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Royal Institute of Philosophy

John Locke and Natural LawAuthor(s): W. von LeydenSource: Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 116 (Jan., 1956), pp. 23-35Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749204 .

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JOHN LOCKE AND NATURAL LAWW. VON LEYDEN, D.Phil.

IT has been said,and fewwould deny, hat JohnLocke is as im-portant s thefounder f philosophicaliberalism s he is as thefounderftheempiricistheoryfknowledge. hough ewas a mostversatile hinker, ritingn philosophy,olitics,medicine,ducation,religion, nd economics,nd on all thesewith he knowledge f anexpert nd the nfluencef an authority,isfameno doubtderiveson theonehandfrom is treatisesnToleration nd Civil Govern-ment, nd fromhis Essay on HumanUnderstandingn theother.Wheneverhese reexpounded yscholars,hepoliticalwritingsrediscussedndependentlyftheEssayandtheEssay ndependentlyfthepoliticalwritings.he reasonfor his s obviouslyhatscholarshaveseenveryittle onnexion etween ocke'sprincipal orks. hishas beenchangedwith heappearance f a manuscriptnwhich represervedight ssays nthe awofnaturewrittenyLocke n Latinshortly fter he Restoration f i66o and thirty earsbefore heappearance n print fhismajorworks.Thismanuscriptas beenpublished y me, nd t snowpossible orecognizehatLocke'stwomainbodies fdoctrine,amely ispolitical heorynd histheoryfknowledge, ave a common round nd that this ies in his earlydoctrinefnatural aw.Admittedly,henotion f naturalaw canbeseen tobe ofcentralmportancen his treatise n CivilGovernmentand it also plays tspart n theEssay.But disappointinglyittle ssaidbyLockeaboutthisnotionn either fthesewritings,ndit isnot until heappearance fhisessayson natural aw that welearnthattheres an importantelation etweenhetwomainparts fhisteachingndwhatthisrelations.In thispaper wish o examine ocke'sargumentsoncerningheexistencend binding orce fnatural aw. I have already ouchedupon ertainspects f his uestionnthe ntroductionomy dition,but there heywere elated otheir istoricalettingnd other ide-issues.Nowmy purpose s more pecific. am also concludinghispaperwith n entrynLocke'sJournal, hich ontains ertain asicideasof histheory f natural aw and whichhas for omereason rother scapedpublication.The awofnature s itoccursnLocke'sphilosophys notthe ameas one ofGalileo's rNewton's o-calledawsofnature: t snotcon-cernedwithphysical henomena,heirmotion rregularity.n thesense nwhich ockeuses theterm,treferso human ehaviourndtoa moral aw. In this ense henotion fa lawofnaturehas had awell-knownistorymongmoralists, olitical heorists,urists, ndtheologianseforend after ocke'stime.

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PHILOSOPHYThefirsterhaps o ntroducehe deawasAristotle. e contrastedtheuniformehaviourf hingsn naturewith hevarieties fhuman

codesofbehaviour. ire,hesaid, lwaysbumsalikeno matterwhereor whent s lit;whethern Greece r nPersia, o-day r a thousandyears go. On the otherhand the customs fmen, heirmoral ndmunicipalawsvaryfrom laceto placeand changefrom ne timeto another.However, here s forAristotlene form fmoral awwhichs eternal nd immutablendhas the same force verywhere;andbecause his awis supposed o be as uniforms a lawgoverningnaturalphenomena e refers o it as a naturalmoral aw, sharplydistinguishingtfromman-madeawswhichhecallsconventional.This deaof a naturalaw obtained reatnfluencehroughoutheperiodwhenthe RomanEmpire preadand thewholeof civilizedhumanity as thoughto form ne universal ommunity,nwhichall menwere qual byvirtue ftheir ommon ationalnature.Thestoicphilosophersnd the Roman awyers laborated his dea andCicerogave it a famous efinition.e speaksoftrue aw as beingright eason n agreement ithnature, funiversalpplicationndunchanging;hattheres no needfor s tolook outside urselvesoran nterpreterf t,though od s the uthor f his awandthe udgewho enforcest.ThatChristianity,illinghevacuum ausedbythebreakdownftheRomanempire,dopted hebelief n a lawofnature an be seenfrom hefact thatthe idea of natural aw appearsas a basic con-ception oth n the aw-booksf heChristianmperor ustinianndin Canon law. Throughouthe MiddleAges the ultimate ppealregarding orals, olitics,aw and alsodivinity as tonatural aw,andbynaturalaw the schoolmenmeant lawpromulgatedyGodin a naturalwayandknown yreason, .e. a law other hanGod'spositiveawwhich s known yrevelation. atural awtogether iththe aw aiddownntheScriptures as thusregardeds constitutingthe whole f the divine aw.As such t was accepted s an objective'rule ndmeasure,' n absolute ontrollingrinciple.The fifteenthnd sixteenthenturies,s we know,witnessed heemergencefa secularmorality,fhumanismnd the newoutlookoftheRenaissance. t was in connexionwith hisnewoutlook ndwith headvent fProtestantismhich dvocated he priesthoodfallbelievers'ndthenecessityftolerationhatnaturalaw cametobe regardeds a bodyof ndividual ights,fsubjective laims ndthusmainly s a liberating,ather han ontrollingrinciple.uringtheseventeenthnd eighteenthenturieshe studyofnatural awwaspursued y urists n theContinent hothoughthis aw to beindependentftheological resuppositionsnd theresult fa purelyscientificonstruction,matter fmathematicaleduction. t thesametime,whileBritishmoraliststtempted o provide thicswith24


