Refocusing the housing debate in developing countries from a pluralist perspective

Habitat International 25 (2001) 191}208

Jorge Hardoy Honorable Mention Paper, 2000

Refocusing the housing debate in developing countries froma pluralist perspective

Ramin Keivani��*, Edmundo Werna�

�Faculty of Built Environment, South Bank University, 202 Wandsworth Road, London SW8 2JZ, UK�Research and Development Unit, Headquaters of the United Nations Volunteers Programme, UK

Abstract

The debate on housing policy in developing countries since the late 1980s has been dominated by theWorld Bank led strategy of developing the housing sector as a whole by enabling primarily formal privatemarkets to work more e$ciently. Yet, the emphasis on private markets has led to the exclusion ofcomplementary and alternative public, co-operative/community based and informal modes of housingprovision from serious policy consideration. This paper argues for the adoption of a more integrated housingpolicy that is based on the recognition and better co-ordination of plurality of provision. Thereby, not onlyallowing further development of speci"c modes in appropriate socio-economic settings but also enabling thecreation of synergies through combining complementary modes in order to overcome their relative weak-nesses, we can boost supply to speci"c target groups. � 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Housing policy; Housing provision; Market enabling strategy

1. Introduction

The need for scaling up housing production in developing countries through all possible meansis now accepted and acknowledged by all policy makers and commentators in this "eld (WorldBank, 1993; UNCHS, 1996a; Tipple, 1994; Okpala, 1992). This has been largely due to theinadequacy of project-based approaches such as sites and services and settlement upgradingprogrammes for low-income housing provision in these countries. It is estimated that in the 10 yrperiod of 1972}1981, for example, the combined output of such project-based programmes wasonly 10% of the actual requirement in developing countries (Burgess, 1992). In its e!orts to devise

*Corresponding author. Fax: #44-20-7815-7350.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Keivani), [email protected] (E. Werna).

0197-3975/01/$ - see front matter � 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.PII: S 0 1 9 7 - 3 9 7 5 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 2 4 - 2

appropriate policies for expanding low-income housing provision the most in#uential interna-tional funding and policy organisation, i.e., the World Bank, and its allied writers have proposedthe adoption of &enabling strategies' for the development of the housing sector as a whole primarilyon the basis of expanding the formal private market mechanism (World Bank, 1993, 1988;Malpezzi, 1994; Dowall, 1992; Pugh, 1995, 1994; La, Nier, Oman, & Reeve, 1987; Cohen, 1983;Linn, 1983). This would be through speci"c policy reforms for adjusting supply and demandconditions and institutional development of the housing markets, particularly housing "nance, inorder to make housing markets more e$cient and eradicate what are deemed to be, largelygovernment imposed, barriers to their expanded activity. Similarly, while UNCHS has moved onto adopt &adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements' in its 1996 Habitat IIconference in Istanbul, enabling strategies for private markets, along similar policy reforms as thatof World Bank, still form the main plank of its shelter policies and recommendations (UNCHS,1996a, b).

The &market enabling strategy' has been subject to criticism by a number of researchers asinappropriate to the context of most developing countries and ignoring the need for expanding therole of informal private land markets and developers (Baken & Van der Linden, 1993; Jones, 1996;Jones & Ward, 1994a, 1995; Durand-Lasserve, 1987; Moavenzadeh, 1987). The informal land andhousing markets are seen by these authors as the most appropriate mode for expanding low-income housing supply in developing countries. This is complemented by a diverse body ofresearchers who have concentrated on developing more speci"c policies for supporting the role ofother sections of the informal sector, such as co-operative and community based initiatives andsubsistent landlords (Vakil, 1996; Me!ert, 1992; Rakodi, 1995; Kumar, 1996).

The main shortcoming of the current debate from the viewpoint of this paper is that in theprocess of advocating their own or making a critique of the views of the opposing camp there hasbeen a tendency to overlook the plurality of provision which must be co-ordinated to the best e!ectdepending on speci"c conditions if one is to achieve the desired result in terms of expandedprovision. It is certainly true that some of the proponents of the &enabling strategy', particularlyUNCHS (1996a, c) have paid much greater attention to the diversity of modes and agents ofhousing provision than the World Bank itself. Nevertheless, the private market is still identi"ed asthe &primary housing delivery mechanism' and forms the backbone of the &shelter for all' policyadopted at the Habitat II conference (UNCHS, 1996a, Clause 63).Moreover, the recommendationsfor action for enabling private markets to work are essentially the same as that proposed by theWorld Bank which are primarily aimed at developing the formal private housing markets. In spiteof rhetoric to the contrary, neither the Bank nor UNCHS policy documents have to date madeco-ordination of pluralism the true focus of policy debate. Instead, pluralism is to be achievedthrough developing the formal private market mechanism.

In our view this is a misleading approach. Formal private markets can and should besupported. However, they need not necessarily be the focus of attention in all or even themajority of cases in developing countries. Indeed, scaling up low-income housing provision,and the development of the housing sector as a whole for that matter, require a morecomprehensive and pluralistic approach to enabling housing strategies. Whereby the di!erentmodes and agents of housing provision are identi"ed and co-ordinated in a comprehensivelyintegrated policy. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to outline the main elements of such anintegrated strategy.

