The dynamics of doping Lance Armstrong the UnitedStates Anti-Doping Agency and the regulatorygovernance of professional cycling

Hans de Bruijn Martijn Groenleer and Theo van RuijvenFaculty of Technology Policy and Management Delft University of Technology Delft The Netherlands

AbstractOn 10 October 2012 the United States Anti-Doping Agency published an investigative report on the use of performance-

enhancing drugs by professional cyclist Lance Armstrong The report paints a disconcerting picture of the doping program that

Armstrong and his US Postal Service professional cycling team managed to carry out for several years despite being subject to

many inspections It contains a wealth of unique empirical data including a large number of affidavits In this article we use this

data to answer the question of how Armstrong was able to prolong prohibited behavior In doing so we focus in particular on the

interactions between Armstrong and the many doping inspectors he encountered Our analysis results in a variety of answers to

this question First inspectors were confronted with an inspectee who behaved as an ldquoamoral calculatorrdquo and acted strategically

The strategies of inspectors were not adequately attuned to such behavior Second the teamrsquos internal professional control was

neutralized by various factors including its strict hierarchy and the many friendships within the team And finally the environ-

ment created strong incentives to start doping and subsequently deny doing so We argue that the dynamics underlying doping

necessitate a combination of measures to regulate the use of performance-enhancing drugs in the field of professional cycling and

beyond

Keywords doping inspection Lance Armstrong professional cycling regulation USADA

1 Introduction

On 10 October 2012 the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) published an investigative report on dopingby professional cyclist Lance Armstrong The report formed the basis of the USADArsquos earlier decision of 24 August2012 to ban Armstrong for life The report paints a disconcerting picture of the use of performance-enhancing drugsby Armstrong and his professional cycling team sponsored by the US Postal Service According to the USADA thereis ldquooverwhelming evidencerdquo that the US Postal Service team ran a sophisticated professional and highly successfuldoping program the likes of which the world of cycling had never seen before (United States Anti-Doping Agency2012 p 2)

The USADA investigation covers the period from 1998 to 2010 During and after the 1998 Tour de France aseries of doping scandals (the ldquoFestina affairrdquo) led to investigations into the Festina and TVM cycling teams andconfessions of riders revealing widespread doping practices (eg Cyclingnews 1998) In subsequent yearsthe idea that professional cycling ought to be a ldquocleanrdquo sport became increasingly important and firm action wastaken against riders who were caught or suspected of doping In 2007 for example Michael Rasmussenwas withdrawn from the Tour de France by his own Rabobank cycling team while wearing the yellow jerseyfor avoiding several out-of-competition doping tests (Vogelzang Committee 2007) Although the value ofkeeping the sport clean thus became more important at least to the outside world it seems that this value wasactually being violated more systematically (in any case by Armstrong and his team) during the period underinvestigation

Correspondence Martijn Groenleer Faculty of Technology Policy and Management Delft University of Technology PO Box5015 2600 GA Delft The Netherlands Email mlpgroenleertudelftnl

Accepted for publication 26 January 2015

bs_bs_banner

Regulation amp Governance (2015) bullbull bullbullndashbullbull doi101111rego12085

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

In this article we examine the USADA report and ask why the various mechanisms that were intended to regulatethe use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional cycling failed so spectacularly and what this tells us aboutenforcement In particular we focus on the interactions between Armstrong and the many doping inspectors heencountered How did the game between the inspectee and the inspectors unfold and how was Armstrong able tocarry out his doping program in the face of so many inspections To answer these questions we examine the role ofgroup culture and the competitive environment in which the doping took place

The article is structured as follows First we provide an overview of what the theories on regulatory governancehave to say about the interaction between inspectors and inspectees (section 2) Then we explain how we used theUSADA report (section 3) and present relevant empirical evidence from the report (section 4) Finally we analyzethis evidence along the lines of the abovementioned theories (section 5) and present a number of conclusions(section 6)

2 The game between inspectors and inspectees

The field of regulatory theory devotes a lot of attention to the relationship between inspectors and inspectees and theinteractions between them In essence inspectors and inspectees are said to be involved in a ldquogamerdquo that is embeddedin various contexts (see notably Hutter 1997 Sparrow 2000 de Bruijn et al 2007) In this section we present atheoretical framework that incorporates the role of group culture and the competitive environment and that enablesus to analyze the case of doping in professional cycling as a form of professional misconduct

21 Type of inspecteeOne of the key questions in the game between inspectors and inspectees is what type of inspectee the inspector isdealing with The intention underlying the inspecteersquos actions plays a key role in determining the type (Baldwin et al2012) Is the inspectee honest or amoral Another question concerns whether or not the inspectee is well informedDoes he or she know what conduct is permitted or prohibited and what constitutes appropriate or inappropriatebehavior Amoral and well-informed inspectees often carry out their deception in a rational and systematic mannerKagan and Scholz (1984) refer to them as ldquoamoral calculatorsrdquo

22 The inspecteersquos strategic behaviorWell-informed and amoral inspectees will always develop strategies to manipulate inspectors The literature men-tions several kinds of strategic behavior or ldquogame playingrdquo (Hutter 1997 McBarnet amp Whelan 1999 Sparrow 2000de Bruijn et al 2007) which can be categorized as follows

Some strategies are aimed at delaying the activities of the inspectors When information is provided just too latefor example the inspection process has to be postponed Another strategy consists of making last-minute improve-ments to information This is problematic for inspectors who have already decided to impose a sanction as the needto process the new information often forces them to postpone the sanction Inspectees know this and only make thekind of improvements that will cause the sanction to be postponed Yet another strategy in this category consists ofldquoplaying the managerial gamerdquo whereby organizations repeatedly send different representatives to meet withinspectors Because these representatives keep adopting different approaches (eg cooperation obstruction indif-ference or ignorance) the inspectors are constantly wrong-footed and the inspection process is regularly inter-rupted A similar strategy concerns the inspectee becoming a moving target frequently changing locations so as todelay the inspection process (Hawkins 1984 2013)

Certain strategies are not only used to delay the inspectorsrsquo activities but are also aimed at misleading themInspectees can benefit from their superior knowledge of the processes at hand (Abbot 2012) Examples of thisinclude fabricating cover stories to conceal prohibited behavior and deliberately destroying evidence A well-knownstrategy in this category is ldquomirror imagingrdquo (Tucker 1996) whereby inspectees find out what indicators areimportant to inspectors before misleading them in relation to those indicators A cynical example of such behavioroccurred in the context of the United Nations (UN) arms inspections in Iraq during the reign of Saddam HusseinThe Iraqi authorities worked out that the UN inspectors used a certain key indicator to identify nuclear installationsnamely whether or not workers at a given installation wore special protective clothing against radiation Once theywere aware of this they instructed the workers to stop wearing such clothing (de Bruijn et al 2007)

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Finally there are strategies that are aimed at delaying the work of the inspectors misleading them and under-mining their legitimacy A well-known strategy in this category is ldquoplaying the Janus ployrdquo (Hawkins 1984)whereby inspectees adopt a two-faced approach On the one hand they are sympathetic and cooperative andconstantly endorse the importance of norm-conforming behavior On the other hand they systematicallyviolate the rules Inspectors who suspect that rules are being broken are faced with a difficult choice If theyintervene for example by conducting an in-depth investigation or imposing a sanction they run the risk that theinspectee may turn out to be respecting the rules after all Such an undeserved intervention which may harm theinspectee can also undermine the legitimacy of the inspector who may thus become more reluctant to intervenein the future In some cases the mere awareness of this risk may be enough to cause an inspector to exhibitreluctance

A similar situation arises in the case of a strategy known as ldquothe non-smoking gunrdquo (de Bruijn et al 2007) Firstthe inspectee implies that the inspector is on to something ndash that he has found a smoking gun Next the inspecteehinders the inspector as much as possible which only serves to confirm the latterrsquos suspicions Ultimately howeverit turns out that nothing is wrong This is very frustrating for the inspector He appears to be on to something andovercomes the inspecteersquos resistance only to be left empty-handed When this happens in public moreover it canundermine the inspectorrsquos legitimacy

23 Counter-strategies by the inspectorWhen inspectees engage in such games inspectors face specific challenges In this context it is useful to distin-guish between enforcement as a bureaucratic standardized activity and enforcement as a strategic activity(Hawkins 1984 Gunningham 2011) Standardized enforcement is obviously a risky approach in the caseof an amoral inspectee because it increases the predictability ndash and therefore the manipulability ndash of the inspec-tor Strategic enforcement is ldquoresponsiverdquo it is attuned to the different motivations of regulated actors andimplies innovative forms of regulation (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992 Etienne 2013 Mascini 2013) In the case ofstrategic enforcement the inspector tracks the inspectee tries to outmaneuver him and constantly devises ldquosmartrdquocounter-strategies

The literature is full of examples of this including strategically selecting inspectees for closer scrutiny buildingup institutional memory combining various types of information activating and using third parties (eg partnersin the inspection system and key players in the inspecteersquos environment) forming alliances with other inspectionagencies and exploiting the ldquoshadow of hierarchyrdquo (Hawkins 1984 Tucker 1996 Hutter 1997 Gunningham ampGrabosky 1998 Sparrow 2000 Gunningham amp Kagan 2005 Winter amp May 2001) In the following paragraphs wecluster these and other strategies into three groups of counter-strategies

A first group of counter-strategies relates to the inspecteersquos intra-organizational context and the possibility forinspectors to trigger the involvement of the inspecteersquos individual colleagues Almost all organizations of a certainsize are characterized by fragmentation and diversity Inspectees exploit this for example by ldquoplaying the managerialgamerdquo but inspectors can also take advantage of it by pursuing a counter-strategy based on the principle of ldquodivideand rulerdquo Fragmentation requires coordination between the inspecteersquos key representatives but such coordinationis occasionally less than perfect For example information that is not provided by one representative can potentiallybe obtained from another

In addition inspectees are often professionals who operate on the basis of shared values such as those that applyto judges (eg transparency sound reasoning due process and fair treatment) By appealing to such valuesinspectors may be able to persuade individual professionals to tell them about prohibited behavior After all onecharacteristic of professional organizations is the autonomy of their employees and the diversity to which this givesrise The main control mechanism is mutual horizontal control vertical control is limited (Kerpershoek et al 2014)Professionals while autonomous keep an eye on each otherrsquos achievements on the basis of common professionalvalues (Kober et al 2007) This presents inspectors with a key opportunity The chance of finding a whistle-bloweramong such professionals is significantly higher than in a traditional hierarchy where there is much less scope forautonomy and diversity (de Bruijn 2010)

This is closely connected to a second group of counter-strategies which concerns the ability of inspectors toactivate third parties in the inter-organizational environment In almost every environment in which inspectorsoperate there are third parties that have some kind of interest in the inspecteersquos rule-abiding behavior Examples

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 3

from the world of professional sports include other inspectees the media sponsors event organizers and nationalsports federations One would expect that this is especially true in a competitive environment as rival sportsmen andteams are likely to have an interest in uncovering the prohibited behavior of others A competitor that cheats hurtsthe core interests of the others most notably by reducing their chances of winning These other competitors are thirdparties in the game between inspectors and inspectees Using them provides inspectors with a powerful weaponagainst rule-violating behavior

A third group of counter-strategies relates to the multi-actor multi-level regulatory framework in which inspec-tors and inspectees operate (Hutter 1988 de Bruijn et al 2007) There are often several inspectors operating onbehalf of various organizations andor at various levels for example on behalf of one international organization andseveral national organizations Once again such an environment creates opportunities for inspectees to manipulateinspectors Inspection activities in a fragmented environment require inter-organizational coordination andinspectees may obtain room to maneuver when such coordination for example in terms of sharing experiences orsuspicions regarding inspectees is lacking or incomplete (Saurwein 2011)

However fragmentation also implies that the system of inspection is characterized by a certain degree ofredundancy (ie overlap or duplication) as the same inspection task is carried out by several inspectors (Heimann1997 Carpenter amp Ting 2007) Each inspectee therefore comes face to face with multiple inspectors Where oneinspector fails another may succeed A level of redundancy in inspections if at least to some extent coordinatedmay thus be valuable in terms of the overall trustworthiness of the inspection system

24 Competing dynamicsThe picture that emerges from the above is that there can be powerful incentives to uncover prohibited behavior bothwithin organizations (counter-strategy 1) and within the competitive environment in which they operate (counter-strategy 2) Moreover if the system of inspection is characterized by a certain degree of redundancy inspectors willhave additional opportunities to uncover prohibited behavior (counter-strategy 3) These incentives and opportu-nities can however be neutralized either by deliberate strategies of the amoral calculator or by social and behavioraldynamics Also a mixture of such strategies and dynamics can hamper action for the common cause (in our casea clean sport) as these two game-theoretical notions make clear

The ldquounscrupulous dinerrsquos dilemmardquo helps to shed light on the decision to participate in prohibited behaviorto defect for personal gain (Glance amp Huberman 1994 Gneezy et al 2004) It can be described as followsTwenty people go out for a meal It is agreed that all will evenly share the bill At the entrance to the restaurantit becomes apparent that there is a choice between two menus one costing 10 euros and another costing 20 eurosIt is agreed that everyone will order the 10-euro menu ndash the 20-euro menu is thus off limits As soon as thisagreement has been made the option of ordering the 20-euro menu becomes very attractive The first and onlyperson to do so ndash the first mover ndash gains a maximum reward he or she dines for 20 euros but only pays 1050euros

If the same bill-splitting agreement applies at a subsequent meal it is likely that several other diners whoremember paying 1050 euros will also order the 20-euro menu As more diners violate the agreement the incentivefor the remaining diners to do likewise becomes stronger the last diner to adhere to the agreement ends up paying1950 euros to receive the 10-euro menu When applied to inspections the dinerrsquos dilemma demonstrates that it paysto be the first to start using ndash or switch to more sophisticated forms of ndash performance-enhancing drugs The firstperson to break the rule in a competitive environment gains the maximum advantage After that there is a powerfulincentive for others to follow suit as quickly as possible

Moreover once prohibited behavior has become widespread there are strong incentives to keep it covered upThe game-theoretic model that helps explain why those involved are not in a hurry to confess to such behavior is theldquogame of chickenrdquo (Rapoport amp Chammah 1966) In this game the question of who will yield first in a dangeroussituation is at stake as in the well-known example of two cars driving straight toward each other Neither driverwants to yield first by swerving left or right as doing so would make him a ldquochickenrdquo (coward) However if neitherdriver yields the cars crash This constitutes a negative outcome for both drivers Individuals thus face the decisionwhether or not to yield without knowing what their opponent will do In such cases it pays to postpone this decisionas long as possible When applied to inspections the ldquogame of chickenrdquo demonstrates that it may be attractive to waitas long as possible before confessing to prohibited behavior

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3 The United States Anti-Doping Agency and the US Postal Service cycling team investigation

31 ContextThe USADA is the national anti-doping organization (NADO) in the US for Olympic Paralympic and PanAmerican Sport It is the USADArsquos mission to ldquopreserve the integrity of competition inspire true sport and protectthe rights of US athletesrdquo (United States Anti-Doping Agency 2013) To fulfill this mission the USADA takesinitiatives to prevent deter and detect violations including in-competition and out-of-competition testing ofathletes and the management of test results as well as the adjudication of athletes suspected of committing ananti-doping rule violation It does so on the basis of an international code the World Anti-Doping Code agreedupon in the framework of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) to which it is a signatory and for the imple-mentation of which it is responsible

One of the USADArsquos initiatives started in 2008 when it launched an investigation into doping in the professionalcycling community in Southern California (USADA 2012) The investigation had an important unintended resultFloyd Landis a former member of the US Postal Service team provided the USADA with detailed information ondoping by the US Postal Service team and Lance Armstrong Landis won the Tour de France in 2006 after he had leftArmstrongrsquos team but was stripped of his title as a result of doping The USADA subsequently launched a detailedinvestigation into doping between 1999 and 2005 the years in which Armstrong won his seven Tour titles Duringthis period Armstrong rode for a cycling team that was sponsored first by the Discovery Channel and subsequentlyby the US Postal Service The composition of the team remained roughly the same

The USADArsquos main findings were that Armstrong doped throughout his professional cycling career that heencouraged other members of his team to do the same that he supplied them with performance-enhancing drugsand that he was the driving force behind an extensive systematic and well-organized doping program (USADA2012) Based on these findings the USADA decided to impose a lifetime ban on Armstrong and to strip him of allof his titles from 1998 onwards Former teammates of Armstrong who admitted to doping and were still active inprofessional cycling all received six-month bans Armstrong refused to cooperate with the USADArsquos investigationdid not respond to the report and initially denied all doping allegations In January 2013 he eventually admitted tousing performance-enhancing drugs including erythropoietin (EPO) to increase red cell production and to improveoxygen delivery to the muscles and thereby endurance capacity

32 MethodsThe report contains a large amount of detailed and carefully organized information and makes a compellingargument It is based on eyewitness testimony correspondence transaction details expert statements and variousother documents It includes 26 affidavits from former teammates fellow riders care providers support staff anddoping experts As such the report provides a unique and well-documented insight into the world of professionalcycling ndash an insight that would otherwise be difficult to obtain

Questions have been raised regarding the USADArsquos motives and methods The authority was accused of takingpart in a witch-hunt against an athlete who had never failed a drug test (see eg VeloNation 2012) However thereis no reason to question the affidavits and the original materials collected by the USADA and presented along withits report The affidavits in particular contain information that is very difficult for researchers to obtain undernormal circumstances for instance through regular interviews They are declarations under oath so the chance thatthey contain factual inaccuracies is quite low or at least no more than in the case of regular interviews

To avoid being influenced by any ulterior motives that the USADA might have had in presenting its report thepresent article relies solely on these sworn statements and original materials (eg emails) Obviously there is a riskthat the individuals who provided the affidavits which are official documents and may have legal ramifications triedto present themselves in the best possible light In order to address this concern the facts used in this article are basedon numerous affidavits submitted by various individuals including still active cyclists who came forward in the faceof significant pressure and whose credibility has been assessed in the USADA report

These statements and materials have been analyzed for information on the interactions between Armstrong theUS Postal Service team the USADA and doping inspectors A basic three-step qualitative approach was applied(Weber 1990 Schreier 2012) First we familiarized ourselves with the documents through reading them carefullySubsequently we extracted key instances of interaction from the documents assigning empirically grounded codes

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(Lincoln amp Guba 1985 Corbin amp Strauss 2008) Finally we clustered together similar and frequent codes (iepatterns) establishing theoretically relevant categories of codes in relation to the game between inspectees andinspectors

Using this approach to analyze the USADA report has important benefits It provides systematic informationderived from a large amount of data It is also less prone to bias than interviewing Moreover a key advantage ofanalyzing publicly available documents is the possibility for corroboration by other researchers Like any otheranalytical method however our approach has its weaknesses Notably it is limited to the use of statements andmaterials collected by the USADA which may not necessarily provide a complete and unbiased picture To appre-ciate the context in which the USADA investigation has taken place we examined media coverage of the reportFinally there is always a risk of data misinterpretation We have sought to alleviate this risk by each individually goingthrough the documents several times and comparing our interpretations

4 The ldquogamerdquo between Armstrong and the inspectors

In this section we present the main findings of the USADA report as substantiated by affidavits and originalmaterials We organize them along the lines of the theoretical framework outlined in section 2 and consider the typeof inspectee the games played by inspectees and the counter-strategies used by doping inspectors using diversitywithin professional organizations as well as activating third parties in a competitive environment and exploitinginstitutional fragmentation and redundancy to carry out multiple inspections

