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Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 30:241–261, 2004

Copyright   c Taylor & Francis Inc.

ISSN: 1040-841X print / 1549-7828 online

DOI: 10.1080/10408410490468812

The Russian Biological Weapons Program:Vanished or Disappeared?

Dany Shoham Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

Ze’ev Wolfson Mayrock Center for Russian, Eurasian and East European Research, the Hebrew University

of Jerusalem, Israel

The legacy and arsenal of biological weapons Russia inherited

from USSR in 1991 became a lingering unsolved issue, in termsof a prime strategic arm that ought to be eliminated, advisably,in accordance with the Biological Weapons Convention Russia iscommitted to, and considering further undertakings and declara-tions made by the Russian regime. Indeed, that inheritance wascreated by USSR as a powerful, highly sophisticated component of utmost importance within the Soviet military paradigm, based ona wide spectrum of virulent, stabilized pathogens and toxins plusdelivery systems. Moreover, remarkably advanced biotechnologieswere thus applied to procurestockpiles of military-gradepathogensand toxins. Yet, an intriguing debate aroused with regard to the ex-tent of the weaponized biological inventory accumulated by USSR,as well as the in effect attitude of Russia towards perpetuating orwiping out that inheritance. It turned out to form a far reachingand challenging complexity, both strategically and scientifically.The present study concentrates on the strategic as well as scientific

spheresshapingthat overallissue at large, attempting to thoroughlyanalyze it through an innovative methodology. One main conclu-sion thereby reached at is that the Russian military still poses apotential menance, in terms of both stockpiled, probably deploy-able biological weapons, and prevailing production capacities.

Keywords   Biological Weapons (BW); Biological Warfare Agent(BWA); Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); Bio-logical Weapons Program (BWP)

BACKGROUND

The Soviet—and then Russian—BWP has for years been

an enigma, although bearing a strategic essence of paramount

importance, and propelling remarkable shifts in the field of microbiology—technologically, medically, and ecologically. It

has been targeted against humans, husbandry, and crops, and

Received 11 March 2004; accepted 6 April 2004.Address correspondence to Dany Shoham, Begin-Sadat Center for 

Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. E-mail:shoham d@netvision.net.il

in parallel included, necessarily, vaccines, anti-sera, drugs, and

disinfectants as vital protective means. The disintegration of 

the USSR in 1991 did not provide any substantial guaranty for abatement of that program within the configuring Russian na-

tional strategic outline. In pragmatic terms, there are doubts as

to whether anything has fundamentally changed. Some changes

did occur and might be regarded as significant, or, perhaps only

superficial. The present article aims to examine the cardinalissue

of whether a significant change has occurred since the dissolu-

tion of the USSR.

One development that took place was the influx of Russian

defectors and immigrants to the West; some of whom provided

invaluable information aboutthe subject in question. In addition,

scientific, technological, and commercial cooperation has been

formed between classifiedmicrobiological Russian facilities and

many Western institutionalized and non-institutionalized bodies(largely backed by the US within financial support programs

for Russia), a cooperation creating a kind of window to look

inside the former Soviet BW complex and its fate. Further, a

degree of transparency has been achieved, in actuality, within

the Russian media, supposedly bringing out certain segments of 

the Soviet/Russian BWP.

The most significant sources of information have come from

two senior Russian microbiologists: Dr. Vladimir Pasechnik,

who landed in London in 1989, and Dr. Ken Alibek (Alibekov),

who landed in New York in 1992. The former served as di-

rector of the Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Preparations in

Leningrad, andthe latterwas first deputychiefof theBiopreparat

system, a large network of BW-oriented facilities (Pasenchnik’sinstitute being among them). Moreover, in 1998, Alibek pub-

lished a book,   Biohazard  that uncovered wide segments of the

Soviet and then Russian BWP. The information included in that

book appears to be credible and representative, even if gauged,

objectively, in termsof possible partiality, tendentiousness(com-

mercial or other), or biases. It mainly brings out the continuity

and persistence of the Russian BWP, beyond portraying, very

effectively, the related system in itself.

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242   D. SHOHAM AND Z. WOLFSON

Russian authorities certainly considered that shortly after 

their landing in Britain and the US, most—if not all—of the

classified information the two Soviet microbiologists had, re-

garding the Soviet/Russian BWP, would probably be revealed

to British and US authorities. Consequently, steps intended to

counter and minimize the damage must have been conducted,

sensibly, one way or another. Schematically, three modes could

have taken place:

•  Perfect abandonment of the existing BWP (an attitude

already established, then, within various Russian ad-

ministration cycles that truly strive for weapons of mass

destruction deproliferation).•  Perfect retaining of the existing BWP (possibly trans-

figured, and probablybetter camouflagedby the Russian

Ministry of Defense).•  Some intermediate between those two edges.

Relying on a wide variety of Soviet and Russian sources of 

information, this article is inclined to inquire into those three

alternatives, and carefully trace the hard nucleus of the Russian

BWP—namely, the different microbiological facilities affiliated

with the Ministry of Defense—since the collapse of the USSR,

as compared with earlier phases. Aiming to decipher concrete

moves taken, both scientifically and strategically, by the con-

cerned Russian system, this article attempts also to illuminate

various aspects related to the interplay prevailing in effect be-

tween Moscow and BW, at large. For that purpose, some evolu-

tionary processes marking the Soviet/Russian BWP in its broad

perspective are tracked, as well. Declarations, statements, wit-

nesses, reports, orientations, and activities of Soviet/Russian

microbiologists and officials, ones that give ideas of the pos-

sible developments occurring in actuality, are discussed, then,

herewith.

METHODOLOGY

The Soviet BWP was initially crystallized during the 1920s,

but it hasevolved considerablysince. The present analysis is pri-

marily based, however, upontwo temporalaxes: a chronological-

strategic axis, the inception of which took place in 1972—while

the Soviet administration was approaching acceding to the con-

solidating BWC (an axis that has proceeded up to the present).

And,in parallel, a chronological techno-scientific axis,reflecting

a very broad microbiological scientific sphere, one that is tightly

interlinked with the Soviet/Russian BWP. Those two method-

ological axes are applied here, completely independent of theimmensely important—and largely open, by now—information

and assessments provided by Pasechnik, Alibek, and Western

analyses.

The first axis progresses through the following milestones

and phases:

•  Acceding to the BWC—1972•  non-impact of the BWC—1973–74•  upgrading and scaling up the BWP—1975–79

•  climax of the Soviet BWP—1980–89•   conversion and reassortment—1990–1996•   restoring and regenerating—1997–present

Concurrently, since 1981 the following events occurred along

that same axis:

1981—First Review Conference of the BWC (further confer-ences occurred periodically);

1991—disintegration of the USSR and succession by Russia;

1992—Yeltsin BW-declaration and the Tri-Lateral Agreement

(with the US and Britain);

1998—Alibek’s book (years after he—and, earlier, Pasechnik— 

defected).

The second axis represents a contemporary, yet different, en-

during entity. Its fundamental point of reference consists in the

chief Russian military microbiological installations concerned,

namely, the facilities located primarily in Zagorsk (ZF), Kirov

(KF), Sverdlovsk (SF), Leningrad (LF), and Moscow (MF).

Constituting the hard nucleus of the entire system involved, it

is assumed that the ongoing activities of those five facilities— 

mainly though not merely—may soundly reflect the complete

fate, or rather shape, of the actual BWP, overall. Yet, this line of 

thinking may certainly have been figured out by some Russian

authorities on their own, serving them, therefore, as a working

hypothesis for appropriate countermeasures to be taken, both

scientifically and structurally. Meaning: the extraneously moni-

tored activities of those military facilities may be used by Russia

to render an image of a totally civilian or defensive conversion.

Hence, the methodology related to that axis and implemented

in the present analysis is aimed at tracing a wide spectrum of 

scientific activities taking place within those facilities, particu-

larly with reference being made to the periods until 1991 (theyear when Soviet disintegration took place), and, comparatively,

since 1992. Additional institutions—military as well as nomi-

nally civilian—are secondarily looked into, in part, whenever 

affecting or accompanying an emerging paradigm related to the

mentioned five military ones.

From a methodological viewpoint, then, this study is system-

atically based upon a set of three categories of domestic Soviet

and Russian sources:

•   Published statements and expressions made by Russian

officials and scientists (mostly alone, and sometimes

together with foreign colleagues);•

 Scientific works published in the Soviet/Russian openmicrobiological literature by researchers affiliated with

or related to the military facilities under discussion;•   Unpublished information provided by scientists linked

to or informed about those facilities during the past

twenty years.

An important part of the materials for this article were collected

through personal interviews with Russian scientists: Prof. Lev

Fedorov and the late Dr. Max Rokhlin in Moscow; as well as

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RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM   243

with the former Soviet scientists Prof. Ely Shliakhov, Dr. Boris

Freger, and Dr. Roma Tzvang, currently in Israel. Others pre-

ferred anonymity and cannot be identified.

