communication to be confidential. Sincethe proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majorityof the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must befiled with the SEC, the information could not have beenintended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made byrespondent during the stockholders’ meeting could not beconsidered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidencewithin the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.

The Court also finds no conflict of interest whenrespondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. Thecase where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa casefiled by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothingin the records that would show that respondent used againstComtech any confidential information acquired while he wasstill Comtech’s retained counsel. Further, respondent made therepresentation after the termination of his retainer agreementwith Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former clientdoes not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’semployment with the client. The intent of the law is to imposeupon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests onlyon matters that he previously handled for the former client andnot for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationshiphas terminated

CANON 22

WACK WACK GOLF V. CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL AND ANTONINO BERNARDO

Facts:Wack-wack was in a labor case against Arcangel. During

the pendency of the case, Wack-wack wanted to change their

counsel from Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz to the Law Office ofJuan Chudian.

During the hearing, neither Wack-wack nor their originalcounsels showed up, so Arcangel was allowed to present hisevidence without Wack-wack. The court awarded judgment toArcangel. The law firm of Chuidian then filed a petition to setaside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding. Thispetition was denied by the lower court. Wack-wack assails thedenial of the petition.

It has to be taken note of that the court did not knowof the change of counsel because Chudian only entered hisappearance after the judgment was rendered against Wack-wack.

Issue: Was the trial court correct in denying the petition to

set aside the judgment?

Held: Yes. As such counsel of record, Balcoff, Poblador and

Cruz must have known that, its impending relief as counself forthe defendant notwithstanding, it is still under obligation toprotect the client’s interest until its final release from theprofessional relationship with such client. The court couldrecognize no other representation on behalf of the clientexcept such counsel of record until a formal substitution ofattorney is effected.

Any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record andits client may reach regarding the presentation of the client’scase in court is purely their private concern. Proceedings incourt cannot be made to depend on them.

VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME

Facts:Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a

land title dispute. The court rule against Venterez andfriends. They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration butAtty. Cosme failed or refused to do so. Because of this,



Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to preparethe MR.

Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of thecomplainants informed him that he was withdrawing the case fromhim because he (the son) already engaged another lawyer to takeover the case. Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned overthe records of the case to the son and thus, ceased to becounsel any longer.

Issue: Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in

handling the case?

Held: Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a

client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful ofthe trust and confidence reposed on him. An attornery whoundertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to itstermination – that is, until the case becomes final andexecutory. Any dereliction of duty affects the client.

The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosme’s defense that hehad already withdrawn from the case. A lawyer may retire at anytime with the written consent of his client fileed in court andwith a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should theclient refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file anapplication with the court. The application must be based on agood case.

What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22. There was no proper revocation in this case. He is

suspended for 3 months.

SANTECO V. ATTY. AVANCE

Facts:Santeco got Atty. Avance to handle a case for her in a

civil suit. She paid her P12,000 as acceptance money. Losing inthe first instance, Atty. Avance made representations that she was going to file a petition for certiorari with the CA.

She didn’t.She also didn’t appear during scheduled hearings,

causing the case to get dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Issue: Is Atty. Avance grossly remiss in the performance of her

duties?

Held: Yes. Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance

of her duties, she abruptly stopped appearing as complainant’s counsel even as proceedings were still pending – with neither awithdrawal nor an explanation for doing so. This violated Canon22.

Suspended for 5 years.

FRANCISCO VS. PORTUGAL

Facts: Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case.

Atty was retained After judgment was rendered convictingappellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion and Petitionfor review of the judgment of conviction. But after the filing,Atty disappeared and was nowhere to be found.

Later, the complainants found out that their petitionswere denied for being filed out of time and for failure to paythe docket fees. The decision became final and warrants ofarrest were issued.

Atty argues that he had decided to withdraw as counsel.He wrote a letter to one of the complainants giving theminstructinos to sign and file with the Court the Notice toWithdraw. But the complainant didn’t file it with the courtbecause they were aware that it would be difficult to findanother counsel.

Issue: Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?



Held: Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the

notice of withdrawal himself if he truly wanted to withdraw. Atthe very least, he should have informed the court. For failureto do so, Atty was negligent. Atty was also negligent in filingthe petition out of time. eventually he would have known thatthe petition was denied but still he failed to informe theconvicts and return their calls.

One of the fundamental rules of ethics is the principlethat an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedlystipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at libertyto abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right towithdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises onlyfrom the client’s written consent or from a good cause.

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, alawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if theclient never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship.Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which dutyof public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA

Facts: Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning

the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale. Pendingresolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to enter hischarging lien equal to 25% of the market value of the litigatedproperties as atty fees. The court granted and the atty’s lienwas annotated on the TCTs. The cases were later dismissed withprejudice at the instance of the plaintiffs therein. Thus theBank now had the TCT’s in its name and the atty’s lien wascarried over.

Atty. filed a motion to fix his Atty Fees based onquantum meruit. RTC granted the motion and fixed the fees at936K. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suitnecessary for enforcement of the lien?

Held: Yes! Yes! CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the

bringing of proper proceedings. A charging lien, to beenforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees,requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money andexecution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the mainaction by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer mayenforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition asan incident in the main action in which his services wererendered when something is due his client in the action fromwhich the fee is to be paid.

Here, there was no money judgment. Thus there is nocharging lien. And court has no authority to fix a charginglien.

A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as aseparate civil suit or as an incident in the main action, hasto be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as anyother money claim.

DORONILLA V. CA

Facts: Heirs of Doronilla had a dispute with their counsel over

his Atty Lien. The RTC declared that Counsel was entitled to10% of the shares of the heirs.

Counsel filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien onthe title of parcels of land of the estate which the heirs hadinherited. The RTC granted the motion.

Issue: Is the order of annotation proper?

Held: No! An attorney's lien does not extend to land which is

the subject matter of the litigation.



SESBRENO V. CA

Facts: Atty was hired as counsel by some workers. They agreed

that Atty would take 30% of whatever they may recover. Thetrial court ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages. Theemployer appealed the decision.

Pending appeal, the workers entered into a compromiseagreement that they waived their right to be reinstated withthe agreement of payment of full backwages at once. The courtadopted the compromise and ordered the withholding of thepayment of 55% for the lien of the Atty. But instead ofwithholding, the employer directly paid the workers in full.Thus Atty filed a complaint for collection against the employerand employees.

Atty. moved to dismiss the case against the employees. Later the trial court ordered payment of 669K by the employee.The CA reversed.

Issue: Is the employer liable for the Atty’s fees?

Held: No! CA affirmed. Atty rightly commenced the action

against both his clients and the judgment debtors. However, atthe instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint againsthis clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled hisdifferences with them. He maintained the case againstemployers because, according to him, the computation of theemployees money claims should have been based on the nationaland not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insiststhat the respondents should be made liable for the difference.

Atty’s act in withdrawing the case against the employeesand agreeing to settle their dispute may be considered a waiverof his right to the lien.

Even if there was such a breach of the contract, he hadwaived his right to claim against the respondents by accepting

payment and/or absolving from liability those who wereprimarily liable to him.

SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT

GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS V. NALDOZA

Facts: Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the

POEA to the SC. Atty asked from complainants $2.5K which hesaid were to be used for payment of docket fees and that thecourt could take cognizance of the case. Later, complainantcorporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the SCconsisted only of nominal fees for such kind of appeal. Attyin order to cover up presented complainant a fake xerox copy ofan alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K.A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted butwas held civilly liable for $2.5K.

Issue: Should Atty be disbarred? Should the case be dismissed

because of his acquittal?

Held: Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldn’t be dismissed.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of theirown. They are distinct from and they may proceed independentlyof civil and criminal cases. The burden of proof is clearlypreponderant evidence.

A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in acivil case will not necessarily result in a finding ofliability in the administrative case and vice versa. Neitherwill a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve theadministrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise isthat criminal and civil cases are altogether different fromadministrative matters, such that the disposition in the firsttwo will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis



Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did hemisappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked areason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, hehad the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court tocover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continuebeing a member of the bar.

SANTOS V. LLAMAS

Facts:This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-

payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8,1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member ofthe bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to yourattention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty.Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has notindicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date &place of issuance) in his pleadings

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138,Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member ofthe bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled topractice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 whichprovides that "default in the payment of annual dues for sixmonths shall warrant suspension of membership in the IntegratedBar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a groundfor the removal of the name of the delinquent member from theRoll of Attorneys."

Issues:W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YESW/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES

Held:Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the IntegratedBar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shalldetermine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sumequivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from eachChapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabledmembers of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceasedmembers thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to theprovisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the paymentof annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension ofmembership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such paymentfor one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name ofthe delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent canengage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and itdoes not matter that his practice is "limited." While it istrue that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemptionfrom the payment of individual income taxes: provided, thattheir annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty levelas determined by the National Economic and DevelopmentAuthority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not includepayment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadingsand thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts thathe had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent isguilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibilitywhich provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THEINTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THEACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITHTO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, norconsent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead orallow the court to be misled by any artifice.



Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and hismisrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeedmerit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’sadvanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and pleafor a more temperate application of the law, we believe thepenalty of one year suspension from the practice of law oruntil he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, isappropriate.

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO AREVALO JR REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROMPAYMENT OF IBP DUTIES

FACTS:Atty Arevalo wrote a letter in Sept 2004, asking to be

exempted from payment of IBP duties amounting to P12,035(unpaid duties from 1977-2005). Atty Arevalo was admitted tothe Bar in 1961. He was with the Philippine Civil Service from1962 to 1986. After that, he migrated and worked in the USAuntil 2003. His main contention was that he cannot be assessedIBP dues for the above amount because he was working with theCivil Service then, and the Civil Service Law prohibits thepractice of one’s profession while in government service. Healso contends that he cannot be assessed for the years he wasworking in the USA.

