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published online 12 November 2013Latin American PerspectivesJames P. Robson and Raymond WiestCase Study from Oaxaca, Mexico

Transnational Migration, Customary Governance, and the Future of Community: A

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1

Transnational Migration, Customary Governance, and the Future of Community

A Case Study from Oaxaca, Mexicoby

James P. Robson and Raymond Wiest

Common-property regimes owned and governed by predominantly indigenous com-munities are widespread in the Mexican state of Oaxaca. The traditional governance sys-tems of these communities are under strain because of transnational migration, which reduces the number of resident adults available to assume public offices and contribute labor to community projects. A study of responses to this situation in two such communi-ties identified adaptations including the establishment of hometown associations in migrant communities in the United States and the requirement that migrants hire substi-tutes to fulfill their obligations in the home community. Given shifts in migration patterns and migrant profiles, however, these adaptations have so far been insufficient to relieve the stress on governance institutions, and this has implications for community identity and governance in the future.

Regímenes de propiedad comunitaria en donde los propietarios y gobernantes son las comunidades indígenas son comunes en el estado mexicano de Oaxaca. En la actualidad las estructuras tradicionales de gobernación de estas comunidades sufren bajo la tensión causada por la migración trasnacional, la cual reduce el número de residentes adultos disponibles para asumir cargos públicos y prestar mano de obra para proyectos de la comunidad. Un estudio de las respuestas a esta situación en dos de esas comunidades identificó adaptaciones que incluyen el establecimiento de asociaciones de tierra de origen en las comunidades de migrantes en los Estados Unidos y el requerimiento de contratar a suplentes que cumplan las obligaciones de los migrantes en sus comunidades de origen. Sin embargo, dados los cambios en el modelo migratorio y el perfil del migrante, estas adaptaciones han sido hasta el momento insuficientes para aliviar la tensión en las insti-tuciones de gobierno, lo cual tiene implicaciones para el futuro de la identidad y gobernación comunitarias.

Keywords: Customary governance, Indigenous identity, Oaxaca, Mexico, Transnational migration

506689LAPXXX10.1177/0094582X13506689LAtin AmericAn PersPectivesrobson and Wiest / migration And Governance in Oaxaca2013

James P. robson is a Banting Fellow and currently a visiting Professor at the University of redlands, california. His research interests are common property, migration, conservation, and land use change. raymond e. Wiest is professor emeritus in the Department of Anthropology at the University of manitoba and the author of many books and articles on labor migration and transnational mexican life. they thank the citizens of san Juan evangelista Analco and santiago comaltepec for their warm welcome and participation in this research. the study was funded through the canada research chair in community-based resource management, a University of manitoba Graduate Fellowship, and a grant to Leticia merino (iFri crc at iis/UnAm, mexico city).

LAtin AmericAn PersPectives, issue XXX, vol. XX no. X, month XXXX xx-xxDOi: 10.1177/0094582X13506689© 2013 Latin American Perspectives

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2 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

common-property regimes dominate the southern mexican state of Oaxaca. Across these communal lands, owned and governed by predominantly indig-enous communities, customary governance institutions play a key role in regu-lating the use and management of shared environmental, economic, and cultural resources, and collective action is a requirement for their formulation, implementation, and enforcement. these institutions and the cultural norms and values they are based upon lie at the heart of local people’s individual and collective identities. it has been suggested that rapid exogenous changes or new threats may unravel communal governance systems that have survived for generations (Ostrom, 2005). As time passes and problems become more complex, the societal feedback loops that are considered essential for building and sustaining resilience and adaptive capacity may erode and weaken, lead-ing institutional structures to fail (Acheson, 2006). this paper examines the degree to which common-property structures in Oaxaca provide the necessary framework for adaptive governance (after Folke et al., 2005).