Notably, some scientists interviewed manifested an incli-

nation to generally gauge various moves and activities occur-

ring within the concerned Russian system more harshly than

is to be expected. The reality, then, may be milder and, hence,

more positive, perhaps, in terms of Russian BW deprolifera-tion trends being fulfilled, in effect. Basically, we assume that

the integration of the above-mentioned three categories of infor-

mation sources may produce a coherent picture fairly close to

actuality.

THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN BWP STRATEGIC AXIS

Stages of Soviet and of Russian BWP

Biological weapons constitute the mostnontransparent sphere

of the Soviet/Russian military complex, and possibly the most

dangerous one, both for Russia and for the rest of the world.

Moreover, the general aggravation of the essence of BW due tocontinuing breakthroughs achieved in the areas of biotechnol-

ogy and medical microbiology is a significant factor in terms of 

strategic potency.

The strategic axis of the Soviet BWP traces back to the first

half of the twentieth century. In 1925, the USSR signed the

Geneva Protocol on Prohibition of BW & CW with a short reser-

vation on the right to use BW & CW against a state that had

used it first against USSR. This reservation legally and practi-

cally served as a basis for future developing a whole system of 

R&D, tests, and production centers of various forms of highly

virulent pathogens and toxins. Concurrently, then, an initial BW

facility was founded in Moscow, designated the Scientific Re-

search Institute of Health. Its activities slowly evolved, appre-

ciably influenced during the 1930s by the extensive—and rather 

intensive—BWP run by Japan, in parallel.

After World War II and the appearance of nuclear weapons,

BW lost their importance in many ways. The Soviets held their 

BWP alive mainly by inertia supported by top brass generals.

Gradually, the program scaled up, until the 1970s, counter-

balancing—if not exceeding—a contemporary American BWP.

In 1972, the USSR and Western countries formed a specific

convention prohibiting development, production, or stockpil-

ing of pathogens and toxins for offensive military purposes,

namely the BWC. This was the first and only case brought out

(much later and merely personally), whereby the Soviet militarybluntly exhibited, inwardly, its stance with respect to its own

BWP:

While the political leadership,ForeignMinister Gromykoin par-

ticular, felt it necessary for propaganda purposes to respond to a pro-

posal to conclude a special separate convention to prohibit BW as a

first step, the military’s reaction was to say “go ahead and sign the

convention; without international controls, who would know about

us anyway?” . . . Several times I asked military officials why they

were so adamant. They always answered that control was out of the

question because it could reveal the extent of the development of 

these weapons and would show Soviet readiness for their eventual

use. They refused to consider eliminating their stockpiles and in-

sisted upon further development of those weapons. The Politburo

approved this.1

The USSR acceded to the BWC. In practical terms, the US

destroyed its BW arsenal, and, consequently, the USSR couldfollow the US, and, thus, comply with the BWC; or, inversely,

take supreme advantage of the new imbalanced bio-strategic

equation. The Soviet military was incisive while favoring the

latter option.

Moreover, in 1972 and 1973 a brilliant Russian microbiolo-

gist, namedYury Ovchinikov, had learned fromWestern journals

and colleagues the way for genetic modifications of bacteria.

Since the 1940s, in Soviet biology had dominated the ideo-

logical concept of Trophym Lysenko, who described genes as

“bourgeois’s dirty trick,” and even in early 1970s ideas related to

genetic research had to wait for a long time to penetrate through

the scientific establishment, if at all.

Ovchinikov realized, however, that any civilian-oriented ge-netic research had but a little chance. The only way that the

Central Committee of Communist Party could “swallow” genes

and compromise with the genetic development was military use

of them. It meant to develop new militant strains of pathogens as

BW. Consequently, in 1973, Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed a

decree ordering a comprehensive update and expansion of the

entire Soviet BW apparatus. Moreover, adding a proper civilian

aroma, in April 1974 the Central Committee issued the decree of 

“Measures of acceleration of development of biological sciences

and its practical implementations in Soviet economy.” Largely,

Ovchinikov generated that course.2

The enormous budgets allocated following this special de-

cree, which announced the program Enzyme, were used byOvchinikov, then, for the construction of at least four huge

centers for research in microbiology. He rebuilt his Institute

of Bioorganic chemistry in Moscow, the Institute of Applied

Microbiology in Obolensk (Moscow region), the Leningrad In-

stitute of Extra Pure Preparations, and the Institute of Applied

Virology in Novosibisk (now “Vector Center”). Most labs in

1Arkady Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who defected to the USA, and

at the time under discussion was a personal advisor to Soviet Foreign Minister 

Gromyko.2Sojourning in 1973for several monthsas a guest ofsomemost advancedUS

bio-centers, Ovchinikov left the country keeping in one blazer’s pocket several

tubeswith steeledcultures of modified bacterial strains, and professional secretsof their developments in the other. As son of a famous hero of WW Two, he

used the opportunity to meet within few months Brezhnev himself and explain

him what smart and powerful weapons they can invent from microbes’ genes,

especially after 1972, when US and UK took the obligation not to develop new

BW. The communists leader liked such an idea to fight “imperialists with their 

owninvents” Interviewwith the late Dr. Max Rokhlin, deputy of Y. Ovchinnikov

in the Institute of Bioorganic chemistry during the 60s and 70s; Moscow, June

1995. see also  http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 Vaccine for Life, and 

http://www.vector.nsc.ru/ex1102-r.htm

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244   D. SHOHAM AND Z. WOLFSON

those centers were strictly secret places, apparently only due to

“bio-safety reasons.”3

In addition, tens of labs affiliated with the Ministry of Public

Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Academy of Sci-

ences started to develop secret programs, with generous grants

from the Enzyme budgets. An organizational framework— 

Biopreparat, a semi-military center for management and coordi-

nation of activities in dozens of nominally civilian facilities andlabs—has been established in 1973. The military also approved

such budgets to create a whole chain of new labs and modernize

the old ones. In addition, the KGB had its own R&D centers for 

special toxic matters including bio-toxins and pathogens for use

in espionage aims and sabotage (so called Fleita program).

After the collapse of the USSR, the total number of scientific

and technological “know-how” facilities that remained intact in

the Russian Federation out of its outstandingly wide-scale BWP,

was hardly even known. Until recently, there was only frag-

mented and vague information available for the public and the

experts outside of various intelligence services, chiefly members

of the teams working in this field in US and UK. A few publica-

tions in the West, such as Ken Alibek’s book Biohazard , Jeanne

Guillemin’s book Anthrax , as well as articles published mainly

by Milton Leitenberg, Jonathan Tucker, and Reymond Zilinskas

(in the US), plus Anthony Rimmington and John Hemsley (in

Britain), contribute to clarifying the real picture.

The Russians themselves, in contrast, published only arti-

cles that dealt with specific issues or a particular research cen-

ter, and refrained from bringing out or analyzing the system of 

BW research, development, and production, as a whole. More-

over, the total number of Russian publications about its BWP is

much smaller than that about the chemical weapons issue, not to

mention the nuclear weapons issue. The first—and at the time

fairly overwhelming—of these (domestic BW revelations) wasthe September 1990 article by Natallie Zernova, about the real

nature of the Sverdlovsk 1979 anthrax disaster.

She wrote for the first time ever in the Soviet press: “in 1979

in Sverdlovsk, the source of anthrax was not infected meat (as

declared); the contagion was contracted by inhalation in the re-

gion of the military compound.”4 This report was fully incrimi-

nating. Moreover, by 1991 Zernova insisted on official investi-

gation of the disaster, relying on direct information forwarded by

several families of victims. They explained that they had prob-

lems with lungs, not with stomach. Further, people related to

the food industry attested that they knew nothing of any cattle

anthrax in 1979. There were no ways to use flash or any infected

parts.5

In 1993, Zernova provided names of the former KGB

3Ovchinikov often used to hint that actually he put the ‘Enzyme’ money

into development of fundamental biology and fool the top brass generals in the

name of progress of real science. The generals in their turn laughed over such

“intelligent” rumors—they knew that only a small part of the budgets went to

non-militaryresearch, to be used as a carrotfor scientists wholoved thefreedom

of science. (Interview with Max Rokhlin, 1995)4Literaturnaia Gazeta, no. 34, Sep. 1990.5Literaturnaia Gazeta, 02.10.91.