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JOHN LOCKE AND NATURAL LAWa rational oundation, nglicans oughtnthe ight fcontemporaryknowledge o redefinehe place of natural aw withinChristianapologetics.Throughouthenineteenthentury,wing o the dvance f riticalandscepticalrguments,herewas a markedendencyorejectmanyof the traditional riteria fmoralitynd to adopt positivist p-proaches, articularlyn legal theory.n fact,therise ofmodemjurisprudences characterizedythe abandonmentfthetheory fnatural aw. Also most modernphilosophers,nalysts s well aspositivists,ave cometoregard hisnotion s obsolete.Yet we findthatbetween he two wars and againin recent imes number fthinkersave admittedhatthey annotdispensewith his oncept.While dmittinghis, omewouldnevertheless aintainhatnaturallaw and the theologywith which his s associated s pure super-stition. or them t is onlybecausethe factsnvolvedn awincludethe deasmenhaveofcertain eneral rsupernaturalharacteristicsthat he egalphilosopher ust akethemnto ccount.Ontheotherhand, here recontemporaryhinkers hogenuinelyelieve nsomesortof natural awand make thisthe basis of their wntheories.

It is certainlynterestingn thisconnexiono notethat t is onlyin Russiathatno tracesofnatural-lawheory ave existed t anytime.ThoughRussia,like theWest,has a Christianradition,tdiffersrom he West nhavingno humanist radition. ndthe deaof a natural aw, as I have tried o show,was derived n thefirstinstance romre-Christianhought,hatofAristotle,heStoics, ndCicero:tis intimatelyinkedwith hehumanist elief ntheefficacyofman'sreason, hefreedomfhiswill, nd hismoral esponsibility.Having ketchedhehistoricalevelopmentf the deaofnaturallaw, etus consider hatdoctrineocke contributednhispublishedworks.His teachingn theSecond Treatise fGovernmentan besummarizeds follows:The lawof nature s a declarationf God's willanda standard frightndwrong.t is a law that lready overnshe tateofnature,i.e.a pre-socialtate nwhich llmen refree ndequal,and nwhichthey ivetogethernpeace. f menmakepromiseso oneanothernthestateofnature, heymust onsiderhemselves oundby them,'fortruth nd keeping aithbelongto menas men, and not asmembersfsociety.'t is likewiseccordingothis aw andprior oanypositive ivil aws hat achman'sprivate ropertysdetermined.ThoughGod hasgiven heearth nd all its fruits o men ncommon,thelaw of nature ets boundsto what eachman is allowedto ap-propriatendkeepforhimself.ince within hesebounds person's'right nd conveniency' o together,herecan be littleroomforquarrelsboutproperty. urther,or ockepartofGod'spurposencreatingman was to 'puthimunder trong bligationsfnecessity,