41 Armstrong and his team as inspecteesOne of the USADArsquos most notable findings was that Armstrong and his team acted according to a very clear planwhich sets this case apart from scandals involving other teams Arguably these scandals mostly concern individualcyclists and none of these teams ran a doping program like the US Postal Service did The US Postal Service team waswell informed about the available doping techniques and applied them in a systematic manner For example cyclistscan use blood transfusions to maintain higher hematocrit levels (ie the volume of red blood cells as a proportionof total blood volume) during tough races If their hematocrit levels subsequently exceed the maximum permittedvalue they can be lowered by injecting physiological saline solutions The staff of the US Postal Service teamcontinuously tracked the hematocrit levels of riders in order to avoid detection (USADA 2012 p 77 p 108 egAffidavits of Tom Danielson Floyd Landis George Hincapie and Jonathan Vaughters) They knew that doping wasprohibited Armstrong publically and systematically denied doping and stated under oath that he never usedperformance-enhancing drugs (USADA 2012 pp 146ndash147)

42 Their strategic behavior over the yearsThe USADA report lists several ways in which Armstrong and his team attempted to manipulate the inspectors Onestrategy applied by Armstrong was delaying inspections For example Armstrong would provide informationconcerning his whereabouts as late as possible leaving inspectors less time to organize a drug test (USADA 2012 p134) The USADA report also describes how Armstrong and his team used a wide variety of training locations anddeliberately chose locations where they were less likely to be tested (USADA 2012 p 132 Affidavits of GeorgeHincapie and Tom Danielson) In this way the team always remained one step ahead of the inspectors

Another strategy used by Armstrong and his team was related to the information asymmetry between them andthe inspectors and the opportunities this provided for deception The US Postal Service team frequently fabricatedcover stories and the teamrsquos doctors were willing to issue statements that lacked any medical basis (USADA 2012 p32 Affidavits of Emma OrsquoReilly Jonathan Vaughters and Tyler Hamilton) An example that features extensively inthe USADA report is tampering with evidence especially in relation to hematocrit levels If necessary riders arrivedtoo late for drug tests or the team ensured that riders with low hematocrit levels were tested first (USADA 2012 p133 p 139 Affidavits Jonathan Vaughters David Zabriskie and Dr Larry Bowers) In one example Armstrong andhis team made use of the fact that no tests were conducted during the night by arranging to receive micro-doses ofEPO at night time (USADA 2012 p 138 Affidavits of Christian Vande Velde Jonathan Vaughters and Dr LarryBowers)

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The USADA report also describes how the inspectees always stayed ahead of the inspectors by constantlyadapting Until 2000 there was no test for EPO When a test for EPO was adopted in 2000 it proved relatively easyto manipulate Finally when the EPO tests became more sophisticated the team switched to blood transfusions(USADA 2012 pp 110ndash111 eg Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton Tom Danielson and David Zabriskie)

Another key strategy was playing the Janus ploy Armstrong constantly stressed that he was cooperating with alltests and that he was the most tested athlete in the history of sport (USADA 2012 pp 129ndash130) At the same timethe report describes the exceptionally brazen methods that he and his team used to deceive the testers For exampleit describes how during a test at the 1998 World Championships a team doctor smuggled in masking agents underhis coat in order to influence the test at the last moment (USADA 2012 p 20 p 122 p 139 Affidavits of JonathanVaughters and Christian Vande Velde) It also describes how during the 1999 Tour de France a motorcyclist followedthe US Postal Service team at all times in order to clandestinely provide the members of the team with performance-enhancing drugs (USADA 2012 p 30 Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton Frankie Andreu and Betsy Andreu) Thesestrategies make it very difficult for inspectors to do their job it is hard to imagine that somebody who consistentlyclaims to be honest and cooperative is actually involved in a sophisticated doping program

43 The counter-strategies of doping inspectorsThe USADA report points out that the inspectors were unable to cope with the three types of strategic behavior usedagainst them Armstrong and his team successfully delayed the inspectorsrsquo work for example by repeatedly switch-ing their training camps revealing information about those camps at the last minute and arriving too late for drugtests In addition they successfully misled the inspectors for example by tampering with evidence Finally theyrepeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the more serious tests Armstrongrsquos legal advisors claiming that he was themost tested athlete in the history of sport

For the most part the inspections never rose above the level of a standardized bureaucratic activity It is alsoworth noting that some inspectors became increasingly careless They sometimes tolerated the fact that riders didnot respond to a knock on the door outside of competition They also did not consistently report missed drug testsEven in competition riders managed to avoid tests simply by dropping out of the race (USADA 2012 p 40 p 131Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie and George Hincapie) In combination with the neutralisation ofinternal professional control and an extremely competitive and highly fragmented environment this seems to have madethe systematic use of performance-enhancing doping in the US Postal Service team possible

431 The neutralization of internal professional controlA professional cycling team like other professional organizations consists of several individual cyclists all with theirown specializations (eg climbing sprinting time trial) and therefore is likely to be characterized by a certainamount of diversity In addition one would expect these individuals to be generally committed to a set of profes-sional values that are incompatible with the systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs As already mentionedthese values play a key role in the mutual horizontal control mechanisms that exist within professional organiza-tions such as cycling teams When they are violated there is a reasonable chance that the cyclists involved will discussthose violations This means that there is always a possibility that some of the cyclists within the team will find theprohibited behavior hard to stomach and become whistle-blowers

However the USADA report notes that inspectors were unable to exploit this possibility in the case of LanceArmstrong and his team until Floyd Landis provided inspectors with incriminating information because the mutualhorizontal control mechanisms were not functioning An oft-cited explanation for this is that the value system wascompletely out of balance Doping had become an accepted phenomenon throughout the world of cycling beyonda single cyclist or team It was a social norm a part of the job for professional cyclists and riders therefore no longerconfronted each other about it Worse they no longer regarded doping as cheating it was seen as normal behaviorNevertheless this is not the picture that emerges from the research

As already noted the idea that professional cycling should clean up its act was rapidly gaining ground at the endof the 1990s especially after the Festina doping affair in 1998 and the number of inspections was actually increasingRiders who joined the US Postal Service team were shocked when they found out about the teamrsquos systematic dopingpractices One of them was David Zabriskie a young rider with a family history of drug use who was determinedto remain clean his entire life but eventually ended up doping as well (USADA 2012 pp 112ndash114 Affidavits of DavidZabriskie and Michael Barry) The question is therefore how did mutual professional control fail to work

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

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The USADA report shows that the US Postal Service teamrsquos structure was becoming increasingly hierarchicalArmstrong was a very dominant person who tolerated no contradiction He also had two allies in Tyler Hamiltonand Kevin Livingston Together they formed the so-called ldquoA teamrdquo which benefitted from special EPO deliveryservices during the Tour de France and crushed any criticism of doping (USADA 2012 pp 22ndash23 Affidavits of TylerHamilton and Frankie Andreu) This led to a standoff between the experienced riders with an established positionand the younger riders who were critical of doping with the younger group losing this confrontation They weresimply forced to participate in the doping program

Part of this hierarchical culture according to the USADA report was Armstrongrsquos veto power over hiring andfiring (USADA 2012 p 6) Any rider who did not comply with the teamrsquos doping practices was de facto out of a jobor in any case not selected for competition in the big races The culture was also reflected in Armstrong pickingJohan Bruyneel as Team Director and having him serve for nine years in this position It was Bruyneel whosubsequently convinced young riders such as Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie Levi Leipheimer and ChristianVande Velde who did not themselves consider performance enhancing drug use as normal that it was required forsuccess in the peloton (USADA 2012 pp 114ndash115 Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie Levi Leipheimerand Christian Vande Velde)

Within the US Postal Service team a key role was played by the medical staff who together with others such asdrug smugglers are described as an ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo in the USADA report (USADA 2012 p 6) The medical staffhad a dual relationship with professional cycling On the one hand they were not part of the profession serving assupport staff in every sense of the word On the other hand they had positioned themselves at the heart of theprofession because medical supervision was a crucial factor in the teamrsquos success Armstrong exploited this situationas much as possible The riders were constantly told to follow the instructions of Dr Ferrari (ldquoSchumirdquo) who wassimultaneously kept at a distance from them (USADA 2012 pp 94ndash95) This contributed to the development of apowerful hierarchy in which all individual riders came up against Armstrong who was able to exert further pressureon them through the ldquoA teamrdquo and Dr Ferrari

The US Postal Service team thus became increasingly homogeneous in terms of its attitude to doping the useof which became institutionalized Some members of the team cheerfully sang a song about using EPO on the teambus (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p 22) Moreover anyone who did not join in was perceived as beingdisloyal not only to the professional team but also to his or her friends Email exchanges between Armstrong andvarious teammates repeatedly refer to mutual friendship and the importance of loyalty between friends (USADA2012 see eg Appendix A Exhibits G and I email exchanges between Armstrong and Andreu and Andreu andHincapie)

Rather than such prohibited behavior becoming normalized in the sense that it was not considered prohibitedanymore it was imposed on the team by strong leaders and legitimized by support staff This made it difficult forinspectors to control such behavior Even though several cyclists within the team did not consider doping to benormal they did not blow the whistle The extremely competitive and highly fragmented environment of profes-sional cycling further exacerbated the difficulties encountered by inspectors

432 An extremely competitive and highly fragmented environmentThe environment in which Armstrong carried out his doping program was extremely competitive A win for onerider represented a loss for everyone else What impact did this have on doping and on the game between inspectorsand inspectees The situation encountered by the USADA was that everyone was violating the rules ndash at least that wasthe general perception In response to questions by David Zabriskie US Postal Service team director Johan Bruyneelanswered that ldquoeveryone is doing itrdquo (USADA 2012 p 113) and that they would not be doing it if it was harmfulBruyneel thus made it seem like doping was in line with prevailing norms in the peloton even though it wasprohibited further reducing the incentive of individual cyclists in the US Postal Service team to speak out againstdoping For the cyclists there seemed nothing to lose as long as they played the game well and better than otherteams

Furthermore the game between inspectors and Armstrong and his team was embedded in a heavily fragmentedinstitutional structure Professional cyclists who travel all over the world to train and compete deal with a multitudeof national anti-doping organizations which in theory all operate on the basis of the same World Anti-DopingCode but which in practice have different levels of professionalism and different approaches to doping inspections

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

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(Hanstad et al 2010) In big races the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) is responsible for testing but the USADAreport shows that cooperation between UCI and the NADOs especially the USADA was not always smooth forexample with respect to exchanging information (USADA 2012 p 141) There also appear to be differences betweenindividual NADOs in terms of the standard and frequency of the inspections For example the USADA reportdescribes how the US Postal Service team went to a Spanish resort for training because the risk of inspection wasnegligible at this location (USADA 2012 p 133)

A fragmented environment thus appears to have been of greater advantage to Armstrong and his team thanto the inspectors In this particular case the latter were unable to exploit one of the potential advantages offragmentation ndash a system of inspection with built-in redundancy ndash because Armstrong and his team were familiarwith all of the systemrsquos shortcomings and could in fact play the various inspectors off against each other More-over the inspectorsrsquo aforementioned standardized bureaucratic approach limited their ability to exploit the sys-temrsquos built-in redundancy Where inspections were carried out (they were often lacking) they followed a standardpattern In addition there was insufficient cooperation between the NADOs in order to reap the benefits ofredundancy The inspections were therefore relatively easy to avoid even in cases of unannounced testing(USADA 2012 p 132)

44 Reinforcing dynamicsThe systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs and the simultaneous effort to conceal this from the inspectorscreates an interesting dynamic Doping provides an advantage that weakens the incentive of other teams to adhereto the rules In fact it creates an incentive to cheat This incentive to cheat can be effective even if riders are unsurewhether or not others are doping The mere perception that they might be doing so without being caught can act asan incentive to break the rules

This activates the dinerrsquos dilemma because it is advantageous to be one of the first to engage in the prohibitedbehavior The dinerrsquos dilemma also has a strong dynamic of its own At first Armstrong and his team used EPOWhen this became increasingly difficult they switched to blood transfusions Once again the mere perception thata team is using advanced doping techniques is enough of an incentive for others to copy their behavior Moreoverthe more unscrupulous you are the greater your advantage over your rivals The incentive to break the rules keepsbecoming stronger and those who do so obviously have no interest in disclosing their actions even contemplatingto hold onto their secrets to the grave as was pointed out by Tyler Hamilton (USADA 2012 p 128) This dynamicultimately leads to a situation in which everyone is breaking the rules

Even in a situation in which doping is widespread individuals or teams may step forward to expose it onmoral grounds or because it is in their interest to do so However in a situation in which other teams or ridersin the peloton are doping or at least not openly criticizing those who do the option of being the first to revertto the original value of keeping the sport clean ndash and especially of doing so publicly ndash is very unattractive (seeeg Committee Anti-Doping Approach 2013) The first individual or team to yield and break professionalcyclingrsquos code of silence (ldquoomertardquo) faces several substantial risks damaging his own reputation as well as that ofhis team and his sponsor destroying long-term friendships with other riders in the peloton and of course beingpunished (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One pp 12ndash13) The latter is a key source of uncertainty How will theauthorities react Will they be lenient out of respect for the first person to come forward or very strict in orderto set an example

This turns the decision whether or not to confess to doping into a game of chicken It is very unattractive for arider to be the first to confess and much more attractive to wait for someone else to do so first Through his actionsArmstrong strengthened the perception that the situation amounted to a game of chicken Specifically he wouldpublicly (and aggressively) attack cyclists who raised the issue of doping This happened for example to FilippoSimeoni (USADA 2012 pp 72ndash73) and Floyd Landis who continued doping after he left Armstrongrsquos team and wasaccused by Armstrong of having ldquozero credibilityrdquo and being a ldquoproven liarrdquo (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p11) During the 1999 Tour de France Christophe Bassons wrote in a diary he was keeping in Le Parisen that he wasldquoshockedrdquo by Armstrongrsquos dominance The next day Armstrong rode up to Bassons and berated him calling him adisgrace and telling him he should get out of cycling (USADA 2012 p 35) In this manner Armstrong added asignificant risk to the many other risks faced by the ldquochickenrdquo namely a conflict with the sportrsquos leading (andgenerally admired) rider

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5 Analysis

In section 2 we presented several theoretical approaches to the interaction between inspectors and inspectees Onthe basis of the USADA report that we introduced in section 3 we described the nature of the interactions betweenArmstrong and the doping inspectors in section 4 In this section we analyze the empirical evidence along the linesof the theoretical framework This leads us to the following findings which help us to answer the question why thevarious mechanisms that were intended to regulate the use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional cyclingfailed so spectacularly

Armstrong and the US Postal Service team have all the characteristics of an ldquoamoral calculatorrdquo (Kagan amp Scholz1984) They knew exactly what behavior was permitted or prohibited and deliberately broke the rules The team hadan ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo and was consistently able to innovate and apply new doping techniques ldquoDeviancerdquo waslegitimized not normalized (cf Vaughan 1996) For a period of several years the US Postal Service team successfullydeployed a wide range of strategic behavior outsmarting inspectors As can be derived from the USADA report thisbehavior was aimed at delaying inspections misleading inspectors and undermining the legitimacy of the entireinspection process much in line with what we expected on the basis of Hutter (1997) McBarnet and Whelan (1999)Sparrow (2000) and de Bruijn et al (2007)

The inspectors were unable to exploit the diversity and horizontal control mechanisms within the US PostalService team Prohibited behavior was not only legitimized by medical support staff it was also imposed by its leaderArmstrong turned the team into a hierarchy with limited scope for autonomy and value-driven behavior and forcedall of his teammates to go along with the doping program In this manner he neutralized the teamrsquos internal controlmechanisms in contrast to what we expected on the basis of professionalism literature (eg Kober et al 2007 deBruijn 2010)

In theory the fragmented environment can be exploited because it allows inspectors to employ redundancy ofenforcement regimes as a strategy However this proved to be false in practice Armstrong did come face to face withmultiple inspectors but without fail he managed to identify the weak points in the inspection system notably itscoordination Moreover the competitive environment can be expected to produce incentives to tackle prohibitedbehavior This also did not happen in practice as the proceeds of the prohibited behavior were high especially forthe first mover and the exit costs (ie the costs of exposing the prohibited behavior) or at least the perception thereofas fed by Armstrongrsquos action were also high

When taken together these findings form a dynamic that continuously strengthened Armstrongrsquos position Firstof all the teamrsquos alignment with the doping program gave rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism Everyone had aninterest in concealing the prohibited behavior and this created a powerful incentive to engage in strategic behaviorAs the strategic behavior of the team members increased the incentive to remain aligned became stronger This isbecause the exit costs kept rising as the team continued its deliberate policy of doping strategic behavior and liesMoreover whoever revealed the prohibited behavior would lose friends and be forced to leave Armstrongrsquos teamStrategic behavior was therefore not only the result of aligning with prohibited behavior but also an incentive tomaintain and reinforce this alignment

Second when a team that is so strongly aligned engages in strategic behavior it becomes increasingly difficult forinspectors to uncover the prohibited behavior This creates a whole new dynamic an aligned team that engages inprohibited behavior in a competitive environment and remains undiscovered activates the dinerrsquos dilemma More-over once everyone starts breaking the rules the game of chicken comes into play It is very unattractive to be thefirst to admit to widespread doping In the case at hand the prohibited behavior therefore spread through the worldof professional cycling like an oil stain

Third once these two games have been activated another dynamic emerges The first cyclist or team to startusing a new doping technique gains an advantage over the other riders and can be fairly certain that the game ofchicken will prevent them from reporting anything to the inspectors The new doping technique leads to a new gamethat rekindles the entire dynamic In fact a new game may even begin before the previous game has ended

Fourth this dynamic made it increasingly difficult for the inspectors to catch Armstrong The peloton was rife withincentives to conceal the prohibited behavior Many of the inspectorsrsquo counter-strategies ndash such as cooperating withwhistle-blowers activating third parties (eg other teams) or exploiting the inspection systemrsquos built-in redundancyndash therefore failed to produce results This obviously encouraged the teams to continue their prohibited behavior

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Finally the situation also contains a paradox Armstrong was so good at concealing his prohibited behavior fromthe inspectors that he kept taking it further The extent of his amoral behavior kept growing from EPO and bloodtransfusions to evidence tampering and blatant lies At a certain point it became so extensive and so widely knownamong riders that there was finally momentum for the USADA (and other NADOs) to take firm action Itaccordingly launched an investigation in which many riders faced in-depth questioning The paradox is as followsThe better an inspectee is at concealing prohibited behavior the more he will engage in it At a certain point howeverthe behavior is so extensive that it ultimately becomes easier for the inspectors to uncover it

6 Conclusions

What practical lessons can be learned about potential enforcement strategies from our analysis of the game betweeninspectors and inspectees in the case of professional cycling What does the analysis tell us about enforcementtheoretically speaking that we did not know before and that may also be relevant for other sectors such as medicalacademic or financial sectors

In discussions about the future of professional cycling two sets of enforcement strategies are frequently putforward as possible ldquosolutionsrdquo for the doping problem first external doping control by NADOs and WADA mustbe intensified and second professional cycling itself ndash that is the riders teams and entourages ndash needs toundergo a cultural shift (eg Wilson 2013) Similar sets of enforcement strategies have been suggested afterrevelations of professional misconduct in other sectors A clear example is the financial sector where the irre-sponsible behavior of bankers in combination with serious gaps in regulation (and rapid innovations in financialproducts) bloated the market with ldquotoxicrdquo assets resulting in the near collapse of the financial system and sub-sequently in a rethinking of control arrangements (eg Groenleer et al 2014) In many countries the latter meantthe introduction of more strict rules about bankersrsquo bonuses and financial products and more central oversighton compliance with those rules

It follows from our analysis that in professional cycling inspections could also be intensified by various meansincluding the use of technological aids such as biomedical passports as has been done in recent years Moreimportant is that inspection be regarded less as a bureaucratic standardized activity and more as a continuousprocess of developing new strategies in response to the inspecteersquos behavior (Weil 2008) This means for examplethat there could be more profiling in order to tailor inspections to different types of inspectees that greater use couldbe made of information other than doping tests (eg relying more on informants) that inspections could have agreater surprise element that greater use could be made of the networks around teams (eg sponsors who have a lotto lose) and that sanctions would have to be persuasive if possible (eg ldquonaming and shamingrdquo) (van Erp 2011) yetpunitive if necessary