officers who confirmed that the source was a nearby military

facility. Russian and American scientists agreed it was a BW in-

cident. Brain autopsies of people who died from anthrax proved

that. (Dr. Abramova kept dozens of them in secret—but in front

of her desk—for 14 years.) However, the Sverdlovsk military

microbiological facility continued to work under supervision of 

the Ministry of Defense.6 Internally, Zernova was the first to

propel the shift of transparency, in that context.Beyond the boundaries of the USSR, a concomitant course

occurred. Since the defection of Dr. Pasencknic in 1989, and in

spite of the consequent revelations regarding the Soviet BWP,

it took three years for the British and American governments to

obtain a Russian admission. It came in a speech by Boris Yeltsin

in January 1992, on the eve of his visit to the United States to

meet with President Bush, when he referred to “a lag in imple-

menting” the 1972 BWC.7 However, the military Directorate for 

Bacteriological, Radiological and Chemical Defense claimed— 

following President Yeltsin’s admissions—that all charges of an

active Soviet (and then Russian) BWP were lies, and that “all

work on BW stopped in 1975.” A seemingly proper formula

emerged then, while in February 1992 President Yeltsin and his

military advisor, General Volkogonov, had promised, “halt (in)

Russian research into BW.”8

Perfectly sincere, Yeltsin persisted in this line, ignoring—or 

rather unaware of—the genuine, enduring attitude of his mili-

tary toward BW. By March 1992, thus, a Tri-Lateral Agreement

was reached between Russia, UK, and the US, giving parties ac-

cess to their biological research facilities to check compliance

with the BWC. The trilateral statement “confirmed the termi-

nation of offensive research, the dismantlement of experimental

technological lines for the production of agents, and the clo-

sure of the BW testing facility” in Russia. It also “dissolved the

department in the Ministry of Defense responsible for the of-fensive biological program.” Moreover, in April 1992 President

Yeltsin announced a decree stating, “It shall be established that

the development and implementation of biological programs in

breach of the BWC . . . are not being permitted in the territory

of the Russian Federation.”9

In the decree, Yeltsin also appointed a committee—headed

by Major General Anatoly Kuntsevich, formerly deputy head

of the Soviet chemical forces—which was to report to him in a

month about how to achievethis transparency of theRussian pro-

gram and to end its illegitimate activities. Subsequently, General

Kuntsevich stated the following in a Russian interview:

Indeed these clear violations on the convention were only admit-

ted afterthe totalitarianregimecollapsedand duplicityin politics wasabandoned. . . The remnants of the offensive programs in the area of 

BW were still around as recently as 1991. It was only in 1992 that

6Literaturnaia Gazeta, 14.04.93.7http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/hui01/ 8TASS, 26 Feb, 1992.9“Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Fulfilling Inter-

national Obligations with Regard to Biological Weapons,” Moscow, April 11,

1992.

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RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM   245

Russiaabsolutely stopped this work. . . We didnot have stockpilesof 

BW. The point is that they cannot be kept for a long time. Therefore,

the question of their destruction does not come up.10

The boom came shortly after Yeltsin’s decree on BW in 1992.

It faded within a year, however, and only one or two serious

publications had appeared annually, added to two or three pieces

of free journalists or the NGOs, like Prof. L. Fedorov, founder 

and head of the “Association for Chemical Safety.”11

Under the tri-lateral agreement, reciprocal visits took place

in 1993 and 1994 in various facilities. Further, by April 1994 the

Russian Presidential Committee on the Problems of Chemical

and Biological Disarmament also referred to theissue of visiting

in Russian facilities nominally affiliated with the military, and at

the summit in May1995, Russia agreed—in principle—to finally

permit inspection visits to the BW facilities directly managed by

the Russian military. The visits were to occur in August 1995,12

but they had not yet occurred. Obviously, since 1996 theRussian

information flow weakenedand becameless valid. In thelast few

years there were mainly reactions to Ken Alibek’s publications

and few statements about the R&D of new medicines, supported

by the US program and aimed at decreasing the threat. Some-

times, those Russian publications demonstrate that in Moscow

there is the feeling that in 1992 they went too far in their open-

ness, and that is why after 1996 they narrowed the borders of 

unclassified information.

Soviet and Russian Postures at the BWCReview Conferences

Mirroring an alternating strategic course, the postures taken

by USSR and then Russia at the BWC Review Conferences

are worth mentioning.13 They add the diplomatic dimension

of Moscow’s international policy conducts relating to BW, as

follows:1981 (First Review Conference of the BWC): The USSR— 

together with the USA—undertakes to intensify negotiations

aimed at achieving a joint initiative concerning ways for imple-

menting the BWC.

1986 (Second Conference): The USSR declares that it does

not possess any of the biological agents or toxins, weapons,

equipment, or means of delivery specified in the BWC, nor does

it conduct research or development work for the purposes of 

producing or perfecting that kind of weapon. The USSR agrees

to an exchange of information dealing with certain categories of 

its microbiological research institutions.

10Interview with General Kuntsevich in Rossiyskie Vesti, September 22,

1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-186, September 24, 1992.11Among the few valid ones was the analysis by journalist Sergey Leskov,

who spent several months in the US and compared the US and Russian BW

programs. Leskov stated that information on Russian BW productionis scarcely

available. As he said, even in 1992, this was a “very impolite question,” asking

authorities about BW, the equivalent of asking to hold the “nuclear briefcase”

for a while. (Izvestiya, 26 June 1993)12TASS, 29 May 1995.13Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention website www.opbw.org/ 

1991 (Third Conference): The USSR supports administra-

tive strengthening of confidence-building measures, and calls

for new modalities aimed at furthering openness. Among these

measures are: annual submission of information on national pro-

grams of work in the area of protection against BW; annual sub-

mission of information on facilities with P4 containment level

as well as on facilities with a lower level of containment in case

they carry out research and development in the area of protec-tion against BW, or implement other related activities on orders

of the Ministry of Defense; international exchange of scientists

conducting such activities.

1996 (Fourth Conference): Russia calls for rigid, precondi-

tioned provisions through which a request for conducting a chal-

lenge inspection may be approved. Within that context, such re-

quests have to be based upon a complaint concerning a possible

breach of the BWC; such a complaint “must contain all possible

evidence confirming that it is well-founded.”14

2001(Fifth Conference): Russia accentuates—due to the con-

tinuing danger of terrorism involving the use of WMD—its be-

lief in the need to strengthen the operation of the BWC by rati-

fying a multilateral and legally binding document.15

Remarkably, the posture posed in 1986, while categorically

denying any offensive-oriented BWP, took place right during

the climax-phase of developing BW by the USSR. By 1991,

contrastingly, a genuine bud of deproliferation emerged, and

persisted for several years. Yet, the year 1996 marked, indeed

(as reflected in the respecting posture), an outset of Russian re-

gression, which has been continuing up to these days. It was

aimed to decelerate domestic conversion processes and control

foreign interference moves. Somewhat mitigating, ostensibly, a

guest article by Alexander Vorobiev, permanent representative

of Russia to the Conference on Disarmament, called, concur-

rently, for “decisions that should be made in national capitalsand instructions given to the negotiators to find the possibility to

proceed intensively with the elaboration of the BWC verifica-

tion regime . . . A major step forward for the negotiators would

be to start working as soon as possible on the rolling text of 

the Protocol or at least parts of it, e.g., on mandatory declara-

tions.”16 Later on, the Russian stance manifested at the 2001

BWC Review Conference was rather insignificant, in whatever 

sense serving to gauge it.

Beyond the BWC, and contrary to the 1980s line of denial,

on one occasion a senior member of the Soviet Central Com-

mittee stated, while participating in a Pugwash conference, in

1987: “We will use new scientific principles which are avail-

able to us, and the utilization of genetic engineering allows for achieving very dangerous consequences that may not be man-

ageable.”17 Overall, the inconsistent diplomatic course of the

14Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention website www.opbw.org/ 15TASS, 21 Nov. 2001.16Vorobiev, A. V., Working on the compliance regime for the BWC; Chem.

Biol. Convention Bull., 31, 2-4, 1996.17Pugwash Annual Meeting: From Confrontation to Reconciliation, Sep.

1987, Austria.

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246   D. SHOHAM AND Z. WOLFSON

Soviet/Russian postures, as described, constitutes a notable— 

largely misleading—reflection of the actual BWP stages pre-

sented above.

Did the USSR Manufacture BW?

Allin all, then, theUSSR andRussia didnot admit to ever pro-

ducing BW, eventually. Unlike its progenitor, however, Russiadid acknowledge the existence of operational production lines,

which have been designed and installed (by the USSR, chiefly)

for that purpose, but were never run in effect, allegedly, beyond

experimental scale. Weren’t they?

Thekey question about production of BW andhoardingthem,

the Soviets always kept vague. They did not reaffirm the need

for dismantling of specific BW production facilities, since 1992.