Our inspiration comes from a 2004 article by michael Kearney and Federico Besserer entitled “Oaxacan municipal Governance in transnational context.” Based on work that began in the late 1990s, this piece set the stage for further research on the impact of labor migration to the United states on the traditional governance structures of Oaxacan municipalities. Kearney and Besserer began with the observation that “the spectacular growth of the transnational Oaxacan popular organizations has been made possible because of the sociocultural and political resources inherent in these bounded home communities” (2004: 450). their findings added to the growing evidence (Jones, 2009; robson, 2010) of pressure to remain in the United states for relatively long periods of time to meet personal and family sustenance requirements even though lengthy absences interfered with traditional obligations for community service. they also suggested shifts in the way individuals were identifying themselves because of the expense and hardship of transnational migration. they noted that “what is at stake here is the viability of an ancient, time-tested form of essentially democratic community governance” (2004: 453).

this paper further examines the viability of village governance and traditional obligatory task performance in light of migrants’ lengthy absences and the loss of their contributions of needed resources. Both declining participation and increased inequality among users increase the cost and the difficulty of collective action (Agrawal, 2002; Baker, 2005). these changes, in addition to evolving cul-tural attitudes, may impact the social institutions and conventions that are a fun-damental part of local community identity and cooperation (cohen, 2004).

Alternatively, governance institutions may adapt to new or changing reali-ties. A number of scholars point to the reinforcement of local governance in the face of such processes and recognize that the erosion of community is not uni-versal (Kearney, 1995; Waterbury, 1999). What is characteristic of migration under globalization is links between sending and receiving localities such as remittance flows, cyclical migration, and frequent communication. migrants form sister communities that establish social and economic ties with their home communities and new senses of belonging and identity (Basch, Glick-schiller, and Blanc-szanton, 1994; Kearney, 1995; Levitt, 2001; smith, 2006; stephen, 2007). this may allow demographic and cultural change to strengthen com-munity through adaptation of the social institutions that regulate local life and territorial management (Orlove, 1999; Waterbury, 1999).




Robson and Wiest / MIGRATION AND GOVERNANCE IN OAXACA 3

Ours is one of the first studies in Oaxaca or mexico to ask whether these adaptive responses are appropriate or likely to succeed. the principal data come from fieldwork undertaken by robson (2010) in northern Oaxaca sup-ported by lessons drawn from Wiest’s work over four decades (1973; 1983; 2009) on transnational migration from a village in michoacán.

Study AreA And MethodS

the primary research for this paper took place in Oaxaca’s sierra norte or sierra de Juárez region, which covers an area of 9,347 square kilometers, roughly a tenth of the state’s territory (ineGi, 2009). Data come from two in-depth case studies, the chinantec community of santiago comaltepec and the Zapotec community of san Juan evangelista Analco. rather than conducting a strict comparative analysis, we use the two cases to improve our exploration and understanding of impacts, responses, and underlying processes. Fieldwork began in December 2007 and ended in January 2010 and included time spent in both study communities and in Los Angeles, california, the principal U.s. destination for migrants from both places. research methods included par-ticipant observation, structured and semistructured interviews, and focus group discussions. these methods were interactive and responsive to local conditions and helped provide a high level of detail about participants and their experiences.

CoMMonS GovernAnCe in northern oAxACA

the two study communities, comaltepec and Analco, represent distinct eth-nolinguistic groups—chinantecs from the chinantla Alta region (who refer to themselves as Dza jmiih or tsa jujmi, roughly translated as “people of the same word”1), and a subgroup of Zapotecs known as Bene xon (“people of the clouds”) (robson, 2010). Previous ethnographic work has shown that Zapotecs and chinantecs have centuries-long histories, common identities, shared and differentiated cultures, and resource practices tied to variable climatic and veg-etative zones (Barabas, 1999; Bartolomé et al., 1999; nader, 1969; romero Frizzi, 2000; Weitlaner and cline, 1969). However, while there is diversity and undoubted difference among the local customs, practices, and cosmologies found in the sierra norte (robson, 2010), there is remarkable uniformity in the way they govern themselves. in both Analco and comaltepec, a traditional governance system based on indigenous customary law, known as usos y cos-tumbres (uses and customs), is the pillar around which local life is structured. in this system, community assemblies (both municipal and communal) hold the maximum authority (velasquez, 2000). elected officials are accountable to assemblies rather than to the state or federal government, and assemblies are free to devise and approve norms that govern life in their jurisdictions.

