CARP Case Digest

G.R. No. 133706 Supreme Court 3rd

Division (Panganiban, J.)Francisco Estolas vs. Adolfo Mabalot May 7, 2002

FACTS:

Adolfo Mabalot was awarded with an agricultural land by virtue ofPD 27. Corresponding Certificate of Land Transfer was issued onNovember 11, 1973. In May 1978, he needed money for medicaltreatment and passed the land to Francisco Estolas in exchange ofP5,800 and P200 worth of rice. According to Mabalot, the transferwas only a verbal mortgage but Estolas treated the same as sale.Department of Agrarian Reform then issued a Transfer CertificateTitle in favor of Estolas. In 1988, Mabalot tried to redeem theland from petitioner but was unsuccessful. DAR Regional Officedecided in favor of the petitioner contending that there wasabandonment on the part of the respondent. DAR Central Office,however, reversed its regional office’s decision. Estolasappealed but Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent,contending that the transfer of land to petitioner is void andthere was no abandonment by respondent since failure on theredemption was due to a higher redemption price set by thepetitioner.

ISSUE:

Is the transfer of the agricultural land valid?

LAW:

Presidential Decree 27 provides that title to land acquiredpursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program ofthe government shall not be transferable except to the grantee’sheirs by hereditary succession or back to the government by otherlegal means.

RULING:

Kristie Xyla R. AmaroCEU School of Law and Jurisprudence (1st Semester, SY 2013-2014)Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation

Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent. It affirmed thedecision of the Court of Appeals and cited that there is no roomfor interpretation in the provision of PD 27 regarding transferof agricultural land. It affirmed, as well, CA’s decision on thenon-abandonment of the subject land by the respondent.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The award ofagricultural land by virtue of PD 27 is based on the premise thatfarmers must be given opportunities to achieve a dignifiedexistence and to make them more independent, self-reliant andresponsible citizens. To protect that interest, the law providesthat transfer of title shall only be made if such wouldconstitute either transfer to the awardee’s heirs or to thegovernment. This would ensure that these small farmers will notbe deceived or enticed to sell the property in consideration ofurgent financial needs. Such provision of the law accorded thefarmers or grantees the protection they need from abusive lendersor creditors.

G.R. No. 109568 Supreme Court 1st Division(Austria-Martinez, J.)Roland Sigre vs. August 8, 2002Court of Appeals & Lilia Gonzales

FACTS:

Lilia Gonzales, in her capacity as a co-administratrix of theestate of Matias Yusay, filed a petition for prohibition andmandamus, seeking to prohibit Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)from accepting leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre and for LBPto turnover to Gonzales the rentals previously remitted by Sigre.Sigre was a tenant of Gonzales in an irrigated rice land inIloilo. He remitted rental payments to Gonzales until theissuance of memorandum circular no. 6 series of 1978 by the


Department of Agrarian Reform, which set the guidelines in therental payments by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transferprogram of PD No. 27. Pursuant to the issuance, Sigre stoppedpaying Gonzales and remitted the rentals to LBP instead. Gonzalesquestioned the validity of the circular and the constitutionalityof PD 27. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Gonzales andordered LBP to return the rentals to the respondent and Sigre torevert direct payment to Gonzales. Rolando Sigre, whosubstituted Ernesto, filed consolidated petitions for reviewalleging that erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Is the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 invalid? Is PD No. 27unconstitutional?

LAW:

PD No. 27 decrees the emancipation of tenants from the bondage ofthe soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land theytill and providing the instruments and mechanism therefor.

PD No. 816 provides that rentals are to be paid to the landownerby agricultural lessee until after the valuation of the propertyshall have been determined.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rolando Sigre and granted hisconsolidated petitions. The Court ruled that DAR MemorandumCircular No. 6 is not in conflict with PD 816, which states thattenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals tothe landowner until the value of the property has been determinedor agreed upon by the landowner and DAR. The circular onlysupplements such Presidential Decree by mandating that tenant-farmer pays rental to LBP after the value has been determined.Moreover, the Court reiterated that there is no question on theconstitutionality of PD 27, providing for the emancipation of


tenants from the bondage of soil and transferring to them theownership of the land they till.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. DAR MemorandumCircular and PD 816 are not in conflict with each other, rather,they complement each other. With the promulgation of DARcircular, the petitioner is now obliged to remit rental paymentsto Land Bank of the Philippines since the value of the propertyhas been ascertained. The respondent’s contention is withoutmerit as the constitutionality of PD 27 has long been settled.