Further, during a discussion in the Duma on 27 October 2000

and the vote on the new law that eliminates the 1925 reserva-

tion to the BW & CW Convention, officials such as Deputy of 

Foreign Minister Mamedov and Chief of Staff Kvashnin told

the parliament: “We   have no  BW, and therefore there is noth-

ing to destroy . . . The new law related to the BWC will not betranslated to any budget allocation for BW stock destruction

facilities, in opposite to what happened with the ratification of 

CWC.”18

For years, times and again, Russian officials rejected even

hints of theexistence of BW production in theformer USSR. For 

instance, Lieutenant General Valentin Estigneyev, Chief Com-

mander of Biological Warfare Directorate in the Russian army

has been interviewed by Izvestiya on that issue.19 Referring to

the 1979 anthrax accident, he still (as of 1998) discredited at-

tributing the affair to weapon-grade anthrax. He implied that

Soviet weapon-grade anthrax would unlikely contain a mixture

of several strains (as analyzed by an international scientific team

in Sverdlovsk), but rather a single strain, expectedly bearing,however, a 100% lethality rate. Generally, indeed, completed

weaponization is perforce a precondition for BW production,

whereas it is not necessarily indicative of subsequent BW pro-

duction occurring in reality. That plain logic is seemingly useful.

Thus, in the end of 1999, Estigneyev stated, “What we devel-

oped never went into serial manufacturing . . . Nobody hoarded

it, or tried to create strategic stocks.” He then added, “in 1989 we

eliminated indications of forbidden activity” (but not the activity

itself—authors’ note).20

In retrospect, even faced with verysolid evidenceprovided by

Pasechnic in 1989 and by Alibek in 1992, Moscow persisted in

its stance. One cannot dispute, ostensibly, the underlying ratio-

nale: both aredefectors and, hence, “must write what they didfor 

commercial reasons”. . . Well, let us agree with this, strictly for 

discussion purposes. In comparison, General Kuntzevich occu-

pied high-ranking positions in the system for decades, and must

18The DUMA (Russian Parliament) website (in Russian): http://www.akdi.

ru/GD/plen z/2000/s27-10 d.htm19Izvestiya, 3 March 1998.20Yadeirnyi (Nuclear) Kontrol, no. 4, p. 19, 1999.

be considered a trustworthy figure. In 1992, when Yeltsin had

appointed him a Chairman of the Committee for the Issues of 

BW and CW Conventions, he said to an official governmental

newspaper:21

“We admitted, that after the ratification of the convention

(o f  1972), the offensive BW programs were not immediately

discontinued; researched continued, testing continued, and pro-

duction was taking place” (in Russian: “shlo proizvodstvo.“ ”).22 Notably, nobody can argue that the

Russian word “proizvodstvo” means something other than “pro-

duction”; not pilot project or preparation for production. It was

undeniable: Kuntsevitch meant production, literally, period;

namely, full-scale manufacturing.

Kuntzevich was, in all opinions, a key expert in the fields of 

BW and CW in USSR. Since 1972 he served for years as chief 

military adviser for the Soviet delegation on the Geneva nego-

tiations about eliminating BW and CW held by USSR, US, and

GB. In such a position Kuntzevich was better aware than any-

body of the meaning of terminology in international affairs and

of the possibilities to manipulate it. The chance that Kuntzevich

could have used the improper words in an interview that he gave

to governmental newspaper—is next to zero. Not to mention

that before printing, it would have been carefully reread by his

assistants (unlike in a live talk show on TV).23 In early 2000,

Ze’ev Wolfson sent a letter to the Editor of Nuclear Control,

whereby he asked Evstigneyev about the contradiction in his

and Kuntzevich’s statements. The letter had been published in

the May–June 2000 issue of that Russian journal; however, no

reaction from any Russian official has followed.

Actually, Evstigneyev contradicted not only his older col-

league Kuntzevitch, but himself as well. In an interview with

Evstigneyev in 1992, published in the Russian Army newspaper 

Krasnaia Zvezda, one can find a similar phrase: “In the mid 70s,in several Soviet pharmaceutical plants, strictly protected sec-

tions were constructed, the purpose of which was clear to all.”

(It was not direct speech of Evstigneyev, but anyway the hint

was very clear and the article was based on his words.).24

Mention should be made of some additional indications of 

BW production in the former USSR.

Fedorov stated with confidence that large quantities of BW in

the form of warheads for some types of SS-missile, which con-

sist of numerous orange-sized balls (containers) to disseminate

anthrax and other pathogens over wide territories, plus bombs

and shells in several models, had been secretly stored on a base

21Rossiyskie Vesti, 22 Sep, 1992.22Rossiyskie Vesti, 22 Sep. 1992.23General Anatolii Kuntsevich was dismissed, two years later (in April

1994), and charged with selling some 800 kilograms of chemical precursor 

for chemical weapons to Syria and with the attempt to sell another consignment

of chemicals whose export is banned. These had been stolen from an institute

developing CW in Moscow. After months of investigation, the charges were

dropped and the case never made it to court. (Nezavismaia Gazeta 24 October 

1995)24Krasnaia Zvezda 29 Sept. 1992 p. 3.

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RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM   247

for CW. Moreover, he elaborated on BW munitions in 1996:

“After 1992 our military kept the stock of BW far from any sign

detectable by international experts . . . the US cannot find it, not

in Stepnogorsk, neither in Makhachkala. They move the muni-

tionsfromonestoragesiteofCWtoanother.”25 This statement— 

perhaps themost importantone made by a Russian—is meaning-

ful in several senses: the very fact that BW production was car-

ried out by the USSR; the enduring retention of BW by Russia;and the ongoing, sound practice of concealing BW in (inter-alia)

CW storage sites.

Notably, since 1992, Russian officials avoided acknowledg-

ing the issue of production more than once, but rather played

linguistic games. In the latest example—the most recent offi-

cial statement, made by Valery Spirande, Deputy Chief Man-

ager of the Department of BW & CW Conventions issues in the

Russian State Agency for Munitions, in 2003—instead of “pro-

duction” of various BW, the word “vytachivanie” was used—a

word habitually used only todescribethe process ofmolding pre-

cious stones into souvenirs or figurines. Remarkably, Spirande

claimed most of it was for tests of samples of US bio-weaponry

that the Russians got only in drawings.26

It so happened, that during the last few years, Russian mil-

itary officials sometimes demonstrated real detention of 1992

statements. Thus, in November 2001, in connection with the

anthrax attacks in the US, commander of biological and chem-

ical defense directorate general Holostov, maintained: “Russia

never developed, produced or stored BW.”27 This statement un-

ambiguously excludes the possibility of ever storing BW entirely

manufactured earlier by the USSR.

During the same month, however, another report was elicited

fromGeneral Prof. Peter Burgasov, former Chief Sanitary Physi-

cian of the Soviet Army, anda senior researcher withinthe BWP.

Admittingthat development of BW by theSovietsdid take place,in the form of live field tests, he described a “smallpox incident”

that happened in the 1970s, and was then hushed:

“On Vozrazhdenie Island in the Aral Sea, the strongest recipes

of smallpox were tested. Suddenly I was informed that there were

mysterious cases of mortalitiesin Aralsk. A research ship of theAral

fleetcame15 kmaway fromthe island(it was forbidden tocomeany

closer than 40 km). The lab technician of this ship took samples of 

planktontwice a dayfrom thetop deck. Thesmallpox formulation— 

400 gr. of which was exploded on the island—”got her” and she

became infected.After returninghome to Aralsk, she infected several

people including children. All of them died. I suspected the reason

for this and called the Chief of General Staff of Ministry of Defense

and requested to forbid the stop of the Alma-Ata—Moscow train in

25www.voortuzhenie.narod.ru/Enciklopedia Vooruzhenia/.26He said as follows: “.. . in the USSR and in Russia modeled real

foreign ammunition—aviation bomb from 1 to 4 pounds in weight.

“Turned out” singles samples of it, produced tests in real condition

on the animals on the testing plots. (In Russian.. . .   B   CCPP

http://www.vremya.ru/2003/74/ 

6/56655.html 24 April 200327 (Russian Information Agency) Novosti, 2 Nov. 2001.

Aralsk. As a result, theepidemic around thecountry wasprevented.I

called Andropov, who at that time was Chief of KGB, and informed

him of the exclusive recipe of smallpox obtained on Vozrazhdenie

Island.”28

By 2002, other Russian epidemiologists still declined to ac-

knowledge the incident, attributing it to a natural outbreak, trig-

gered by the“garden variety”smallpox virus. When asked about

the specific strain thatgenerated the outbreak—a highly commu-nicable, possibly vaccine-resistant strain named Aralsk—they

replied curtly that no such strain existed, a stance they main-

tain to this day. Actually, it was a new lethal strain of small-

pox that traveled far from the BW testing facility on an island

in the Aral Sea to infect people downwind on a ship. Most of 

the adults exposed to the strain contracted smallpox despite be-

ing immunized. Prompted, remarkably extensive countermea-

sures, including vaccination, disinfection,and quarantiningwere

conducted.29

The virulent strains of anthrax and smallpox that have been

adopted—and likely upgraded, parallel to other pathogens— 

were rather produced and stockpiled by the USSR, beyond tech-

nical weaponization, considering the overall information pre-sented in this article. At any rate, the fact that Russia did—or,

sensibly, does—possess lines for productionof an arsenal of BW,

has not just technical implications such as demand from West-

ern partners to destroy large fermentation vessels. It definitely

means that Russia had and still has hundreds of scientists and

engineers highly qualified in the stages of  production processes

 per se, with all technical knowledge of how to solve problems

arising when a virulent microbiological seed is transferred from

a lab tube to an industrial line.

