Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of
Metaphysics.http://www.jstor.orgSocratic and Non-Socratic
Philosophy: A Note on Xenophon's "Memorabilia", 1.1.13 and 14
Author(s): Laurence Berns Source:The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.
28, No. 1 (Sep., 1974), pp. 85-88Published by:Philosophy Education
Society Inc.Stable
URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/20126584Accessed: 05-08-2015 14:35
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content downloaded from 128.163.2.206 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 14:35:53
UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsSOCRATIC
ANDNON-SOCRATICPHILOSOPHY: ANOTEONXENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA,
1.1.13AND14 LAURENCEBERNS Andhewonderedwhetherit
wasnotevidenttothemthatitisnot possible forhuman beings
todiscoverthese things[sc. divine things, r? Sai/i?na]. Sinceeven
thosewho thought mostofthemselvesfortheir speaking aboutthese
things donotholdthesame opinions withone another, butare disposed
towardsone anotherlikemadmen. I Forofthe madmen,1) somedonot
fearterrible things,2) otherseven fear things not frightening;3)
and somedonothold ?Soklv] itshameful [ai] to say ortodo anything
whateverina crowd,4) whileothers holdthatitisnot right evento go
out [oi}h'l%iTii)T?ov~] among human beings;5) andsomedonothonor any
holything[ortemple,Upbv], or altar, nor any otherofthedivine
things,6) whileothersvenerate stones, chancewood things, and
beasts. II Andofthosewho worry aboutthe natureofall
things[j?vw?vTwv]* 1) some holdthatthe being[r?8j>] isone
only,2) andothersthat they areinfinitein multitude ; 3) andfor some
everything is alwaysmoved, 4) andforothers nothing couldever be
moved;5) andforsome every thing bothcomestobeandis destroyed,6)
whileforothersnoth ing couldevercometobenor be destroyed.
Wehavetwolistswiththree pairs ineach.Withinbothlists
whatissaidabouteach subject ina later pair,dependsupon what was
saidabout correspondingsubjects inearlier pairs. Ofthestate
mentsaboutmadmenthefirst pair isconcernedwithextremeatti tudesabout
fear, thesecondwithextreme judgments about shame,
thethirdwithextremebehavior concerningpiety. The subject of
thethird pair,piety, is derivedfrom or dependent upon thefirst two,
fearand shame, asinthesecondlist generation anddestructionare de
pendentupon numberandmotion.The suggestion seemstobethat
tobeashamedistofear disgrace, while pietydependsupon a fearof being
in disgrace beforedivinitiesor divinity : Correspondingly, move
ment presupposes limited plurality,mover,moved, andthatfrom
whichandto whichthe movingthing moves ; coming to beand passing
awaypresupposes themovementofa plurality of elementarybeings
intoandoutofdifferentcombinations. The parallel
structureofbothlistsinvitescoordination.Do This content downloaded
from 128.163.2.206 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 14:35:53 UTCAll use subject
to JSTOR Terms and Conditions86 LAURENCEBERNS eachofthe attitudes,
or dispositions, listedunder (I)correspondto, orare
theyappropriateto, theviewofthewholesetdownunder the samenumberin
(II)? Isthere a characteristic disposition, a peculiar kindof
madness,corresponding toeachofthese major non or
pre-Socraticpositions? Wewill begin fromwhatseemsmost evident,
fromtheendof thelists.Forthosefor whom everything
bothcomestobeandis destroyed(II,5),nothing is eternal, there areno
immortals,nothing worthy ofdivinehonors (I,5). Forthosefor whom
nothing could evercometobe orbe destroyed(II,6)everything is
eternal, and any chance thingtheyhappenupon couldbe thought
tobedivine (I,6). Forthosewhoholdthatthe being is one only(II,1),
every thing is onewith itself, thereis no othertoharm one; hence
they donotevenfearterrible things(I,1). Forthoseforwhomthe beings
are infinite, unlimited (aireipa) in multitude (II,2), there are
noboundsto possible sourcesof danger, towhatisotherfromone self, to
possible sourcesoffear (I,2).(I), 3and4wereconcerned withthe
shameful, to aivxpov. Its opposite isthe noble, tokoXov (1.1.16).
Thefourth correspondence ismostdifficult: If, we may conjecture,
the origins, the "parents," of everything are noble, and therefore
everything wasonce noble, and nothing couldeverbe moved or
changed(Kivr?dr?vai)(II,4), then oneis always in danger of
beingexposed asashamefulviolatorofthenoble (I,4). Forthose forwhom
everything is alwayschanged(II,3),nothing nobleever remains such,
andthereforethereis nothing evertobeashamedof (I,3).
Socrates,according to Xenophon and Plato,always avoided
theseextremesof"those claiming to philosophize."1 He always sought
the meanbetweenfearlessnessand timidity, betweenshame lessnessand
bashfulness, between superstition and impiety. But sobriety, or
moderation, aoxppoavvrj, seemedtobe a theoretical as wellasa moral
principle forSocrates:"Hedidnotdraw a boundary betweenwisdom
(croata) andmoderation .. ."(3.9.4).Byexposing themad-like
extremes,Xenophon indicates what, for Socrates, the
sobertheoretical means are, that is, the beings arelimitedin multi
1This, at1.2.19isthefirstoccurrenceof any word cognate with
"philosophy" inthe Memorabilia. This content downloaded from
128.163.2.206 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 14:35:53 UTCAll use subject to
JSTOR Terms and ConditionsSOCRATIC ANDNON-SOCRATICPHILOSOPHY87
tude, some thingschange andsomedo not, andsome things come into
being and perish andothersdonot. If sobriety
ormoderationisthecharacteristicofSocratic philosophizing,
andifitistheSocraticelementthatiscommonto the philosophies
ofPlatoand Aristotle, thatcharacteristic might
betracedtotheSocraticthinkers'insistence on doingjustice tothe
cognitivesignificance of common,ordinaryexperience,(which we
understandtoincludewhatissaidaboutthe thingsexperienced).2
Afewillustrations may suffice. Socrates, intheTheaetetus (180d),
ironicallyadapting theattitudeofadherentsofuniversalflux speaks
ofcobblers "foolishlysupposing thatsomeofthe beings areatrest
andothersin motion."Thetroublewith"thefamousmenof old," the
Stranger from Elea says on the followingday(Sophist,243a-bl),
isthat "looking far beyond[yictpihbvTes,overlooking or despising]
us, the many,theyslighted us ; fornot caring whetherwefollow along
withthemwhen theyspeak orareleft behind, eachofthemdoeshis own
thing tothelimit."Hecomesbacktothediscussionof motion andrest
later,arguing thatthe philosophermust, asit seems, not accept the
sayings that"theall"isatrestor that"the being" isin everyway
moving, butrather"inaccordwiththechildren's prayer aboutall things
motionlessand beingmoved, hemust say thatthe being andtheallareboth
[motionless and beingmoved]together" (249c-d).
Thediscussionbecomesschematizedin Aristotle's Physics,
?,chapter3,253a22ff., where (254al) heconcludesthat"fromthese
andothersuch arguments itis impossible for anyone tobelieve
eitherthatall things arein motionor thatall things are always at
rest."3 In3.9.6 Xenophon's Socrates says thatmadnessisthe opposite
of wisdom,ao(pia.4Ignorance,however, isnot madness, "buttobe
ignorant ofoneselfandto opine andto suppose thatoneknows
whatonedoesnot know, hereckonedtobe very closetomadness."
Thiswouldseemtobeamore precise characterizationofthose
mad-likethinkerswho worry aboutthenatureofall things. If
theythought that by the study ofthe cosmos they wouldbeable
tomakeandcontrolnatural phenomena whenever they wanted to, 2 Cf.
Plato, Phaedo96ff. 3 Cf. 253bl, 29.Cf.also Plato,Sophist 251c-252e.
4 In1.1.16itisthe opposite of