With the passage in 1998 of the Law of the rights of indigenous Peoples and communities of the state of Oaxaca, communities’ right to autonomy is now officially recognized, with the municipality and/or community considered the territorial unit in which that autonomy is exercised.2 Given that Oaxaca has some 570 municipalities and life is governed by usos y costumbres in more than





400 of them (velasquez, 2000), an important synergy has developed between civic and communal governance. Locally elected leaders in most indigenous Oaxacan villages maintain control over both civic governance and the manage-ment of their communal territories. the actions of community members are guided primarily by local statutes. this autonomous system exhibits many of the characteristics of polycentric governance (Alcorn and toledo, 1998), allow-ing users to experiment with rule combinations, access local knowledge, and obtain rapid feedback from their own policy changes.

two social institutions—the cargo and the tequio—define the system. they link community members with their communal resources and constitute the service that active and able-bodied comuneros (common-property rights hold-ers) must provide in return for the benefits they receive from their membership in the community. A cargo is an elected post of responsibility in the communal and/or municipal government. A mid- to high-level post is customarily held for a three-year period. religious cargos cover the operation and maintenance of the village church and the organization of religious festivities and rites of passage. municipal cargos involve the traditional governance functions, among them juez (judge) and topil (community policeman). Other cargos relate to the management of the community’s common-property resources, including local forests. the tequio is community service—the contribution of voluntary (unpaid) labor to community projects that require the participation of large numbers of people, including the maintenance and improvement of the com-munity’s basic infrastructure (sewerage, roads) and the conservation of territo-rial resources (see Bray, 2010).

While the basic structure of this system is broadly the same for indigenous communities across Oaxaca, there is variation in the numbers and types of cargos and tequios employed and the particular community members (in terms of age, gender, etc.) who participate in these arrangements. For example, while many communities require all able-bodied comuneros between 18 and 60 years of age to participate, an earlier retirement age may be permitted in some com-munities. similarly, the status of women and their level of involvement in the community decision-making process vary. men have customarily controlled offices in comaltepec and Analco as in most indigenous Oaxacan communities (Walker and Walker, 2008), but there is no formal prohibition on women’s serv-ing in administrative posts including the municipal presidency. thus, while women have often been excluded or discouraged from participating in deci-sion making, any gender bias is a consequence not of the system but of “the influence of cultural values widespread in mexico” (Hunn, 2008: 53).

the cargo and the tequio, as key collective-action institutions, thus play a critical role in village and community life across the sierra norte. For this rea-son, they offer an excellent focal point for investigations into the sociocultural impacts of transnational migration.

FindinGS

Despite a history of internal migration to regional and national urban centers, since the early 1980s the United states has become the most important destination





for migrants from both communities (robson, 2010). this shift to international migration has been primarily driven by the pull of economic opportunities that are the product of neoliberal forces at the global level and neoliberal poli-cies implemented by the mexican government in recent decades. the decision to migrate has also been aided by the establishment of strong kin-based migrant networks. some migrants reported that the demands of the usos y costumbres system contributed to their decision to head north (see also Alatorre, 2000; Garibay, 2007).

the increase in U.s.-bound migration has had a significant impact on the resident population of both communities (Figure 1). village depopulation has made serious inroads into the numbers of active resident comuneros in both communities (table 1). in Analco and comaltepec, close to half of resi-dent comuneros are over the age of 50. As a consequence, both have suffered a significant shortage of adult (male) labor. in terms of actual numbers, Analco appears to be in the more precarious position. While the overall situ-ation in comaltepec is less problematic, the numbers of comuneros in the two smaller settlements of La esperanza and san martin soyolapam are par-ticularly low.