Assuming that the Soviets did produce combat strains and

various weaponry platforms, such knowledge may be helpful in

reopening the production lines one day.

The Issue of Conversion

 Essence of the Course

In 1992, Soviet military microbiologists asserted that their 

budgets hadsuffered a 30%cut andthe personnelhad been cutby

50%. According to the army newspaper  Krasnaia Zvezda,30 the

new Department for Biological Defense at the Defense Ministry

employed at the time “hardly more than ten experts,” and there

were 400 scientists altogether who worked in the sphere of mil-

itary microbiology, whereas just one center in the US had 1000

employees. The newspaper also claimed that only ten active lab-

oratorieswere left in Russia, whereas there were 100such labs in

the US. Moreover, in 1991 the USSR had reportedly spent some70 million rubles ($0.5 million) on her ten labs and only 50 mil-

lion rublesin 1992, whereas theUS hadspent$100 million on its

100 institutes.” Clearly, none of the quoted figures is perfectly

reliable, because they are the result of various machinations,

28Interview in the Russian newspaper “Courier,” 24 November 2001.29Vedomosty (Moscow), 27 March, 2003.30Krasnaia Zvezda, 29 Sept. 1992.

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248   D. SHOHAM AND Z. WOLFSON

such as ignoring the entire Biopreparat research, development,

and production complex that still employs thousands of people.

A significant drop did take place, nevertheless. Within a short

time after the 1992 decree, because of deep crisis of Russian

economy, many of the R&D centers found themselves out of 

budgets. Thousands of scientists and professional staff had no

sources of income at all. For instance, from the end of the 1980s

to 1994, the Kolstovo-based Siberian Vector Virology Center re-duced,reportedly, as much as 58%of hisstaff (3500 outof 6000).

Similarly, the Institute of Appliance Microbiology in Obolensk,

lost 54% of his personal, (about 1400 out of 2700), including

28% of the leading researchers, in the years 1990–1996.31

Those and other nominally civilian institutes, belonging to

the Biopreparat Enterprise, formed scientific and commercial

connections with various Western institutions; current recipro-

cal visits were—and still are—included. Although common, that

phenomenon was described, yet, as typical camouflage by an-

other senior Russian defector who came over (October 1993) to

British Intelligence to tell his debriefers what steps the Russian

military had taken to keep the concealed project going. Appar-

ently reliable, he stated: “In every facility that had been opened

for inspection to Western intelligence, the Russians had estab-

lished convincing cover stories that made it appear as if each site

had been converted to research and manufacture of vaccines. The

secret work continued in parts of the sites that were never vis-

ited by the American or British officials. Work is continuing

as before, in defiance of Yeltsin’s orders.”32 Salient examples

embodying that practice are the distinguished facilities located

at Obolensk, Koltsovo, Berdsk, Omutninsk, and so forth. Some

other ones did convert completely.

Unlike many branches of the military-industrial complex, the

microbiological industry in Russia benefited from ideal market

conditions, or a so-called “niche,” in the early 1990s. First, thecountry has always suffered from a chronic shortage of vaccines,

vitamins, and modern antibiotics that had to be imported. Sec-

ond, since the late 1980s, Russia has been inundated by a wave

of protests against environmental pollution that was closely re-

lated to the activity of the pharmaceutical and microbiological

enterprises. Some of them were shut down. The growing short-

age of medicines was compensated for by increasing imports

from Western markets that had by then become accessible.

At that time, the Russian government managed to preserve

the basis of the military-biological complexes, although they suf-

fered substantial losses. The government offered them a chance

for independent survival by tossing them the idea of conversion

as a life belt. Centers that belonged to the Ministry of Defense,such as Institutes in Kirov (Viatka), Sverdlovsk (Ekatherinburg),

and Zagorsk (Sergiev Posad), generally refrained from releasing

data concerning their personal; however, they also went through

a troubled period.33

31http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 r Vaccine for Life.32“At Face Value,” The Sunday Times, March 27, 1994.33Spirande said “the number of our experts in military institutes and labs is

the minimal for their tasks”.. . (Interview with Spirande, op. cit.)

Thus, an appreciable proportion of BW-related scientific and

technical manpower plus assets have indeed been removed or 

converted. Budgets have tangibly been diminished. Drifting of 

scientists, including key scientists, from one facility to another 

significantly intensified, but has been regulated. Examples of 

absorbing facilities are the Bio-Med Scientific-Industrial Com-

plex (located at Perm), and certain sections within the Bio-Mash

Scientific-Production Association (based at Moscow). Cooper-ation with civilian frameworks remarkably decreased. In prac-

tice, the Biopreparat system almost stopped its various activities

with regard to BW, although the related techno-scientific poten-

tial has been retained to a certain degree. Generally, then, those

steps necessarily weakened the overall competence of the BWP.

All in all, yet, no major alteration could be discerned or traced,

in essence, regarding the confidentiality and techno-scientific

R&D microbiological profile of the concerned properly military,

parallel system, as a whole;neithercould be detected,therein,in-

dications of a shift in favor of a concrete anti-bioterrorism effort,

being taken place, as declared. Still, such endeavor did serve, in

practice, for conversion purposes within the Biopreparat system.

ANTI-BIOTERRORISM

In the place where the Russian governmental initiative of 

converting military R&D centers and absorbing into the mar-

ket economy had little success, American assistance within the

“Reduce the Common (WMD) Threats” program fared much

better. In thebiological sphere, a chief courseof that program for 

conversion has been the anti-bioterrorism one. The Novosibirsk-

based Biopreparat-affiliated Vector microbiological center has

been a pioneering facility, within that context. Longtime before

others, Vector’s Director, Academician Sandakhchiev started to

cooperate with international institutions, and already in the early

1990s focused on issues related to monitoring and preventionof bioterrorism.34 The Vector Institute had originally been es-

tablished in the Novosibirsk Academic Compound, in the end

of 1970s, but for security reasons, it was later moved outside

of the city to the village Koltsovo. Recently, as an indepen-

dent scientific enterprise, Vector became the main center for the

Russian (non-military) microbiological research. From 1989 to

1996, Vector lost about a half of its staff, but until 2002, accord-

ing Dr. Raisa Martuniuk, in charge of international programs in

Vector, it nearly rebuilt itself and not one of its scientists is in a

hurry to leave it.35

There are plenty of microbiological labs all over Russia

eager—for financial,professional, or even ideological reasons— 

to save forbidden strains, bio-toxins, equipment, and informa-

tion. On the other hand, with time the Americans became more

attentive to Russian arguments about development of anti-terror 

measures. Similarly, already in the mid 1990s they accepted the

Russian classification of “police gases” that gave a green light

to Moscow for further development of sleeping and irritating

34http://www.vector.nsc.ru/art1-r.htm35 http://www.expert.ru, 18 2002 r Vaccine for Life

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RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM   249

agents, partially supported also by the US grants. A recent ex-

ample of such a biotoxin-based agent is the pepper gas. In fact, it

represents a wide range of biotoxin-based incapacitating agents.

The sort of sleeping gas used by the Russians to free hostages

in the Moscow Theatre was another incapacitating substance.

The Russians, from their side, stressed that the US grants,

which play a major role the survival of many Russian centers,

have a very negative aspect: Reportedly, then, while Americansreceive sophisticated researches for a small charge, the best

Russian scientists now actually work for foreign military or 

semi-military projects. At the same time, Russia cannot use the

money for full-scale production vaccines and diagnostic kits,

to protect itself against the bio-terror threat.36 Also, the anti-

bioterrorism outline and legislative base that was established in

Russia—to deny possible access by terrorist states and terror-

ist groups to dual-use technologies, plus materials—have been

described by Vorobiev. He thereupon pointed at potential inter-

national cooperative efforts to be implemented, accordingly.37

Eventually, in 2001, a commitment was achieved between Rus-

sian and US Presidents, Vladimir V. Putin and George W. Bush,

to pursue cooperation to counter the threat of bioterrorism, in-

cluding a focus on health-related measures.

The meaningfulness of bioterrorism has been further accen-

tuated during the 55th session of the World Health Assembly in

Geneva (May 2002), when Russia came out for stepping up the

struggle against the threat of bioterrorism. As Minister of Health

of Russia and head of the Russian delegation Yuri Shevchenko

stated, thisconcernsintensification of scientific-research workto

obtain a new smallpox vaccine based on the collections of wild

strains of this most dangerous disease existing in Russia and

the US. Shevchenko noted that during his meeting with head of 

the American delegation Tommy Thompson main attention had

been paid to the “questions of joint resolution” of the pressingproblems of countering bioterrorism and ensuring biosecurity.38

According to Shevchenko, “for twenty years we have not

been vaccinating the population, while smallpox is not anthrax,

from the standpoint of the danger it breeds. If the smallpox virus

is used as a BW, the world’s population will be incapable of re-

sisting this disease.” As he stressed, it is necessary not only to

start vaccinating as soon as possible the people of the “high-

risk group,” livestock-farmers and workers of the biotechnolog-

ical sphere in particular, but “to think of all people in general.”