G.R. No. 128557 Supreme Court 2nd

Division (Bellosillo, J.)Land Bank of the Philippines vs. December 29, 1999Court of Appeals and Jose Pascual

FACTS:

An action for mandamus was filed by Jose Pascual after therefusal of Land Bank of the Philippines to pay private respondentpursuant to the final decision rendered by the ProvincialAgrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). LBP was ordered to pay Php1.9M plus interest as just compensation to Jose Pascual. Thecomputation was based on the increased value of the GovernmentSupport Price, which was Php 300 per cavan of palay and Php 250per cavan of corn. The petitioner refused to pay the respondentalleging the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals andthat it acted beyond its authority. It also asserted that thewrit of mandamus could not be issued, as there are other remediesavailable in the ordinary course of law.

ISSUE:


Is the Land Bank of the Philippines bound to pay the Php 1.9Mplus 6% interest per annum as just compensation to Jose Pascual?

LAW:

EO 228 provides that the valuation of rice and corn lands coveredby PD 27 shall be based on the average gross productiondetermined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production inaccordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of1973 and related issuance of the Department of Agrarian Reform.The average gross production shall be multiplied by 2.5, theproduct shall be multiplied by Php 35, the government supportprice for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, orPhp 31, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos ofcorn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be thevalue of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for thepurpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation tothe landowner.

RULING:

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals ingranting the compensation of Php 1.9M but it deleted the 6%interest per annum, as it is no longer applicable. AdministrativeOrder No. 13, which provides compensation to landowners forunearned interests is no longer applicable since the PARADalready increased the GSP from Php 35 to Php 300 per cavan ofpalay and from Php 31 to Php 250 per cavan of corn.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court to modify thedecision of the Court of Appeals. I believe that imposing 6%interest per annum on top of the Php 1.9M value of the lands isunconscionable. It goes beyond the “just compensation” requiredby law to be given to landowners. By PARAD’s decision to increasethe basis of land valuation, the landowner has already been


justly compensated. The need for imposing the interest isuncalled for.



Division (Quisumbing, J.)Hon. Antonio Nuesa and Restituto Rivera vs. March 6, 2002Court of Appeals, DARAB and Jose Verdillo

FACTS:

An award over two (2) parcels of agricultural land was granted bythe Secretary of Agrarian Reform in favor of Jose Verdillo. Hethen filed an application with the Regional Office of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform to purchase the lots after twenty-one years. Restituto River, who was in possession of andcultivating the land for the time being, filed a letter ofprotest against Verdillo. He also filed an application topurchase the land. After investigation, Antonio Nuesa, theRegional Director of DAR, ordered the cancellation of the grantto Verdillo. A petition was consequently filed by Verdillo withthe Provincial Adjudication Board for the annulment of the saiddecision.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the petition ofVerdillo on the ground of improper remedy but the DARABProvincial Adjudicator denied it and the DAR AppellateAdjudication affirmed the same. Hence, petitioners submit thispetition for review.

ISSUE:


Does the Court of Appeals act in grave abuse of discretion whenit sustained DARAB’s decision?

LAW:

RA 6657 and other relevant laws and issuances provide that theDepartment of Agrarian Reform is vested with the primaryjurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform mattersand shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all mattersinvolving the implementation of the agrarian reform program.