192 R. Keivani, E. Werna / Habitat International 25 (2001) 191}208

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248973397_Rental_Tenure_in_the_Cities_of_Developing_Countries?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-38d0e033-e3c0-421a-819c-7a5485a85295&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIyMjY1ODc3MTtBUzoyMTY2MzY1MTU3MjEyMTdAMTQyODY2MTU3ODU3Ng==

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248973552_Landlordism_in_Third_World_Urban_Low-Income_Settlements?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-38d0e033-e3c0-421a-819c-7a5485a85295&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIyMjY1ODc3MTtBUzoyMTY2MzY1MTU3MjEyMTdAMTQyODY2MTU3ODU3Ng==

Fig. 1. A conceptual model of housing provision in developing countries.

To this end, the paper will "rst present a brief analysis of the main modes and agents of housingprovision in developing countries highlighting the capacities and limitations of each mode indi!erent socio-economic contexts. Following, the paper will consider the degree to which thecurrently dominant &enabling strategy' conforms to an integrated plural housing strategy. In itsconcluding section the paper focuses on co-ordination of pluralism by bringing together thepreceding discussions on modes of housing provision and the critique of the market enablingstrategy.

At this stage we would like to acknowledge that the broad review-based nature of our analysisdrawing on a wide range of references and countries makes it di$cult to provide in-depth analysisof contextual di!erences between countries. Nevertheless, we feel that the analysis will provide anadequate basis for examining the overall impact and potential of &market enabling strategy' withina pluralist paradigm of study.

2. Modes of housing provision in developing countries

Housing provision in developing countries is classically divided into two main groups ofconventional/formal and unconventional/informal modes of provision. These essentially representa dichotomy between two opposing processes (Drakakis-Smith, 1981). The former group repres-ents housing that is produced through the o$cial channels of recognised institutions, e.g. planningauthorities, banks and building and land development companies, and observing formal legalpractices, building standards and land use and subdivision regulations. In the main using semi-industrial to industrial mode of production utilising wage labour, modern industrially producedmaterials and being relatively capital intensive (Drakakis-Smith, 1981). The latter group, on theother hand, represents those housing units which are usually produced outside o$cial channelswithout o$cial development permits and do not conform to land use and subdivision regulations(Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Baross & Van der Linden, 1990). This group in the main uses a traditionalmode of production which is relatively labour intensive, utilising a large input of self-help labourand indigenous and traditional materials (Drakakis-Smith, 1981). However, a considerable numberof unconventional dwellings may also utilise modern industrial materials, semi-industrial methodsof production and wage labour or contract builders for at least some parts of their buildingactivities (Tipple & Wilkinson, 1992; Brumlik, 1992). As shown in Fig. 1 these main groups of

R. Keivani, E. Werna / Habitat International 25 (2001) 191}208 193

provision, moreover, can be subdivided into further modes depending on the actors involved andthe social relations between them.

3. Conventional or formal modes of housing provision

The conventional or formal mode of housing provision mainly caters for the high-income groupsof the urban population in developing countries. This is mainly achieved through the privatemarket. In addition the state, either directly or indirectly, also provides housing units for somesections of the low-income groups and essential government employees through this mode. Tothese must be added co-operative housing provision which can be formed either through govern-ment channels or independently.

4. Unconventional or informal modes of housing provision

Unconventional or informal modes of housing provision in developing countries primarily existdue to the inability of low-income groups to purchase high quality and professionally designed andconstructed housing produced through the conventional sector (UNCHS, 1996c; Gilbert, 1990;Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Turner, 1976). This situation itself is brought about by the inability ofperipheral capitalist development to absorb large sections of the urban population in formal sectoremployment on the one hand or to provide adequate wages and salaries to large sections of thosethat are employed by the sector on the other. As a result the unconventional mode of housingprovision has become a necessary part of urban growth and development in developing countriesin order to provide housing for the vast majority of urban poor who cannot gain housing throughthe formal sector. Consequently, the state is forced to tolerate and accommodate a certain degree ofillegality and irregularity.

Table 1 provides a summary of the di!erent modes of housing provision in developing countries.

5. The market enabling strategy

The roots of the market enabling strategy should, in fact, be sought in the work of suchpioneering housing researchers and practitioners as John Turner, William Mangin and CharlesAbrams on self-help housing processes in informal settlements in the 1960s and the earlier work ofJacob Crane in initiating government sponsored self help schemes in Puerto Rico in the 1930s and1940s (Turner, 1972, 1976; Abrams, 1966; Drakakis-Smith, 1981 and Harris, 1998). The importanceof their work, particularly that of Turner, lay in identifying the self-build processes through whichmillions of low-income households were able to provide their own housing units at their own paceand according to their own priorities and requirements of their stage of life, on mainly squattedland in informal settlements. Their arguments for accepting, channelling and strengthening theseprocesses as the main mechanism for low-income housing provision in developing countriespushed the boundaries of housing debate. In time such processes were to be adapted in to the moreformal policy of aided self-help programmes which became the corner stone of World Bank, UNand many national governments in developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s.