He contended, however, that the inoculation of the population

against smallpox will be resumed, provided a new safe vaccine

is obtained. Russia has thereupon been noted for intensifying

the struggle against threat of bioterrorism.Consequently, The Russian-US BioIndustry Initiative (BII)

began in 2002,constituting the newest proliferation threat reduc-

tion program. It aims to counter bioterrorism through targeted

36Interview with Spirande, op. cit.37Vorobiev, Alexander. “Countering Chemical/Biological Terrorism in the

Former Soviet Union: The Need for Cooperative Efforts,” Politics and the Life

Sciences, [London], 15, September 1996, 233–5.38Pravda, 15 May 2002.

reconfiguration of large-scale, formerly Soviet BW research,

development, and production facilities for civilian purposes, by

creating Russian-US research partnerships.39 Collaboration has

then been established in 2003 between the International Science

and Technology Center (ISTC), Moscow, and the Boston-based

Center for Integration of Medicine and Innovative Technology

(CIMIT), to implement the BII. Conversion is thus intended to

take place through formation of systems in Russia to link scien-tists, physicians, and engineers to solve medical and scientific

problems,and identify innovative technologies and commercial-

ization opportunities.40

The Russians are seemingly pleased with the BII. At best,

however, the conversion of the Biopreparat network may pre-

sumably be accomplished, thus. Still, the trends of anti-

bioterrorism and biomedical collaboration do not appear to

facilitate conversion within the military microbiological insti-

tution. Neither do the following declared arguments of commer-

cial secrecy, with reference being made to the MOD facilities in

Sverdlovsk and Kirov.

Sverdlovsk In August 1992, official representatives stated that there were

no more military secrets in the domain of BW or related fields,

but that there are commercial secrets forming a potential, which

will be realized by the microbiologists for the benefit of pub-

lic health and country’s economy. Consequently, in September 

1992, Prime Minister Yegor Gaidarissued a decreethat formally

marked the beginning of the conversion process of the military-

biological complex. The decree dealt with the reconstruction

of the Sverdlovsk facility, which became the most known and

problematic facility consequent to the 1979 event, when anthrax

leek caused a disastrous, primarily concealed incident.41

Accordingto thedecree and related commentaries, theequip-

ment of the Sverdlovsk facility was dismantled by 1985. After 

the reconstruction ordered by Gaidar, the facility was supposed

to manufacture new products, such as vaccines, antibiotics, and

other medicines. Correspondent Aleksander Pashkov, who vis-

ited the facility in Sept. 1992, wrote that the equipment that

he had been shown appeared outdated, and could not be com-

pared with the equipment of the American military center for 

biological research seen in a German TV film.42

If the equipment for the production of BW had already been

dismantled in 1985, then what wasPashkov shown in 1992? And

if it is a matter of manufacturing vaccines and medicines, then

why is the comparison made with a center dealing with BW?

A statement by the director of the Sverdlovsk facility, Major General Anatoly Kharechko, clarified things. In March 1993

(only sixmonths after Gaidar’s decree), he held that “ . . . thestaff 

39www.state.gov/documents/organization/2878140New Russian-American Collaboration Against Bioterrorism: Moscow’s

International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) participating, Pravda, 17

Sept. 2003.41Izvestiya 25 April 1992, p. 1.42Izvestiya, 22 Sep. 1992, p. 8.

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250   D. SHOHAM AND Z. WOLFSON

employed by the center is currently continuing to implement the

scientific research plans approved by the higher authorities of 

the Defense Ministry; therefore, it is a matter only of a partial

re-orientation of the staff efforts.” 43 Subsequently, the center 

has been producing some antibiotics, samples of which were

later shown on local television in 1998. Since 1992, however,

not one single correspondent has been allowed on the premises

of the military town number 19 that still houses the center. Local journalists maintain that new equipment was bought from Japan

and other countries and that, according to Kharechko, the center 

returned to its previous active level of work after the regression

in the mid 90s. About 200 soldiers with Rottweiler dogs still

patrol the entire complex.44

Too many questions remain unanswered concerning the

Sverdlovsk 1979 disaster and its corollaries. Addressing them

could also aid in understanding the real Russian BW-related

system at large. One of the questions is: did people actually die

from genetically modified anthrax? Prof. Ely Shliakhov, one of 

the internationally acclaimed experts on anthrax offered the fol-

lowing evidence. His former university classmate, Prof. Peter 

Burgasov, while serving as a Chief Soviet Army Sanitary Physi-

cian, took a key position in the investigation of the Sverdlovsk

disaster. Even for him there was no way to approach the full

data. However, he studied one aspect of the epidemiological

observation with his team that had no explanation. Burgasov’s

staff took numerous samples from school desks a few days after 

the disaster in several schools beside Compound 19 (the places

where the underground secret facilities were situated, the source

of anthrax fallout). Many probes taken from pupils’ desks con-

tained a large number of active anthrax—more than is needed

to infect children sitting on them or inhaling the bacteria—for 

a few days already. None of those children fell ill or died, and

neither did the teachers—all of them females. This may indicatethat several Russian experts who supposed that some anthrax

strain was “oriented” on combat staff, namely adult males only,

were right.45

Kirov

According to one of its directors, Yevgenii Pimenov, another 

majormilitary-microbiological institute in Kirov approached the

idea of conversion in a more serious manner.46 The institute was

having serious difficulties paying wages (that, according to the

military, were lower than those of civilian experts) and purchas-

ing the most basic equipment, and it suffered from a “brain

drain,” although previously the military could afford to choose

the best from dozens of applicants. In Kirov, as in Sverdlovsk, itsoon became clear that the only client for their production could

be just the same old one, namely the Ministry of Defense.

Unsurprisingly, then, Senator Lugar was prevented from vis-

iting the installation called Kirov-200, with the excuse that it

43ibid.44Vechernii Sverdlovsk (city newspaper ) 25 November 1998.45E. Shliahkov, personal interview, Tel Aviv, June 2000.46Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 Dec. 1992.

belonged to Kirov University, and for reasons of commercial

confidence (in August 2002). This case left a bad taste, because

never before did Kirov University has any modern facility of 

that sort, while situated just next to the Kirov military microbio-

logical center (a facility that has been working with BW already

for 60 years).47

THE PROBLEM OF BIOTECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

An Inevitable Consequence?

A rather more important phenomenon is the Russian exper-

tise, possibly being the most demanded “products” within the

world black market of BW technologies, in various forms of 

transferring (from direct personal consultation to selling copies

of records on operation of processes). Such knowledge could be

utilized for bio-proliferation for years.

Remarkably typifying the applicability of a cardinal dual-use

technology, migration of biotechnological components and as-

sets from Russia plus other formerly Soviet states takes place

in a variety of modes: fully or semi-institutionalized, private(completely commercial), through “scientific mercenaries,” for-

warded confidential documents, or performed other technolog-

ical thefts. Moreover, primary state-to-state transfer of such es-

sentials and assets does not mean that a secondary phase of 

migration to another country, or countries, would not occur,

consequently. Significantly, biotechnologies were provided by

Russia to Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The inter-

faces with Iraq (until 2002) and with Iran, are herewith detailed,

together with Russian commenting, to demonstrate the problem

of biotechnology transfer.

The Past Interface with Iraq

Several specific cases, whereby Russia was blamed for di-

rectly supporting Iraq’s BWP, led to unequivocal—though not

necessarily convincing—discountenances made by Russian sci-

entists and officials.

First, a DIA report of 1994 noted that BW technology related

to anthrax and smallpox was made available to Iraq (and North

Korea), around 1992. This allegedly occurred mainly through

scientists from the Kirov facility that traveled to Iraq.48 Seem-

ingly compatible with that report has been information for-

warded to the  New York Times  by an unspecified CIA source

(as of December 2002), stating that Iraq had possibly obtained

a particularly virulent strain of smallpox from a Russian scien-

tist, Dr. Nelli Maltseva—a senior specialist on smallpox virus— while visiting Iraq in 1990. Maltseva has been a distinguished

researcher at the Moscow Research Institute for Viral Prepa-

rations, a cardinal facility housing hundreds of virulent strains

47Interview with Spirande, op. cit.48Department of Defense, DIA report, Filename: 22010910.94a, May

26, 1994; IIR 2 201 0910 94/RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.  html head  /headbodypre

/irp/gulf/intel/950719/22010910 9

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RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM   251

of various viruses, including smallpox. Russian scientists who

worked for many years with her, unambiguously discredited

such a possibility, arguing that all smallpox strains (about 120)

were absolutely inaccessible for Maltseva, unless granted, and

at any event were all transferred to Vector Center for Virol-

ogy and Biotechnology, at Koltsovo, Novosibirsk.49 That asser-

tion might be questionable, as shown in the appendix of this

article.Moreover, key microbiologists included in the UN BW in-

spection team in Iraq (UNSCOM) were Russians who had been

deeply involved in the Soviet BWP. Premier Yevgeny Primakov

worked with the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to pack in-

spection teams with Russians picked by Moscow. The

manipulation seemingly paid off. Reportedly, the Russians on

the inspection team were “paranoid” about efforts made to un-

cover production of smallpox virus, a pathogen that has been

weaponized by Iraq.50

Also, negotiationstook place in 1995between Russia and Iraq

for the supply of fermentation equipment, including a 5,000-liter 

fermentation vessel. The vessel that Moscow agreed to sell Iraq

was 10 times larger than the largest vessel Iraq has admitted

using to brew germs. Uncovered documents call for an agree-

ment between Russian experts and leaders of Iraq’s weapons

programs and for the “design, construction and operation of the

plant,” ostensibly for producing single-cell animal feed protein.