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PHI LOSOPHYconvenience,nd inclinationo drivehim nto ociety,s well as tofithimwithunderstandingnd language o continue nd enjoy t.'Throughout an's ife nsocietynd under olitical overnment,heobligationsfthe awofnature emain alid,andit is only s theyarefounded n this aw thatthemunicipalaws ofcountriesre ustlaws. n general, olitical ower or ocke s ustifiednlyn sofar sitpreserves en'snatural ights,speciallyhose f ife ndproperty.Governments thus imited othbynaturalaw andbymen's ights,and these wocameto be almost dentical orLocke.On the otherhand, whatman did notpossess n the stateof naturehe cannotresigno thecommunityhenheenterst: sincehe hadnoarbitraryrightn the stateofnature o act against he aw ofnature, .e. todestroy imselfrothers,rtotakeaway property hichsnothis,there houldnotbe anysuch rbitraryowernsociety.It can be seenthatthepart played by natural aw in Locke'spolitical heorys indeedfundamental.t is becausehe believes hislaw to be the awofthe tateofnature,ndthis tateofnature o benotaltogethernnulledwhen t ssupersededymen's ife nsociety,thatforhimnatural aw remains alid in society nd in fact setslimits opolitical overnment.o putthepoint essmetaphorically:becausehe is rational,man, ccordingo Locke, s eternallyubjectto naturalaw, tself rationalaw,regardlessfwhetherr not helives n an establishedociety.Unfortunately,espitethe basic importancefnatural aw forLocke's political heory, heres little eal discussionf t in any ofhis mature ublishedwritings.n a passageofhis SecondTreatisefGovernmente even xpresslyeclines ninvestigationf heparticu-larsofthis aw; yetwhatweshouldikehim o tellus particularlyshow he thinkswe cometo knownatural aw,and how andtowhatextent t can be saidto be binding.n myview,Locketendednhislateryears oregardhenotion f a lawofnature s a mere remiseofhisthought,s somethinge believednbutbarely nvestigated.The reason or his ttitude, think,s to be foundndifficultiesehad in reconcilinghenotionof this aw with omeof hismaturedoctrines.or nstance,hedevelopmentfhishedonisticiews ndhisphilosophyf anguagen theEssayhad made tdifficultorhimto attempt full xpositionfnatural aw or even to believe n itwhole-heartedly.However,with the discovery f Locke's early manuscript nnatural aw we are in a position o fill n the picturewhich s leftrather ague nhis matureworks.We can see nowthatmostofhisremarksboutthe aw ofnaturenthe econdTreatise ndtheEssayhave theirorigin n his early essays. In particular,wo crucialquestions about which here s hardly nydiscussion t all in hismaturewritings)bviously xercised ismindwhenhewaswriting26


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JOHN LOCKE AND NATURAL LAWtheessays, .e. theepistemologicaluestion-howdo we knowthelawofnature?-and themoral uestion-how ndto what xtent sthat awbinding?Because of therelatively ullaccountwhich he essays provideof Locke's viewson natural aw,it is also possiblenow to pointtodefiniteweaknessesn his theory nd to state one's criticismsnprecise erms.n a sense tis not surprisingo find hatthe thoughtofpublishing is earlyworkon natural aw recededfrom ocke'smindand that the moral doctrines fhis youthwerenot whollyabsorbed n thewritingsf hismaturity. here s a greatdeal ofambiguityn thisnotion f a law ofnature, nd a philosopheratu-rallyfeels alleduponto disentanglehecomplex fdifferentssuesthat t contains.Theconcept hathasgiven ise oconfusionntheoriesfnaturallaw s thatofreason rrationality,ndI propose owtoinvestigatethemeaning fthis ermn so far s it concerns s here.If asked exactlywhatcommands orm artof the aw ofnature,Locke andmostother heorists, believe,would nclude hefollow-ing:topreserveife, obeget ndbring p children,oworship od,toobeyparents,o show ratitudeobenefactors,orespectnother'sproperty,nd to live nsocietywith thermen.Now all these om-mandshavea showoftruth r reason nd imply uties hatwouldseem to be obvious nd readily cceptable o common ense.How-ever, ther ictates fthis awmight ot seem o beequallypatent,andithasthereforeeenconsideredecessaryorman, norder hathemayknowhisduties, oemploy ismental aculties,.e. hissensesand hisunderstanding.ne ofthereasons,nfact,whynatural awhas beencalleda naturalawis thattheknowledgef t is said tobeacquired yman'snatural aculties,.e. sense-perceptionndreason,the ointexercise fwhich onstitutes hatLocke and others alledthe light fnature.'The light fnature' s thusreason nd the awofnatures a lawofreason, lawthatdoes notbindchildren,diots,or animals, recisely ecausetheyare by naturedevoidofunder-standingn theordinaryense.To conceive f aw as a lawofreason as no doubt dvantages, ar-ticularlyhatofmakingt capableoftreatmentpartfromman'semotional ature nd thereby ecuringor t complete mpartiality.'Law,' as Aristotle as said, is reasonfreefrom ll passionand aneutral uthority.' ut-and here we cometo the crucialpoint-doestheconceptionf aw as a lawofreasonmply hat t spossibleto justifyt rationally,ndifso,has anyoneof themany heoristswhothroughoutheageshave madeattemptsn thisdirection eensuccessful?I am inclined o answerboth thesequestionsby saying hatarational efencefnatural awis bound o failbecause t is liable to

