1ib3982

5BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2826July 11, 2013

accompanying DOD report finds the argument in favor of countervalue targeting so weak that it cate-gorically denies the guidance from the White House requiring that the DOD to pursue it.10

Accordingly, the problem with the NPRIS is that a counterforce employment and targeting pol-icy requires a larger and more capable force than the one the NPRIS recommends. This contradic-tion exists between the White House guidance to the Department of Defense and the DOD nuclear employment report and within the DOD employ-ment report. The repressive regimes that the u.S. needs to deter maintain multiple levers of internal repression and strategic military capabilities to threaten the nations of the free world. Consequently, they present larger numbers of targets, many of them hardened against attack with reinforced bun-kers, than would be presented by population centers under a countervalue targeting policy. The problem becomes even more pronounced if the u.S. faces a coalition of strategic enemies made possible by proliferation.

By way of reference, the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads found necessary by the George W. Bush Administration to meet the require-ment to defeat strategic attacks and deter them was between 1,700 and 2,200. The plan included targets that are hardened and deeply buried facilities, which are fairly described as classic counterforce targets. The NPRIS fact sheet says nothing about why it relies on the target sets that are shrinking enough to per-mit reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by one-third from the 1,550 accountable warheads under New START, not to mention the 1,700 to 2,200 deemed necessary by the Bush Administration.

Accordingly, dedicated advocates of lower num-bers of nuclear weapons in the u.S. arsenal than proposed by the Obama Administration have openly argued for a minimal deterrence nuclear posture based on countervalue targeting.11 These advocates understand that a countervalue targeting policy

would permit a significantly smaller nuclear force, admittedly under the questionable assumption that such a targeting policy would present a strong deter-rent posture toward current and future u.S. enemies, whereas the counterforce targeting policy identified in NPRIS must lead to relatively high numbers of nuclear weapons.

The Obama Administration apparently has cho-sen to gloss over this apparent contradiction in the NPRIS. Indeed, the fact sheet fails to identify clearly the nature of the connection that the NPRIS makes between its suggested targets and its recommended number of weapons.

Flaw #2: Insufficient survivability for the U.S. nuclear force. The reductions recommend-ed by NPRIS would likely make the u.S. strategic nuclear force less survivable. The fact sheet asserts that a disarming strike against u.S. strategic nuclear forces is exceedingly remote. However, whether such a strike will remain exceedingly remote would depend on the future structure of the u.S. strategic nuclear posture. The NPRIS provides only vague overall numbers. For exam-ple, in a letter to Senator John McCain (RAZ) on November 14, 2011, Secretary of Defense leon Panetta explained how automatic spending cuts under the Budget Control Act of 2011 could affect the defense program.12 An attachment to his letter states that these cuts could eliminate the ICBM leg of the triad.

Secretary Panetta identified elimination of ICBMs as a plausible result of President Obamas defense budget policies.

Former Air Force Chief of Staff larry Welch explained the link between preservation of the ICBM leg and survivability in a speech in Washington, D.C.,

10. U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy, p. 4.

11. For example, see Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council Occasional Paper No. 7, April 2009, http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf (accessed June 18, 2012).

12. Leon Panetta, letter to Senator John McCain, in press release, Statement by Senators McCain and Graham on Secretary Panettas Letter Detailing Devastating Impact of Sequester, November 14, 2011, http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=a4074315-fd3e-2e65-2330-62b95da3b0e9 (accessed July 11, 2012).


Flaw #5: The fact sheet offers no commit-ment to modernize nuclear delivery systems. The u.S. needs to modernize the delivery systems for its nuclear forces for reasons that go beyond the need to replace the aging delivery systems. The u.S. needs new systems that can ensure the timely, high-ly precise delivery of weapons against time-sensitive targets, such as ICBMs mounted on mobile launch-ers. Speed and precision of the new delivery vehicles should be key considerations in the modernization effort. The NPRIS fact sheet does not mention these requirements.

Flaw #6: The fact sheet mentions no recom-mendations for appropriate yields of the weap-ons in the arsenal. The yield of a specific nuclear weapon is critical to maximizing its deterrent effect under different circumstances. A key variable in addressing the yield question is the accuracy of the overall weapon system. Generally speaking, higher accuracy permits lower yields in a counterforce tar-geting plan.

Maximizing the effectiveness of the deterrent is even more important than the question of the rela-tionship between accuracy and yields. Higher yields do not always strengthen deterrence. For example, if a President finds the yield to be too high to permit its use under a given circumstance, it will detract from deterrence if a potential enemy calculates in advance that the President will recognize this prob-lem. Disturbingly, the NPRIS fact sheet does not dis-cuss the preferable yields for a full array of different weapons in the u.S. nuclear arsenal. In fact, it does not address the yield question whatsoever, and nei-ther does the Department of Defense employment report. This suggests that they assume that the yields of the current array of weapons are appro-priate in every instance and will remain so for the indefinite future. This is a dangerous assumption.

Flaw #7: Command and control problems are not seriously addressed. The overall capabili-ties of the nuclear command and control system are essential to determining the overall survivability of the force. However, improved command and control systems for nuclear weapons are about more than survivability. By outward appearances, both the NPRIS fact sheet and the DOD employment report fail to recognize the broader issues related to nucle-ar command and control.

Speed and reliability of communications are key considerations for modernizing nuclear command

and control systems, particularly with ballistic mis-sile submarines at sea. Further, the broader com-mand and control structure should be integrated with the global reconnaissance strike system, which identifies strategic targets and rapidly and precise-ly directs weapons against the target. Accordingly, nuclear delivery systems that can rapidly and pre-cisely attack targets will be of little value if not sup-ported by a command and control system that is inte-grated with the global reconnaissance strike system. According to the fact sheet, the NPRIS addresses neither issue.

De-alerting is an effective step for artificially reducing the value of the U.S. nuclear force to the point that maintaining any such force can no longer be justified.

Flaw #8: The NPRIS defers consideration of the deterrence value of short-range weapons, particularly for extended deterrence. u.S. nucle-ar weapons deter strategic attacks not only against the u.S. itself, but also against u.S. allies around the world, which is called extended deterrence. The existing u.S. nuclear posture is considered weak by some allies and friends, who are less confident in u.S. assurances about and the commitment to their secu-rity. While u.S. strategic nuclear forces are essential to strengthening extended deterrence, they are not sufficient for this purpose by themselves. Forward basing short-range nuclear weapons to address stra-tegic threats to u.S. allies is also essential because these forward-deployed nuclear forces are tangible means of bringing u.S. allies into the overall deter-rence posture. Further, these forward-deployed weapons can fill in rungs in the escalation ladder, which if left out would result in a relatively weak deterrent. Finally, forward-deployed nuclear forces increase the flexibility of the overall nuclear force and add to the military effectiveness of the broader nuclear force.

Accordingly, in its 2009 report, the Strategic Posture Commission noted an emerging perception among some u.S. allies and friends that u.S. weak-ness in non-strategic nuclear weapons was under-mining their confidence in u.S. security assurances.


very perceptions that inform decision making, from the context to the biases. Successful psychologi-cal operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations, influencing the course of the conflict. To be effective, however, psychologi-cal warfare operations cannot be limited to war-time. Instead, peacetime psychological operations are necessary, both to understand an opponent bet-ter and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations.

PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime, between military and civilian, and among strategy, operations, and tactics.

Peacetime applications of psychological war-fare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponents unconscious, implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. By employing various forms of strategic communi-cations, including diplomatic efforts, one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sym-pathy and support for ones own policies and goals. At the same time, such techniques attempt to iso-late opponents, undermining their positions, por-traying them as fostering ill intentions, and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed.

In addition, employing all the tools of communi-cations, including various forms of media, empha-sizes ones own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. All the while, one must be work-ing to counter opponents efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize ones populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken.

In wartime, psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military tar-gets and goals. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion, doubt, anxiety, fear, terror,

regret, and exhaustion in an opponent, especially among senior military and civilian leaders. Ideally, such a campaign will induce neglect and maxi-mize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisive-ness at all levels, thereby degrading opposition deci-sion-making processes. The ability to interfere with an opponents information systems, coupled with efforts to influence decision makers, can create a strong psychological impact.

Another facet of wartime psychological opera-tions is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopeless-ness in the enemy. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance, but once the conflict is concluded, such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. When one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemys heart.6 In order to undermine the opponents morale, one must empha-size information favorable to oneself through vari-ous forms of media as well as through third parties, friendly elements in the opponents society, and sim-ilar outlets.

Finally, offensive psychological warfare opera-tions must be complemented by defensive measures, since an opponent will also be trying to undermine ones own forces, population, and leaders. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict, highlight ones successes and the enemys failures, and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in ones own soci-ety and the insulation of ones decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy informa-tion warfare efforts. This need for control explains Beijings efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population, including the Great Firewall of China.

Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks

For the PlA, psychological warfare is the res-posibility of the General Political Department (GPD), working in coordination with the rest of the PlA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy

6. Guo, Psychological Warfare Knowledge, p. 14.

Issue BrIefThe Cost of Educating the Public on ObamacareAlyene Senger

No. 3983 | July 1, 2013

Open enrollment in Obamacares insurance exchanges is slated to begin in October, and the Administration is using extraordinaryand ques-tionableefforts to raise awareness among the pub-lic and facilitate enrollment for fear not enough peo-ple will sign up for coverage.1

Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Kathleen Sebelius has recently admitted to contact-ing outside groups soliciting funding for assistance with public outreach.2 This effort to lobby outside groups to fund outreach efforts raises ethical ques-tions and sheds light on the true cost of operating the health care law.

Navigators, Assisters, and Consumer Assistance Programs. Obamacare makes avail-able navigator grants for qualifying organizations for the purpose of educating and facilitating individ-uals enrollment into the exchanges.

Organizations that act as navigators must

Raise awareness about the availability of quali-fied health plans,

Distribute fair and impartial information con-cerning enrollment and eligibility for subsidies,

Facilitate enrollment,

Provide referrals to enrollees with grievances or questions, and

Provide information in a manner that is linguisti-cally appropriate.

To be eligible to receive a navigator grant, an enti-ty must demonstrate existing relationships, or that it could readily establish relationships, with employ-ers and employees, consumers (including uninsured and underinsured consumers), or self-employed individuals likely to be qualified to enroll in a quali-fied health plan.

Proposed federal regulations direct the exchange to select at least two different types of entities as navigators, one of which must be a community and consumer-focused nonprofit group. One such orga-nization is Planned Parenthood, which plans to play a large role in consumer assistance programs for Obamacare and has applied for navigator grants.3

The navigator grants are funded through the operational budgets of exchanges. States that are setting up their own exchanges are also using fund-ing from federal exchange establishment grants to operate non-navigator assistance programs. These

assisters, as they are known, will perform the same general functions as navigators.

A proposed federal rule estimates compensa-tion for these groups at $20 per hour for personnel, $29 per hour for project leads, and $48 per hour for senior executives.4

HHS has announced that it will also distribute $150 million in federal grants to community health

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/ib3983

Produced by the Center for Health Policy Studies

The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 20002(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

2

issue brief | NO. 3983July 1, 2013

centers in each state to further consumer assistance efforts. The stated purpose is to support health cen-ters in raising awareness of insurance options and providing eligibility and enrollment assistance to uninsured patients of health centers and residents in their approved service areas.5

Wide Disparity in funding between Navigators and Assisters. The biggest practical difference between navigators and assisters is their source and amount of funding. HHS has announced it will spend just $54 million out of its operational budget on naviga-tors to be dispersed among the 34 states that are relying on the federal government to set up their exchanges.6 under this scenario, Texas will receive about $8 million to fund navigators to reach its nearly 5 million unin-sured residents (less than $2 for every uninsured indi-vidual), and Florida will receive roughly $5.85 million to reach its 3.5 million uninsured.

Advocates of the law worry about the low level of federal outreach funding. As Stan Dorn, senior fel-low at the urban Institute, put it, this level of fund-ing is a drop in the bucket. Its not enough to enroll tens of millions of uninsured into coverage.7

In contrast, states that are running their own exchanges and using assisters for consumer outreach

report much higher spending, largely attributable to their ability to use exchange establishment grants. For example, the state-based Maryland exchange plans to spend $24 million on its 750,000 unin-sured.8 Another state-based exchange, Colorado, has just announced an exchange public awareness cam-paign with TV and radio ads that will cost $2 million over two months. In total, the Colorado exchange plans to spend at least $10.5 million to provide con-sumer assistance to fewer than 1 million uninsured residents in the first year of exchange operations.9 The California state-based exchange anticipates that it will need 25,000 assisters in 2014 for a total cost of an estimated $57.9 million.10

The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee speculates that HHSs use of establish-ment grants to fund assisters is an attempt to cir-cumvent Obamacares prohibition on such grants being used for navigators. Even HHS officials have admitted there is virtually no difference between the two programs. In a letter to the Secretary, the Committee writes:

[As HHS officials] agree that the functions of the Navigators and Assisters programs are

1. FoxNews, Fundraising Push from Sebelius Draws Scrutiny from Key GOP Senator, May 11, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/05/11/fundraising-from-hhs-secretary-draws-scrutiny/#ixzz2Vup6HJAL (accessed June 28, 2013); and Jason Milliman and Joanne Kenen, 5 Messaging Challenges for Obamacare, Politico, June 30, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/obamacare-challenges-93595.html (accessed July 1, 2013).

2. David Morgan, Analysis: Some Republicans See New Scandal in Sebelius Fundraising, Reuters, May 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/21/us-usa-healthcare-scandals-analysis-idUSBRE94K08420130521 (accessed June 28, 2013).

3. Kathryn Smith, Planned Parenthood Promoting Obamacare, Politico, June 19, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/planned-parenthood-promoting-obamacare-93078.html (accessed July 1, 2013).

4. Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 66 (April 5, 2013), pp. 20581-20597, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Exchange Functions: Standards for Navigators and Non-navigator Assistance Personnel, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-04-05/pdf/2013-07951.pdf (accessed July 1, 2013).

5. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Health Center Outreach and Enrollment Assistance Fiscal Year 2013, May 9, 2013, http://bphc.hrsa.gov/outreachandenrollment/hrsa-13-279.pdf (accessed June 28, 2013).

6. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Cooperative Agreement to Support Navigators in Federally-Facilitated and State Partnership Exchanges, April 9, 2013, http://apply07.grants.gov/apply/opportunities/instructions/oppCA-NAV-13-001-cfda93.750-cidCA-NAV-13-001-017645-instructions.pdf (accessed June 28, 2013).

7. Phil Galewitz and Jenny Gold, Funding to Enroll Uninsured in New Markets Called Drop in Bucket, Kaiser Health News, April 9, 2013, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2013/April/09/54-million-dollar-grants-for-exchange-enrollment-efforts.aspx (accessed June 28, 2013).

8. News release, Lt. Governor Anthony Brown Announces Launch of Health Insurance Consumer Assistance Program to Ready Residents and Small Employers for Open Enrollment Through Maryland Health Connection, Maryland Health Connection, April 25, 2013, http://marylandhbe.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Connector-entities-release_FINAL-1.pdf (accessed June 28, 2013).

9. Phil Galewitz, Colorado Launches $2M Ad Campaign for New Online Marketplace, Kaiser Health News, May 8, 2013, http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/index.php/2013/05/colorado-launches-2m-ad-campaign-for-new-online-marketplace/ (accessed June 28, 2013).

10. Richard Heath and Associates, Inc., Phase I and II Statewide Assisters Program Design Options, Recommendations and Final Work Plan for the California Health Benefits Marketplace, June 26, 2012, pp. 7 and 48, http://www.healthexchange.ca.gov/StakeHolders/Documents/CHBE,DHCS,MRMIB_StatewideAssistersProgramDesignOptionsRecommendationsandWorkPlan_6-26-12.pdf (accessed June 28, 2013).

3

BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2821July 11, 2013

very perceptions that inform decision making, from the context to the biases. Successful psychologi-cal operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations, influencing the course of the conflict. To be effective, however, psychologi-cal warfare operations cannot be limited to war-time. Instead, peacetime psychological operations are necessary, both to understand an opponent bet-ter and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations.

PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime, between military and civilian, and among strategy, operations, and tactics.

Peacetime applications of psychological war-fare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponents unconscious, implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. By employing various forms of strategic communi-cations, including diplomatic efforts, one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sym-pathy and support for ones own policies and goals. At the same time, such techniques attempt to iso-late opponents, undermining their positions, por-traying them as fostering ill intentions, and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed.

In addition, employing all the tools of communi-cations, including various forms of media, empha-sizes ones own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. All the while, one must be work-ing to counter opponents efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize ones populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken.

In wartime, psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military tar-gets and goals. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion, doubt, anxiety, fear, terror,

regret, and exhaustion in an opponent, especially among senior military and civilian leaders. Ideally, such a campaign will induce neglect and maxi-mize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisive-ness at all levels, thereby degrading opposition deci-sion-making processes. The ability to interfere with an opponents information systems, coupled with efforts to influence decision makers, can create a strong psychological impact.

Another facet of wartime psychological opera-tions is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopeless-ness in the enemy. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance, but once the conflict is concluded, such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. When one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemys heart.6 In order to undermine the opponents morale, one must empha-size information favorable to oneself through vari-ous forms of media as well as through third parties, friendly elements in the opponents society, and sim-ilar outlets.

Finally, offensive psychological warfare opera-tions must be complemented by defensive measures, since an opponent will also be trying to undermine ones own forces, population, and leaders. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict, highlight ones successes and the enemys failures, and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in ones own soci-ety and the insulation of ones decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy informa-tion warfare efforts. This need for control explains Beijings efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population, including the Great Firewall of China.

Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks

For the PlA, psychological warfare is the res-posibility of the General Political Department (GPD), working in coordination with the rest of the PlA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy

6. Guo, Psychological Warfare Knowledge, p. 14.