RULING:

The Court ruled that DARAB officials and boards, provincial andcentral, had overstepped their legal boundaries in takingcognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera andrespondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded the lots inquestion. It emphasized the importance of observingjurisdictional limits set by enabling laws for the implementationof the agrarian reform program. DARAB’s decision is unjustified,as it should not, in the first place, take cognizance of thecase. Hence, Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed and DARRegional Director’s order granting the land in favor of RestitutoRivera was reinstated.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court, not only on thebasis of jurisdictional authority, but also based on theprinciple of equity. Restituto Rivera has been in possession ofthe land and he has also been cultivating the same. It is onlyequitable that he be awarded with the agricultural land. JoseVerdillo, who was originally granted with the award of land, didnot act upon it until after the lapse of twenty-one years. He didnot object nor initiated an action to stop Rivera from possessingand cultivating the land. Hence, it can be inferred that he wasestopped from filing an action to recover the land by way of thegrant. As Rivera cultivates the agricultural land for quite some


time now, it is pursuant to the objectives of agrarian reformthat he reaps the fruits of his labor.



Division (Velasco Jr., J.)Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. December 21,2007Secretary of Agrarian Reform & DAR Regional Director (Region V)

FACTS:

The Archbishop of Caceres owned several parcels of land plantedwith rice, corn and coconut trees. He filed petitions forexemption from Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under PD 27 of theselands with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office in NagaCity. Two petitions were however denied by the Regional Directorof Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioner contended thatsuch lands were donations and he held the property only in trustcapacity. He argued that the donations had stipulationsprohibiting him to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber ormortgage the subject lands, from which he concluded that he wasthe “landowner” as contemplated by the PD 27 and RA 6657. Thepetition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, hence thispetition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Are the subject lands exempt from Operation Land Transfer underPD 27?

LAW:

RA 6657 provides for an exclusive list of exemptions as follows:

“Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. –


a) Lands actually, directly, exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forestreserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of thisAct.

b) Private lands actually, directly, exclusively used for prawn farms andfishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, thatsaid prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed andCertificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued under the AgrarianReform Program. In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have notbeen subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consentof the farmworkers shall no longer be necessary; however, the provisionof Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply.

c) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessaryfor national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimentalfarm stations operated by public or private schools for educationalpurposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production center,church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamiccenters appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries,penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates,government and private research and quarantine centers and all landswith eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those alreadydeveloped, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (As amendedby RA 7881)”

RULING:

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals inholding that subject lands are not exempt from the Operation LandTransfer of PD 27 and RA 6657. Supreme Court held that theArchbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the Filipinofaithful as the lands in question clearly do not fall under anyof the exemptions enumerated by the law. The law is clear on theexemptions granted and there is no room for interpretation.According to the decision in this case, the Archbishop, as areligious leader, can just take solace in the fact that his landsare going to be awarded to those who need and can utilize them tothe fullest.


OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court that the land inquestion should not be exempt from the OLT of PD 27. The ultimategoal of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is to accord landto the landless who can utilize such to its fullest. With thenobility of this law, it is only proper that exemptions bestrictly construed. Only exclusions contemplated by law should beallowed to ensure that its purpose would not be defeated.Moreover, I find the contention of the Archbishop ratherunbecoming of a religious leader. He, among anybody else, shouldhave understood the reason behind the Operation Land Transfer ofCARL. By filing the petitions for exemptions, it was as if hewanted to deprive the landless the lands that should be awardedto them.



Division (Velasco Jr., J.)Josephine Taguinod & Vic Aguila vs. September 14,2007Court of Appeals, Antonino Samaniego, et al.

FACTS:

Salud Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots basedon homestead patents. Said lots were transferred to Vic Aguila,who was then a minor, and to Josephine Taguinod. Both lots wereheld under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27 with 12tenants or farmer-beneficiaries identified. Salud Aguila, onbehalf of Vic Aguila, filed an application for retention over thesaid land. And when Vic Aguila reached the age of majority, hefiled a letter-protest for exclusion or exemption from OLT.Taguinod filed the same letter-protest seeking for exclusion andexemption from OLT. The DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer(MARO) recommended the approval of applications of Salud andTaguinod to the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) forretention of the lots in question. PARO did grant theapplication, which led the beneficiaries to file a counter-protest.