The agreement includes, however, the names of the director of 

Iraq’s botulinum toxin program (a different single-cell protein,

in that case), the chief engineer for the Iraqi al-Hakam BW

plant, and prominent members of Iraq’s military industrial com-

mission. Though Russia flatly denied involvement, it refused

to allow interviewing Russians to determine whether the equip-

mentwas actuallydelivered(indeed delivered, in all probability).

The Russians were “constantly giving the Iraqis the benefit of doubt. They said, ‘no way could al-Hakam be a dual-use facil-

ity.” 51 Further, in response to a request written to the Russian

Ambassador to the UN, Sergei Lavrov, asking him to clarify

documentation that his inspectors secured in Baghdad in 1997,

the Russian Foreign Minister and Defense Minister completely

rejected the whole affair.52

In another uncovered file detailing a deal for Russian air-

craft, one chapter pertains to engine and guidance systems for 

49Gazeta.Ru, December 5, 2002, US paperto faceRussian smallpox lawsuit,

By Yelena Vrantseva.50Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal,

March 27, 2003.51Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal,

March 27, 2003.52Rohde, D., ‘A possible Russian link to Iraq arms buildup,’   New

York Times, 12 Feb. 1998, URL   http://search.nytimes.com/ ; Smith, R. J.,

‘Did Moscow try to skirt sanctions?,’   Moscow Times, 13 Feb. 1998, URL

http://www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1998/Feb/13/story2.html; Smith,

R. J., ‘Russian firms discussed factory sale with Iraqis,’   Moscow Times,

19 Feb. 1998, URL  http://www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1998/Feb/19/ 

story4.html; and ‘Russia denies allegations in “Washington Post,” ’  RFE/RL

 Newsline, 12 Feb. 1998,URL http://search.rferl.org/newsline/1998/02/120298.

html.

remote-controlled drowns, capable of disseminating BWA. Fi-

nally, in 1999, Iraq’s Scud-C (al-Hussein) missileswere acquired

from high-level military officials and Russian arms dealers. The

al-Hussein was retrofitted to deliver biological (and chemical)

weapons with Russian technology. UNSCOM was prevented

from verifying Iraqi claims that it had destroyed the al-Hussein

warheads. At the time, Russia joined with France and Germany

in taking up Iraq’s campaign to weaken inspections. Referringto the amassing incriminating data, Russia’s Foreign Minister,

Igor Ivanov, was decidedly testy: “there is no evidence confirm-

ing violations by Russian firms of existing sanctions,” he stated,

before aiming sharp words at the U.S.53 Notably, he did not

directly deny the alleged violations.

The Interface with Iran

The Russian-Iranian biological interface appears to be coor-

dinated, in terms of displaying a line of total innocence, parallel

to granting assistance desired by Iran. Thus, in a 1998 statement

issued in response to a  New York Times article on Iran’s BWP,

Vladimir Rakhmanin, a spokesman for the Russian foreign min-

istry, said that Moscow has taken note of Western media reports

of Iran’s attempts to hire Russian researchers for the develop-

ment of BW. He repeated that Russia“has been andwill continue

to abide by international standards for WMD and missile deliv-

ery systems.”54 That positive line has apparently been fulfilled

on one occasion, when connections between the Russian semi-

military Obolensk microbiological institute and Iran were cut.

The formerly Soviet, Islamic sisters, Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan, are geo-strategically of vital importance for Iran.

Iran recognized their capacities in the WMD area—particularly

after they gained independence—and formed ties, accordingly.

Thus, during their meeting in Ashkhabad in June 1992, the three

leaders found merit in declaring together that all three states willmake efforts to counter accumulation and employment of bio-

logical, chemical, and nuclear weapons altogether.

Kazakhstan and Armenia serve as main bridges and sources.

Thus, the equipment of an Armenian biological key-plan was

entirely sold to Iran through a firm affiliated, officially, with the

United Arab Emirates, in spite of a vigorous American attempt

to foil the move.55 Yet, it has been indicated that Russian plants

stood behind the Armenian “leaks.” Thus, the Russians would

transfer to the Armenians, and to other partners, superfluous

production equipment and information potentially necessary for 

Iran; or the Russians would ignore (of course, not without a

payoff) the question of how Armenian businessmen disposed of 

the property belonging to them.56The dimension of techno-scientific cooperation between

Russia and Iran is no less significant. The Iranian-Russian

53Robert Goldberg, The Russian Strain (Commentary), Wall Street Journal,

March 27, 2003.54Interfax, 1224 GMT, 11 Dec 98; FBIS-TAC-98-345.55Khachtrian, E. and Danielyan, E., US named Armenian firm subject to

Iran sanction; RFE/RL Armenian Report, May 16, 2002.56Oleg Khrabryi www.vesti.ru, May 28, 2002.

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252   D. SHOHAM AND Z. WOLFSON

biotechnological interface includes, indeed, strong, continuing

ties between scientists of both parties, stemming, apparently,

from regular academic cooperation. One conspicuous frame-

work of that evolving interface is the annual “Agriculture and

Natural Resources” Iranian-Russian Conference. Bearing a re-

markably wide scientific scope, this framework includes typi-

cally applicable topics, diluted within its overall scope. Clostrid-

ium botulinum (isolation of types A, B, E, in north of Iran)and the related toxinogenic bacterium Clostridium chauvoei

(large-scale cultivation) were two topics presented, thereupon,

in Moscow, among many others.57

THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN BWP TECHNO-SCIENTIFICMICROBIOLOGICAL AXIS: ACTIVITIES WITHINMILITARY FACILITIES

Until 1991

Five military facilities engaged heterogeneously in various

sub-domains of medical microbiology, and forming, altogether,

a sensible entirety, have long constituted the skeleton of the

Soviet BWP:

•  Institute for Military Sanitation—Center of Virology,

located in Zagorsk (now Sergiyev Posad)—mainly vi-

ral and rickettsial BWA;•  Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology, located

in Kirov (now Vyatka)—mainly bacterial BWA;•   Center for Military-Technical Problems of Anti-

Bacteriological Defense, located in Sverdlovsk (now

Yekaterinburg)—mainly anthrax;•  Scientific Research Institute of Military Medicine, lo-

cated in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg)—mainly epi-

demiological and medical aspects relating to BWA;

•   State Establishment for Biological Instrumentation,Precision Machinery and Safety Techniques, located

in Moscow—mainly apparatuses, installationsand sub-

stances related to BWA.

Detailed information about each of these five facilities, with

special reference to their microbiological profile of activities

until 1991, is briefly described in the following sections and is

presented in depth in the appendix.

The Soviet BWP carried out within those facilities included

most types of anti-human BWA: bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae,

and toxins. Those BWA types were laboratory- and field-tested,

then, and, consequently, serially weaponized. There is some

doubtconcerning weaponizationof anti-human pathogenic fungi(regardless of mycotoxins, which at any event have been

weaponized). Non-microbial toxins (phytotoxins and zootox-

ins) have extensively been looked into (in addition to microbial

57H.R. Tavakoli, Isolation of  Clostridium botulinum  (types A, B & E) in

sediments from coastal areas of the north of Iran; R. P. Langroudi, Large scale

cultivation of clostridium chauvoei (Blackleg) vaccine by fermenter. The 3rd

International Iran and Russia Conference “Agriculture and Natural Resources,”

September 18–20, 2002.

toxins), to develop a variety of biochemical warfare agents for 

diverse purposes; the related activities conducted within various

chemical-weapons-oriented facilities, including military ones.

The non-microbial toxins-concerned system has been operating

independently of the pathogens plus microbial toxins related

system, except for those cases involving genetically induced

non-microbial toxin production within benign bacteria (toxin

biosynthesis), or within recognized pathogens (virulence ampli-fication). At large, BWA against humans, livestock, and crops

have all been developed, produced, and weaponized. Within the

present analysis, a wide range of anti-human BWA is visited,

excluding pathogenic fungi and non-microbial toxins.