More external control may be needed but our analysis also indicates that it will probably not be enough Indeedsuch an approach could not only ldquocrowd outrdquo intrinsic motivation to behave responsibly (Frey amp Jegen 2001) itcould also actively reinforce the incentives to neutralize internal mutual control mechanisms and thus backfireThis is especially true in cases such as the world of sports where the reward for doing so takes the form of the firstmover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma More external control may make it harder to violate agreements butwhoever succeeds in doing so gains an even greater advantage while those who get caught are depicted as ldquolosersrdquoInternal professional control must therefore be strengthened at the same time

When it comes to strengthening internal professional control the key issue is to ensure that riders who haveproblems with medical (or other) practices have the opportunity and the nerve to speak out against the ring-leaders before they are co-opted into doping practices for example by offering them some form of protectionWhen internal professional control fails and certain attitudes become entrenched a possible solution is to granta special role to a concerned outsider (Weaver et al 1999 Sunstein 2003) Potential candidates for this role includechief sponsors or national cycling federations which have an interest in maintaining a clean image (Chadwick2013)

As regards the question of how a concerned outsider might break through the teamrsquos internal hierarchy there aremany options formulating procedures influencing team composition (ie ensuring sufficient counterweight tostrong leaders) and organizing regular in-depth discussions with riders in which these issues can be addressed It isalso important to define the medical staff as a professional unit and treat it in a similar way In other words the staff

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should be sufficiently balanced and have ample opportunities for communicating criticism of fellow physicians tothe concerned outsider Through strengthening internal control mechanisms the necessity of external control maythus be reduced

An approach that is limited to the need for a cultural shift is risky as can be derived from our analysis Acultural shift requires incentives in order to take place However some of the explanations for doping in sportsare of a structural nature and will therefore never completely disappear For instance the potential for negativeeffects of hierarchical control by a strong leader can never be entirely removed because a (sports) team can onlybe successful as a team if it acts somewhat uniformly Indeed leadership is an important factor in limiting toogreat a level of diversity (Janis 1982 Eden 2004 Levi 2010) Moreover as professional cycling like health careservices scientific research and financial service provision takes place in a highly competitive environment thetemptation of the first mover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma will always be present and may even be reinforcedby a strong leader setting a ldquobadrdquo example The study of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC)published three years after the USADA report supports this view It finds that a culture of doping continues toexist although dopers have moved on to new and more advanced methods to avoid detection (Cycling Indepen-dent Reform Commission 2015 p 12)

This brings us to three more general conclusions in regard to regulatory enforcement moving beyond the case ofprofessional cycling These conclusions are likely to apply to prohibited behaviors in other professional sectors as wellBefore they can be extrapolated however further (comparative) research is necessary for instance on the manipu-lation of lending rates in the financial sector (think of the Libor scandal) plagiarism and fabricating results in science(eg Bhattacharjee 2013) and on ldquoupcodingrdquo in health insurance billing (eg Kerpershoek et al 2014)

A first conclusion is that regulating prohibited behaviors in professional sectors requires a multifacetedapproach combining different types of enforcement strategies over time None of the aforementioned enforcementstrategies will probably be effective when applied in isolation and in a static manner only mixtures are likely to besuited to deal with the dynamics of the prohibited behavior (in our case doping) as we have described them Thisis in line with but slightly different than one would expect on the basis of responsive regulation theories which arguendash simply put ndash that under certain conditions one strategy will work better than another (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992)As conditions are often highly variable deciding on one particular strategy is far from easy Inspectors not only needto be able to recognize patterns of strategic behavior and have a variety of enforcement strategies at their disposalthey also must cleverly combine these strategies and use them simultaneously (even though this is often perceivedas wasteful) and be willing to run the risk of missing their targets with at least some of these strategies (rather thannot shooting at all)

A second conclusion is that such a multifaceted approach needs to take account of the often-competitiveprofessional environment which is a fertile ground for prohibited behavior The key challenge for regulators willbe to ensure that such a competitive environment is conducive to fighting and exposing prohibited behaviorrather than enabling and concealing it We have shown that professionals only have a strong interest in exposingcheating by others before the dynamics kick in In the fight against professional misconduct it will thus beimportant to prevent the first mover advantage from re-emerging The trick is to identify the point at whichprohibited behavior spreads and ldquogoes viralrdquo (cf Gladwell 2000) because it is up to this point that interventionsto curb this behavior such as those described above are likely to be most effective This is difficult ndash in fact thedynamics do not have a clear beginning or end and a new game may have already started before the previous onehas ended The mere understanding ndash gained through the application of theories on social and behavioral dynam-ics ndash that the game between inspectees and inspectors is a continuous one will however help inspectors to targettheir strategies

Finally a multifaceted enforcement approach is not only necessary because inspectors are confronted with amultifaceted problem but also because it has strategic and symbolic value Strategically speaking it strengthens theinspectorrsquos position in the game with the inspectee Cleverly combining multiple strategies simultaneously meansthat there is always another option to fall back on if one or more measures prove ineffective It also createsconsiderable uncertainty for any first mover considering prohibited behavior Given the countless ways in whichmisbehaving professionals could be dealt with this uncertainty can act as an incentive not to go down this path Amultifaceted approach also has an important symbolic value it shows that the fight against professional misconductis being taken seriously without simply resorting to intrusive or centralized forms of regulatory governance

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References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

(Lincoln amp Guba 1985 Corbin amp Strauss 2008) Finally we clustered together similar and frequent codes (iepatterns) establishing theoretically relevant categories of codes in relation to the game between inspectees andinspectors

Using this approach to analyze the USADA report has important benefits It provides systematic informationderived from a large amount of data It is also less prone to bias than interviewing Moreover a key advantage ofanalyzing publicly available documents is the possibility for corroboration by other researchers Like any otheranalytical method however our approach has its weaknesses Notably it is limited to the use of statements andmaterials collected by the USADA which may not necessarily provide a complete and unbiased picture To appre-ciate the context in which the USADA investigation has taken place we examined media coverage of the reportFinally there is always a risk of data misinterpretation We have sought to alleviate this risk by each individually goingthrough the documents several times and comparing our interpretations

4 The ldquogamerdquo between Armstrong and the inspectors

In this section we present the main findings of the USADA report as substantiated by affidavits and originalmaterials We organize them along the lines of the theoretical framework outlined in section 2 and consider the typeof inspectee the games played by inspectees and the counter-strategies used by doping inspectors using diversitywithin professional organizations as well as activating third parties in a competitive environment and exploitinginstitutional fragmentation and redundancy to carry out multiple inspections

41 Armstrong and his team as inspecteesOne of the USADArsquos most notable findings was that Armstrong and his team acted according to a very clear planwhich sets this case apart from scandals involving other teams Arguably these scandals mostly concern individualcyclists and none of these teams ran a doping program like the US Postal Service did The US Postal Service team waswell informed about the available doping techniques and applied them in a systematic manner For example cyclistscan use blood transfusions to maintain higher hematocrit levels (ie the volume of red blood cells as a proportionof total blood volume) during tough races If their hematocrit levels subsequently exceed the maximum permittedvalue they can be lowered by injecting physiological saline solutions The staff of the US Postal Service teamcontinuously tracked the hematocrit levels of riders in order to avoid detection (USADA 2012 p 77 p 108 egAffidavits of Tom Danielson Floyd Landis George Hincapie and Jonathan Vaughters) They knew that doping wasprohibited Armstrong publically and systematically denied doping and stated under oath that he never usedperformance-enhancing drugs (USADA 2012 pp 146ndash147)

42 Their strategic behavior over the yearsThe USADA report lists several ways in which Armstrong and his team attempted to manipulate the inspectors Onestrategy applied by Armstrong was delaying inspections For example Armstrong would provide informationconcerning his whereabouts as late as possible leaving inspectors less time to organize a drug test (USADA 2012 p134) The USADA report also describes how Armstrong and his team used a wide variety of training locations anddeliberately chose locations where they were less likely to be tested (USADA 2012 p 132 Affidavits of GeorgeHincapie and Tom Danielson) In this way the team always remained one step ahead of the inspectors

Another strategy used by Armstrong and his team was related to the information asymmetry between them andthe inspectors and the opportunities this provided for deception The US Postal Service team frequently fabricatedcover stories and the teamrsquos doctors were willing to issue statements that lacked any medical basis (USADA 2012 p32 Affidavits of Emma OrsquoReilly Jonathan Vaughters and Tyler Hamilton) An example that features extensively inthe USADA report is tampering with evidence especially in relation to hematocrit levels If necessary riders arrivedtoo late for drug tests or the team ensured that riders with low hematocrit levels were tested first (USADA 2012 p133 p 139 Affidavits Jonathan Vaughters David Zabriskie and Dr Larry Bowers) In one example Armstrong andhis team made use of the fact that no tests were conducted during the night by arranging to receive micro-doses ofEPO at night time (USADA 2012 p 138 Affidavits of Christian Vande Velde Jonathan Vaughters and Dr LarryBowers)

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The USADA report also describes how the inspectees always stayed ahead of the inspectors by constantlyadapting Until 2000 there was no test for EPO When a test for EPO was adopted in 2000 it proved relatively easyto manipulate Finally when the EPO tests became more sophisticated the team switched to blood transfusions(USADA 2012 pp 110ndash111 eg Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton Tom Danielson and David Zabriskie)

Another key strategy was playing the Janus ploy Armstrong constantly stressed that he was cooperating with alltests and that he was the most tested athlete in the history of sport (USADA 2012 pp 129ndash130) At the same timethe report describes the exceptionally brazen methods that he and his team used to deceive the testers For exampleit describes how during a test at the 1998 World Championships a team doctor smuggled in masking agents underhis coat in order to influence the test at the last moment (USADA 2012 p 20 p 122 p 139 Affidavits of JonathanVaughters and Christian Vande Velde) It also describes how during the 1999 Tour de France a motorcyclist followedthe US Postal Service team at all times in order to clandestinely provide the members of the team with performance-enhancing drugs (USADA 2012 p 30 Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton Frankie Andreu and Betsy Andreu) Thesestrategies make it very difficult for inspectors to do their job it is hard to imagine that somebody who consistentlyclaims to be honest and cooperative is actually involved in a sophisticated doping program

43 The counter-strategies of doping inspectorsThe USADA report points out that the inspectors were unable to cope with the three types of strategic behavior usedagainst them Armstrong and his team successfully delayed the inspectorsrsquo work for example by repeatedly switch-ing their training camps revealing information about those camps at the last minute and arriving too late for drugtests In addition they successfully misled the inspectors for example by tampering with evidence Finally theyrepeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the more serious tests Armstrongrsquos legal advisors claiming that he was themost tested athlete in the history of sport

For the most part the inspections never rose above the level of a standardized bureaucratic activity It is alsoworth noting that some inspectors became increasingly careless They sometimes tolerated the fact that riders didnot respond to a knock on the door outside of competition They also did not consistently report missed drug testsEven in competition riders managed to avoid tests simply by dropping out of the race (USADA 2012 p 40 p 131Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie and George Hincapie) In combination with the neutralisation ofinternal professional control and an extremely competitive and highly fragmented environment this seems to have madethe systematic use of performance-enhancing doping in the US Postal Service team possible

431 The neutralization of internal professional controlA professional cycling team like other professional organizations consists of several individual cyclists all with theirown specializations (eg climbing sprinting time trial) and therefore is likely to be characterized by a certainamount of diversity In addition one would expect these individuals to be generally committed to a set of profes-sional values that are incompatible with the systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs As already mentionedthese values play a key role in the mutual horizontal control mechanisms that exist within professional organiza-tions such as cycling teams When they are violated there is a reasonable chance that the cyclists involved will discussthose violations This means that there is always a possibility that some of the cyclists within the team will find theprohibited behavior hard to stomach and become whistle-blowers

However the USADA report notes that inspectors were unable to exploit this possibility in the case of LanceArmstrong and his team until Floyd Landis provided inspectors with incriminating information because the mutualhorizontal control mechanisms were not functioning An oft-cited explanation for this is that the value system wascompletely out of balance Doping had become an accepted phenomenon throughout the world of cycling beyonda single cyclist or team It was a social norm a part of the job for professional cyclists and riders therefore no longerconfronted each other about it Worse they no longer regarded doping as cheating it was seen as normal behaviorNevertheless this is not the picture that emerges from the research

As already noted the idea that professional cycling should clean up its act was rapidly gaining ground at the endof the 1990s especially after the Festina doping affair in 1998 and the number of inspections was actually increasingRiders who joined the US Postal Service team were shocked when they found out about the teamrsquos systematic dopingpractices One of them was David Zabriskie a young rider with a family history of drug use who was determinedto remain clean his entire life but eventually ended up doping as well (USADA 2012 pp 112ndash114 Affidavits of DavidZabriskie and Michael Barry) The question is therefore how did mutual professional control fail to work

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The USADA report shows that the US Postal Service teamrsquos structure was becoming increasingly hierarchicalArmstrong was a very dominant person who tolerated no contradiction He also had two allies in Tyler Hamiltonand Kevin Livingston Together they formed the so-called ldquoA teamrdquo which benefitted from special EPO deliveryservices during the Tour de France and crushed any criticism of doping (USADA 2012 pp 22ndash23 Affidavits of TylerHamilton and Frankie Andreu) This led to a standoff between the experienced riders with an established positionand the younger riders who were critical of doping with the younger group losing this confrontation They weresimply forced to participate in the doping program

Part of this hierarchical culture according to the USADA report was Armstrongrsquos veto power over hiring andfiring (USADA 2012 p 6) Any rider who did not comply with the teamrsquos doping practices was de facto out of a jobor in any case not selected for competition in the big races The culture was also reflected in Armstrong pickingJohan Bruyneel as Team Director and having him serve for nine years in this position It was Bruyneel whosubsequently convinced young riders such as Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie Levi Leipheimer and ChristianVande Velde who did not themselves consider performance enhancing drug use as normal that it was required forsuccess in the peloton (USADA 2012 pp 114ndash115 Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie Levi Leipheimerand Christian Vande Velde)

Within the US Postal Service team a key role was played by the medical staff who together with others such asdrug smugglers are described as an ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo in the USADA report (USADA 2012 p 6) The medical staffhad a dual relationship with professional cycling On the one hand they were not part of the profession serving assupport staff in every sense of the word On the other hand they had positioned themselves at the heart of theprofession because medical supervision was a crucial factor in the teamrsquos success Armstrong exploited this situationas much as possible The riders were constantly told to follow the instructions of Dr Ferrari (ldquoSchumirdquo) who wassimultaneously kept at a distance from them (USADA 2012 pp 94ndash95) This contributed to the development of apowerful hierarchy in which all individual riders came up against Armstrong who was able to exert further pressureon them through the ldquoA teamrdquo and Dr Ferrari

The US Postal Service team thus became increasingly homogeneous in terms of its attitude to doping the useof which became institutionalized Some members of the team cheerfully sang a song about using EPO on the teambus (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p 22) Moreover anyone who did not join in was perceived as beingdisloyal not only to the professional team but also to his or her friends Email exchanges between Armstrong andvarious teammates repeatedly refer to mutual friendship and the importance of loyalty between friends (USADA2012 see eg Appendix A Exhibits G and I email exchanges between Armstrong and Andreu and Andreu andHincapie)

Rather than such prohibited behavior becoming normalized in the sense that it was not considered prohibitedanymore it was imposed on the team by strong leaders and legitimized by support staff This made it difficult forinspectors to control such behavior Even though several cyclists within the team did not consider doping to benormal they did not blow the whistle The extremely competitive and highly fragmented environment of profes-sional cycling further exacerbated the difficulties encountered by inspectors

432 An extremely competitive and highly fragmented environmentThe environment in which Armstrong carried out his doping program was extremely competitive A win for onerider represented a loss for everyone else What impact did this have on doping and on the game between inspectorsand inspectees The situation encountered by the USADA was that everyone was violating the rules ndash at least that wasthe general perception In response to questions by David Zabriskie US Postal Service team director Johan Bruyneelanswered that ldquoeveryone is doing itrdquo (USADA 2012 p 113) and that they would not be doing it if it was harmfulBruyneel thus made it seem like doping was in line with prevailing norms in the peloton even though it wasprohibited further reducing the incentive of individual cyclists in the US Postal Service team to speak out againstdoping For the cyclists there seemed nothing to lose as long as they played the game well and better than otherteams

Furthermore the game between inspectors and Armstrong and his team was embedded in a heavily fragmentedinstitutional structure Professional cyclists who travel all over the world to train and compete deal with a multitudeof national anti-doping organizations which in theory all operate on the basis of the same World Anti-DopingCode but which in practice have different levels of professionalism and different approaches to doping inspections

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

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(Hanstad et al 2010) In big races the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) is responsible for testing but the USADAreport shows that cooperation between UCI and the NADOs especially the USADA was not always smooth forexample with respect to exchanging information (USADA 2012 p 141) There also appear to be differences betweenindividual NADOs in terms of the standard and frequency of the inspections For example the USADA reportdescribes how the US Postal Service team went to a Spanish resort for training because the risk of inspection wasnegligible at this location (USADA 2012 p 133)

A fragmented environment thus appears to have been of greater advantage to Armstrong and his team thanto the inspectors In this particular case the latter were unable to exploit one of the potential advantages offragmentation ndash a system of inspection with built-in redundancy ndash because Armstrong and his team were familiarwith all of the systemrsquos shortcomings and could in fact play the various inspectors off against each other More-over the inspectorsrsquo aforementioned standardized bureaucratic approach limited their ability to exploit the sys-temrsquos built-in redundancy Where inspections were carried out (they were often lacking) they followed a standardpattern In addition there was insufficient cooperation between the NADOs in order to reap the benefits ofredundancy The inspections were therefore relatively easy to avoid even in cases of unannounced testing(USADA 2012 p 132)

44 Reinforcing dynamicsThe systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs and the simultaneous effort to conceal this from the inspectorscreates an interesting dynamic Doping provides an advantage that weakens the incentive of other teams to adhereto the rules In fact it creates an incentive to cheat This incentive to cheat can be effective even if riders are unsurewhether or not others are doping The mere perception that they might be doing so without being caught can act asan incentive to break the rules

This activates the dinerrsquos dilemma because it is advantageous to be one of the first to engage in the prohibitedbehavior The dinerrsquos dilemma also has a strong dynamic of its own At first Armstrong and his team used EPOWhen this became increasingly difficult they switched to blood transfusions Once again the mere perception thata team is using advanced doping techniques is enough of an incentive for others to copy their behavior Moreoverthe more unscrupulous you are the greater your advantage over your rivals The incentive to break the rules keepsbecoming stronger and those who do so obviously have no interest in disclosing their actions even contemplatingto hold onto their secrets to the grave as was pointed out by Tyler Hamilton (USADA 2012 p 128) This dynamicultimately leads to a situation in which everyone is breaking the rules

Even in a situation in which doping is widespread individuals or teams may step forward to expose it onmoral grounds or because it is in their interest to do so However in a situation in which other teams or ridersin the peloton are doping or at least not openly criticizing those who do the option of being the first to revertto the original value of keeping the sport clean ndash and especially of doing so publicly ndash is very unattractive (seeeg Committee Anti-Doping Approach 2013) The first individual or team to yield and break professionalcyclingrsquos code of silence (ldquoomertardquo) faces several substantial risks damaging his own reputation as well as that ofhis team and his sponsor destroying long-term friendships with other riders in the peloton and of course beingpunished (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One pp 12ndash13) The latter is a key source of uncertainty How will theauthorities react Will they be lenient out of respect for the first person to come forward or very strict in orderto set an example

This turns the decision whether or not to confess to doping into a game of chicken It is very unattractive for arider to be the first to confess and much more attractive to wait for someone else to do so first Through his actionsArmstrong strengthened the perception that the situation amounted to a game of chicken Specifically he wouldpublicly (and aggressively) attack cyclists who raised the issue of doping This happened for example to FilippoSimeoni (USADA 2012 pp 72ndash73) and Floyd Landis who continued doping after he left Armstrongrsquos team and wasaccused by Armstrong of having ldquozero credibilityrdquo and being a ldquoproven liarrdquo (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p11) During the 1999 Tour de France Christophe Bassons wrote in a diary he was keeping in Le Parisen that he wasldquoshockedrdquo by Armstrongrsquos dominance The next day Armstrong rode up to Bassons and berated him calling him adisgrace and telling him he should get out of cycling (USADA 2012 p 35) In this manner Armstrong added asignificant risk to the many other risks faced by the ldquochickenrdquo namely a conflict with the sportrsquos leading (andgenerally admired) rider