The issue was then elevated to the Regional Director of DAR, whoruled that the application for retention be granted to thepetitioners of not more than seven (7) hectares of land. Lots inexcess of 7 hectares must be placed under the control of theOperation Land Transfer. Petitioners filed motions forreconsideration.

Taguinod filed an appeal with the Office of the Secretary of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform, contending that she was therightful owner of the disputed land after redeeming the propertyfrom Salud Aguila, her adoptive mother, when such land wassubjected to a mortgage. The Secretary affirmed the decision ofthe DAR Regional Director and denied the petitioner’s appeal. The


Secretary also found that Salud Aguila was disqualified to retain7 hectares of land.

With this decision, the petitioners interposed appeal before theOffice of the President. The Office of the President ruled infavor of the petitioners. It anchored its ruling on the fact thatthe land in question was derived from a homestead patent. Assuch, these lands are exempt from the coverage of PD 27.

The respondents, then, filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.The CA reversed the decision of the Office of the President andreinstated the decision of the Secretary of DAR. CA agreed withthe Office of the President that the rights of the homesteadersare superior to those of tenants invoking agrarian reform laws.However, petitioners failed to establish the identities of theoriginal homestead patentees and that they are direct compulsoryheirs of the original patentees.

ISSUE:

Are the lots previously covered by homestead patents outside theambit of PD 27?

LAW:

RA 6657, Sec. 6 provides that original homestead grantees ortheir direct compulsory heirs who still own the originalhomestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retainthe same areas as long as they continue to cultivate saidhomestead.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.According to SC, it is a settled rule that homestead grantees’


rights are superior to those of tenants invoking rights under theagrarian reform law. However, in this case, the petitionersfailed to prove the identities of the original homestead granteesand establish that they were indeed direct compulsory heirs ofthe grantees to avail of the exemption. As exclusions from thecoverage of PD 27 must be strictly construed, failure on the partof the petitioners to prove that they are covered by theexemptions provided for by law extinguishes their rights to availof the same. Premised on the said grounds, the petitioners aredisqualified to avail of the right of retention over the land asthey are not small landowners and the lands in dispute aresubject to the Operation Land Transfer of PD 27.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Since petitionersfailed to prove that they hold superior rights over the subjectland, they are not entitled to the exemptions accorded by thelaw. Granting them with the right of retention over the said landwould defeat the very purpose of the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program. Promotion of social justice is the paramountconsideration of the program; hence, it is a deviation from thiscore purpose if retention will be granted to the petitioners whostill own several parcels of land aside from the lots inquestion. It is more in accordance with law that qualifiedfarmer-beneficiaries will be granted parcels of land, which theycan till and fully utilize to improve their living.



Division (Chico-Nazario., J.)Apo Fruits Corp & Hijo Plantation vs. December 19, 2007Court of Appeals & Land Bank of the Phils.

FACTS:

Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Incorporated wereowners of 5 parcels of land in Davao. These companies voluntarilyoffered to sell their lands to the Department of Agriculturepursuant to RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Theparties were not able to come into agreement as to the price ofthe lands in question. Thus, the petitioners brought the matterto before the DAR Adjudication Board to determine justcompensation. Pending the determination of the just compensation,the government deposited P26M and P45M to Apo Fruits Corporationand Hijo Plantation, Inc., respectively. DAR also registered saidlands in the name of the Republic of the Philippines anddistributed the same to farmers under CARP.

Three years passed but DARAB failed to render decision on thevaluation of land and determination of just compensation. Hence,petitioners filed a complaint for the determination of justcompensation before the Regional Trial Court of Davao, whichrendered decision in favor of AFC and HPI. RTC ruled that thepurchase price of the land should be higher than what wasinitially offered by DAR, considering the permanent improvementson AFC’s and HPI’s lands.

Department of Agrarian Reform appealed the RTC decision to theCourt of Appeals, which reversed RTC’s decision.


ISSUE:

Was the price set forth by the Department of Agrarian Reformwithin the ambit of just compensation as contemplated by the law?

