2251303

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Mind ssociation

A Note on VerificationAuthor(s): Frederick C. CoplestonSource: Mind, Vol. 59, No. 236 (Oct., 1950), pp. 522-529Published by: on behalf of theOxford University Press Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251303Accessed: 06-01-2016 05:55 UTC

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2/9

V.-A NOTE ON

VERIFICATION

BY

FREDERICK .

COPLESTON,.J.

1. (i) IN Human Knowledge:

Its Scope

and

Limits

p. 167)

Lord

Russell

makes

a

distinction etween meaning

and

,significance

.

The significance f

a sentence esultsfrom

the meaningsof

its

words together

with

the laws of

syntax.

Althoughmeanings

must

be

derived rom xperience,ignificance

need not .

I

agree

withthis; though

certainly o not wish

to try o makeLord Russellresponsibleor ny use I maymake

of

this

distinction.

(ii) That meanings must be derived

n some way

from

experience

eems

to

me

to

follow from the facts of

human

psychology. Not

being prepared to accept the existence

of

innate

deas in

the

sense n whichLocke

attacked he hypothesis

of innate

deas,

I am

prepared o accept

the generalposition

f

Locke that

the two sources

of

our empiricalknowledge

re

sense-perception

nd

introspection. I

am

not prepared

to

dispensewiththe use of the latterterm.) In the concept

language

should aythatourconcepts

re

formed

n

dependence

on,

or

through

reflection

n,

the

data of

experience.

Some

experimental

atum

or data must be relevant o the formation

of

a

concept,

f

that

concept

s

to

be

intelligible

o

us.

In this

perhaps

ather

oose

sense

accept

Lord

Russell's

assertion hat

meanings

must

be derived

from xperience

.

(iii)

The

significance

f

a

sentence

eed not

be

directly

erived

from xperience.

In otherwords statementmay be significant

even thoughwe do not know whether t is true or false. If I

say

that there

re

galaxies receding

rom

s

so

fast

that no

light

from hem

an

possibly

eachus, experiences certainly elevant

to

the formation

f the ideas of

galaxies

, recession

,

speed , light , and the sentence

has significance; but

I

may not

know

whether he

sentence

s true or false. Let us

suppose that

the

sentence tates an hypothesis

ut forwardn

order

to

explain

certain observed

data.

The

hypothesis

hen

restson inference,.e. on reflectionn the data ofexperience.

(iv) In

order

hat the sentence hould

be significant ust

t

be verifiable

Obviously,

t

need

not be verifiable

n the

strong

sense

of the word verifiable

. Must t be verifiable

in the

weak sense of the word

?

If

the possibility f con-

522


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3/9

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON:

A NOTE ON VERIFICATION 523

ceiving or imagining acts

which would make the statement

true

will

count as

verifiabilityn the weak sense , then

I

should ay that the sentence, o be significant, ustbe verifiable

in

the

weak

sense. Perhaps

may refer o an examplewhich

have

used

elsewhere,

nd

which

think hat musthave borrowed

unconsciously rom he

above-mentioned orkof Lord iRussell.

If

I

make

the statement,There will be a war in which tomic

and

hydrogen ombs will be employed nd whichwill blot out

the

whole human

race this

statement cannot be

verified

(i.e. cannot be knownwhethert is true or false),because there

wouldbe nobody o verifyt,werethe prophecy o be fulfilled.

It may

be

said, of course, hat I am unjustifiably isregarding

the

possibility

f there

being

ntelligent eings on, say, Mars,

who mightbe able to verify

he statement; but it is quite un-

necessary

o

introduce

onsideration f such beings; the state-

ment

s

intelligible o

us

because we

can conceive or imagine

facts

whichwould

render

t true or false.

I

should not myself

call

this

verification,ecause,

in order

to imaginethe facts,

have to introduce

myself,

urreptitiously,

s a

background

observer,whereas condition f the fulfilmentf theprophecy

is that

no human

being

should be

alive. However,

f

anyone

wishes

o

count the

conceiving

r

imagining f the facts which

would render

hestatement rue

or falseas verifiabilityn the

weak

sense

,

I

should not wish

to quarrelwithhim.

I

should

regard

t as

a

matter f

terminology.

2.

I wish

now to examine

one or two statements

n

the light

of the

remarks

have

just

made.

(i) Suppose that A says,

There

s an

invisible nd intangible

footballfloatingn the air exactly hreefeetabove myhead

,

and

that

he

intends

to affirmy this that the football

s ab-

solutely mperceptible.

(a)

The

meanings of

words

like

football , floating

,

air ,

and head

are derivedfrom

xperience.

We know

by experience

what it means

to

say

of

something

hat it

is a

football .

Or, if we

do

not

happen

to have seen

a

football,

it

can be

explained

to

us what

a

football

s, provided

hat the

explanations given ous interms fwhat we have experienced.

(b)

This

being so,

A's

assertion

may appear

at first

hearing

to

be

significant;

t is

not

obviously

nonsensical

n

the

sense

that

Bax, cax,

bax

is

nonsensical.

We

understand he

words

football

etc.

and

it

may

seem

to

us, therefore,

hat

A

has

made a

significanttatement,

he

contradictory

f

which

would also be

significant.

Because

the words

have

meanings,

the

sentence

eems

to state

something, omething

which

could



8/19/2019 2251303

4/9

524

FREDERICK

C.

COPLESTON:

also be

denied.

Bax,

cax,

bax

,

however,

tates

nothing.;

and

because

t

statesnothing,

t

is

impossible o

deny

t.

(c) But, f applythetestofaskingwhether canconceive r

imagine

ny

facts which

would render

A's

statement

rue

or

false, he

answer

must

be, I

think,

hat I

cannot.

Why

not

?

Because

the

word

football

means

something

erceptible.

The

Concise

Oxford

Dictionarydefines

football

s a

large

round

r

elliptical

nflated

all

;

and

itis

obviously

onsensical

to

say

of an

object

of

this

kind,

specially

f

one

adds

that

it is

made

of

leather,

hat

it is

absolutely

mperceptible. f

it

is

proper o say of somethinghat it is a football, t cannotbe

proper

o

say

of

t

that

t is

imperceptible

y

anyof

the

senses.

And

if

t is

proper

o

say

of

anything

hat

t is

imperceptible,

t

cannot

be a

football.

Therefore,

ince

he

phrase an

absolutely

imperceptibleootball is

analogous

to

the

phrase

a

round

square ,

I

cannot

conceive

f

any

factsor

circumstances

hich

would

make

t true

o

say

that

here

s

an

absolutely

mperceptible

football either

floating

n

the air

or

existing

anywhere

lse.

Therefore 's

assertions

nonsensical,

hough

t is

not nonsensical

in exactly he samesensethat Bax, cax, bax is nonsensical.

(ii)

Suppose

that

B

says:

In

everything

f

which

t

is

true

to

say

that t

is

a

human

being,

here

s

a

spiritual

oul.

(a)

Is

B's

assertion

nonsensical n

the sense

that

Bax,

cax,

bax is

nonsensical

If

it

were,

this

could

only

be

because

the

phrase

spiritual

oul is

a

mere

latus

vnocis.

f

this were

so,

no

explanation

ould be

given

f ts

meaning.

But,

f B

says,

I think

hat

every

human

being

s

capable

of

exercising

ertain

activities,

he existence

nd character

f

which can

be

known

by experience; and I think hatthcseactivitiesmust be attri-

buted

to

something

whichdoes

not fall

into the class

of those

things

f which

t is

proper

o

say that

they

are

material;

and

that

'

something

I call a

'

spiritual

soul

,

he

has

given

a

meaning

o

the

phrase

spiritual

oul

.

I am

not in

the

least

concerned ow

with

the

validity

or

invalidity

f

B's

inference:

what wish

to

point

out

is

that,

whether

he inferences

valid

or

invalid,

ome

experiential

ata are

relevant

o

the

formation

ofthe dea spiritual oul , andthatthe dea is formedhrough

reflection

n the

data

of

experience.

I

think,

hen,

hat the

dea

or

concept

of

spiritual

soul

fulfils

he

-requirements

or

intelligibility

r

meaningfulnesshich

postulated

arlier

n

these

notes.

If

this

s

the

case,

B's

assertion s

not

nonsensicaln

the

same

sense

that

Bax,

cax,

bax is

nonsensical.

(b)

Is

B's

assertion onsensicaln

the

sense

hat A's

statement

about

the

football s

nonsensical

At first

earing

perhaps

t



8/19/2019 2251303

5/9

A NOTE ON VERIFICATION 525

may

be. For

t

might

eem

hat

f t

is

proper

o

say

of

nything

thatit

is a

spiritual

oul

,

it

cannot

be

proper

o

speak

of

t

at thesametime.asbeing in anything. But,whenB asserts

that

in

every

human

being

there s

a

spiritual oul,

he means

that

any given

human

being

xercises ertain

ctivities,

r can do

so,

which

must

be

attributed o

a

spiritual

oul,of

which t

is

proper o say that it

is

the spiritual oul of that

human

being

because t

s

the

principle

f

activities xclusively

ssociated

with

that

human

being.

He does

not

mean

that

the soul is in

the

body

in

the

same sense

that

the

tea is

in

the

pot,

or

that it is

situated t the pinealgland. (If

he

is

a

Scholastic,

e also

meansof

course,

hat the

spiritual

oul exercisesvital

functions,he

relation

f which o the soul makes

t proper o say, giventhe

limitations

f

anguage, hat the

soul is in the

body.)

(c) Can

one

imagine

r

conceive

acts

whichwould

render 's

assertion

rue

or

false,

r

at

least whichwould

tend

to confirm

r

di3confirmt

?

One

cannot,

f

course, magine spiritual oul;

for

nythingmagined

must

be

pictured

s

material,

ven

f

t is

pictured

as

very thin

,

like

Anaxagoras'

Nous.

But

I

at

least can conceivethe possibility f there being certainex-

periencable

human

activities,

which

would

reveal

the

existence

of

a

spiritual oul,

or

from

which

one

might

nfer

he

existence

of

a

spiritual

oul.

At the mention

f

inference

in

this connection can well

imaoine a

raising

of

eyebrows.

But

my

main

point

in these

notes

is

to

suggestthat, though the

modern

discussion

of

meaning is

certainly

aluable,

nd

though t

has

made clearer

certain cute difficultieshich

onfronthe

metaphysician

n his

use of anguage, t has not,so faras metaphysicss concerned,

revolutionized

he

situation ince

Kant's criticism

f

metaphysics

in

the

way

that

t is

sometimes

upposed

o

have done. I

wish

to

illustrate

my point.

3.

(i)

Let us

suppose hat

someone, ,

makes

he two

following

metaphysical

tatements: There s a spiritual oul in

man

,

and

Absolute

being

exists

. His

friend

,

who

accepts

the

principle

f

verifiability,sks him what facts would

verify r

falsify,

onfirm n

disconfirm,

is

statements. C answers

hat,

if there s a spiritual oul in man, it will be foundthat man

exercises,

r

can exercise, ertain ctivitieswhichmustbe

ascribed

to a

spiritual rinciple;

and he

cites

s

examples

f

these

ctivi-

ties

mathematical

easoning

nd

the

passing

fmoral

udgments.

He also affirms

hat,

f

absolute

being xists, t

willbe found

hat

contingent

eings

exist

or

that

at

least one contingent eing

existis. A discussion nsues

betweenC and D. If C

takes as



8/19/2019 2251303

6/9

526

FREDERICK

C.

COPLESTON:

examples

of certain

activities

mathematical easoning

nd

the

passing

of

moral

udgments,

hey

will

probably

gree

as to

thefactthatman is capable of mathematical easoningnd of

passing

moral

udgments,

ven

f

there

s

some

dispute

s

to

the

meaning

of the

words

man

, capable

of and

moral

judgments

.

When

they

come

to

discuss

the

statement

hat

at

least

one

contingent

eing

xists,

hey

may

or

may

not

agree;

but

they

will

be

discussing

statement

he

truth

of

which,

C

would

claim,

s

verifiable

y

reference

o

expeiience.

(ii)

At thispoint

D observes

hat,

f

C is

offering

he

statement

that at least one contingent eingexistsas an observation-

statement

,

then,

whether

t

is

an

observation-statement

or not,

he is

equivalently

aying

that

the

statement

hat

a

contingent

eing

exists

can

be

logically

derived

from

he

state-

ment

that

absolute

being

exists.

C

answers

hat

he

does

not

mean

o mply

his. What

he means

s this.

Our

deas

are

formed

in

dependence

n

experience

nd

through

eflection

n

the

data

of

experience.

Accordingly,

f

he

makes

the

statement

that

absolute

being

exists,

this

must,

for

psychological

reasons

(omittingll considerationf mmediatentuitionrofrevelation)

be

due

to

his

recognition

f some

aspect

or feature

f

empirical

reality,

eflection

n which

eads

him

to

make

the

statement.

If,

then,

the

statement

s

made

that

absolute

being

exists,

one

can,

n

a

sense,

derive

the

statement

hat

at least

one

contin-

gent

being

xists,

not

because

one

can

logically

educe

the

atter

statement

rom

heformer tatement,

ut

because

the

existence

of

absolutebeing

could

not

be

normally

nown

or

thought

f

unless

the existence

of

contingent

eing

were first

ecognised.

Similarly,fwesuppose hatthere snodirectmmediatentuition

of

a

spiritual

oul,

nd

if we leave

revelation

ut

of

account,

he

statement

hat

there

s

a

spiritual

oul

in man

wouldnot,

for

psychological

easons,

be made,

unless

there

were

a

previous

recognition

fthe

existence

f

certain

bservable

ctivities

which

the

man

whomakes

thestatement

ounts

s

spiritual

ctivities.

One can,

then,

n a

sense,

derive

the statement

hat

man

is

capable

of

exercising

ctivities

f

a

certain

kind

from

he

state-

ment that there s a spiritual oul in man; but

this

does

not

mean that

one

can

deduce logically

from he

statement hat

there

s

a

spiritual

oul

in

man the statement

hat

every

man

-exercises

n

fact certain

ctivities.

Nor

does it

signify

hat

the

statement

hat

there

is a spiritual

soul

in

man

is

precisely

equivalent

to

the statement

hat,

for

example,

man is

capable

mathematical

easoning.

(iii)

C

having

xplained

n

what

sense he

thinks hat

his

yeri-



8/19/2019 2251303

7/9

-A NOTE ON VERIFICATION 527

fiable

statements

an be derived

from the metaphysical

statements

which he

originallymade,

he

and

D

continueto

discuss these verifiable tatements n the followingform:

Man

is

capable

of

mathematical

reasoning nd of passing

moral

udgments ,

and at least

one

contingent eingexists

.

Let

us

suppose

that C

gives

a

definition

f

the

meaning he

attaches

to the

phrase contingent eing which s acceptable

to

D,

and that theyfinally gree

on the truth f the

statements

that man

is

capable

of mathematical

easoning

nd

of

passing

moral

udgments,

nd

that

at

least one

contingent eing exists.

This measureofagreement avingbeen attained,D goes on

to

say

that

he

seesno reasonwhatsoever

or

oncluding rom hese

two statements espectively

he statements

hat there is a

spiritual

soul in man and that

absolute

being exists

.

The

factson which

hey

have

agreed

are

not such as to

render

true

or false either

he

statement hat

there s a

spiritual oul

in

man

or

that absolute

being

exists.

(iv) Leaving

C and

D

to arguethevalidity fthe

inferences

in question,

wish

o

give

two

syllogisticrguments,

n

order o

showwhat I thinkC and D have been about, in the language

ofthe

syllogism,

nd in order o make clear

my

conclusion. The

syllogisms,

he

validity

of

whicth

do

not

presuppose,

s

it is

irrelevant

o

the

point

want to

make,

are

these.

(a)

There

s a

spiritual

oul

in

man if man

is

capable

of

exer-

cising

mathematical

easoning

nd of

passing

moral

udgments

But

man

is

capable

of mathematical

easoning

nd of

passing

moral

udgments:

Therefore

here

s a

spiritual

oul n man.

(b) Ifat leastonecontingenteing xists, bsolutebeing xists:

But

at

least one

contingent eing

xists:

Therefore

bsolute

being

exists.

(a)

I

supposed

hat

C and

D

reached

greement

s

to

the

facts

that

man

is

capable

of

mathematical

easoning

nd

of

passing

moral

udgments,

nd

that at least

one

contingent eing exists.

In

other

words, hey

reached

agreement

s

to

the

truthof

the

minor

remisses

f

the two

syllogisms iven

bove.

(b) We left

C and

D

arguingbout

the

validity

f

heexistence

of a spiritual soul from man's capability of mathematical

reasoning

nd

of

passing

moral

udgments

nd

the

existence

f

absolutebeing

from

he existence

f

contingent eing.

In

other

words,

we left hem

arguing

bout the

truth

of

the

major pre-

misses f the

two

syllogisms iven

bove.

(vi)

From

the

foregoing

draw

the

following onclusions,

using

he

language

of

the syllogism.



8/19/2019 2251303

8/9

528

FREDERICK

C.

COPLESTON:

(a)

Whenthe

logical

positivist

hallenges

he

metaphysician

to derive

an

observation-statement from his

meta-

physical tatement, e is askingthe metaphysician o provide

the minor

premiss

which,given

man's

psychological

make-up,

is

an

indispensable

ondition f

a valid

metaphysical

rgument.

(b)

When he

challenges

he

metaphysician's

nference,

e is

asking

him

to

give

a

theoretical

ustification

f an

implied

major

premiss,

which tatesan

inference.

(c)

It

was

Kant's

conviction

hat

inferences

f this

sort

are

not valid

or

theoretically ustifiable.

I

submit, then,

that

Kant's problem, amely heproblem fmetaphysicalrgument,

remains he

fundamental

roblem

for

the

metaphysician,

nd

that

hemodern

hifting

f

ttention o

the

problem

f

meaning

has

not

really

uperseded

he older

pproach.

I

think

hat this

conclusion

s

confirmed

y

what seems o

me

to be

the

fact

hat,

when a

metaphysician

rgues

witha

logical

positivist, he dis-

cussion

nevitably

omes o

turn

round he

question

f

nference

or

of

metaphysical

rgument

.

In

the

case of

metaphysician

who admits that

all

our factual

knowledge

s

in

some

way

empiricallyrounded,his s inevitable. Moreover,fthere s a

certain

loosening-up

or

an

inclination o a

greater

egree

of

toleration

n

logical

positivist

ircles n

regard

o

the

meaning

f

meaning,

nd

if

this

process

ontinues,

t will

gradually ecome

more

apparent,

think,

that the

Kantian line

of

attack

on

metaphysics

emains

he

fundamentaline

of

attack

and

presents

the

fundamental

roblem

or he

metaphysician.

The

language

in which he

ogical

positivist

xpresses

is

attackon

metaphysics

may

not

be

the

anguage

f

Kant;

butthe

substance

emains

he

same.

CONCLUSION

It

may

be

said

that all

this s

very

rivial, n

the

ground

hat

every

philosopher

owadays

must take

the

validity

f

Kantian

criticism

s a

starting-point.

ut,

apart

from he

fact

that

the

statement hat

every

philosopher

must

presuppose

he

validity

of

the

Kantian criticism

f

metaphysics

s

not

a

self-evident

proposition,he metaphysician annotescape the necessity f

metaphysical

rgument,

ven f

he

tries

o

conceal

he use

of

uch

argument.

It

is ofno real

help

to

him

o

propound

metaphysical

theories

imply

s

hypotheses

nd to

say

that

he

does

not

pretend

to

prove

them.

Unless

a

metaphysical

heory

ccountsfor

somefact n

or

some

feature

f

empirical

eality,

t can

pro-fitably

be

subjected

to

treatmentwith

Ockham's

razor.

But,

if

it



8/19/2019 2251303

9/9

A NOTE

ON VERIFICATION

529

accounts,

ven fonlywith

probability,

or ome

fact n or some

feature f empirical

eality, he

metaphysicianmay

justly

be

calledupontoshow hatthis sthecase. This means hathewill

have

to

give

a

metaphysicalrgument

,

whether e

supposes

that

the conclusion s established

with probability

r with

cer-

tainty.

If

such

argument

s

possible,

wcll and good:

if it

is

not possible,

he

principlef economy

hould

be applied

to

meta-

physical

heories.

It is not my purpose

o

discuss hequestion

whetheruch argument

s

possible

r not: my purpose

has been

to

show

that the

problem f the

validityof

metaphysicalrgu-

ment emains he fundamentalroblemn regard ometaphysics.

Heythrop

ollege.

INDIAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

CONGRESS.

The

Indian

Philosophical ongress

will

be

celebratingts SilverJubilee

in its Twenty-fifth

ession next December

t Calcutta

n

the

week pre-

ceding Christmas

nder the

auspices of the Calcutta

University.

On

this

occasion,

he

Indian

Philosophical

ongress reets hilosophers

oth

in

India

and

abroad;

and

cordially

nvites hilosophers

rom

broad,

n

particular,o attend ndparticipaten its SilverJubilee ession.

N.

A.

NIKAM, Secretary.

MIND

ASSOCIATION

Those

who wish to

join

the

Association

houldcommunicate

iththe

Hon.

Treasurer,

r.

J.

D.

MABBOTT, St. John'sCollege,

Oxford, o whom

the

yearly

ubscription

f

sixteen

hillingspayable

n advance)

houldbe

sent.

Cheques

hould

e

made

payable

o theMindAssociation. Members

may pay

a

Life

Composition

f ?16 instead

of the annual

subscription.

The annualsubscription aybe paid by Banker'sOrder; forms or his

purpose

an

be

obtained

rom he

Hon. Treasurer.

In

return or

heir

ubscriptions

embers eceiveMIND gratis nd post

free, nd (if of 3

years' standing)

re entitled o

buy back

numbers f

both he Old

and

the New Series

t half-price,

f till n stock.

The

Hon. Secretary

f

the

Associations Mr.

KAIL

BRITTON, University

College,

wansea.

Members

esident

n

U.S;A.

may

pay

the subscription

$2.80)

to the

Hon.

Assistant-Treasurer,

rof. B.

Blanshard,Dept. of

Phil., Yale

University, ew Haven, Conn.

NOTES

At the Annual

Meeting f

the Mind

Association

eld at Bristol

University

n

July,

950, Professor

. C. J.

Webb

was

elected

s

an

HonoraryMember

f the

Mind

Association.

Professor

Webb

was one of

the

foundation

members f the

Mind

Asscciation.

34

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