IBP commented on the letter saying that the IBPmembership is NOT based on the actual practice of law. Once alawyer passes the Bar, he continues to be a member of the IBP,and one of his obligations as member is the payment of annualdues. The validity of such dues has been upheld by the SC insaying that it is necessary to defray the cost of theIntegrated Bar Program and no one is exempted from paying thedues. What was allowed was the voluntary termination andreinstatement later on of membership. If membership isterminated, dues wouldn’t be assessed.

Basically, the main contention of Atty. Arevalo is thatthe IBP’s policy of Non-Exemption in payment of annualmembership dues is invalid because it would be oppressive forone who has been in an inactive status and is without income

derived from his law practice. Also, it is a deprivation ofproperty right without due process.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment

of his dues during the time he was inactive in the practice oflaw, when he was in the Civil Service and abroad?

HELD/RATIO: NO. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by

which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to dohis shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well asobliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organizedby or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is anofficial national body of which all lawyers are required to bemembers. They are, therefore, subject to all the rulesprescribed for the governance of the Bar, including therequirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for theeffective discharge of the purposes of the Bar.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associatewith anyone. The only compulsion to which he is subjected isthe payment of his annual dues. The public interest promoted bythe integration of the Bar far outweighs the slightinconvenience to a member resulting from his required paymentof the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence ofmembership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This meansthat the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for aslong as one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of thelack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member isengaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allowsexemption from payment of membership dues. At most, ascorrectly observed by the IBP, he could have informed theSecretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroadbefore he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP couldhave been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could havebeen discontinued.



VDA. DE BARRERA V. LAPUTGross Misconduct as ground for discipline of lawyer

(Lawyer suspended for intimidating his client to sign papers by placing his revolveron his lap when she refused to do so)

Facts:Respondent Atty. Laput represented petitioner Vda. de

Barrera (Mrs. Barrera) in the estate proceedings of her latehusband. Laput presented to her several papers or pleadingsfor her signature. However, Mrs. Barrera refused to sign thepleadings but requested Laput to leave them so that she may asksomebody to translate the same for her (she was from Cebu).Laput got angry and drew his revolver from its holster andplaced it on his lap to intimidate the 72-year-old woman intosigning the papers. Mrs. Barrera was compelled to sign them,but is now before the court seeking the disbarment of Laput.

Issue: W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct

Held:Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable,

more so considering that they were performed by a man dealingwith a 72-year-old woman. The offense is compounded by thecircumstance that, being a member of the BAR, the offendershould have set an example of a man of peace and champion ofthe Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offendedparty is the very person whom the offender had pledged todefend and protect – his client. He was suspended from thepractice of law for 1 year.

VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL

FACTS:This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against

Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a collegestudent, single. Atty. Daarol went to her house because he wasa friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. Sheknew Daarol to be a single and as a General Manager of ZANECO(electic cooperative).

On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos’ house and askedher to be one of the usherettes in the Mason’s convention sothe latter said he should ask for the permission of herparents. They consented and so she served as an usherette,Daarol picking her up and taking her home everyday.

In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioner’s house andinvited her for a joy ride, with the permission of her mother(who was Daarol’s former classmate). They went to the beachand Daarol proposed his love for Barrientos and told her thatif she would accept him, he would marry her within 6 monthsfrom her acceptance. After a few days of courting, she acceptedthe offer of love. Visitations continued and they agreed to getmarried in Dec 1973.

In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when theyleft, he took her for a joy ride to an airport in Sicayab wherethere were no houses around. There, he pressured her intohaving sexual intercourse reiterating that he loved her, andthat he would marry her and that December was very near anywaythey would marry soon. She gave in after much hesitationbecause she loved him. She cried after the deed.

This event happened frequently thereafter during Augustto October 1973, where she consented because she loved him.Eventually, she became pregnant and informed Daarol. He howeversuggested that she have the baby aborted. She refused. He toldher that she didn’t have to worry because they were gettingmarried soon anyway.

In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos andher mother and told them that he could not marry her because hewas already married. He reassured them though that he has beenseparated from his wife for 16 years and that he would work forthe annulment of his marriage and subsequently marry her. SoBarrientos waited and delivered the baby but eventually wasn’table to contact Daarol anymore (he went MIA).



ISSUE: W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral

conduct.

HELD/RATIO: YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by

respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Eventhen, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible tore-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 yearsand dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he wouldwork for the annulment of his first marriage. It was adeception after all as it turned out that respondent neverbothered to annul said marriage.

Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of hissexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. Heis perverted. He says that: "I see nothing wrong with thisrelationship despite my being married." Worse, he evensuggested abortion.

Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege thathe is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiplemarriages and has inquired into the possibility of marryingcomplainant. As records indicate, however, his claim of havingembraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidencesave that of his self-serving testimony.

By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appeasehis sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstratedhis moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conductunbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit andgrossly immoral conduct is in order.

FELICITAS BERBANO V. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA

FACTS:This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty.

Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming of aLawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment.

Berbano was one of the heirs of a certain Hilapo, whoowned a lot in Alabang. Said lot was being claimed by FIlinvestDevelopment Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs appointed acertain Mr. Daen as attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Dane wasarrested in Jan 1999 and was detained so he needed theassistance of a law for his release. Someone recommended Atty.Barcelona to them. So later that month, Atty. Barcelona went tosee Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty.Barcelona for his release. Atty. Barcelona told them that they(Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000 at that time so thathe could secure Daen’s release the following day. Berbanodidn’t have enough money and time to immediately come up withsuch big amount but they were able to come up with P15,700. Shehanded Atty. Barcelona the money. He said that he would go tothe SC to talk to someone regarding the release of Daen, andthat they should just meet tomorrow.

The day after, they met again. Berbano handed overanother check worth P24,000. The day after, they gave anotherP10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife and daughter).There were other payments of money, the total amounting toP64,000. After much time wasted, and promises reiterated of therelease of Daen, Atty. Barcelona wasn’t seen again and hedidn’t return their calls. Daen was still in jail.

Atty. Barcelona failed to file an answer. Commissioneron Bar Discipline found Barcelona guilty of malpractice andserious breach of CPR. He recommended disbarment and return ofthe P64,000. IBP Board of Governots adopted such findings butrecommended only suspension.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.

HELD/RATIO: Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so

much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguardthe administration of justice by protecting the court and thepublic from the misconduct of officers of the court, and toremove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for



their oath of office have proved them unfit to continuedischarging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof restsupon the complainant, and for the court to exercise itsdisciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must beestablished by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment orsuspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistentlyheld that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justifythe imposition of the administrative penalty.

Complainant’s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before the Commission attesting to thetruth of the allegations laid down in her affidavit. The act ofrespondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearingsset by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice,emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings.

Respondent collected money from the complainant and thenephew of the detained person in the total amount of P64,000.00for the immediate release of the detainee through his allegedconnection with a Justice of the Supreme Court. He deserves tobe disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent hasdemonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that hehas the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, andthereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given tosuch connections. In this case, respondent misrepresented tocomplainant that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daenthrough his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. In sodoing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and publiccontempt. He is disbarred.

HILDA D. TABAS V. ATTY. BONIFACIO B. MANGIBIN

FACTS:This is a disbarment case filed by Tabas against Atty.

Mangibin for allegedly having committed forgery.Tabas claims that in March 2001, a certain Galvan

mortgaged to her a piece of real property to secure a P48,000loan. The deed of the REM was registered and annotated. On

October 2001 however, a certain Castillejos, falselyrepresenting herself as Tabas, appeared before Atty. Mangibinand asked him to prepare a discharge of the said mortgage andthen notarize it afterwards.

Atty. Mangibin prepared the said discharge but hedidn’t ask Castillejos for any other document other that aCommunity Tax Certificate. He later on notarized the said deed.Subsequently, the mortgagor Galvan was able to mortgage thesame property again with Rural Bank of Nauilian. When Tabaslearned of the cancellation, she promptly informed Atty.Mangibin that her signature in the deed was forged. However, hedid not help her.

Atty. Mangibin admits of the discharge deed but deniesliability for the falsification under a claim of good faith. Hesays he did not know of Castillejos’ fraudulent intent and so,he cannot be faulted. He claims it is beyond the realm of hisfuty to investigate the identity of persons appearing beforehim. And that as a matter of routine, he only requires the CTCsof persons appearing before him.

IBP recommended to give respondent merely a warning, tobe more careful in the preparation of legal documents so thatsuch situations may me avoided in the future. Bar Confidanthowever recommended suspension. He was found guilty of grossnegligence.ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mangibin is liable for violating the NotarialLaw and should be suspended from the practice of law.

HELD/RATIO: Yes, suspended for 2 years.A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith

and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, andthe public at large must be able to rely upon theacknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to aprivate instrument.For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost carethe basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity ofpublic instruments would be undermined. A notary public should



not notarize a document unless the person who signed the sameis the very same person who executed and personally appearedbefore him to attest to the contents and truth of mattersstated in the document. The purpose of this requirement is toenable the notary public to verify the genuineness of thesignature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that thedocument is the party's free act and deed.

The circumstances in this case indubitably show thatrespondent did not take even ordinary precautions required inthe premises. Respondent’s conduct showed serious lack of duecare in the performance of his duties as a notary public. Because of his carelessness, respondent failed to notice theglaring difference in the signature of mortgagee in the deed ofreal estate mortgage from her purported signature in thequestioned discharge of real estate mortgage. Hence, hebreached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility,which requires lawyers to promote respect for the law and legalprocesses as well as to uphold the Constitution and obey thelaws of the land.

SESBRENO V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros

hired the petitioner to prosecute their cases. They hadundertaken an an agreement wherein it was stated that Sesbrenowill get 30% of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. they mayrecover. Atty. Sesbreno registered his charhing/retaining lienon the Agreement.

The camineros he was representing obtained a favorablejudgment. RTC ordered that they be reinstate with backsalaries, with privileges and adjustments. The respondent tothat case DPWH appealed to the SC where Sesbreno stillrepresented the camineros. Later on, the Governor of Cebuproposed a compromise settlement of the cases. The partiessigned a Compromise Agreement wherein it is stated thatcamineros will be paid full back wages. Also states that the

camineros are subject to lawyer’s charging and retaining liensas registered in the lower court.