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5 Analysis

In section 2 we presented several theoretical approaches to the interaction between inspectors and inspectees Onthe basis of the USADA report that we introduced in section 3 we described the nature of the interactions betweenArmstrong and the doping inspectors in section 4 In this section we analyze the empirical evidence along the linesof the theoretical framework This leads us to the following findings which help us to answer the question why thevarious mechanisms that were intended to regulate the use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional cyclingfailed so spectacularly

Armstrong and the US Postal Service team have all the characteristics of an ldquoamoral calculatorrdquo (Kagan amp Scholz1984) They knew exactly what behavior was permitted or prohibited and deliberately broke the rules The team hadan ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo and was consistently able to innovate and apply new doping techniques ldquoDeviancerdquo waslegitimized not normalized (cf Vaughan 1996) For a period of several years the US Postal Service team successfullydeployed a wide range of strategic behavior outsmarting inspectors As can be derived from the USADA report thisbehavior was aimed at delaying inspections misleading inspectors and undermining the legitimacy of the entireinspection process much in line with what we expected on the basis of Hutter (1997) McBarnet and Whelan (1999)Sparrow (2000) and de Bruijn et al (2007)

The inspectors were unable to exploit the diversity and horizontal control mechanisms within the US PostalService team Prohibited behavior was not only legitimized by medical support staff it was also imposed by its leaderArmstrong turned the team into a hierarchy with limited scope for autonomy and value-driven behavior and forcedall of his teammates to go along with the doping program In this manner he neutralized the teamrsquos internal controlmechanisms in contrast to what we expected on the basis of professionalism literature (eg Kober et al 2007 deBruijn 2010)

In theory the fragmented environment can be exploited because it allows inspectors to employ redundancy ofenforcement regimes as a strategy However this proved to be false in practice Armstrong did come face to face withmultiple inspectors but without fail he managed to identify the weak points in the inspection system notably itscoordination Moreover the competitive environment can be expected to produce incentives to tackle prohibitedbehavior This also did not happen in practice as the proceeds of the prohibited behavior were high especially forthe first mover and the exit costs (ie the costs of exposing the prohibited behavior) or at least the perception thereofas fed by Armstrongrsquos action were also high

When taken together these findings form a dynamic that continuously strengthened Armstrongrsquos position Firstof all the teamrsquos alignment with the doping program gave rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism Everyone had aninterest in concealing the prohibited behavior and this created a powerful incentive to engage in strategic behaviorAs the strategic behavior of the team members increased the incentive to remain aligned became stronger This isbecause the exit costs kept rising as the team continued its deliberate policy of doping strategic behavior and liesMoreover whoever revealed the prohibited behavior would lose friends and be forced to leave Armstrongrsquos teamStrategic behavior was therefore not only the result of aligning with prohibited behavior but also an incentive tomaintain and reinforce this alignment

Second when a team that is so strongly aligned engages in strategic behavior it becomes increasingly difficult forinspectors to uncover the prohibited behavior This creates a whole new dynamic an aligned team that engages inprohibited behavior in a competitive environment and remains undiscovered activates the dinerrsquos dilemma More-over once everyone starts breaking the rules the game of chicken comes into play It is very unattractive to be thefirst to admit to widespread doping In the case at hand the prohibited behavior therefore spread through the worldof professional cycling like an oil stain

Third once these two games have been activated another dynamic emerges The first cyclist or team to startusing a new doping technique gains an advantage over the other riders and can be fairly certain that the game ofchicken will prevent them from reporting anything to the inspectors The new doping technique leads to a new gamethat rekindles the entire dynamic In fact a new game may even begin before the previous game has ended

Fourth this dynamic made it increasingly difficult for the inspectors to catch Armstrong The peloton was rife withincentives to conceal the prohibited behavior Many of the inspectorsrsquo counter-strategies ndash such as cooperating withwhistle-blowers activating third parties (eg other teams) or exploiting the inspection systemrsquos built-in redundancyndash therefore failed to produce results This obviously encouraged the teams to continue their prohibited behavior

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Finally the situation also contains a paradox Armstrong was so good at concealing his prohibited behavior fromthe inspectors that he kept taking it further The extent of his amoral behavior kept growing from EPO and bloodtransfusions to evidence tampering and blatant lies At a certain point it became so extensive and so widely knownamong riders that there was finally momentum for the USADA (and other NADOs) to take firm action Itaccordingly launched an investigation in which many riders faced in-depth questioning The paradox is as followsThe better an inspectee is at concealing prohibited behavior the more he will engage in it At a certain point howeverthe behavior is so extensive that it ultimately becomes easier for the inspectors to uncover it

6 Conclusions

What practical lessons can be learned about potential enforcement strategies from our analysis of the game betweeninspectors and inspectees in the case of professional cycling What does the analysis tell us about enforcementtheoretically speaking that we did not know before and that may also be relevant for other sectors such as medicalacademic or financial sectors

In discussions about the future of professional cycling two sets of enforcement strategies are frequently putforward as possible ldquosolutionsrdquo for the doping problem first external doping control by NADOs and WADA mustbe intensified and second professional cycling itself ndash that is the riders teams and entourages ndash needs toundergo a cultural shift (eg Wilson 2013) Similar sets of enforcement strategies have been suggested afterrevelations of professional misconduct in other sectors A clear example is the financial sector where the irre-sponsible behavior of bankers in combination with serious gaps in regulation (and rapid innovations in financialproducts) bloated the market with ldquotoxicrdquo assets resulting in the near collapse of the financial system and sub-sequently in a rethinking of control arrangements (eg Groenleer et al 2014) In many countries the latter meantthe introduction of more strict rules about bankersrsquo bonuses and financial products and more central oversighton compliance with those rules

It follows from our analysis that in professional cycling inspections could also be intensified by various meansincluding the use of technological aids such as biomedical passports as has been done in recent years Moreimportant is that inspection be regarded less as a bureaucratic standardized activity and more as a continuousprocess of developing new strategies in response to the inspecteersquos behavior (Weil 2008) This means for examplethat there could be more profiling in order to tailor inspections to different types of inspectees that greater use couldbe made of information other than doping tests (eg relying more on informants) that inspections could have agreater surprise element that greater use could be made of the networks around teams (eg sponsors who have a lotto lose) and that sanctions would have to be persuasive if possible (eg ldquonaming and shamingrdquo) (van Erp 2011) yetpunitive if necessary

More external control may be needed but our analysis also indicates that it will probably not be enough Indeedsuch an approach could not only ldquocrowd outrdquo intrinsic motivation to behave responsibly (Frey amp Jegen 2001) itcould also actively reinforce the incentives to neutralize internal mutual control mechanisms and thus backfireThis is especially true in cases such as the world of sports where the reward for doing so takes the form of the firstmover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma More external control may make it harder to violate agreements butwhoever succeeds in doing so gains an even greater advantage while those who get caught are depicted as ldquolosersrdquoInternal professional control must therefore be strengthened at the same time

When it comes to strengthening internal professional control the key issue is to ensure that riders who haveproblems with medical (or other) practices have the opportunity and the nerve to speak out against the ring-leaders before they are co-opted into doping practices for example by offering them some form of protectionWhen internal professional control fails and certain attitudes become entrenched a possible solution is to granta special role to a concerned outsider (Weaver et al 1999 Sunstein 2003) Potential candidates for this role includechief sponsors or national cycling federations which have an interest in maintaining a clean image (Chadwick2013)

As regards the question of how a concerned outsider might break through the teamrsquos internal hierarchy there aremany options formulating procedures influencing team composition (ie ensuring sufficient counterweight tostrong leaders) and organizing regular in-depth discussions with riders in which these issues can be addressed It isalso important to define the medical staff as a professional unit and treat it in a similar way In other words the staff

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 11

should be sufficiently balanced and have ample opportunities for communicating criticism of fellow physicians tothe concerned outsider Through strengthening internal control mechanisms the necessity of external control maythus be reduced

An approach that is limited to the need for a cultural shift is risky as can be derived from our analysis Acultural shift requires incentives in order to take place However some of the explanations for doping in sportsare of a structural nature and will therefore never completely disappear For instance the potential for negativeeffects of hierarchical control by a strong leader can never be entirely removed because a (sports) team can onlybe successful as a team if it acts somewhat uniformly Indeed leadership is an important factor in limiting toogreat a level of diversity (Janis 1982 Eden 2004 Levi 2010) Moreover as professional cycling like health careservices scientific research and financial service provision takes place in a highly competitive environment thetemptation of the first mover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma will always be present and may even be reinforcedby a strong leader setting a ldquobadrdquo example The study of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC)published three years after the USADA report supports this view It finds that a culture of doping continues toexist although dopers have moved on to new and more advanced methods to avoid detection (Cycling Indepen-dent Reform Commission 2015 p 12)

This brings us to three more general conclusions in regard to regulatory enforcement moving beyond the case ofprofessional cycling These conclusions are likely to apply to prohibited behaviors in other professional sectors as wellBefore they can be extrapolated however further (comparative) research is necessary for instance on the manipu-lation of lending rates in the financial sector (think of the Libor scandal) plagiarism and fabricating results in science(eg Bhattacharjee 2013) and on ldquoupcodingrdquo in health insurance billing (eg Kerpershoek et al 2014)

A first conclusion is that regulating prohibited behaviors in professional sectors requires a multifacetedapproach combining different types of enforcement strategies over time None of the aforementioned enforcementstrategies will probably be effective when applied in isolation and in a static manner only mixtures are likely to besuited to deal with the dynamics of the prohibited behavior (in our case doping) as we have described them Thisis in line with but slightly different than one would expect on the basis of responsive regulation theories which arguendash simply put ndash that under certain conditions one strategy will work better than another (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992)As conditions are often highly variable deciding on one particular strategy is far from easy Inspectors not only needto be able to recognize patterns of strategic behavior and have a variety of enforcement strategies at their disposalthey also must cleverly combine these strategies and use them simultaneously (even though this is often perceivedas wasteful) and be willing to run the risk of missing their targets with at least some of these strategies (rather thannot shooting at all)

A second conclusion is that such a multifaceted approach needs to take account of the often-competitiveprofessional environment which is a fertile ground for prohibited behavior The key challenge for regulators willbe to ensure that such a competitive environment is conducive to fighting and exposing prohibited behaviorrather than enabling and concealing it We have shown that professionals only have a strong interest in exposingcheating by others before the dynamics kick in In the fight against professional misconduct it will thus beimportant to prevent the first mover advantage from re-emerging The trick is to identify the point at whichprohibited behavior spreads and ldquogoes viralrdquo (cf Gladwell 2000) because it is up to this point that interventionsto curb this behavior such as those described above are likely to be most effective This is difficult ndash in fact thedynamics do not have a clear beginning or end and a new game may have already started before the previous onehas ended The mere understanding ndash gained through the application of theories on social and behavioral dynam-ics ndash that the game between inspectees and inspectors is a continuous one will however help inspectors to targettheir strategies

Finally a multifaceted enforcement approach is not only necessary because inspectors are confronted with amultifaceted problem but also because it has strategic and symbolic value Strategically speaking it strengthens theinspectorrsquos position in the game with the inspectee Cleverly combining multiple strategies simultaneously meansthat there is always another option to fall back on if one or more measures prove ineffective It also createsconsiderable uncertainty for any first mover considering prohibited behavior Given the countless ways in whichmisbehaving professionals could be dealt with this uncertainty can act as an incentive not to go down this path Amultifaceted approach also has an important symbolic value it shows that the fight against professional misconductis being taken seriously without simply resorting to intrusive or centralized forms of regulatory governance

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

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References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

The USADA report also describes how the inspectees always stayed ahead of the inspectors by constantlyadapting Until 2000 there was no test for EPO When a test for EPO was adopted in 2000 it proved relatively easyto manipulate Finally when the EPO tests became more sophisticated the team switched to blood transfusions(USADA 2012 pp 110ndash111 eg Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton Tom Danielson and David Zabriskie)

Another key strategy was playing the Janus ploy Armstrong constantly stressed that he was cooperating with alltests and that he was the most tested athlete in the history of sport (USADA 2012 pp 129ndash130) At the same timethe report describes the exceptionally brazen methods that he and his team used to deceive the testers For exampleit describes how during a test at the 1998 World Championships a team doctor smuggled in masking agents underhis coat in order to influence the test at the last moment (USADA 2012 p 20 p 122 p 139 Affidavits of JonathanVaughters and Christian Vande Velde) It also describes how during the 1999 Tour de France a motorcyclist followedthe US Postal Service team at all times in order to clandestinely provide the members of the team with performance-enhancing drugs (USADA 2012 p 30 Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton Frankie Andreu and Betsy Andreu) Thesestrategies make it very difficult for inspectors to do their job it is hard to imagine that somebody who consistentlyclaims to be honest and cooperative is actually involved in a sophisticated doping program

43 The counter-strategies of doping inspectorsThe USADA report points out that the inspectors were unable to cope with the three types of strategic behavior usedagainst them Armstrong and his team successfully delayed the inspectorsrsquo work for example by repeatedly switch-ing their training camps revealing information about those camps at the last minute and arriving too late for drugtests In addition they successfully misled the inspectors for example by tampering with evidence Finally theyrepeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the more serious tests Armstrongrsquos legal advisors claiming that he was themost tested athlete in the history of sport

For the most part the inspections never rose above the level of a standardized bureaucratic activity It is alsoworth noting that some inspectors became increasingly careless They sometimes tolerated the fact that riders didnot respond to a knock on the door outside of competition They also did not consistently report missed drug testsEven in competition riders managed to avoid tests simply by dropping out of the race (USADA 2012 p 40 p 131Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie and George Hincapie) In combination with the neutralisation ofinternal professional control and an extremely competitive and highly fragmented environment this seems to have madethe systematic use of performance-enhancing doping in the US Postal Service team possible

431 The neutralization of internal professional controlA professional cycling team like other professional organizations consists of several individual cyclists all with theirown specializations (eg climbing sprinting time trial) and therefore is likely to be characterized by a certainamount of diversity In addition one would expect these individuals to be generally committed to a set of profes-sional values that are incompatible with the systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs As already mentionedthese values play a key role in the mutual horizontal control mechanisms that exist within professional organiza-tions such as cycling teams When they are violated there is a reasonable chance that the cyclists involved will discussthose violations This means that there is always a possibility that some of the cyclists within the team will find theprohibited behavior hard to stomach and become whistle-blowers

However the USADA report notes that inspectors were unable to exploit this possibility in the case of LanceArmstrong and his team until Floyd Landis provided inspectors with incriminating information because the mutualhorizontal control mechanisms were not functioning An oft-cited explanation for this is that the value system wascompletely out of balance Doping had become an accepted phenomenon throughout the world of cycling beyonda single cyclist or team It was a social norm a part of the job for professional cyclists and riders therefore no longerconfronted each other about it Worse they no longer regarded doping as cheating it was seen as normal behaviorNevertheless this is not the picture that emerges from the research

As already noted the idea that professional cycling should clean up its act was rapidly gaining ground at the endof the 1990s especially after the Festina doping affair in 1998 and the number of inspections was actually increasingRiders who joined the US Postal Service team were shocked when they found out about the teamrsquos systematic dopingpractices One of them was David Zabriskie a young rider with a family history of drug use who was determinedto remain clean his entire life but eventually ended up doping as well (USADA 2012 pp 112ndash114 Affidavits of DavidZabriskie and Michael Barry) The question is therefore how did mutual professional control fail to work

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

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The USADA report shows that the US Postal Service teamrsquos structure was becoming increasingly hierarchicalArmstrong was a very dominant person who tolerated no contradiction He also had two allies in Tyler Hamiltonand Kevin Livingston Together they formed the so-called ldquoA teamrdquo which benefitted from special EPO deliveryservices during the Tour de France and crushed any criticism of doping (USADA 2012 pp 22ndash23 Affidavits of TylerHamilton and Frankie Andreu) This led to a standoff between the experienced riders with an established positionand the younger riders who were critical of doping with the younger group losing this confrontation They weresimply forced to participate in the doping program

Part of this hierarchical culture according to the USADA report was Armstrongrsquos veto power over hiring andfiring (USADA 2012 p 6) Any rider who did not comply with the teamrsquos doping practices was de facto out of a jobor in any case not selected for competition in the big races The culture was also reflected in Armstrong pickingJohan Bruyneel as Team Director and having him serve for nine years in this position It was Bruyneel whosubsequently convinced young riders such as Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie Levi Leipheimer and ChristianVande Velde who did not themselves consider performance enhancing drug use as normal that it was required forsuccess in the peloton (USADA 2012 pp 114ndash115 Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie Levi Leipheimerand Christian Vande Velde)

Within the US Postal Service team a key role was played by the medical staff who together with others such asdrug smugglers are described as an ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo in the USADA report (USADA 2012 p 6) The medical staffhad a dual relationship with professional cycling On the one hand they were not part of the profession serving assupport staff in every sense of the word On the other hand they had positioned themselves at the heart of theprofession because medical supervision was a crucial factor in the teamrsquos success Armstrong exploited this situationas much as possible The riders were constantly told to follow the instructions of Dr Ferrari (ldquoSchumirdquo) who wassimultaneously kept at a distance from them (USADA 2012 pp 94ndash95) This contributed to the development of apowerful hierarchy in which all individual riders came up against Armstrong who was able to exert further pressureon them through the ldquoA teamrdquo and Dr Ferrari

The US Postal Service team thus became increasingly homogeneous in terms of its attitude to doping the useof which became institutionalized Some members of the team cheerfully sang a song about using EPO on the teambus (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p 22) Moreover anyone who did not join in was perceived as beingdisloyal not only to the professional team but also to his or her friends Email exchanges between Armstrong andvarious teammates repeatedly refer to mutual friendship and the importance of loyalty between friends (USADA2012 see eg Appendix A Exhibits G and I email exchanges between Armstrong and Andreu and Andreu andHincapie)

Rather than such prohibited behavior becoming normalized in the sense that it was not considered prohibitedanymore it was imposed on the team by strong leaders and legitimized by support staff This made it difficult forinspectors to control such behavior Even though several cyclists within the team did not consider doping to benormal they did not blow the whistle The extremely competitive and highly fragmented environment of profes-sional cycling further exacerbated the difficulties encountered by inspectors

432 An extremely competitive and highly fragmented environmentThe environment in which Armstrong carried out his doping program was extremely competitive A win for onerider represented a loss for everyone else What impact did this have on doping and on the game between inspectorsand inspectees The situation encountered by the USADA was that everyone was violating the rules ndash at least that wasthe general perception In response to questions by David Zabriskie US Postal Service team director Johan Bruyneelanswered that ldquoeveryone is doing itrdquo (USADA 2012 p 113) and that they would not be doing it if it was harmfulBruyneel thus made it seem like doping was in line with prevailing norms in the peloton even though it wasprohibited further reducing the incentive of individual cyclists in the US Postal Service team to speak out againstdoping For the cyclists there seemed nothing to lose as long as they played the game well and better than otherteams

Furthermore the game between inspectors and Armstrong and his team was embedded in a heavily fragmentedinstitutional structure Professional cyclists who travel all over the world to train and compete deal with a multitudeof national anti-doping organizations which in theory all operate on the basis of the same World Anti-DopingCode but which in practice have different levels of professionalism and different approaches to doping inspections

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

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(Hanstad et al 2010) In big races the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) is responsible for testing but the USADAreport shows that cooperation between UCI and the NADOs especially the USADA was not always smooth forexample with respect to exchanging information (USADA 2012 p 141) There also appear to be differences betweenindividual NADOs in terms of the standard and frequency of the inspections For example the USADA reportdescribes how the US Postal Service team went to a Spanish resort for training because the risk of inspection wasnegligible at this location (USADA 2012 p 133)