Tab

le1

Sum

mar

yof

the

mai

nm

odes

ofho

using

pro

vision

indev

elop

ing

coun

tries�

Mode

ofpro

vision

Main

char

acteristics

Appr

opriat

ese

ttin

gTar

getgr

oup

Formalprivate

Spe

culative

Dom

inat

ion

by

form

alde

velo

per

s(la

rge

and

small)

Mid

dle

tohigh

inco

me

coun

tries

Lar

gely

mid

dlean

dhi

gh-

inco

me

group

sForm

al"na

nce

Theex

istence

ofwellfu

nctio

nin

gdev

elop

men

tan

dbu

ildin

gin

dustries

Ince

rtain

positive

econ

om

icco

ndi

tion

s,i.e

.,hi

ghan

dra

pid

econ

omic

growth

and

rising

inco

mes

this

modeca

nalso

targ

etth

ehigher

sector

soft

helo

win

com

eho

use

hold

sIn

dus

trialbuild

ing

tech

nolo

gyCom

plia

ncewith

plan

nin

gre

gulation

san

dbu

ildin

gstan

dar

ds

Sustai

ned

and

rapid

econom

icgr

owth

and

rising

inco

mes

Dev

elop

er-L

andow

ner

Mainl

ysm

allsc

ale

join

tve

nture

sbetwee

nde

velo

pers

and

land

owne

rsM

iddle

tohigh

inco

me

coun

tries

Lar

gely

mid

dlein

com

egr

oup

sM

ixed

form

al}in

form

al"na

nce

Astro

ngm

iddle

clas

sIn

dus

trial/se

miin

dus

trialbuild

ing

tech

nolo

gyW

elles

tabl

ished

dev

elop

men

tan

dco

ntra

ctin

gin

dus

try

Com

plia

ncewith

plan

nin

gre

gulation

san

dbu

ildin

gstan

dar

ds

Buoy

antho

using

mar

ket

Abili

tyto

bui

ldto

higher

dens

itiesth

anth

eor

igin

albuild

ings

Indi

vidu

alow

ner

-occ

upier

tech

nolo

gyLan

downer

com

missioni

ngbuild

ing

forhis

own

use

Mixed

info

rmal}fo

rmal"na

nce

Mid

dle

tohigh

inco

me

coun

tries

Lar

gely

mid

dlein

com

egr

oup

sSe

mi-in

dustrial

bui

ldin

gtech

nol

ogy

Com

plia

ncewith

plan

nin

gre

gulation

san

dbu

ildin

gstan

dar

ds

Welles

tabl

ished

cont

ractin

gin

dustry

Ince

rtain

case

s,i.e

.,pub

licland

allo

cation,c

anin

clude

low-inc

om

egr

oups

Publicprovision

Direc

tLar

ge-sca

lepr

oject

s"na

nce

dan

din

itiated

bygo

vern

men

tsLar

gely

inap

prop

riat

ein

dev

elopi

ng

count

ries

asa

form

oflo

w-inc

omehou

sing

Bet

tersu

ited

astied

/ser

vice

housing

fores

sent

ialpu

blic

emplo

yees

Lar

gely

bui

ltby

priva

teco

ntra

ctors

Form

al"na

nce

Indus

trialbuild

ing

tech

nolo

gyCom

plia

ncewith

plan

nin

gre

gulation

san

dbu

ildin

gstan

dar

ds


Tab

le1

(con

tinu

ed)

Mode

ofpro

vision

Main

char

acteristics

Appr

opriat

ese

ttin

gTar

getgr

oup

Site

san

dse

rvices

Pro

ject-b

ased

serv

iced

land

allo

cation

Par

ticu

larly

suited

toco

unt

ries

with

larg

epublic

land

reso

urce

sLow

tom

iddle

inco

me

group

sLar

gedeg

ree

ofse

lf-b

uild

More

limited

butstill

applic

able

inot

her

coun

tries

Initia

ted

bynat

iona

lgo

vern

men

tsas

wellas

inte

rnat

iona

lag

encies

Com

plicat

edorg

anisat

ion

and

bure

aucr

acy

Pro

blem

swith

repl

icat

ion

and

cost

reco

very

Mixtu

reof

form

alan

din

form

al"na

nce

Tra

ditional/sem

i-in

dus

trialbui

ldin

gte

chnolo

gyO

vera

llco

mpl

ianc

ewith

plan

nin

gre

gula

tions

and

build

ing

stan

dar

ds

Settlem

entupg

radin

gExt

endi

ng

serv

ices

and

regu

larising

existing

low

inco

me

settlem

ents

All

dev

elopin

gco

untries

Low

inco

megr

oups

Initia

ted

bynat

iona

lgo

vern

men

tsorin

tern

atio

nal

agen

cies

Com

plicat

edorg

anisat

ion

and

bure

aucr

acy

Pro

blem

swith

repl

icat

ion

and

cost

reco

very

Co-

ope

rative

Form

alorg

anisat

ion

ofwork

ers,

trad

espeo

ple

and

low-inc

om

ehou

sehol

dsfo

rth

epurp

oseofhous

ing

provision

Lar

gely

und

eveloped

butap

pro

priat

ein

all

deve

lopin

gco

untries

Low

tom

iddle

inco

me

group

s

Co-o

per

atio

nan

dneg

otiat

ion

with

public

auth

orities,

bank

san

dco

ntrac

tors

Req

uires

gove

rnm

entsu

ppo

rtfo

rgr

eaterex

pan

sion

Initia

ted

bygo

vern

men

ts,po

litical

partiesorm

ore

orga

nic

Mixtu

reof

form

alan

din

form

al"na

nce

Sem

i-in

dustrial

bui

ldin

gtech

nol

ogy

Ove

rall

com

plianc

ewith

plan

nin

gre

gula

tions

and

buili

din

gstan

dard

sPublic}non

pub

licpa

tner

ship

Exc

han

ging

chea

ppubl

icland

oroth

er"na

ncial

ince

ntive

sfo

rex

pansion

oflo

wco

sthou

sing

Appl

icab

lein

allco

untries,

par

ticu

larly

thos

ewith

larg

epub

licla

nd

reso

urc

esan

dwelles

tablis

hed

deve

lopm

entan

dco

ntra

ctin

gin

dustries

Low

and

mid

dle

inco

me

group

s

Can

invo

lvelarg

esc

ale

privat

edev

elope

rs,pr

ivat

ein

divid

ualsorth

eco

-ope

rative

sReq

uires

gove

rnm

entsu

ppo

rtfo

rgr

eater

expa

nsio

nM

ixtu

reof

form

alan

din

form

al"na

nce

Indus

trialto

sem

i-in

dustrial

build

ing

tech

nol

ogy

Req

uires

gove

rnm

entsu

ppo

rtfo

rgr

eater

expa

nsio

nCom

plia

ncewith

plan

nin

gre

gulation

san

dbu

ildin

gstan

dar

ds


Informalhousing

Squat

terhou

sing

Lan

din

vasion

sCou

ntrieswith

alarg

ede

gree

ofco

mm

unal

and

pub

licland

owner

ship

Estab

lished

low-inco

me

group

sLar

gely

self-

built

par

ticu

larly

atth

ein

itialstag

esTolera

ntor

wea

kgo

vern

men

tsIn

crem

enta

lco

nstru

ctio

nov

erse

vera

lye

ars

Lac

kin

gor

inad

equat

ese

rvices

inm

ost

count

ries

Pre

cariou

slo

cation

sM

anip

ulat

ion

bypolit

ical

par

ties

and

gove

rnm

ents

Lar

gedeg

ree

ofin

volvem

entof

CBO

san

dN

GO

sIn

form

al"na

nce

Lar

gely

trad

itio

nal

and

som

ese

mi-in

dustrial

bui

ldin

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nol

ogy

Low

quality

ofho

usin

gin

most

count

ries

Lar

gely

lack

ing

plann

edla

yout

Lac

kof

com

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nce

with

plan

ning

regu

lations

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ticu

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lera

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sect

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text

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epap

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tabl

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been

com

pile

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am

ore

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review

oflit

erat

ure

whi

chin

clude

Am

is(1

996),

Ang

elan

dPor

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(199

0),B

ahar

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(199

6),B

urg

ess(1

985),D

eSam

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4),D

esai

(199

6),G

ilber

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ard

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5),I

gela

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996)

,Ize

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(199

3),J

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(199

4b),M

cCutche

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(197

9),M

itlin

and

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thwai

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2),N

ient

ied

and

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derLin

den

(199

0),O

guns

haki

nan

dO

layiwol

a(199

2),P

ayne

(198

8),R

amirez

etal

.(19

92),

Roy

(198

3),Sa

leem

(198

3),Sha

kur(198

7),So

liman

(198

6),S

tein

ber

g(199

0),T

asch

ner(199

2),Van

Lin

dert

(199

2),W

ard

(199

0),W

ard

and

Chan

t(198

7).


There was, however, a crucial di!erence between the self-help policies advocated by writers suchas Turner and the aided self-help policies implemented by international agencies and nationalgovernments. The former envisaged dweller control through participatory policies for supportingand enabling the informal self help processes by increasing the direct access of informal low-incomehouseholds to "nancial, material and technical resources. The latter, on the other hand, attemptedto formalise and regulate the process largely through internationally "nanced government control-led aided self-help projects. It was not, therefore, surprising that the resultant bureaucraticframework of the aided self-help programmes with their huge overhead costs, long delays andduration and involvement of a multitude of international, national and local public and formalprivate actors failed to capture the dynamism and scope of the informal processes observed in thework of the earlier advocates of informal self-help housing (Burgess, 1992, 1985; Soliman, 1986;Jones & Ward, 1994a).

The in#uence of self-help on the market enabling strategy stems from its e!ort to replaceconventional public housing programmes of the time, i.e., full publicly "nanced housing productionand subsidised renting, by enabling private individual self-builders to help themselves. Thedi!erence, however, is that whereas the early conception of self-help envisaged an enabled andexpanded informal self-build housing sector the current World Bank conception primarily envis-ages an enabled and expanded formal land housing market.

In this regard the World Bank (1993) has formulated certain policy recommendations which aimat the reorientation of government activity away from direct housing provision and regulation ofthe private housing markets to one of enabling housing markets to function more e$ciently. Theseare:

� developing property rights,� developing mortgage "nance including lending and borrowing at positive interest rates,� rationalising subsidies,� opening up urban land for residential development through provision of infrastructure,� reforming building and planning regulations concerning land and housing development for

expanding market activity,� organising the building industry by eliminating regulatory barriers,� developing an institutional framework for managing the housing sector.

We have shown the private market bias of these recommendation elsewhere in greater detail(Keivani & Werna, forthcoming). Relevant critical studies also include Jones and Ward (1994a,1995), Jones (1996) and Baken and Van der Linden (1993). It su$ces to state here that theserecommendations are primarily designed to create the institutional capacity and an open marketenvironment for expanding formal private activity.