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PHILOSOPHYinvolve onfuseddeas aboutreason. ssues that shouldbe clearlydistinguishedrom ne another n any truly ational xpositionreobscuredf onepassesfrom tatementsoncerning atters f factto definitions,hence o statementsbout ways of knowledge,ojudgmentsfvalue, nd finallyo logical ruths,ssuminghrough-out thateachof thepassages s a step n oneand thesamesortofinferentialrocess,ndthat ach sconcerned ith ne and the amemeaning frationality.It can be shown, believe, hata confusionf thiskindoccurs nevery heoryfnaturalaw: I canonlygiveoneexamplehere, ndIwill ry o showhowthe confusionrisesnLocke'stheory. he lineofmy enquirywill followwhat taketo be the ogical tepsofhisargument. heyare brieflyhese: Locke passesfrom he factualstatementhatmanpossesses eason otheconclusionhatreason shisessential haracteristicnd hence o theassumptionhat reasonleadsto thediscoveryf moral ruthsnd, fproperlymployed,othediscoveryfoneand the ame etofmoral ruths,.e. natural aw.Fromthishe is led to infer thical ssertionso theeffecthatthemoralstandards iscovered y reasonare themselvesational ndthatthey recommands indingn allmen.Fromthishepassestothebelief hat hevalidityf uch ommandsanbeproved yreason,and evenshown o be necessaryn thesamewayas a geometricaldemonstrationr a logicaldeduction.Locke's tarting-pointssimple:t s thefactual tatementhatmenpossess eason nduse their eason.Thefact hatsomemencannotreason ndthat omeofthosewhocan donot s admitted y Locke,and he refersoidiots nd childrenndto thosewhobecauseoftheiremotional ature rbecause hey re azyorcareless,makenoproperuseof heir eason.n spite f his dmission,isnext tep sto assertthatmennotonly an reason utthat easonstheir efiningropertyand that hereforeheirpecial unctionstoexerciset, .e. that heyareobliged o usetheir eason.Locke's nferenceere s fromhematter-of-factroposition-iftis a matter-of-factroposition-that ll menare rational, o thestatement-whichsa definition-thatnorder obetrulymen,menmust e rational. his tatements not o much bout n ndisputablefact s a belief erived rom ristotle'sdeaof fixed atures.' houghdefinitionsepend nsome enseonevidence, hey renotempiricalstatements,.e. statementsboutfact,which an be either rueorfalse;hencedefinitionsannotbe validated r nvalidated ystate-ments fa purely actualkind.Moreover,rom statement boutman'sdefiningharacteristic,.e. a statementhat sneither moralonenor necessary ne, hemoralpropositionsinferredhathe hasa duty o ive nconformityith isessential ature. hisconformityis in tsturn wofold:tmaymean hat t sman'sduty ousereason28


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JOHN LOCKE AND NATURAL LAWandalso thathehas a duty o obeyreason,.e. toaccept hefindingsof reason.Further,t is impliednLocke'swhole rgumenthatthevery uestion t issue,namelywhethereason s an essentialharac-teristic f menand whetherhey re thereforebliged o use it isdecided ffirmativelyyreason tself. conclude henthatwe arehere confronted ithvariousmeanings f the termreasonwhichLocke does not disentangle,nd also withstatementsfdifferentkinds o that t is notalwayspossible opassfromnetothe otherandto applyto eachthe samesort f proof.Letusnowconsider ocke'sanswer othequestion owmen ometo knownatural aw.

Obviously,nconnexion ith hisquestion, easonwillhavetobediscussed n two evels:firstly,s a mentalactivity' fman eadingto the production r discovery f moraltruth; econdly, s thespiritual roduct fthis activity, onsistingf a bodyofrationalprinciplesrrules fconduct. ocke s carefulo distinguishetweenthe twomeanings freason.By the first e understandshe dis-cursive acultyfthemindwhich eeks o discoverruth yformingargumentsrom hings nown o things nknown. y thesecondheunderstands set of moraltruthswhich an becomean objectofknowledgend a rule of action,and thishe calls 'rightreason.'Whereasforhim thediscursive acultyiketheorgans f sense sinbornn man, right eason' s not.And forhimalso, themoraltruths oming efore hemind renotmadeor dictated yhumanreason, utmerely iscoverednd interpretedyit. Thus n a wayhe stillregards uman eason s a sort fcauseofwhich ruths theeffect:t does notbring ruthnto xistence ut tleadstoits know-ledge. willnotraisehere he uestionwhethereason anberegardedas a causeratherhan implys a wayofdoing rconsideringome-thing;norwillI examinewhether ulesof conduct re discoveredrather han made,as the studyof anthropology ouldsuggest.think owever hatLocke'sbeliefnthecausalefficacyfreasonwasa half-heartednesince ccordingo himreason annotbe regardedas a sourceofknowledge.y itself, e would ay,reason rovides oprimary otions nd it thereforeequires omematerialwhich anserveas a starting-pointor ts operations.Accordingo himthematerialn questions provided ysense-perception.It is here,n connexionwithhis early heory fnatural aw thatLocke'sempiricism,iswell-knownmphasis n knowledgey thesenses,has itsorigin. or thisreason said at thebeginningf mypaperthat Locke'stwo main bodiesofdoctrine, amelyhistheoryofknowledgendhispolitical hilosophy,avea common roundndthatthis ies n hisearlydoctrinefnaturalaw.The stepswherebynLocke'sviewreason eadsto theknowledgeofnatural awfrom uchdata as thesenses upply re brieflyhese:

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PHI LOSOPHYOur senses ellus notonlyofbodies nd theirmotions utalso ofbeauty ndregularityn all parts ftheworld. incethisbeauty nd

regularity ustbe theresult fsomesuperior esign, eason nferstheexistence f a mostwiseand powerful reator. hisargumentfrom esign ogether ith he o-callednthropologicalrgumentresingled ut by Locke from mongthe traditional roofs fGod'sexistence recisely ecausethesetwoargumentsre derived romsense-experiencend, partfromationalnference,equire ofurthersupport,whereas ll other uchproofs resuppose priorinotionswhich ocke sunwillingoaccept.Locke goeson toshow hat inceGod snotonlypowerfulutalsowise,He hasdesignedheworld orsomepurpose ndthatwefind neverythingdefiniteule rpatternappropriateoits nature.God'spurposencreatingmanwas thatheshould ive according o reason.Two particular unctions e isintendedoperformretoworshipGodand to live n societywithothermen.What Locke has endeavoured o establish o far s firstlyhatthere xists law-maker,.e. somesuperior ower owhichman srightlyubject, nd secondly hatthis aw-maker as expressedwill, hisbeing he awofnature. hus nLocke'sview t sreason nco-operation ith ense-experiencehich eveals heexistence f anatural aw and also thedictates fthis aw. ThewholeofLocke'sargument ere s derived rom hescholasticsnd there s nothingoriginalbout texceptperhaps is nsistencen thepartplayedbysense-perception.hether ovelornot, nemaywonderfthe rgu-ment ormsherightpproach othequestion t issue.When skinghimselfwhether atural aw can be known, ocke does notfor amoment onsider hepossibilityhatthis aw, and expressionsfvaluegenerally, ight otbelong o the classofthings fwhich tmakes ense o saythatthey reknown ntheordinaryenseoftheword, .e. that statementsbout them an be justifiedyreferenceto empirical acts, o rules of inference,r to self-evidentruths.Lockedoes notfacethis ssueandinsteadmakes hepropermploy-ment f man'snatural aculties necessarynd sufficientonditionfor heknowledgefnaturalaw.Yetno mattero what xtentmen'ssenses nd their eason refound obe efficient,his fficiencysnocriterionywhich odecidewhetheratural aw sa proper bjectofknowledge.ucha decisionmustbe derived romn analysis ftheconcept fnatural awrather ifferentromheoneLockeoffered.Thenext tep n Locke'sargumentgainconsists f an inference:hepassesfromwhathehashithertostablished o ethical ssertionsconcerninghebindingorce fnaturalaw.Having hownhatman'sreason an ead tothediscoveryfcertain ational rinciples,egoeson to conclude hat man s morally bliged o acceptthesefindingsofhisreason. n otherwords, ocke startswith ertain tatements30