A fragmented environment thus appears to have been of greater advantage to Armstrong and his team thanto the inspectors In this particular case the latter were unable to exploit one of the potential advantages offragmentation ndash a system of inspection with built-in redundancy ndash because Armstrong and his team were familiarwith all of the systemrsquos shortcomings and could in fact play the various inspectors off against each other More-over the inspectorsrsquo aforementioned standardized bureaucratic approach limited their ability to exploit the sys-temrsquos built-in redundancy Where inspections were carried out (they were often lacking) they followed a standardpattern In addition there was insufficient cooperation between the NADOs in order to reap the benefits ofredundancy The inspections were therefore relatively easy to avoid even in cases of unannounced testing(USADA 2012 p 132)

44 Reinforcing dynamicsThe systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs and the simultaneous effort to conceal this from the inspectorscreates an interesting dynamic Doping provides an advantage that weakens the incentive of other teams to adhereto the rules In fact it creates an incentive to cheat This incentive to cheat can be effective even if riders are unsurewhether or not others are doping The mere perception that they might be doing so without being caught can act asan incentive to break the rules

This activates the dinerrsquos dilemma because it is advantageous to be one of the first to engage in the prohibitedbehavior The dinerrsquos dilemma also has a strong dynamic of its own At first Armstrong and his team used EPOWhen this became increasingly difficult they switched to blood transfusions Once again the mere perception thata team is using advanced doping techniques is enough of an incentive for others to copy their behavior Moreoverthe more unscrupulous you are the greater your advantage over your rivals The incentive to break the rules keepsbecoming stronger and those who do so obviously have no interest in disclosing their actions even contemplatingto hold onto their secrets to the grave as was pointed out by Tyler Hamilton (USADA 2012 p 128) This dynamicultimately leads to a situation in which everyone is breaking the rules

Even in a situation in which doping is widespread individuals or teams may step forward to expose it onmoral grounds or because it is in their interest to do so However in a situation in which other teams or ridersin the peloton are doping or at least not openly criticizing those who do the option of being the first to revertto the original value of keeping the sport clean ndash and especially of doing so publicly ndash is very unattractive (seeeg Committee Anti-Doping Approach 2013) The first individual or team to yield and break professionalcyclingrsquos code of silence (ldquoomertardquo) faces several substantial risks damaging his own reputation as well as that ofhis team and his sponsor destroying long-term friendships with other riders in the peloton and of course beingpunished (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One pp 12ndash13) The latter is a key source of uncertainty How will theauthorities react Will they be lenient out of respect for the first person to come forward or very strict in orderto set an example

This turns the decision whether or not to confess to doping into a game of chicken It is very unattractive for arider to be the first to confess and much more attractive to wait for someone else to do so first Through his actionsArmstrong strengthened the perception that the situation amounted to a game of chicken Specifically he wouldpublicly (and aggressively) attack cyclists who raised the issue of doping This happened for example to FilippoSimeoni (USADA 2012 pp 72ndash73) and Floyd Landis who continued doping after he left Armstrongrsquos team and wasaccused by Armstrong of having ldquozero credibilityrdquo and being a ldquoproven liarrdquo (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p11) During the 1999 Tour de France Christophe Bassons wrote in a diary he was keeping in Le Parisen that he wasldquoshockedrdquo by Armstrongrsquos dominance The next day Armstrong rode up to Bassons and berated him calling him adisgrace and telling him he should get out of cycling (USADA 2012 p 35) In this manner Armstrong added asignificant risk to the many other risks faced by the ldquochickenrdquo namely a conflict with the sportrsquos leading (andgenerally admired) rider

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 9

5 Analysis

In section 2 we presented several theoretical approaches to the interaction between inspectors and inspectees Onthe basis of the USADA report that we introduced in section 3 we described the nature of the interactions betweenArmstrong and the doping inspectors in section 4 In this section we analyze the empirical evidence along the linesof the theoretical framework This leads us to the following findings which help us to answer the question why thevarious mechanisms that were intended to regulate the use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional cyclingfailed so spectacularly

Armstrong and the US Postal Service team have all the characteristics of an ldquoamoral calculatorrdquo (Kagan amp Scholz1984) They knew exactly what behavior was permitted or prohibited and deliberately broke the rules The team hadan ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo and was consistently able to innovate and apply new doping techniques ldquoDeviancerdquo waslegitimized not normalized (cf Vaughan 1996) For a period of several years the US Postal Service team successfullydeployed a wide range of strategic behavior outsmarting inspectors As can be derived from the USADA report thisbehavior was aimed at delaying inspections misleading inspectors and undermining the legitimacy of the entireinspection process much in line with what we expected on the basis of Hutter (1997) McBarnet and Whelan (1999)Sparrow (2000) and de Bruijn et al (2007)

The inspectors were unable to exploit the diversity and horizontal control mechanisms within the US PostalService team Prohibited behavior was not only legitimized by medical support staff it was also imposed by its leaderArmstrong turned the team into a hierarchy with limited scope for autonomy and value-driven behavior and forcedall of his teammates to go along with the doping program In this manner he neutralized the teamrsquos internal controlmechanisms in contrast to what we expected on the basis of professionalism literature (eg Kober et al 2007 deBruijn 2010)

In theory the fragmented environment can be exploited because it allows inspectors to employ redundancy ofenforcement regimes as a strategy However this proved to be false in practice Armstrong did come face to face withmultiple inspectors but without fail he managed to identify the weak points in the inspection system notably itscoordination Moreover the competitive environment can be expected to produce incentives to tackle prohibitedbehavior This also did not happen in practice as the proceeds of the prohibited behavior were high especially forthe first mover and the exit costs (ie the costs of exposing the prohibited behavior) or at least the perception thereofas fed by Armstrongrsquos action were also high

When taken together these findings form a dynamic that continuously strengthened Armstrongrsquos position Firstof all the teamrsquos alignment with the doping program gave rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism Everyone had aninterest in concealing the prohibited behavior and this created a powerful incentive to engage in strategic behaviorAs the strategic behavior of the team members increased the incentive to remain aligned became stronger This isbecause the exit costs kept rising as the team continued its deliberate policy of doping strategic behavior and liesMoreover whoever revealed the prohibited behavior would lose friends and be forced to leave Armstrongrsquos teamStrategic behavior was therefore not only the result of aligning with prohibited behavior but also an incentive tomaintain and reinforce this alignment

Second when a team that is so strongly aligned engages in strategic behavior it becomes increasingly difficult forinspectors to uncover the prohibited behavior This creates a whole new dynamic an aligned team that engages inprohibited behavior in a competitive environment and remains undiscovered activates the dinerrsquos dilemma More-over once everyone starts breaking the rules the game of chicken comes into play It is very unattractive to be thefirst to admit to widespread doping In the case at hand the prohibited behavior therefore spread through the worldof professional cycling like an oil stain

Third once these two games have been activated another dynamic emerges The first cyclist or team to startusing a new doping technique gains an advantage over the other riders and can be fairly certain that the game ofchicken will prevent them from reporting anything to the inspectors The new doping technique leads to a new gamethat rekindles the entire dynamic In fact a new game may even begin before the previous game has ended

Fourth this dynamic made it increasingly difficult for the inspectors to catch Armstrong The peloton was rife withincentives to conceal the prohibited behavior Many of the inspectorsrsquo counter-strategies ndash such as cooperating withwhistle-blowers activating third parties (eg other teams) or exploiting the inspection systemrsquos built-in redundancyndash therefore failed to produce results This obviously encouraged the teams to continue their prohibited behavior

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd10

Finally the situation also contains a paradox Armstrong was so good at concealing his prohibited behavior fromthe inspectors that he kept taking it further The extent of his amoral behavior kept growing from EPO and bloodtransfusions to evidence tampering and blatant lies At a certain point it became so extensive and so widely knownamong riders that there was finally momentum for the USADA (and other NADOs) to take firm action Itaccordingly launched an investigation in which many riders faced in-depth questioning The paradox is as followsThe better an inspectee is at concealing prohibited behavior the more he will engage in it At a certain point howeverthe behavior is so extensive that it ultimately becomes easier for the inspectors to uncover it

6 Conclusions

What practical lessons can be learned about potential enforcement strategies from our analysis of the game betweeninspectors and inspectees in the case of professional cycling What does the analysis tell us about enforcementtheoretically speaking that we did not know before and that may also be relevant for other sectors such as medicalacademic or financial sectors

In discussions about the future of professional cycling two sets of enforcement strategies are frequently putforward as possible ldquosolutionsrdquo for the doping problem first external doping control by NADOs and WADA mustbe intensified and second professional cycling itself ndash that is the riders teams and entourages ndash needs toundergo a cultural shift (eg Wilson 2013) Similar sets of enforcement strategies have been suggested afterrevelations of professional misconduct in other sectors A clear example is the financial sector where the irre-sponsible behavior of bankers in combination with serious gaps in regulation (and rapid innovations in financialproducts) bloated the market with ldquotoxicrdquo assets resulting in the near collapse of the financial system and sub-sequently in a rethinking of control arrangements (eg Groenleer et al 2014) In many countries the latter meantthe introduction of more strict rules about bankersrsquo bonuses and financial products and more central oversighton compliance with those rules

It follows from our analysis that in professional cycling inspections could also be intensified by various meansincluding the use of technological aids such as biomedical passports as has been done in recent years Moreimportant is that inspection be regarded less as a bureaucratic standardized activity and more as a continuousprocess of developing new strategies in response to the inspecteersquos behavior (Weil 2008) This means for examplethat there could be more profiling in order to tailor inspections to different types of inspectees that greater use couldbe made of information other than doping tests (eg relying more on informants) that inspections could have agreater surprise element that greater use could be made of the networks around teams (eg sponsors who have a lotto lose) and that sanctions would have to be persuasive if possible (eg ldquonaming and shamingrdquo) (van Erp 2011) yetpunitive if necessary

More external control may be needed but our analysis also indicates that it will probably not be enough Indeedsuch an approach could not only ldquocrowd outrdquo intrinsic motivation to behave responsibly (Frey amp Jegen 2001) itcould also actively reinforce the incentives to neutralize internal mutual control mechanisms and thus backfireThis is especially true in cases such as the world of sports where the reward for doing so takes the form of the firstmover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma More external control may make it harder to violate agreements butwhoever succeeds in doing so gains an even greater advantage while those who get caught are depicted as ldquolosersrdquoInternal professional control must therefore be strengthened at the same time

When it comes to strengthening internal professional control the key issue is to ensure that riders who haveproblems with medical (or other) practices have the opportunity and the nerve to speak out against the ring-leaders before they are co-opted into doping practices for example by offering them some form of protectionWhen internal professional control fails and certain attitudes become entrenched a possible solution is to granta special role to a concerned outsider (Weaver et al 1999 Sunstein 2003) Potential candidates for this role includechief sponsors or national cycling federations which have an interest in maintaining a clean image (Chadwick2013)

As regards the question of how a concerned outsider might break through the teamrsquos internal hierarchy there aremany options formulating procedures influencing team composition (ie ensuring sufficient counterweight tostrong leaders) and organizing regular in-depth discussions with riders in which these issues can be addressed It isalso important to define the medical staff as a professional unit and treat it in a similar way In other words the staff

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 11

should be sufficiently balanced and have ample opportunities for communicating criticism of fellow physicians tothe concerned outsider Through strengthening internal control mechanisms the necessity of external control maythus be reduced

An approach that is limited to the need for a cultural shift is risky as can be derived from our analysis Acultural shift requires incentives in order to take place However some of the explanations for doping in sportsare of a structural nature and will therefore never completely disappear For instance the potential for negativeeffects of hierarchical control by a strong leader can never be entirely removed because a (sports) team can onlybe successful as a team if it acts somewhat uniformly Indeed leadership is an important factor in limiting toogreat a level of diversity (Janis 1982 Eden 2004 Levi 2010) Moreover as professional cycling like health careservices scientific research and financial service provision takes place in a highly competitive environment thetemptation of the first mover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma will always be present and may even be reinforcedby a strong leader setting a ldquobadrdquo example The study of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC)published three years after the USADA report supports this view It finds that a culture of doping continues toexist although dopers have moved on to new and more advanced methods to avoid detection (Cycling Indepen-dent Reform Commission 2015 p 12)

This brings us to three more general conclusions in regard to regulatory enforcement moving beyond the case ofprofessional cycling These conclusions are likely to apply to prohibited behaviors in other professional sectors as wellBefore they can be extrapolated however further (comparative) research is necessary for instance on the manipu-lation of lending rates in the financial sector (think of the Libor scandal) plagiarism and fabricating results in science(eg Bhattacharjee 2013) and on ldquoupcodingrdquo in health insurance billing (eg Kerpershoek et al 2014)

A first conclusion is that regulating prohibited behaviors in professional sectors requires a multifacetedapproach combining different types of enforcement strategies over time None of the aforementioned enforcementstrategies will probably be effective when applied in isolation and in a static manner only mixtures are likely to besuited to deal with the dynamics of the prohibited behavior (in our case doping) as we have described them Thisis in line with but slightly different than one would expect on the basis of responsive regulation theories which arguendash simply put ndash that under certain conditions one strategy will work better than another (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992)As conditions are often highly variable deciding on one particular strategy is far from easy Inspectors not only needto be able to recognize patterns of strategic behavior and have a variety of enforcement strategies at their disposalthey also must cleverly combine these strategies and use them simultaneously (even though this is often perceivedas wasteful) and be willing to run the risk of missing their targets with at least some of these strategies (rather thannot shooting at all)

A second conclusion is that such a multifaceted approach needs to take account of the often-competitiveprofessional environment which is a fertile ground for prohibited behavior The key challenge for regulators willbe to ensure that such a competitive environment is conducive to fighting and exposing prohibited behaviorrather than enabling and concealing it We have shown that professionals only have a strong interest in exposingcheating by others before the dynamics kick in In the fight against professional misconduct it will thus beimportant to prevent the first mover advantage from re-emerging The trick is to identify the point at whichprohibited behavior spreads and ldquogoes viralrdquo (cf Gladwell 2000) because it is up to this point that interventionsto curb this behavior such as those described above are likely to be most effective This is difficult ndash in fact thedynamics do not have a clear beginning or end and a new game may have already started before the previous onehas ended The mere understanding ndash gained through the application of theories on social and behavioral dynam-ics ndash that the game between inspectees and inspectors is a continuous one will however help inspectors to targettheir strategies

Finally a multifaceted enforcement approach is not only necessary because inspectors are confronted with amultifaceted problem but also because it has strategic and symbolic value Strategically speaking it strengthens theinspectorrsquos position in the game with the inspectee Cleverly combining multiple strategies simultaneously meansthat there is always another option to fall back on if one or more measures prove ineffective It also createsconsiderable uncertainty for any first mover considering prohibited behavior Given the countless ways in whichmisbehaving professionals could be dealt with this uncertainty can act as an incentive not to go down this path Amultifaceted approach also has an important symbolic value it shows that the fight against professional misconductis being taken seriously without simply resorting to intrusive or centralized forms of regulatory governance

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd12

References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

The USADA report shows that the US Postal Service teamrsquos structure was becoming increasingly hierarchicalArmstrong was a very dominant person who tolerated no contradiction He also had two allies in Tyler Hamiltonand Kevin Livingston Together they formed the so-called ldquoA teamrdquo which benefitted from special EPO deliveryservices during the Tour de France and crushed any criticism of doping (USADA 2012 pp 22ndash23 Affidavits of TylerHamilton and Frankie Andreu) This led to a standoff between the experienced riders with an established positionand the younger riders who were critical of doping with the younger group losing this confrontation They weresimply forced to participate in the doping program

Part of this hierarchical culture according to the USADA report was Armstrongrsquos veto power over hiring andfiring (USADA 2012 p 6) Any rider who did not comply with the teamrsquos doping practices was de facto out of a jobor in any case not selected for competition in the big races The culture was also reflected in Armstrong pickingJohan Bruyneel as Team Director and having him serve for nine years in this position It was Bruyneel whosubsequently convinced young riders such as Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie Levi Leipheimer and ChristianVande Velde who did not themselves consider performance enhancing drug use as normal that it was required forsuccess in the peloton (USADA 2012 pp 114ndash115 Affidavits of Tyler Hamilton David Zabriskie Levi Leipheimerand Christian Vande Velde)

Within the US Postal Service team a key role was played by the medical staff who together with others such asdrug smugglers are described as an ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo in the USADA report (USADA 2012 p 6) The medical staffhad a dual relationship with professional cycling On the one hand they were not part of the profession serving assupport staff in every sense of the word On the other hand they had positioned themselves at the heart of theprofession because medical supervision was a crucial factor in the teamrsquos success Armstrong exploited this situationas much as possible The riders were constantly told to follow the instructions of Dr Ferrari (ldquoSchumirdquo) who wassimultaneously kept at a distance from them (USADA 2012 pp 94ndash95) This contributed to the development of apowerful hierarchy in which all individual riders came up against Armstrong who was able to exert further pressureon them through the ldquoA teamrdquo and Dr Ferrari

The US Postal Service team thus became increasingly homogeneous in terms of its attitude to doping the useof which became institutionalized Some members of the team cheerfully sang a song about using EPO on the teambus (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p 22) Moreover anyone who did not join in was perceived as beingdisloyal not only to the professional team but also to his or her friends Email exchanges between Armstrong andvarious teammates repeatedly refer to mutual friendship and the importance of loyalty between friends (USADA2012 see eg Appendix A Exhibits G and I email exchanges between Armstrong and Andreu and Andreu andHincapie)

Rather than such prohibited behavior becoming normalized in the sense that it was not considered prohibitedanymore it was imposed on the team by strong leaders and legitimized by support staff This made it difficult forinspectors to control such behavior Even though several cyclists within the team did not consider doping to benormal they did not blow the whistle The extremely competitive and highly fragmented environment of profes-sional cycling further exacerbated the difficulties encountered by inspectors

432 An extremely competitive and highly fragmented environmentThe environment in which Armstrong carried out his doping program was extremely competitive A win for onerider represented a loss for everyone else What impact did this have on doping and on the game between inspectorsand inspectees The situation encountered by the USADA was that everyone was violating the rules ndash at least that wasthe general perception In response to questions by David Zabriskie US Postal Service team director Johan Bruyneelanswered that ldquoeveryone is doing itrdquo (USADA 2012 p 113) and that they would not be doing it if it was harmfulBruyneel thus made it seem like doping was in line with prevailing norms in the peloton even though it wasprohibited further reducing the incentive of individual cyclists in the US Postal Service team to speak out againstdoping For the cyclists there seemed nothing to lose as long as they played the game well and better than otherteams

Furthermore the game between inspectors and Armstrong and his team was embedded in a heavily fragmentedinstitutional structure Professional cyclists who travel all over the world to train and compete deal with a multitudeof national anti-doping organizations which in theory all operate on the basis of the same World Anti-DopingCode but which in practice have different levels of professionalism and different approaches to doping inspections

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd8

(Hanstad et al 2010) In big races the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) is responsible for testing but the USADAreport shows that cooperation between UCI and the NADOs especially the USADA was not always smooth forexample with respect to exchanging information (USADA 2012 p 141) There also appear to be differences betweenindividual NADOs in terms of the standard and frequency of the inspections For example the USADA reportdescribes how the US Postal Service team went to a Spanish resort for training because the risk of inspection wasnegligible at this location (USADA 2012 p 133)

A fragmented environment thus appears to have been of greater advantage to Armstrong and his team thanto the inspectors In this particular case the latter were unable to exploit one of the potential advantages offragmentation ndash a system of inspection with built-in redundancy ndash because Armstrong and his team were familiarwith all of the systemrsquos shortcomings and could in fact play the various inspectors off against each other More-over the inspectorsrsquo aforementioned standardized bureaucratic approach limited their ability to exploit the sys-temrsquos built-in redundancy Where inspections were carried out (they were often lacking) they followed a standardpattern In addition there was insufficient cooperation between the NADOs in order to reap the benefits ofredundancy The inspections were therefore relatively easy to avoid even in cases of unannounced testing(USADA 2012 p 132)