In a defence of World Bank policy and private housing markets Malpezzi (1994) points totremendous over-regulations in many housing markets of developing countries which impedemarket operation and drive up costs. The aim of the enabling strategy he explains is to increase thepractical e$ciency of private markets towards producing housing for the majority of the popula-tion than their present situation. E$cient markets will separate incremental consumption fromincremental payment, `so that households can consume the "nal desired bundle, or closer to it,soonera (Malpezzi, 1994, p. 459) and pay for it incrementally through mortgage repayments over


many years. Intermediary "nancial systems and well developed rental housing markets, hecontinues, aid the process of housing capital formation by separating consumption decisions fromcurrent income and `more dependent on long-run (permanent) income, and log run desiredconsumptiona (Malpezzi, 1994). Hence the emphasis on deregulation and institutional develop-ment for increasing formal private market activity.

We do agree that formal private markets can and should be more e$cient to expand theirhousing production to include larger numbers of the lower and middle income populations.However, the degree to which the scenario of an e$cient housing market depicted by Malpezzi isactually viable in most developing countries in at least the short to medium terms remains highlydebatable and one might even say unlikely. This is evident in the failure of IMF and World Banksponsored short-term macro-economic stabilisation or structural adjustment programmes of3}5 yr to lead to expanded private sector investment and sustainable economic growth in mostdeveloping countries, which have undertaken such programmes, in the medium terms (Pugh, 1995,1994).

It is precisely this gap between the objective conditions of developing countries and World Bankpolicy proposals that forms a main plank of criticism in Jones and Ward's (1994a, 1995) critique ofthe Bank's New Urban Management Programme and urban policy in general. They identifycertain positive aspects to the NUMP and urban policy, such as the shift from project-basedapproach to a more comprehensive and enabling role by public administrations, greater emphasison e$ciency and transparency in government, decentralisation, local empowerment and the linkbetween urban economy and the national economy. Nevertheless, they have serious misgivingsabout the ability to either e!ectively implement some of the institutional reform of NUMPrecommendations due to political compromises in many developing countries or the ability oflow-income households and the informal land markets to bene"t from much of the proposedprogramme even if implemented. They argue that the market-led nature of the programmeseriously limits the `scope within NUMP for the state to intervene in order to create the preciseconditions which might allow policies advocated under NUMP to succeed. Without this structure,therefore, the unquestioning application of the NUMP proposals are likely to lead to a range ofvaried outcomes that are di$cult to predict and not necessarily of a positive naturea (Jones& Ward, 1994a, pp. 46}47). They, therefore, conclude by asserting that an important tool forovercoming this shortcoming is for the state to maintain a mixture of control and managementover the land market rather than solely relying on management or totally abrogating theresponsibility (Jones & Ward, 1994a, 1997). It is only in this way, they argue, that the state can`in#uence the land market signi"cantly enough to resolve the land problem &#ashpoints' in LDCcitiesa (Jones & Ward, 1994a, b, p. 47).

Jones and Ward on the whole regard the Bank's urban policy in the 1990s as a clear shift to themainstream Bank ideology as part of an attempt by the Bank to bring its rather &maverick' urbandepartment more in line with its mainstream neoliberal free market philosophy. In a reply to thiscritique and earlier writings by Jones and Ward (1997), Pugh (1997) argues that Jones and Wardhave been selective in their use of data and ignored the post 1986 developments in Bank thinking.He argues that while in the early 1980s Bank's urban policy could be described as primarilyneoliberal it had evolved under the in#uence of institutional economics and liberalist new politicaleconomy to have a much wider and inclusive conception of enabling with a reorientation ofpublic}private roles in the most e$cient way. He then points to the Bank's 7-point housing policy


recommendations to further argue that far from the state withdrawing it would have expandedroles in targeted subsidies, the creation of appropriate policies, and institutional reforms in suchareas as housing "nance, land policy development, building regulations and the environment.Pugh, moreover, extensively uses UNCHS urban and housing policy documents since 1987 toshow that the post 1990 World Bank conception of enabling as having a strong local community,CBO, NGO and informal input.

The proposed increased involvement of the state along the 7-point recommendations outlined,however, does not negate the neoliberal philosophy underlying the Bank's policy agenda. If anything it reinforces this perception since they are all primarily designed to create the institutionalcapacity for expanded formal private market activity. Moreover, we are of the view that it isa mistake to equate UNCHS and World Bank policies and ideology on the subject. While theirpolicies overlap to a large degree with respect to enabling the formal private markets the UNCHS,as Pugh's citations show, has paid much greater attention to making the strategy more inclusive byincluding particularly the community and co-operative sectors. The Bank pays scant attention inthis regard.

Following similar concerns the 1996c (p. 338) UNCHS report on human settlements states:

As the title of the most recent World Bank policy statement makes clear, the focus is on &enablingmarkets to work rather than on enabling poor people to gain access to housing and landmarkets'.

As a result, the Habitat II agenda explicitly takes on board the low-income communitiesthemselves, community groups, NGOs and women as main actors who should be supportedthrough the enabling strategy as the private market (UNCHS, 1996a). Nevertheless, while theUNCHS has moved in the right direction the focus of the policy has remained enabling privatehousing markets to work as the primary housing delivery mechanism along the same lines as theWorld Bank policy recommendations. Accordingly, the Habitat II agenda pays scant attention tothe role and requirements of the informal private markets in their own right.

