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Thought and Its ObjectsAuthor(s): Akeel BilgramiSource: Philosophical Issues, Vol. 1, Consciousness (1991), pp. 215-232Published by: Ridgeview Publishing CompanyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1522930Accessed: 21/09/2008 23:03

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PHILOSOPHICAL SSUES, 110 UConsciousness, 1991

Thought and its ObjectsAkeel BilgramiTo the question of the title of his paper -what is presentto the mind?- Donald Davidson's answer is: nothing. Heargues that if the phrase 'objects of thought' is intended tosuggest that thinkers stand in a psychological or epistemo-logical relation with such objects, then we must deny thatthe phrase picks out anything at all.

What is his reason for rejecting such objects? It is simplythis. By definition, these objects of thought, these 'epis-temological intermediaries', as he calls them, are such thatthinkers cannot be wrong about what they are. But, he says,there is nothing like that, nothing about which we cannot onoccasion be wrong.He, then, asks two questions.First, he wonders, since many philosophers think that self-knowledge or first person authority is ensured only if thereare objects of thought, does it follow from denying objectsof thoughts that we do not know what we think? He arguesthat it does not. There is no threat that the denial bringsto self-knowledge. He goes on to give a positive accountof why we can have self-knowledge despite denying objectsof thought. The positive account shows how there could beno interpretation of agents at all if we did not assume that

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agents had self-knowledge or first person authority. The veryidea of interpretation necessitates self-knowledge.Second, he wonders, since many philosophers have thoughtthat the relational nature of the predicate forces us to positobjects of thoughts, does denying objects of thought amountto giving up on the idea that 'believes' is a relational pred-icate? He canvasses various criticisms philosophers have of-fered of the idea that it is a relational predicate, and thenreminds us of compelling arguments which he himself hasgiven against such criticisms many years ago. He concludesthat one ought not to deny that it is a relational predicate.He then offers his own positive account of how to reconcilethe relational nature of 'believes' with the denial of objectsof thought. 'Believes' relates the thinker to an object, aboutwhich we need never say that it is "within the ken of thebeliever". He or she need not stand in any psychological re-lation with it. It is not that sort of object. What sort ofobject is it, then? He answers this question by saying thatit is none other than an utterance of our's (the interpreters')which we take to have the same truth-conditions as the beliefwhose content is being identified. This involves no commit-ment to saying that it is something with which the thinkerstands in a psychological or epistemological relation.I find myself in general agreement with Davidson on bothquestions. But Davidson uses his answers to draw certainphilosophical consequences and to make certain polemicalpoints against recent philosophical work on intentionality.He thinks his answer to the first question shows that philoso-phers like Putnam are quite wrong to think that the doc-trine of externalism about intentional content threatens self-knowledge. He thinks his answer to the second questionshows that philosophers like Searle and Fodor are quite wrongto think that indeterminacy and holism threaten the realityof intentional states. Here I find myself unconvinced thatDavidson has fully and adequately addressed the worries thatthese philosophers are concerned with. Not that I think thatthe worries are unanswerable. It is Davidson's response tothem that I have qualms about. I will spend the rest ofthis comment discussing these two consequences that David-son draws from his denial of objects of thought. I will first

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look at the consequenceshe draws from his answer to thequestionof self-knowledge,and then to the consequenceshedraws from his answer to the questionabout the relationalnature of the predicate believes'

1 Self-Knowledge and Objects of ThoughtThe denial of objects of thoughtis intendedby Davidsontohave a devastatingeffect at once on conflictingphilosophi-cal conceptionsof the relation betweenself-knowledgeandintentional content.On the one hand, there is a conceptionheldby certain n-ternalistphilosopherswho believe that onlyif thereare theseinternalobjects of thought can we guaranteethat we haveself-knowledge.Descartes,and some of the empiricistsweresuchphilosophers.On the otherhand, there is a conceptionheldby certainexternalistphilosopherswho denythat thereare these innerobjects of thoughtand who, as a result, arehappyto denyself-knowledge.Hecites Putnamamongthese.He arguesthat they are both wrongand they are wrongfor the same reason. They both share an assumptionthatbringsthem to their wrongconclusions.The assumption sthat only objects of thoughtwill guaranteeself-knowledge.Let me elaborateon this and then commenton it.Davidsonposes the followingquestion:how can external-ism, the doctrine that our intentional contents are consti-tuted by items in the externalenvironment,allowfor self-knowledge?And this is his answer:

Thesuggestion amproposingaboutthe natureof thepropo-sitionalattitudesappliesdirectlyto a problem hat has trou-bled a numberof philosophersn recentyears. There arecon-vincingarguments o showthat the correctdeterminationofthe contentsof beliefs(andmeaningsand otherpropositionalattitudes) depends n parton causalconnectionsbetweenthebelieverand eventsandobjectsin the worldof whichhe maybe ignorant. A standardexample is Putnam's twin-earthcase. Weareinvited to imagine,I'm sureyouwillremember,that there is a twin to ourEarth which s, in all immediately

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218 AKEEL BILGRAMIdiscernable respects, identical with our earth. On it is mydoppelganger, molecule for molecule the same, having beenexposed to the same conditioning, and having exactly thesame linguistic dispositions. Yet one of us believes it is waterhe sees before him (me) when the other believes it is twater.The explanation is that there where there is water on Earththere is twater on Twearth, though no one has yet detectedthe difference. Since there is no inner or psychological differ-ence between me and my twin, neither of us has any reasonto say he believes on thing rather than the other. Thereforeneither of us knows what he believes. So there may be, andperhaps always are, non-subjective factors, factors unknownto the thinker, which decide what the "object of thought" is.If the identity of the "object of thought" is partly dependenton factors of which the person is ignorant, doesn't it followthat the person doesn't know what he thinks?The answer is that it doesn't follow. It would follow if theobject used to identify my thought were something I had tobe able to discriminate in order to know what I think. Butthis is what we have abandoned.1

Davidson, as I said, has argued that internalist philoso-phers have assumed that thoughts take objects which areinner epistemological intermediaries, and they have assumedthis in order to account for the special fact of first-personknowledge of thoughts. In the hands of the internalists hethinks the assumption amounts to what he calls a 'myth ofthe subjective'. For reason that I mentioned at the very be-ginning, he thinks that we should not assume that thoughtstake any objects. He claims that once we give up on theobjects of thought thesis, we can then see that there is nothreat that externalism poses to first person authority, sinceit is only the obsession with that thesis which would haveconjured up the threat in the first place.As I said, it does seem to me that that the denial of objectsof thought is a very important part of the proper understand-ing of the contents of the propositional attitudes. Attributors

1DonaldDavidson, "What is Present to the Mind",in this volume,p. 214.

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externalists with wrongly accepting and sharing an aspectof internalist faith, which is that first person authority canonly be explained by the positing of epistemological interme-diaries that serve as the objects of thought, and which wecannot be wrong about. That is, he says that they swing totheir conclusion about lack of self-knowledge because theyshare the assumption with internalists that self-knowledgerequires the thesis about inner objects of thought which aredirectly perceived. Giving up on the thesis, i.e., giving up oninner objects of thoughts, they give up on self-knowledge.5Let's look a little harder at the criticism of Putnam. Thetrouble with the criticism is that it takes Putnam to be say-ing that a mere denial of internalism is sufficient to give upon first person authority. It is only if we take Putnam thisway, and then take internalists to be committed to the ob-jects of thought thesis, that lay Putnam open to Davidson'scriticism that he shares an assumption with the internalist.But it does not seem to me that Putnam's idea that we maynot always know what we believe turns on just simply deny-ing the internalist position with its commitment to internalobjects of thought. Rather it turns on the specificexternalistcommitments which flow from his (and Kripke's and Burge's)views on reference and meaning.6 I think there is enough tex-tual evidence in Putnam's "Meaningof Meaning" (where histhat there is another notion of content, narrow content, which raises noproblem for self-knowledge since it is purely internal. Burge denies thatthere is any need for a second notion of internal content and argues thathis externalism does not imply a denial of self-knowledge. In (Bilgrami1991) and much more briefly in (Bilgrami 1987) I argue that Burge mustadopt a second notion of content, given his specific form of externalism.50r at any rate, as I said in the last footnote, they retain self-knowledge by bifurcating content, i.e., by manufacturing a second notionof purely internalist content. And Davidson will presumably want to saythat this second notion falls once again within the thesis that there areepistemologically intermediary objects of thought.6This is a common conflation in the few discussions of this subjectthat exist. See, for instance, Crispin Wright in (Wright 1989a, p. 630)-especially his long footnote 6)- for a move from the specific exter-nalisms of Putnam and Burge to remarks about why externalism neednot threaten self-knowledge, remarks which talk much more generallyabout externalism rather than about these specific externalist views.A genuine defence of their externalisms against the charge that they

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uncharitable. But this has landed Putnam with just the re-jection of self-knowledge which we said he cannot avoid. Noamount of denying that there are objects of thought is goingto help Putnam avoid this conclusion.I think that Putnam's intent can also be established bypointing out that these externalist commitments better ex-plain why it is that, for Putnam, first person authority fails tohold only in some cases only (cases, where an agent does notknow the right chemistry or some other of nature's essences.).Whereas if one gave Davidson's explanation for why Putnamgives up on self-knowledge, then self-knowledge would failto hold much more comprehensively than Putnam seems towant to say; more comprehensively, because if one believedthat self-knowledge of thoughts was a result of thoughts hav-ing inner objects and one also thought that there are no innerobjects of thought, then presumably one would not restrictone's denial of self-knowledge to the sorts of cases (naturalkinds) Putnam discusses.8It is because Davidson thinks that Putnam's surrender offirst person authority is due to his sharing an underlying as-sumption with the internalism he rejects (rather than becauseof his specific externalist commitments), that he thinks it issufficient to criticize Putnam's externalism for sharing theobjects of thoughts thesis with internalism. But it is not suffi-cient. The correct and complete diagnosis of Putnam's aban-donment of self-knowledge for externally constituted con-tents is that his specific externalism sometimes does not al-low for self-knowledge, when it should. The proof of thispoint is that one can formulate a specific alternative exter-nalist view of content that does not threaten self-knowledgewith this dilemma and they must be impaled on one of the horns orthey must posit another notion of content that is not externalist in theirsense in order to avoid being impaled. I cannot possibly reproduce thatdiscussion here.Putnam casts his externalist net a little wider than I am indicatinghere. It is more than natural kind terms that will raise a problem forself-knowledge. If one takes Kripke's externalism about proper namesthat too will raise a similar problem. Burge casts the net even wider bybringing in a social externalism over and above a scientific essentialistone.

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in this way. One can, for instance, claim that the externalworld constitutesconceptsbut not have any truck with thescientificessentialismor rigiddesignation hat is essentialtoPutnam's view of certaintermsandconceptsthat go into thespecificationof concepts. Spellingout the details of this ex-ternalism s an importantand complextask, which I cannotpossiblytake on here. I havetried to do so in (Bilgrami1987)and moreelaborately n (Bilgrami 1991). My point for nowis that there areexternalismswhich threatenself-knowledgeand there areexternalismswhich do not. Davidson'sdiagno-sis for why an externalistneed not abandonself-knowledgedoes not distinguishbetween these externalismsand is, asa result, an unsatisfyinglygeneraldiagnosis. Putnam's ex-ternalism threatensself-knowledgeeven if Putnam were tograntto Davidsonthat objectsof thoughtsare not the onlywayto guaranteeself-knowledge.Onceyou adoptPutnam'sexternalismnothingwill guaranteeself-knowledge.It is hisparticularexternalismthat gives rise to the problem. Anycompletediagnosismust show how it threatensit and pro-pose an externalism hat doesnot.Thisunsatisfyinglygeneraldiagnosisn Davidson eeds ntothe similarlyunsatisfyingpositive suggestionhe goes on tomake about how to makeexternalismcompatiblewith self-knowledge,once we give up on objectsof thoughts. His an-swerat the end of the paperis that there can be no denyingthe presumptionof first personauthorityor self-knowledgebecause without it agents could not be said to be "inter-pretable at all". In an earlierpaper, (Davidson 1987), hemakes the samepoint moreexplicitly:

Whenwe havefreedourselvesrom the assumptionhatthoughtsmusthavemysteriousbjects,wecan see howthefact thatmentalstates as wecommonlyonceivehem areidentifiedn partby theirnaturalhistorynot onlyfails totouchthe internalcharacter f such statesor to threatenfirstpersonauthority;t alsoopens he wayto an explana-tion of firstpersonauthority.Theexplanationomeswiththe realization hat whata person'swordsmeandependsin the mostbasic caseson the kindsof objectsand eventsthathavecaused he person o hold the words o be appli-

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cable; similarly for what the person's thoughts are about.An interpreter of another's words and thoughts must dependon scattered information, fortunate training, and imagina-tive surmise in coming to understand the other. The agentherself, however, is not in a position to wonder whether sheis generally using her own words to apply to the right ob-jects and events, since whatever she regularly applies themto gives her words the meaning they have and her thoughtsthe contents they have. Of course, in any particular case,she may be wrong about what she believes about the world;what is impossible is that she is would be wrong most of thetime. The reason is apparent: unless there is a presump-tion that the speaker knows what she means, i.e., gettingher own language right, there would be nothing for an inter-preter to interpret. To put the matter another way, nothingcould count as someone regularly misapplying her own words.First person authority, the social character of language, andthe external determinants of thought and meaning go natu-rally together, once we give up the myth of the subjective,the idea that thoughts require mental objects.

This positive suggestion is intended to show that there isno incompatibility between externalism and self-knowledge.But I think it is arguable that it does not do that and theonly reason Davidson thinks it does is that he has conceivedof the incompatibility in unsatisfyingly general terms, he hasconceived of it as flowing from a misguided commitment toobjects of thought. This way of conceiving of the incom-patibility ushers out the relevance of specific versions of ex-ternalism, it ushers out the relevance of specific versions ofexternalism which do indeed make externalism incompatiblewith self-knowledge. It therefore allows Davidson to go awaywith the impression that his positive remarks get rid of theincompatibility.Instead all that the positive remarks do is answer a verydifferent question, they answer a question that has noth-ing specifically to do with externalism: what, in general,explains the undeniable fact that agents whom we are in-terpreting have self-knowledge of their own thoughts, giventhat in our interpretations we are not specifying objects of

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sible, given externalism. His positive account which invokesthe need to posit self-knowledge to find agents interpretableat all does not address this question. The claim that interpre-tation requires self-knowledge on the part of the interpreteeis unhelpful with the problem that arises for self-knowledgewhen interpretation and content-attribution proceeds alongPutnam's (or Burge's lines) i.e, proceeds by looking to sci-entific essences (or to experts' opinion) in the attribution ofconcepts to the interpretee. Just pointing out that the veryidea of interpretation requires self-knowledge on the part ofthe interpretee, therefore, says something unsatisfyingly gen-eral about the problem we are struggling with: how to makeexternalism compatible with self-knowledge?

2 Indeterminacy, Holism and Objects ofThought

Let me now turn to Davidson's discussion of what he takes tobe another consequence of his denial of objects of thoughts.Here the target of his criticism is not Putnam, but Searleand Fodor. He thinks that they too have missed the pointthat there are no objects of thoughts, and have thereforeunnecessarily raised worries about certain sensible views ofintentional content.

Here again I think Davidson has misunderstood the sourceof Searle's and Fodor's worries. I do no think their worriesstem from a hidden commitment to objects of thought. Letme elaborate.Having denied that taking 'believes' as a relational pred-icate requires that there be objects of thought within theepistemological or psychological ken of thinkers, Davidsonsuggests that the relational nature of the predicate is bestunderstood in terms of an interpreter's assigning his ownsentences to specify the contents of a thinker's thoughts. Hespells this out with the analogy of assigning numbers in themeasurement of temperature. And having done so, he takesup Searle's and Fodor's worries that this will introduce a

holism and an indeterminacy in the study of intentional con-

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tent which will, in turn, destroy the possibility of taking arealist attitude towards intentionality.He argues that once we give up on objects of thought, thenneither indeterminacy nor holism is a threat to their statusas real things.His argument could be summarized as follows. Taking arealist attitude towards a class of sentences is to take themas being capable of truth and falsity. Attributions of thoughtand meaning could be taken to be true or false, despite in-determinacy; only now there is no temptation to think thata statement of the conditions of their truth or falsity specifyobjects of the mind. Indeterminacy is inevitable since thereare no such objects which would bestow determinacy. Butthe analogy with numbers and temperature which he offers,and the consequent analogy of indeterminacy with metresand feet, Fahrenheit and Centigrade, shows that there is noserious threat that indeterminacy brings with it. After all,saying "Its 32? Fahrenheit" does not mean one is not sayingsomething true or false, just because one could also have said"Its 0? Centigrade".However, I would have thought that Searle's objection isnot that objects of thought exist and so I know from mygaze on an object present to my mind, which of two mean-ings that two translation (or truth) manuals have attributedto me is the right one.9 I would think that Searle's point isthe more sophisticated one that if one takes Davidson's andQuine's third person approach to these things, one is saddled(in the attribution of meanings and thoughts) with the inter-ests of the interpreter. And, I would have thought that heargues that these interests of the interpreter have the effectof producing indeterminacies in the attributions which willnot be of the trivial and harmless kind of indeterminacy that

9In fact there is a question about whether Searle is even committed tothe 'objects of thought' thesis. In (Searle 1983) he explicitly announcesa Fregean conception of sense and thought but explicitly denies thathe is committed to Frege's view of senses grasped by agents. PerhapsDavidson has in mind to argue that anybody who embraces the kindof Cartesian internalism about the mind in the way that Searle doesmust, despite this explicit denial, embrace objects of thought. But theargument for that is not itself explicit in Davidson's paper.

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228 AKEEL BILGRAMIDavidson's analogy with Fahrenheit and Centigrade scalesfor the measurement of temperature suggest. It is true thatSearle sometimes speaks as if even examples of trivial in-determinacy are threatening in some way to the reality ofintentional states. But here I think he does so, not becausehe is insisting on an 'object of thought' conception of inten-tionality, but because he is not following through on his ownargument from the point about interests of the third personto see that the point only applies if there are non-trivial ex-amples of indeterminacy. Thus the issue between Searle andDavidson lies in the question whether the the third personapproaches can impose enough constraints of the right sort,such that the interest-relativity inherent in these approachesis kept enough in check so as to ensure that the indetermina-cies are trivial and harmless. Davidson has argued elsewherethat his principle of charity will keep things under such checkbut, unfortunately Searle has never joined him in any disputeabout the relevance of this to indeterminacy.1l But that iswhere the deep issue lies and that is an area quite distinctfrom the question of objects of thought, since the issue canarise even after denying that there are such objects.The case of Fodor seems to me even more complicated anddistant from the thesis about objects of thought. Fodor's ob-jections to holism and how it threatens the reality of thoughtand meaning has not much to do with indeterminacy. Hisworry is that if the content of a thought is the content it isbecause it has inferential relations with other thoughts, thenthere will be no saying that one person has the same thoughtas another since their surrounding beliefs are bound to besomewhat different. What is worse, for almost exactly thesame reason, there will be no saying that someone's thoughtis the same from one waking moment to the next. This will

10In (Bilgrami 1989) I argue that Davidson's early formulations of theprinciple of charity will not keep things enough under check and it isprobably what Searle has at the back of his mind when he criticizesradical interpretation for being too caught up with the third personpoint of view. I argue further that subsequent formulations by him andothers like Grandy are more likely to keep things in check and I explicitlyconnect this point with the entire question of realism about intentionalstates. See also (Bilgrami 1991, ch. 5.)

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10. THOUGHT AND ITS OBJECTSmake generalizations about beliefs and desires impossible andthere will be no sense in which such states will explain be-haviour. If intentional states are not pulling their weight inexplanations, that will, in turn, put into doubt the status ofintentional states as real things. It will undermine any realistattitude toward intentional states.Now this worry does not seem to me to be one that theanalogy with numbers and the measurement of temperaturewill help to allay. For even within the triviality and harm-lessness of a holistically induced indeterminacy, the holismthat Fodor worries about will survive; it will survive becausemeanings and contents, as Davidson has always insisted, willalways get their specification and individuation in the holis-tic context of an indefinite number of other meanings andcontents. That holism is a fact about meaning that persistseven if the indeterminacy it induces is harmless. And it is afact that Fodor finds far from harmless. And what he findsharmful in it would not be erased if he joined Davidson indenying objects of thought.What is neurotic about Fodor's worry flows from a quitedifferent source than a commitment to objects of thought.It flows from a deeply mistaken view, I believe, of the rela-tionship between a theory of meaning which (I agree withDavidson) is necessarily holistic and the contents which gointo the explanation of behaviour. A theory of meaning spec-ifies the meanings of the terms of an agents language, or onemight say, it fixes his concepts. I think of these specifications(even if they were given in the clauses of a truth-theory) assummarizing the beliefs a person has associated with eachterm. Since no two persons are likely to have the same be-liefs associated with a term, no two persons, at the level of atheory of meaning, are likely to share concepts. But when weattribute contents to beliefs and desires of agents to explainactions, these contents are not composed of those unsharedconcepts. Rather the particular local context in which a par-ticular action is being explained will allow us to distil outof the aggregate of beliefs associated with the concept (atthe non-local, meaning-theoretic level) just what is requiredfor that locality. So, imagine two agents. One knows chem-istry the other doesn't. Hence their concepts of water at the

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meaning-theoretic level are quite different since their respec-tive aggregates of beliefs associated with 'water' will not over-lap. Yet if in a particular explanatory locality we are explain-ing their common action of drinking tumblers full of a certainsubstance to quench their thirst, we may distil out of theirdiffering aggregate sets of beliefs those that are necessary forthe contents that go into that explanation. These may wellcoincide; for the chemical beliefs that the chemically knowl-edgeable one of them associates with water can be left out ofthe explanation of that action of his. It is irrelevant to it.Fodor's mistake is to think that the relationship between atheory of meaning on the one hand and particular contentson the other is such that the concepts fixed by the former goexactly and directly into the latter, i.e, the concepts fixed bya theory of meaning go exactly and directly into the contentswhich explain behaviour.ll If they did go directly into it thenwhat he finds harmful about holism will indeed be harmfulto intentional content. But it is a mistake to think that theygo into it directly.And the point I want to make against Davidson is that Idon't see that this mistake, if it is a mistake, is related in anyobvious way to any commitment to objects of thought.I have argued that Davidson is right to deny that there areobjects of thought in the epistemological sense, and right toinsist that neither self-knowledge nor the relational natureof 'believes' is under threat, if there are no such objects ofthought. I have, however, expressed reservations against theconsequences he has drawn from these insights for his crit-icisms against certain contemporary views of intentionalitydue to Putnam and Searle and Fodor. If these philosophersare wrong to hold the views they respectively hold aboutself-knowledge and indeterminacy and holism regarding in-tentional states, it is not for reasons having to do with objectsof thoughts.

liThis is a very widespread mistake in the study of meaning and con-tent, and it has partly to do with unclarity about what one should meanby the idea that truth-theories give meanings and truth-conditions in-dividuate content. For a more detailed discussion of these themes andan account of content which is not based on this mistaken conception,see (Bilgrami 1991, ch.l and ch.4.)

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3 REFERENCESBilgrami, A. 1985: "Comments on Loar", Contents ofthought, eds. R.H. Grimm and D.D. Merrill (Tucson, Ari-zona: University of Arizona Press).Bilgrami, A. 1987: "An Externalist Account of Psycholog-ical Content", Philosophical Topics 15.Bilgrami, A. 1989: "Realism without Externalism", Jour-nal of Philosophy 86.Bilgrami, A. 1991: Belief and Meaning (Blackwell).Bilgrami, A. (forthcoming): "Self-Knowledge and Resent-ment", Philosophical Topics (Special Issue on The Philos-ophy of Hilary Putnam).Burge, T. 1979: "Individualism and the Mental", MidwestStudies in Philosophy 6: Studies in Metaphysics, eds. P.French, T. Uehling, H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press).Burge, T. 1988: "Individualism and Self-Knowledge",Journal of Philosophy 85.Davidson, D. 1987: "Knowing One's Own Mind", Proceed-ings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Associ-ation 60.Fodor, J. 1987: Psychosemantics (Cambridge, Mass.:M.I.T. Press).Kripke, S. 1972: "Naming and Necessity", Semantics forNatural Language, eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman(Boston: Reidl).Kripke, S. 1979: "A Puzzle about Belief', Meaning andUse, ed. A. Margalit (Dordrecht: Reidel).Putnam, H. 1975: "The Meaning of 'Meaning"', Language,Mind and Knowledge:Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy

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of Science 7, ed. K. Gunderson (Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press).Searle, J. 1983: Intentionality (Cambridge, England: Cam-bridge University Press).Searle, J. 1987: "Indeterminacy and the First Person",Journal of Philosophy 84.Wright, C. 1989a: "Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy ofMind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention", Journal of Phi-losophy 86.