Sespreno was not the counsel anymore after finality ofjudgment adopting the compromise agreement. The camineros movedfor execution however, only 45% of the amount due them wasreleased because the court retained the 55%, holding it waspayment of the lawyer’s fees pending determination of suchamount. However, instead of complying with the court orderdirecting partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paidthe camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.

Sesbreno now sues for Damages and Attorney’s Feesagainst respondents and his former clients. RTC ruled in favorof Sesbreno. The court further upheld the petitioner’s statusas a quasi-party considering that he had a registered charginglien. CA reversed.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Sesbreno is entitled to Damages for breach of

contract.

HELD/RATIO: NO. The compromise agreement had been validly entered

into by the respondents and the camineros and the same became thebasis of the judgment rendered by this Court.

Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees was evidenced byan agreement for attorney’s fees voluntarily executed by the camineroswhere the latter agreed to pay the former “thirty (30%) percentof whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they might recoverin the mandamus and other cases that they were filing or havefiled.” Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided forin their contract nor was a specified rate agreed upon on howthe money claims were to be computed. The use of the word“whatever” shows that the basis for the computation would be theamount that the court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering that the parties agreed to a compromise, thepayment would have to be based on the amount agreed upon bythem in the compromise agreement approved by the court.



To insure payment of his professional fees andreimbursement of his lawful disbursements in keeping with hisdignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in favor ofa lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papersof his client which have lawfully come into his possessionuntil what is due him has been paid, but also a lien upon alljudgments for the payment of money and executions issuedpursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein hisservices have been retained by the client.

A charging lien is an equitable right to have the feesand costs due to the lawyer for services in a suit secured tohim out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should notbe allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favorwithout paying thereout for the services of his attorney inobtaining such judgment.

Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers arenot merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that yieldsprofits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a jobdone or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlikemercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom fromgovernmental interference, is impressed with a public interest,for which it is subject to state regulation.

Considering that petitioner’s claim of higher attorney’sfees is baseless and considering further that he had settledhis case as against his former clients, SC did not sustain hisright to damages for breach of contract. The attendantcircumstances, in fact, show that the camineros acknowledgedtheir liability to the petitioner and they willingly fulfilledtheir obligation. It would be contrary to human nature for thepetitioner to have acceded to the withdrawal of the caseagainst them, without receiving the agreed attorney’s fees.

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

CANON 1

LIBARIOS V. DABALOS

(Gross ignorance of the law; close association)

Facts:Judge Dabalos without conducting any hearing directed

the issuance of a warrant of arrest against accused and at thesame time fixed the bail for accused Calo and Allocod.

Held: Judge Dabalos is fined with a warning.It has been an established legal principle or rule that

in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, thetrial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding toprove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong,before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release ofthe accused. Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion thatthe evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, thelaw and settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing beconducted before bail was fixed. Respondent judge's disregardof an established rule of law by depriving the prosecution ofthe opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against theaccused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law,which is subject to disciplinary action.

Considering that respondent judge had a closeassociation with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee ofthe said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judgedemanded that he should have refrained from fixing the bail ofsaid accused and from concluding that the evidence against himwas merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as tohis judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waitedfor the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom thecase was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing thebail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should notonly render a just, correct and impartial decision but shoulddo so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to hisfairness, impartiality and integrity.

GO V. COURT OF APPEALS



Facts:Accused presented himself before the police to verify

reports that he was being hunted by the police. He wasthereafter detained. The prosecutor then informed accused ofhis right to preliminary investigation but that he must firstsign a waiver of the provision of Art.125 of the RPC. Accusedrefused to execute such waiver. The prosecutor filed aninformation for murder with no recommended bail and acertification that no preliminary investigation was conductedbecause accused did not sign a waiver of the provisions ofArt.125 of the RPC. Counsel of accused however later filed amotion for release and proper preliminary investigation. Afterthe case was raffled to the RTC, Judge Pelayo initiallyallowed the release of accused on a cash bond and issued anorder granting the leave to conduct preliminary investigation.Later on however, Pelayo motu proprio issued an order recallingthe granting of bail and proceeded to trial. Accused and hiscounsel continuously opposed this.

Held: (Note: What is related to ethics is actually found in

the concurring opinion of Justice Gutierrez)“I am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge

should insist on proceeding to trial in a sensational murdercase without a preliminary investigation despite vigorous andcontinued objection and reservation of rights of the accusedand notwithstanding the recommendation of the prosecutor thatsaid rights be respected… I agree with Justice Isagani Cruzthat the trial court has apparently been moved by a desire tocater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartialadministration of justice. Mass media has its duty tofearlessly but faithfully inform the public about events andpersons. However, when a case has received wide and sensationalpublicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only tobe fair and impartial but also to give the appearance ofcomplete objectivity in its handling of the case.”

SABITSANA V. VILLAMOR

Facts:It was discovered that there were 87 cases undecided by

respondent judge beyond the 90-day reglementary period. Thedismal state of the Courthouse of the respondent judge whichwas described as bereft of any dignity as a court of law hasbeen noted. Judge Villamor however shifts the blame on hisclerk of court, Atty. Jocobo who he claims was inefficient inthe management of the court records.

Also, in the case of theft by Lipango, Villamordesignated Judge Pitao as acting judge of the MCTC. Villamorwarned Pitao to acquit Lipango because the case was beingbacked up by someone powerful. He did this by sending a letterto Pitao through Lipango’s wife. However, Pitao still convictedLipango because the evidence of guilt was strong. When Pitaowas away for some conference, he found out that Villamorrevoked his designation and appointed another as judge of theMCTC. And finally, when the case was elevated to the RTC whereVillamor was assigned he acquitted Lipango.

Held: Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2A judge sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the

least possible delay but that his responsibilities includebeing an effective manager of the Court and its personnel.Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides:“A judge should diligently discharge administrativeresponsibilities, maintain professional competence in courtmanagement, and facilitate the performance of theadministrative functions of other judges and court personnel.”Also, under Rule 3.09 is that: “A judge should organize andsupervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt andefficient dispatch of business, and require at all times theobservance of high standards of public service and fidelity.”

Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoidimpropriety and the appearance of impropriety in allactivities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judgeshall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of



litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2,Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in-pendingsuits with the end in view of influencing the course or theresult of litigation does not only subvert the independence ofthe judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in itsintegrity and impartiality

TAN V. ROSETE

Facts:Before the cases were decided, respondent judge

allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant.The staff member told complainant Tan that Judge Rosete wasasking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of thecases. She was shown copies of respondent judge’s decision inthe criminal cases, both still unsigned, dismissing thecomplaints against the accused. She was told that respondentjudge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as sheremits the amount demanded. Complainant, however, did notaccede to respondent’s demand because she believed that she hada very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminalcases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge.

Held:We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to

the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be theembodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Theexacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designedto promote public confidence in the integrity and impartialityof the judiciary because the people’s confidence in thejudicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legalknowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, butalso on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightnessthey are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomesthe transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, heplaces his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for thelaw and impairs public confidence in the integrity andimpartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore

paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in theperformance of his duties and his daily life, be free from anyappearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.

Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff totalk with complainant and show copies of his draft decisions,and his act of meeting with litigants outside the officepremises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicialconduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. Theyconstitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140of the Revised Rules of Court

DIMATULAC V. VILLONNote: I’ll skip the facts because its exhaustingly long and complicated (recall: Kenjie’s

40page case. Haha. Note, there are actually a lot of respondents but only Villon isrelated to us). Basically, there was denial of due process.

Judge Villon --- Acting with deliberate dispatch, set the dateof arraignment without even perusing the records (otherwise hewould’ve known among others, that there was a motion to deferproceedings because of an appeal pending in the DOG, there wasan order giving petitioners 10days to file a petition with theCA, the filing of such petition, order of the CA directingrespondent accused to comment on the petition to show cause whythe application for a write of preliminary injunction shouldnot be granted…etc.,).

All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind acautious attitude as these were unmistakable indicia of theprobability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment beprecipitately held. While it may be true that he was not boundto await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal his judicialinstinct should have led him to peruse the documents toinitially determine if indeed murder was the offense committed;or, he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure aresolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given thetotality of circumstances, judge Villon should not have merelyacquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.

IMPORTANT: The judge "should always be imbued with ahigh sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his



obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." Hemust view himself as a priest, for the administration ofjustice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the samedevotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacredceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render servicewith impartiality commensurate with the public trust andconfidence reposed in him. Although the determination of acriminal case before a judge lies within his exclusivejurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered,but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. Thejudge's action must not impair the substantial rights of theaccused, nor the right of the State and offended party to dueprocess of law.

CANON 2

FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY

Facts:Despite the lapse of more than 10years, respondent judge

failed to render judgment in the case were complainant wascounsel to plaintiff. After Hamoy was transferred, complainantlearned he brought the records of the case to his new station.Hamoy’s excuse was that his utility aid mixed the records upand because the dockets were congested with so many family-cases his court being the only family court in the area. Healso failed to comply with the directives of the OCA. Also, hewas able to collect his salary when he claimed in hiscertification that he had no pending cases.

Held:Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from liability for

the inefficiency of his court personnel. Judges are chargedwith the administrative responsibility of organizing andsupervising his court personnel to secure the prompt andefficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times theobservance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

More importantly, judges have a duty to decide theircases within the reglementary period. On meritorious grounds,they may ask for additional time. It must be stressed,however, that their application for extension must be filedbefore the expiration of the prescribed period. Upon histransfer to another post, respondent Judge should have askedthe permission of the Court Administrator to bring the recordsof the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised theparties of his action with respect thereto.

Furthermore, respondent Judge should be held liable forhis failure to obey directives from this Court and the CourtAdministrator. Needless to say, judges should respect theorders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more so thisCourt from which all other courts should take their bearings

In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than acardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Respondent Judge must bearin mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded ofjudges are designed to promote public confidence in theintegrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribedperiod but collects his salary upon a false certificate isguilty of dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct and deservesthe condemnation of all right thinking men. In view of theprimordial role of judges in the administration of justice,only those with irreproachable integrity and probity must beentrusted with judicial powers.