44 Reinforcing dynamicsThe systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs and the simultaneous effort to conceal this from the inspectorscreates an interesting dynamic Doping provides an advantage that weakens the incentive of other teams to adhereto the rules In fact it creates an incentive to cheat This incentive to cheat can be effective even if riders are unsurewhether or not others are doping The mere perception that they might be doing so without being caught can act asan incentive to break the rules

This activates the dinerrsquos dilemma because it is advantageous to be one of the first to engage in the prohibitedbehavior The dinerrsquos dilemma also has a strong dynamic of its own At first Armstrong and his team used EPOWhen this became increasingly difficult they switched to blood transfusions Once again the mere perception thata team is using advanced doping techniques is enough of an incentive for others to copy their behavior Moreoverthe more unscrupulous you are the greater your advantage over your rivals The incentive to break the rules keepsbecoming stronger and those who do so obviously have no interest in disclosing their actions even contemplatingto hold onto their secrets to the grave as was pointed out by Tyler Hamilton (USADA 2012 p 128) This dynamicultimately leads to a situation in which everyone is breaking the rules

Even in a situation in which doping is widespread individuals or teams may step forward to expose it onmoral grounds or because it is in their interest to do so However in a situation in which other teams or ridersin the peloton are doping or at least not openly criticizing those who do the option of being the first to revertto the original value of keeping the sport clean ndash and especially of doing so publicly ndash is very unattractive (seeeg Committee Anti-Doping Approach 2013) The first individual or team to yield and break professionalcyclingrsquos code of silence (ldquoomertardquo) faces several substantial risks damaging his own reputation as well as that ofhis team and his sponsor destroying long-term friendships with other riders in the peloton and of course beingpunished (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One pp 12ndash13) The latter is a key source of uncertainty How will theauthorities react Will they be lenient out of respect for the first person to come forward or very strict in orderto set an example

This turns the decision whether or not to confess to doping into a game of chicken It is very unattractive for arider to be the first to confess and much more attractive to wait for someone else to do so first Through his actionsArmstrong strengthened the perception that the situation amounted to a game of chicken Specifically he wouldpublicly (and aggressively) attack cyclists who raised the issue of doping This happened for example to FilippoSimeoni (USADA 2012 pp 72ndash73) and Floyd Landis who continued doping after he left Armstrongrsquos team and wasaccused by Armstrong of having ldquozero credibilityrdquo and being a ldquoproven liarrdquo (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p11) During the 1999 Tour de France Christophe Bassons wrote in a diary he was keeping in Le Parisen that he wasldquoshockedrdquo by Armstrongrsquos dominance The next day Armstrong rode up to Bassons and berated him calling him adisgrace and telling him he should get out of cycling (USADA 2012 p 35) In this manner Armstrong added asignificant risk to the many other risks faced by the ldquochickenrdquo namely a conflict with the sportrsquos leading (andgenerally admired) rider

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 9

5 Analysis

In section 2 we presented several theoretical approaches to the interaction between inspectors and inspectees Onthe basis of the USADA report that we introduced in section 3 we described the nature of the interactions betweenArmstrong and the doping inspectors in section 4 In this section we analyze the empirical evidence along the linesof the theoretical framework This leads us to the following findings which help us to answer the question why thevarious mechanisms that were intended to regulate the use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional cyclingfailed so spectacularly

Armstrong and the US Postal Service team have all the characteristics of an ldquoamoral calculatorrdquo (Kagan amp Scholz1984) They knew exactly what behavior was permitted or prohibited and deliberately broke the rules The team hadan ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo and was consistently able to innovate and apply new doping techniques ldquoDeviancerdquo waslegitimized not normalized (cf Vaughan 1996) For a period of several years the US Postal Service team successfullydeployed a wide range of strategic behavior outsmarting inspectors As can be derived from the USADA report thisbehavior was aimed at delaying inspections misleading inspectors and undermining the legitimacy of the entireinspection process much in line with what we expected on the basis of Hutter (1997) McBarnet and Whelan (1999)Sparrow (2000) and de Bruijn et al (2007)

The inspectors were unable to exploit the diversity and horizontal control mechanisms within the US PostalService team Prohibited behavior was not only legitimized by medical support staff it was also imposed by its leaderArmstrong turned the team into a hierarchy with limited scope for autonomy and value-driven behavior and forcedall of his teammates to go along with the doping program In this manner he neutralized the teamrsquos internal controlmechanisms in contrast to what we expected on the basis of professionalism literature (eg Kober et al 2007 deBruijn 2010)

In theory the fragmented environment can be exploited because it allows inspectors to employ redundancy ofenforcement regimes as a strategy However this proved to be false in practice Armstrong did come face to face withmultiple inspectors but without fail he managed to identify the weak points in the inspection system notably itscoordination Moreover the competitive environment can be expected to produce incentives to tackle prohibitedbehavior This also did not happen in practice as the proceeds of the prohibited behavior were high especially forthe first mover and the exit costs (ie the costs of exposing the prohibited behavior) or at least the perception thereofas fed by Armstrongrsquos action were also high

When taken together these findings form a dynamic that continuously strengthened Armstrongrsquos position Firstof all the teamrsquos alignment with the doping program gave rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism Everyone had aninterest in concealing the prohibited behavior and this created a powerful incentive to engage in strategic behaviorAs the strategic behavior of the team members increased the incentive to remain aligned became stronger This isbecause the exit costs kept rising as the team continued its deliberate policy of doping strategic behavior and liesMoreover whoever revealed the prohibited behavior would lose friends and be forced to leave Armstrongrsquos teamStrategic behavior was therefore not only the result of aligning with prohibited behavior but also an incentive tomaintain and reinforce this alignment

Second when a team that is so strongly aligned engages in strategic behavior it becomes increasingly difficult forinspectors to uncover the prohibited behavior This creates a whole new dynamic an aligned team that engages inprohibited behavior in a competitive environment and remains undiscovered activates the dinerrsquos dilemma More-over once everyone starts breaking the rules the game of chicken comes into play It is very unattractive to be thefirst to admit to widespread doping In the case at hand the prohibited behavior therefore spread through the worldof professional cycling like an oil stain

Third once these two games have been activated another dynamic emerges The first cyclist or team to startusing a new doping technique gains an advantage over the other riders and can be fairly certain that the game ofchicken will prevent them from reporting anything to the inspectors The new doping technique leads to a new gamethat rekindles the entire dynamic In fact a new game may even begin before the previous game has ended

Fourth this dynamic made it increasingly difficult for the inspectors to catch Armstrong The peloton was rife withincentives to conceal the prohibited behavior Many of the inspectorsrsquo counter-strategies ndash such as cooperating withwhistle-blowers activating third parties (eg other teams) or exploiting the inspection systemrsquos built-in redundancyndash therefore failed to produce results This obviously encouraged the teams to continue their prohibited behavior

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd10

Finally the situation also contains a paradox Armstrong was so good at concealing his prohibited behavior fromthe inspectors that he kept taking it further The extent of his amoral behavior kept growing from EPO and bloodtransfusions to evidence tampering and blatant lies At a certain point it became so extensive and so widely knownamong riders that there was finally momentum for the USADA (and other NADOs) to take firm action Itaccordingly launched an investigation in which many riders faced in-depth questioning The paradox is as followsThe better an inspectee is at concealing prohibited behavior the more he will engage in it At a certain point howeverthe behavior is so extensive that it ultimately becomes easier for the inspectors to uncover it

6 Conclusions

What practical lessons can be learned about potential enforcement strategies from our analysis of the game betweeninspectors and inspectees in the case of professional cycling What does the analysis tell us about enforcementtheoretically speaking that we did not know before and that may also be relevant for other sectors such as medicalacademic or financial sectors

In discussions about the future of professional cycling two sets of enforcement strategies are frequently putforward as possible ldquosolutionsrdquo for the doping problem first external doping control by NADOs and WADA mustbe intensified and second professional cycling itself ndash that is the riders teams and entourages ndash needs toundergo a cultural shift (eg Wilson 2013) Similar sets of enforcement strategies have been suggested afterrevelations of professional misconduct in other sectors A clear example is the financial sector where the irre-sponsible behavior of bankers in combination with serious gaps in regulation (and rapid innovations in financialproducts) bloated the market with ldquotoxicrdquo assets resulting in the near collapse of the financial system and sub-sequently in a rethinking of control arrangements (eg Groenleer et al 2014) In many countries the latter meantthe introduction of more strict rules about bankersrsquo bonuses and financial products and more central oversighton compliance with those rules

It follows from our analysis that in professional cycling inspections could also be intensified by various meansincluding the use of technological aids such as biomedical passports as has been done in recent years Moreimportant is that inspection be regarded less as a bureaucratic standardized activity and more as a continuousprocess of developing new strategies in response to the inspecteersquos behavior (Weil 2008) This means for examplethat there could be more profiling in order to tailor inspections to different types of inspectees that greater use couldbe made of information other than doping tests (eg relying more on informants) that inspections could have agreater surprise element that greater use could be made of the networks around teams (eg sponsors who have a lotto lose) and that sanctions would have to be persuasive if possible (eg ldquonaming and shamingrdquo) (van Erp 2011) yetpunitive if necessary

More external control may be needed but our analysis also indicates that it will probably not be enough Indeedsuch an approach could not only ldquocrowd outrdquo intrinsic motivation to behave responsibly (Frey amp Jegen 2001) itcould also actively reinforce the incentives to neutralize internal mutual control mechanisms and thus backfireThis is especially true in cases such as the world of sports where the reward for doing so takes the form of the firstmover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma More external control may make it harder to violate agreements butwhoever succeeds in doing so gains an even greater advantage while those who get caught are depicted as ldquolosersrdquoInternal professional control must therefore be strengthened at the same time

When it comes to strengthening internal professional control the key issue is to ensure that riders who haveproblems with medical (or other) practices have the opportunity and the nerve to speak out against the ring-leaders before they are co-opted into doping practices for example by offering them some form of protectionWhen internal professional control fails and certain attitudes become entrenched a possible solution is to granta special role to a concerned outsider (Weaver et al 1999 Sunstein 2003) Potential candidates for this role includechief sponsors or national cycling federations which have an interest in maintaining a clean image (Chadwick2013)

As regards the question of how a concerned outsider might break through the teamrsquos internal hierarchy there aremany options formulating procedures influencing team composition (ie ensuring sufficient counterweight tostrong leaders) and organizing regular in-depth discussions with riders in which these issues can be addressed It isalso important to define the medical staff as a professional unit and treat it in a similar way In other words the staff

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 11

should be sufficiently balanced and have ample opportunities for communicating criticism of fellow physicians tothe concerned outsider Through strengthening internal control mechanisms the necessity of external control maythus be reduced

An approach that is limited to the need for a cultural shift is risky as can be derived from our analysis Acultural shift requires incentives in order to take place However some of the explanations for doping in sportsare of a structural nature and will therefore never completely disappear For instance the potential for negativeeffects of hierarchical control by a strong leader can never be entirely removed because a (sports) team can onlybe successful as a team if it acts somewhat uniformly Indeed leadership is an important factor in limiting toogreat a level of diversity (Janis 1982 Eden 2004 Levi 2010) Moreover as professional cycling like health careservices scientific research and financial service provision takes place in a highly competitive environment thetemptation of the first mover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma will always be present and may even be reinforcedby a strong leader setting a ldquobadrdquo example The study of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC)published three years after the USADA report supports this view It finds that a culture of doping continues toexist although dopers have moved on to new and more advanced methods to avoid detection (Cycling Indepen-dent Reform Commission 2015 p 12)

This brings us to three more general conclusions in regard to regulatory enforcement moving beyond the case ofprofessional cycling These conclusions are likely to apply to prohibited behaviors in other professional sectors as wellBefore they can be extrapolated however further (comparative) research is necessary for instance on the manipu-lation of lending rates in the financial sector (think of the Libor scandal) plagiarism and fabricating results in science(eg Bhattacharjee 2013) and on ldquoupcodingrdquo in health insurance billing (eg Kerpershoek et al 2014)

A first conclusion is that regulating prohibited behaviors in professional sectors requires a multifacetedapproach combining different types of enforcement strategies over time None of the aforementioned enforcementstrategies will probably be effective when applied in isolation and in a static manner only mixtures are likely to besuited to deal with the dynamics of the prohibited behavior (in our case doping) as we have described them Thisis in line with but slightly different than one would expect on the basis of responsive regulation theories which arguendash simply put ndash that under certain conditions one strategy will work better than another (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992)As conditions are often highly variable deciding on one particular strategy is far from easy Inspectors not only needto be able to recognize patterns of strategic behavior and have a variety of enforcement strategies at their disposalthey also must cleverly combine these strategies and use them simultaneously (even though this is often perceivedas wasteful) and be willing to run the risk of missing their targets with at least some of these strategies (rather thannot shooting at all)

A second conclusion is that such a multifaceted approach needs to take account of the often-competitiveprofessional environment which is a fertile ground for prohibited behavior The key challenge for regulators willbe to ensure that such a competitive environment is conducive to fighting and exposing prohibited behaviorrather than enabling and concealing it We have shown that professionals only have a strong interest in exposingcheating by others before the dynamics kick in In the fight against professional misconduct it will thus beimportant to prevent the first mover advantage from re-emerging The trick is to identify the point at whichprohibited behavior spreads and ldquogoes viralrdquo (cf Gladwell 2000) because it is up to this point that interventionsto curb this behavior such as those described above are likely to be most effective This is difficult ndash in fact thedynamics do not have a clear beginning or end and a new game may have already started before the previous onehas ended The mere understanding ndash gained through the application of theories on social and behavioral dynam-ics ndash that the game between inspectees and inspectors is a continuous one will however help inspectors to targettheir strategies

Finally a multifaceted enforcement approach is not only necessary because inspectors are confronted with amultifaceted problem but also because it has strategic and symbolic value Strategically speaking it strengthens theinspectorrsquos position in the game with the inspectee Cleverly combining multiple strategies simultaneously meansthat there is always another option to fall back on if one or more measures prove ineffective It also createsconsiderable uncertainty for any first mover considering prohibited behavior Given the countless ways in whichmisbehaving professionals could be dealt with this uncertainty can act as an incentive not to go down this path Amultifaceted approach also has an important symbolic value it shows that the fight against professional misconductis being taken seriously without simply resorting to intrusive or centralized forms of regulatory governance

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd12

References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

(Hanstad et al 2010) In big races the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) is responsible for testing but the USADAreport shows that cooperation between UCI and the NADOs especially the USADA was not always smooth forexample with respect to exchanging information (USADA 2012 p 141) There also appear to be differences betweenindividual NADOs in terms of the standard and frequency of the inspections For example the USADA reportdescribes how the US Postal Service team went to a Spanish resort for training because the risk of inspection wasnegligible at this location (USADA 2012 p 133)

A fragmented environment thus appears to have been of greater advantage to Armstrong and his team thanto the inspectors In this particular case the latter were unable to exploit one of the potential advantages offragmentation ndash a system of inspection with built-in redundancy ndash because Armstrong and his team were familiarwith all of the systemrsquos shortcomings and could in fact play the various inspectors off against each other More-over the inspectorsrsquo aforementioned standardized bureaucratic approach limited their ability to exploit the sys-temrsquos built-in redundancy Where inspections were carried out (they were often lacking) they followed a standardpattern In addition there was insufficient cooperation between the NADOs in order to reap the benefits ofredundancy The inspections were therefore relatively easy to avoid even in cases of unannounced testing(USADA 2012 p 132)

44 Reinforcing dynamicsThe systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs and the simultaneous effort to conceal this from the inspectorscreates an interesting dynamic Doping provides an advantage that weakens the incentive of other teams to adhereto the rules In fact it creates an incentive to cheat This incentive to cheat can be effective even if riders are unsurewhether or not others are doping The mere perception that they might be doing so without being caught can act asan incentive to break the rules

This activates the dinerrsquos dilemma because it is advantageous to be one of the first to engage in the prohibitedbehavior The dinerrsquos dilemma also has a strong dynamic of its own At first Armstrong and his team used EPOWhen this became increasingly difficult they switched to blood transfusions Once again the mere perception thata team is using advanced doping techniques is enough of an incentive for others to copy their behavior Moreoverthe more unscrupulous you are the greater your advantage over your rivals The incentive to break the rules keepsbecoming stronger and those who do so obviously have no interest in disclosing their actions even contemplatingto hold onto their secrets to the grave as was pointed out by Tyler Hamilton (USADA 2012 p 128) This dynamicultimately leads to a situation in which everyone is breaking the rules

Even in a situation in which doping is widespread individuals or teams may step forward to expose it onmoral grounds or because it is in their interest to do so However in a situation in which other teams or ridersin the peloton are doping or at least not openly criticizing those who do the option of being the first to revertto the original value of keeping the sport clean ndash and especially of doing so publicly ndash is very unattractive (seeeg Committee Anti-Doping Approach 2013) The first individual or team to yield and break professionalcyclingrsquos code of silence (ldquoomertardquo) faces several substantial risks damaging his own reputation as well as that ofhis team and his sponsor destroying long-term friendships with other riders in the peloton and of course beingpunished (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One pp 12ndash13) The latter is a key source of uncertainty How will theauthorities react Will they be lenient out of respect for the first person to come forward or very strict in orderto set an example

This turns the decision whether or not to confess to doping into a game of chicken It is very unattractive for arider to be the first to confess and much more attractive to wait for someone else to do so first Through his actionsArmstrong strengthened the perception that the situation amounted to a game of chicken Specifically he wouldpublicly (and aggressively) attack cyclists who raised the issue of doping This happened for example to FilippoSimeoni (USADA 2012 pp 72ndash73) and Floyd Landis who continued doping after he left Armstrongrsquos team and wasaccused by Armstrong of having ldquozero credibilityrdquo and being a ldquoproven liarrdquo (USADA 2012 Addendum Part One p11) During the 1999 Tour de France Christophe Bassons wrote in a diary he was keeping in Le Parisen that he wasldquoshockedrdquo by Armstrongrsquos dominance The next day Armstrong rode up to Bassons and berated him calling him adisgrace and telling him he should get out of cycling (USADA 2012 p 35) In this manner Armstrong added asignificant risk to the many other risks faced by the ldquochickenrdquo namely a conflict with the sportrsquos leading (andgenerally admired) rider

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 9

5 Analysis

In section 2 we presented several theoretical approaches to the interaction between inspectors and inspectees Onthe basis of the USADA report that we introduced in section 3 we described the nature of the interactions betweenArmstrong and the doping inspectors in section 4 In this section we analyze the empirical evidence along the linesof the theoretical framework This leads us to the following findings which help us to answer the question why thevarious mechanisms that were intended to regulate the use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional cyclingfailed so spectacularly

Armstrong and the US Postal Service team have all the characteristics of an ldquoamoral calculatorrdquo (Kagan amp Scholz1984) They knew exactly what behavior was permitted or prohibited and deliberately broke the rules The team hadan ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo and was consistently able to innovate and apply new doping techniques ldquoDeviancerdquo waslegitimized not normalized (cf Vaughan 1996) For a period of several years the US Postal Service team successfullydeployed a wide range of strategic behavior outsmarting inspectors As can be derived from the USADA report thisbehavior was aimed at delaying inspections misleading inspectors and undermining the legitimacy of the entireinspection process much in line with what we expected on the basis of Hutter (1997) McBarnet and Whelan (1999)Sparrow (2000) and de Bruijn et al (2007)

The inspectors were unable to exploit the diversity and horizontal control mechanisms within the US PostalService team Prohibited behavior was not only legitimized by medical support staff it was also imposed by its leaderArmstrong turned the team into a hierarchy with limited scope for autonomy and value-driven behavior and forcedall of his teammates to go along with the doping program In this manner he neutralized the teamrsquos internal controlmechanisms in contrast to what we expected on the basis of professionalism literature (eg Kober et al 2007 deBruijn 2010)