the ratios between numbers of active resident comuneros and number of cargos in the two communities (table 2) are much lower than the estimated ratios for Analco (4.25) and comaltepec (5.51) for the late 1970s. As a conse-quence, the cargo system is severely strained. One resident of Analco summed up the problem: “We suffer from a lack of people. . . . there are no citizens, no people to carry out cargos. . . . those that are here are older people—there are few youngsters—and it is the same group of citizens that have to do all the

Figure 1. Population change (number of residents) in Comaltepec and Analco, 1930–2008 (ineGi population counts 1930–2005 and local community census 2007).

tAble 1

resident and nonresident (Migrant) Comuneros, Comaltepec and AnalcoResident

Community Active Retired Nonresident

comaltepec 158 83 299Analco 82 22 240

Source: robson (2010).





work.” the overall ratio is slightly higher in comaltepec but is critically low in san martin soyolapam.

iMPACtS on GovernAnCe And CoMMunity-level reSPonSeS

the shortfall in resident comunero numbers has had a number of impacts on the governance system. in both communities many lower-level cargos have been dispensed with, and this increases the workload for mid- and high-level cargo holders. in Analco and the smaller localities of comaltepec, there is no longer strict adherence to the hierarchy of offices, and this means that younger comuneros now have less opportunity to gain experience before taking on lead-ership roles. At the same time, the selection of younger candidates to fill impor-tant cargos allows the community to benefit from energetic and educated personnel and acts as an incentive for young people to stay in the village.

in santiago comaltepec a comunero can still retire after completing six year-long cargos, but this rule has been rescinded in La esperanza and san martín soyolapam. in Analco there is a retirement age of 60, but it is common to find overage men holding down less demanding cargos and participating in tequios. Fewer days of tequio are now dedicated to less important or less urgent community work, while for indispensable projects the number of days of tequio has increased to compensate for the shortage of labor. in the smaller localities this means that a lot of work never gets started and that the projects that do get off the ground often take a long time to reach completion (robson and Berkes, 2011).

in response to this situation, both communities have introduced a number of institutional adaptations: a reduction in the duration of the cargo term, leg-islation establishing the rights and obligations of migrant comuneros, and, in Analco, an expanded governance role for women. the most significant of these adaptive strategies is the establishment of new rules and obligations for nonresident (migrant) comuneros. the decision to migrate must often factor in community obligations, and therefore these obligations may determine whether a would-be migrant leaves in the first place and, having migrated, how long he or she remains absent. Among these new obligations is the requirement for migrant comuneros to pay substitutes to fulfill their obliga-tions. Key to this development has been the establishment of hometown asso-ciations in Los Angeles (comaltepec and Analco) and Las vegas (Analco) that facilitate the transfer of financial and cultural resources between migrant and home communities.

tAble 2

estimated Comunero : Cargo ratios, 2008

Community Cargos (estimated) Active comuneros Comunero : Cargo Ratio

comaltepec santiago comaltepec 52 104 2.00La esperanza 17 34 2.00san martín soyolapam 14 20 1.42Analco 53 82 1.55

Source: robson (2010).