In contrasting, Russia admitted that the only BWA included

in her (merely R&D) program were the pathogens of plague,

anthrax, brucellosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, Q-fever,

and typhus, plus botulinum toxin.58 Notably, this declared list

mostly overlapped (not casually) with the much earlier list ac-

knowledged by the US, concerning its own weaponized BWA;

at the same time, it reflected but one slice of a much wider spec-

trum of pathogens and toxins cultivated by Moscow’s military

(see appendix).

Since 1992

None of the military facilities became civilian or accessi-

ble for foreigners. The quality of R&D activities—in terms of 

both the range of pathogens being dealt with, as well as their 

applicability—mostly persisted. The general volume of R&D

activities has yet been somewhat reduced. BW production in the

main five facilities under discussion ostensibly stopped. Their 

reorganization has been configured by the MOD according to

three conceptual principles:

•

 retaining of existing capacities;•   hindering effective foreign monitoring;•  misleading of domestic civilian authorities, if needed.

A profound perception regarding the magnitude and power of 

BW—possibly a realistic one, objectively—marked that mili-

tary concept. It is substantiated, as well, by the still predomi-

nant Russian assessment that the US is not giving up BW, in

actuality, and that some countries in Eurasia, China in particu-

lar, are in possession of BW, and unwilling to depreciate them.

Hence, a varietyof waysthrough whichreorganization processes

should—tentatively, at the least—be accomplished, have been

worked out:

•   false or semi-false conversion of some existing BW-oriented installations or parts of them;

•   assimilation by existing BW-oriented facilities or labs;•   construction of new, alternative facilities or labs—either 

“non-existing” or under-coverage existing ones (such

as the large and modernized unspecified ones in Strizhi

and in Lakhta);

58TASS, 12 Sep. 1992.

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RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM   253

•  formation of a system of modular mobile installations

thatcould possibly substitute certain existingnon-mobile

installations.

From a scientific microbiological viewpoint, this outline may

serve to implement some courses that have lately emerged (in

addition to earlier, still ongoing ones, as detailed below) for 

instance:•   increased virulence and shortened incubation periods

of pathogenic agents;•  induced UV resistance and heat-stability;•  usability of innocent or relatively benign bacteria or 

viruses, infective to man, as operators of toxin-coding

genes;•  serial production of protein toxins within abiotic arti-

ficial systems containing the coding gene plus needed

conditions; namely, an in vitro appliance containing

certain codinggene plus components (not cells, viruses

or tissues) essential for bringing about its functioning.

Concurrently, however, very senior Russian microbiologists in-volved in the BWP brought out large portions of their profes-

sional knowledge through books (regardless of Alibek’s book),

significantly contributing, thus, to the trend of transparency. The

following is a list of these books published in Russia:

•   1998— Chuma (plague), by I. V. Domaradskii;•   1999— Sibirsca Yazva  (anthrax) (authors detailed be-

low);•   2003—  Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biologi-

cal War Machine, by I. V. Domaradskii.

The book about anthrax, is intriguing in that it was written by a

battery of distinguished figures: Major-General Nikifor T. Vasi-lyev, Commander of the Directorate of Radiation, Chemical and

Biological Security of the Defense Ministry (former “15 Di-

rectorate, bacteriological warfare”), Major-General Academi-

cian Anatoly T. Kharechko, Head of the Center of Military-

Technological Problems of Biological Protection, Ekaterinburg

(former “Compound 19”, Sverdlovsk), his deputy Nikolay V.

Sadovoi, N.V. Litusov, a key scientist of the Center, Vladimir 

V. Kozhukhov, Head of the Anthrax Department of the R&D

Institute of Microbiology of the Defense Ministry (Vyatka, for-

mer Kirov), P.G. Vasilyev, a key scientist of the Institute, and

Gennady G. Onishchenko, Chief Sanitary Inspector of Russia.

Other Military FacilitiesIn addition to the above-mentioned military facilities, re-

markably few classified military installations have been

responsible—since the late 50s—for technical weaponization

of BWA. Storage has ordinarily been carried out in the form of 

loaded sub-munitions right upon the weaponization facilities,

and in the form of preserved bulky agent right upon the agent

production facilities, with the exception of the Malta storage fa-

cility and an additional unidentified storage facility. Several CW

storage facilities are apparently being utilized for BW storage,

as well.

Technical weaponization took place within installations usu-

ally affiliated to some primarily conventional-warhead-oriented

facilities that partially underwent sub-specializations. An excep-

tion has been an underground military installation located very

close to the Saratov Anti-Plague Institute. In this facility, serial

production of the plague bacterium has been conducted withininfected horses, and ultimately the product has been serially

installed—at another wing of this installation—into surface-to-

surface missiles, warheads, or sub-munitions. Another excep-

tion, in that sense, has been the Sverdlovsk compound, with

anthrax development, production, weaponization, and storage

altogether occurring therein. Two new, large BW military owned

complexes were constructed in Lakhta and Strizhi, totally un-

specified. A third one has been built elsewhere.

Several military facilities were responsible for field testing of 

weaponized systems, namely those on the Komsomolskiy and

Vozrozhdeniye Islands (designated Aralsk-7 sites), Shikhany

(mainly for testing of toxins and non-pathogenic simulants, as

well as platforms and dispensers), and unspecified sites in

Northern Siberia and Southern Siberia, possibly in the vicin-

ity of Koltsovo or the Mongolian borderline. Field tests con-

sisted in both ground and aerial dissemination trials of BW in

various forms of the active pathogen, sub-munitions, and mu-

nitions. Additionally, ballistic warheads have been field tested

successfully.

In general, strict separation between weaponization facili-

ties and the facilities engaged in developing and producing the

BWA themselves has been followed, both physically and proce-

durally. Experimental weaponization often took place through

cooperation between development and weaponization facilities.

Serial manufacturing of BWA-filled-weapon systems was sepa-rate. Coordination has been supervised only at the highest levels

of the military headquarters of the BWP.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The might borne by human pathogens has been explored

extensively in Russia; certainly by its Soviet progenitor. The

motivation behind this exploration—for military purposes, ei-

ther defensive or offensive—is a resulting issue with its own

significance. Nonetheless, the immeasurable entirety of knowl-

edge, expertise, and experience gained and imbibed by Russia

in the field of medical microbiology is apparently unique in

comparison to any other country, stemming from a conjunc-

tion of vast, mostly diversified territories and environments (inpart formerly Soviet, non-Russian), containing a grand variety

of native pathogens; favoring conditions for natural expression

of those pathogens; considerable attention and alertness paid

toward them; and tangible scientific abilities that are solemnly

utilized within both civilian and military Russian frameworks.

Mutual, positive feedback has formed and has continuously

been increasing between that entirety and a supremely strategic

Soviet/Russian paradigm, configuring the vitality of BW. The

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254   D. SHOHAM AND Z. WOLFSON

outcome has been the most advanced and sophisticated BWP

worldwide. Paradoxically, the Soviet BWP has been carried out

until 1972, parallel to the US BW arsenal—rather exceeding,

in practice, the latter—whereas since 1973 it remarkably scaled

up in spite of, or, actually, in consequence of the elimination

of the American arsenal (plus Soviet acceding to the BWC).

Other emerging extraneous BW threats—such as the Chinese

one—fueled that process, secondarily.BW manufacturing (or production), in terms of serial stock-

piling of both BWA and weapon-systems designed to contain

them in an operational state, is the key issue of the whole com-

plexity relating to the Soviet\Russian BWP. Therefore, if such

manufacturing did not ever take place, then any efforts made

so as to uncover BW, or demand to expose them, are totally

meaningless; and vice versa. The findings of the present analy-

sis suggest that BW were manufactured by the USSR, inherited

to Russia, mostly preserved by her, and apparently incorporated

into somewhat modified, enduring, exclusively classified mili-

tary frameworks. (To a certain extent, the latter are still backed,

technologically, by some secret remains of the converted Bio-

preparat system.)

The current phase of that evolutionary process is facilitated,

in effect, by an informal Russian-American status quo, one that

has virtually been established lately, acknowledging the non-

termination of BW, for the time being. In a sense, the cardi-

nal, unsolved issue of the smallpox virus constitutes an illus-

trative reflection of that much broader, yet unresolved issue.

Sheltered by seemingly acceptable justifications of essential on-

going research into the most dreadful pathogen of mankind is

thus still extant in Russia, the US and, most likely, some other 

places. It perfectly symbolizes the bivalent potential of further,

extremely ominous pathogens held, militarily, by Russia and ad-

ditional states. In Russia, it is retained, probably, as a stockpiledweapon, along with an arsenal of various pathogens and tox-

ins. The argument that full acquaintances with pathogens reck-

oned as BWA—and, likewise, with their aggressive attributes,

in terms of bio-terrorism threats—are necessary for achieving

effective protection, is a very reasonable one, an