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JOHN LOCKE AND NATURAL LAWoffact, .e. statementsbout humannature, ontaining o judg-ments fvalue; he thenpassesto certainmetaphysicalndtheologi-cal statements hich ontain omoralwords ither; rom hese tate-mentshe draws conclusion boutwhatmenoughtodo,as if theconclusion f validargumentould ontainnything,.g.an ought,'whichsnotcontainedn thepremises. hepoint hat t simpossibleto deducean ethical onclusion rom remiseshatare non-ethicalwas madeforciblyyHume na celebratedassage. In every ystemofmorality,'he says, . . . I have always remarked, hat the authorproceedsforsome time in the ordinaryway of reasoning, ndestablishes he beingof a God, or makes observationsoncerninghuman ffairs; hen fa sudden amsurprisedo find, hat nsteadoftheusualcopulationsfpropositions,s, and is not, meetwithnopropositionhat s notconnected ith n ought,ran ought ot....As thisought,rought ot xpressesomenewrelation raffirmation,itisnecessaryhat tshould e explained; nd at the ametime hata reason hould egiven .. how hisnewrelation an be a deductionfrom thers,which re entirely ifferentrom t.' Humeconcludesfrom hese observations hat theywould subvert ll the vulgarsystems fmorality,nd let us see,thatthedistinctionf viceandvirtue s not . . . perceived by reason.'Let us consider rieflyt which oint n Locke'sargumentmoralassertionsre ntroduced.hey ppear n twocontexts. ne swhereLocke advanceshis proof fGod's existence nd the voluntarist'theory orrather efinition)hat awor men'sduties re theexpres-sion ofa superior ill.For Locke thenmoral bligationsrebindingbecause hey risefrom od's commands. owfromaying hatGodcommands s to do certain ctionswecannotnferhatweought odo them, ot even fwe add thefurtherremisehatGod commandsus toobeyHis commands.he ethical tatementoncerningurdutyto do certain ctions anbe derived nlyfrom nother thical tate-ment uchas thatweought o do what God commands. or Lockesuch derivations infactpossible incehe argues hatobedienceoGod'swill s right,hat s, obligatory. owever nydeduction romthispremiser firstmoral rinciple,.e.that creature ught oobeythewish fhisCreator,maybe saidto be compelling nly fthepre-miseis self-evident,hich s doubtfuln Locke's example,for twouldnotbe self-contradictoryoreject heprinciplehatobediencetoGod'swill s right.Moreover,he voluntarist'heory arrieswithit an implicationwhich Locke obviously ounddissatisfying,ortogether ith heconcept f will t introducesn arbitrarylementintomorality.In order omakehistheorymore erfect,ockeattemptso derivemoralobligationn someotherway. He does thisas partofhisendeavour o arrive t a purely ational oundationfethics.For

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PHILOSOPHYhimhumanreasonnot only ndicates rteacheswhat man'sdutiesare, but at the sametimemakeshis dutiesbinding; t is thus self-depending ourceof obligation.He maintains hat natural aw iscoevalwith hehuman ace nd that llmen re subject o t since tis 'so firmlyootedn the soil of humannature.' n his viewtheresin facta 'harmony' r 'conformity'convenientia)etweenmoralvalues and man'srationalnature; or s man's nature s always hesame so reason pronounces' fixed ndpermanent uleof morals.One maywonder owfrom heseviewsLocke can arrive t a theoryofmoral bligation.o derive atural awfromman'srational ature,and this, n its turn, romGod's wisdomn creatingman suchthatcertain uties ollow rom is constitutions to draw n ethical on-clusion romntirely on-ethicalremises.hereforehe ameobjec-tion pplieshere s in connexion ith he voluntarist'heoryf aw.To putthepointdifferentlyne might ay that reason an perhapsdeclarewhat typeof action s in accordancewithman's nature ndis thereforensome ensenecessary; ut t does not thereby rovemoralobligationo performhe action.Grotius, ocke's contempo-rary, dmittedhatnatural aw, fdefineds a dictate fright easononly ndicateswhether r not an action s morally ecessary,ndbefore imSuarezhadpointed ut that n thiscapacity t wouldbeofthenature f directiveule atherhan f law nthe trictense,a law having binding orce.But thisdifficulty,ocke would rgue, an be overcome yestab-lishing close analogybetweenmoralknowledge nd mathema-tics.The stepheproposes ow s a furtherxample fa doubtful,fnot llegitimate,assagefrom nekindof discourseo another. orfromssertionsbout moral uleshepassesto the assertionhatthevalidity fthese ules an be proved, ndeven hown o be necessaryinthe same way as a geometricalemonstration.Locke advances his newargumentn connexionwithhis notionofa harmonyetween atural aw andman'srational ature.Thushesays: In fact t seems ometo followustas necessarilyrom henature fman that, fhe is a man,he is boundto love andworshipGod and also to fulfilther hings ppropriateo therational ature,i.e. to observe he aw ofnature, s it follows romhe nature f atriangle hat, f t is a triangle,ts three ngles reequalto tworightangles.' By analogywith mathematical ecessity ocke hereen-deavours o establish henecessaryalidity f moralrules. t is notaltogetherlear,however, hethern thispassagehethinks fmoraltruths s self-evidentrinciplesr as deductions rom elf-evidentprinciples.rom nother assagewhere ewants o makeclearthatman's dutiesnecessarilyollow rom isverynaturetmightppearthatheregardsmoral ruths s self-evident;orhe compareshewayinwhich hese reapprehendedo theway n whichmen, o long s