DAWA V. DE ASA

Facts:Presiding judge Armando de Asa was charged with sexual

harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness by Floride Dawa,Femenina Lazaro-Barreto and Noraliz Jorgensen. Dawa andBarreto were employed as stenographic reporters while Jorgensenwas a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of CaloocanCity and detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court. Theycharged de Asa for allegedly forcing himself on them andkissing them on the lips.



Issue: Whether de Asa violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial

Ethics

Ruling. Yes.Canon 2 provides that a judge should avoid impropriety

and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. He shouldbehave at all times as to promote public confidence in theintegrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is thereforeparamount that a judge's personal behavior, both in theperformance of his duties and in his daily life, be free fromthe appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.

In the present case, the Court found totallyunacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in subjectingherein complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcomesexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do theactions of respondent judge fall short of the exactingstandards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance ofsatisfying the standards of decency even of society at large.His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affrontto women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment becausethey necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, oroffensive environment for the employees. Let it be rememberedthat respondent has moral ascendancy and authority overcomplainants, who are mere employees of the court of which heis an officer. The Court concludes with moral certainty thathe acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and proprietyand violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not aplace for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants hisremoval from office.

IN RE JUDGE MARCOS

Facts:Two complaints were filed by Romeo T. Zacarias and a

concerned citizen of Gerona, Tarlac. These Complaints

identically charged Judge Martonino R. Marcos (Formerly of theMunicipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City) andClerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5th Municipal CircuitTrial Court of Gerona, Tarlac) with immoral conduct and illegalsolicitation from litigants. Zacarias alleged that, on twooccasions, Judge Marcos and Visaya tried to extort money fromhim in exchange for a favorable decision in a criminal caseagainst Zacarias and for his provisional release. He furtheralleged that upon some inquiries, he was informed that therespondent Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe moneyand that the respondents are engaged in an illicit love affairwhich is common knowledge to municipal and court personnel andas well as to the people of Gerona.

Issue: Whether respondents violated the Code of Judicial

Conduct

Ruling: Yes.The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate

“should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety inall activities” and “should be the embodiment of competence,integrity and independence.” Since appearance and reality fusein the performance of judicial functions, the judge -- likeCaesar’s wife -- must not only be pure, but also be beyondsuspicion. the actions of respondent judge were not free fromall appearances of impropriety. His conduct lacked themeticulous care expected of one ever mindful of the image ofthe judiciary that one portrays. It is the kind of behaviorfor which he must be administratively dealt with, as it erodespublic confidence in the judicial system.

As to respondent clerk, we find that she was equallyremiss in the performance of her duties. By her own admission,she required complainant to post the cash bond, even though shehad not been instructed to do so by respondent judge. Shethereby arrogated judicial power unto herself. Thedetermination of whether to require a cash bond, like the



approval of bail or the release of the accused, is purely ajudicial function. It was certainly not among the mandatedduties of respondent clerk. It has been stressed that theconduct and behavior of everyone charged with the dispensationof justice is circumscribed by the trust and confidence reposedin a public office. The image of a court of justice isnecessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, ofthe men and women who work therein, from the judge to thelowliest clerk.

LACHICA V. FLORDELIZA

Facts:Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of

Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, charged the respondent, JudgeRolando A. Flordeliza of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ofJose Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse ofjudicial position and intimidation, for allegedly compellingher to sign a death certificate even though she was not theattending physician. According to Lachica, during a party,Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk at that time, threatened tofile an administrative case against her if she will refuse tosign the death certificate.

Issue: Whether respondent-judge is guilty as charged of abuse

of judicial position and intimidation amounting to violation ofthe Code of Judicial Conduct

Ruling: Yes. A judge’s official conduct should be free from the

appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not onlyupon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, butalso in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.”

From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence onrecord, this Court is convinced that the charge of misconductagainst the respondent judge has been established bysubstantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in

administrative cases. His undue interest in having complainantsign the Death Certificate is highly questionable, to say theleast. Further, his inebriated demeanor and incoherentbehavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness isreprehensible in a judge and should be subjected todisciplinary action. Respondent was FINED in the amount of TENTHOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, with a stern warning that arepetition of the same or similar acts in the future will bedealt with more severely.

SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN V. JAVELLANA

Facts:Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S.

Javellana, acting presiding judge of the RTC of San CarlosCity, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in the performance ofofficial duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. Thecomplaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons Group, Inc., againstRomeo Tan before the San Carlos City RTC. Complainant averredthat there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment inthe criminal case, the decision, that had acquitted the accusedRomeo Tan, having been rendered only on the tenth month afterthe case was submitted for decision. Respondent judge was alsocited for impropriety by complainant because he was often seenwith Attorney Vic Agravante, counsel for the accused, whosevehicle respondent judge would even use at times.

Issue: Whether Judge Javellana violated Canon 2 of the Code of

Judicial Ethics

Ruling: Yes.The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the

part of respondent judge in his close association with acounsel for a litigant.



The Court shares the view and disquisition of theHonorable Justice. Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent inassociating with litigants and counsel appearing before them soas to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias orpartiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges shouldlive in retirement or seclusion from any socialintercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, thatthey continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relateto members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in suchfields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with thenoble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pendingor prospective litigations before them, however, judges shouldbe scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend toawaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundryrelations could influence their objectivity, for not only mustjudges possess proficiency in law but that also they must actand behave in such manner that would assure, with greatcomfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence,integrity and independence. The respondent was ADMONISHED toconstantly be circumspect in his conduct and dealings withlawyers who have pending cases before him.

SAMSON V. CABALLERO

Facts:This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and

falsification of a public document against respondent JudgeVirgilio G. Caballero. Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged thatrespondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have beenappointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutionalqualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity andindependence, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial andBar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination anyapplicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.

According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBCinterviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pendingadministrative charges against him. She disclosed that, onbehalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc.,

she had filed criminal and administrative charges for graveabuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest ofthe service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised PenalCode against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July23, 2003.

At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedlycommitted certain improprieties and exceeded his powers byoverruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation heconducted.

Issue: Whether respondent violated the Code of Judicial Ethics

Ruling: Yes. Since membership in the bar is an integral

qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness ofa judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judgewho disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violateshis oath as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondent’sdishonest act was against the lawyer’s oath to “do nofalsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.”

It cannot be denied that respondent’s dishonesty did notonly affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moralcharacter in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continuein the practice of law. Possession of good moral character isnot only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also acontinuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practiceof law is to remain an honorable profession and attain itsbasic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not onlymaster its tenets and principles but should also accordcontinuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moralcharacter is of much greater import, as far as the generalpublic is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Thefirst step towards the successful implementation of the Court’srelentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfitmembers, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition ofa rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court isextraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible



representation of the law, they should set a good example tothe bench, bar and students of the law. The standard ofintegrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than thatof the average person for it is their integrity that gives themthe right to judge.

Respondent was DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll ofAttorneys.

CANON 3

DIMO REALTY V. DIMACULANGAN

Facts:Leonardo P. Dimaculangan, respondent, filed with the

Regional Trial Court a complaint for specific performanceagainst Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. (Dimo Realty) andspouses Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon, petitioners. Thecomplaint alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968, petitionersengaged the services of respondent as geodetic surveyor tosubdivide (into subdivision lots) 2 parcels of land situated inBarrio Namuco, Rosario, Batangas. As payment for respondent’sservices, petitioner agreed to give him 1 subdivision lot atVilla Luz Subdivision and pay him P9,200.00 in cash. After thecompletion of respondent’s work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00in installments and delivered to him possession of the lot.However, despite respondent’s demands, petitioners failed todeliver the title of the lot, prompting him to file with theRTC a complaint for specific performance and damages. The trialcourt issued an order dismissing the complaint for impropervenue. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration withmotion for inhibition alleging partiality on the part of thepresiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago. CA denied the motionfor inhibition.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in denying the motion forinhibition

Ruling: No. Suffice it to state that whether judges should

inhibit themselves from a case rests on their own "sounddiscretion." Otherwise stated, inhibition partakes ofvoluntariness on the part of the judges themselves. This Courthas to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicativeof arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be brandedthe stigma of being biased or partial. In a catena of cases, weheld that "bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasonsfor the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved withclear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partialityand prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be presumed,especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judgeswhose oaths of office require them to administer justicewithout respect to person and to do equal right to the poor andthe rich." Here, petitioners merely alleged the arbitraryissuance of a temporary restraining order without howevershowing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. Infact, the Court of Appeals held that "such error of therespondent judge does not necessarily warrant his inhibition inthe case."

PIMENTEL V. SALANGA

Facts:Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari

and/or prohibition is the right of respondent judge of theCourt of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit injudgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorney,appears as counsel.

Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he iscomplainant in an administrative case he himself lodged in thisCourt on May 12, 1967, against respondent judge upon avermentsof "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality,ignorance of the law and incompetence."



Petitioner moved in the court below to have respondentjudge disqualify himself from sitting in Civil Case 21-C,Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470 aforesaid.He there prayed that the records of those cases be transferredto another sala.

Respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stoodhis ground with the statement that the administrative complaintagainst him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules ofCourt

Issue: Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations inwhich counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversaryin an administrative case said counsel lodged against him? NO.

Held:Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for

disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and underwhich he should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never beeninterpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself, in the absence ofany challenge by either party, due to his close blood relationshipwith counsel for one of said parties. Considering the spirit ofthe Rule, it would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good,sound and/or ethical grounds, is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge andthe official who is empowered to act upon the request for suchinhibition.

The exercise of sound discretion — mentioned in the rule —has reference exclusively to a situation where a judgedisqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case.7 For,the permissive authority given a judge in the second paragraphof Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the matter ofdisqualification, not otherwise. Better stated yet, when ajudge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legallydisqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, therule remains as it has been — he has to continue with the case.A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer forgrounds other than those specified in the first paragraph ofSection 1, Rule 137.