In theory the fragmented environment can be exploited because it allows inspectors to employ redundancy ofenforcement regimes as a strategy However this proved to be false in practice Armstrong did come face to face withmultiple inspectors but without fail he managed to identify the weak points in the inspection system notably itscoordination Moreover the competitive environment can be expected to produce incentives to tackle prohibitedbehavior This also did not happen in practice as the proceeds of the prohibited behavior were high especially forthe first mover and the exit costs (ie the costs of exposing the prohibited behavior) or at least the perception thereofas fed by Armstrongrsquos action were also high

When taken together these findings form a dynamic that continuously strengthened Armstrongrsquos position Firstof all the teamrsquos alignment with the doping program gave rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism Everyone had aninterest in concealing the prohibited behavior and this created a powerful incentive to engage in strategic behaviorAs the strategic behavior of the team members increased the incentive to remain aligned became stronger This isbecause the exit costs kept rising as the team continued its deliberate policy of doping strategic behavior and liesMoreover whoever revealed the prohibited behavior would lose friends and be forced to leave Armstrongrsquos teamStrategic behavior was therefore not only the result of aligning with prohibited behavior but also an incentive tomaintain and reinforce this alignment

Second when a team that is so strongly aligned engages in strategic behavior it becomes increasingly difficult forinspectors to uncover the prohibited behavior This creates a whole new dynamic an aligned team that engages inprohibited behavior in a competitive environment and remains undiscovered activates the dinerrsquos dilemma More-over once everyone starts breaking the rules the game of chicken comes into play It is very unattractive to be thefirst to admit to widespread doping In the case at hand the prohibited behavior therefore spread through the worldof professional cycling like an oil stain

Third once these two games have been activated another dynamic emerges The first cyclist or team to startusing a new doping technique gains an advantage over the other riders and can be fairly certain that the game ofchicken will prevent them from reporting anything to the inspectors The new doping technique leads to a new gamethat rekindles the entire dynamic In fact a new game may even begin before the previous game has ended

Fourth this dynamic made it increasingly difficult for the inspectors to catch Armstrong The peloton was rife withincentives to conceal the prohibited behavior Many of the inspectorsrsquo counter-strategies ndash such as cooperating withwhistle-blowers activating third parties (eg other teams) or exploiting the inspection systemrsquos built-in redundancyndash therefore failed to produce results This obviously encouraged the teams to continue their prohibited behavior

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd10

Finally the situation also contains a paradox Armstrong was so good at concealing his prohibited behavior fromthe inspectors that he kept taking it further The extent of his amoral behavior kept growing from EPO and bloodtransfusions to evidence tampering and blatant lies At a certain point it became so extensive and so widely knownamong riders that there was finally momentum for the USADA (and other NADOs) to take firm action Itaccordingly launched an investigation in which many riders faced in-depth questioning The paradox is as followsThe better an inspectee is at concealing prohibited behavior the more he will engage in it At a certain point howeverthe behavior is so extensive that it ultimately becomes easier for the inspectors to uncover it

6 Conclusions

What practical lessons can be learned about potential enforcement strategies from our analysis of the game betweeninspectors and inspectees in the case of professional cycling What does the analysis tell us about enforcementtheoretically speaking that we did not know before and that may also be relevant for other sectors such as medicalacademic or financial sectors

In discussions about the future of professional cycling two sets of enforcement strategies are frequently putforward as possible ldquosolutionsrdquo for the doping problem first external doping control by NADOs and WADA mustbe intensified and second professional cycling itself ndash that is the riders teams and entourages ndash needs toundergo a cultural shift (eg Wilson 2013) Similar sets of enforcement strategies have been suggested afterrevelations of professional misconduct in other sectors A clear example is the financial sector where the irre-sponsible behavior of bankers in combination with serious gaps in regulation (and rapid innovations in financialproducts) bloated the market with ldquotoxicrdquo assets resulting in the near collapse of the financial system and sub-sequently in a rethinking of control arrangements (eg Groenleer et al 2014) In many countries the latter meantthe introduction of more strict rules about bankersrsquo bonuses and financial products and more central oversighton compliance with those rules

It follows from our analysis that in professional cycling inspections could also be intensified by various meansincluding the use of technological aids such as biomedical passports as has been done in recent years Moreimportant is that inspection be regarded less as a bureaucratic standardized activity and more as a continuousprocess of developing new strategies in response to the inspecteersquos behavior (Weil 2008) This means for examplethat there could be more profiling in order to tailor inspections to different types of inspectees that greater use couldbe made of information other than doping tests (eg relying more on informants) that inspections could have agreater surprise element that greater use could be made of the networks around teams (eg sponsors who have a lotto lose) and that sanctions would have to be persuasive if possible (eg ldquonaming and shamingrdquo) (van Erp 2011) yetpunitive if necessary

More external control may be needed but our analysis also indicates that it will probably not be enough Indeedsuch an approach could not only ldquocrowd outrdquo intrinsic motivation to behave responsibly (Frey amp Jegen 2001) itcould also actively reinforce the incentives to neutralize internal mutual control mechanisms and thus backfireThis is especially true in cases such as the world of sports where the reward for doing so takes the form of the firstmover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma More external control may make it harder to violate agreements butwhoever succeeds in doing so gains an even greater advantage while those who get caught are depicted as ldquolosersrdquoInternal professional control must therefore be strengthened at the same time

When it comes to strengthening internal professional control the key issue is to ensure that riders who haveproblems with medical (or other) practices have the opportunity and the nerve to speak out against the ring-leaders before they are co-opted into doping practices for example by offering them some form of protectionWhen internal professional control fails and certain attitudes become entrenched a possible solution is to granta special role to a concerned outsider (Weaver et al 1999 Sunstein 2003) Potential candidates for this role includechief sponsors or national cycling federations which have an interest in maintaining a clean image (Chadwick2013)

As regards the question of how a concerned outsider might break through the teamrsquos internal hierarchy there aremany options formulating procedures influencing team composition (ie ensuring sufficient counterweight tostrong leaders) and organizing regular in-depth discussions with riders in which these issues can be addressed It isalso important to define the medical staff as a professional unit and treat it in a similar way In other words the staff

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 11

should be sufficiently balanced and have ample opportunities for communicating criticism of fellow physicians tothe concerned outsider Through strengthening internal control mechanisms the necessity of external control maythus be reduced

An approach that is limited to the need for a cultural shift is risky as can be derived from our analysis Acultural shift requires incentives in order to take place However some of the explanations for doping in sportsare of a structural nature and will therefore never completely disappear For instance the potential for negativeeffects of hierarchical control by a strong leader can never be entirely removed because a (sports) team can onlybe successful as a team if it acts somewhat uniformly Indeed leadership is an important factor in limiting toogreat a level of diversity (Janis 1982 Eden 2004 Levi 2010) Moreover as professional cycling like health careservices scientific research and financial service provision takes place in a highly competitive environment thetemptation of the first mover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma will always be present and may even be reinforcedby a strong leader setting a ldquobadrdquo example The study of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC)published three years after the USADA report supports this view It finds that a culture of doping continues toexist although dopers have moved on to new and more advanced methods to avoid detection (Cycling Indepen-dent Reform Commission 2015 p 12)

This brings us to three more general conclusions in regard to regulatory enforcement moving beyond the case ofprofessional cycling These conclusions are likely to apply to prohibited behaviors in other professional sectors as wellBefore they can be extrapolated however further (comparative) research is necessary for instance on the manipu-lation of lending rates in the financial sector (think of the Libor scandal) plagiarism and fabricating results in science(eg Bhattacharjee 2013) and on ldquoupcodingrdquo in health insurance billing (eg Kerpershoek et al 2014)

A first conclusion is that regulating prohibited behaviors in professional sectors requires a multifacetedapproach combining different types of enforcement strategies over time None of the aforementioned enforcementstrategies will probably be effective when applied in isolation and in a static manner only mixtures are likely to besuited to deal with the dynamics of the prohibited behavior (in our case doping) as we have described them Thisis in line with but slightly different than one would expect on the basis of responsive regulation theories which arguendash simply put ndash that under certain conditions one strategy will work better than another (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992)As conditions are often highly variable deciding on one particular strategy is far from easy Inspectors not only needto be able to recognize patterns of strategic behavior and have a variety of enforcement strategies at their disposalthey also must cleverly combine these strategies and use them simultaneously (even though this is often perceivedas wasteful) and be willing to run the risk of missing their targets with at least some of these strategies (rather thannot shooting at all)

A second conclusion is that such a multifaceted approach needs to take account of the often-competitiveprofessional environment which is a fertile ground for prohibited behavior The key challenge for regulators willbe to ensure that such a competitive environment is conducive to fighting and exposing prohibited behaviorrather than enabling and concealing it We have shown that professionals only have a strong interest in exposingcheating by others before the dynamics kick in In the fight against professional misconduct it will thus beimportant to prevent the first mover advantage from re-emerging The trick is to identify the point at whichprohibited behavior spreads and ldquogoes viralrdquo (cf Gladwell 2000) because it is up to this point that interventionsto curb this behavior such as those described above are likely to be most effective This is difficult ndash in fact thedynamics do not have a clear beginning or end and a new game may have already started before the previous onehas ended The mere understanding ndash gained through the application of theories on social and behavioral dynam-ics ndash that the game between inspectees and inspectors is a continuous one will however help inspectors to targettheir strategies

Finally a multifaceted enforcement approach is not only necessary because inspectors are confronted with amultifaceted problem but also because it has strategic and symbolic value Strategically speaking it strengthens theinspectorrsquos position in the game with the inspectee Cleverly combining multiple strategies simultaneously meansthat there is always another option to fall back on if one or more measures prove ineffective It also createsconsiderable uncertainty for any first mover considering prohibited behavior Given the countless ways in whichmisbehaving professionals could be dealt with this uncertainty can act as an incentive not to go down this path Amultifaceted approach also has an important symbolic value it shows that the fight against professional misconductis being taken seriously without simply resorting to intrusive or centralized forms of regulatory governance

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd12

References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

5 Analysis

In section 2 we presented several theoretical approaches to the interaction between inspectors and inspectees Onthe basis of the USADA report that we introduced in section 3 we described the nature of the interactions betweenArmstrong and the doping inspectors in section 4 In this section we analyze the empirical evidence along the linesof the theoretical framework This leads us to the following findings which help us to answer the question why thevarious mechanisms that were intended to regulate the use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional cyclingfailed so spectacularly

Armstrong and the US Postal Service team have all the characteristics of an ldquoamoral calculatorrdquo (Kagan amp Scholz1984) They knew exactly what behavior was permitted or prohibited and deliberately broke the rules The team hadan ldquoarmy of enablersrdquo and was consistently able to innovate and apply new doping techniques ldquoDeviancerdquo waslegitimized not normalized (cf Vaughan 1996) For a period of several years the US Postal Service team successfullydeployed a wide range of strategic behavior outsmarting inspectors As can be derived from the USADA report thisbehavior was aimed at delaying inspections misleading inspectors and undermining the legitimacy of the entireinspection process much in line with what we expected on the basis of Hutter (1997) McBarnet and Whelan (1999)Sparrow (2000) and de Bruijn et al (2007)

The inspectors were unable to exploit the diversity and horizontal control mechanisms within the US PostalService team Prohibited behavior was not only legitimized by medical support staff it was also imposed by its leaderArmstrong turned the team into a hierarchy with limited scope for autonomy and value-driven behavior and forcedall of his teammates to go along with the doping program In this manner he neutralized the teamrsquos internal controlmechanisms in contrast to what we expected on the basis of professionalism literature (eg Kober et al 2007 deBruijn 2010)

In theory the fragmented environment can be exploited because it allows inspectors to employ redundancy ofenforcement regimes as a strategy However this proved to be false in practice Armstrong did come face to face withmultiple inspectors but without fail he managed to identify the weak points in the inspection system notably itscoordination Moreover the competitive environment can be expected to produce incentives to tackle prohibitedbehavior This also did not happen in practice as the proceeds of the prohibited behavior were high especially forthe first mover and the exit costs (ie the costs of exposing the prohibited behavior) or at least the perception thereofas fed by Armstrongrsquos action were also high

When taken together these findings form a dynamic that continuously strengthened Armstrongrsquos position Firstof all the teamrsquos alignment with the doping program gave rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism Everyone had aninterest in concealing the prohibited behavior and this created a powerful incentive to engage in strategic behaviorAs the strategic behavior of the team members increased the incentive to remain aligned became stronger This isbecause the exit costs kept rising as the team continued its deliberate policy of doping strategic behavior and liesMoreover whoever revealed the prohibited behavior would lose friends and be forced to leave Armstrongrsquos teamStrategic behavior was therefore not only the result of aligning with prohibited behavior but also an incentive tomaintain and reinforce this alignment

Second when a team that is so strongly aligned engages in strategic behavior it becomes increasingly difficult forinspectors to uncover the prohibited behavior This creates a whole new dynamic an aligned team that engages inprohibited behavior in a competitive environment and remains undiscovered activates the dinerrsquos dilemma More-over once everyone starts breaking the rules the game of chicken comes into play It is very unattractive to be thefirst to admit to widespread doping In the case at hand the prohibited behavior therefore spread through the worldof professional cycling like an oil stain

Third once these two games have been activated another dynamic emerges The first cyclist or team to startusing a new doping technique gains an advantage over the other riders and can be fairly certain that the game ofchicken will prevent them from reporting anything to the inspectors The new doping technique leads to a new gamethat rekindles the entire dynamic In fact a new game may even begin before the previous game has ended

Fourth this dynamic made it increasingly difficult for the inspectors to catch Armstrong The peloton was rife withincentives to conceal the prohibited behavior Many of the inspectorsrsquo counter-strategies ndash such as cooperating withwhistle-blowers activating third parties (eg other teams) or exploiting the inspection systemrsquos built-in redundancyndash therefore failed to produce results This obviously encouraged the teams to continue their prohibited behavior

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd10

Finally the situation also contains a paradox Armstrong was so good at concealing his prohibited behavior fromthe inspectors that he kept taking it further The extent of his amoral behavior kept growing from EPO and bloodtransfusions to evidence tampering and blatant lies At a certain point it became so extensive and so widely knownamong riders that there was finally momentum for the USADA (and other NADOs) to take firm action Itaccordingly launched an investigation in which many riders faced in-depth questioning The paradox is as followsThe better an inspectee is at concealing prohibited behavior the more he will engage in it At a certain point howeverthe behavior is so extensive that it ultimately becomes easier for the inspectors to uncover it

6 Conclusions

What practical lessons can be learned about potential enforcement strategies from our analysis of the game betweeninspectors and inspectees in the case of professional cycling What does the analysis tell us about enforcementtheoretically speaking that we did not know before and that may also be relevant for other sectors such as medicalacademic or financial sectors

In discussions about the future of professional cycling two sets of enforcement strategies are frequently putforward as possible ldquosolutionsrdquo for the doping problem first external doping control by NADOs and WADA mustbe intensified and second professional cycling itself ndash that is the riders teams and entourages ndash needs toundergo a cultural shift (eg Wilson 2013) Similar sets of enforcement strategies have been suggested afterrevelations of professional misconduct in other sectors A clear example is the financial sector where the irre-sponsible behavior of bankers in combination with serious gaps in regulation (and rapid innovations in financialproducts) bloated the market with ldquotoxicrdquo assets resulting in the near collapse of the financial system and sub-sequently in a rethinking of control arrangements (eg Groenleer et al 2014) In many countries the latter meantthe introduction of more strict rules about bankersrsquo bonuses and financial products and more central oversighton compliance with those rules

It follows from our analysis that in professional cycling inspections could also be intensified by various meansincluding the use of technological aids such as biomedical passports as has been done in recent years Moreimportant is that inspection be regarded less as a bureaucratic standardized activity and more as a continuousprocess of developing new strategies in response to the inspecteersquos behavior (Weil 2008) This means for examplethat there could be more profiling in order to tailor inspections to different types of inspectees that greater use couldbe made of information other than doping tests (eg relying more on informants) that inspections could have agreater surprise element that greater use could be made of the networks around teams (eg sponsors who have a lotto lose) and that sanctions would have to be persuasive if possible (eg ldquonaming and shamingrdquo) (van Erp 2011) yetpunitive if necessary

More external control may be needed but our analysis also indicates that it will probably not be enough Indeedsuch an approach could not only ldquocrowd outrdquo intrinsic motivation to behave responsibly (Frey amp Jegen 2001) itcould also actively reinforce the incentives to neutralize internal mutual control mechanisms and thus backfireThis is especially true in cases such as the world of sports where the reward for doing so takes the form of the firstmover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma More external control may make it harder to violate agreements butwhoever succeeds in doing so gains an even greater advantage while those who get caught are depicted as ldquolosersrdquoInternal professional control must therefore be strengthened at the same time

When it comes to strengthening internal professional control the key issue is to ensure that riders who haveproblems with medical (or other) practices have the opportunity and the nerve to speak out against the ring-leaders before they are co-opted into doping practices for example by offering them some form of protectionWhen internal professional control fails and certain attitudes become entrenched a possible solution is to granta special role to a concerned outsider (Weaver et al 1999 Sunstein 2003) Potential candidates for this role includechief sponsors or national cycling federations which have an interest in maintaining a clean image (Chadwick2013)

As regards the question of how a concerned outsider might break through the teamrsquos internal hierarchy there aremany options formulating procedures influencing team composition (ie ensuring sufficient counterweight tostrong leaders) and organizing regular in-depth discussions with riders in which these issues can be addressed It isalso important to define the medical staff as a professional unit and treat it in a similar way In other words the staff

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 11

should be sufficiently balanced and have ample opportunities for communicating criticism of fellow physicians tothe concerned outsider Through strengthening internal control mechanisms the necessity of external control maythus be reduced

An approach that is limited to the need for a cultural shift is risky as can be derived from our analysis Acultural shift requires incentives in order to take place However some of the explanations for doping in sportsare of a structural nature and will therefore never completely disappear For instance the potential for negativeeffects of hierarchical control by a strong leader can never be entirely removed because a (sports) team can onlybe successful as a team if it acts somewhat uniformly Indeed leadership is an important factor in limiting toogreat a level of diversity (Janis 1982 Eden 2004 Levi 2010) Moreover as professional cycling like health careservices scientific research and financial service provision takes place in a highly competitive environment thetemptation of the first mover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma will always be present and may even be reinforcedby a strong leader setting a ldquobadrdquo example The study of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC)published three years after the USADA report supports this view It finds that a culture of doping continues toexist although dopers have moved on to new and more advanced methods to avoid detection (Cycling Indepen-dent Reform Commission 2015 p 12)

This brings us to three more general conclusions in regard to regulatory enforcement moving beyond the case ofprofessional cycling These conclusions are likely to apply to prohibited behaviors in other professional sectors as wellBefore they can be extrapolated however further (comparative) research is necessary for instance on the manipu-lation of lending rates in the financial sector (think of the Libor scandal) plagiarism and fabricating results in science(eg Bhattacharjee 2013) and on ldquoupcodingrdquo in health insurance billing (eg Kerpershoek et al 2014)

A first conclusion is that regulating prohibited behaviors in professional sectors requires a multifacetedapproach combining different types of enforcement strategies over time None of the aforementioned enforcementstrategies will probably be effective when applied in isolation and in a static manner only mixtures are likely to besuited to deal with the dynamics of the prohibited behavior (in our case doping) as we have described them Thisis in line with but slightly different than one would expect on the basis of responsive regulation theories which arguendash simply put ndash that under certain conditions one strategy will work better than another (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992)As conditions are often highly variable deciding on one particular strategy is far from easy Inspectors not only needto be able to recognize patterns of strategic behavior and have a variety of enforcement strategies at their disposalthey also must cleverly combine these strategies and use them simultaneously (even though this is often perceivedas wasteful) and be willing to run the risk of missing their targets with at least some of these strategies (rather thannot shooting at all)