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JOHN LOCKE AND NATURAL LAWthey anseeand thesunshines,must fnecessityome o know healternationsfday andnight ndthedifferencesetweenoloursndbetween curved nd a straightine.Thepointheseems nxious omake n bothpassages s thatfrom heconcept f man's nature,fsuitablydefined, ropositionsoncerningmoral obligationwouldfollow ithernalyticallyrbytherules fdeductivenference,ustas inmathematics,rantingertain efinitions,e accept omepro-positionss self-evidentndothers s demonstrable.Here, n thesetting fhisearlydoctrinefnatural aw,we meetwith hefirstxample f Locke'scelebrated ontentionhat mathe-matics ndmoralityreparallelnthat hey oth ontain elf-evidenttruths nd are capableof demonstration.everalof hiscontempo-raries, .g.Grotius,nd also certain ritishmoralists ollowing im,e.g.SamuelClarke, elda similar iew.Theyfound hisview ttrac-tivefor wo reasons: irstly,tpresentedn improvementna legis-lativeethicswhich hey regarded s unsatisfactoryecauseoftheelementfarbitrarinesstcontains; econdly,heviewofthedemon-strabilityf thics eemed o them oallowmoral ules o beregardedas independentfa superior ill nd at thesame time s necessarilyvalid, .e. notmerely irective ut binding.Whatever dvantagesLockemayhavehopedto derive rom hisview, traisesdifficultiesforhisargumentntheessays.There retwo lternativeso beconsidered.n theonehand,Lockemayhavebeentempted o acceptmoraldefinitionss thestarting-point fa demonstrativeeduction fethics;he didso,fornstance,in hismaturework,heEssay (IV. III. i8), where ederiveshepro-position hat where here s no propertyheres no injustice' rompreliminaryefinitionsfpropertys a right o anythingnd ofinjustice s theviolation fthatright. erehe s confrontedith hesameproblem s in the case of someone ryingo draw an ethicalconclusion rom on-ethicalremises; or o deducean ethicalpro-position rom efinitionshouldbe just as impossible. n theotherhand, fLockeaccepts elf-evidentoral ruths s the first rinciplesofhisdemonstrativecience fethics heonly ustificationehas forthis s hisbeliefn the nalogy etweenmoralknowledgend mathe-matics, rvisionrespectively.t is farfrom bvious,however,hatsuch parallel anbeaccepted.All thatLockehas shownsthat hereareself-evidentrinciplesnmathematicsndthatcertain mpiricalpropositionsan in some sensebe called self-evident. ithoutdemonstrationf he ruthf he nalogy nwhich erelies ecannotclaimto have indicated he existence fself-evident oral roposi-tions,or,forthatmatter, f a demonstrativecience f ethics. nfact,moral deas and judgments re verydifferentrom hoseofmathematics,ndmoral bligations a kindofnecessityhatdiffersfromogicalnecessitys itdoesfromausalnecessity.n otherwords,