This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closedto a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fairand impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice,we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in theinterest of justice.

Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial anddecision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are notlicensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make aspeculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Courtto tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simplybecause counsel for a party litigant happens to complainagainst him. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then,as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.

In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondentjudge is not legally under obligation to disqualify himself, wemay not, on certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting,trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned

MONTEMAYOR V. BERMEJO(The RULING portion is kind of lengthy because I think the refutation of the Court for

every misconduct alleged is important. )

Facts:Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge failed

to decide the case within the period provided under Section 11,Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court).

Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the CourtAdministrator (OCA) the instant Administrative Complaintcharging Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence andinefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law,gross misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the bestinterest of the service.Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three Motions forExecution and two Motions to Require Defendant’s Counsel toInform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment.

Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo preventedthe transmittal of the records of the case to the appellatecourt within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal in



violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.According to him, it was only after the respondent Judgereceived the defendant’s supersedeas bond that the formerissued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerkof Court to transmit the records of the case to the appellatecourt.

The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable fordelay in the rendition of judgment. In essence, he argues thatsince the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution wasissued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment onOctober 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day period.

Issue:Is the respondent judge guilty of delaying rendition of

judgment and violating the Code of Judicial Ethics? YES.

Held:The reckoning point from which the mandatory period for

rendition of judgment should be computed is the receipt of thelast affidavits and position papers of the parties, or theexpiration of the period for filing the same, as provided bythe Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the judgedeeming the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning pointis fixed by law, not by the judge. A judge cannot by himselfchoose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond thatauthorized by the law.

The records do not reveal when the parties receivedJudge Bermejo’s Order requiring them to submit their respectiveaffidavits and position papers. Assuming, however, that thecourt received the defendant’s Position Paper on August 14,2002, as respondent Judge claims, judgment should have beenrendered on September 13, 2002. Instead, the decision was datedOctober 10, 2002, or nearly a month after the lapse of themandatory period for rendition of judgment and almost twomonths from the receipt of the defendant’s Position Paper.Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay and, thus,administratively liable.

Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requiresjudges to administer justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of thesame Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’sbusiness promptly and decide cases within the required periods.The failure to decide a case within the required period is notexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency and is a ground forthe imposition of administrative sanctions against thedefaulting judge.

The respondent Judge, however, can only offer feebleexcuses for his inaction on the plaintiffs’ Motions forExecution. He claims that the first Motion for Execution prayedthat hearing be set on a date that was not a motion day. JudgeBermejo forgets that while the Rules of Court requires allmotions to be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or ifFriday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the nextworking day, the same Rules provides an exception for motionsrequiring immediate action. Perhaps, as a judgment in favor ofthe plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer case is immediatelyexecutory, the plaintiffs believed that their motion came underthe exception. However, if the respondent Judge did not sharethis view, he could have simply set the motion for hearing onthe next motion day. Instead, he untenably ignored the motion.

Judge Bermejo also rationalizes his failure to act onthe motion on the ground that there was no proof yet that thedefendant’s counsel had received notice of the Judgment.

The plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Executionalmost two months later on December 12, 2002. The fact that theregistry receipts of the service of judgment had not yetreturned at this point would have been cause for apprehensionfor any responsible judge. Yet Judge Bermejo has not conveyedany semblance of anxiety. He did not inquire from, nor inform,the Clerk of Court about the absence of the receipts two monthsafter copies of the Judgment were sent to the parties. Instead,he found the lack of registry receipts a convenient reason fortarrying on the motion.

These circumstances may lead a sophisticated mind toconclude one of two things.



One, the registry receipts are indeed missing from therecords but Judge Bermejo is denying it to cover up such loss.This conclusion is buttressed by the odd fact that, despite theseriousness of Dr. Montemayor’s allegations, the respondentJudge has not offered in these administrative proceedings anyevidence of the existence of the registry receipts. An obviousdisregard of keeping records is evidence of incompetence andlack of professionalism.

A judge is charged with exercising extra care inensuring that the records of the cases and official documentsin his custody are intact. There is no justification formissing records save fortuitous events.

Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registryreturn receipts, in which case, he is not only guilty ofdragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse,bias in favor of the defendant.

Other circumstances support the theory of bias. JudgeBermejo provides a flimsy justification for his inaction on Dr.Montemayor’s Second Motion for Execution. According to therespondent Judge, the court was undertaking its semestralinventory when the motion was filed. Even if the Court were toadmit the adequacy of this obvious pretext, Judge Bermejo, atthe very least, should have set the motion for hearing on thenext motion day after the inventory. But again, he disregardedthe second motion.

Next, under Section 19, Rule 70, supra, in case thedefendant does not file any supersedeas bond or did not makeany monthly deposit, the plaintiff would be entitled as amatter of right to the immediate execution of the inferiorcourt’s judgment. In such a case the execution is mandatory.

However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creatingthe many delays in obvious disregard of the letter and thespirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary Procedure,Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It bearsreminding him that a judge must at all times not only beimpartial but maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus,under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge shouldavoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all

activities. Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judgeshould so behave at all times as to promote public confidencein the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Theappearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to publicconfidence and the administration of justice as actual bias orprejudice.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O.Bermejo, Jr. of delay in the rendition of judgment in violationof Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct forwhich he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge isalso declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 ofsaid Code and is fined the amount of P10,000.00.

OKTUBRE V. VELASCO

FACTS:Oktubre is the administrator of Paler Building, owned by

Peggy D’Arcy. D’Arcy is the aunt-in-law of Judge Velasco. Shortly after Velasco’s appointment to the MTC of

Maasin, he asked D’Arcy if he could reside at the PalerBuilding. He was initially allowed by D’Arcy however when hesought an extension to stay thereat he was denied by D’Arcy.Nevertheless, Judge Velasco was able to stay in the buildingalbeit in another room.

Judge Velasco then sent letters to the tenants of thebuilding declaring that he was the lawful owner of the buildingand all rentals should be deposited by them at his office inthe MTC. He also sent a strongly worded letter using the MTC’sletterhead to D’Arcy asserting possession over the building.

Judge Velasco caused the removal of the building’sservice jeep from its garage. D’Arcy then instructed Oktubre toreplace the vehicle in the building and to take measures toensure that the removal would not be repeated. Oktubresuccessfully replaced the vehicle and removed one of its wheelsand put it inside the computer room of the building.

Thereafter, Judge Velasco caused the destruction andreplacement of the padlock to Oktubre’s room and the accessgate to the third floor of the building.



Oktubre then filed a complaint against the judge in thePunong Baranggay. Conciliation proceedings failed.

After the hearing, Oktubre was asked by a police officerto come with him to the station at the chief’s request. Uponarrival, he was confronted with an arrest warrant signed underauthority by Judge Velasco in connection with the allegedrobbery of the jeepney’s wheel and he was put behind barspursuant thereto.

After obtaining his release he was again filed suit formalicious mischief and falsification of documents again byJudge Velasco. All the complaints were supported by the soleaffidavit of Judge Velasco which he prosecuted using hisOffice.

ISSUE:Whether or not Judge Velasco is guilty of grave

misconduct, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of thelaw.

RULING:

Respondent Judge is Liable for Grave Misconduct andGrave Abuse of Authority.

Note Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of Code of Judicial Conduct andRule 3.12 of the same code. For inappropriately using hisOffice’s letterhead and for acting on his own criminalcomplaints against complainant and D’Arcy, respondent Judgeviolated these rules. Thus, he is liable for grave misconduct[and grave abuse of authority.

On Respondent Judge’s failure to Recuse Himself from HisCriminal Complaints. Note the principle that no judge shouldpreside in a case in which he is not wholly free,disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should nothandle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptibleto bias and partiality. The rule is intended to preserve thepeople’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he cancompetently construe and enforce the law. However, it is more

important that he should act and behave in such a manner thatthe parties before him have confidence in hisimpartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mereappearance of partiality is proscribed.

Here, although he is the complainant in the threecriminal complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualifyhimself from the cases. Worse, he even issued a warrant ofarrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest anddetention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judgeviolated Rule 3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137,which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. Tobe sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any ofthe instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as theprovision itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive.More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sittingin a case where he is related to a party or to counsel withinthe sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity,respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judgefrom doing so in cases where he is a party. Indeed, the ideathat a judge can preside over his own case is anathema to thenotion of impartiality that such was no longer included in theenumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.

Respondent Judge’s subsequent inhibition from the threecases does not detract from his culpability for he should nothave taken cognizance of the cases in the first place. The evilthat the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is thedenial of a party of his right to due process. This became faitaccompli when respondent Judge refused to abide by such rule.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco,Presiding Judge of the Municipal TrialCourt, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct,Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority forviolation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.12 of the Code of JudicialConduct. He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture ofretirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in anybranch of the government or any of its agencies orinstrumentalities, including government owned or controlled



corporations. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves duehim as of this date.

SANDOVAL V. CA

Facts:It appears that an impostor succeeded in selling

property lawfully titled in another’s name by misrepresentinghimself as the latter. The lower court ruled in favor of theoriginal owner and nullified the deed of sale in favor of thebuyer who claims to be a purchaser in good faith. CA affirmed.

[…]Hence, this petition for review where Juan C. Sandoval

prays for the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision. Twoissues are presented for resolution. First, petitionercontends that he was denied due process when the ponente of thedecision in the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did notinhibit himself from the case inasmuch as he was, for a time,the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the case. Second,petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for valuewho should not be held accountable for the fraud committedagainst private respondent Tan, Jr.

Issue:Whether or not the Justice who penned the assailed

decision in the Court of Appeals should have inhibited himselffrom taking part in the case.

Held:In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal

reason for inhibition.”A judge’s conduct should be above reproach and in the

discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious,studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just,impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless ofprivate influence should administer justice according to lawand should deal with the patronage of the position as a publictrust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private

interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performanceof his office.”

