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Alternatives 2008),233-248

Toward the End of War?Peeking Through the GapPertti Joenniemi*

The concept ofw ris clearly not its oldself.The recent debateindicates with considerable clarity that there no longer exists asuperior position from which to authoritatively enforce a dom-inant and broadly accepted definition. The most profoundchallenges consist of the claims that the concept has had itsdays and should accordingly be abandoned. In addition toexploring the background of this critique, the article aims toevaluate what accounts for the openness in the first place. Theeffort is to probe the broader constellations underpinn ing warand in particular the nexus between war and the state in orderto trace possible changes. The article argues that these broaderconstellations provide a firm er basis for arriving at conclusionsabout both the nature of the debate and the future ofw ras afundam ental political and social concept.KEYWORDS:war state,discursive structures, modernity, postmodernity

The concept of war no longer conveys meaning the way it formerlydid. It is no longer of help, the argument goes, if one is to makesense of recen t events. With the breakdown of many certainties con-structed in the name ofwar a static concept is unlikely to be an ade-quate guide for future challenges. Pressure to unravel establishedways of comprehending war is building. The discursive structuresunderpinning the concept have become less restrained, allowing itto be questioned on both ontological and epistemological grounds.This critique is accompanied by efforts to rename and differen-tiate among various forms of political violence. A variety of voiceshave asserted that a breaking po int has em erged . The ir claims indi-

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profound counterdiscourses. Critics find the concept unconvincingand assert that it is out of touch with the essence of contemporaryconflicts. The commonplace understanding is, therefore, to be rel-egated to the dustbin of history to make room for other, and so farless-established, forms of meaning. War, as a concept, is understoodto have becom e obsolete ; it is seen as be ing on its way to dyingout, or being regarded as having en tere d the process of bein g dis-inv en ted . ' Allegedly, War is not only in transi tion, it is in a crisis. 2The recent debate concerning the essence of war clearly indi-cates that a superior position from which to authoritatively enforce adom inant and broadly accepted defmition no longer exists. Th e pre-vious self-evidence of the concept of war, and its assumed contin-gency, has become unsustainable; what remains are multiple, con-tend ing conceptualizations. Rather than a fixed, single poin tconcept, with considerable resilience, war has become unfixed and multiperspectival. Several constitutive logics simultaneously strug-gle with each other over the meaning of war. In fact, one mightspeak of a certain postm odernization of war or, for that matter, ofdevelopments that reach beyond modernity wherein war appears inboth pre- and postmodern forms. The emergence of many newcoinages indicates varied attempts to grasp the essence ofwar Forinsta nce , phrases such as new wars, cyber wars, asymm etricwars, post-Clausewitzian wars, postnational wars, hybrid wars,pre-emptive wars, imm anent wars, liberal wars, hum anita rianwars, and global wars point to the notion that con tem pora ry warsare un ders too d differently from earlier ones. War is no longer tobe treated as an ideal type con cep t in a Weberian sense. The mean-ing of this fundamental category of political and social discourse isshifting.This conceptual renewalpart of the search for new, interpre-tative categories also includes coinages such as network wars, aphrase developed to stay current with rapid societal and technolog-ical transformation.3 T he conc ept of network wars echoes talk ofa revolution in military affairs and has had a con siderable impac ton military m achin eries. Likewise, the phrase fourth-generationwar emphasizes chang es in the sph ere of informa tion technology,complexity science, and the organizational logic of network society. ^The conce pts spectacle war and virtual war 5 stress images as a

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economy, public and private, as well as peace and war) requires abrand-new vocabulary if one is to differentiate between variousforms of collective violence.The conceptual diffusion and fragmentation that have, over therecent years, been conducive to efforts of redefinition include thecollaborative scholarly platform called Dictionary of War. This webendeavor departs quite explicitly from the idea that (modern) war,as an arm ed confrontation between sovereign states, is ou tda ted. Atthe same time, the project asserts that there is no peace as cu rre ntdevelopm ents are rife with political violence of various kinds. War isnot seen as an isolated occurrence disrupting a state of peace, but aconstant presence imbricated and deeply rooted in social relations.In viewing the alm ost ever-present war as a con stitutive form of anew order, the dictionary challenges established pe rcep tions bycoining one hundred articulations regarding the issue of war. Inother words, it generates a plentitude of terms for war, therebyadding considerably to the linguistic resources available. This allowsone to remain abreast of the many unprecedented developmentsthat increasingly exceed established definitions. The dictionaryasserts that new and increasingly rich vocabularies are needed nowthat war exists as a plurality. Modernity has lost control in a dualsense: War is neither disappearing nor taking expected forms.