LAW:

RA 6657, Sec. 57 provides that the Special Agrarian Courts (SAC)shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitionsfor the determination of just compensation to landowners.

Sec. 17 of the same Act provides that in determining justcompensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the currentvalue of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, thesworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and theassessment made by government assessors shall be considered. Thesocial and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and thefarmworkers and by the government to the property as well as thenon-payment of taxes or loans secured from any governmentfinancing institution on the said land shall be considered asadditional factors to determine its valuation.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that just compensation was not accordedto the petitioners, AFC and HPI. DARAB’s failure to determinejust compensation for a span of three years was prejudicial tothe landowners. DAR was not able to justify why a lower purchaseprice was offered for the said lots. The Court ruled that toallow the taking of landowners’ properties and to leave themempty-handed while government withholds compensation isundoubtedly oppressive. According to the decision, justcompensation embraces not only the correct determination of the


amount of be paid to the owners of the land, but also the paymentof the land within a reasonable time from its taking.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. Although thewelfare of the less privileged farmers is the main considerationof the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, payment of justcompensation to landowners should not be taken for granted. Whilethe government reserves its right to uphold the law and protectsmall farmers, it should not also oppress the landowners anddeprive them of just compensation in exchange of theirproperties. With the facts presented in the case, it can beconcluded that the landowners have given the government,especially DAR, ample time to determine just compensation. Butthe latter’s failure to determine and award such compensationprejudiced their rights as property owners. It is only just andproper to award P1.38B to the petitioners.



Division (Bellosillo, J.)Victor Valencia vs. Court of Appeals April 29, 2003

FACTS:

Victor Valencia, a government retiree, owned two parcels of land,which he leased out to Glicerio Henson for ten (10) years. Hensonconstituted Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to work on theproperty during his lease. Valencia then leased the same land toFr. Andres Flores for five years after the expiration of thefirst lease contract. Fr. Flores also designated several peopleas workers, including Crescenciano and Marciano. The petitioneracquired said parcels of land through a homestead grant by thegovernment.

After the expiration of the contract between Valencia and Flores,the petitioner demanded the workers to vacate the said land.However, the workers refused and continued cultivating the land.They applied for Certificates of Land Transfer under theOperation Land Transfer Program of PD 27, instead. The Departmentof Agrarian Reform granted the applications and CLTs were issuedto the respondents.

Valencia then filed actions for recovery of possession over thesubject land on the ground that the tenants and the governmentunjustly withheld these lands from him. He also contested theexistence of the tenancy relationship between him and the tenant-beneficiaries.

ISSUE:

Were the subject lands wrongfully taken from the petitioner?


LAW:

RA 3844, Sec. 6 states that a Civil Law Lessee is notautomatically authorized to employ a tenant without the consentof the landowner.

RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The subject landswere unlawfully taken from Valencia when the Department ofAgriculture issued Certificates of Land Transfer to therespondents (tenants). First, the lands in question were acquiredby the petitioner through a homestead grant, which is excludedfrom the coverage of PD 27. Second, the tenant-beneficiaries werenot really tenants of the landowner. The lessee, Fr. Flores, wasthe one who hired the workers to cultivate the land. Suchdesignation of workers was beyond the scope of authority of aCivil Law Lessee and was made without the consent of thelandowner. The security of tenure guaranteed by the laws may onlybe invoked by tenants de jure, and not by those who are not trueand lawful tenants. The Court also emphasized that while it istrue that in case of reasonable doubt, the it has to tilt thebalance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittinglyextends its sympathy and compassion, it is never justified togive preference to the poor simply because they are poor orreject the rich simply because they are rich. Justice must alwaysbe served for the poor and the rich alike according to themandate of the law.