From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basisfor Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case. To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided partly over thecase below, heard part of plaintiff’s evidence and ruled onmotions. The decision itself, however, was penned by anotherjudge, the Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took over as presidingjudge when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted. Upon elevationto the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to JusticeVictor as ponente.

The principle that approximates the situation obtainingherein is the disqualification of a judge from deciding a casewhere his “ruling in a lower court is the subject of review” or“in which he has presided in any inferior court when his rulingor decision is the subject of review.” Granted that JusticeVictor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his wasnot the pen that finally rendered the decision therein. Hence,he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where hehad to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit himself fromthe case.

Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been moreprudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owingto his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has heldthat a judge should not handle a case in which he might beperceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias andpartiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promotepublic confidence in the integrity and respect for thejudiciary. While he is not legally required to decline fromtaking part in the case, it is our considered view that hisactive participation in the case below constitutes a “just orvalid reason,” under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him tovoluntarily inhibit himself from the case.

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ V. JUSTICE DICDICAN

Facts:



This is an administrative complaint against JusticeDicdican filed by Ma. Asparen, a party to a case involving St.Mary Mazzarello School. In that case, the school imposeddisciplinary sanctions on Ms. Asparen but the same was liftedby Hon. Elumba, judge of the Trial Court. The respondentjustice of the CA issued a TRO.

So complainant here sought the inhibition of respondentfrom the case on the ground that the latter had previouslyrepresented various religious organizations during his practicein law and the petitioner in this case is run by a religiousorganization.

Respondent denied that such circumstance affected hisimpartiality in the case but he nevertheless inhibited himself.

Despite such inhibition, it was still alleged thatJustice still appeared as one of the signatories of aresolution dated Nov. 21, 2006 of the CA admitting thememorandum of the petitioner school and which deemed thepetition as submitted for resolution.

Complainant alleged that respondent justice’s actionsshowed his manifest bias and prejudice against his client inthe case. Respondent Justice however, was able to show that nodocument was forwarded to him when he inhibited from the case.It was also shown that another Justice took over the same. Itwas also shown that his inclusion as a signatory was a meremistake by the stenographer as shown by the letter of apology.

Held:Complaint was devoid of merit. In administrative

proceedings, burden of proof is upon complainant. Ifcomplainant fails to do so, respondent is under no obligationto prove his defense.

In the present case, the complainant failed tosubstantiate his imputations of impropriety and partialityagainst respondent justice. He failed to present any otherevidence to prove his charges.

A party’s remedy if prejudiced by the orders of amagistrate lies with the proper reviewing court, not with theoffice of the court administrator by means of an administrative

complaint. When some other judicial means is available, anadministrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy forevery act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.

CANON 4

J. KING & SONS COMPANY V. JUDGE HONTANOSAS

Facts:Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case

pending before the RTC presided over by respondent. Respondentissued an Order granting the application for writ ofpreliminary attachment. An urgent motion to discharge and liftwrit of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants beforethe respondent and on the same day, respondent issued an Orderlifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order wasissued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rulesof Civil Procedure. Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding company’s Supreme CourtClearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of thebonding company had a deficiency. At a meeting in his house,respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to payP250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will bereconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filedby complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the karaokemusic lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant,and he uses said facilities "gratis et amore."

Held:We agree with the Investigating Justice’s finding that

respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for notholding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachmentand for violating the three-day notice rule.

Respondent acted with indecent haste in immediatelyholding a hearing on the motion to lift attachment filed only afew minutes before said hearing, in considering the samesubmitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting thewrit of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond,



all on the same day without giving complainant the opportunityto be heard on the matter.

It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be heldto account or answer criminally, civilly or administrativelyfor an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in goodfaith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption.However, it has also been held that when the law violated iselementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action. Theprinciples of due notice and hearing are so basic thatrespondent’s inability to accord a litigant their right theretocannot be excused. In this case, we believe that respondent’sactuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we findrespondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violatingthe three-day notice rule and failing to give hereincomplainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard on thematter

As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond,respondent utterly failed to exercise due care in examining thesupporting papers. The respondent should know the basicrequirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bondsuch as counter-bond.

It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meetwith a litigant at his home and to frequent the karaoke barowned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free.Respondent thereby received benefits from a litigant appearingin his court. Respondent’s defense that his wife offered to paybut the management of the karaoke bar did not allow her to doso, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said bar arequite clear that respondent’s wife would sign the order slips,but no payment was ever given by respondent or his wife.Respondent should have insisted on paying, especiallyconsidering that complainant has a total of three cases pendingbefore his court. By entertaining a litigant in his home andreceiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent miserablyfailed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.

Insistence on personal integrity and honesty asindispensable qualifications for judicial office reflect anawareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the

damage that can be done to the legal order by judicialcorruption.

CENTRUM AGRI-BUSINESS REALTY CORP V. JUDGE BETHEL KATALBAS-MOSCARDON

Facts:Petitioner Centrum filed a complaint with the MTCC for

ejectment of several stores leasing its building (JVLSBuilding). Centrum bought this property from JVLS Co. Inc., butthe tenants refused to pay rent to Centrum (These tenants onthe other hand sued JVLS to enforce their right of firstoption). MTCC ruled for Centrum, ordered the tenants to payrent covering 53 months + interests.

The tenants appealed this decision to RTC whererespondent is the presiding judge. In that appeal, Centrummoved for the execution of the MTCC decision, but respondentrefused. The tenants moved for 30 days within which to filetheir supplemental memorandum, which the judge granted, butlimited the period to 10 days. Centrum urged for the earlyresolution of the case, but the judge said that Centrum’smotion was already moot and academic, but she wanted to givethe tenants a chance to file their memorandum (meaning a rulingwas already made).

The judge on July 13 released the decision in favour ofCentrum, but with different rental rates (higher, in favour ofCentrum). This decision was dated June 15.

In the present administrative case against respondentjudge, Centrum charged her with 1. Corrupt acts and practices,gross dishonesty, serious misconduct; 2. Knowingly rendering anunjust interlocutory order; 3. Gross ignorance of the law.

Centrum states that not only were the amounts in thedecision substantially increased, it also disclosed that it hadreceived a duplicate copy of the decision even before it waspromulgated, signed by the respondent. Judge claimed she wasinnocent and had no idea how Centrum got a copy. Centrum alsoalleges that the judge unjustly denied its motion forexecution.



Held:Respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and is

dismissed from office.Although there is no proof of how Centrum obtained a

copy of the decision even before its promulgation, the fact isthat a copy was obtained by it and this is highly irregular.Since the judge is ultimately responsible for the safekeepingof her papers, the burden of accounting is on her.(judge claims that her stenographer was at fault)

This was not merely a simple case of breach ofconfidentiality, but evidence suggests a scheme to extort moneyfrom Centrum.

There was a negotiation between the Judge and Centrum,as admitted by the latter’s counsel. Why Centrum filed thiscase against the judge appears to be that the decision,although it was completed as of June 15, was not promulgateduntil after nearly a month, leading Centrum to fear thatrespondent judge would welsh on her undertaking to increase theawards in its favour.

On rendering an unjust interlocutory order and grossignorance of the law, the court finds the judge’s errors inthis case to be grossly inexcusable. The judge violated certainprovisions in the rules of court applicable to ejectmentproceedings.

RIZALINA CAPCO-UMALI V. PAULITA ACOSTA-VILLARANTE

Facts:Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (petitioner) charged Judge

Paulita Acosta-Villarante (respondent) with violation of Canon4.

The petitioner and other judges made a courtesy call tothe Mayor of Mandaluyong and they talked about local allowanceof judges. The Mayor noticed the disparity in the amountsreceived (respondent was receiving more, compared to petitionerand other judges). So the Mayor ordered that the allowancereceived by respondent be reverted to the previous rates.

During the first ever monthly meetingof RTC judges, whathappened in the courtesy call was reported. Angered,respondent yelled accusations of paninira at the Executivejudge (she was there during the courtesy call and was presidingover the meeting). Petitioner, also present at the meeting,felt that she had to rescue the executive judge and explainedwhat happened. This time, respondent yelled at petitioner,called her sinungaling and told petitioner to stop talkingbecause “nakakahiwa boses mo.” Petitioner yelled back,“matanda ka na, malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ngganyan, madadamay pa kami,” to which the respondent answeredthat she was ready to die any moment because she did no wrong.Basically, they had a screaming match until they were pacified.

Judge Villarante then wrote a Memorandum addressed toExecutive Judge of the Mandaluyong RTC, copies of which werefurnished to the Justices of the SC, JBC, other judges ofMandaluyong, its Congressman, and prosecutor. The memosuggested that the holding of monthly meeting of judges besuspended, considering what transpired. Petitioner filed acomplaint for libel based on the memorandum. In causing thecirculation of the memorandum, respondent claimed that it washer obligation to bring to the attention of concerned officialsthe personal demeanor of petitioner that would put thejudiciary in public scrutiny and disrespect.

Held:Both judges are fined (11,000 for petitioner, 16,000 for

respondent) and given a stern warning for having violated Sec1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

Courts are looked upon by the people with highrespect. Misbehavior by judges and employees necessarilydiminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding isa disgraceful occurrence reflecting adversely on the image ofthe Judiciary. By fighting, respondent judges failed to observethe proper decorum expected of members of the Judiciary. Moredetestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mereallowance coming from the local government.



The behaviour of both parties was very unbecoming. JudgeCapco-Umali failed to live up to the standard ofpropriety required of judges. While she might have beenprovoked by Judge Acosta-Villarante’s referral to her as aliar, she should have maintained her composure instead ofshouting back at a fellow judge. She should have exercisedself-restraint instead of reacting in such a very inappropriatemanner.

Judge Acosta-Villarante should also be required toanswer for her failure to observe the basic norm of proprietydemanded from a judge. She provoked petitioner by calling hersinungaling. She should have been more cautious in choosing herwords. She also repeated the uncalled for conduct when shewrote the memorandum and caused its circulation. If indeed thememorandum was produced strictly to allow the parties to cooloff and avoid a repetition of the incident, there was no needto mention the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali duringthe meeting. The memorandum was thus written as a medium forretaliation against Judge Capco-Umali.