The dictionary project signals, more generally, that, with the pro-liferation and blurring of established borderlines, war does not meanthe same thing in all times and places. Rather than being confined toits own place and time, it permeates the normality of the politicalprocess. No doubt, the dictionary approaches the issue in a produc-tive manner. This approach differs from other critics, such as Christo-pher Coker, Kalevi Holsti, or Martin van Crevald. While the dictio-nary celebrates the virtues of complexity and broadens the repertoireof linguistic resources and meanings useful to learning what war isabout, the critics tend to favor parsimony and opt for the return ofprecise and stable meanings. Perhaps they find the plentitude aspiredfor through endeavors such as the D ictionary of War quite disturbing.In their view, the concept of war has been deprived of any real sub-stance through the banishment of crucial limits and boundaries.Rather than being broadened and made increasingly fluid, they sug-gest that it needs further restraints and increasing distinctions; thatit needs to be redrawn and fixed within the context of other concep-

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through undisputed and intersubjectively shared meanings. One is,consequently, asked to imagine change reaching beyond what hasbeen imaginable within war's previously established meaning andattendant social continuities.

Key Constellation of ConceptsMy aim is no t to pass judg m en t on these two app roach es and waysof reacting to war, but to investigate the gap that has emerged sincethe discourse on war lost its power to categorically oust alternativearticulations. I attempt to explore these openings through the con-troversy over established ways of thinking about war.

The increasingly contested nature of the concept of war signalsthe extensive change it is undergoing. The question of how far-reaching these changes are remains unanswered. Are we basicallytalking about a cyclical phenomenon observed many times beforewith contestation and the telling of dystopies in fact contributing tothe survival of the concept? Can the concept accommodate thesepressures in its established form without collapsing as a meaningfulcommunicative device? Or, does the more recent discord reallypoint to a genuine implosion? Has this crucial signifier been frac-tured beyond repair, thus indicating that war as a comm only u nde r-stood con cep t is well on its way to becom ing history?In examining these questions, I neither want to privilege norstake out a particular definition ofwar Instead, I approach the con-cep t as socially construc ted. Since war is historically n ego tiated andculturally de pe nd en t, it may well display signs of contingency over a

considerable period of time. It is part of a discourse (such as theHobbesian emphasis on the state of nature being inherently violentand confiictual) that rend ers war as som ething largely inevitable. Itremains, nonetheless, adjustable and malleable to changing circum-stances. These qualities require that waris,from time to time, openedup and repacked.8 The concept has to be re-found to remain vitaland ofvalue.There is, therefore, nothing particularly surprising about thedoubts surrounding the concept of war since the Cold War and9 / 1 1 . Previously well-established fault lines have been thrown into

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context. This type of discourse differs in that it fails to contributeto increasing the number of options. Such an approach neitherattempts to stake out a particular definition, nor does it aspire tocoin new possibilities for restabilizing the meaning ofwar.Instead, itopenly raises an ontological question about war as a major aspect ofbeing. The core issue to be addressed is, therefore, how talk of rup-turing the surface emerges at all. What provides such articulationswith legitimacy in the discourse? Do these claims have any chance ofgaining broader credibility?The alleged demise of war tends to lack credibility because,among other reasons, it would undermine a considerable number

of certainties c onstructed in its nam e. A breakdown would bring, inaddition to considerable ontological anxiety, difficulties for manyoth er key concep ts essential to defining what politics is about. Ifw rbecom es ambivalent or outdated , a variety of contem pora ry securitypractices, as well as a considerable number of other, more generalefforts of ordering, would run into trouble. The concept would nolonger be productive in thinking about a contingent future. Froma different perspective, the rupture would also open up new modesof thinking. Even more forcefully than has already been the case,articulations that pertain to particular instances ( 9 / 1 1 , for instance)would take precedence over more neu tral terms, such as conflict,campaign, or concepts like risk, and crime. Such specific artic-ulations are bound to grow in significance in order to fill the voidthat has emerged.