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PHI LOSOPHYanyattempt o prove hata moralrule s bindings doomed o failif t is consideredobe thesameas an attempt o prove hata geo-metrical emonstrations valid.I conclude hat,for he reasons have given,Locke's theory fnatural aw is opento criticism;hatbecausethe difficultieshichbesethistheoryre iableto be presentnany philosophicalefenceof this awas a law ofreason, o suchdefencean ever ucceed.Tosaythis s nottodeny hatnatural awis acceptable s thebasisofmoral obligationf one regards t as a premise f thoughtwhichcannotbe furtherustifiedyreason,.e. as an article ffaith, ranideal.Butthiswouldbe a very ifferentssuefrom hatwhich havediscussedn thispaper, nd because t s notprimarilyphilosophicalproblem, do notpropose o go into t further.t should be re-membered,owever,hat Lockehimself,n his ateryears, ametoregard he dea of a law ofnature s a merepremise fhisthought,and thathe musthave perceived ertain heoretical ifficultiesnthisnotion,for he could neverbringhimself o publishhis owndoctrinen theessays.Herethen s a summaryf what havetried o sayinthispaper.First outlined hedevelopmentf the idea of natural aw fromantiquityo modernimes. hen gavea briefccount fwhatLockesaysaboutnaturalaw n hisTreatisefGovernmentnd showed hatas a rationalaw t s offundamentalmportanceorhispolitical ndmoralphilosophy. owever,we find hemostdetailed ccount fhisdoctrinefnaturalaw nrecentlyiscoveredssays, hework fhisyouth, ndit is becausetherehe enters o fullyntotheparticularsof this aw that t is possible orus to subjecthistheoryo a closeexaminationndto pointoutexactlywhere heweaknessesie. Wesawthatthe chief ifficultyrisesfrom n ambiguitynthe centralnotion, hatof reason. explained hat thisambiguitys liabletogiverise o confusionsnanytheoryfnatural awto theextent hatsucha theory epresentsn attempt o justify ationallyhe morallawas a lawofreason. ucha process f ustificationouldbe intheformfa logicaldeduction; utsince he mainterm,hatofreason,wouldbe employedn differentenses,there re bound to occurillegitimatenferencesrom ne kindof discourse o another.Theinferencesn Locke's argumentre fromfactualstatementson-cerningeason o definitionsoncerningeason; hence o statementsaboutdiscoveriesmadebyreason, romwhich ertain thical tate-ments oncerninghebinding orce frational rinciplesrederived;these tatements,n their urn, rethoughto be like statementsnmathematics,.e. capableof ogicalproof,n analogywhich bscuresthe distinctionetweenmoral ndlogicalnecessity.

[ThefollowingsLocke'sJournalntry or5 July,678 (Bodleian34


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JOHN LOCKE AND NATURAL LAWMS. Locke f.3, pp. 20I-2), headedLex naturae. he chronologicalcontext n whicht falls s discussed nmyedition f Locke'sessayson natural aw,pp. 66-7; themoraldoctrine fwhicht forms partis to my mindbest explained y H. Sidgwickn his Outlines f theHistory f Ethics, th ed., 1946, pp. 175-8. I havemodernizedhespelling nd punctuation f the passage,published erefor he firsttime.'Godhaving ivenman above therreaturesf hishabitableartofthe niverse knowledgefhimself hich he beastshave not,he isthereby nder bligations, hich hebeasts re not, orknowing odto be a wise gent;he cannot utconclude hathe has thatknowledgeandthose aculties hich e findsnhimselfbovetheother reaturesgivenhimfor ome use and end. If thereforee comprehendsherelation etween ather nd sonand finds t reasonable hat his sonwhomhe has begot (onlyin pursuanceof his pleasurewithoutthinkingfhis son) and nourishedhould bey, ove, and reverencehim ndbegratefulohim,he cannot ut find t muchmore eason-able thathe andevery therman should beyandrevere,ove andthank he author ftheir eing o whom hey we all thatthey re.If he findst reasonable o punish ne of his children hat njuresanother, e cannotbutexpect hesamefromGod the Fatherof allmen,when nyone njures nother;fhe findst reasonable hathischildrenhould ssist ndhelpone another ndexpectst fromhemas their uty,willhenotalso by the same reason onclude hatGodexpects hesameofall menone toanother?f he finds hatGod hasmade himand all othermen n a state whereinhey annot ubsistwithout ociety nd has giventhem udgemento discernwhat scapable ofpreservinghatsociety, an he but conclude hathe isobligedndthatGodrequires im ofollow hose uleswhich onduceto thepreservingfsociety?']UniversityfDurham.

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