BINALAY V. LELINA, JR.

Facts: Complainant Atty. Binalay filed this administrative case

against Judge Lelina, Jr. for violating Rule 138 of the Rulesof Court and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct (bothare with regard to prohibition on judges in the privatepractice of law).

Respondent judge is preventively suspended for beingcharged with rape, abduction with rape and slight illegaldetention. While still under suspension, the judge filed amanifestation for the court to grant him the permission topractice law during the remainder of his preventive suspension,or if such cannot be granted, to consider him resigned from thejudiciary.

It turned out, however, that even before he filed thismanifestation, he had already engaged in the private practiceof law representing 2 persons in a criminal case, and one in a

civil case, all of which are still pending. All pleadings inthose cases were signed by him, as a partner of the BartolomeLelina Calimag Densing & Associates Law Offices.

In the meantime, the office of court administratordirected respondent to desist from engaging in the practice oflaw pending the court’s resolution of his manifestation.

In his comment, the judge argues that the prohibition toengage in practice of law applies only to judges who are in theactive service and should not cover those under suspension. Healso said he was forced to practice law due to his impoverishedlife and because of the continuing sufferings of his wife andchildren.

Held:Judge is suspended and sternly warned. By being merely suspended, judge remains to bound by the

prohibition to practice law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos ditinguiredebemos. Law does not make a distinction between a suspendedjudge and an active judge. The fact that he tried to secure anauthorization to engage in the practice of law only shows thathe is aware of the prohibition.

Moreover, he should not permit the law firm to stillcarry his name. By allowing the firm to do so, he held himselfin public as a lawyer, in violation of the rules and norms ofjudicial ethics.

CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN V. PRESIDING JUDGE PORNILLOS(Judge dismissed for borrowing money from lawyers with pending

cases before her)

Facts:Complainants charged Judge Pornillos for, among others,

the violation of the Canons of Judicial Conduct for borrowingmoney from her staff and lawyers in amounts ranging from P500-P5k. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made aninvestigation and found that such attaches no administrativeliability (since they were already paid or waived by thecreditors and were obtained 19 years ago).



Issue: W/N Judge Pornillos should be held administratively

liable.

Held: Yes. Judge Pornillos was dismissed from the service for

gross misconduct (aggravated by undue delay in renderingdecisions and violation of SC rules). Under the Uniform Ruleson Administrative Cases in the Civil service, borrowing moneyby superior officers from subordinates is a violationpunishable by reprimand, suspension, and dismissal fromservice. At the very least, she should be admonished fordealing with her subordinates in an improper manner.

More severely prohibited is borrowing money or propertyfrom lawyers and litigants in case pending before the court (aserious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of ROC). Under Canon 5of the Code of Judicial Conduct (the old one), a judge shallrefrain from financial and business dealings that tend toreflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere withthe proper performance of judicial activities, or increaseinvolvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before thecourt.

LIHAYLIHAY V. JUDGE ALEJANDRO CANDA

Facts:Petitioner filed a complaint against Judge Canda for the

ff. acts:Threatening her through text message that she would be introuble (because he thought she was supporting an applicant forsheriff which he opposed)Filing admin. complaints and criminal cases to harass her

Describing her as a GRO, undignified, a whore,disgusting, repulsive, pakialamera, offensive, etc. (in aletter he wrote to the Executive Judge after he found out shead him blotted with the police because of the text threat)Publishing such remarks in a newspaper

Issue: W/N Judge Canda is guilty of gross misconduct

Held:Yes. Sec. 2, Canon 4: As a subject of constant public

scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that mightbe viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen…in particular,judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistentwith the dignity of the judicial office.

Sec. 6, Canon 4: Judges are entitled to freedom ofexpression, but in exercising such right, they shall alwaysconduct themselves in a manner as to preserve the dignity ofthe judicial office.

The acts committed by Judge Canda are unbecoming of ajudge, and these subjected the judiciary to embarrassment. Hewas fined and was given a stern warning.

IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF LOUIS BIRAOGO

Facts:The Supreme Court, en banc, continued its deliberations

on the draft of Justice Ruben Reyes in 3 consolidated cases(Limkaichong case). Since there was no further objection, theEn Banc approved it. Being printed on Gilbert paper, JusticeReyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the samesession. However, they decided to withhold the promulgation ofthe Gilbert copy because 9 justices wanted to concur only inthe result (if the majority concurred only in result, theponencia would have no doctrinal value). They decided to holdoral arguments.

Biraogo, a petitioner in one of the 3 cases, held apress conference and circulated to the media an undated lettersigned by him together with a photocopy of the unpromulgatedponencia. He insinuated that the Court unlawfully and withimproper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.

Since the unauthorized release of the copy infringed onthe confidential deliberations of the SC and constituted



contempt of court, the SC directed an investigation. TheInvestigating Committee found that the leak came from JusticeReyes himself. Hence, he must be liable for grave misconduct.

Issue: W/N Justice Reyes is liable for gross misconduct

Held:YES. He is suspended from the practice of law

indefinitely. The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides thatconfidential information* acquired by justices and judges intheir official capacity shall not be used or disclosed for anyother purposes not related to their judicial duties.

*Information not yet made public concerning the work ofany justice or judge relating to pending cases.

CANONS 5 & 6

REPUBLIC V. CAGUIOAConsolidation of 3 cases against respondent

FACTSCase 1: Judge Caguioa issued a writ of preliminary

injunction against the Republic for the implementation of alaw5 which required the payment of duties and taxes toimporters in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, who formerly had anexemption to such taxes but was subsequently required by virtueof such law. He also granted various ex-parte motions forinterventions of different but similarly situated corporations,and approved an injunction bond of P1M for all the petitioners.These orders were immediately implemented despite the MRs filedby the OSG. The Republic filed administrative cases againstCaguioa for manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law andconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Thiswas acted upon by the OCA and subsequently by the CA, statingthat Caguioa gravely abused his discretion for ordering theissuance of the writ of Preliminary Injunction.

5 RA 9334

Case 2: (Almost similar circumstances, different peopleinvolved) Judge Caguioa issued a writ of preliminary injunctionand a TRO, to enjoin a person from acting as an officer in aGov’t agency. The agency filed administrative cases againstCaguioa for manifest partiality, gross ignorance of the law andconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Case 3: Caguioa ordered a Writ of Execution, after hisorder of dismissal of a case based on prescription. PrivatePetitioner filed a case for Grave Misconduct against Caguioa.The CA saw this as invalid, because the Writ should conform tothe dispositive portion of the decision. The Order of dismissaldid not adjudicate any rights of the parties and resolved noother matter except the dismissal of the case.

The findings of the Investigative Justice of the CA:Case 1: Guilty of gross ignorance of the law + conductprejudicial to the best interest of the service. Evidence onthe Manifest Partiality was insufficient.Case 2: Same as Case 1.Case 3: Guilty of simple misconduct.Penalty: 1-year suspension + Stern Warning.

ISSUE/S: W/N Caguioa is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law,

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service andSimple Misconduct.

HELD: YES! Adopt findings of the CA. Caguioa Dismissed from

service + forfeiture of retirement benefits except leavecredits.

RATIO: Gross Ignorance of the Law

Judge Caguioa issued the Writs of Preliminary Injunctionthat did not satisfy the legal requisites for its issuance, andwhich was enforced outside of his territorial jurisdiction. Inthe former, the applicants of the Writ showed no clear and



unmistakable right that was material and substantial as wouldwarrant the issuance of such Writ, and the of its urgency andnecessity. In short, he issued the Writs without basis.

The requisites for the issuance of the Writ are basicand elementary, and should have been known by Caguoia. Basicrules should be at the palm of their hands. Where the law isbasic, lack of conversance with it, and for transgressing theelementary jurisdictional limits of his court, a judge shouldbe administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.

Not Grave MisconductEven though Caguioa issued the Writs without basis, in

this circumstance, it only amounts to simple misconduct. Forgrave misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained ofshould be corrupt, or with evident bad faith. Such conduct wasnot evident in the case.

DEE C. CHUAN & SONS INC. V. PERALTA

FACTS:Sept 13, 2002: Final order of an unlawful detainer case

in favor of Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. An appeal was filed withPeralta, an RTC Judge.

March 18, 2003: DCCSI filed a "motion to dismiss appealand for issuance of writ of execution" for failure of theappellants to post the required bond and to pay the rentals duein accordance with the decision of the MeTC.

March 21, 2003: Acting on the Motion, Peralta requiredappellants to file their comment.

August 11, 2003, October 20, 2003 and December 3, 2003:DCCSI filed a motion to resolve. However, despite the lapse ofmore than one year, respondent failed and refused to resolvethe pending motions. Complaint thus filed.

When asked by the OCA about the case, Peralta said thatit "ha (d) been resolved by (his) Court and the same (was) already for mailing" andattached a copy of his order dated May 5, 2004. In his order,he dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellants to filetheir memorandum and directed the issuance of a writ of

execution in favor of DCCSI. The OCA, in its report, foundPeralta indeed failed to resolve several motions for more thana year and showed indifference in his comment and recommendedthat he be held liable for inefficiency in the performance ofhis official duties and fined in the amount of P11, 000.

ISSUE/S: W/N Peralta is liable for inefficiency and undue delay

in rendering a decision or order.

HELD: YES! FINED + Sternly Warned.

RATIO:Delivery of Decisions with Reasonable Promptness

The Constitution mandates that all cases or mattersfiled before all lower courts shall be decided or resolvedwithin 90 days from the time the case is submitted fordecision. Peralta ignored this mandate. Failure to complywithin the mandated period constitutes a serious violation ofthe constitutional right of the parties to a speedy dispositionof their cases.

For more than a year, Peralta failed to resolve severalmotions ― the motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writof execution as well as the three motions to resolve, anddidn’t offer any reason or justification on why it took himmore than a year to resolve the motions. He thus violated theNew Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to disposeof the court’s business promptly and decide cases within therequired periods. A judge’s failure to resolve motions andincidents within the prescribed period of three months as grossinefficiency for it undermines the people’s faith andconfidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings itto disrepute.