OPINION:

I agree with the opinion of the Supreme Court. I strongly agreewith Justice Bellosillo that decisions of the Court should notfavor the poor just because they are poor. Although the agrarianreform program is especially implemented to promote socialjustice and provide opportunity for the farmers to own the landsthey till and decently provide a living for their families, the


Court has to maintain its independence and must decide alwaysaccording to the mandate of the law. In this case, the landownerwas unlawfully deprived of his property. The parcels of land weretaken away from him pursuant to PD 27. However, according to thesame law, the subject property is exempt from the Operation LandTransfer Program as it was acquired through a homestead title.Moreover, the tenant-beneficiaries did not qualify as rightbeneficiaries of the program because they are not lawful tenantsof the landowner. They were designated to cultivate the landwithout the tacit consent of Valencia. With all these facts, Ibelieve that while it is not beneficial to the respondents, thedecision was fair enough to enable the real owner to recoverpossession of his property.


G.R. No. 78742 Supreme Court En Banc(Cruz, J.)Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. July 14, 1989vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

FACTS:

The case at bar is a consolidation of four cases harping on theconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, Executive OrderNos. 228 and 229, and Republic Act No. 6657. The petitioners inthis case question the unreasonable taking of their land withoutjust compensation. The lands were taken from the petitionersbefore the payment of just compensation. The landowners alsoraised the issue that the mode of payment of compensation for thelands subjected to the agrarian reform program was unfair andprejudicial to them.

ISSUE:

Are the executive orders 228 and 229 in violation of theconstitutional provision that no property shall be taken withoutdue process or just compensation?

LAW:

RA 6657, Section 16 provides for the procedure on the acquisitionof private lands. Included in this section is the payment of justcompensation. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall send noticeto the landowners for the acquisition of land and offer to paycorresponding value of the land. If the landowner accepts theoffer of DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall pay theowner the purchase price of the land within 30 days after thedelivery of the deed of transfer in favor of the government.Otherwise, the DAR shall conduct an administrative summary


proceeding to determine the value of the land. Upon payment ofthe purchase price to the landowner, or in case the offer wasrejected, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated bythe DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds, the DAR shalltake immediate possession of the land and shall request theproper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Titlein the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The lands willthen be distributed to the beneficiaries. Any party who disagreeswith the decision may bring the matter to the court of properjurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Secretary of AgrarianReform. It found no basis to render the executive ordersunconstitutional. As regard the just compensation in question,the court ruled that the case does not deal with the traditionalexercise of the power of eminent domain. Neither does it involveexercise of ordinary expropriation. The expropriation involvedpertains to vast areas of land amounting to a hundreds of billionpesos. Hence, just compensation in cases like this need not bepaid fully in money.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The agrarianreform program involves a massive transfer of landownership fromprivate individuals and corporations to the government, and assuch, a large sum of money is needed to pay for justcompensation. Hence, it is not to be expected that all landsubject to the implementation of the agrarian reform program willbe paid at once and in full before they shall be taken away bythe State. It will be detrimental to the economy and would affectother government projects if all landowners will be paid withjust compensation at the same time for the full amount. While thegovernment is mandated to pay for just compensation whenever it


takes away private property, it should also ensure that suchtaking would not affect other projects of the government intendedfor other stakeholders.



Division (Panganiban, J.)Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. vs. July 2, 1999Court of Appeals, PCSO & Fernando Carrascoso, Jr.

FACTS:

Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. was an owner of several racehorses. Heentered in the sweepstakes races on March 6, 1986 to September18, 1989. He sent letters of demand to private respondents forthe collection of prizes and other fees due him. The respondentshowever responded consistently that the Presidential Commissionon Good Government (PCGG) was withholding the demanded prizes.When petitioner filed an action for collection before theRegional Trial Court, the PCGG advised private respondents thatit is no longer objecting to the remittance of the prizewinnings. Petitioner, however, refused to accept payment ofprizes.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered PCSOand Carrascoso to pay the prize winnings with interest. The Courtof Appeals however reversed the decision of the trial court onholding that the respondents are in bad faith. CA is of theopinion that the respondents were just carrying out theinstructions of the PCGG.

ISSUE:

Was the withholding of the petitioner’s winnings in violation ofhis property rights without due process of law? Did therespondents act in bad faith when it withheld the remittance ofwinnings?