Through questioning this alleged gap, my approach treats theconcept of war as part of a distinct discursive structure and constel-lation of core ideas that regulate what can be meaningfully said.^Such deep connections to conceptions in other fields make the con-cept of war convincing and easy to reproduce over a long period oftime. These links, or ove rarching codes, consist of a large collectionof concepts such as politics, reason, and international. In oth erwords, the meaning of war is established and upheldor, for thatmatter, thrown out of balancewithin this discursive universe ofrelated ideas.In this context, focusing on a plurality of key ideas would pro-vide a very detailed and comprehensive picture. It would alsosignificantly contribute to the complexity of analyses. My aim is to delimitthe constellation of concepts to the extreme, thereby condensing

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been the pair that determines contingency and fragility. War isresilient if the link between war and the state remains unproblem-atic. Conversely, the concept of war can no longer be articulatedwith the same level of confidence if it is severed from the concept ofthe state.

Fram ing arly WarClearly, regulation and differentiation have the greatest impact on var-ious descriptions of the historical trajectory ofwar These two ways offraming are used in many historiographie efforts of outlining whatw ris about and how it has evolved. They create a rather linear renditionof the concept, despite the presence of some conflicting elements.This narrative presents war as undergoing a process of narrowingdown. War moves from being something rather unconstrained intovarious, more regulated, instrumental, and modern forms. Overall,the initial expressive, s wellas existential, forms are minimized so thatwar may appear easier to frame and comprehend.^

Th ere is some degre e of differentiation pre sen t in the histori-ography ofw rfrom the very beginning. This allows the concept ofwar to refer to something more organized and sanctioned than indi-vidual acts of killing, murder, or random forms of massacre. Wide-spread use of the termprimitiv in various efforts to categorize theearly phases of war ind icates , however, that this differentiationremains quite mild. The accounts primarily comprise descriptionsof a broad variety of cases of violent conflict w ithout narrowing thecases down into any specific pa ttern or form of war. W ith littleregularity in tracing the entities involved in the conduct of vio-lenceor the grievances fought aboutthere is scarce ground for anuanced framing of war. Similarly, wars far back in history have oftenbeen cast as chaotic or rega rde d as generally pa rt of the hum ancondition. Additionally, factors such as bravery, chivalry, and heroicself-sacrifice have dominated these renditions, which contribute toan un derstand ing of war as purposeful and instrum ental. Unsurpris-ingly, concepts such as feud are used in para llel with war in thevocabularies adopted in these accounts.'2Furthermore, in depictions of war as part of a plurality of con-

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Notably, efforts to define war (during its early phases) throughexclusion have not fared much better. In its modern form, the con-cept refers to a crisis, points to a moment of existential danger, oraims at outlining some thing ex traordinary. In the con text of histori-cal accounts, however, it has been much more difficult to differenti-ate the norm from the exception.'3 Likewise, defining war throughits productive effects has yielded unsatisfactory results. In large part,this is because the link between war and community building hasremained obscure, although this link has occasionally been pointedout, as in the case of ancient wars fought by the Greek city-states. Itwas widely known that their fighting was conducive to border draw-ing. Th e practice took place, however, in regards to barba rians,thereby depicting an d singling out the Greeks as a m ore civilizedcommunity.'*

A crucial step of differentiation occu rred onc e factors such asreligion, morality, and ethics became increasingly important interms of the assumed underlying causes. With authors such as SaintAugustine and Saint Aquinas providing the intellectual ground forthe move, war becam e differentiated in terms of 'just and unjust.This distinction bolstered regulative efforts in the sense that someforms of war were regard ed as excessive, whereas othe rs were u nd er-stood as tolerab le, if not justified. This distinction also im plied, inontological terms, that the exceptional could be kept separate fromthe norm.

Such moral and ethical distinctions also contributed to variouslaw-based approaches and framings. Authors such as Vatel, Pufen-dorf and Grotius built on this initial differentiation by turn ing theprevious, predom inantly theological, appro ach into an explicit legalcategory. This increasingly identified states as the sole legitimateauthority and bounded political community to make decisions con-cern ing p eace and war. This move was quite im po rtant in n arrowingdown the ambiguity, doubt, and uncertainty that had previously sur-rounded ways of defining war.

Toward a odem ReadingIn accounting for the ontological and epistemic development ofthe concept ofwar it is essential to address the work of Gad von

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political and social milieu, wherein the state replaced societies withpervasive warlike relations. War was viewed as a reflection of b roadersocietal constellations, rather than something autonomous and prem-ised by laws of tsown. Th e state equipped with military institutionsand a monopoly over the means of violencewas located as the basicun it of an interna tional order composed of sovereign states.War withinthe context of the Clausewitzian comprehension, thus allows for dif-ferentiation between the dom estic sphe re of politics and the relationsbetween state entities as a major form of human agency.Notably, the classical model of war, introduced by Clausewitz,presents war as a duel between equal sovereignties. War is compre-

hended as a means of settling interstate conflicts of interest, wherestates have something of a monopoly on war. When, for example,Herfried M nkler argues that war has m ore recently becom e a po-litically controversial concept, his vantage point consists, in essence,of the classical Clausewitzian un de rsta nd ing .'^ I t is necessary, the re-fore,to recapitulate some key aspects of the story of classical war inorde r to capture the structuring logic that has profoundly impactedthe concept of war.The classical idea of war replaced earlier, far m ore anarc hic andunbound conceptualizations. Generally, the concept of war hadincluded clashes and the collective use of violence. Various moral orreligious justiflcations were aba nd on ed in the process of subordi-nating war to m odern reason. W ithin the new comp rehen sions, warboiled down to a duel in which no state could claim to have right-eousness on its side. Since the enemy was recognized as an equal,and also provided with the right to self-defense, war was no longeras could be the case in earlier timesunderstood as a prime formof self-expression. This meant that the aims of classical war could beregarded as limited, since war no longer required the elimination,submission, nor resocialization of the opponent. With politics (gov-erne d by calculable reason ) steering war, its exercise could, in p rin-ciple, be restrained to a balance of interests.Along similar lines, a spatial delimitation took place with regardto classical war. The reco gn ition of war as a statist affair ratified andsanctioned the establishment of homogenous and stabilized insides.This process located difference and contingency outsidethat is,the sphere of anarchy and unpredictability. The spatial differentia-

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Another example of an institutionalization is the practice of for-mally declaring war. The notion of ustusfiostis presumes that thetwo parties will wage regulated war by limiting their hostiUties toattacks against combatants and military objects. Once furnishedwith recogn ition they may negotiate various rules and no rm s thatgovern the practice ofwar These agreements have included somerather specific rules ofwar The actors involved have for instancebeen able to pursu e activities such as arms con trol. In a similar veinthey have also been able to confer about peace.What is crucial here is the close interconnection establishedbetween war and states in the context of the Clausewitzian compre-

hens ion.i7 This framing do es no t however merely ou tline a con-nec tion . In fact it entails recognition of the states as core actors inpolitics and internatio nal relations. T he states are no t ju st seen aspreexisting actors advancing their interests through a relationshipof instrum enta l rationality. They are viewed above all as entitiesthat prevail through their central prerogative of deciding over warand peace and in this context their oppo sition to each other. Thisrelationship has in sho rt been depicted as co-constitutive with warwaged in the name of the sovereign whose interests are at stake.Incidentally this connected ness th at forms one of the baselinesof modern life may also be found in more current discussions aboutfailed states. The req uirem en t of equal dignity with all states havinga generally recognized monopoly of war has becom e increasinglyquestionable due to growing conditionality. The introduction of amore hierarchic set of norms and rules underpinning recognitionappears to invite more denial disrespect and den igration. One maysubsequently note in this contex t that it is no t only the concep t of

war that is in trouble: statehood is also questioned and diversifiedthrough categories such as failed rogue anaem ic collapsed abortedpredatory kleptocratic phantom and so forth. 8Crucially these areterms of misrecognition implying that states as the key constitutiveunits of the inte rna tional system are no longer a prio ri alike. In-stead they are subject to considerab le norm s-based differentiationthat allows some states to position themselves above others. Superiorstates may gain the right to resort to violence in the name of protec-tion rescue care democracy or progress. Therefore the norm s pro-hibiting recognition on an equal basis also allow for invasion.

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true expression of what war is about, it has also been controversialand a cause of internal disputes.As noted by Wilhelm Grewe, 'Th e most significant differencebetween internationall win the 19di century and the Anglo-AmericanAge is the turn towards a discriminatory concept of war. i9 Such anorms-based approach imposes a certain inhibition on the unfoldingofwar This development may reflect a move from the teachings ofRealpolitik to a more liberal stance. It may also be in terp reted as repli-cating crucial tensions within the Realpolitik school of thoughtitselfIn his writings toward the end of the 1930s, Carl Schmitt pointedout that disciplining war through the creation of normative rules

transfers decisions about the legality an d illegality of war from statesto a supranational institution.2 According to Schmitt, this actuallydeprives states of one of their central p rerogatives: the decision overwar and peace.Within such a context, war is no longer premised on the right ofstates to make autonomous decisions. Instead, they are constrainedby the collective interests of the international community. Withautonomy gone, the option of an authentic disclosure of politicalspace also vanishes. Similarly, decisions about the just nature of warno longer rest with states, as war is collectivized and denationa lized.Schmitt argued that war, therefore, takes on a very differentnature.21 It no longer stands for an extension of national politics byother means; instead, it is fought in the name of a higher order. Infact, this ruptures the previously coherent concept into two contra-dictory concepts that ultimately abolish the concept of war alto-gether. Schm itt asserted that e ither war is legitimate and just or it isunjust and illegitimate. Introduced, to some extent, during the years

of the League of Nations, a discriminatory concept ofw rultimatelyabolishes the classical one, albeit without eliminating violence.Schmitt argued that the turn from instrumental to righteous warunravels various restrictions built into the classical concept, whichcould open the floodgates to total war. From this, he concludedthat there is no viable alternative to the classical concept of war.These Schmittian warnings notwithstanding, war has been col-lectivized and denationalized over time. The Clausewitzian stress onrationality, cost-beneflt calculations, and the primacy of politics hasallowed for a different reading within Realpolitik and, more gener-

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theory of choice.22 Reason has become a restraint and an obstruc-tion for war to overcome. Recent developm ents, since the centu ry'straumatic conflicts and the period of the Cold War, have consider-ably strengthened arguments to restrict war through various nor-mative measures. In other words, it is possible to trace a rather cru-cial disruption in contingency since the conceptual link betweenthe state and war has become far weaker than before.

The ecay of StatesWith the monopoly of states being undermined in the discourse,waging war has becom e increasingly anch ore d in term s of globaland cosmop olitan appro aches. It has also becom e attached toentities such as humanity. Th e two latter epithets tend to stand foropenly normative approaches that view the use of collective vio-lence as potentially creating positive consequences. Terms such astransnational networks soety an d local actorsalso flgure fre qu en tly inthe analysis of new wars. In this context, entities such as war-lords and terro rists are occasionally furn ished with agency.23An other way of anc horing the con cept of war regards it as a grandthea ter. Crucially, viewing war as a spec tacle, devoid of specificmeaning, disconnects and deprives it of external bonds. Conse-quently, when understood in this wholly self-centered manner, warspins rather wildly; its detached and autonomous stature then con-tributes to the inevitable dissolution and demise of other key cate-gories of political order (states in particular).

Th ere is little agreem ent on the transformations un de r way andno clear consensus around any particular points. For some observ-ers, the fragmented, nonregular, and scattered nature of wars cre-ates an emphasis on local actors and con ditions. O thers draw theopposite conclusion, claiming that und erlying causes may be foundin worldwide pa tterns . This claim, then, mandates global action tocope with the challenges. Global and hu m anita rian ways offraming war are often u nd erp inn ed and strengthe ned by liberalapproaches.

To the extent that any shared and unifying marker is invoked, itconsists of the global. The global figures in the discourse as anexp lanation as well as an outco m e. It also stands o ut as a major fac-

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govern and exercise their power, including the waging ofwars,hasdeclined. For example, in his more general study on the interre-lated processes of war-making and state-making in the context ofglobalization, Herfried M nkler argues tha t Economic globaliza-tion has tu rn ed post-colonial state-building into state-decay. State-making has been crushed, he contends, by the twin forces of glob-alization and tribalism.24

Despite frequent m ention of new wars, the em ergence of such non regular wars is not, necessarily, un pre ce de nte d. Th e new-ness does not always imply novelty nor d oes it po int to linear devel-op m en t. Th e claim is, rather, tha t various conflicts, which previouslyexisted in the shadow of regular, political wars waged between greatpowers, have now entered a much more central stage in interna-tional politics. To state it differently, what was previously viewed asexcessive and seen as constituting a relatively unimportant residuein regard to the way modern war was unfolding has more recently,and unexpectedly, gained ground. What was before viewed as ex-ceptional has been reconfigured and is now seen as part of normal-ity. Th e previous no rm , where wars between states were reg arde d as pro per wars, has beco m e the exc eptio n. W hat used to be viewedas a residue has not disappeared from the scene. Instead, it hasgained significance and now dominates the discourse on contem-porary wars. Rather than remaining in the shadows as something irregular or unconv ention al, such wars occupy a key constitutiveposition in more recent efforts to account for crucial forms of polit-ical violence. In this con text, Mnkler refers to an ironic relapseinto premodern times.25 jhis argument is also, occasionally, takento the po int of a med ievalization of war. In this regard , a re tu rn to(neo) medieval times is yet ano th er way of acco un ting for the loss ofdistinctiveness among interconnections between war and the state.

With 9 /1 1 defined as the day that chan ged th e world, it isclear that discussions about terrorism have had the most destabiliz-ing impact. Instead of the calculable and well-delineated threats topower in the political era , the discourse has focused on patholog i-cal dangers that make the classical, statist forms of war outdated.Terrorism has, for the most part, been viewed as somethingunprecedented. Therefore, the terms break established borders ina profound way. Past experiences and delineations are not much

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wars, nuclear weapons (seen as constituting traditional-power, polit-ical arsenals) are called terro r w eapo ns, an d some states (likeIran ) are slotted into the catego ry of terro r states. Actors previ-ously at the fringes of the debate are acknowledged. The coining ofconcepts, such as hom eland security, gra nt the nation , and societym ore generally, con siderable agency in the war on terror. In fact,the discourse on terrorism signals that crucial categories of differ-entiation are being un derm ined ; yet the con cept of war seems mal-leable enough to persist.

Overall, the categories used to differentiate various forms of warhave become quite blurred. Standard vocabularies appear increas-ingly insufficient to serve as reliable points of reference. Historicallydrawn distinctions have resurfaced in the discourse, and a richrepertoire of very new concepts has been thrown into the deba te.Inevitably, we reach the conclusion that war is no longer its for-m erself In the first place, there is much do ub t to be found in thesedebates. Clearly, the concept is not treated as generally valid, stable,nor descriptive in nature. Instead, it is a contested object of a con-siderable amount of critical scholarship. Moreover, there is muchmore awareness of the concep t's historicity. Various efforts to rescu ethe concept do not work in the way intended, and war has becomepart of an expanding list of contested concepts.26 Rather than re-store war's traditionally uncontested and stable nature, these de-bates testify to the increasing fragility of the concept. They add to,rather than reduce, the signs of contingent disruption. Instead oferasing do ubt, efforts of restoration increase th e no ise. As stated byAnn a Leande r, they wreak havoc on the established fundam entalcategories through which we see the world. 27

Does this warrant the conclusion that the concept of war hasbasically become intellectually illegitimate? Has it had its day? Is itwell on its way out of the discourse?Confining the analysis to mere changes in the concept does notconstitute a sufficient effort for more durable answers to emerge.The concept may no longer signify as strongly as it did in its Clause-witzian form. Nonetheless, it is able to resurface in another context.Th e em ergence of exit-talk a m ong scholars of war also signals some

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prov ide war with its distinctiveness. My analysis here has focused, inparticular, on the nexus between the concep ts of war and the statea connection that has been crucial for the credibility and stabilitythat war, as a concep t, has enjoyed thro ug ho ut the m odern era.Against this background, it appears that there is more at stakethan simply updating the concept. These changes point to morethan just a cyclical phenomenon wherein the concept is revised,every now and then, in order to remain relevant to changing cir-cumstances. Efforts of renewal and the search for alternative artic-ulations do not cu rrently occu r in the context of an established andunchanged constellation of broader conceptual departures. Thereis a basis, in that sense, for discussions of profound change includ-ing a way out of the current dilemma. Clearly, an extensive reshuffling is underway that includes changes to the nexus between warand the state.This is not to say that the state will have lost out altogether. It isstill part of a broader constellation of key concepts that underpinwar; however, it does not have its former eminence. Instead, the statehas to com pete with other departure s, in particular humanity, cos-m opo litan, and the global. Th e concept of war is less auto no -mous; it is reliant on, paired with, or borrows from other concepts.There are a multitude of options competing with the state for analliance with war. Clearly, there is no hierarchy to be traced wherethe state would occupy a self-evident primacy. On the contrary, thevarious bonds have become quite diffuse and fluent. This allows warto be expressed and n am ed in a multifaceted manner, including thepossibility that the concept ofw rmay be dro pp ed altogether.

Creative efforts of renaming and coining a broader linguisticrepertoire, rather than aspiring for a return to a strictly unilinear,precise, and stable meaning, are warranted. At the same time, re-turning to war in its traditional conceptual guise also requires arestoration of the nexus between war and the state. In principle, thevarious voices calling for the state to be brought back into the dis-course on war along neo-Weberian lines are correct. Th e prospectsfor such a move to succeed appear quite slim since the discourse ismoving toward completely severing the concept of war from theconcept of the state. Indeed, a significant chasm has developed andwill, presumably, increase rath er than decrease in the years to come .

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of the Cold War: Has War Been Disinvented? ReviewofInternational Studies18 , no. 3 (1992): 189-198; Martin van Crevald, TheTransformation ofWar(New York: Free Press, 1991); Chris Hables Gray,PostmodernWar: ThePoli-ticsofConflict (London: Routledge, 1997); Kalevi Holsti, TheState, War, andthe StateofWar(Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press,1996);Joh n Lynne,Battle: AHistory ofCombatandCulture(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2003). Fora summ ary of the discou rse, see Michael Brzoska, 'New Wars' Discourse inGerimny, JournalofPeace Research41,n o. 1 (2004): 107-117. The idea thatpolitical and social concepts are historical rather than fixed has been madeand elaborated, on a more general level, by Reinhart Koselleck,FuturesPast: On theSemantics ofHistorical Time,trans. Keith Tribe (Cam bridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).2.Gray, note 1, p. 3.

3.This concep t has been used in particular by Mary Kaldor, Ameri-can Power: From 'Gom pellance' to 'Cosmopolitanism'? International ffairs79,no. 1 (2003): 1-22. Also Ulrich Beck has contributed to the debate witha num ber of new coinages, such as post-national wars or hum anitarianwars ;see Beck, ber den po stnation alen K rieg, Bltter fr deutscheundInternationale Politik8 (1999): 984-990.4. See, for exam ple, William Lind, Un derstanding Fo urth Genera-tion Warfare, Anti-War.com:http://antiwar.com /lind/?articleid=1 702.5.The conce pt has been used by Jean Baudrillard, The GulfWar DidNotTake Place(Sydney: Power Publications, 1995).6. Slavoj Zizek,Welcome to the Desertofthe Real(NewYork:Verso, 2002),p. 10. On the con cep t of virtual war, see Andreas Behnke, 'vw.nato.int.':virtuousness and virtuosity in NATO's representation of the Kosovo cam-paign , in Peter van Ham a nd Sergei Medvedev, eds..Mapping EuropeanSecurity fter Kosovo (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2002),pp. 26-144. On the refusal of most Western leaders to use the concept ofwar in the con text of the Kosovo campaign, see Pe rttij oe nn iem i, Kosovoand the End ofWar, in van Ham and Medvedev, note 6, pp. 48-65.7. See http://www.woerterbuchdeskrieges.de/8. For this argument, see Azar Gat, AHistory of Military Thought fromEnlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2001);JohnKeegan,History ofWarfare (London: Pimlico, 1993); or Peter Paret, MakersofModern Strategy:From Machiavelli tothe Nuclear ge (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 198 6), p . 5.9. For a similar effort applied to the concept of power, see StefanoGuzzini, 'The Goncept ofPower: Gonstructivist Analysis, Millennium33,no.3 (2005):455-521.On a more general level, see Martin Bulmer, Goncept inthe Analysis of Qualitative Data, Soolo^cal Revieiu27,no . 4 (1979): 651-677.10. Among numerous works, see, for example, Glaudio Gioffi-Revilla, Ancient Warfare: Origins and Systems, in Magnus I. Midlarsky, ed ..TheHandbookofWar StudiesII (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1999)pp.223-245.11. Along these lines, see Keith F. Otterbein, F euding and Wa rfare:Selected Works ofKeithF Otterbein (Langho rne: Gordon & Breach Science

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