BACULI V. BELEN

FACTS:



Baculi, a Provincial Prosecutor, filed an Informationagainst a person-accused for frustrated homicide. Belen, a RTCJudge, directed Baculi to submit evidence that the notice ofpreliminary investigation was duly served and received by suchperson. After a series of pleadings filed by Baculi, Belendirected the former why he should not be cited for tempt ofcourt for making unfounded statements in his pleadings. No suchreason was given, thus Belen found Baculi guilty of directcontempt for making scurrilous (vulgar) and contumacious(rebellious) statements in one of the latter's Motions, andsubsequently for indirect contempt. Baculi moved that suchorder be set aside, but was denied by Belen, stating that suchDecisions are final and executory. Therefore, Baculi filed acomplaint against Belen, denying the claims against him, andadded that Belen was induced by revenge because it was Baculiwho indicted him in a previous libel case against him, and thatBelen had a 'power complex'.

ISSUE: W/N Belen is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for

citing Baculi in indirect contempt.

HELD: YES! Suspended for 6 months + Stern warning.

RATIO:Gross Ignorance of the Law

Indirect contempt is any improper conduct tending,directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade theadministration of justice. The scurrilous and contumaciousstatements constitute direct contempt because it is equivalentto misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a courtor judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Butsuch is not the reason for indirect contempt. And even if suchstatements were considered as indirect contempt, Belen did notfollow the proper procedure under the Rules of Court. Thisstrengthens the OCA's findings that Belen is grossly ignorantof basic procedure.

Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign ofincompetence. Basic procedural rules must be at the palm of hishands. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions ofthe Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does notknow the same, and failure to follow basic legal commandsembodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignoranceof the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not ajudge like Belen.

MARIANO V. JUDGE NACIONAL

Facts:This is an administrative complaint for gross

inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of dutyand violation of judicial conduct stemming from an action forejectment.

In the ejectment proceeding, Judge Nacional issued apre-trial order dated Sep. 3, 2004 requiring the parties tofile their respective position papers on Sep. 30, 2004 (w/c theparties complied with). Nacional subsequently issued an orderdated Dec. 28, 2004 requiring parties to submit theirrespective “memoranda in the form of a court decision” whichthe parties complied with. The case was eventually decided byNacional on Feb. 14, 2005.

Complaint alleges that the issuance of the Dec. 28, 2004order violated the prohibition on memoranda by the RevisedRules on Summary Procedure and that Nacional violated the Ruleswhen he decided the case only on Feb. 14, 2005 (136 days fromthe date required by law).

Judge Nacional admits that he exceeded the maximumperiod allowed under the Revised Rules and offered thefollowing excuses: (1) quality of decision had priority overcompliance w/ reglementary pd; (2) heavy caseload; and (3)documents were voluminous.

Issue: W/N Nacional violated basic procedure and code of

judicial conduct?



Held: Yes, he is fined P40K for gross ignorance of the law

and procedure, P20K for violation of Canons 3 & 6 (Code ofJudicial Conduct) and P10K for violations of CPR

The urgency of restoring social order is the paramountconsideration in settling unlawful detainer and forcible entrycases. The necessity of promptly resolving unlawful detainerand forcible entry cases is made more imperative by expressprovisions of the periods of rendition of judgment (30 daysafter receipt of the affidavits and position period, orexpiration of the period for the filing the same – ROC/Rules ofSummary Procedure). Corollarily, Sec 5 of Canon 6 of Code ofJudicial Conduct mandates judges to perform all judicial dutiesefficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Thejustifications advanced by Nacional cannot be accepted becausedoing so will undermine the wisdom behind procedural rules &diminish respect for the law. The judge (by himself) cannotchoose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond thatauthorized by law. If a judge needs more time to decide a case,he should formally request the SC for an extension of thedeadline.

Failure to apply elementary rules of procedureconstitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Lack ofmalice or good faith will not exonerate Nacional because therules violated were basic procedural law. All he had to do wasapply them, but he chose not to. It is settled that one whoaccepts the position of judge owes the public and the court theability o be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain theprofessional competence at all times. Competence and diligenceare prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.(Note: length of service does not mitigate administrativepenalty)

CANEDA V. MENCHAVEZ

Facts:

Complainant Atty. Caneda is counsel for defendantVirginia Guzman, in Civil Case Roberto Borromeo v. Heirs of JuanBorromeo, for judicial partition pending with Judge Mechanvez’ssala.

During the Dec. 14, 2005 hearing of said partition case,the motion to segregate the inheritance shares of one of theplaintiffs, Roberto Borromeo was due to be taken up. During thehearing, the defendants agreed to a partition subject toplaintiff’s withdrawal of a motion for reconsideration it filedbefore the SC to clear one of the areas (subject to partition)of squatters. Because the plaintiff could not withdraw the MRbefore the SC, Atty. Caneda suggested mediation. JudgeMenchavez blurted out “never mind mediation, walay hinundanna.”

When Judge Menchavez checked on the progress of thecase, Atty. Caneda remarked it was being delayed because noproper summons had been served on the defendants who wereresiding outside the country. Menchavez reacted angrily andbanged his gavel & shouted “I said no publication period.”Afterwards, Menchavez slammed the table with his hand and wentinside his chambers. Afterwards, Judge Menchavez came back witha holstered handgun and smashed it on the table, as he angrilyshouted at Atty. Caneda “Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahig ulo!”

Atty. Caneda filed a complaint against Judge Menchavezalleging that the Judge’s act of challenging him inside thecourtroom in the presence of many people was improper

Issue: W/N Judge Menchavez should be held liable

Held: Yes, Judge Menchavez overstepped the norms of propriety

demanded of a member of the bench by losing his cool anduttering intemperate language during the hearing.

In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before ajudge whose role is to hear and consider the submissions, andsubsequently rule on the matter. It is not a situation wheretwo equals, such as the opposing counsels, argue against each



other. Menchavez should have coolly ruled and allowed counselto respond to his ruling instead of proceeding in a manner thatinvited further arguments. Atty. Caneda also erred when hecontinued to argue despite Judge Menchavez’s ruling. However,Menchavez should have directed the complainant to wind up hisarguments under pain of direct contempt if he persisted in hisarguments. Direct contempt is not enforced by the judge’s actof bringing out of his weapon and asking counsel the directquestion “what do you want?” This confrontational manner has noplace in our present justice system. There are agents of thelaw, officers of the court & the police who can be called uponto implement contempt orders & restore order as needed.

Judge Menchavez’s overreacting by bringing out a gun foreveryone present in the court to see, even for purposes ofmaintaining order and decorum in court, is inexcusable in theabsence of overt acts of physical aggression by a party beforethe court. While the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires amagistrate to maintain order and decorum in the court, the Codeitself sets its limits (as provided for by Sec. 6 of Canon 6)wherein the judge himself must observe decorum by acting withdignity and courtesy to all those present in the courtroom.Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient, andcourteous both in conduct and in language.

SUAREZ V. DILAG

Facts:Suarez filed administrative complaints of (a) graft and

corruption against Judge Dilag and Court Stenographer Pascuaand (b) grave misconduct and ignorance of the law against JudgeDilag allegedly for collecting P30K from litigants inconsideration of favorable judgments in cases for annulment ordeclaration of nullity of marriage. Suarez further pointed outthe existence of conflicting decisions rendered by Judge Dilar(Pancho Case, Tomboc Case, del Rosario Case which were allpreviously dismissed but subsequently reopened the case andgranted the petition).

After referral to an investigation officer, the InvestigatingJustice found Judge Dilag liable for (1) gross misconduct forsinging conflicting decisions; (2) gross ignorance of the lawand procedure in handling Moreno and Perez cases; and (3) grossnegligence and inefficiency for failing to administersupervision over his staff when a fake registry return receiptwas effected in Cayabyab Case and entries of judgment wereeffected in Moreno Case & Dinoso v. Corpuz. Pascua was foundguilty of graft and corruption.

Issue: W/N Judge Dilag should be held liable?

Held: Yes, Judge Dilag is dismissed from service, with

forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leavebenefits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointmentto any public office.A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity, andindependence to uphold and maintain public confidence in thelegal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep abreast ofdevelopments in law and jurisprudence, he is presumed to havemore than a cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure (Eg.taking cognizance of a second petition for declaration ofnullity on the ground of psychological incapacity when Dilaghad already dismissed with prejudice the first petitioninvolving the same parties, issues, and causes of action withthat of the first petition). Not every error is indicative ofignorance, for if committed in good faith, no administrativesanction is imposed. Good faith, however, inheres only withinthe parameters of tolerable judgment. It does not apply wherethe issues are so simple and the applicable legal proceduresevident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. Inthe case at bench, Dilag failed to follow basic legalprocedures which are not excusable but renders himadministratively liable for gross ignorance of the law andprocedure (During questioning, Dilag said that re-filing isallowed in a dismissal with or without prejudice. Also, he



deiced a case even before the submission of the City Prosecutorrelative to the investigation to determine collusion betweenthe parties as required under Sec. 9 of the Rule on Declarationof Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of VoidableMarriages)

Dilag was charged with gross ignorance of the law.However, to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law,the error must be so gross and patent as to produce aninference of bad faith. The acts complained of must not only becontrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were alsomotivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Forto hold a judge administratively accountable for ever erroneousorder or decision he renders would be intolerable. In the caseat bar, there was no allegation whatsoever that Dilag wasmotivated by bad faith, malice or corruption when he issued thepremature warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, the Court holdshim administratively liable for his unfamiliarity with therules on the conduct of prelim investigations. Judges should beconversant with basic legal norms and precepts as well as withthe statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to followdevelopments in the law and to apply them. Having accepted theexalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen,the judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to thedignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law.Thus, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to befaithful to the law and be the embodiment of professionalcompetence.


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Legal Ethics Digest