LAW:

Civil Code Article 32 provides that it is not necessary that thepublic officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it


is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rightsof petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or goodfaith in the performance of one’s duties.

Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominaldamages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invadedby the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizingthat right.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.The respondents did not act in bad faith when they withheld theprize winnings of the petitioner upon the instructions of thePCGG. Hence, the moral and exemplary damages should not beawarded. However, the Court agreed with the petitioner and thetrial court that the petitioner’s constitutional right has beenviolated. Although the PCSO and private respondent only actedupon the instructions of the PCGG, they could have also soughtlegal basis for the order issued by the latter. A little exerciseof prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issuedspecifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings ofpetitioner. Hence, Cojuangco was unlawfully deprived of hisproperty. Nominal damage, amounting to Php 50,000 was thenawarded to the petitioner.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court in holding therespondents liable for nominal damages and for the payment of theprize winnings. Despite the existence of an order issued by thePCGG, the respondents are still liable for damages for failure toexercise prudence in inquiring into the legality andapplicability of the withholding order. Even if the petitionerhas properties subject to examination of the PCGG, the propertyin question is not part of the sequestration proceedings.



Division (Francisco, J.)Land Bank of the Philippines vs. July 5, 1996Court of Appeals, Pedro Yap, et. Al.


FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration filed after the petition forreview on certiorari was denied. The petitioners contend thatcontrary to the Court’s conclusion, the opening of the trustaccounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficientcompliance with the mandate of the RA 6657. The respondents, onthe other hand, argue that there is no legal basis for allowingthe withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejectinglandowners pending the determination of the final valuation oftheir properties.

In this case, the private respondents’ parcels of land weresubjected to the implementation of the agrarian reform program.The landowners did not accept the offer made by the Department ofAgrarian Reform, hence, they demanded for reassessment of landvaluation. Pending the determination of the final valuation, thepetitioners opened trust accounts as a mode of deposit pursuantto Section 16 of RA 6657. ISSUE:

Was the opening of trust account for the rejecting landownerscompliant to the mandate of RA 6657?

LAW:

Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides that “Upon receipt by the landownerof the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response form thelandowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of thecompensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall takeimmediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds toissue a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines…”

RULING:


The Court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration forlack of merit. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision of RA6657 as to the procedure for acquisition of private lands isclear and unambiguous. Hence, including the opening of trustaccounts within the ambit of Section 16 (e) is tantamount toexpanded construction. The Court also ruled that to allow thetaking of the landowners’ properties and in the meantime leavethem empty-handed by withholding the payment of compensationwhile the government speculates on whether or not it will pursueexpropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide toabandon the property and return it to the owners when it hasalready been rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly anoppressive exercise of eminent domain.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. It is prejudicialand oppressive for the landowners to be deprived of justcompensation especially when their properties have already beentaken away from them. The Constitution guarantees that when aprivate property is to be taken from an individual orcorporation, just compensation must be given. In this case, theDepartment of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippineswere not compliant with the mandate of the law regarding paymentof just compensation to the landowners.


G.R. No. L-61293 Supreme Court 2nd

Division (Regalado, J.)Domingo Maddumba & Anita Maddumba February 15, 1990vs. GSIS

FACTS:

This is a petition for mandamus, compelling respondent GSIS toaccept payment of LBP bonds at their face value for a pre-existing obligation.


Government Service Insurance System conducted a public bidding ofseveral foreclosed properties. Domingo and Anita Maddumbaparticipated in the bidding and gave a manager’s check and cashas proposal bond. Upon receipt of notice of award, the petitioneroffered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at facevalue. Such bonds were issued to him as payment for his Ricelandacquired by the government pursuant to PD 27. GSIS, however,rejected the offer. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash theremaining 25% down payment and all future installments. When thesecond installment became due, the petitioner sent a letter toGSIS Board of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay themonthly amortizations with his LBP bonds. He invoked theprovision of Section 85 of RA 3844, as amended by PD No. 251.GSIS however, denied the petitioner’s request. GSIS would onlyaccept the LBP bonds if they be discounted because acceptance atface value would impair the actuarial solvency of GSIS. Hence,petitioner filed an action for mandamus.

ISSUE:

Can GSIS be compelled to accept payment of LBP bonds?

LAW:

Sec. 85 of RA 3844 provides that “The bonds issued by the Bank may beused by the holder thereof and shall be accepted for any of the following: xxx Paymentfor the purchase of shares of stocks or assets of government-owned and controlledcorporations. Upon offer by the bondholders, the corporation owned and controlled bythe Government shall, through its Board of Directors, negotiate with such bondholderwith respect to the price and other terms and conditions of the sale. In case there arevarious bondholders making the offer, the one willing to purchase under terms andconditions most favorable to the corporation shall be preferred. If no price isacceptable to the corporation, the same shall be determined by the Committee ofAppraisers composed of three members, one to be appointed by the corporation,another by the bondholder making the highest or only offer, and the third by themembers so chosen. The expense of appraisal shall be borne equally by the corporationand the successful purchaser. Should the government offer for sale to public any or allshares of stocks or assets of any of the government-owned or controlled corporations,


the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank shall be preferred, providedthat the various bids be equal in every respect in the medium of payment.”

RULING:

The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus in favor thepetitioners. GSIS is ordered to accept payment of LBP bonds atface value. It not disputed that under Sec. 85 of RA 3844, GSISis compelled to accept LBP bonds as payment for the purchase ofits assets, and in fact, the bidder who offers to pay in LBPbonds is entitled to preference. Moreover, such provisioncushions the impact of dispossession. Acceptance of LBP bonds,instead of money, entails a bigger sacrifice on the part of thelandowners when they departed with their property pursuant to theimplementation of the agrarian reform program. Thus, discountingthe LBP bonds for acceptance as payment, thereby reducing theireffective value, imposes additional burden on the landowner’spart.

OPINION:

I agree with the opinion of the Supreme Court. GSIS, as agovernment owned and controlled corporation, must accept thepayment of LBP bonds as payment for the purchase price of theasset sold. The bonds were issued by the government and it wouldseem peculiar if the GSIS rejects these bonds, being aninstrumentality of the government, as well. To dishonor suchbonds would impair the integrity of the debt instruments issuedby the government. Discounting of the bonds gave the landownerdouble burden: first, when his property was taken away from himand compelled to receive LBP bonds as payment of justcompensation and second, when such bonds would be accepted andused in a diminished value.


G.R. No. 86889 Supreme Court En Banc(Paras, J.)Luz Farms vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform December 4,1990

FACTS:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultrybusiness. Along with others in the same business, Luz Farms standto be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions ofRA 6657 and its implementing guidelines. The petition prayed forthe declaration of the aforesaid laws and guidelinesunconstitutional. Luz Farms contend that the term “agriculture”as used by the law, did not mean to include livestock, poultryand swine.

ISSUE:


Are the aforementioned provisions of CARL unconstitutional?

LAW:

Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The State shall,by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers andregular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they tillor, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive just share of the fruits thereof. To thisend, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agriculturallands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress mayprescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, andsubject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the Stateshall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentivesfor voluntary land-sharing.

RULING:

The Supreme Court declared section 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of RA 6657insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry andswine in its coverage NULL and VOID. During the deliberations inthe Constitutional Commission of 1986, it can be concluded thatthe framers of the law did not intend to include livestock andpoultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandatedagrarian reform program.

OPINION:

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The Constitutiononly includes “agriculture” as subject of the agrarian reformprogram. The intention of the legislators in drafting the law wasto provide farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands theytill and receive just share of its fruits. To include livestock,poultry and swine within the ambit of the agrarian reformprogram, is giving expanded interpretation of the law, which isin itself, clear and unambiguous. The decision of the Court torender the provision null and void is in accordance with the


mandate of the Constitution. No one must be deprived of hisproperty without due process of law.


Documents

CARP Case Digest