6. Beyond enabling private markets

As shown in Table 1 the diversity of modes of housing provision in developing countries and therange of actors involved indicates that the process involves an intricate and complex network ofrelationships between various agents and the state. In designing policies for the expanded provisionof low-income housing provision in developing countries, therefore, it is important to take accountof the social and political context and dimensions of land and housing supply (Jones, 1996; Baken& Van der Linden, 1993). For this reason it is important to identify and take in to consideration theentire structures of provision and the interactions of the relevant interest groups and agentsinvolved in the various sub-markets and forms of housing provision. This is as opposed to solelyrelying on adjustments to supply and demand which is the basis of the recommendations outlinedby the World Bank and its allied writers. Such adjustments are unable to take account of thecomplex relationships between the di!erent actors and interest groups which are played out incultural, social and political spheres which are country and even city speci"c and which directlyin#uence the outcome of such policies.


� It is pertinent to note that on the basis of experiences in Ahmadabad, India, and Mexico both Baken and Van derLinden (1993) and Jones (1996) seriously question the extent of costs attributed to compliance with o$cial regulationsand standards in formal private market activity.

The relaxation of land use regulations and increased government provision of basic infrastruc-tural services, for example, can be positive actions which increase both formal and informal privatesector access to suitable residential land and help in reducing the price of housing units indeveloping countries.� Indeed, critics of World Bank &enabling strategy' have themselves called forreducing size and standard regulations as a means of increasing security for informal marketactivity (Baken & Van der Linden, 1993).

However, due to the existence of landed interest groups and their close interaction with publico$cials in many developing countries the e!ects of withdrawal of state from land ownership andcontrol and deregulation of the land market in terms of private ownership and exchange remainsfar more unclear. Indeed, as many authors have pointed out, the problem of excessive landspeculation by landowners, including building "rms and developers, in unregulated land marketsposes a serious challenge to the e$ciency of the private market mechanism. Baken and Van derLinden (1993) have argued, for example, that there is a need to distinguish between the demandsgenerated by the use value and investment value of land since increased deregulation and morefreedom for the market cannot prevent excessive land price increases caused by investmentdemand.

This is particularly the case in developing countries where it is more likely that conditionsconducive to increased investment demand in land such as the lack of alternative investmentavenues and high in#ation rates exist (Baken & Van der Linden, 1993). Moreover, despiteprotestations by advocates of the formal private markets (Malpezzi, 1994; Walters, 1983) thatspeculation is a rational response to scarcity of serviced land which would be eradicated in itsabsence other writers have noted the tendency of formal private "rms to take the easiest route forpro"t maximisation through land speculation and land development gains even in the UK whichhas undoubtedly negligible scarcity of serviced land and a much more developed housing and realestate market (Duncan, 1986; Ball, 1983).

An often quoted example of the success of deregulation and increased capacity of housingmarkets has been the experience of Bangkok between 1980 and the mid-1990s (Dowall, 1989, 1992).As noted by Yap (1996), however, the &Bangkok phenomenon' occurred during a relatively longperiod of one and half decades of economic growth and increasing e!ective demands of the middle-and low-income populations. In the words of Baken and Van der Linden (1993) it is quite likelythat in such favourable economic and demand conditions a similar increase in private marketproduction capacity would have occurred even in a more regulated market.

Overall the above debates support the argument that imperfections and ine$ciencies areinherent to urban land and housing markets rather than being necessarily related to governmentregulations. Such ine$ciencies would be particularly damaging for increased low-income housingprovision by the formal private sector since it would require lowering the cost of supply. A majorfactor in this regard would be increased access to cheaper factors of production, such as land and"nance, by the formal private "rms. Consequently, if deregulation of land and "nance leads toincreased speculation and monopoly behaviour on land or very high interest rates as in the case of


Chile between 1974 and 1982 it cannot be conducive to increased provision of low-incomehousing by formal private "rms. In this regard Duran and Soza (1987) note that in Chileduring 1974}1982 the government was emphasising the role of private supply to cover thewhole quantitative and qualitative range of demand and left price regulations, credit andinterest rate control to the market. Therefore, the private sector was recognised as the onlyagent for supplying the housing demand of the middle-high income population, while the urbanpoor were basically excluded. However, even many of the higher income social groupscould not a!ord the price of houses on o!er, which is evident from the fact that many housesremained unsold*e.g. 15,000 new units in Greater Santiago alone in April 1983 (Duran & Soza,1987). At the same time as a result of "nancial deregulation the "nancial costs of an averageprivately constructed house in the construction phase alone was 31.4% of the sale price anda purchaser would have to pay a real interest rate of about 269.68% over twelve years (Duran& Soza, 1987).

With the direct example of the Swedish housing market the 1996 UNCHS (Habitat) GlobalReport on Human Settlements has acknowledged that enabling policies for increased and cheaperhousing provision through the formal private market does not necessarily mean increased deregu-lation (UNCHS, 1996c). Rather, it may even mean increased regulation and intervention by thestate even to the extent of laying down what is produced by the private market if it leads to theprovision of cheaper and plentiful factors of production (UNCHS, 1996c). This is also exactly thecrux of the argument put forward by Jones and Ward (1994a, 1995, 1997) in their critique andreplies to World Bank and Pugh.