A second conclusion is that such a multifaceted approach needs to take account of the often-competitiveprofessional environment which is a fertile ground for prohibited behavior The key challenge for regulators willbe to ensure that such a competitive environment is conducive to fighting and exposing prohibited behaviorrather than enabling and concealing it We have shown that professionals only have a strong interest in exposingcheating by others before the dynamics kick in In the fight against professional misconduct it will thus beimportant to prevent the first mover advantage from re-emerging The trick is to identify the point at whichprohibited behavior spreads and ldquogoes viralrdquo (cf Gladwell 2000) because it is up to this point that interventionsto curb this behavior such as those described above are likely to be most effective This is difficult ndash in fact thedynamics do not have a clear beginning or end and a new game may have already started before the previous onehas ended The mere understanding ndash gained through the application of theories on social and behavioral dynam-ics ndash that the game between inspectees and inspectors is a continuous one will however help inspectors to targettheir strategies

Finally a multifaceted enforcement approach is not only necessary because inspectors are confronted with amultifaceted problem but also because it has strategic and symbolic value Strategically speaking it strengthens theinspectorrsquos position in the game with the inspectee Cleverly combining multiple strategies simultaneously meansthat there is always another option to fall back on if one or more measures prove ineffective It also createsconsiderable uncertainty for any first mover considering prohibited behavior Given the countless ways in whichmisbehaving professionals could be dealt with this uncertainty can act as an incentive not to go down this path Amultifaceted approach also has an important symbolic value it shows that the fight against professional misconductis being taken seriously without simply resorting to intrusive or centralized forms of regulatory governance

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd12

References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

Finally the situation also contains a paradox Armstrong was so good at concealing his prohibited behavior fromthe inspectors that he kept taking it further The extent of his amoral behavior kept growing from EPO and bloodtransfusions to evidence tampering and blatant lies At a certain point it became so extensive and so widely knownamong riders that there was finally momentum for the USADA (and other NADOs) to take firm action Itaccordingly launched an investigation in which many riders faced in-depth questioning The paradox is as followsThe better an inspectee is at concealing prohibited behavior the more he will engage in it At a certain point howeverthe behavior is so extensive that it ultimately becomes easier for the inspectors to uncover it

6 Conclusions

What practical lessons can be learned about potential enforcement strategies from our analysis of the game betweeninspectors and inspectees in the case of professional cycling What does the analysis tell us about enforcementtheoretically speaking that we did not know before and that may also be relevant for other sectors such as medicalacademic or financial sectors

In discussions about the future of professional cycling two sets of enforcement strategies are frequently putforward as possible ldquosolutionsrdquo for the doping problem first external doping control by NADOs and WADA mustbe intensified and second professional cycling itself ndash that is the riders teams and entourages ndash needs toundergo a cultural shift (eg Wilson 2013) Similar sets of enforcement strategies have been suggested afterrevelations of professional misconduct in other sectors A clear example is the financial sector where the irre-sponsible behavior of bankers in combination with serious gaps in regulation (and rapid innovations in financialproducts) bloated the market with ldquotoxicrdquo assets resulting in the near collapse of the financial system and sub-sequently in a rethinking of control arrangements (eg Groenleer et al 2014) In many countries the latter meantthe introduction of more strict rules about bankersrsquo bonuses and financial products and more central oversighton compliance with those rules

It follows from our analysis that in professional cycling inspections could also be intensified by various meansincluding the use of technological aids such as biomedical passports as has been done in recent years Moreimportant is that inspection be regarded less as a bureaucratic standardized activity and more as a continuousprocess of developing new strategies in response to the inspecteersquos behavior (Weil 2008) This means for examplethat there could be more profiling in order to tailor inspections to different types of inspectees that greater use couldbe made of information other than doping tests (eg relying more on informants) that inspections could have agreater surprise element that greater use could be made of the networks around teams (eg sponsors who have a lotto lose) and that sanctions would have to be persuasive if possible (eg ldquonaming and shamingrdquo) (van Erp 2011) yetpunitive if necessary

More external control may be needed but our analysis also indicates that it will probably not be enough Indeedsuch an approach could not only ldquocrowd outrdquo intrinsic motivation to behave responsibly (Frey amp Jegen 2001) itcould also actively reinforce the incentives to neutralize internal mutual control mechanisms and thus backfireThis is especially true in cases such as the world of sports where the reward for doing so takes the form of the firstmover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma More external control may make it harder to violate agreements butwhoever succeeds in doing so gains an even greater advantage while those who get caught are depicted as ldquolosersrdquoInternal professional control must therefore be strengthened at the same time

When it comes to strengthening internal professional control the key issue is to ensure that riders who haveproblems with medical (or other) practices have the opportunity and the nerve to speak out against the ring-leaders before they are co-opted into doping practices for example by offering them some form of protectionWhen internal professional control fails and certain attitudes become entrenched a possible solution is to granta special role to a concerned outsider (Weaver et al 1999 Sunstein 2003) Potential candidates for this role includechief sponsors or national cycling federations which have an interest in maintaining a clean image (Chadwick2013)

As regards the question of how a concerned outsider might break through the teamrsquos internal hierarchy there aremany options formulating procedures influencing team composition (ie ensuring sufficient counterweight tostrong leaders) and organizing regular in-depth discussions with riders in which these issues can be addressed It isalso important to define the medical staff as a professional unit and treat it in a similar way In other words the staff

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 11

should be sufficiently balanced and have ample opportunities for communicating criticism of fellow physicians tothe concerned outsider Through strengthening internal control mechanisms the necessity of external control maythus be reduced

An approach that is limited to the need for a cultural shift is risky as can be derived from our analysis Acultural shift requires incentives in order to take place However some of the explanations for doping in sportsare of a structural nature and will therefore never completely disappear For instance the potential for negativeeffects of hierarchical control by a strong leader can never be entirely removed because a (sports) team can onlybe successful as a team if it acts somewhat uniformly Indeed leadership is an important factor in limiting toogreat a level of diversity (Janis 1982 Eden 2004 Levi 2010) Moreover as professional cycling like health careservices scientific research and financial service provision takes place in a highly competitive environment thetemptation of the first mover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma will always be present and may even be reinforcedby a strong leader setting a ldquobadrdquo example The study of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC)published three years after the USADA report supports this view It finds that a culture of doping continues toexist although dopers have moved on to new and more advanced methods to avoid detection (Cycling Indepen-dent Reform Commission 2015 p 12)

This brings us to three more general conclusions in regard to regulatory enforcement moving beyond the case ofprofessional cycling These conclusions are likely to apply to prohibited behaviors in other professional sectors as wellBefore they can be extrapolated however further (comparative) research is necessary for instance on the manipu-lation of lending rates in the financial sector (think of the Libor scandal) plagiarism and fabricating results in science(eg Bhattacharjee 2013) and on ldquoupcodingrdquo in health insurance billing (eg Kerpershoek et al 2014)

A first conclusion is that regulating prohibited behaviors in professional sectors requires a multifacetedapproach combining different types of enforcement strategies over time None of the aforementioned enforcementstrategies will probably be effective when applied in isolation and in a static manner only mixtures are likely to besuited to deal with the dynamics of the prohibited behavior (in our case doping) as we have described them Thisis in line with but slightly different than one would expect on the basis of responsive regulation theories which arguendash simply put ndash that under certain conditions one strategy will work better than another (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992)As conditions are often highly variable deciding on one particular strategy is far from easy Inspectors not only needto be able to recognize patterns of strategic behavior and have a variety of enforcement strategies at their disposalthey also must cleverly combine these strategies and use them simultaneously (even though this is often perceivedas wasteful) and be willing to run the risk of missing their targets with at least some of these strategies (rather thannot shooting at all)

A second conclusion is that such a multifaceted approach needs to take account of the often-competitiveprofessional environment which is a fertile ground for prohibited behavior The key challenge for regulators willbe to ensure that such a competitive environment is conducive to fighting and exposing prohibited behaviorrather than enabling and concealing it We have shown that professionals only have a strong interest in exposingcheating by others before the dynamics kick in In the fight against professional misconduct it will thus beimportant to prevent the first mover advantage from re-emerging The trick is to identify the point at whichprohibited behavior spreads and ldquogoes viralrdquo (cf Gladwell 2000) because it is up to this point that interventionsto curb this behavior such as those described above are likely to be most effective This is difficult ndash in fact thedynamics do not have a clear beginning or end and a new game may have already started before the previous onehas ended The mere understanding ndash gained through the application of theories on social and behavioral dynam-ics ndash that the game between inspectees and inspectors is a continuous one will however help inspectors to targettheir strategies

Finally a multifaceted enforcement approach is not only necessary because inspectors are confronted with amultifaceted problem but also because it has strategic and symbolic value Strategically speaking it strengthens theinspectorrsquos position in the game with the inspectee Cleverly combining multiple strategies simultaneously meansthat there is always another option to fall back on if one or more measures prove ineffective It also createsconsiderable uncertainty for any first mover considering prohibited behavior Given the countless ways in whichmisbehaving professionals could be dealt with this uncertainty can act as an incentive not to go down this path Amultifaceted approach also has an important symbolic value it shows that the fight against professional misconductis being taken seriously without simply resorting to intrusive or centralized forms of regulatory governance

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd12

References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

should be sufficiently balanced and have ample opportunities for communicating criticism of fellow physicians tothe concerned outsider Through strengthening internal control mechanisms the necessity of external control maythus be reduced

An approach that is limited to the need for a cultural shift is risky as can be derived from our analysis Acultural shift requires incentives in order to take place However some of the explanations for doping in sportsare of a structural nature and will therefore never completely disappear For instance the potential for negativeeffects of hierarchical control by a strong leader can never be entirely removed because a (sports) team can onlybe successful as a team if it acts somewhat uniformly Indeed leadership is an important factor in limiting toogreat a level of diversity (Janis 1982 Eden 2004 Levi 2010) Moreover as professional cycling like health careservices scientific research and financial service provision takes place in a highly competitive environment thetemptation of the first mover advantage in the dinerrsquos dilemma will always be present and may even be reinforcedby a strong leader setting a ldquobadrdquo example The study of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC)published three years after the USADA report supports this view It finds that a culture of doping continues toexist although dopers have moved on to new and more advanced methods to avoid detection (Cycling Indepen-dent Reform Commission 2015 p 12)

This brings us to three more general conclusions in regard to regulatory enforcement moving beyond the case ofprofessional cycling These conclusions are likely to apply to prohibited behaviors in other professional sectors as wellBefore they can be extrapolated however further (comparative) research is necessary for instance on the manipu-lation of lending rates in the financial sector (think of the Libor scandal) plagiarism and fabricating results in science(eg Bhattacharjee 2013) and on ldquoupcodingrdquo in health insurance billing (eg Kerpershoek et al 2014)

A first conclusion is that regulating prohibited behaviors in professional sectors requires a multifacetedapproach combining different types of enforcement strategies over time None of the aforementioned enforcementstrategies will probably be effective when applied in isolation and in a static manner only mixtures are likely to besuited to deal with the dynamics of the prohibited behavior (in our case doping) as we have described them Thisis in line with but slightly different than one would expect on the basis of responsive regulation theories which arguendash simply put ndash that under certain conditions one strategy will work better than another (Ayres amp Braithwaite 1992)As conditions are often highly variable deciding on one particular strategy is far from easy Inspectors not only needto be able to recognize patterns of strategic behavior and have a variety of enforcement strategies at their disposalthey also must cleverly combine these strategies and use them simultaneously (even though this is often perceivedas wasteful) and be willing to run the risk of missing their targets with at least some of these strategies (rather thannot shooting at all)

A second conclusion is that such a multifaceted approach needs to take account of the often-competitiveprofessional environment which is a fertile ground for prohibited behavior The key challenge for regulators willbe to ensure that such a competitive environment is conducive to fighting and exposing prohibited behaviorrather than enabling and concealing it We have shown that professionals only have a strong interest in exposingcheating by others before the dynamics kick in In the fight against professional misconduct it will thus beimportant to prevent the first mover advantage from re-emerging The trick is to identify the point at whichprohibited behavior spreads and ldquogoes viralrdquo (cf Gladwell 2000) because it is up to this point that interventionsto curb this behavior such as those described above are likely to be most effective This is difficult ndash in fact thedynamics do not have a clear beginning or end and a new game may have already started before the previous onehas ended The mere understanding ndash gained through the application of theories on social and behavioral dynam-ics ndash that the game between inspectees and inspectors is a continuous one will however help inspectors to targettheir strategies

Finally a multifaceted enforcement approach is not only necessary because inspectors are confronted with amultifaceted problem but also because it has strategic and symbolic value Strategically speaking it strengthens theinspectorrsquos position in the game with the inspectee Cleverly combining multiple strategies simultaneously meansthat there is always another option to fall back on if one or more measures prove ineffective It also createsconsiderable uncertainty for any first mover considering prohibited behavior Given the countless ways in whichmisbehaving professionals could be dealt with this uncertainty can act as an incentive not to go down this path Amultifaceted approach also has an important symbolic value it shows that the fight against professional misconductis being taken seriously without simply resorting to intrusive or centralized forms of regulatory governance

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd12

References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

References

Abbot C (2012) Bridging the Gap ndash Non-state Actors and the Challenges of Regulating New Technology Journal of Law and

Society 39 329ndash358

Ayres I Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate OUP Oxford

Baldwin R Cave M Lodge M (2012) Understanding Regulation Theory Strategy and Practice 2nd edn OUP Oxford

Bhattacharjee Y (2013) The Mind of a Con Man New York Times 26 April [Last accessed 15 September 2014] Available from

URL httpwwwnytimescom20130428magazinediederik-stapels-audacious-academic-fraudhtmlpagewanted=1amp

_r=2amppagewanted=allamp

de Bruijn H (2010) Managing Professionals Routledge London

de Bruijn H ten Heuvelhof E Koopmans M (2007) Law Enforcement The Game Between Inspectors and Inspectees Universal

Publishers Boca Raton

Carpenter D Ting MM (2007) Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas American Journal of Political Science 51 835ndash852

Chadwick S (2013) Market-driven Morality The Economist 22 April [Last accessed on 22 April 2013] Available from URL

httpwwweconomistcomblogsgametheory201304corruption-sport-0fsrc=nlw|newe|4-22-

2013|5582513|37184323|EU

Committee Anti-Doping Approach (2013) Meedoen of Stoppen [Taking part or walking out] June [Last accessed 1 October

2013] Available from URL httpwwwcommissieadanlEINDRAPPORTCOMMISSIEADApdf

Corbin J Strauss AL (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques 3rd edn SAGE Thousand

Oaks

Cycling Independent Reform Commission (2015) Report to the President of the Union Cycliste Internationale CIRC Lausanne

Cyclingnews (1998) Drug scandal at the tour 12 July [Last accessed 15 December 2013] Available from URL http

autobuscyclingnewscomresults1998jul98jul12html

Eden L (2004) Whole World on Fire Organizations Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation Cornell University Press Ithaca

van Erp J (2011) Naming without Shaming The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch Financial Market Regulation amp

Governance 5 287ndash308

Etienne J (2013) Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships Regulation amp Governance 7 30ndash47

Frey BS Jegen R (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory Journal of Economic Surveys 15 589ndash611

Gladwell M (2000) Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference Little Brown New York

Glance N Huberman B (1994) The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas Scientific American 270 76ndash81

Gneezy U Haruvy E Yafe H (2004) The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill The Economic Journal 114 265ndash280

Groenleer MLP Mijs A ten Heuvelhof E van Meeuwen B van der Puil J (2014) Strategic Behaviour and Crisis-driven Change

in Regulation and Governance of the European Financial and Economic System From Networks to Hybrids Jerusalem Papers

in Regulation amp Governance 63

Gunningham N (2011) Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement Responsive Regulation and Beyond In Parker C Nielsen VL

(eds) Explaining Compliance Business Responses to Regulation pp 199ndash222 Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK

Gunningham N Grabosky P (1998) Smart Regulation Designing Environmental Policy OUP New York

Gunningham N Kagan RA (2005) Regulation and Business Behavior Law amp Policy 27 213ndash218

Hanstad DV Skille EAring Loland S (2010) Harmonization of Anti-doping Work Myth or Reality Sport in Society Cultures

Commerce Media Politics 13 418ndash430

Hawkins K (1984) Environment and Enforcement Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution Clarendon Press Oxford

Hawkins K (2013) Enforcing Regulation Robert Kaganrsquos Contribution ndash And Some Questions Law amp Social Inquiry 38 950ndash972

Heimann CFL (1997) Acceptable Risks Politics Policy and Risky Technologies University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Hutter BM (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers Clarendon

Press Oxford

Hutter BM (1997) Compliance Regulation and Environment Clarendon Press Oxford

Janis IL (1982) Groupthink Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Hougton Mifflin Boston

Kagan R Scholz A (1984) The ldquoCriminology of the Corporationsrdquo and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies In Hawkins K

Thomas JM (eds) Enforcing Regulation pp 67ndash95 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publising Boston

Kerpershoek E Groenleer M de Bruijn H (2014) Unintended Responses to Performance Management in Dutch Hospital

Care Bringing Together Managerial and Professional Perspectives Public Management Review doi 10108014719037

2014985248

Kober R Ng J Paul B (2007) The Interrelationship Between Management Control Mechanisms and Strategy Management

Accounting Research 18 425ndash452

Levi D (2010) Group Dynamics for Teams SAGE Thousand Oaks

The dynamics of doping H de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 13

Lincoln SY Guba EG (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry SAGE Thousand Oaks

McBarnet D Whelan C (1999) Challenging the Regulators Strategies for Resisting Control In McCrudden C (ed) Regulation and

Deregulation Policy and Practice in the Utilities and Financial Services Industries pp 67ndash78 Clarendon Press Oxford

Mascini P (2013) Why Was the Enforcement Pyramid So Influential And What Price Was Paid Regulation amp Governance 7

48ndash60

Rapoport A Chammah AM (1966) The Game of Chicken American Behavioral Scientist 10 10ndash28

Saurwein F (2011) Regulatory Choice for Alternative Modes of Regulation How Context Matters Law amp Policy 33 334ndash366

Schreier M (2012) Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice SAGE Thousand Oaks

Sparrow MK (2000) The Regulatory Craft Controlling Risks Solving Problems and Managing Compliance The Brookings

Institution Washington DC

Sunstein CR (2003) Why Societies Need Dissent Harvard University Press Cambridge MA

Tucker JB (1996) Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq The

Nonproliferation Review 3(3) 1ndash14

USADA (United States Anti-Doping Agency) (2012) Report on Proceedings Under the World Anti-Doping Code and the USADA

Protocol Reasoned Decision of the United States Anti-Doping Agency on Disqualification and Ineligibility USADA Colorado

Springs

USADA (United States Anti-Doping Agency) (2013) MissionVision [Last accessed 5 September 2013] Available from URL

httpwwwusadaorgmission-vision

Vaughan D (1996) The Challenger Launch Decision Risky Technology Culture and Deviance at NASA University of Chicago Press

Chicago

VeloNation (2012) USADA ldquoLooking Forwardrdquo to Answering Questions on its Role after State Senators Request Review 5

September [Last accessed 5 September 2013] Available from URL httpwwwvelonationcomNewsID12804USADA-

looking-forward-to-answering-questions-on-its-role-after-state-senators-request-reviewaspx

Vogelzang Committee (2007) Rapportage Commissie Vogelzang Zaak Michael Rasmussen [Report Vogelzang Committee Michael

Rasmussen Case] Utrecht

Weaver GR Trevino LK Cochran PL (1999) Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance Management Commit-

ments External Pressures and Corporate Ethics Practices The Academy of Management Journal 42 539ndash552

Weber RP (1990) Basic Content Analysis SAGE Newbury Park

Weil D (2008) A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection International Labour Review 147 349ndash375

Wilson B (2013) Lance Armstrong Fuller Fights to Fix Cyclingrsquos Doping Culture BBC News 6 February 2013 [Last accessed 6

February 2013] Available from URL httpwwwbbccouknewsbusiness-21333899

Winter SC May PJ (2001) Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations Journal of Policy Analysis and Manage-

ment 20 675ndash698

The dynamics of dopingH de Bruijn et al

copy 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd14