reportMinority Rights in Kosovo underInternational RuleBy Clive Baldwin

AcknowledgementsMinority Rights Group International (MRG) gratefullyacknowledges the support of all organizations andindividuals who gave financial and other assistance for thisreport, including DfID (UK Department for InternationalDevelopment). Report editor: Sophie Richmond.

The authorClive Baldwin is Head of Advocacy at Minority Rights GroupInternational. From 2000 to 2002 he was a member of theOSCE Mission in Kosovo. Previously, he was a practisinghuman rights lawyer.

Minority Rights Group InternationalMinority Rights Group International (MRG) is a non-governmental organization (NGO) working to secure therights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities andindigenous peoples worldwide, and to promote cooperationand understanding between communities. Our activities arefocused on international advocacy, training, publishing andoutreach. We are guided by the needs expressed by ourworldwide partner network of organizations, which representminority and indigenous peoples.

MRG works with over 150 organizations in nearly 50countries. Our governing Council, which meets twice a year,has members from 10 different countries. MRG hasconsultative status with the United Nations Economic andSocial Council (ECOSOC), and observer status with theAfrican Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights(ACHPR). MRG is registered as a charity and a companylimited by guarantee under English law. Registered charityno. 282305, limited company no. 1544957.

© Minority Rights Group International 2006All rights reserved

Material from this publication may be reproduced for teaching or for other non-commercial purposes. No part of it may bereproduced in any form for commercial purposes without the prior express permission of the copyright holders.For further information please contact MRG. A CIP catalogue record of this publication is available from the British Library ISBN 1 904584 46 2. Published July 2006. Typeset by Kavita Graphics. Printed in the UK on recycled paper. Cover Photo TheRoma Mahalla (quarter) in Mitrovice/Mitrovica, June 2006. Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule is published byMRG as a contribution to public understanding of the issue which forms its subject. The text and views of the author do notnecessarily represent in every detail and in all its aspects, the collective view of MRG.

Contents

Abbreviations 2

Summary 3

Map 4

Preface 5

Introduction 6

The minority experts? The rulers of Kosovo and their knowledge of minority rights 11

The root causes of the problem 24

Recommendations 29

Relevant international instruments 32

Notes 33

Minority Rights in Kosovo underInternational RuleBy Clive Baldwin

2 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

COMKFOR Commander of KFOR

DPKO UN Department of PeacekeepingOperations

EAR European Agency for Reconstruction

ERRC European Roma Rights Center

EU European Union

FCNM Framework Convention for the Protection ofNational Minorities

FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities(OSCE)

HPD Housing and Property Directorate

IAC Interim Administrative Council

IDP internally displaced person

JCR Joint Committee on the Return of KosovoSerbs

JIAS Joint Interim Administrative Structure

KFOR Kosovo Force

KLA (UCK in Albanian)

Kosovo Liberation Army

KPC Kosovo Protection Corps

KPS Kosovo Police Service

KVM Kosovo Verification Mission

MRG Minority Rights Group International

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO non-governmental organization

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner on HumanRights

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe

PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government

RAE Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians

SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General

UN United Nations

UNDM UN Declaration on the Rights of All PersonsBelonging to National or Ethnic, Religiousand Linguistic Minorities

UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner onRefugees

UNIFEM UN Development Fund for Women

UNMIK UN Mission in Kosovo

UNOSEK UN Office of the Secretary-General for thefuture status process for Kosovo

Abbreviations

3MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

Nowhere in Europe is there such segregation as Kosovo.Thousands of people are still displaced and in camps.Nowhere else are there so many ‘ethnically pure’ towns andvillages scattered across such a small province. Nowhere isthere such a level of fear for so many minorities that theywill be harassed simply for who they are. And perhapsnowhere else in Europe is at such a high risk of ethniccleansing occurring in the near future – or even a risk ofgenocide.

This is not a description of Kosovo in 1998 or in2003. It is a description of Kosovo today. For the Serbsand ‘other minorities’ – the Roma, Bosniaks (Slavic Mus-lims), Croats, Turks and Albanians of Kosovo – who sufferfrom expulsion from their homes, discrimination andrestrictions on speaking their own language, the pattern ofviolence they have endured for so long may be about to beentrenched as law in the new Kosovo, as the future statustalks continue behind closed doors in Vienna.

How, after one of the longest and most expensive inter-national administrations since the creation of the UnitedNations (UN), whose mandate was explicitly to secure anenvironment for refugees to return home and ensure pub-lic safety (Resolution 1244, Article 10), has this beenallowed to occur?

This report tracks a clear failure on the part of theinternational protectorate to learn lessons from the pastand draw on the minority rights expertise available to it inthe UN and other bodies. This failure has allowed deci-sion-makers to remain unaccountable, and produced aConstitutional Framework that refers to minority rights sobroadly that they are too wide to be effective. Instead ofintegration, the current situation encourages the opposite:segregation. The report shows how the initial internation-al governance structure – five different armed brigades inKosovo, each running a different region and led by a dif-ferent country (France, Germany, Italy the UK and theUSA), each with very different policies towards securityand minorities – has kept fresh the wounds inflicted beforethe security forces first arrived and allowed patterns of vio-lence to be repeated.

The problem is not lack of financing. Conversely, thefact that so much money has been spent on the region hasallowed segregation in public services to become an easysolution to conflict between groups. A short-term mentali-ty, the use of quota systems in public services and anelectoral system based on rigid ethnic representation showa lack of commitment to implementing minority rights inany meaningful way.

This report shows how the future status negotiationscurrently under way in Vienna represent both the besthope and the greatest danger for peace.

For hope to be justified, the report emphasizes, there isa radical need for change in mindset and in practice:• Minority rights should be guaranteed by a rule of law

that is actually taken seriously and applied. Till today, the governing administration, the UN Missionin Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force(KFOR) have declared themselves above regulation, over-turning even the most basic of human rights laws, that ofrequiring all detention to be by order of a judge. Rightsthat exist on paper are made meaningless, and any fragilesense of security minorities have is consistently under-mined. Therefore: • The criminal justice system must hold those responsi-

ble for past crimes to account and see them arrestedwhatever their political power.

Out of hundreds of investigations into the 2004 atrocities,few have been prosecuted, and those few convicted havereceived lenient sentences.• All minorities should be consulted on the future of

their lives, their property and their country, instead oftalks taking place among a select group of people, insecret and behind closed doors.

• Specific efforts must be made to include women’s viewsand international negotiations should include minorityrights and gender experts.

When the Constitutional Framework was drawn up in2001 it was not put up for general consultation. The samemistake is being made today, with talks taking place inVienna, far from where the most disadvantaged can takepart. Understanding the devastating realities facing return-ing refugees and communities wanting to keep theirlanguage alive, to travel in safety and to seek work at alllevels of society – all of which have become next to impos-sible for Kosovo’s minorities despite seven years ofinternational intervention – is vital for anyone involved inpeacekeeping missions, in reportage or in internationalgovernance.

The report shows that measures that separate commu-nities through religion or ethnicity should be transitional,if they have to be used at all. The future status talks offer achance for change. Otherwise, the danger is that the pat-terns of segregation that are accepted in Kosovo, and thatlead to the terror of ethnic cleansing, will be enshrined inthe Constitution, and will be played out again over thenext decade.

Summary

4 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

Kosovo

Leposavic/Leposaviq

Zubin Potok

Stimlje/Shtime

Lipljan/Lipjan

Gracanica/Ulpiana

Vucitrn/Vushtrriucitrn

Podujevo/Podujeve

Novo Brdo/Novoberde

Kosovska Kamenica/Kamenice

osovska

Gnjilane/Gjilan

Vitina/Viti

KacanikPrizren

Djakovica/Gjakove

Decani/Decane

Istog/Istok

Srbica/Skenderaj

Rahovac/Orahovac

Suva Reka/Suhareke

Dragas/Dragash

Brod/Brad

Ferizaj/Urosevac

Kosovo Polje/Fushe KosovoGlogovac/

Gllogovc

Klina/Kline

Prishtine/Pristina

Junik

Lapusnik/Llapushnik

MONTENEGRO

ALBANIA

Kosovo

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV

REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Serbia

100 20 km

GNJILANE

PRIZREN

MITROVICE/MITROVICA

Zvecan

Malisevo/Malisheve

Strpce/Shterpce

Obilic/Kopiliq

Peje/PecVitomirica/Vitomirice

Durakovac

PEJE/PEC

PRISHTINE/PRISTINA

V

5MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

In 1999 the United Nations took over the administrationof Kosovo with minority rights at the core of its mandate.Today, with the future status negotiations beginning,Kosovo remains a deeply divided, and physically segregat-ed society. Kosovo provides important challenges, and alsoopportunities to fulfil the guarantees of human rights andthe promises of international cooperation. To the realiza-tion of these promises we must all bring the most faithfulapplication of lessons learned over the past decades ofexperience with enforcement of rights, peace-building andpost-conflict reconstruction. The test that Kosovo offers isalso a challenge for the international machinery of humanrights and, more specifically, minority rights.

Where ethnic tensions and violence divide societies, asin Kosovo, respect for minority rights advances the condi-tions for political and social stability and peace. Ratherthan promoting segregation and separation, minorityrights are based on the principle of an integrated society,where each can use their own language, enjoy their cul-ture and practise their religion but still feel part of abroader, inclusive national identity. In such societies, vari-ous national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups areable to live confidently together, communicate effectively,and recognize value in their differences and in their soci-ety’s cultural diversity.

Central to my mandate as UN Independent Expert onMinority Issues is the UN Declaration on the Rights ofPersons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious andLinguistic Minorities. This, along with other pertinentregional and international standards on minority rights,offers the essential normative tools from which overduesolutions can emerge. They provide both obligations andguidance in the field of minority rights, but also, onceenshrined into a constitutional and legislative framework,a firm foundation upon which to build just societies. Ontheir own such standards are not enough; they requirecommitment, leadership and creative initiatives to turnprinciples into reality.

The UN and other inter-governmental organizationscurrently working in Kosovo, need to more effectivelyimplement human rights standards and human rights-based approaches. I welcome the appointment of theHonourable Marti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland,to lead the future status talks and believe that he will playa pivotal role in forging constructive, collaborative strate-

gies of engagement and inclusive approaches in the nego-tiations ahead.

The diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic communi-ties of Kosovo must realize that solutions lie in theirhands as much as they are the responsibility of govern-ments and the international community, and makeconcerted efforts to move beyond the current divisions.The political will to reach just and durable solutions mustbe demonstrated by the whole of civil society, as well asby states and international actors. The political will torespect the rights and value the contributions of all is anessential component of functioning, healthy, prosperoussocieties: the will to talk, to share, to cooperate, to includeand to participate; the will to build bridges and breakdown barriers between communities, no matter howentrenched those barriers have become. Without suchwill, the best efforts of the international community willnever be sufficient.

There are no easy solutions to the problems of Koso-vo; however, there are paths ahead that offer the greatestpotential for inclusion, peace, stability and develop-ment. Such paths must firmly reject segregation andethnic cleansing, and embrace the rule of law andminority rights. The alternative is a future of continuingdivision, distrust and uncertainty, which has the poten-tial not only to bring suffering and conflict once againto the lives of the people of Kosovo, but also to furtherinflame the tensions of a region that has sufferedenough from the destructive consequences of national-ism and discrimination.

I welcome this timely and important report fromMinority Rights Group International, which offers a vitaland usefully realistic analysis of progress so far on the dif-ficult road to a new Kosovo. A key message of this reportis the need for consultation and the meaningful participa-tion of all of Kosovo’s communities, a message that I fullyendorse.

The report also provides a much-needed assessment ofthe essential role of minority rights, and guidance onensuring that they find their place in the future legalframework of Kosovo, whatever the outcome of the futurestatus negotiations.

Gay McDougallUN Independent Expert on Minority Issues

Preface

6 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

‘We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. Wemust not rest until it is reversed.’ (Tony Blair, speaking about Kosovo, April 1999) 1

‘Various advanced norms … have been introduced totackle many of the key concerns of minority commu-nities. However, the reality in Kosovo remainsdisconcertingly far from these laudable norms andplans.’ (Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on theFramework Convention for the Protection of Nation-al Minorities, November 2005)

In 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)went to war for the rights of a minority – the Albaniansof Kosovo, within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(FRY). Since June 1999, Kosovo has been governed by aninterim administration led by the United Nations Mis-sion in Kosovo (UNMIK)2 and also including theEuropean Union (EU) and the Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A ‘security pres-ence’, called KFOR (Kosovo Force), has been led byNATO and has included soldiers from at least 30 NATOand non-NATO countries. Thousands of internationalofficials have worked in Kosovo, and millions of euroshave been spent. Now approaching its seventh anniver-sary, it is one of the most expensive and long-terminternational administrations since the creation of theUnited Nations (UN).3

The international protectorate was born in circum-stances in which it was clear that its most importantpriority would be to ensure harmony and cooperationbetween the different ethnic groups, i.e. ensuring fullprotection of all rights of these groups, particularlyminorities. On paper it would seem that Kosovo wouldbe particularly blessed in being administered by institu-tions with a long history of working on minority rightsprotection, such as the UN, which in 1992 agreed a Dec-laration on the Rights of All Persons Belonging toNational or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities(UNDM). The UN has a Working Group on Minoritiesthat meets in Geneva each year and gives specialist adviceand opinions on the rights of minorities. The OSCE in1992 established a High Commissioner on NationalMinorities (HCNM) who has developed unmatchedexpertise on using and applying internationally recog-nized minority rights standards in order to prevent

conflict. With the resources put into Kosovo, one wouldexpect minority rights to be fully protected there.

Instead, after nearly seven years of internationalexpertise, the situation of minorities in Kosovo in 2006 isdire. The arrival of the international forces and adminis-tration in 1999 saw a major wave of what can only bedescribed as ethnic cleansing: targeted attacks on minori-ties to drive them from their homes. The result was thedeparture from Kosovo of most of the Serbs, and the dis-placement of a large number of Roma and Albanians (thelatter from Serb areas). Five years later, in 2004, this pat-tern was repeated. Today, thousands of Kosovo’sminorities are unable to live in their homes. On day-to-day protection of basic minority rights – the right ofeveryone to live in a society where they can speak theirlanguage, and practise their culture and religion freelywithout suffering any detriment – Kosovo has achievedrights only on paper. The trend has been for ever-greatersegregation between Albanians and Serbs, down even tovillage level, with all other groups being largely marginal-ized. The talks on the future status of Kosovo have notyet brought forward any new ideas for the resolution ofthis situation.

Clearly, something has gone very wrong. Understand-ing how the international administration failed tounderstand and apply minority rights is critical for tworeasons. First, it is important for the immediate future ofKosovo. Whatever comes out of the future status discus-sions must include a structure to ensure that minorityrights will be fully implemented, allowing everyone tolive freely, learning from the mistakes of the last sevenyears. However, it is also vital for future peacekeepingthat those involved in international missions learn whythe UN and OSCE have not used their institutionalknowledge of minority rights on such a critical mission.

A brief history of KosovoKosovo, a region of approximately 11,000 sq. km andwith an estimated population of 2 million,4 has, likemost of south-east Europe, been inhabited by many eth-nic, linguistic and religious groups. Much ink, andindeed blood, has been spilt in attempts by variousgroups to claim that they were the first to inhabit a par-ticular region and therefore should have a superior (orperhaps the sole) claim. In fact, such claims are meaning-less, as all groups who live in Kosovo have the same

Introduction

7MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

rights to live freely and to economic and political partici-pation. Despite this, the history is still referred tofrequently, so a brief account is needed.

For many years Kosovo was part of the Roman andByzantine empires. By 1000 CE, Albanians, who tracetheir ancestry back to the Illyrians, were living there, aswere Slavs (Serbs) and Vlachs. From about 1200 to 1450Kosovo was part of the Serbian kingdom. Major Serbmonasteries were founded at Gracanica, Pec (Peje) andDecani. Most famously, on 28 June 1389, the first battleof Kosovo took place between the armies of the Serbianprince Lazar (whose armies contained nationalities fromacross the region, including Albanians) and the OttomanSultan Murad. Although both leaders were killed, thebattle has passed into Serb mythology as a heroic defeatfor the Serbs.

However, the Serb kingdom, and with it Kosovo, wasnot conquered by the Ottomans until 1455. Kosovoremained part of the Ottoman Empire for the next 450years, with Turkish-speaking rulers, and gradually a largepart of the population adopted Islam. Following a briefAustrian occupation of 1689–90, the Ottoman recon-quest led to a flight of Serbs from the area. This VelikaSeoba (great flight) is an important part of the Serb viewof history, and marks the point when, according to Serbbelief, they became a minority in Kosovo.

The Albanian national revival is usually said to havebegun with the ‘League of Prizren’ that originated from ameeting in Prizren, Kosovo in 1878, but was crushed bythe Ottomans within three years. A further Albanian ris-ing took place in 1910.

In 1912, the vilayet (province) of Kosovo was con-quered by Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria in the FirstBalkan Wars and divided between them, with the largestpart going to Serbia. After the First World War, Serbiaand Montenegro became part of the new country ofYugoslavia.5 The Yugoslav government discussed expellingthe Albanian population of Kosovo.

During the Second World War, most of Kosovo wasmade part of Italian-controlled Greater Albania. Follow-ing Italy’s surrender to the Allies in September 1943, thearea was occupied by German forces until they wereforced to retreat by the advancing Soviet Army a yearlater. Thousands of Serbs were killed during the war andmany thousands fled. Some were denied the right toreturn at the end of the war.6

After the Second World War, Tito came to power andformed what became (in 1963) the Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Initially the authorities inKosovo had little power, but more and more power wasgiven to them to run the province. In 1974 the finalSFRY Constitution was issued, which gave almost fullautonomy to Kosovo although it remained nominally a

part of Serbia. Following the death of Tito in 1980, theAlbanian-dominated authorities in Prishtine/Pristina hada very large degree of autonomy. Serbs began to complainever more strongly about discrimination and exclusion inKosovo, particularly after Albanians demonstrated in1981, demanding that Kosovo become a full republic.There were also many complaints from all communitiesthat economic development was much more limited inKosovo than in the rest of the country.

In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, then a little-knownCommunist Party official, became famous by going toKosovo and publicly taking up the cause of the Serbminority there. This led to his coming to power in Ser-bia. A key part of his rise was the removal of theautonomy of Kosovo in 1989, with power to run theprovince returning to Belgrade. This was followed by sys-tematic discrimination against the Albanians in Kosovofor the next decade in what was now the Federal Repub-lic of Yugoslavia. Albanian-language education and mediawere greatly reduced, and Albanians were systematicallydismissed from state jobs and discriminated against inhiring for new positions. Kosovo’s Albanians respondedwith a mass peaceful movement, which protested againstand boycotted the state institutions. Separate, unofficialAlbanian institutions were set up, including elections,which resulted in the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, andan alternative, unofficial, education system.

However, after 1988–9, little international attentionwas paid to Kosovo. This remained the case when theinternational community was focused on the wars furthernorth in Yugoslavia (in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovinaand, briefly, Slovenia). Kosovo was ignored during theDayton peace agreements that ended the war in Bosnia in1995. Only when a ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’ (KLA, orUCK in Albanian) began operations, leading to a full-scalewar in 1998, did the international community noticeKosovo. Both Serbs and Albanians fled Kosovo in 1998,although the numbers are disputed. As the war continuedin 1998, NATO countries threatened to bomb Serbia.Milosevic agreed to a ceasefire with the KLA and an inter-national presence, led by the OSCE, to monitor it.7

However the ceasefire broke down and the OSCEreported on a new wave of human rights abuses againstAlbanians, particularly the Racak massacre of January1999.8 This led to renewed pressure for an internationalagreement, with negotiations at Rambouillet in Francetrying to push Milosevic to agree to an autonomousKosovo with international supervision. These negotia-tions failed and NATO began bombing the FRY inMarch 1999.

The bombing continued for three months. Duringthat period hundreds of thousands of people, largelyAlbanians, fled Kosovo. Many have alleged this was due

8 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

to a deliberate policy of the FRY forces of ethnic cleans-ing, which formed a key part of the indictment and trialof Milosevic at the International Criminal Tribunal forthe Former Yugoslavia (2002–6). In June 1999, underRussian pressure, Milosevic agreed to pull FRY forces andofficials out of Kosovo and have them replaced by aninternational administration and security force.

Minorities in KosovoThe term ‘minority’ in Kosovo is even more controversialthan usual. As is often the case, members of groups havelittle wish to be referred to as minorities, the mostimportant issues being their ability to live freely, to speaktheir own language, and to practise their culture and reli-gion. For Serbs, in particular, there is a fear that by beingreferred to as a ‘minority’ in Kosovo they are concedingthat Kosovo is an independent state (as Serbs are not aminority in Serbia as a whole). For this reason, the term‘community’ has often been used in Kosovo, such as inthe rights given under the Constitutional Framework.

However, the term ‘minority’ is an objective one. Itrefers to a group based on nationality, ethnicity, languageor religion that happens to be a minority in a particularlocation. In their Eighth Assessment of the Situation of Eth-nic Minorities in Kosovo, the OSCE and United NationsHigh Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said:

‘Though conscious of the growing complexity andsensitivity surrounding minority issues and cognisantof the tendency to speak of local communities asopposed to minorities, we have maintained the struc-ture and terminology of previous reports. This is notdone out of insensitivity but rather out of efficacy.Therefore, we continue to use the phrase minorityand its use simply refers to any community that livesin a situation where they are a numeric minority rel-ative to the communities surrounding them. As such,the term is as applicable to Kosovo Serbs in Gracani-ca/Ulpijana as it is to Kosovo Albanians in northMitrovice/Mitrovica.’ 9

This is an entirely appropriate approach in Kosovo. The terms ‘minority’ and ‘minority rights’ are neededwhen a particular ethnic, religious or racial group lackspower, usually through being a numerical minority inthe area where governmental power rests. In Kosovo thismeans that every group apart from the Albanians is aminority. Albanians are a minority in the areas in Koso-vo that have become Serb-dominated, notably the threemost northern municipalities,10 the north of Mitro-vice/Mitrovica city and in Strpce/Shterpce municipalityin the south.

Population figures in Kosovo are difficult to verify,both before and after 1999. The SFRY held censusesevery 10 years, which included a category of ethnicity.However the last of these was held in 1991 and was boy-cotted by Albanians. Since 1999 no census has been held.Although the entire population of Kosovo was expectedto register for elections after 1999 no figures have beenkept on ethnicity.

SerbsAs stated above, Serbs have lived in Kosovo for centuries.Kosovo has a particular importance to Serbs because of themonasteries and the legends around the 1389 battle. ThePatriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church is the Archbish-op of Peje/Pec, one of the major cities of Kosovo and thesite of one of the main monasteries. Despite the years ofsecularism under communism, the Serb identity in Kosovois still largely tied to the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Serbs, however, have long been a numerical minorityin Kosovo. According to Serbian history, their minoritystatus began with the flight of many Serbs after theOttoman Empire reconquered the province in 1690. Theprovince was conquered by Serbia in 1912 and attemptswere made to ‘recolonize’ the province with Serbs; theselargely failed. As increasing power was devolved to Koso-vo’s (largely Albanian) authorities by Yugoslavia, Serbscomplained about discrimination and some left theprovince. Milosevic’s rise to power brought a revocationof Kosovo’s autonomy and discrimination in favour ofSerbs throughout the 1990s. By 1999, it is estimated thatthere were up to 300,000 Serbs in Kosovo. In some partsof Kosovo they formed the majority, including threemunicipalities in the north, the municipality ofStrpce/Shterpce in the south and the town of KosovoPolje/Fushe Kosove near Prishtine/Pristina in the centre.Many Serbs lived in the major towns and cities, formingapproximately 25 per cent of the population of Prish-tine/Pristina. Until the NATO bombing began they wereclearly the dominant group in Kosovo.

Roma, Ashkalia and EgyptiansThe Roma are believed to have entered the Balkans inthe 13th century CE and have remained there eversince.11 They were found across Kosovo, many becom-ing sedentary early on. Some adopted Islam, somebecame Orthodox Christians. Some (largely Muslims)adopted Albanian as a first language, some Serbo-Croat-ian, with others retaining Romany as a first language.However, as in the rest of Europe, all other communitiesgenerally treated the Roma with ‘social contempt’.12 Atleast 1,000 Roma from Kosovo were killed during theSecond World War, as part of the Porajmos, the geno-cide of the Roma.

9MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

Roma, however, have often expressed loyalty to thepost-Second World War Yugoslavia that they saw as givingthem more freedom than ever before. The number identi-fying themselves as Roma increased from 11,000 post-warto 43,000 in the 1991 census. The latter is certainly amajor underestimate, as Roma have often identified them-selves officially as Albanian, Serb or Turk.

With the mass dismissal of Albanians from stateemployment in Kosovo at the start of the 1990s, some oftheir positions were taken by Roma. Roma were used bySerb authorities during the ethnic cleansing in 1999 tobury the dead.13 Among some Albanians, there was animage that Roma had been ‘collaborators’ with the Serbauthorities.

From the 1990s onwards, there has been a clear divi-sion of the Roma into three self-identifying groups. Thosewho largely spoke Albanian as a first language identifiedthemselves as Ashkalia (sometimes spelt Ashkaelia) orEgyptians. The Egyptians consider themselves a groupwhose ancestry is traced back to Egypt.14 Both groupshave a close affinity with Albanians, but have been largelyrejected by Albanians.15 Those who consider themselvesRoma in Kosovo today, however, generally speak eitherRomany or Serbian as their first language.

After some disputes, the right to self-identification hasbeen acknowledged and the three groups have been recog-nized by UNMIK, for example with regard torepresentation under the electoral system. Sometimes theterm RAE is used to refer to all three groups together. Allthree groups can be said to be in the worst position inKosovo, with the worst education, highest levels of dis-crimination in the workplace and almost certainly thehighest unemployment rates. Within the three communi-ties, the Roma are in the worst position of all.

BosniaksUnder the Ottoman Empire a large number of speakers ofSlavic languages (predominantly the language known asSerbo-Croatian) adopted Islam. They formed a majorityof the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of theSandzak region of Serbia and Montenegro immediately tothe north of Kosovo. The group was only recognized as anational identification in Yugoslavia in 1961, with a cen-sus category of ‘Muslims in the ethnic sense’. During theBosnian war in the 1990s, the term ‘Bosniak’ was adoptedfor this group, and the Bosnian language promoted as dis-tinct from Serbian and Croatian.

The term ‘Bosniak’ was also largely adopted after 1999by the Muslims in Kosovo whose first language wasBosnian. Bosniak has become the accepted term for thosewho were sometimes referred to as ‘Slavic Muslims’ andsometimes self-identifying as ‘Torbesh’.16 They are partic-ularly concerned to protect the Bosnian language as

distinct from Serbian.17 The community is predominantlyMuslim and numbered at least 35,000 in 1999.18 Bosniaksthemselves state that their community in Kosovo num-bered at least 100,000 in 1991 and is approximately57,000 today.19

GoraniAlso Muslim and Slav, but distinct from the Bosniaks, isthe Gorani community based in the mountain region ofGora in the south-west, probably the most remote regionin Kosovo. The Gora numbered approximately 12,000 intheir home region in 1999, with smaller communities inthe major cities of Kosovo. Their numbers are estimatedat 6,000 today.

CroatsThere are two small communities of Croats in Kosovo,Janjevo (near Prishtine/Pristina) and Letnica (in thesouth). Religious identification as Catholic was veryimportant to Croat identity and Letnica is a destinationfor pilgrimage.

TurksFrom the 1450s until 1912, Kosovo was ruled by theOttoman Empire and the language of government wasTurkish. Turkish was named as one of the official lan-guages in Kosovo in the 1974 Constitution.

By 1999, the population of those identifying as Turk-ish had been reduced to somewhere between 12,000 and50,000. The majority are in the Prizren region, withsmaller communities elsewhere. Many Turks fled toTurkey to escape either the war or unemploy-ment.20 Thecritical issue for them has largely been recognition andprotection of their language.

AlbaniansAlbanians have for some considerable period been themajority group in Kosovo. However, they have been aminority in Serbia as a whole, and suffered from policiesaimed at reducing their numbers and influence in Kosovo,culminating in the removal of their political power in1989, loss of jobs and language rights, and ethnic cleans-ing in March–June 1999. Since the departure of the FRYauthorities in June 1999, Albanians have once more beenin a position of power in Kosovo as a whole. Howeverthey have been or have become a minority in Serb-domi-nated areas, including the three northern municipalities,the north of Mitrovice/Mitrovica city and the municipali-ty of Strpce/Shterpce in the south. In areas whereAlbanians are a minority, they have often experiencedproblems similar to those of minorities elsewhere in Kosovo (including expulsion from their homes, discrimi-nation and restrictions on speaking their language).

10 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

Circassians, Jews, Vlachs

In the 1860s, the Ottoman Empire settled thousands ofCircassian (Cerkezi) refugees (from the Caucasus) inKosovo and other parts of the Balkans. Many fled Koso-vo when the Ottomans were driven out in 1912. By1999 a few hundred remained in two villages in Koso-vo, and have subsequently wished to keep themselvesvery quiet.

The Jewish community of Kosovo numbered a fewhundred in 1941. Half were transported to their deaths inthe Holocaust and the majority of the rest left for Israelafter 1945. The population today of Jews is minuscule.21

A vanished group in Kosovo are the Vlachs, an Ortho-dox people who once numbered in the thousands.However, since the Serbian conquest of 1912 they havebeen completely assimilated into the Serbs and no one inKosovo today identifies themselves as Vlach.

11MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

To understand what was done and not done in Kosovo, itis necessary to understand the rather complicated struc-ture of government that emerged in 1999 and afterwards.UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999 made itclear that Kosovo remained part of the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia.22 In practice, Kosovo has been governedentirely separately from the FRY (which became theunion of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, currently split-ting into two distinct republics following a referendum).The main government authority in Kosovo has been theUnited Nations Mission in Kosovo, set up as the ‘interna-tional civil presence’ under 1244. Resolution 1244 gives itthe responsibility for:

‘a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final set-tlement, of substantial autonomy and self-governmentin Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of theRambouillet accords (S/1999/648); b. Performing basic civilian administrative functionswhere and as long as required …j. Protecting and promoting human rightsk. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of allrefugees and displaced persons to their homes inKosovo.’ 23

This interim administration has now lasted nearly sevenyears, the longest assumption of government in the UN’shistory. UNMIK itself developed a very complex struc-ture, made up of four ‘pillars’. Initially these consistedof: UNMIK, responsible for administration/governancein most areas; the UNHCR, responsible for reconstruc-tion; the OSCE, responsible for institution-building;and the EU mission, responsible for economic develop-ment. The UNHCR left the pillar structure in 2000,while keeping a mission in Kosovo, and was replaced bya second UNMIK pillar responsible for policing and jus-tice. Other UN bodies, such as the Office of the HighCommissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), also hadoffices in Kosovo, as did the Council of Europe, butthese were not part of UNMIK. UNMIK has beenheaded by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), of which there have been a bewilderingnumber since 1999 (apart from the first, Acting SRSG,all European males).24

The ‘international security presence’ set up by 1244 iscalled KFOR. It is a multinational force and has had atleast 30 participating states, largely NATO members, butalso including countries such as India, Russia and Swe-den. KFOR was set up as a separate body from UNMIKand, while the necessities of the work required coopera-tion with UNMIK, it is entirely autonomous, notcontrolled by the civilian authority in Kosovo (unlike thesituation under the UN administration in East Timor).Even more confusingly, while KFOR in theory had aunited command structure, headed by a Commander(COMKFOR), in practice national units within KFORoften acted according to their own priorities. In particular,the initial five different brigades in Kosovo, each runninga region and led by a different country (France, Germany,Italy, the UK and the USA), had very different policiestowards security and minorities.25 KFOR’s mandate inResolution 1244, included, crucially the duties of:

‘c. Establishing a secure environment in whichrefugees and displaced persons can return home insafety, the international civil presence can operate, atransitional administration can be established, andhumanitarian aid can be delivered; d. Ensuring public safety and order until the interna-tional civil presence can take responsibility for thistask …’ 26

Attempts to have Kosovan involvement in governmenthave only added to the complexities of the governmentstructures. Initially, the failure of UNMIK to assertauthority left effective power in much of Kosovo in thehands of the Kosovo Liberation Army. In the Serb areasthe situation was a mixture of remaining Belgrade author-ity (‘parallel structures’ in areas such as the justice systemand education) and day-to-day power in areas such assecurity resting with informal Serb groups. At the end of1999 a structure was set up to formalize the relationship.Called the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS),it created an Interim Administrative Council (IAC), con-sisting of three Albanians and, later, one Serb, and set upa system of what amounted to ministries in which an(international) UNMIK official and a Kosovan were co-heads. In 2000 elections took place for municipal

The minority experts? The rulers of Kosovo and theirknowledge of minority rights

12 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

authorities and power was handed over to these authori-ties for a wide range of local issues. In 2001 aConstitutional Framework was issued by the SRSG,which is, in effect, an interim Constitution for Kosovo.This created a system known as the ‘Provisional Institu-tions of Self-Government’ (PISG). Following electionsto a Kosovo Assembly in 2001, a Kosovo-wide govern-ment was chosen consisting of a President, PrimeMinister and Kosovan ministers. Much of UNMIK’sday-to-day authority was handed over. In October 2005,the Security Council decided to launch the process toresolve Kosovo’s future status.

However UNMIK and the SRSG have remained,both in theory and in practice, the most important deci-sion-makers in Kosovo. Ultimate authority rests withthem, with some power having been kept by them evenafter the creation of the PISG (notably policing and jus-tice). The SRSG, under the Constitutional Framework,retains the right to intervene in government at any timeand is required to do so to protect communities.

KFOR, although greatly reduced in numbers, hasretained much power throughout the seven years. At notime has KFOR declared its mission to secure publicsafety and order and hand over responsibility complete.Therefore much power on issues affecting minorities hasremained with KFOR.

Kosovo, therefore has been, effectively, a UN protec-torate for seven years. Given the organizations involved,one would have expected a deep understanding ofminority rights and their implementation. The UN hasbeen at the centre of the development of internationalminority rights. Its major human rights treaties aredirectly relevant to minority rights.27 In 1992, its Gener-al Assembly passed a Declaration on the Rights ofPersons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious orLinguistic Minorities, which set out the generallyaccepted rights of all minorities. Its final Article 9 statesthat:

‘The specialized agencies and other organizations ofthe United Nations system shall contribute to thefull realization of the rights and principles set forthin the present Declaration, within their respectivefields of competence.’

The UN has a specialist Working Group on Minorities,which meets in Geneva and has a support staff of spe-cialist minority experts within the UN Office of theHigh Commissioner for Human Rights. Since UNMIKwas set up, the UN has developed its minority expertisefurther with the creation of a Special Adviser to the Sec-retary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and anIndependent Expert on Minority Issues.

The OSCE, which formed part of UNMIK, has had,if anything, an even greater institutional knowledge ofminority rights, and particularly how to use them inresolving and preventing conflict. This has come from thecreation of the Office of the High Commissioner onNational Minorities in 1992. Based in The Hague, thisoffice was set up as a conflict prevention mechanism,designed to identify minority issues that could cause con-flict and recommend solutions, largely through ‘quietdiplomacy’. In the 1990s this office worked largely inCentral Europe and the Baltic states, but developed andpublished general guidelines on how to address criticalissues for minorities, including public participation, edu-cation, linguistic rights, electoral systems and the media.

In fact, what has happened in Kosovo has been theopposite of what was expected. Despite the excellentknowledge that rested within the UN and OSCE onminority rights, minority rights have not been protectedin Kosovo. Ethnic cleansing took place in 1999 and 2004and the general trend has been towards greater segrega-tion, not integration. While a lot of information on thesituation of minorities has been gathered, policies towardsminorities seem to have been largely haphazard and con-fused, and rarely rights-based.

To examine what happened, the various structures thatwere set up to address minority issues will be described,and what they achieved.

A plethora of solutions: settingup structures to deal withminoritiesOver the years the various governmental bodies have set upa variety of institutional structures to address minorityissues. Minority issues were recognized as a major priorityfor UNMIK very early on, and the first (Acting) SRSGmade this point in a speech in July 1999.28 An immediateoutcome was the setting up by the UNHCR and OSCE(then both part of UNMIK) of an inter-agency Ad HocTask Force on Minorities. This body, first chaired by theUNHCR, and subsequently by the OSCE, tried to identifythe key problems facing minorities in Kosovo and come upwith policy solutions and recommendations. It was largelydriven by the two organizations, but would involveUNMIK and KFOR staff – and only rarely minority par-ticipation. At the beginning the Task Force met weekly,responded to immediate issues, particularly as seen byOSCE and UNHCR staff in minority areas, and had someimpact on KFOR policy.29 It then began to address system-atic problems. However, both the OSCE and the UNCHRfelt that the Task Force was increasingly not being listenedto and decided to disband it in 2001, arguing that what

13MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

was needed was an UNMIK-led body that would be ableto develop and implement UNMIK policies.30

The impact of the Task Force can be seen, notably inthe ten joint OSCE/UNHCR public assessments of thesituation of minorities in Kosovo published between 1999and 2003. These are detailed descriptions of what washappening to each minority group during a critical peri-od. It is probable that during this period Kosovo hadmore in-depth assessment of the situation of its minoritiesthan anywhere else. This also led to minority issues beinga very high priority for both the UNHCR and theOSCE.

UNMIK increasingly set up its own structures focusedon minorities. In September 1999 it created Civil AffairsMinority Officers,31 renamed as Local Community Offi-cers in 2000. At the start of the administration, UNMIKhad a senior human rights adviser, who worked closelywith the OSCE. However, after he left, he was notreplaced, partly because of a disagreement between Prish-tine/Pristina, the OHCHR and the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO) over who should makethis appointment and what human rights qualificationswere required.32 During an interim period, UNMIKdeveloped an office that focused on human rights issuesin general, and returns in particular. At the end of 2001this was formalized into an ‘Office of Returns and Com-munities’, which took over from the UNHCR thecoordination of policy on returns, and has dealt withmore general issues affecting minorities. In December2001, UNMIK set up an Advisory Board on Communi-ties to provide policy advice on minority issues. Thishelped to develop policies on employment and pushthrough the anti-discrimination law.

As Kosovan institutions were set up, they includedorganized mechanisms to address minority issues. Themunicipal authorities set up in 2000 were required, bylaw, to set up a Communities Committee in each munici-pality. The Constitutional Framework required theKosovo Assembly to set up a Committee on the Rightsand Interests of Communities. The first PISG included aPrime Minister’s Advisory Office on Community Issues.

For a long period, approaches to minority issues in thegovernment departments remained haphazard. When theministries were still controlled by UNMIK, the Depart-ment of Health and Social Welfare was the first to create aposition of minorities’ adviser. In 2001, the OSCE andUNHCR noted an improvement in attempts to deal withminority issues in the Public Utilities Department. At theend of 2001, UNMIK created a Judicial Integration Sec-tion to improve minority access to the justice system. Butthese were, for some years, limited examples.

Another notable failure to integrate policy was oncoordination of gender and minority policy. Gender issues

do not appear to have been systematically coordinatedinto the institutional structures to address minority issues.Instead, separate structures were set up for gender issues,with little attempt to look at multiple discrimination.

On the issue of return of minorities, attempts weremade to coordinate policy from 2000 onwards. A JointCommittee on the Return of Kosovo Serbs (JCR) was setup, chaired by UNHCR and consisting of UNMIK, theOSCE, KFOR and Serb leaders. The title itself shows itwas designed as a political coordinating body, only focus-ing on one ethnic group. However, it did develop ageneral set of principles and, in 2001, changing its focusto the return of all the displaced, it became a Task Forceon Return and Reintegration, focusing on all communi-ties. Regional and Municipal Working Groups on Returnwere set up, to involve local authorities. In 2002,UNMIK, in the form of its Office on Returns and Com-munities, took over responsibility for this work. TheSRSG also appointed a Kosovo Serb as an Adviser onReturns in 2001. In January 2005 the PISG appointed aKosovo Serb as Minister for Returns and Communities.

Ethnic cleansing, the displacedand returnAt the heart of minority rights protection in Kosovo is thedisplacement that took place in 1999 and 2004 and thefailure to reverse this. It is therefore necessary to examinethis in some detail.

Between March and June 1999, it is estimated thatover 800,000 Albanians were expelled from Kosovo. Atleast 100,000 Serbs had also left Kosovo, fleeing thebombing.33 That was why a key component of the man-date and duties of UNMIK and KFOR was to ensure thereturn of the displaced. For the Albanians displaced dur-ing the spring, return took place rapidly – indeed, theinternational authorities originally tried to set up a con-trolled return but abandoned this as most of the displacedsimply returned when they saw the position was safe.

However, the arrival of UNMIK and KFOR saw anew mass exodus from and displacement within Kosovo,that of Kosovo’s minorities – particularly of Serbs, Romaand, in certain areas, Albanians. By October 1999 theYugoslav Red Cross stated that there were 234,000 Serband Roma internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Koso-vo in Serbia and Montenegro.34

The reasons for this were numerous. The departure ofthe FRY armed forces and administrators saw many Serbsleave immediately, fearing what might come afterwards.However, the main reason for the flight in 1999 was a sys-tematic campaign of intimidation against minorities,clearly intended to force them to leave either Kosovo as awhole or certain areas. The first wave of this intimidation

14 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

is documented at length by the OSCE and others.35 Itincluded verbal and physical intimidation, and the burn-ing and occupying of minority homes. The murder of 14Serb farmers when harvesting in Lipljan/Lipjan (centralKosovo) on 23 July 1999 was widely publicized. TheOSCE estimated the number of murders of minorities tobe at least 50 a week in the summer of 1999 and still atthree a week in October 1999.36

The outcome of this was that Kosovo became aprovince rigidly divided by ethnicity. Albanians fled fromSerb-dominated areas, notably the north ofMitrovice/Mitrovica city. Serbs fled from their homesacross Kosovo, with the effect that, outside the north,they became confined to enclaves. The largest of thesewas Strpce/Shtrpce in the south, and other Serb enclavesincluded the town of Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove (wherethey had formerly been a majority) and the centre of thetown of Rahovac/Orahovac (where they lived in whatamounted to a ghetto). In Prishtine/Pristina municipality,the estimated 50,000 Serbs living there in June 1999 hadbeen reduced to 600 by the end of October 1999.37 Twohighly publicized killings on the streets of Prishtine/Pristina in 1999 destroyed any remaining confidenceSerbs had in the ability of the international administra-tion to protect them. First was the killing of a newlyarrived Bulgarian UNMIK staff member in October, sup-posedly because his killers believed he was speakingSerbian. Then, on Albanian ‘Flag Day’ in November, aSerb family in Prishtine/Pristina were dragged from theircar by a crowd, who attacked them, shot one dead andburned their car. Despite the hundreds of witnesses tothis murder only one person was arrested, who subse-quently escaped from KFOR detention.38

The attacks and intimidation equally targeted theRoma,39 who were publicly blamed for being ‘collabora-tors’ with the Milosevic regime. Roma fled from theirhomes across Kosovo, and notably from the RomaMahalla (quarter) in south Mitrovice/Mitrovica city,which was burned down. The European Roma RightsCenter (ERRC) has described this ethnic cleansing as the‘single biggest catastrophe to befall the Romani commu-nity since World War II’.40

Bosniaks, Croats and Gora also felt under severe pres-sure during this period, with similar accounts of attacksand occupation of homes. The Croat community in Let-nica was described as suffering ‘despair and resignation’due to harassment and failure to obtain protection fromUNMIK and KFOR, and most left for Croatia.41

The minorities who left their homes became perma-nently displaced. Albanians and some Serbs went to otherhomes within Kosovo, but most Serbs and Croats went toCroatia and Serbia. Roma, with nowhere to go, oftenended up in displacement camps, most notoriously at Ple-

mentina in central Kosovo, where they suffered over-crowded conditions, with some camps being described asuninhabitable because of lead contamination.42

The minorities that remained lived in a situation ofextreme fear and violence. They felt unable to movefreely, due to fear of attack, and often relied on KFORarmed escorts to make the smallest journey. Someminorities, such as the few hundred remaining Serbs inPrishtine/Pristina, found themselves confined largely toa single apartment building, surrounded by armedforces. Minorities felt fearful about speaking their lan-guage in public for fear of attack. They also feltsystematically excluded from public services because ofboth their lack of freedom of movement and discrimina-tion in the services themselves.43

The overwhelming evidence is that the intimidationwas systematic and directly aimed at forcing minoritiesto leave, and therefore constitutes ethnic cleansing.44 Tounderstand who organized this and why it was allowedto happen it is necessary to understand who had powerin Kosovo in 1999. KFOR entered Kosovo quickly, as ithad an army in place on the border, which had beenready for a ground invasion. However, UNMIK did nothave administrative staff or police fully in place until2000 and was severely understaffed during 1999. Theresulting gap in civil and policing authority was filled bythose with weapons who were prepared to use intimida-tion to impose their authority, notably former membersof the KLA. They set up ‘shadow authorities’ across theAlbanian-majority parts of the province, including peo-ple who claimed police powers. In the Serb north, agroup known at times as ‘the Bridge-watchers’ seemed toassume authority, almost certainly with backing fromBelgrade. The OSCE clearly linked both groups to theharassment and eviction of minorities in their areas, aswas acknowledged by the then SRSG.45 The OSCEstates that ‘the evidence in part points to a careful target-ing of victims and an underlying intention to expel’ and‘A consistent reporting feature has been assumed UCKpresence and control.’ 46

What is striking about 1999, and has determinedevents in Kosovo ever since, is that neither UNMIK norKFOR was willing or able to take effective action.UNMIK was severely understaffed, particularly in termsof policing. KFOR, an international army, was gearedtowards defending Kosovo from Yugoslav forces, notdealing with systematic ethnic cleansing. KFOR’s onlyresponse in 1999 seems to have been to try to protectthe few remaining minorities through static checkpointsand escorts – and this was when KFOR was at its maxi-mum strength. No major attempt was made to publiclydemonstrate the new international rulers’ intolerance ofethnic cleansing, in particular through identification and

15MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

arrest of those responsible. Instead, by allowing theintimidation to continue, UNMIK and KFOR effective-ly showed they tolerated the ethnic cleansing anddivision of Kosovo. Despite being blamed for ethniccleansing by the OSCE, leaders of the KLA and, later,members of the Serb Bridge-watchers, were co-optedinto power. Many of the ‘shadow authorities’ that hadbeen linked to the intimidation of minorities were rec-ognized by UNMIK as the effective authorities in themunicipalities, at least until the first elections at the endof 2000. The KLA was guaranteed a fixed number of thefirst recruits to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). Mostnotoriously, although the KLA was officially disbandedin September 1999, a Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)was created. Although an official ‘civil defence’ force, ithas always been allowed to portray itself as the successorto the KLA and as an army (and indeed was initiallymonitored by KFOR), and, particularly in 1999, it car-ried out self-styled policing across Kosovo. Although theRegulation (1999/8) setting up the KPC stated that 10per cent of its members would be from minorities, itsemblems were very similar to the KLA’s (in Albaniancolours) and it was linked for a considerable period withattacks on minorities and other Albanians, and opposi-tion to the use of the Serbian language.47

UNMIK and KFOR seem to have been overwhelmedby the ethnic cleansing in 1999 and not known how toreverse it. Despite the evidence that ethnic cleansingneeds to be reversed quickly if it is to be reversed at all,no large-scale and systematic attempt was made to breakdown barriers, reverse the isolation of the minorities andallow them to return. The message that came from KFORand UNMIK was always that the time was ‘not ripe’ forreturn, and the divisions, particularly in Mitrovice/Mitro-vica city, hardened into firm lines on the map. This seemsto have been largely because of an unwillingness to takeon those leaders of Albanians and Serbs who were pro-moting the ethnic cleansing and segregation of Kosovo.

In subsequent years, minorities continued to leaveKosovo. The authorities found it difficult to provideminorities with the three ‘s’ words – security, space(homes) and sustainability – which are crucial not onlyfor return but also for ensuring that isolated communitiescan stay. Minorities continued to feel chronically insecure.Although attacks on minorities decreased from the veryhigh levels of 1999, very few ever felt able to travel andlive freely. Every so often new attacks would begin.Attempts made by UNMIK to assert its authority innorthern Kosovo, including Mitrovice/Mitrovica city,were invariably met with organized rioting and attacks. Anotable and public attack on minorities was the bombingin 2001 of the ‘Nis Express’ service connecting Serbs inisolated communities in central Kosovo with Serbia

proper. On the critical issue of confidence in the ability ofthe authorities to protect them, the minorities were neverable to feel assured. As will be set out below, in the criticalarea of homes – reclaiming occupied homes, rebuildingdestroyed homes and protecting minorities from forcedsales of homes – the international authorities did very lit-tle. The harassment leading to sales of homes resulted inmany minorities leaving, such as the Roma inFerizaj/Urosevac. And the fact of living in such condi-tions, often unable to travel, made day-to-day sustainableliving impossible, causing minorities to give up and leave.

On the return of the displaced minorities, very little wasdone in the critical early months; instead the displacedbecame more and more permanent. Before the creation ofthe JCR in mid 2000 there was no coordination and poli-cies were implemented haphazardly. For example, theBritish army had its own policy on the return of Serbs toPrishtine/Pristina, and the American office (Embassy) triedto set up its own return scheme of Serbs to a village in thenorth of the province. The JCR began to coordinate this,but for quite some time was focusing its attention on small-scale return to particular villages (notably in Istog/Istok)rather than addressing the major Kosovo-wide problems ofsecurity, property and discrimination.

One particular approach directly violated the rights ofthe minorities to return. The basic principle of everyKosovan having the right to return to their home was setout in Resolution 1244 and therefore UNMIK andKFOR were required to prioritize this. Yet the approachof many units of KFOR was to try to control this returnand, in particular, to say it could not take place untilKFOR had created a ‘safe and secure environment’.Sometimes this led KFOR to implement policies thatamounted to opposing returns. A notorious example wasGerman KFOR, in the south-west in 2000–1, whichoften portrayed return at that time as being ‘premature’and likely to lead to disturbances. Rather than dealingwith the disturbances, German KFOR instead tried toprevent return, through setting up checkpoints and moni-toring persons entering the Serb areas, to prevent anyone‘not authorized’ entering them. This was a serious viola-tion of the rights of all persons to determine when theywished to access and return to their homes. It was onlywhen the head of the OSCE and COMKFOR inter-vened, concerned about Serbs boycotting the 2001election, that German KFOR relaxed its policy.48

As stated above, gradually return policy became morecoordinated, particularly after the creation of the Officeon Returns and Communities. UNMIK and UNHCRproduced a manual for sustainable return in 2003. How-ever, it appeared that the number of returnees actuallywent down in 2002, although it increased a little in2003.49

16 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

March 2004

In early 2004, UNMIK was claiming much progress onthe rights of minorities. At a major international confer-ence, Jean-Christian Cady, UNMIK’s head of justice andpolicing said:

‘Kosovo is a good example of what the internationalcommunity and the United Nations can achieve tostop ethnic cleansing and build policy instrumentsthat will prevent it from occurring again.’ 50

Violence against ethnic groups seemed to have decreased.A set of laudable ‘Standards’ for Kosovo to achieve beforefuture status talks had been set out in 2003, including fullprotection of minority rights. However, what the deci-sion- makers were ignoring was that the big problems hadnot been resolved. Neither UNMIK nor KFOR hadensured that minority groups could exercise their right tolive freely in Kosovo, and only a few thousand hadreturned. Kosovo remained a fundamentally segregatedsociety. Even the Standards did not start from the positionof ending the segregation in Kosovan society, which wasbeing seen as almost inevitable. The warnings on this bybodies such as the Ombudsperson were largely ignored.

The failure of UNMIK and KFOR’s policies was dra-matically shown by a new wave of ethnic cleansing inMarch 2004, nearly five years after the internationalauthorities had taken over responsibility for Kosovo. Theviolence began following the reported deaths of threeAlbanian children and one Serb teenager. Within hours,groups of young Albanians attacked Serb, Roma andAshkalia communities across Kosovo. In what Kofi Annanlater described as an ‘organized, widespread and targetedcampaign’, homes and churches were burned down.51

Serbs, Roma and Ashkali fled in what, as in 1999, canonly be described as ethnic cleansing. One striking exam-ple was the departure of almost the entire remainingcommunity of Serbs in Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove. Theviolence left 19 dead, 954 wounded, 4,100 persons dis-placed, 550 homes destroyed, and 27 Orthodox churchesand monasteries burned.52

What was also notable was the almost complete failureof UNMIK and KFOR to prevent this. This was verysimilar to 1999. Although KFOR by 2004 had 18,000troops instead of over 40,000, it now had years of experi-ence in Kosovo. UNMIK had a fully functionaladministration and police service (the latter consisting ofinternational UNMIK police and the Kosovo Police Ser-vice). Yet report after report, set out in most detail byHuman Rights Watch, shows minorities saying that whenthey called for assistance, UNMIK and KFOR securityforces did not come, or if they did, they came late and

said they could only evacuate the minorities, not protectthem. Despite this disaster, the international communitycontinued to refuse to learn and apply the basic lessons,primarily the need for effective accountability and prose-cution of such crimes. Rather than take any responsibility,the blame was put entirely on the Kosovan politicians.Within the international administration there was anattempt to prevent the use of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’.53

The Standards were adopted, stating that ‘No one isabove the law’, and much of the damaged propertyrebuilt. However, once again the main issues causing seg-regation were not addressed. Two years later, very fewpeople have been convicted for the crimes that took placein March 2004 and those that have have been largely at alow level. One of the main reasons for this has been statedto be that the response of the international communitywas to set up a separate international police unit (in ajudicial system that was based on judicial, then on prose-cutorial investigation). This unit was disbanded inJanuary 2005, due to its ineffectiveness.54

The main decision taken by the international commu-nity in response to the ethnic cleansing was to decide toresolve Kosovo’s future status, but without any prior guar-antee of minority rights. Two years later, the segregationof Kosovo is more firmly entrenched than ever, and theethnic cleansing of 2004 has not been reversed.

Other issues

Security

‘The Parties undertake to take appropriate measures toprotect persons who may be subject to threats or acts ofdiscrimination, hostility or violence as a result of theirethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity.’ 55

In Kosovo, the critical issue for most minorities has beenthat of day-to-day security. Organized violence, harass-ment and attacks on property began at the start of theinternational administration and have continued eversince. Minorities do not feel adequately protected by theauthorities in Kosovo. As described above, organized sys-tematic ethnic cleansing took place in 1999 and 2004,but at all times ongoing insecurity has been chronic.What is critical is not only the actual insecurity but alsothe perception of minorities as to whether they can beadequately protected.

When one looks at the issue of security over the yearsone can see it coming in waves. After the first wave ofattacks in 1999, the authorities hailed a reduction towardsthe end of 1999. This was followed by a new outbreak ofviolence in February 2000, following an attack on aUNHCR-run bus for minorities. Later that year attacks

17MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

decreased, which was again hailed as a success. Once morethis was followed by a new wave of attacks on minorities,notably the bombing of the ‘Nis Express’ bus carryingSerbs in February 2001, in which 10 were killed. A fur-ther reduction in violence in 2003 ended with the attacksin March 2004 outlined above. It seems that, throughoutthe period, attacks have been organized.56 At no time canone speak of a situation of normality, with minorities feel-ing adequately safe and secure.

Apart from the day-to-day fear this has caused forminorities, forcing them to leave their homes and, if stay-ing in Kosovo, congregate in mono-ethnic enclaves, acritical outcome has been the restriction on freedom ofmovement. Minorities have felt afraid of moving freely,and needed escorts to do so. Again, apart from the viola-tion of a fundamental right, this has made it very difficultfor them to access employment and services, includinghealth, education and social assistance.

In nearly seven years, the international authoritieshave not come up with policies leading to a permanentand sustained increase in security for minorities. Respons-es have been hindered by the lack of coordination andconfused responsibility for security. In 1999–2000, a criti-cal issue was the failure of all countries to provideadequate police – UNMIK police did not become fullystaffed until late 2000. As stated above, KFOR was notmade subject to civilian control, so has operated indepen-dently. At the same time, and perhaps critically, for yearsKosovans were not made responsible for security. A Koso-vo Police Service was set up quickly and has a good recordfor recruitment of minorities. Yet giving it power has beenmuch slower. UNMIK retained direct control of security(policing) and justice, even after the creation of the PISG.Similarly, setting up a justice system has taken a very longtime.

It is therefore not surprising that the response of theauthorities to the minorities’ needs has been erratic.KFOR, which one should remember is made up ofarmies, not police forces,55 initially provided checkpoints,patrols and escorts. This was requested by minorities.Attempts have been made to deal with the issue of free-dom of movement by building new roads and, for aperiod, the UNHCR ran a bus service for minorities.58

Later, though, KFOR removed most of its permanentinstallations as troop numbers were reduced.

Some new laws have been passed to attempt to addressethnic hatred and supposedly make convictions easier.The first regulation on the prohibition on incitement toracial hatred has been rarely used though, as it is consid-ered to be badly drafted – it appears that UNMIK didnot use any of the numerous models available in the restof Europe. The Temporary Media Commissioner in Koso-vo did take action to fine newspapers for racial hatred,59

but again there seems to have been no coordinatedapproach.

The effect of the military measures that have beentaken has been to reinforce segregation. Unless the aimis for Kosovo to be a permanently divided armed camp,measures that separate communities cannot be muchmore than a temporary solution. The underlying prob-lems need to be addressed and they have not been.Most importantly, despite the overwhelming evidenceof the organized nature of the ethnic cleansing and vio-lence, no leaders have been prosecuted. While a fewpeople have been tried for attacks on minorities, theyseem to have been very low level. As stated above, theapproach seems to have been to co-opt into power thoseaccused of organizing the violence. Since 1999 therehave been allegations that attempts to investigate andarrest senior figures in Kosovo have been prevented forpolitical reasons.60

Segregation and discriminationRespect for minority rights aims at a society where every-one can speak his/her language, and practise their religionand culture without suffering any detriment. This meansintegrated societies, not societies that are rigidly dividedby ethnicity or religion. Worst of all can be division thataims at creating mono-ethnic areas. Almost invariably,minority rights within such areas are limited. The bestform of long-term stability in a society is integration withrespect for diversity. This requires effective measures totackle discrimination and to ensure that all groups haveaccess to public services and employment on an equalbasis.

UNMIK and KFOR have done very little to takemeasures towards an integrated society. After the March2004 ethnic cleansing, the then SRSG said ‘The conceptof a multiethnic Kosovo that the international communi-ty has been persistently attempting to implement inrecent years is no longer tenable.’ 61 In fact the interna-tional community, after a few attempts at the start of itsmission, has never really tried to create an integratedKosovo that allows all persons to live freely.

Instead the policies adopted have effectively reinforcedthe division of Kosovo into Albanian and Serb areas, withservices divided accordingly. Other minorities have beentreated as effectively second class.

The ethnic cleansing of 1999 led to Albanian and Serbareas. On a temporary basis, preserving such divisionsprobably made maintaining a modicum of security easier.Very little has been done to end such divisions, however.

From 1999, UNMIK and KFOR have allowed allaspects of Kosovo to become divided. This has been seenmost clearly in public services such as health and educa-tion. In July 1999, the majority of Serb and other

18 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

minority staff in Prishtine/Pristina hospital walked out,following numerous cases of intimidation and harassment.Reports of poor treatment for minorities were numerous.62

In Mitrovice/Mitrovica hospital in what had become aSerb area, Albanian staff and Albanian patients wereharassed, and a Serb leader said publicly that there shouldbe no Albanians in the hospital. KFOR proved unable todo anything about this and all Albanians left the hospitalin September 1999.63 Serb patients were banned from Gji-lan/Gnjilane hospital in September 1999. Rather thanaddress the issue of discrimination in the hospitals, theauthorities have preferred to allow separate systems todevelop. For example, after Serbs felt unable to use Prishtine/Pristina hospital, a health facility was set up inthe Serb village of Gracanica/Ulpijana.

The education system, divided since 1990, hasbecome even more so. As with so many other issues, noattempt was made to impose integration. UNMIK’s initialoverall ideal policy appears to have been to aim for ‘twoschools under one roof ’, in which different groups sharedthe buildings but had segregated classes.64 This itself is farfrom ideal as it promotes segregation, with differentknowledge of history, language and culture. But even thishas been impossible to introduce. In Mitrovice/Mitrovica,UNMIK announced mixed schools in September 1999.However, following a wave of violence instigated by Serbsin response, the policy was suspended a week later, show-ing once more that the international authorities wereintimidated by violence. Albanians were left with facilitiesin the south of a worse status than in the north.65 InPrizren, both Bosniaks and Turks reported harassmentand denial of education in their language.66 By 2000,Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian children were still largely notreceiving education.67 Roma girls suffered disproportion-ately.68 A system of parallel structures, where Serb schoolsare effectively run by Serb authorities, has been toleratedas a way of ensuring a modicum of public services toschools.

In employment, minorities lost their jobs en masse in1999. Attempts to remedy this have been quite limited,and often restricted to strict quotas. Mass discrimination,for example, is reported against the Roma in hiring bypublic and private employers and very little has been doneto address this. At least one Roma was told that ‘minority’jobs were meant for Serbs only.69

Since 1999, very little has been done to break downthis division. Most importantly, there has been no clearanti-discrimination strategy. The one significant step wasthe passing of an Anti-Discrimination Law in September2004.70 This event was one of the few examples wherethere was cooperation between international organizationsand the Kosovan government and international best prac-tice was used. The initial impetus for this law came from

the OSCE, which began pushing for such a law in 2000.71

The law was largely drafted by OSCE and the PrimeMinister’s Office. It relied heavily on EU standards andexperience.72 For political reasons, the main Serbian partyin the Assembly opposed the creation of an independentbody to help enforce the law.73 Other than that though,the law is generally good. It is one of the few areas whereKosovo has passed laws and policies in advance of most ofthe rest of Europe, based on understanding of what workselsewhere.

The law has scarcely been implemented, despite acommitment to do so under the 2004 Standards Imple-mentation Plan. The OSCE itself produced a plan for itsimplementation and organized training of judges. Yetthere is little record of a systematic take-up and changein policies among state officials, and not one legal casehas been brought.74 Nearly two years after the law waspassed, the PISG has finally produced a plan for itsimplementation.

PropertyWith the ethnic cleansing and near-permanent displace-ment of minorities from and within Kosovo, propertyissues have been among the most important. These comein three main areas.

First is the illegal occupation of homes formerlyowned/occupied by minorities. This is largely in the cities.Second is the destruction of minority-owned homes(mainly in the countryside), often followed by illegal con-struction on the site. Both these issues need to beaddressed before minorities can hope to return.

The final main issue has been the ongoing attempt todrive minorities out of parts of Kosovo through forcedsales – i.e. targeting minority areas and homes and harass-ing the owners until they sell their homes, often for pricesfar below the normal market value. This has been a criti-cal component of the ongoing departure of minoritiesfrom the province.

The international response to dealing with all of theabove has left a lot to be desired. In March 2004, afternearly five years of government, UNMIK stated that‘immovable property rights in Kosovo are not sufficientlyrespected or protected’.75 Return of occupied propertyrequires two steps: first that all property should be quick-ly, fairly and legally granted to its rightful owner; thenthat that owner should be allowed to use his/her propertyin the way s/he desires and, most importantly, that anyillegal occupiers should be evicted.

The international community, purporting to applylessons from Bosnia, decided in 1999 that the regularKosovo courts could not deal with the property claims.Instead, a complicated system involving a Housing andProperty Directorate (HPD) and a Housing Claims

19MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

Commission was set up to deal with residential propertyclaims. However, it was chronically under-funded fromthe start, particularly when compared with either the reg-ular courts, with minor return projects or with the vastamounts of money spent by the international communityon elections. The HPD did not open an office in thePrizren region (covering one-fifth of Kosovo) until Febru-ary 2003. Very few special arrangements were put in placeto ensure that minorities could use the system freely.When property titles were awarded, at times KFOR andUNMIK police refused to carry out eviction orders, fear-ing unrest.

On the issue of the reconstruction of destroyed homes,some of the vast sums of assistance money did go to thisvital issue. But it does not seem to have been well thoughtout or planned. At times minority homes were recon-structed and then immediately burned down.Notoriously, the European Agency for Reconstruction(EAR) insisted that all its projects be determined by themunicipal authorities, despite overwhelming evidence thatmany of these municipalities were biased against Serbsand other minorities.76 The result was that in 2000 anestimated 2 per cent of EAR assistance went to minoritiesand in 2001 only 3.7 per cent.77 Agencies funding andcarrying out reconstruction projects failed to understandand apply the concept of indirect discrimination. Theirpolicies, which they said treated everyone equally, endedup discriminating against minorities. One example of thiswas reconstruction agencies requiring everyone seekingassistance to present themselves in person, despite manyminorities being outside Kosovo or having major restric-tions on freedom of movement.

Finally, across Kosovo, minorities found themselvespressurized into forced sales of homes. At the root of thislay the fear of minorities for their security. With no confi-dence they would be protected by the authorities, theysuccumbed to pressure to sell their homes in order tomake money to start a new life elsewhere. In some partsof Kosovo there seemed to be a focused attempt to forceminorities to sell. Over the years this seemed, for exam-ple, particularly prevalent amongst the Serbs in KosovoPolje/Fushe Kosove. The OSCE and UNHCR describedwhat would happen: young Albanian men would visit aSerb home and politely offer to buy it. If refused, sometime later the house would be stoned. The men wouldreturn with a lower offer. Again, if this was refused, thestoning would continue until the Serbs sold. Such houseswere deliberately targeted to leave the remaining Serbsfeeling vulnerable.

The response of the authorities was to make the situa-tion of the minorities worse, through giving UNMIKMunicipal Administrators the power to refuse to registerinter-ethnic sales of homes.78 Ostensibly, this was done to

halt the continuing flight of minorities from large parts ofKosovo. However, internal consultations within UNMIKrevealed large-scale opposition to this. It was pointed outthat it violated the rights of minorities over their property,was discriminatory as it only applied in minority areas,and made the situation of minorities worse as they wouldstill leave but, being unable to sell their homes, wouldnow have no money. Above all, it addressed a symptomrather than the cause of the problem, which was the lackof security of minorities. Despite this, the law was pushedthrough by UNMIK at the behest of Serb leaders, whothreatened to boycott the 2001 elections otherwise. Theeffect could easily have been predicted. Serbs still leftKosovo, as they still faced security threats, but now foundthemselves without money as they were not able to selltheir homes. In fact it appears that the fear and uncertain-ty about this law led to a rise, not a reduction, in sales ofhomes by minorities.79 Short-term politics had again takenpriority over the rights of members of minorities and theirlong-term future.

Participation‘The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for theeffective participation of persons belonging to nationalminorities in cultural, social and economic life and inpublic affairs, in particular those affecting them.’ 80

The international community, as elsewhere in the world,stressed elections as the solution to Kosovo’s problems.Vast amounts of money and time were spent organizingmunicipal elections in 2000 and elections to the KosovoAssembly in 2001 (repeated in 2002 and 2004 respective-ly). The importance of ensuring minority participationwas recognized to some extent. Minority representationwas guaranteed in the municipal authorities and in theKosovo Assembly. However, it seems that in the secondround of municipal elections, minority representationdropped significantly.81

The Assembly has a complicated system of minorityrepresentation. It appeared to copy, to some degree, thatof Bosnia, based on guaranteed seats for named minoritygroups. It guarantees 10 seats for Serbs and 10 for ‘other’minorities, divided according to the relative size of com-munities, (Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians had four seats,Bosniaks three, Turks two, and Gora one). Minoritieswere also free to stand for the Assembly under the normalelectoral system. What the system could not address, ofcourse, were boycotts by minority groups. In 2000, theSerbs largely boycotted the municipal election. The SRSG therefore appointed Serbs to numerous municipalauthorities. In 2001 the Serbs did participate, voting over-whelmingly for a party called Povratak, which participatedin the Assembly. In 2004 the government of Serbia called

20 MINORITY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO UNDER INTERNATIONAL RULE

for a boycott of the Kosovo Assembly elections that waslargely adhered to.

What has been positive about the approach to partici-pation is that it has gone beyond simple representation inassemblies and attempted to ensure minority representa-tion in government. The original JIAS InterimAdministrative Council (four persons) eventually includeda Serb, Rada Trajkovic, and four of the initial co-heads ofdepartments (ministers) were minorities. The Constitu-tional Framework provides that, of the seven members of the Presidency of the Assembly, one shall be from aKosovo Serb party and one from a party representing‘non-Kosovo Albanians and non-Kosovo Serbs’. It alsorequires the Assembly to create a Committee on Rightsand Interests of Communities with two members fromeach community in the Assembly, which can review draftlaws in the light of communities’ interests. It requires atleast two ministers (three if there are more than 12 intotal) to be from ‘Communities other than the Commu-nity having a majority representation in the Assembly’,with one of these minority ministers being Serb and theother being from ‘another Community’. All of this hasbeen applied.

At municipal level, Regulation 2000/45 required eachmunicipal authority to set up a Communities Committeeand a Mediation Committee to represent minority inter-ests. However, the effectiveness of these seems to havebeen very limited. It was not helped by the fact that nocentral guidelines were in place.82

However, the right of minorities is the right of eachmember of the minority ‘to effectively participate in deci-sions affecting them’. This has not been achieved in Kosovofor several reasons. First, the right to participate has largelybeen the right of minority leaders to participate. Manydecisions have been held to have involved ‘minority partici-pation’ when only a few leaders were consulted. Before2001, very few of these leaders could claim any democraticaccountability, and even after 2001 there was not a cultureof accountability of leaders. A few attempts were made totry and speak to communities themselves, such as the Plat-form for Joint Action for the Roma, Ashkalia andEgyptians, but all of these proved short-lived and consistedof a few visits by leaders to communities, without sustainedinvolvement. It should be noted that the vast majority ofminority leaders have been men.

A notorious example of consultation was on the draft-ing of the Constitutional Framework in 2001. This setout the rights of communities (minorities) but was notput up for general consultation. Instead a small secretivegroup drafted it. Minority consultation consisted of dis-cussions with a few Serb leaders. Another example ofleaders making their own decisions was that of the leadersof the Povratak party to veto the creation of an indepen-

dent body to implement the anti-discrimination law. Thisdecision was made due to a general policy of opposingpermanent structures in Kosovo, but was hardly in thegeneral interest of Serbs. In 2003 the OSCE said that theelected minority representatives lacked accountability totheir electorate.83

Even more important, though, was the fact that, eventoday, the Kosovo PISG has very limited power. The Con-stitutional Framework that set up the PISG says nothingin it shall affect or diminish the authority of UNMIK orKFOR. The SRSG has the power to override the PISG atany time. He also has specific reserved powers, including:‘Full authority to ensure that the