the authorities in both communities were of the opinion that there needed to be stronger pressure on migrants in U.s. cities to recognize their commitment to the home village. As of 2008, close to half of the absent comuneros from Analco and comaltepec were maintaining their active status, but a growing number in Los Angeles were questioning their continued participation in these commons institutions. As a former municipal president in Analco acknowl-edged: “many people who leave forget about their obligations [to the commu-nity], and many think ‘they cannot make me comply, because i no longer use the services provided by the village.’ . . . they forget about their moral obliga-tions.” similarly, one comaltepecano long-term resident in Los Angeles said that the cargo and tequio were “no longer relevant in today’s world,” adding that “a lot of the guys in Los Angeles continue to comply with cargos in good faith but have no intention of going back to comaltepec.” As their own material needs increase, some migrants have stopped cooperating altogether. in both La esperanza and san martin soyolapam, village authorities reported that among the comuneros who had left since 2000 only a handful were fulfilling their obli-gations. continued commitment to customary governance depends upon migrants’ marital and family status, shifting migration patterns, and new atti-tudes among second- and third-generation migrants. the trend is toward declining participation (robson, 2010).

deCline in the QuAlity oF GovernAnCe

Decline in the quality of governance is both a critical (Kearney and Besserer, 2004) and an underinvestigated (robson and Berkes, 2011) consequence of migration. the top cargos require a certain level of education and leadership ability, and because the pool of qualified comuneros has shrunk over time it is increasingly difficult to find the right people for the most important jobs. indeed, interviewees from both communities noted how difficult it was to iden-tify the three candidates for the top municipal and communal offices that the local electoral procedure required. in addition, a reduction in the duration of mid- and high-level cargos has led to a much quicker turnover of officeholders, and this affects the quality of the work that they can achieve. there is less time for incoming officials to learn the ropes and fully assume their responsibilities before having to make way for the next set. the shortened term discourages officials from pursuing longer-term projects, and when long-term projects are undertaken there may be a problem of follow-up on the part of the incoming authorities. Finally, the problems associated with the lack of a transition period between outgoing and incoming officials have become more pronounced. As one comunero commented, “nothing ever gets done. . . . new people come in with new ideas and existing projects get put to one side.”

the inability to fill cargos with qualified people and ensure that governance adheres to customary standards has become a major concern. Among the crite-ria used by state and federal governments to evaluate whether a community is equipped to govern a municipality are the number of cargos being performed and whether the resident population is large enough to fill them. While some cargos can be dispensed with, others cannot be lost without fundamentally





undermining the system. if it were stripped of its municipal status, Analco would become an agency of a neighboring municipality. Although the com-munity would maintain control over its communal resources, it would no lon-ger be the sole decision maker for civic matters. in comaltepec there are enough comuneros in the head village to ensure the community’s municipal status for the immediate future, but its ability to manage its extensive communal resources has been weakened.

diSCuSSion

Oaxacan communities are increasingly dependent on the market economy, the service industry, and migrant remittances. they are what michael Kearney (1996) called “post-peasant communities,” organizations that have developed multiple identities to combine different sources of income with complex forms of reproduction in an interconnected, globalized world (schuren, 2003; Wolf, 1982). migration has led to a severe reduction in the number of active resident comuneros in both study communities, and this has placed multiple pressures on the governance systems that are pillars of community life, identity, and par-ticipation. these findings place the continuity of traditional governance and social organization in northern Oaxaca in doubt.

some suggest that the greatest hope for affected villages lies in the establish-ment and strengthening of transnational ties and the emergence of new institu-tional arrangements (cohen, 2005; Orlove, 1999; Waterbury, 1999). this brings to the fore ideas of moral economy (scott, 1976; thompson, 1993) and institu-tional “embeddedness” (mccay, 2002), calling attention to the role of cultural norms, mores, values, and shared histories in guiding the organization and decision making of social collectives. in both Analco and comaltepec, collec-tive action based on shared communities of origin shows that migrants take their sense of community with them. through the establishment of hometown associations, community can be both strengthened at home and recreated among fellow villagers living in faraway cities (Fox, 2007; Grieshop, 2006; stiffler, 2007; Wiest, 2009). in particular, the monetization of the cargo and the tequio—obliging migrants to provide compensation for their nonparticipation—provides an opportunity for migrants to finance the continuity of local customs and ways of life.

However, while migration from northern Oaxaca was once temporary or circular, over the past 15 years or so semipermanent or permanent migration, coinciding with an increase in migration to the United states during the 1990s and early 2000s, has become dominant. increasingly, migrants participate either intermittently or not at all in transnational institutional arrangements. indeed, in contrast to the high expectations associated with a more optimistic view of transnational communities (cohen, 2005), participation is modest and on the decline. this is consistent with findings for communities in other parts of mexico (Fox, 2007; Jones, 2009).

these are consequences of the changing nature of migrant lifestyles, in which personal and family commitments can quickly alter one’s status from active to nonactive. Because the journey to the United states has become more expensive and more difficult (cornelius and Lewis, 2007; Wiest, 2009), undocumented migrants are staying longer in the north and abandoning the temporary





migration prevalent during the 1980s and early 1990s. For such individuals, “once circular migration has become a one-way trip” (Fox, 2007: 289). in addi-tion, a number of migrants are now leaving their home village or choosing to remain longer in the United states or mexico city because of the burden of the local governance system. in both study communities, there is a growing tension between the community’s investment expectations and the willingness of migrants to meet them.

since the signing of the north American Free trade Agreement (nAFtA), campesinos in the highlands of northern Oaxaca have had to adjust by moving into occupations outside agriculture and forestry. While migration may still be seen by some as occurring outside the dominant rural development frame-work, for most families it is a central component of a contemporary survival strategy (Fox, 2007: 329). Under these circumstances, it can be a struggle for communities like Analco and comaltepec to strike a balance between custom-ary systems and engagement with the market economy. Aspects of the tradi-tional governance system in northern Oaxaca resemble what eric Wolf (1957) called the “closed corporate peasant community,” with authority and honor derived from participation in the rotating system of civic-religious-political officeholding. While some aspects of this age-old system can travel with migrants, other rural traditions are harder to maintain without a productive presence in the traditional community. thus the impact of migration speaks directly to the way affected communities may function in years to come as globalization transforms them into more “open” systems.

the Future oF CoMMunity

Governments functioning under the usos y costumbres system are generally much smaller in scale and more politically autonomous in Oaxaca than in other parts of mexico. traditional governance extends to entire municipalities, autonomous spaces where indigenous communities write their own laws (Walker and Walker, 2008). it is a system that carries with it notions of common indigenous history, social organization based on kinship ties, community ser-vice, and political participation based on one’s standing in the community. Yet, as Kearney and Besserer (2004: 451) noted, “the distinctive features of indige-nous civic governance in Oaxaca have developed over many centuries in what, until fairly recently, were relatively local communities.” in the context of high rates of migration, the future of this governance system is uncertain: “there is much reason to be concerned about the vitality of communities to staff offices and deliver basic services, maintain and improve infrastructure, maintain law and order, and preserve communal ceremonial and religious life and identities” (2004: 453). shifts in migration patterns and migrant profiles are, despite insti-tutional adaptations, challenging the ability of sending villages to maintain an effective local governance system based upon long-standing cultural norms and beliefs.

in neither community have the pressures associated with a changing migra-tion dynamic been sufficiently alleviated by collective responses to demo-graphic and cultural change. migration rates remained high up until our last visit in 2011, with decisions to postpone a trip north being a consequence of economic difficulties in the United states or difficulties at the border rather





than pressure applied by the community. While this suggests that other strate-gies are needed, communities do not have many institutional options to fall back on. Additional changes that could delay or mitigate further impacts—for example, restoring the original three-year term of office—are unlikely to work if the burden placed on the remaining residents continues to be severe.

One concrete opportunity is an expanded role for women. Although com-munity citizenship rights (and obligations) have customarily been limited to resident adult males, there is no legal impediment to greater female participa-tion, and some communities, such as Analco, have become more flexible about the terms of membership. this makes perfect sense because many sending communities have become majority-female. encouraged by deliberate empow-erment strategies, women in Analco are increasingly participating in gover-nance. However, while this is a highly significant development, it is not found uniformly across the region. velasquez (2004: 484) has shown that some kinds of female participation in the local public sphere can have contradictory impli-cations, as in the frequent case (in comaltepec, for example) in which a wom-an’s participation in the place of her absent husband imposes on her “a kind of second-class citizenship as well as additional work obligations.” in other words, the current pattern of varied but limited female access to local decision making remains far from a system in which women have full rights to citizen-ship in local community governance.

thus, despite institutional adaptations and the promise offered by the femi-nization of local governance, the governance system in both study communi-ties is under stress. One possible scenario is the concentration of civic governance in fewer, larger municipalities. Yet this would imply a gradual loss in the syn-ergy that exists between communal and municipal governance. even among larger and less vulnerable municipalities, the abandonment of seasonal ranches and smaller permanent settlements because of migration (robson, 2010) is adversely affecting the ability of communities to govern geographically exten-sive and ecologically diverse forest commons. As affected communities strug-gle to maintain continuity, they can expect to receive little assistance from government. A former municipal president of comaltepec explained: “[the state] is happy for ‘usos y costumbres’ to continue because it implies a lower cost for them. . . . it’s not in their interest to change the system.” Any help, therefore, will most likely come from the transnational community. However, increasing the contributions from migrant members involves balancing what the community needs and what migrants are willing to provide. even if migrants are coerced into financing more government posts and are able to do so over the long term, the further monetization and professionalization of local governance will surely erode the ideals of civic reciprocity and service that have traditionally underpinned this system.

Our data generally support Kearney and Besserer’s (2004: 454) claim that this is “a new moment in the history of Oaxacan communities” in which local citi-zenship and administration are becoming “increasingly dependent on the ser-vice of return migrants and the [support] of immigrants living in the north.” As sending communities, comaltepec and Analco have moved from the migration phase through the settlement phase to the beginnings of the consolidation phase (after smith, 2006). As migrant communities become larger and more estab-lished, migrant comuneros become major players in community decision





making, and this affects the very processes of “community making.” As distri-butions of social power and privilege move beyond the bounded territorial arena to incorporate the migrant diaspora and a dialectic emerges between resident and nonresident community members, the decision-making process will begin to change. in extreme cases, there have been reports of village gover-nance’s being relocated abroad, such as smith’s (2006) case of a mixtec commu-nity in Puebla that is effectively governed by officials living in new York. While this is an improbable scenario for either of our two study communities, we are seeing a shift as the demographic center of gravity moves away from bounded communities into more dispersed transnational populations.

While debate continues on the long-term impacts of mexican migration to the United states (e.g., Binford, 2003; cohen, 2005; Jones, 2009), our research suggests increasing monetization, commoditization, and, arguably, incorpora-tion into the global market economy. this in itself need not be totally destruc-tive of local governance structures, nor should it lead to the loss of unique ethnic identity structures and institutions if there can be a shift from the tradi-tional fulfillment of service obligations to a resilient reinvention of identity (see Grieshop, 2006). this reinvention could take the form of community-based eco-tourism projects, the consolidation of community control of forest resources (Bray, 2010), new forms of cooperative farm work (robson, 2010), or a portfolio of diverse community-level activities undertaken for economic, social, and environmental gains. such initiatives could provide both investment opportu-nities for migrants and more local employment choices for village youth.

Wiest’s monitoring of transnational migration from the michoacán mestizo community of Acuitzio over a 40-year period suggests that there is no single change trajectory in the community; rather, transnational migration has fluctu-ated with the economic opportunities available at home and abroad. Under nAFtA, however, migration has increased significantly and taken Acuitzences to new and more distant locations, and migrant remittances have become the primary driver of Acuitzio’s economy. Despite extended stays abroad, remit-tances remain strong along with a recent and pronounced collective emphasis on “home,” including hometown association initiatives in chicago and various california locations. Political involvement of transnational workers is challeng-ing politics-as-usual to the point of active recruitment among them of candi-dates for political office at home.

As Kearney and associates (e.g., Kearney and Besserer, 2004; nagengast and Kearney, 1990) have observed, much depends on conditions and shifts in the larger global economy and the way mexican workers and their communities of origin engage with “the realities of the rapidly accelerating trends of deterrito-rialization, transnationalization, and globalization that are reshaping them” (Kearney and Besserer, 2004: 464). A great deal also depends on the evolution of migration patterns and flows in response to unfolding events and policies in both sending and receiving regions. since the end of 2009, for example, there has been a significant downturn in the number of new migrants heading north from the two study communities. this is a trend affecting other parts of the country, with data suggesting that net migration flows to the United states have stopped and may be reversing (Passel, cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012). Yet with recent signs of an upturn in the U.s. economy, migration north may again become the norm.





Our findings, of course, come from just two communities located in a par-ticular region of Oaxaca. similar work in many more communities will be needed before comment can be made (with authority) on the relationship between migration and local governance in broader terms. Our study shows that there are aspects of customary life that have persisted over time and, through the vagaries of transnationalism, may be reinforced and reconsti-tuted. rather than being uniform under capitalist accumulation, change will likely take place in specific places and in response to different drivers and markets. While Analco and comaltepec are struggling, some communities from the same region have used migration to funnel greater investment into the local economy and introduce some quite radical institutional adapta-tions.3 At the other extreme, migration from villages close to Oaxaca city and in the mixteca has produced what Otero (1999) calls a “farewell to the peas-antry,” in which wage labor has become a “sure sign of proletarianization and the death of communalism.” communities are facing a range of collective-action dilemmas, and the ways in which they respond will be determined by the sociocultural, economic, environmental, and intellectual resources avail-able to them.

ConCluSion

this study has highlighted the tension between two frameworks for explain-ing the persistence of long-standing indigenous governance systems in Oaxaca, mexico, in the face of internal and external stressors driven by rural-urban migration.

On the one hand, the establishment of hometown associations is clear evi-dence that contemporary commons regimes act as vehicles for the symbolic production of locality (after Baker, 2005). this supports the argument that migrants continue to adhere to a communalist ideology that explains their com-pliance with communal obligations and an apparent strengthening of commu-nity. Oaxacan commons are considered inseparable from the collective labor relations and ideologies that bind communities together, and, as mutersbaugh (2004: 6) notes, these regimes can show a “marvelous ability to reconfigure to meet new challenges.”

On the other hand, migrants are individuals and therefore prone to indi-vidualistic behavior, which may conflict with any moral obligations they feel to the collective. in our two study communities, a sizable number of migrants have isolated themselves from local customs, with a trend toward declining participation in adapted customary institutions. these findings point to a limit to the capacity of migrants to invest capital (human, finan-cial, cultural, or symbolic) in the home community and a likely decline in such investment over the long term. When individual and family needs take precedence, migrants, as rational economic actors, begin to break with community expectations. Put another way, when migrating individuals weigh their futures in terms of the limitations of their resources, they are likely at a crossroads with regard to their primary allegiance—to family or to community.





noteS

1. A reference to the large number of dialects found in the chinantla (Bartolomé et al., 1999).2. As Anaya muñoz (2005) explains, before the 1998 reforms, the authorities in indigenous

municipalities were elected by way of usos y costumbres and then registered officially as political party candidates and “ratified” through the official electoral process.

3. san Pablo macuiltianguis (a neighboring community of comaltepec), for instance, has not only monetized its cargo system but is now hiring professionals from Oaxaca city to fill some of the posts. the financing is coming from migrant groups in Los Angeles and the local community forestry operation (Leticia merino, personal communication).

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Documents

Robson and Wiest 2014 LAP Online First (November 2013)