Strassmann (1994) reaches a similar conclusion as to the limits of an under-regulated market onthe basis of the situation of the land market in Manila where there is minimal governmentregulations on land and housing markets, relaxed standards and regulations for low-cost housing,an e$cient building industry in technological and institutional terms and an active real estatemarket. Yet, large amounts of residential land are kept empty within the city for speculativepurposes by private land owners due to almost negligible taxation on vacant land which accountsfor only 0.2% of the reasonable market value of land. Consequently, half of the households couldnot a!ord even the cheapest units built by the unsubsidised formal private sector due to high landand housing prices. Therefore, the degree to which land and housing markets are deregulated orsupervised is entirely dependent on identifying and examining the structures of provision andrelationship of agents in any particular context.

Moreover, there is deep rooted involvement of politicians, political parties and local o$cials inthe illegal activities of informal settlements in developing countries. These include sanctioningland invasions and protecting informal subdivisions. Such activities indicate that theimplementation of policies and application of regulations in the "eld of land and housing areintrinsically tied to, and a result of, interplay between di!erent political and economic interestgroups which is often manifested in the form of clientelism and political mediation (Baken & Vander Linden, 1993; Jones & Ward, 1994a, 1995). A similar relationship can also be identi"ed betweenine$cient and excessive speculative activities of formal private landowners and politicians. This isexempli"ed by the case of Manila, Philippines, where e!orts for raising idle land taxes and relatedland reforms were thwarted by powerful formal private sector land owners who were supported bysome congressional leaders who were themselves large property and land owners (Strassmann,1994).


7. Conclusion: the shift to a pluralist approach

The preceding discussions lead us to the conclusion that rather than utilising all available meansfor expanding housing provision in developing countries, the current conception of &enablingstrategy' is primarily a policy for the development of formal private markets to the implicit orexplicit exclusion of other policies and modes of provision which were highlighted in Table 1. It isthe contention of this paper that the over-reliance on formal private markets which is apparent inthe Bank's strategy will lead to the sti#ing of initiative in the development of new policies and a lackof more appropriate application and further development of the other existing policies and modesof provision.

We would, therefore, advocate a more comprehensive and pluralistic approach to enablinghousing strategies. This would combine adjustments to overall supply and demand conditions ofthe market with the identi"cation and inclusion of all the related modes and agents of provision inappropriate policies aimed at expanded housing provision by the identi"ed modes and agents tocarefully selected target groups which form the most suitable sub-market for each mode. Such anapproach would consider the social, cultural and political factors which govern and determine theactivities of agents in each mode in order to co-ordinate and enhance the positive aspects of eachmode and counteract their negative tendencies and actions. Moreover, as each mode of provisionhas its own advantages which suit the speci"c requirements of certain sections of urban populationit is important to identify the target group of the expanded provision of each mode based onrealistic analysis of the output capacities of the modes and requirements and e!ective demand ofthe groups concerned.

Consequently, and contrary to the current &enabling strategy', such an integrated approach maylead, for example, to increasing public sector involvement in, and regulation of, land and housingmarkets depending on the speci"c conditions of countries concerned. Similarly, it may combineseveral di!erent modes such as project based sites and services programmes, co-operative/CBOhousing, formal and informal contractors and developers and public land allocation in order toovercome their relative weaknesses and boost appropriately targeted housing provision.

On the other hand in some middle to high income countries, particularly with sustained andrapid economic growth, rising incomes and well established contracting and development indus-tries, di!erent modes of formal private housing markets can play a major role in housing provisionfor the middle and upper tiers of the low-income groups. In addition to providing institutionalsupport for the housing market, particularly housing/building "nance and infrastructure provision,the low-income output of such modes may be enhanced through the creation of public}privatepartnership schemes.

Partnership in our view is an important mode of provision which could tie many di!erent modesin di!erent socio-economic context to create synergies for e$cient and a!ordable housing provis-ion. As a recent paper by Jones and Pisa (2000) notes, partnerships may also be seen to bridge theideological divide between the advocates of the free market system and those of state interventionby allowing the participation of both as a well as community actors. A common form ofpartnership relates to public}private joint venture schemes. In this mode of provision publicauthorities usually provide cheap suitable land and tax incentives and private "rms provide"nance and build housing units on these land in exchange for being able to sell an agreed partof the projects on the open market and o!er the rest to low-income households at agreed prices.


�The ejido is a form of land tenure enshrined in Article 27 of the Mexican constitution (1917) which established thatcertain peasants (ejidatarios) held rights to land for agrarian purposes in perpetuity which could not be sold, rented ormortgaged (Jones & Ward, 1998). By late 1990 this form of land ownership accounted for 55% of the national land areaand was held by 3.5 million ejidatarios in 30,000 communities (Jones & Pisa, 2000).

Such schemes have been tried in several developing countries including Malaysia, India and Iran(Billand, 1993; Moatazed-Keivani, 1993; Drakakis-Smith, 1981). Depending on the context, thedesign criteria of at least the low-income section of the project is negotiated with, or determined by,the government side (Moatazed-Keivani, 1993).

Depending on the socio-economic and land ownership structure of the cities concerned othervariations of public}private partnerships can emerge. In west Africa and Mexico an importantthird actor in such schemes are the customary land owners (Jones & Pisa, 2000). Indeed, as theejido�-private partnership schemes in Mexico show in the early stages of the programme thegovernment largely played a facilitative role by providing the legal framework for such partner-ships to occur through the provision of legal titles to such customary land communities willing toparticipate (Jones & Pisa, 2000). Up to early 1998, however, the ejido-private partnership did nothave any clear low-income housing mandate or intention. Indeed, Jones and Pisa (2000) note thatof the 12 participating ejidos all except one were principally intended for providing land for middleincome residential and luxury leisure developments.

Another type of partnership can occur between the public and co-operative mode of housingprovision. In this mode the public sector provides land free or under market price and members ofthe co-operative "nance and build their own housing units. This form of partnership wasimplemented relatively successfully in Iran after the 1979 revolution. In 1985, for example, over 6%of total urban housing investment in the country was provided under this mode. Again for suchmodes to be e!ective it is crucial that the government has both the political will and physicalresources to implement such programme. One should note that even on its own the co-operativemode of provision can be an e!ective form of low-income housing provision. By de"nitionco-operatives allow groups of people to organise themselves and pool their resources and e!ortsinto a formal organisation which can then negotiate on behalf of its members for acquiringland from the government or the private market, applying for and receiving credit ormortgage loans from government and formal sector institutions, receive building materials andcommission contractors for building the housing units (Vakil, 1996; Okpala, 1992). In addition toIran co-operatives have proved to be relatively successful in a number of countries including Indiaand Turkey (Okpala, 1992). In 1984, eighteen Apex co-operative Housing Societies in Indiacovered some 34,000 housing co-operatives and by 1982 had provided loans for the completion of480,000 dwellings (Okpala, 1992). In Turkey, on the other hand, the contribution of housingco-operatives to the total housing production during 1978}1980 was more than 13% (Okpala,1992).

The experience in Iran and elsewhere suggests that as far as low-income housing provision isconcerned the success of such partnerships is primarily dependent on the political will and physicalcapacity of governments to pursue the policy in terms of their ability to build up large land reserves.In Iran, for example, extensive public}private as well as public}co-operative partnership schemesonly were possible due to the large public land reserves which were built up under the Urban Land


Act after the 1979 revolution which introduced a ceiling limit on private ownership of land in urbanareas. To this must be added the political will of the post-revolution government to implement theAct and follow such programmes through. Lack of political will and undue interference has beennoted as the main reasons for failure of innovative projects in both India and Pakistan (Jones& Pisa, 2000).

In addition to the political will and physical and institutional capacity of the government,however, the success of such schemes is also dependent on satisfying the requirements of the otherstakeholders. In the case of private actors the pro"t motive is obviously the most crucial factor. InIran, for example, until 1990 the public}private schemes had not been very successful due to thebad locations of the land plots o!ered by the government which created problems of sale of theunits on the open market (Moatazed-Keivani, 1993). Similarly, the ejido-private partnershipprogramme in Mexico has thus far proved to be not very successful. Jones and Pisa (2000) point outthat by early 1998 only eight out of a total of 1122 ejidos surrounding Mexico largest cities hadestablished partnership schemes in a total of 12 projects. Reasons for this included bureaucraticinadequacies and delays in granting land titles, shortage of capital in the ejido sector anddomination of the schemes by the private sector to the exclusion of ejidatarios leading to loss ofcontrol over their land and the project without su$cient "nancial remuneration. As a result theMexican government has taken steps to overcome these problems with fast track legal titleprovision and proposals for new lines of "nance for ejido development through a national fund orstate government. In the event of provision of public "nance the government would becomea formal partner in the project until such time the ejido has repaid the capital or decides to donateserviced land (Jones & Pisa, 2000). Another important initiative has been proposals for changingthe organisational structure of ejido-private partnerships by recommending the formation of truststo act as intermediaries between the partners in an attempt to redress the power imbalance betweenejido and private partners (Jones & Pisa, 2000). As Jones and Pisa (2000) note, however, while thesemeasures have been undoubtedly positive it is too early to judge their e!ect in overcomingproblems identi"ed with the earlier partnerships. It may be that the government will have to takefurther measures to make the process more transparent and inclusive of ejido demands to urbanagencies as well as higher e$ciency and "nancial viability for both ejidatarios and privatedevelopers.

In conjunction with Table 1 the above discussion on partnerships and co-operative modes ofhousing provision serve to illustrate the rich potential that exist in terms of modes of housingprovision in developing countries. As noted in the case of partnerships, problems always exist. Theyare, however, not insurmountable. The challenge for governments is to muster the political will andfor international and national policy makers, practitioners and academics to devise innovativepolicies for realising the potential without preconceived ideological biases and preferences.

Depending on the social, economic, political, legal and institutional conditions and capacities ofcountries concerned there are di!erent opportunities for co-ordination and creation of synergiesthrough complementary combinations. The task, however, is by no means easy nor have weprovided the ultimate paper on the issue. Rather we have only provided the general outline ofa strategy which must be developed and re"ned through greater research on identifying andexamining the potential, means and problems of co-ordination between di!erent modes of housingprovision in speci"c contexts in developing countries. This paper ends, therefore, by calling forfurther research in this area.


Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments of reviewers of the Jorge Hardoy MemorialPrize and Professor Charles Choguill on an earlier version of the paper. We remain, however, solelyresponsible for any errors or misconceptions.

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Documents

Refocusing the housing debate in developing countries from a pluralist perspective